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GAO-10-655R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 15, 2010:

Congressional Committees:

Subject: The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan:

The United States and its international partners[Footnote 1] from over 
40 nations have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and 
rebuild Afghanistan since 2001. In an effort to establish clear and 
specific U.S. strategic goals, the President of the United States, in 
March 2009, outlined the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
This strategy emphasizes a strategic goal to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return. 
The strategy was followed by the completion, in August 2009, of a 
Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. In December 2009, the 
President reaffirmed the U.S. strategic goal and underscored the 
importance of U.S. efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan to help 
ensure the safety of the United States and the American people.

To assist the Congress in its oversight of U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan, this publication and its interactive graphic (1) identify 
and describe key U.S. and international strategies and plans that 
collectively guide U.S. efforts in Afghanistan; (2) provide examples 
and information about key efforts to assist Afghanistan; and (3) 
identify oversight issues that Congress may wish to consider in its 
work. During April and May 2010, we presented this strategic framework 
to Congress as part of our classified briefing on the Afghanistan 
campaign plans.[Footnote 2]

The strategic framework includes relevant strategies--the Afghan 
National Development Strategy, the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,[Footnote 3] and the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 
Stabilization Strategy. It also includes U.S. plans: the Operation 
Enduring Freedom Campaign plan, the National Security Council 
Strategic Implementation Plan, and the U.S. Integrated Civilian-
Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP). The ICMCP, describes three lines of 
effort--security, governance, and development[Footnote 4]--to be 
implemented by U.S. civilian and military personnel. Finally, NATO 
plans include the NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military 
Plan, and the operational plans for NATO[Footnote 5] and for NATO's 
subordinate command--the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Since 2003, we have issued multiple reports and testimonies related to 
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/risks/national-challenges-iraq/]. Over the 
course of this work, we have identified improvements that were needed 
as well as many obstacles that affect success and should be considered 
in program planning and implementation. We also concluded that several 
existing conditions, such as security, the limited institutional 
capacity of the Afghan government, and the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure continue to create challenges to U.S. efforts to assist 
with securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Afghanistan.

This publication represents an update to our April 2009 report, 
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, and is based on 
our past and continuing work. Our ongoing work on Afghanistan includes 
U.S. and coalition partners' efforts to develop a capable Afghan 
National Army, the expansion of U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, 
U.S. efforts to develop Afghanistan's agricultural and water sectors, 
and contracting issues related to U.S. forces.

To describe the strategic framework for Afghanistan, illustrated by 
the interactive graphic on the following page, we reviewed GAO's past 
reports on Afghanistan, including those that analyze U.S. plans for 
the country. We reviewed strategies, reports, and other documents for 
Afghanistan including those listed in the graphic. We interviewed 
officials from the Departments of Defense and State, including State's 
Office of the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; U.S. Central Command; and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. To illustrate the lines of effort in the graphic, we used 
examples that were priorities in the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military 
Campaign Plan or that we had identified as significant in previous GAO 
reports. For example, the graph illustrating the security line of 
effort--daily average attacks against civilians and ISAF and Afghan 
security forces--is based on our reporting on the security environment 
in Afghanistan. The oversight issues are based on our past, ongoing, 
and planned work on Afghanistan, including the Afghan security 
environment, the campaign plans for Afghanistan, training and 
equipping of Afghan National Security Forces, U.S. counter-narcotics 
efforts in Afghanistan, expansion of agricultural opportunities, and 
logistical support for the deployment of U.S. forces. We updated 
relevant data when possible and tested the reliability of data not 
previously reported.

We conducted our work from November 2009 through June 2010 in 
accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that 
are relevant to our objectives.  The framework requires that we plan 
and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate 
evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations 
in our work.  We believe that the information and data obtained, and 
the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings 
and conclusions.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the 
Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. Each agency provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated into the report where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this publication to the congressional 
committees listed in Enclosure 3, as well as the Secretaries of 
Defense and State; and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. The report is available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any 
questions, please contact, Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Key contributors are in enclosure 4. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:

Enclosures: 

[End of letter] 

Figure: Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustration, including 4 
photographs and 4 figures] 

Interactivity instructions: 
For more information, including oversight issues: 
* Roll your mouse over the for online version. 
* See Enclosures 1 and 2 for print version and instructions for 
printing. 

U.S. Goal: Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and prevent their return. 

Framework Documents: 

Relevant strategies: 
* Afghan National Development Strategy; 
* U.S Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
* Afghanistan Pakistan R3egional Stabilization Strategy (U.S. 
document). 

U.S. plans: 
* Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan; 
* National Security Council Strategic Implementation Plan; 
* Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to 
Afghanistan. 

NATO plans: 
* NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan; 
* NATO Operational Plan; 
* ISAF Operational Plan. 

Enclosure 1: Framework and Selected Documents Comprising the Strategic 
Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan:

This enclosure provides information regarding documents shown in the 
graphic under "Framework Documents" and "Timeline of Selected 
Documents". This information can also be accessed via the interactive 
rollovers in the electronic version of the graphic.

Printing Instructions: To print this report and the Strategic 
Framework graphic on 8.5 x 11" paper first set the page scaling to 
"Fit to Printable Area" in the print dialogue box. Then uncheck 
"Choose Paper Source by PDF page size." 

Table 1: Descriptive Information about Afghan, U.S., and NATO 
Documents Comprising the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in 
Afghanistan:

Afghan Documents and International Agreements: 

Documents: Bonn Agreement; 
Date Issued: December 2001; 
Description: The Bonn Agreement, signed in December 2001 under the 
sponsorship of the United Nations, was the first of several 
international agreements that laid out a framework for the transition 
of Afghanistan from Taliban rule to a new Afghan national government. 
The agreement established an interim authority for Afghanistan, 
requested the United Nations to authorize an international security 
force to assist in the transition, and set out the role of the United 
Nations to advise the interim authority. 

Documents: Afghan Compact; 
Date Issued: January 2006; 
Description: The Afghan Compact (January 2006) was the product of the 
2006 London Conference--a meeting of Afghanistan's government, over 50 
other nations, and the United Nations and other international 
organizations. The compact first introduced the concept of security, 
governance, and development as the areas of focus for Afghan 
reconstruction activities. In the compact, the Afghan government, with 
the support of the international community, committed to achieving 
benchmarks in these areas, such as developing a professional national 
army by the end of 2010. 

Documents: Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS); 
Date Issued: 2008; 
Description: The Afghan National Development Strategy (2008) is that 
country's guiding document for achieving its reconstruction goals. The 
strategy focuses on improving the country's security, governance, and 
economic growth and reducing poverty. It also provides information on 
the resources needed to carry out the strategy and on the shortfall in 
Afghanistan's projected revenue. It was released in 2008 and is 
effective through 2013. 

Documents: London Conference Communiqué; 
Date Issued: January 2010; 
Description: The Communiqué, issued in January 2010, was the product 
of the 2010 London Conference. Conference participants committed to 
helping the government of Afghanistan in several areas, such as anti-
corruption and improving the capability of the Afghan army and police 
forces. Conference participants also acknowledged the intention of 
NATO's North Atlantic Council to begin transitioning the lead 
responsibility for security, province by province, from ISAF to 
Afghanistan forces in late 2010/early 2011. 

U.S. Plans and Strategies: 

Documents: Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan; 
Date Issued: November 2001 continuing; 
Description: The Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign Plan (2001) and 
updates are classified. Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing U.S. 
led operation that conducts counter-terrorism operations in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is a U.S. led operation that coordinates 
with ISAF. It operates under a U.S. commander who also is the 
commanding general of ISAF. 

Documents: U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
Date Issued: March 2009; 
Description: In March 2009, the President of the United States 
presented the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, based on a 
policy review he requested upon taking office. The goal of the 
strategy is to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and to prevent their return to either country. The 
strategy initiates a regional approach by linking Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in a common fight against violent extremists. It incorporates 
input from the Afghan and Pakistani governments, NATO, and 
international partners and organizations in Afghanistan. The strategy 
emphasizes economic assistance to Pakistan as well as an expectation 
that Pakistan will combat Al-Qaeda and violent extremists in 
sanctuaries in Pakistan. For Afghanistan, the strategy commits to 
increasing U.S. troop levels to fight extremists along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, train Afghan security forces, and provide civilian 
experts to help the Afghan government. In December 2009, the President 
reaffirmed the March 2009 U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
and announced the planned deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. 
troops to Afghanistan to target the insurgency, secure key population 
centers, and train Afghan security forces. The President also stated 
the additional troops would accelerate efforts and allow the transfer 
of U.S. forces out of Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. He 
reaffirmed the need to pursue a more effective civilian strategy and 
focus assistance in areas, such as agriculture, that could make an 
immediate impact. 

Documents: National Security Council Strategic Implementation Plan; 
Date Issued: July 2009; 
Description: The National Security Council Strategic Implementation 
Plan (July 2009) is classified. According to State Department 
officials, the plan was released in July 2009 and provides a series of 
goals and objectives for implementing the U.S. Strategy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The plan also includes measures of 
effectiveness to track progress in achieving the objectives. 

Documents: Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to 
Afghanistan (ICMCP); 
Date Issued: August 2009; 
Description: The ICMCP (August 2009), signed by the U.S. ambassador to 
Afghanistan and the commanding general, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, was 
developed collaboratively by the U.S. agencies working in Afghanistan, 
the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, the government of 
Afghanistan, and other partner nations. The plan provides guidance for 
U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and lays out a counterinsurgency 
campaign to secure and support the Afghan people and government. The 
plan calls for integrated civilian and military teams to address lines 
of effort by working on 11 specific efforts called transformative 
effects. 

Documents: Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy; 
Date Issued: January 2010; 
Description: The regional stabilization strategy, released in January 
2010 and updated in February, signed by Secretaries of Defense and 
State, focuses on U.S. non-military efforts and states that the U.S. 
combat mission is not open-ended but the United States is committed to 
building a lasting partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 
strategy focuses on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to 
combat extremism, deliver high-impact economic assistance, create 
jobs, and reduce insurgent funding from the illicit narcotics trade. 
The strategy identifies key initiatives, such as building the capacity 
of government in population centers in Eastern and Southern 
Afghanistan, improving agricultural development, and reintegrating 
Taliban who renounce Al-Qaeda. 

NATO Plans and Documents: 

Documents: Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
Operational Plan; 
Date Issued: June 2003; 
Description: The SHAPE OPLAN (June 2003) is a classified document. 
According to a NATO official, this plan was issued in 2003 to direct 
NATO operations inside Kabul. SHAPE, a component of NATO, was 
established in 1951 as part of an effort to establish an integrated 
and effective NATO military force. SHAPE's mission is to prepare, plan 
and conduct military operations in order to meet NATO political 
objectives. 

Documents: Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
Operational Plan; 
Date Issued: April 2006; 
Description: The SHAPE OPLAN (April 2006) is a classified document. 
According to a NATO official, this plan provided for NATO to assume 
responsibility throughout Afghanistan - all regions plus established 
Regional Command Capital (Kabul). 

Documents: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operational Plan; 
Date Issued: 2005 continuing; 
The NATO OPLAN (2005) is classified. NATO's main role in Afghanistan 
is to assist the Afghan government in exercising and extending its 
authority and influence across the country, paving the way for 
reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately 
through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force. 

Documents: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operational 
Plan; 
Date Issued: March 2006 continuing; 
Description: The ISAF OPLAN (March 2006) is classified. ISAF is a NATO-
led mission in Afghanistan established by the UN Security Council in 
December 2001. ISAF is composed of troops contributed from the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other nations, including 
member nations of the European Union and NATO. ISAF conducts 
operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the 
insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in 
governance and socio-economic development. 

Documents: NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan; 
Date Issued: April 2008; 
Description: The NATO Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan 
(April 2008) is classified. According to State Department and NATO 
officials, this document provides broader political objectives for the 
NATO alliance in Afghanistan and establishes a framework for measuring 
those objectives. 

Documents: Commander's (ISAF/U.S. Forces, Afghanistan) Initial 
Assessment; 
Date Issued: August 2009; 
Description: The Commander's (ISAF and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan) 
Initial Assessment (August 2009) provided an overall assessment of the 
situation in Afghanistan; reviewed plans and ongoing efforts; and 
identified revisions to operational, tactical, and strategic guidance. 
While the assessment acknowledges some progress, it contains findings 
and recommendations, including the need for additional resources, to 
address what it termed at the time a deteriorating situation. 

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to 
NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. 
Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, United 
Nations, Government of Afghanistan documents. 

[End of table] 

[End of Enclosure 1] 

Enclosure 2: Lines of Effort Background, Illustration, and Key 
Oversight Issues:

This enclosure provides information regarding the lines of effort to 
assist Afghanistan in the graphic, as well as key oversight issues for 
the Congress to consider. This information and the key oversight 
issues can also be accessed via the interactive rollovers in the 
electronic version of the graphic.

Table 2: Background Information, Illustrations, and Key Oversight 
Issues Regarding the Lines of Effort to Assist Afghanistan:

Lines of Effort: Security; 
Background, Illustrations, and Key Oversight Issues: As shown in the 
graphic, the data indicates that the pattern of enemy-initiated 
attacks in Afghanistan has remained seasonal in nature, generally 
peaking from June through September each year and then declining 
during the winter months. While attacks have continued to fluctuate 
seasonally, the annual attack "peak" (high point) and "trough" (low 
point) for each year since September 2005 have surpassed the peak and 
trough, respectively, for the preceding year. In December 2009, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan stated that the Taliban and other 
extremist groups exercise increasing influence in many areas of the 
south and east, and attacks and instability are rising in parts of the 
north and west. To reverse this situation, in December 2009, the 
President committed an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to 
be deployed throughout 2010. GAO has reported that Afghanistan's 
difficult and uncertain overland supply routes, lack of 
infrastructure, other logistical difficulties, and lack of oversight 
for contractors pose challenges to this deployment. As of early 2010, 
about 107,000 contractors support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and DOD 
reports this number is likely to increase. Another critical effort to 
improving the security situation lies in implementing the U.S. and 
ISAF counterinsurgency strategy, which integrates civilian and 
military efforts. According to publicly released documents approved by 
the U.S. and Afghan governments, and NATO, these efforts include 
action against irreconcilable elements in Kandahar and Helmand during 
2010, and trying to train about 300,000 Afghan army and police by 
October 2011. 
Key Oversight Issues: 
* How are the United States, NATO, and ISAF measuring progress for 
security and what metrics are they applying? 
* How do the United States and its international partners coordinate 
and evaluate their efforts in Afghanistan? 
* Given commitments in other parts of the world, to what extent has 
DOD evaluated its ability to provide trained and ready forces with 
required skills within desired timeframes to support the U.S. strategy 
in Afghanistan? 
* To what extent has DOD evaluated its ability to transport U.S. 
military, civilian and contractor personnel, and equipment within 
desired timeframes, given factors such as security considerations, 
limitations on the availability of overland supply routes and access 
to air bases, and limited existing facilities for staging and 
reception? 
* To what extent has DOD developed mitigation plans for addressing 
potential challenges, including any alternatives should delays occur 
in getting U.S. forces with their accompanying equipment in place to 
conduct their missions within desired time frames? 
* To what extent has DOD identified the role of contractors in 
Afghanistan, including the types of services they will provide with 
regard to security? 
* To what extent has DOD identified its contractor requirements and 
taken steps to ensure that sufficient personnel are in place to 
effectively manage and oversee contractors in Afghanistan? To what 
extent are current and proposed Afghan National Security Force levels 
based on an analysis of Afghanistan's needs and long-term ability to 
sustain its forces? 

Lines of Effort: Governance; 
Background, Illustrations, and Key Oversight Issues: As illustrated in 
the graphic, the Afghanistan government is in the process of 
appointing its full cabinet of ministers. Strengthening the Afghan 
government is an essential part of U.S. and international efforts in 
Afghanistan. According to the ANDS, significant governance issues that 
Afghanistan must address include multiple and parallel government 
structures, weak public sector institutions, and high levels of 
corruption. The United Nations reported in January 2010 that 
Afghanistan required a systematic approach to building civilian 
institutions and the government lacked the sub-national institutions 
needed to provide services. U.S. and international strategies aim to 
strengthen Afghanistan's government range from helping hold elections 
to building the capacity of government at all levels. To assist in 
these efforts, the United Nations, and over 60 nations committed 
during the January 2010 London Conference to more fully resource 
civilian efforts; and the United States made it a priority to provide 
a surge of civilian expertise. According to State Department 
officials, the surge intends to support all civilian efforts, and this 
increase is supported by strengthened civilian-military structures 
such as National Level Working Groups. U.S. plans include the 
provision of technical advisors to key ministries in Kabul such as 
Finance and Agriculture, and assistance at the local levels. For 
example, the District Development Plan intends to strengthen the 
government of Afghanistan's ability to deliver services with U.S. and 
ISAF support, and is expected to expand in 2010. Other U.S. efforts 
include helping Afghanistan train 16,000 civil servants, most at the 
provincial and district level, by 2011. At the community level, the 
National Solidarity Program highlighted in the graphic is a program 
funded by the Afghanistan National Trust Fund, to which the United 
States is a major contributor. 
Key Oversight Issues: 
* How is the United States ensuring there are adequate numbers of 
civilians to meet surge requirements for the governance efforts? 
* How is the United States working to develop Afghan government 
capacity at the appropriate central government and provincial levels? 
* What is the strategy to help Afghanistan train the number of civil 
servants needed to provide strengthened governance? 
* What efforts has the United States made to enhance Afghan 
accountability and reduce corruption? 

Lines of Effort: Development; 
Background, Illustrations, and Key Oversight Issues: Strengthening the 
Afghan economy is critical to the counterinsurgency strategy. 
According to the U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, 
poverty and widespread unemployment in population centers are 
exploited by insurgent and criminal elements for recruitment. GAO has 
reported that the illicit narcotics industry equals as much as one-
third of Afghanistan's licit economy, is a notable source of funding 
for the insurgency, and competes with licit development. Finally, 
Afghanistan cannot cover its projected government expenditures without 
relying on expected levels of foreign assistance contributions from 
the international community. Donor assistance accounted for about 88 
percent of Afghanistan's total funding during the 2008-2009 budget 
year and greater shortfalls are projected in the coming years. From 
2002 to 2009, the U.S. and the international community have assisted 
Afghan reconstruction and development, with the U.S. providing about 
$38.6 billion for these purposes. Projects include improving 
Afghanistan's roads and transport network, building schools, and 
developing water and energy projects. According to the U.S. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Stabilization Strategy, the highest U.S. 
reconstruction priority for 2010 is implementing a civilian-military 
agricultural development program to create jobs and sap the insurgency 
of fighters and revenue. Specific initiatives include issuing credit 
vouchers to farmers, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar. U.S. 
military commanders also planned to use the Commander's Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) to provide urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction needs to assist the local population. Longer term 
efforts focus on creating sustainable jobs in the private sector, 
among other things. 
Key Oversight Issues: 
* How effective are economic and development assistance programs in 
insecure areas? What are the development priorities in the most 
insecure areas? What strategies does USAID have to maintain ongoing 
efforts in these areas? 
* To what extent are the United States, international organizations, 
and donor countries developing plans to address Afghanistan's 
projected budget shortfall? 
* How are U.S. and international partners ensuring the projects and 
programs they fund are sustainable by the Afghan government? 
* How do USAID and DOD coordinate their reconstruction projects with 
each other and with other donors who provide assistance in the same 
area? 

Sources: Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to 
NATO, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. 
Central Command, U.S. Agency for International Development, United 
Nations, Government of Afghanistan documents. 

[End of table] 

[End of Enclosure 2] 

Enclosure 3: List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chair: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Chair: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Kay Granger: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Russ Carnahan: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and 
Oversight: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Jeff Flake: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Michael Honda: 
United States House of Representatives: 

[End of Enclosure 3]

Enclosure 4: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition, the following staff contributed to the results presented 
in this report: Tet Miyabara, Assistant Director; Nina Pfeiffer; 
Marcus Oliver; Erin Smith; Etana Finkler; Jonathan Mulcare; Martin De 
Alteriis; and Mark Dowling.

[End of Enclosure 4] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Included among these international partners are the United Nations 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is an 
alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe.

[2] The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 
mandated that GAO review and assess the campaign plan for Afghanistan. 
As part of our response to the mandate, we provided classified 
briefings on the campaign plans to relevant Congressional committees.

[3] The U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan refers to the March 
27, 2009 and December 1, 2009 speeches delivered by President Obama.

[4] The U.S Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan also identifies 
'Information' as an important line of effort.

[5] The NATO Operational Plan (OPLAN) referred to in this publication 
is the Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum OPLAN. 

[End of section] 

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