

DOCUMENT RESUME

05150 - [B0485405]

Opportunities Exist for Substantial Savings in Administration of Military Skill Training Programs. PPCD-78-13; B-975773. February 14, 1978. 24 pp.

Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

Issue Area: Personnel Management and Compensation (300).

Contact: Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (except procurement & contracts) (051).

Organization Concerned: Department of the Air Force; Department of the Army; Department of the Navy.

Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services; Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Authority: DOD Directive 1100.4. Defense Appropriations Authorization Act [of] 1975. 10 U.S.C. 138(d).

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends about \$6.1 billion a year with a military and civilian staff of about 169,6000, excluding contractor support, to train military personnel. About \$3.4 billion of this amount provides skill training for over 1.2 million military personnel.

Findings/Conclusions: DOD has not instructed the services as to how many hours a week military students should be required to attend initial skill training classes; the number of hours per week students attend classes varies widely. During fiscal year 1977 the services could have reduced costs an estimated \$155 million a year if they scheduled 40 hours a week in the classroom, shop, or laboratory for all initial skill training courses. Nonskill activities could be accomplished without extending training time if scheduled outside the 40 hours. The Army has overstated the need for school instructors by understating the hours they are available to teach; at least 1,250 hours teaching time a year is attainable because the Army uses it for interservice training courses, and it is the lowest number of hours used by any of the services. DOD could reduce training costs by millions of dollars by using civilians and by contracting for more skill training.

Recommendations: The Secretary of Defense should require the services to: (1) schedule a minimum of 40 hours a week in the classroom, laboratory, or shop for skill training whenever possible; and (2) review the military positions in support of training to identify those which meet the criteria for conversion to civilians, determine the least costly method of staffing the positions, and convert positions from military to civilian or contract for training. He should require the Army to determine the number of hours its instructors spend in teaching and adjust its criterion accordingly and, pending such determination, use a minimum of 1,250 hours a year to estimate its requirements for instructors. (RES)

5405



**UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE**

**Opportunities Exist For Substantial
Savings In Administration Of
Military Skill Training Programs**

The Department of Defense could save millions of dollars a year by requiring:

- the services to increase the number of courses now conducted for less than 40 class hours a week to a full 40-hour class week by eliminating or scheduling separately nonskill training activities;
- the Army to establish a more economical and supportable criterion for instructor staffing; and
- the services to use the least costly method of staffing training activities as instructed by the Congress.

Staffing data submitted to the Congress in the Military Manpower Training Report is incomplete and inaccurate, making valid assessment of the training resources difficult if not impossible.

FEBRUARY 14, 1978



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPE NSATION DIVISION

B-155773

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Because the Congress has long been concerned with the cost and size of the military training establishment, we reviewed the administration of skill training programs. This report addresses the scheduling of 40 class hours a week, the staffing criteria used in determining instructor requirements, the substituting of civilians for military positions in support of training and contracting for training, and the inaccurate staffing data reported to the Congress in the Military Manpower Training Report.

This report contains recommendations to you on pages 7, 12, 17, and 21. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on action taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services; the Chairmen, House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; and the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H. L. Krieger".

H. L. Krieger
Director

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR
SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY
SKILL TRAINING PROGRAMS

D I G E S T

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends about \$3.4 billion a year to provide skill training to 1.2 million military personnel. DOD could save millions of dollars a year by requiring

- the services to provide skill training a minimum of 40 class hours a week whenever possible and eliminate nonskill training activities from course curriculums;
- the Army to adopt a more reasonable criterion for determining staffing levels for skill training instructors consistent with the other services; and
- the services to substitute civilians for military personnel or contract for training support whenever feasible.

DOD has not instructed the services as to how many hours a week military students should be required to attend initial skill training classes. The number of hours per week students attend classes varies widely. Air Force students normally attend class 30 hours a week. Army and Marine Corps students generally are on a 40-hour training week, but this week includes an average of 6 hours of nonacademic time. Navy schools generally require their students to attend skill training classes more hours per week than the other services, with 22 percent of the courses requiring 40 hours a week. Class weeks shorter than 40 hours extend the time students must be at the schools. During fiscal year 1977, if all training had been conducted on a 40-hours class basis, the services could have reduced their personnel strengths by about 12,000 and the cost of initial skill training by about \$155 million.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the services to schedule a minimum of 40 hours a week in the classroom, laboratory, or shop for skill training whenever possible. (See p. 7.) Exceptions desired by the services should be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval as appropriate.

The Army uses a factor which inflates its estimated need for instructors at least 39 percent compared to the other services. Its authorized instructors for fiscal year 1977 were about 85 percent of its estimate. But the Army used some of these people for other purposes. The inflated estimate increased the Army's authorized positions by about 2,000 and its budget for the fiscal year by about \$28 million. (See p. 9.)

The Army uses a factor of 900 class hours a year in computing the number of instructors required for Army skill training but uses 1,250 hours a year when computing instructor requirements for interservice training courses. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps use 1,250 hours or more, and their instructors perform essentially the same duties as Army instructors. (See p. 10.)

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to (1) determine the number of hours its instructors spend in teaching and adjust its criterion accordingly and (2) use, pending such a determination, a minimum of 1,250 hours a year to estimate its requirements for instructors. (See p. 12.)

DOD could reduce training costs by millions of dollars annually by using more civilians and by contracting for more skill training. For years it has been the policy of the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and DOD to advocate increased use of these optional staffing methods. But the services have resisted. (See pp. 14 and 15.)

DOD has published criteria to guide the services on the kinds of positions which should be occupied by civilians. But training officials said they had not converted positions from military to civilian because

DOD has not required it. They also said they had not contracted more for training because DOD has not required it.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the services to review the military positions in support of training to identify those which meet the criteria for conversion to civilians, determine the least costly method of staffing the positions, and, based on these determinations, convert positions from military to civilian or contract for training. (See p. 17.)

The Military Manpower Training Report is required by law (10 U.S.C. 138(d)(2)) to be issued annually to the Congress to support the services proposed training programs. DOD is responsible for preparing the report from data provided by the military services. (See p. 19.)

The staffing used by the services to conduct training programs was not completely reported in the Military Manpower Training Report. Consequently, the Congress cannot rely on this report for complete and accurate information on staffing. This has seriously impaired the usefulness of the report. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense issue clarifying instructions requiring complete and accurate reports of staffing used in support of training. (See p. 21.)

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
GAO	General Accounting Office
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
TRADOC	Army Training and Doctrine Command

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends about \$6.1 billion a year with a military and civilian staff of about 169,600 excluding contractor support to train military personnel. About \$3.4 billion of this amount provides skill training to over 1.2 million military personnel. Types of skill training and the estimated number of students scheduled to receive such training during fiscal year 1978 are as follows:

<u>Type of skill training</u>	<u>Number of students</u>	<u>Number of courses</u>
Initial (enlisted)	521,232	882
Advanced (enlisted)	159,842	3,003
Initial (officers)	25,823	157
Advanced (officers)	35,103	772
Functional training (note a)	<u>474,942</u>	<u>2,179</u>
Total	<u><u>1,216,942</u></u>	<u><u>6,993</u></u>

a/Provides short courses usually outside students' military occupational specialties; it covers those types of required training which do not fit precisely into the definitions of the other subcategories.

The principal organizations responsible for training and the staffing authorized to conduct and support it in each service are shown below:

	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Staff (note a)</u>
Army	Training and Doctrine Command	70,200
Navy	Chief of Education and Training	39,800
Marine Corps	Training and Education Division, Headquarters	12,900
Air Force	Air Training Command	<u>46,700</u>
Total		<u><u>169,600</u></u>

a/Equivalent positions for contract services are not included.

Initial skill training of enlistees consumes about 65 percent of the resources devoted to skill training. We directed most of our review, therefore, to the efficiency and economy of initial skill training and the adequacy of related reporting to the Congress. We evaluated

- the pace of the training as controlled by the training schedule;
- the services' methods for determining staffing requirements;
- the economy of staffing the schools with civilians, including contractor personnel; and
- the adequacy of training reports to the Congress.

The term "skill training" as used in this report means that portion of the course curriculum which is peculiar to the occupational specialty in which the student is being trained. Nonskill training activities are those portions of the program of instruction which are common to many courses, such as physical training or automobile driver safety training. We did not evaluate the curriculum used for the courses in terms of relevance to the actual military occupational requirements in subsequent field assignments.

CHAPTER 2

SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS COULD BE REALIZED

IF THE SERVICES PROVIDED INITIAL SKILL

TRAINING 40 HOURS A WEEK

DOD has not instructed the services as to how many hours a week military students should be required to attend initial skill training classes. The number of hours per week students attend classes varies widely. Air Force students normally attend class 30 hours a week. Army and Marine Corps students generally are on a 40-hour training week, but this week includes an average of 6 hours of non-academic time. Navy schools generally require their students to attend skill training classes more hours per week than the other services, with 22 percent of the courses requiring 40 hours a week.

Class weeks shorter than 40 hours extend the time students must be at the schools. During fiscal year 1977 if all training had been conducted on a 40-hour class attendance basis, the services would have been able to reduce personnel by about 12,000 and the cost of initial skill training by about \$155 million. These savings were computed using fiscal year 1977 programed input unadjusted for anticipated attrition. Actual attrition should not have a significant impact on the estimated savings presented in the following overall table.

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total (note a)</u>
Training and support costs per student week (note b)	\$326.00	\$261.00	\$200.00	
Deduct estimated fixed costs (45 percent)	<u>146.70</u>	<u>117.45</u>	<u>90.00</u>	
Variable training and support costs	\$179.30	\$143.55	\$110.00	
Entry level personnel costs per week	<u>172.49</u>	<u>172.49</u>	<u>172.49</u>	
Total variable cost per student week	<u>\$351.79</u>	<u>\$316.04</u>	<u>\$282.49</u>	
Student weeks extended	182,400	223,320	73,231	478,951
Total (in millions)	<u>\$64.2</u>	<u>\$70.6</u>	<u>\$20.6</u>	<u>\$155.4</u>
Increase in personnel	4,560	5,584	1,831	11,975

a/We did not include the Marine Corps schools in the estimate because of their relatively fewer students.

b/As determined by DOD.

Initial skill training of enlistees comprises about 65 percent of the schools' training loads. We did not determine the amount of costs being incurred because of shortened class periods for the other types of skill training.

To demonstrate how the length of the skill training week affects the course length we compared the air traffic controller course among the services and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). We recognize that the curriculum class hours vary, because of differing skill levels desired

for graduates. However, the following table demonstrates the impact of the number of hours of training per week on the course length.

	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>FAA</u>
Scheduled class hours	570	438	499	680
Student class hours per week	30	33	36	40
Number of weeks for course	19	13.2	14	17
Number of weeks at 40 class hours a week	14.25	11.0	12.5	17
Weeks saved	4.75	2.2	1.5	0

AIR FORCE

The Air Force schedules 30 class hours a week for most of its enlistees attending initial skill training courses. Based on its fiscal year 1977 student loads for these courses, the Air Force could save 223,320 student weeks if it increased the class attendance to 40 hours a week.

The Air Force presently conducts 79 skill training courses that use 40 class hours a week. Of these, 16 are initial skill training courses. Air Force officials said that these courses were placed on a schedule of 40 class hours weekly after successful testing. Other courses were not changed because of unfavorable test results. We were told that (1) tests are in progress on five courses, (2) six other courses are being readied for test, and (3) several pretest feasibility studies are underway on other courses.

Air Training Command officials told us that the Air Force provides an additional 2 hours a day outside the classroom for related training and/or complementary training. Related training is required for all students, but is not associated with the skill being taught. It includes such subjects as automobile driving safety courses and general military training. Complementary technical training generally involves reading assignments, but can include completion of a workbook.

We found that complementary technical training varied from course to course. For one course students were required to complete workbook assignments on material not covered in the classroom. These students were tested daily on material covered the night before. In another course there was no formal complementary technical training.

ARMY

Army students generally spend 40 hours a week in training; however, part of this time is for nonskill training which is unrelated to the skill being taught. For example, the Army schedules 328 hours, or 8 weeks and 1 day, for a personnel management specialist course. A week and a half of this time is devoted to activities which could be conducted outside classroom hours, as follows:

<u>Nonskill training activity</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Inprocessing and outprocessing	14
Commandant's time (note a)	12
Open time	10
Physical conditioning	<u>24</u>
Total nonskill time	<u>60</u>

a/This time is used for unprogramed administrative purposes and nonscheduled guest speakers. It can also be used for the Commandant's talks to students. Often it is free time for the students.

On the other hand, the Army has shortened certain courses involved in one-station unit training which combines basic and skill training. For these courses the Army schedules more than 40 hours a week for training and reduces nonskill training. For example, at the Army Air Defense School, the Army scheduled 44.5 hours a week for an air defense artilleryman course and eliminated 49 hours of mostly nonskill time.

NAVY

The Navy teaches at least 36 class hours of skill training a week for approximately 70 percent of its initial skill training courses, with approximately 22 percent on a 40-hour skill training week. We found that approximately

one-third of the Navy's initial skill training courses include training which is unrelated to the skill being taught. This training includes physical fitness, administrative time, and general military subjects. The Navy could reduce skill training costs by eliminating this unrelated training from its 40-hour week.

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps generally schedules 40 hours a week in training. However, part of this time frequently is scheduled for nonskill activities, which are unrelated to the skill being taught. These activities, which include such matters as physical training and time set aside for the school director, could be scheduled separately. We did not compute the amount of savings available through scheduling 40 class hours of skill training weekly. However, the Marine Corps could also reduce skill training costs by making this change.

CONCLUSIONS

During fiscal year 1977 the services could have reduced costs an estimated \$155 million a year if they scheduled 40 hours a week in the classroom, shop or laboratory for all initial skill training courses. Nonskill activities could be accomplished without extending training time if scheduled outside the 40 hours. The Navy's experience with some of its courses, the Army's experience with one-station unit training, the Air Force's favorable test results on 79 courses, and FAA's experience with air traffic controller training provide indications that this schedule is feasible. In view of the high cost of training, we believe it is reasonable and prudent to institute 40 class hours a week of skill training whenever possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the services to schedule a minimum of 40 hours a week in the classroom, laboratory, or shop for skill training whenever possible. Exceptions desired by the services should be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval as appropriate.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The services generally disagreed with us that they should adopt a policy of scheduling 40 class hours a

week for skill training. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officials stated that physical and general military training are essential parts of skill training. We are not questioning the need for such training; our position is that it can be scheduled separately.

Air Force officials said that we are not giving proper recognition to the complementary technical training provided outside the classroom. They said that experience has shown that the objectives of such training must be fulfilled in the classroom when converting to 8 class hours a day. Air Force officials added that the change in course length will not be proportional, because complementary technical training objectives will be added to the course curriculum. The results of our review indicate that some courses did not provide for any formal complementary technical training.

CHAPTER 3

NEED FOR A MORE ECONOMICAL ARMY CRITERION

FOR INSTRUCTOR STAFFING

The Army uses a factor which inflates its estimated need for instructors by at least 39 percent compared with the other services. Its authorized instructors for fiscal year 1977 were about 85 percent of its estimate. But the Army used some of these people for other purposes. The inflated estimate increased the Army's authorized positions by about 2,000 and its budget for the fiscal year by about \$28 million.

To estimate instructor requirements, each service has established a staffing criterion which includes the number of hours an instructor is available to teach skill training courses. More instructors are needed when an instructor is required to teach fewer class hours. The services provided us with estimates of instructor time used in their staffing criteria. As shown below, the Army has the lowest number of hours an instructor is expected to teach each year. Supervisory time and weekends are not included in the figures.

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>
Class hours	900	1,360	1,320	1,250
Class preparation	500	121	510	476
Training materials and standards preparation	200	231	(a)	(a)
Annual leave	201	<u>b/83</u>	<u>b/108</u>	(c)
Miscellaneous duties	207	200	142	354
Holidays	<u>72</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(d)</u>
Total hours	<u>2,080</u>	<u>2,087</u>	<u>2,080</u>	<u>2,080</u>

a/Included in class preparation.

b/Based on studies of actual experience.

c/Included in miscellaneous duties.

d/Included in the five other categories.

The Army uses a staffing formula which includes the 900 class hours to compute instructor requirements for its service schools but uses 1,250 hours for interservice training courses. The formulas require the user to define the number of instructor class hours required to teach each course and the number of times the courses are scheduled annually.

BASIS FOR ARMY CRITERION

The Army has no study to support the 900 class hours used to compute instructor requirements. Army officials said that a study was done on instructor staffing, but the information was not retained.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) stated that the major reason for the difference between the Army and the other services is that Army instructors are assigned noninstructional workloads. These duties include contribution to preparation of training materials and standards, and other miscellaneous duties such as participating in unit training. He said staffing standards used by the other services do not call for instructor personnel to accomplish these activities.

We found, however, that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are also scheduling time for preparation of materials and standards and miscellaneous duties. These duties are described in the position description of instructors which are identical in each of the services.

As a limited test of the Army's criterion, we requested officials at Fort Rucker, Alabama, to provide us a profile of actual instructor time for the air traffic control division. The profile included assigned instructors within the division for August 1977. Based on this information, the annual distribution of an air traffic control instructor's time is as follows:

<u>Task area</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Class hours of instruction	1,172
Class preparation	372
Training materials and standards preparation	26
Other	<u>510</u>
Total	<u><u>2,080</u></u>

As shown on page 9, the Army estimates more time for preparation of classes, training materials, and standards than any of the services. At the Army's Administration School, the contribution to training materials and standards preparation is accomplished by exchanging instructors for personnel in other directorates. Consequently, no additional instructors are required for this purpose. Officials at the Transportation School said instructors spend only a limited amount of time on preparation of training materials and standards. Discussions with instructors confirmed this.

AUTHORIZED INSTRUCTOR POSITIONS
USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Although the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assigns instructors to training schools, school commandants distribute the people among the training departments and other departments. Since the schools do not need all of their authorized instructor positions, the commandants use the people for other purposes. For example, at Fort Lee, Virginia, the Army was using an average of 176 fewer instructors than authorized but had 12 more people than authorized assigned to other jobs.

A comparison of staffing with computed requirements and authorizations for selected courses at other locations follows.

<u>Course</u>	<u>Number of instructors</u>		
	<u>Required</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Staffed</u>
Jet engine mechanic	21	18	16
Air traffic control	212	167	146
Personnel management specialist	3	a/7	3

a/Estimated on the basis of the ratio of total instructors authorized to total estimated requirements.

INCREASE IN ARMY BUDGET

Although the estimated instructor requirements are not authorizations, they are the basis for authorizing instructors. For fiscal year 1977 TRADOC estimated requirements for 11,371 instructors for its service schools and received

authorizations for 9,717. Thus, the authorizations were about 85 percent of the number requested.

The Army's estimate of 11,371 was 3,183, 39 percent higher than would have resulted from using 1,250 teaching hours per instructor. Use of that criterion would have reduced instructor requirements to 8,188, which is 1,529 fewer than were authorized.

The Army estimates support positions at 30 percent. Therefore, the increase of 1,529 positions, which resulted from the Army's requirements estimate, was further increased by 459 support positions. Using \$27,542 a year for officers and \$12,162 a year for enlisted staff, we estimate that these 1,988 positions increased the Army's budget by about \$28 million.

CONCLUSION

We believe the Army has overstated the need for school instructors by understating the hours they are available to teach. The Army should base its criterion on actual experience in the schools.

We believe that at least 1,250 hours teaching time a year is attainable because the Army uses it for interservice training courses and it is the lowest number of hours used by any of the services. Moreover, our review showed that the Army uses fewer instructors than authorized and uses instructor positions for other purposes.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Army to

--determine the number of hours its instructors spend in teaching and adjust its criterion accordingly and

--use, pending such a determination, a minimum of 1,250 hours a year to estimate its requirements for instructors.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Army officials said that the 900 instructor contact hours evolved from the reorganization of Army schools and that it was used to provide personnel for various training

functions. They said that they have not done a good job in accounting for the people.

We believe that the Army needs to separately identify and justify instructor as well as other personnel requirements in order to see that staffing levels are appropriate.

CHAPTER 4

LEAST-COST STAFFING

NOT USED FOR TRAINING

DOD could reduce training costs by millions of dollars annually by using more civilian instructors and by contracting for more skill training. For years the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and DOD policy have advocated increased use of these optional staffing methods. But the services have resisted.

DIRECTION TO SUBSTITUTE CIVILIAN FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL

In the fiscal year 1975 Defense Appropriations Authorization Act, the Congress told DOD to use the least costly form of staffing consistent with military requirements and other needs of DOD. The Congress told the Secretary of Defense to consider the advantage of converting from one form of staffing to another (military, civilian, contract) for the performance of each specific job.

For years DOD Directive 1100.4 has stated that the military services should employ civilians in positions which

- do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness;
- do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved; and
- do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), in an October 1976 article for the "Defense Management Journal," said:

"Defense Department policy is that each position be filled by a civilian unless it can be proven that a military person is required. As a result, the burden of proof is on the Services to show that each position programmed as a military space can only be filled by a military person."

THE TRAINING COMMANDS HAVE RESISTED
THE USE OF CIVILIANS

With few exceptions, the training commands have successfully resisted the pressures to hire civilians for training. The mix of skill training instructors authorized for fiscal year 1978 contained relatively few civilians, as shown in the following table:

<u>Schools</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent civilian</u>	<u>Percent civilians in work force</u>
Army	8,344	1,373	9,717	14	18
Navy	7,723	a/123	7,846	2	22
Air Force	4,470	1,235	5,705	22	25
Marine Corps	1,175	26	1,201	2	8

a/The Navy proposed conversion of 4,800 military positions in the Naval Education and Training Command to civilian status but has not identified specific positions to be converted.

Regardless of the widespread recognition that the use of civilians is economical, the training commands prefer the retention of military instructors. The reasons most often cited for this include:

- Need for positions to which the services can rotate military personnel from overseas or sea duty.
- Ability of military instructors to relate duty experience and course material.
- Need for a military environment to maintain discipline among students.
- A belief that the Congress is less apt to reduce military staffing authorizations.

Some of these reasons are legitimate concerns. There is a need for positions in the continental United States to allow rotation. But the service have not limited the number of military positions to those needed for rotation. In

a June 1974 report, 1/ we showed that elimination of military positions at Marine Corps centers would have little if any impact on rotation. The report also showed that continuity of service provided by career civilians would improve the efficiency of operations. The same advantage should apply to military schools and thus enhance the quality of training. Moreover, use of civilian instructors, whether Federal or contractor employees, would not require that schools be moved from military environments, or prevent the maintenance of discipline.

LIMITED CONTRACTING INITIATIVE

Many military skill courses are particularly adaptable to contracting because of their similarity to courses taught in the private sector. For example, the Army Administration School proposed contracting for instruction of military stenographers. The stenography course contains typing, shorthand, administrative procedures, and English grammar and usage. A similar course taught in private institutions is the general secretarial course. The school estimates that about \$129,000 will be saved annually by contracting for instruction. TRADOC has given approval to contract, and officials estimate that the course will be under contract by July 1978.

The Army contracts for portions of helicopter pilot training and realizes large savings. There are 196 instructors provided by the contractor for part of the training program. Each contract instructor costs about \$15,000 a year, while in-house civilians cost \$25,675 a year. Projecting the dollar difference over the 196 contract instructors indicates savings of \$2,096,000 a year by contracting.

Navy training officials conducted a study to determine the feasibility of contracting for training in certain skills. Although the study completed in 1975 identified several skills as potential candidates, the Navy had not contracted for the training.

CONCLUSION

It is widely recognized that civilians and contractors can provide commercial type services at lower cost than

1/"Opportunity To Reduce Costs and Improve Efficiency by Employing Civilians Instead of Marines" (S-146890, June 19, 1974).

military personnel. This has been demonstrated in the relatively few instances in which the training commands have contracted for training. But the commands have resisted pressures to use more civilians for a variety of reasons.

There is merit to some of the reasons advanced by the training commands. But the commands are using these reasons in general opposition to increased use of civilians instead of establishing specific positions when reasons for not substituting civilians are clearly valid.

Although substantial economies could be achieved through greater use of civilians, the training commands have been largely successful in resisting this change. Accordingly, we believe they are unlikely to do much toward conversion of military positions to civilians or contracting for training in the absence of firm action by DOD to require it.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the services to:

- Review the military positions in support of training to identify those which meet the criteria for conversion to civilians.
- Determine the least-cost method of staffing the positions as instructed by the Congress in the fiscal year 1975 Defense Appropriation Authorizations Act.
- Based on these determinations, proceed without delay to staff the training establishment accordingly or arrange for contracting as appropriate.

AGENCY COMMENTS

The services generally did not agree that they should use more civilians in the conduct of their training programs. They said that there is no requirement to use the least costly form of staffing and that they would await direction from DOD before taking action in this area.

Air Force officials said that a relatively high military to civilian instructor ratio was essential. They said military instructors bring with them current field experience to provide the appropriate mix and emphasis on theoretical and practical aspects of training. Further, they said

that the added theoretical knowledge derived from instructor duty is also regularly fed back to the operational units. We would agree that these benefits accrue by having military instructors; however, we question the importance of field experience in such skill training as that for administrative clerk, finance clerk, or personnel clerk positions.

CHAPTER 5

STAFFING DATA IN MILITARY MANPOWER TRAINING

REPORT IS INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE

The Military Manpower Training Report does not accurately reflect staffing in support of training in total and at specific locations because data submitted by the service is inadequate:

- Not all elements of training support are being included.
- Base operations support are not consistently reported.
- Training support provided by one service to another is not included for specific locations.
- Contractor personnel are not included.

The Military Manpower Training Report is required by law (10 U.S.C. 138(d)(2)) to be issued annually to the Congress to support the services' proposed training programs. DOD is responsible for preparing the report from data provided by the military services.

The staffing resources committed to training have been of continuing interest to the Congress. However, valid assessments of these resources in relation to the students in total or by specific location cannot be made without reliable and complete information. The Congress should expect the data to be complete and accurate.

TRAINING POSITIONS EXCLUDED

DOD instructions for compiling training support manpower provide for inclusion of all military manpower of whatever service which is authorized for conducting the category of training activities reported. The Army did not report personnel performing training-related functions in training development, combat development, and unit training support organizations. The fiscal year 1978 staffing for these functions totaled 5,257 positions. These elements provide planning, development, assessment, and administrative support for training functions at each training location. A TRADOC official explained that they did

not consider these functions as a part of training operations. Consequently, they did not include these people in the reported data.

BASE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF TRAINING NOT REPORTED

The services are inconsistently reporting base operations staffing in support of training in the Military Manpower Training Report. The Army and Air Force, as provided by DOD instructions, include a proportionate share of base operations in training support, but the Navy does not. The Marine Corps includes base support for 3 of 9 locations. For example, the Navy reported 1,592 staff for a fiscal year 1977 training program at the Naval Air Technical Training School in Memphis, Tennessee. We estimate that 1,320 base support personnel should also have been allocated to training, based on a ratio of the population involved in training versus nontraining positions. Further, the Navy did not report staff provided by the Marine Corps. There were 551 Marine Corps personnel assigned to training activities at the school. Thus, the Navy should have reported a staff of 3,463 instead of only 1,592.

Navy personnel stated that they reported only the direct manpower associated with the training load, based on their interpretation of DOD instructions.

TRAINING STAFF PROVIDED BY ANOTHER SERVICE EXCLUDED

Sometimes one service provides instructors and other personnel to another service; however, the receiving services did not report this staff, as required by DOD instructions. Both Army and Navy personnel told us that they do not report the staff from other services.

Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps reported by location 939 Marine Corps instructors and support personnel serving in Navy schools.

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL NOT REPORTED

DOD instructions for preparing the Military Manpower Training Report did not require the services to report contractor personnel. Large numbers of contractor personnel, which are not included in the Training Report, perform base operating support functions at training installations. In

addition, some training is performed by contract. But the services excluded contractor personnel from their reports. Examples of contractor support are:

- The Air Force contracts for part of base support at Vance Air Force Base, which conducts pilot training. At this base, the contractor provides an equivalent of 1,456 staff-years.
- The Army contracts for instructors and maintenance personnel at Fort Rucker, Alabama, where helicopter pilot training is conducted. Contractors provide an equivalent of 2,146 staff-years.

DOD officials pointed out that, although contractor support on a staff-year basis was not included in the Training Report, the costs for such personnel were included. They said that contractor staff-years are reported routinely through contract administration channels but are not normally reported as program support by program administrators.

DOD STUDY OF TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT POSSIBLY INVALID

At the request of the Congress, DOD made a study of the appropriateness of training establishment staffing. This study was based in part on the data provided by the services for the Military Manpower Training Report. To the extent that this data was not complete or accurate as described above, the study may have been invalid. Until the deficiencies in the services' data are corrected, valid assessments of training staffing cannot be made.

CONCLUSIONS

The staffing used by the services to support their training programs has not been accurately and completely reported by the services for the Military Manpower Training Report. Consequently, valid assessments of these resources cannot be made. The Congress should be able to rely on the data in this report to be complete and accurate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue clarifying instructions which (1) define the activities in support of training, (2) require standardized reporting of base support personnel and personnel provided by other

services at all training installations, and (3) require reporting of equivalent staff-years of contractor support. The data reported by the services should be periodically audited to help insure consistency, completeness, and accuracy.

AGENCY COMMENTS

The services agreed that the data submitted for the Training Report was incomplete and that there was a need for DOD to issue clarifying instructions so that future reports would be consistent and accurate.

CHAPTER 6

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We made our review at the training headquarters of the services and selected schools. We concentrated on the administration of skill training courses, but placed emphasis on enlisted initial skill training because it represented about 65 percent of skill training.

We examined the policies, practices, and procedures for the services in regard to staffing and conducting skill training. We discussed our work with training officials at the principal service organizations and at the departmental headquarters and incorporated their comments in our report.

Additionally, we reviewed the supporting data for the Military Manpower Training Report prepared annually by DOD.

The locations visited during our review were:

AIR FORCE

Air Training Command
Randolph Air Force Base, Texas

Keesler Technical Training Center
Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi

Chanute Technical Training Center
Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

ARMY

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia

United States Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, Alabama

United States Army Transportation School
Fort Eustis, Virginia

United States Army Administration Center
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

NAVY

Chief of Naval Education and Training
Pensacola, Florida

Chief of Navy Technical Training
Millington, Tennessee

Naval Air Technical Training Center
Memphis, Tennessee

Naval Air Technical Training Center
Meridian, Mississippi

MARINE CORPS

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia