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entitled 'Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the future 
of Air Traffic Control Modernization' which was released on May 30, 
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May 30, 2007: 

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future 
of Air Traffic Control Modernization: 

Dear Chairman Costello: 

This letter responds to your May 10, 2007, request that we address 
questions submitted for the record related to the May 9, 2007, hearing 
entitled The Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization. Our answers 
to your questions are attached. Our responses are based on our previous 
work, [Footnote 1] preliminary results of ongoing work, and our 
knowledge of the areas addressed by the questions. We prepared our 
responses during May 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Because our responses are based on our 
previously issued products for which we sought and incorporated agency 
comments, as well as updates that we obtained through interviewing FAA 
officials and reviewing their documentation, we did not seek agency 
comments on our responses to these questions. 

We are sending copies of this letter to the Administrator, Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the Director, Joint Planning and 
Development Office. We will make copies available to others on request. 
This letter is also available on GAO's Web site at www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions or would like to discuss the responses, 
please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Sincerely yours, 

signed by: 

Gerald L. Dilligham, Ph.D. 
Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

Enclosure: 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record: "The Future of Air 
Traffic Control Modernization" 

Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
U.S. House of Representatives: 

Hearing held on May 9, 2007: 

Questions for Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Jerry F. Costello: 

1. Several stakeholders and other observers have suggested that JPDO is 
at a juncture wherein its current organizational structure and 
operating procedures should be revisited. The suggestions have ranged 
from the idea that JPDO should cease to exist as soon as it publishes 
its primary planning documents to the idea that it should become more 
autonomous, with more authority and budgetary control. 

a. How long should JPDO continue to exist, and if it should continue to 
exist, in what ways should its role and responsibilities with regard to 
NextGen change? 

JPDO was established to plan and coordinate the development of the next 
generation air transportation system (NextGen) and should exist for the 
duration of those tasks. The basic planning documents that JPDO is 
developing for NextGen are near completion, but further iterations of 
these planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are 
developed and implemented. With NextGen's progression from the initial 
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to 
include coordination and facilitation activities, as well as planning 
activities. GAO believes this is a reasonable evolution and a proper 
role for JPDO and is consistent with the language of JPDO's authorizing 
legislation. 

One example of this evolution is the role JPDO has begun to play in 
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the Air Traffic 
Organization's (ATO) strategic plans. ATO has expanded and revamped its 
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) to become the Federal Aviation 
Administration's (FAA) implementation plan for NextGen. The Review 
Board that oversees the OEP is cochaired by JPDO and ATO. Similar 
developments are expected to occur with other partner agencies as JPDO 
completes a memorandum of understanding with these agencies. If JPDO 
ceased to exist before NextGen was more fully developed, some 
alternative means of planning and coordinating NextGen's development 
would have to be established, which could delay NextGen's 
implementation. 

JPDO's role could further evolve to include more coordination and 
oversight activities. For example, JPDO could establish a program 
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as 
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner 
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems- 
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and 
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with 
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development 
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project 
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC);[Footnote 2] (5) overseeing 
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term 
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among 
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and 
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation 
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy 
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements. 

Another example of the evolution of JPDO's role is the organizational 
shift from integrated product teams to working groups. This shift 
reflects the extension of JPDO's role beyond planning to the 
development of work products or "outcomes" that will contribute to the 
early development of NextGen and facilitate its implementation. As JPDO 
assumes more responsibility for facilitating NextGen's implementation, 
greater authority and resources would allow it to do more to coordinate 
the efforts of the partner agencies and work with the Office of 
Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of contact. With 
adequate funding and authority, JPDO could acquire staff with the 
project management and systems engineering skills needed for JPDO to be 
an effective oversight and coordinating office. 

b. To what extent do you think that moving JPDO out of the Federal 
Aviation Administration's Air Traffic Organization will give it greater 
visibility and authority? 

Currently, JPDO is located within FAA and reports to both the FAA 
Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer of ATO. In GAO's view, 
JPDO should not be moved out of FAA. Since JPDO provides the vision for 
the future air traffic control (ATC) system and ATO is to be the 
principal implementer of that vision, the two organizations need to 
continue working closely together. 

However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact 
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. On one 
hand, JPDO must counter the perception that it is a proxy for the ATO 
and, as such, is not able to act as an "honest broker." On the other 
hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a 
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, 
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change 
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO 
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change may also 
lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary bureaucracy 
and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and NextGen 
processes. 

As a part of any change in the dual reporting status of JPDO's 
Director, consideration could be given to the possibility of creating 
the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen and elevating the 
JPDO Director to that post. 

c. What are the potential pluses and minuses of such a move? 

One plus or advantage of moving JPDO out of ATO is that it could raise 
JPDO's authority and visibility in interagency deliberations by putting 
JPDO on an equal footing with ATO and other FAA lines of business. For 
example, moving JPDO out of ATO might strengthen its linkages to the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). In addition, JPDO may be able to work more effectively with 
other FAA lines of business, such as Airports, for which JPDO has 
planning responsibilities. For example, JPDO is responsible for 
developing plans to increase airport capacity. A minus or disadvantage 
of moving JPDO out of ATO is that because much of the work related to 
implementing NextGen must occur under ATO, this work could be harder to 
accomplish. 

d. What are some potential alternative organizational structures or 
arrangements and operating procedures for JPDO? 

We think that besides moving JPDO out of ATO and changing JPDO's 
reporting status, a potential organizational alternative for JPDO could 
be elevating the JPDO Director's position by having the Director and 
the ATO Chief Operating Officer cochair the Joint Resources Council, 
the body within FAA that provides executive review and oversight of 
acquisitions. (Currently, the JRC is chaired by the Federal Acquisition 
Executive, a responsibility delegated by the Administrator to the Vice 
President of ATO-Administration.) Consideration could also be given to 
creating the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen for the 
JPDO Director. This would give greater authority, credibility, and 
visibility to this important position. 

e. What are your thoughts on the following suggestions? 

1) JPDO should be established as a program office with program 
management capabilities and tools to interact with other program 
offices such as the FAA program office, the program office that DOD has 
committed to create, and the joint weather office involving DOD, DOC, 
and FAA. 

Currently, we do not think JPDO has the technical resources, tools, or 
operational knowledge to function as a program office. Moreover, the 
partner agencies, led by ATO, have the operational knowledge to best 
implement NextGen systems. JPDO, however, could function purely as a 
coordinating body or executive council. For example, JPDO could be 
provided with the resources and authority to establish a program 
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as 
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner 
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems- 
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and 
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with 
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development 
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project 
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC); [Footnote 3] (5) overseeing 
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term 
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among 
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and 
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation 
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy 
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements. 

2) JPDO lacks the technical capacity to evaluate the R&D efforts of its 
government partners and private sector clients and should be provided 
with an increased capacity and technical resources to carry out this 
function. 

To oversee multi-agency programs and have the capacity to evaluate 
NextGen R&D efforts, JPDO must have the requisite human and technical 
resources, such as a sufficient number of personnel with expertise in 
areas related to NextGen technologies. JPDO does not currently have 
these resources, but it could obtain them with funding over and above 
the level in the FAA reauthorization proposal. Such resources are 
needed for JPDO to monitor the implementation of NextGen. 

3) JPDO lacks a clear process to identify inconsistencies in partner 
agency budgeting. JPDO should become a partner in the budgeting process 
and there should be a budget resolution council to provide a forum for 
negotiation of budget priorities. 

JPDO is already a partner in the budgeting process. JPDO has been 
working with OMB to develop a process that would allow OMB to identify 
NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider 
NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. Under this process, JPDO 
and its partner agencies can jointly present OMB with business cases 
for the partner agencies' NextGen-related efforts, and these business 
cases can be used as inputs to funding decisions for NextGen research 
and acquisitions across the agencies. 

We do not believe JPDO needs a forum to negotiate budget priorities. 
The Senior Policy Committee (SPC), headed by the Secretary of 
Transportation, includes senior-level officials from JPDO's partner 
agencies and was established, in part, to address NextGen budget 
issues. In JPDO's enabling legislation, SPC was explicitly made 
responsible for identifying NextGen resource needs and making 
recommendations to the members' respective agencies for the necessary 
funding. 

2. Much has been written and spoken about the role of and contributions 
of the various partner agencies to JPDO. Some observers have commented 
that the degree of participation by the partner agencies seemed to be 
on a continuum from a significant amount of participation to seemingly 
not very much at all. FAA and NASA are consistently indicated as the 
most involved participants. 

a. In your opinion, to what extent are the partner agencies 
participating in the vision and work of JPDO? 

The partner agencies' participation in the vision and work of JPDO has 
varied to date and will continue to evolve over time. Interagency 
partnerships are difficult because it takes time to forge working 
relationships and establish accountability. While FAA and NASA have 
been the most involved in the planning and coordination of NextGen, the 
other agencies are also participating. The Department of Defense, for 
example, is transferring to NextGen the technology it has developed for 
sharing information across networks, is establishing a program office 
to coordinate all of its NextGen activities, and is collaborating with 
FAA and the Department of Commerce to develop and implement NextGen's 
weather forecasting capability. The Department of Homeland Security is 
participating by contributing "in-kind" services in the form of 
personnel and research. 

b. How could the roles of the partner agencies be changed to enhance 
their participation or positively affect the development of NextGen? 

We believe that the partner agencies' participation in NextGen could be 
enhanced by incorporating NextGen goals and activities in the agencies' 
key planning documents and research agendas. For example, JPDO is 
working with FAA to refocus one of FAA's key planning documents--its 
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP)--on the implementation of 
NextGen. Formerly a plan for airport capacity, OEP has been expanded 
and revamped to become a comprehensive description of how FAA will 
implement NextGen. We believe that similar efforts by the other partner 
agencies could increase both their accountability to JPDO and JPDO's 
authority over them. In addition, JPDO has been working with OMB to 
develop a process for identifying NextGen-related research in the 
partner agencies' budgets (see 1e. (3)). 

c. What do you think about the idea of having each partner agency 
designate a senior-level official as the responsible individual for all 
NextGen-related programs in the agency? 

Designating a senior-level official within each partner agency as 
responsible for all of that agency's NextGen-related programs could be 
an effective way of helping to ensure that all the partner agencies are 
interacting on an equal footing and providing the needed leadership and 
commitment. 

d. Some observers have noted that there seems to be a lack of 
accountability and authority in the current JPDO structure, especially 
with regard to partner agencies. Would you agree or disagree with this 
assertion? If you agree with the assertion, how could this problem be 
addressed? 

We would agree that, as a planning and coordinating organization, JPDO 
lacks authority over the key human and technological resources of its 
partner agencies. Consequently, institutionalizing its process for 
collaborating with its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's 
ability to leverage its partner agencies' resources and facilitate the 
implementation of NextGen. Institutionalizing the collaborative process 
means that, as administrations and staffing within JPDO change over the 
years, those coming into JPDO will clearly understand what is expected 
of them and what time and resource commitments are entailed. JPDO, 
however, has not yet established some practices that are important to 
institutionalizing its collaborative process. For example, JPDO does 
not yet have formal long-term agreements among its partner agencies on 
their roles and responsibilities in creating NextGen. According to JPDO 
officials, a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the Secretary 
or another high-ranking official from each partner agency, will define 
the partner agencies' roles and responsibilities. To date, this MOU has 
been signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA, 
but remains unsigned by the Departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security. (See 2e.) 

e. What kind of changes to the authority and resources now provided to 
JPDO would you suggest to enhance its effectiveness in coordinating the 
partner agencies? 

Besides institutionalizing the collaborative process between JPDO and 
its partner agencies, elevating the position of JPDO within the NextGen 
implementation process could enhance its effectiveness in coordinating 
the partner agencies. In addition, JPDO could be provided with the 
resources and authority to establish a program oversight capacity that 
would enable it to perform such functions as (1) harmonizing the 
enterprise architectures among the partner agencies; (2) coordinating 
the research, development, and systems-engineering and integration 
activities of the cooperating agencies and industry; (3) overseeing 
multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with FAA, the selection of 
products or outcomes of research and development that would be moved to 
the next stage of a demonstration project through the Joint Resources 
Council (JRC); (5) overseeing the fundamental research activities that 
support the long-term strategic investments of NextGen by managing a 
research portfolio among NASA, academia, federally funded research and 
development centers, and industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline 
modeling and simulation environment for testing and evaluating 
alternative concepts to satisfy NextGen enterprise architecture 
requirements. 

JPDO's efforts to reorganize itself internally may also increase its 
authority and enhance the participation of its partner agencies. We see 
this as a positive development that extends JPDO's role beyond planning 
to focus more on the development of work products or "outcomes" that 
will contribute to the early development of NextGen and facilitate its 
implementation. As JPDO assumes more responsibility for facilitating 
NextGen's implementation, greater authority and resources would allow 
it to do more to coordinate the efforts of the partner agencies and 
work with the Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen 
point of contact. We believe that with adequate authority and funding, 
JPDO could acquire staff with the project management and systems 
engineering skills needed for JPDO to be an effective oversight and 
coordinating office for NextGen. 

3. JPDO has been described as having a government staff of fewer than a 
dozen full-time government employees to coordinate a long-term 
initiative involving tens of billions of dollars investment. Some 
observers say that JPDO will only be credible in its joint role when 
funded by all principal partners. Only FAA and NASA currently fund JPDO 
and its funding has not grown since inception despite its maturing 
requirements. 

a. What are your thoughts on the following suggestions related to 
funding JPDO? 

1) JPDO operations should be funded equally with money from FAA, NASA, 
DOD, DHS, and DOC until such time as a memorandum of understanding can 
be established to determine an alternative proportional scheme. 

We believe the partner agencies' funding of JPDO operations could be 
based on the roles and resources of the the partner agencies or the 
partner agencies could continue to contribute cash, expertise, and 
other resources as needed and available. For example, DOD plans to 
provide $5 million for a demonstration of information sharing across 
networks this year (FAA and DHS are also providing $5 million each for 
this demonstration). The other partner agencies provide a variety of 
"in-kind" services through personnel assigned to JPDO and research. 
Nonetheless, it is most important to ensure that JPDO's funding needs 
are fully met. 

2) FY09 funding from DOD, DHS, and DOC should match the ongoing 
commitment from FAA and NASA of at least $18M per entity for a total of 
$90M in FY09. 

Contributions of some amount by the partner agencies could encourage 
those agencies to have JPDO undertake work that is valuable to them as 
well as to JPDO. While some stakeholders have said that requiring $18 
million per agency, the amount currently contributed by FAA and NASA, 
would not be likely to have a significant impact on the R&D budgets of 
DOD, DHS, and DOC, we believe it is most important that the agencies 
contribute some amount to JPDO relative to their roles and 
responsibilities for making NextGen a reality. 

b. Some stakeholders and other observers have opined that it is 
essential that JPDO be independent of ATO to be successful in 
objectively facilitating the implementation of NextGen with its other 
governmental partners. 

In GAO's view, making JPDO independent of ATO could help to reduce or 
eliminate any perceptions on the part of JPDO's other governmental 
partners that JPDO might be too closely aligned with FAA to serve as an 
objective, independent facilitator of a multiagency partnership. 
Independence could also raise JPDO's authority and visibility in 
interagency deliberations by putting it on an equal footing with ATO 
and other FAA divisions. Furthermore, we believe loosening JPDO's ties 
to ATO could strengthen its linkages to DOD and DHS and enable it to 
work more effectively with other FAA divisions, such as Airports, for 
which JPDO has planning responsibilities. For example, JPDO is 
responsible for developing plans to increase airport capacity. Moving 
JPDO out of ATO could, however, make it harder for JPDO to obtain ATO's 
collaboration on efforts related to the implementation of NextGen. 

c. What are some alternative governance structures that could be used 
by JPDO? 

Besides moving JPDO out of ATO and thereby eliminating its dual 
reporting status (to both the FAA Administrator and the ATO Chief 
Operating Officer), the operation of the Joint Resources Council, the 
body within FAA that provides executive review and oversight of 
acquisitions, could be changed so that is the council would be chaired 
jointly by the Chief Operating Officer and the JPDO Director. 
(Currently, the JRC is chaired by the Federal Acquisition Executive, a 
responsibility delegated by the Administrator to the Vice President of 
ATO-Acquisition & Business Services.) Additionally, consideration could 
be given to creating the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen 
to put the JPDO Director on a more equal organizational footing with 
the ATO Chief Operating Officer. 

d. What are the advantages and disadvantages of any such governance 
structures, including potential unintended consequences? 

As discussed, moving JPDO out of ATO and elevating the position of the 
JPDO Director could increase JPDO's independence, raise its authority 
and visibility in interagency deliberations, strengthen its linkages to 
DHS and DOD, and enable it to work more effectively with other FAA 
divisions. Such changes could, however, make it harder for JPDO to 
collaborate with ATO. 

e. You testified that the Senior Policy Committee (SPC) meets only 
sporadically and has not been actively engaged in providing cross- 
agency leadership. What do you think would be the effect of a mandated 
schedule for SPC meetings, i.e., quarterly or semi-annually? 

To date, the SPC has not met regularly. During the time JPDO has been 
functioning--just over 3 years--the SPC has met four times and has not 
convened as a formal body since November 2005. Although JPDO's enabling 
legislation calls for the SPC to advise the Secretary of 
Transportation, provide policy guidance for NextGen, and provide 
ongoing policy review for the transformation of the air transportation 
system, the legislation does not require a meeting schedule for the 
SPC. To the extent that the SPC cannot voluntarily meet on a regular 
schedule, then we think requiring regular meetings could be beneficial. 

f. The JPDO Board has no legislative basis, as it was not created by 
Vision 100. A junior and senior level board (i.e., SPC) for governance 
is unprecedented in industry. Why not dissolve the JPDO Board? 

The JPDO Board acts as an action arm of the SPC members whose wide- 
ranging responsibilities limit their continuing and comprehensive 
involvement in NextGen. We believe a designated senior person from each 
agency who has access to and can act with the authority of the SPC 
member from that agency is needed to carry out necessary actions. 

g. What are your thoughts on the following governance related ideas? 

1) JPDO should report directly to the Office of the Secretary of 
Transportation. 

In GAO's view, JPDO should not report to the Secretary of 
Transportation because placing JPDO in the Secretary's office would 
remove it too far from the implementation and operations of NextGen. 

2) The JPDO Director should report to the FAA Administrator 
exclusively, rather than also to the ATO Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
as is currently the case and proposed in FAA's reauthorization. 

As discussed, this change could increase JPDO's independence and 
authority and strengthen JPDO's linkages to some other agencies and 
divisions, but it could also hamper interactions with ATO. 

3) FAA funding of JPDO should be direct from FAA Financial Services, as 
is the case for other independent internal FAA entities, e.g., Airports 
and Commercial Space Transportation, rather than through ATO. 

Yes, this change would be consistent with moving JPDO out of ATO and 
could help to raise the visibility and legitimacy of JPDO. If JPDO 
becomes organizationally independent of ATO, then its FAA funding 
should come directly from FAA Financial Services, as does the funding 
for FAA's Airports and Commercial Space Transportation divisions. 

4) FAA should create the position of "Associate Administrator for Next 
Generation Systems" that is co-equal internally with positions of the 
same title for Commercial Space Transportation, Airports, and Aviation 
Safety. 

FAA should consider creating the position of Associate Administrator of 
NextGen and elevating the JPDO Director to that post. We think that 
this would give greater credibility, authority, and visibility to this 
important position. 

5) If such a position were created what do you think would be the 
effect of the JPDO Director filling that position or reporting to it? 

The JPDO Director could fill that position. Another reporting level 
could increase red tape and bureaucracy. 

6) The Director of JPDO or Associate Administrator for Next Generation 
Systems should be a voting member of the FAA Joint Resources Council 
and participate in making capital investment decisions. 

In GAO's view, the JPDO Director should be a member of the Joint 
Resources Council (JRC), the body within FAA that makes capital 
investment decisions and provides executive review and oversight of 
acquisitions. The FAA reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO 
Director to be a voting member of the JRC, as is the Chief Operating 
Officer of ATO. This change would help ensure that NextGen plans are 
consistent with current operations. 

4. You have testified that FAA's funding system based on the current 
ticket and fuel taxes is sufficient to fund the NextGen. However, the 
Administrator suggests that if the current funding structure were able 
to support NextGen, it would be a much longer process and has argued 
for a user fee based system. 

a. What would be the effect, if any on the NextGen budget if Congress 
does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation financing reform 
package (ticket taxes; aviation fuel taxes) as part of a new 
authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel taxes in 
place? 

The current FAA funding structure can provide sufficient funding for 
NextGen--with some caveats. Congress has used the current funding 
structure--excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution--to fund FAA 
for many years. As the number of air travelers has grown, so have 
excise tax revenues. Even though revenues fell during the early years 
of this decade as the demand for air travel fell, they began to rise 
again in fiscal year 2004, and FAA estimates that if the current taxes 
remain in effect at their current rates, revenues will continue to 
increase. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO),[Footnote 5] revenues obtained from the existing funding 
structure are projected to increase substantially. Assuming the General 
Fund provides about 19 percent of FAA's budget, CBO estimates that 
through 2016 the Trust Fund can support about $19 billion in additional 
spending over the baseline FAA spending levels CBO has calculated for 
FAA (the 2006 funding level, growing with inflation) provided that most 
of the spending occurs after 2010. How far this money will go to fund 
modernization is subject to a number of uncertainties--including the 
future cost of NextGen investments, the volume of air traffic, the 
future cost of operating the national airspace system (NAS), and the 
levels of future appropriations for the Airport Improvement program, 
all of which influence funding for FAA. 

However, if the desired level of funding exceeded what was likely to be 
available from the Trust Fund at current tax rates, Congress could make 
further changes within the current structure that would provide FAA 
with additional revenue. Congress could raise more revenue from 
airspace system users for NextGen or for other purposes by raising the 
rates on one or more of the current excise taxes. Congress could also 
provide more General Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation's 
fiscal imbalance may make a larger contribution from this source 
difficult. 

b. If additional financial resources, in the range of $200 million 
annually for the next five years over the President's current budget 
request, were made available to JPDO, what would or should be its 
priorities aimed at expediting NextGen capabilities into the NAS? 

In GAO's view, JPDO could expedite the development of NextGen 
capabilities with accelerated funding over and above the President's 
current budget request. There are several areas in which additional 
research and development and deployment could be undertaken or 
accelerated with funding over and above the President's current budget 
request. Two closely related areas that could be candidates for 
increased funding are avionics development and aircraft equipage. 
Additional support in these areas could accelerate the transition to 
satellite-based navigation, which requires the commercial fleet to be 
equipped with advanced avionics. This transition would allow FAA to 
pursue the elimination of costly ground-based navigation aids; the 
transition to data link; and the standardization of future aircraft 
capabilities such as flight management systems, traffic collision 
avoidance systems, and modular avionics. The successful development and 
deployment of NextGen will require a series of incremental changes that 
must be tested to help ensure that they do not degrade the safety of 
the current system. Developing the evidence for regulatory bodies and 
for the public that these incremental changes are safe will be time 
consuming, costly, and difficult. For example, additional development 
funding could help with the testing of a system in which both pilots 
and air traffic controllers share in decisions about flight paths. Such 
testing would increase the level of safety assurance for en route and 
terminal automation and support the acquisition of air-to-ground data 
communications used in trajectory negotiation. 

Research and development for advanced concepts and applications could 
also accelerate and strengthen the area of airborne applications. This 
research area could include spacing and merging for approaches 
including: optimizing the spacing of aircraft that are in fight, 
allowing for closely spaced parallel approaches and reduced separation 
standards, and addressing the issue of wake turbulence. Additional 
funding could also allow for limited field trials to refine operational 
and system requirements, and work could be done to integrate unmanned 
aerial systems into the NAS. Establishing supporting processes for 
rulemaking and software certification could also accelerate the removal 
of potential bottlenecks to implementing NextGen. 

Another area that could benefit from additional funding is human 
factors research. As you know, one of the principal changes under 
NextGen will be a transformation from air traffic control to air 
traffic management. This will mean new roles for all participants in 
the system, including air traffic controllers and pilots. Additional 
funding could accelerate human factors research and training 
initiatives that are central to the success of NextGen, such as 
initiatives defining the relative responsibilities of aircraft 
personnel and ground controllers, and modernizing controller training 
through the use of advanced simulation and intelligent tutoring tools. 

5. Traditionally, NASA has developed promising technologies to a high 
maturity level enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic 
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA 
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical 
maturity, JPDO/FAA must find ways to have the necessary R&D work 
conducted by other organizations. This R&D includes work needed for 
planning as well that needed for validation and demonstrations. 

a. To what extent do FAA and the other federal partners have the 
resources and capability to meet the R&D needs in these two areas? 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formerly 
conducted the type of intermediate research and development (R&D) and 
demonstration projects that will be needed for the NextGen program, but 
the funding for these efforts was discontinued when NASA's aeronautical 
research portfolio was restructured to focus more on fundamental 
research. Although FAA has not fully determined the impact of the NASA 
restructuring on the R&D needs for NextGen, We agree with some key 
stakeholders that additional R&D funds will be needed and are critical 
for the timely development of NextGen. FAA recognizes that this is a 
critical issue and has already taken some action to address it. For 
example, in the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for FAA, 
funds have been included for developmental and transition research, in 
the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Activity 1 account. In light of the 
NASA restructuring, FAA has also undertaken a study to assess the 
nature and scope of its NextGen R&D needs. According to JPDO officials, 
this study will be completed in August 2007. FAA officials say the 
results of this study will be used as a basis for determining how any 
"gap" identified can be addressed with government or private sector 
resources. 

b. What actions should JPDO take to help ensure that the 
demonstrations, certifications, and transition R&D needed to validate 
new technologies be conducted in a timely manner so that NextGen will 
not be delayed? 

The time required to prototype, validate, and certify a technology can 
present a significant risk to the timely and cost-effective 
implementation of NextGen. We have studied the lead times required to 
prototype, validate, and certify new technologies. Neither JPDO nor FAA 
currently has sufficient resources to prototype, validate, and certify 
new technologies, and neither agency can currently develop the 
technologies internally without causing significant delays in the 
implementation of NextGen. In addition, stakeholders have expressed 
concern over the time it takes to develop rules for new equipment and 
the problems caused when equipment is fielded before rules are 
finalized. Any activities that will be required to implement new 
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for the 
certification of new systems, and develop technologies will take time. 
Just as important, the time required to prototype, validate, and 
certify a new technology must be balanced against the need to ensure 
the reliability of the technology and the safety of the flying public. 

If JPDO had sufficient resources, it could prototype, validate, and 
certify new technologies in a timely manner. We believe another option 
would be for JPDO to identify other organizations with the capacity to 
accomplish these tasks and provide them with the resources to take on 
these tasks. In addition, JPDO could work with FAA's Aviation Safety 
organization to establish the metrics needed to assess compliance with 
the standards to which these systems must conform. 

c. It takes considerable time to prototype, validate, and certify new 
technologies required for NextGen, in addition to time required for 
rulemakings. How much of a risk do these processes pose to timely 
development of NextGen? 

We cannot quantify how much of risk exists, but we think that a 
significant risk does exist for the timely development of NextGen 
because demonstrations and transition R&D are necessary to develop 
certification standards for new technologies. 

JPDO does not currently have the resources to prototype, validate, and 
certify new technologies. Moreover, several of the stakeholders with 
whom we spoke believed that even if JPDO were to obtain the needed 
resources, it could require as much as 5 years to establish the 
infrastructure needed to prototype, validate, and certify new 
technologies. Any activities that will be required to implement new 
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for certifying 
new systems, and develop technologies will take time. Just as 
important, the time required to prototype, validate, and certify new 
technologies must be balanced against the need to ensure the 
reliability and safety of the technology. 

d. What do you think of the following suggestions related to research 
and development? 

1) Establish JPDO as the modeler for the NextGen business case, with a 
formal charter and supporting resources made available to allow the 
creation of a National Virtual Test Bed to link government, academic, 
and industry simulation models in a nonpartisan and transparent fashion 
to assess technical options and quantify cost and benefits of the 
evolving implementation approach for NextGen. 

Yes, this role seems to be consistent with JPDO's authorizing 
legislation. As JPDO becomes more involved in facilitation, it must 
test, validate, and assess technical options and quantify their costs 
and benefits so that decision makers can evaluate the options for 
inclusion in the NAS. 

2) In order for FAA/JPDO to be able to conduct all but the most long-
term, fundamental research supporting NextGen development, some or all 
of NASA's aeronautics research capabilities should be transferred to 
FAA/ JPDO, specifically Langley Research Center and portions of Ames 
Research Center. 

In GAO's view, some or all of NASA's aeronautical research capabilities 
that are located at Langley Research Center and portions of Ames 
Research Center could be transferred to FAA or JPDO. However, another 
alternative to consider might be to make more use of the resources 
available at the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and 
the FAA Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This decision 
will be informed by the results of a JPDO study that is currently 
underway to assess the nature and scope of NextGen's R&D needs. 
According to JPDO officials, this study will be completed in August 
2007. 

(540156): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the 
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007); Joint Planning and Development Office: 
Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 29, 2007); Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring 
the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007); 
and Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges 
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-
07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006). 

[2] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition 
program baselines, which define cost, schedule, performance, and 
benefit parameters for programs over their full life cycle. 

[3] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition 
program baselines which define cost, schedule, performance, and benefit 
parameters for programs over the full lifecycle of the program. 

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