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United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

June 20, 2006: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business 
Case before Making Further Investments: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The F-22A is the Air Force's next generation air superiority[Footnote 
1] fighter aircraft. It incorporates a low observable (stealth) and 
highly maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a new 
engine capable of sustained supersonic flight without the use of 
afterburners. It was originally designed to counter threats posed by 
the Soviet Union and was intended to replace the F-15 fighter in the 
air-to-air combat role. However, the Air Force now plans to add a more 
robust ground attack and intelligence-gathering capability not 
previously envisioned but now considered "necessary" to increase the 
utility of the aircraft. In December 2005, the Air Force changed 
designations from the F/A-22 to the F-22A. The aircraft maintained all 
current capabilities as well as the expanded ground attack 
capabilities. Officials have initiated a modernization program to 
develop and integrate these new capabilities. 

In March 2005,[Footnote 2] we reported that despite substantial changes 
to the F-22A program since it started in 1986, Air Force leaders have 
not developed a new business case for investing billions more dollars 
to modernize the aircraft. Over time quantities have been reduced, and 
in recent years both funding and quantities have been in a state of 
flux. Given significant changes in quantities and planned capabilities, 
the large investments still planned, and the potential for further 
changes, you requested that we review the F-22A program. Specifically, 
we assessed the need for a new business case[Footnote 3] before further 
investments are made in the F-22A program and statutory criteria the 
Air Force is required to meet to enter a multiyear contract for the 
remaining aircraft. 

To assess the Air Force's business case for further investments in the 
F-22A program, we reviewed recent Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) and F-22A requirements documents. We 
also reviewed F-22A planned modernization schedules and documents and 
interviewed program officials from the F-22A program office, Air Combat 
Command, and the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Tactical Air. 
To assess the Air Force's proposed use of a multiyear contract for the 
remaining F-22As, we compared program documentation on cost, schedule, 
and performance with statutory criteria for entering into a multiyear 
contract. We conducted our review between August 2005 and April 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

Based on our review, in our opinion, the DOD has not demonstrated the 
need or value for making further investments in the F-22A program. The 
Air Force's current stated "need" is for 381 F-22As to satisfy air-to- 
air missions and recently added requirements for more robust ground 
attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities. However, because of 
past cost overruns and current budget constraints, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) states that it can now afford only 183 F- 
22As. This leaves a 198-aircraft gap between the Air Force's stated 
need and what is currently affordable. The Air Force is planning to 
invest about $4.4 billion through 2011 to add more robust ground attack 
and intelligence gathering capabilities for the F-22A. However, because 
of the large aircraft gap between stated Air Force requirements and 
current and future budget realities, it may not be prudent to make 
additional investments for these new missions and capabilities. 
Furthermore, alternatives such as the Joint Strike Fighter and F-15 
might be able to execute ground attack more cost-effectively given the 
substantially fewer numbers of F-22As that OSD has committed to buy. 

In December 2005, OSD restructured the F-22A program by extending 
production to 2010, adding 4 aircraft for a total planned procurement 
of 183 F-22As and adding $1 billion to the procurement program. Under 
the restructured acquisition program, the Air Force is planning to 
procure a total of 60 F-22As in a multiyear procurement. However, in 
the Air Force's multiyear procurement justification package sent to 
Congress on May 16, 2006, it stated that an additional $674 million is 
needed to fully fund the multiyear program being proposed. Our work led 
us to make observations on issues that could affect the Air Force's 
ability to satisfy several of the statutory criteria for entering into 
a multiyear contract, including the documentation of savings, a stable 
design, and available funding. 

We believe the Congress should consider withholding additional funding 
for procurement and modernization until the Department completes a 
comprehensive business case that addresses the concerns we have raised 
herein. In response to a draft of this report, the Department stated 
that a recently completed Joint Air Dominance (JAD) study conducted by 
DOD adequately identified the quantity and mix of tactical aircraft 
needed and thus already satisfied the intent of our recommendation. We 
have asked OSD to provide us access to the JAD study, but it has not 
yet done so. We plan to pursue this matter with the Department. 
However, because Congressional deliberations on this issue are ongoing, 
we believe it is important to provide the data and analysis in the 
report at this time. Given the way this program has unfolded, with 
frequently changing OSD-approved requirements, repeated cost overruns, 
and given that DOD did not object to the data and analysis contained in 
the report, we are not changing our matter for Congressional 
consideration. If Congress does decide to provide more funding for the 
F-22A program, that funding should be conditioned on DOD providing the 
JAD study and subjecting it to independent review to ensure that it 
provides adequate justification for sound investment of taxpayer 
resources. 

Background: 

The F-22A began development in 1986 to replace the F-15 air superiority 
aircraft. The continued need for the F-22A, the quantities required, 
and modification costs to perform its mission have been the subject of 
a continuing debate within DOD and the Congress. Supporters cite its 
advanced features--stealth, supercruise speed, maneuverability, and 
integrated avionics--as integral to the Air Force's Global Strike 
initiative and for maintaining air superiority over potential future 
adversaries.[Footnote 4] Critics argue that the Soviet threat the 
fighter was originally designed to counter no longer exists and that 
its remaining budget dollars could be better invested in enhancing 
current air assets and acquiring new and more transformational 
capabilities that will allow DOD to meet evolving threats. The Air 
Force has already committed funds to acquire 122 F-22As. To complete 
the procurement program, it now plans to buy the remaining F-22As using 
a 3-year multiyear contract that ends procurement in 2010. To begin the 
multiyear strategy, the Air Force has included $2.0 billion for advance 
procurement of parts and subassembly activities in its fiscal year 2007 
budget request. Additionally, it has included $800 million for 
continuing development and modifications of existing aircraft. 

DOD Has Not Completed a New Business Case to Justify Further 
Investments in the F-22A Program: 

The Air Force's business case for the F-22A program is unexecutable as 
planned because there is a significant mismatch between the Air Force's 
stated "need" for the F-22A aircraft and the resources OSD is willing 
to commit. According to Air Force officials, a minimum of 381 F-22A 
aircraft are needed to satisfy today's national security requirements, 
yet OSD states it can only afford to buy 183 F-22A aircraft. This 
results in a 198-aircraft gap in capability. Additionally, the Air 
Force now states a "need" for greater ground attack and intelligence- 
gathering capabilities, not included in the existing business case that 
will require an extensive modernization program. The value of this 
planned investment in modernization is highly questionable absent a new 
business case that supports the minimum capability-based need, given 
credible current and future threats, and that considers various options 
that are both affordable and sustainable over time. 

The Air Force states a need for one squadron of 24 F-22A aircraft for 
each of the 10 Air Expeditionary Forces, the planned organization of 
the Air Force aircraft and personnel for operations and deployments. 
This requirement is established to carry out missions including support 
in major regional conflicts, home land security, and others. According 
to the Air Force, this requires a total of 381 F-22As, 240 primary 
aircraft and 141 aircraft for training, attrition, and to allow for 
periodic aircraft depot maintenance. 

OSD has restructured the F-22A acquisition program twice in the last 2 
years (in December 2004 and December 2005) to free up funds for other 
priorities. These decisions have created a mismatch between the Air 
Force's stated requirements and what OSD considers an affordable 
quantity of F-22As. In December 2004, OSD reduced the program to 179 F- 
22As to save about $10.5 billion. This budget decision also terminated 
procurement in 2008. Then in December 2005, OSD changed the F-22A 
program again, adding $1 billion to extend production for 2 years to 
ensure a 5TH generation fighter[Footnote 5] aircraft production line 
would remain in operation in case the Joint Strike Fighter experienced 
delays or problems. OSD also added 4 aircraft for a total planned 
procurement of 183 F-22As. 

The Air Force is currently planning to provide the F-22A with greater 
ground attack and intelligence-gathering capabilities. It estimates 
these will cost about $4.4 billion between 2005 and 2011. It is also 
planning additional modernization efforts for more of these 
capabilities in the future, but the cost, content, and timing has not 
yet been determined. However, the 198-aircraft gap between the Air 
Force's stated "requirement" and the planned procurement quantities 
raises questions on whether the F-22A will be able to carry out its 
planned missions. The Air Force is buying less than half the required 
381 aircraft to fill out its planned organizational structure-- 
necessary to carry out planned air-to-air, ground attack, and 
intelligence-gathering missions. Other alternatives could be available 
to carry out the ground attack and intelligence gathering capabilities. 
For example, DOD is also investing billions of dollars to develop the 
Joint Strike Fighter aircraft--a 5TH generation fighter-intended for 
ground attack and billions of dollars to develop intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms and sensors. 

Air Force Is Requesting to Use a Multiyear Contract for the F-22A: 

The Air Force is proposing to buy the remaining 60 F-22As over a 3 year 
period with a multiyear contract and submitted its justification to the 
Congress on May 16, 2006.[Footnote 6] To enter into a multiyear 
contract the Air Force must first meet the statutory criteria listed in 
10 U.S.C. § 2306b (a). Table 1 shows the six criteria that must be 
satisfied before entering into a multiyear contract and our 
observations on issues that could affect the Air Force's ability to 
satisfy several of the criteria. 

Table 1: Observations of F-22A Multiyear Contract Criteria as of April 
2006: 

Multiyear criteria: Contract will result in substantial savings; 
GAO observations: The Air Force has not completed an estimate of 
savings, but its preliminary indications are a maximum of 5 percent 
savings. However, when the unit procurement costs for the planned 
multiyear approach is compared to how the Air Force had previously 
planned to buy the remaining aircraft, the unit procurement costs 
increase under multiyear. 

Multiyear criteria: Minimum need expected to remain substantially 
unchanged during contract period in terms of production rates and total 
quantities; 
GAO observations: Quantities have continually been in a state of flux 
in the F-22A program including changes in the last two budget 
submissions. 

Multiyear criteria: Reasonable expectation agency head will request 
funding at required level to avoid contract cancellation; 
GAO observations: The Air Force has indicated that its multiyear budget 
is currently under funded by $674 million. Further, it is proposing to 
use incremental funding rather than fully funding each aircraft lot. 

Multiyear criteria: There is stable design, and technical risks are not 
excessive; 
GAO observations: While the design for the baseline F-22A aircraft, 
designed primarily for an air superiority role, is stable, the design 
for the ground attack capability to be added has not been demonstrated 
and thus cannot be considered "stable.". 

Multiyear criteria: Estimates of contract cost and cost avoidance are 
realistic; 
GAO observations: The Air Force has not completed its analysis of 
contract cost or cost avoidance at this time. 

Multiyear criteria: Use of contract will promote national security of 
the United States; 
GAO observations: No observation. 

Source: GAO Analysis and 10 U.S.C. 2306b. 

[End of table] 

The Air Force has requested statutory authorization for a multiyear 
contract for the remaining F-22As as part of the fiscal year 2007 
authorization and budget process in order to award the contract in 
early 2007. As shown in the table above, we believe there are some 
critical considerations that need to be addressed before the multiyear 
plan can be justified. These include the following considerations: 

Savings--The Air Force stated in its May 16, 2006, multiyear 
justification package that cost avoidance would approximate $225 
million or about 2.7 percent. This is based on comparing three annual 
contracts to a single multiyear contract to buy 56 aircraft. The 
document also identifies a need for an additional $674 million to fully 
fund a 60 aircraft multiyear contract as was proposed in the fiscal 
year 2007 President's budget. While building an estimate for three 
separate annual contracts provides a basis to compare to a multiyear 
approach, it is not how the Air Force had previously planned to buy the 
aircraft remaining in the F-22A program. The fiscal year 2006 
President's Budget included procurement costs to buy the remaining 56 F-
22As in two lots--29 F-22As in 2007 and 27 F-22As in 2008. If the unit 
procurement costs of this previous plan are compared to the planned 
multiyear procurement unit costs for 60 aircraft as proposed in the 
fiscal year 2007 President's Budget, the unit costs increase by 10 
percent. In other words, the unit procurement costs increase from $166 
million per aircraft to $183 million per aircraft for the proposed 
multiyear contract. 

Funding--The Air Force has stated that the proposed multiyear plan for 
60 aircraft is under funded by about $674 million. The Air Force 
believes it will need these funds in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. 
Additionally, the Air Force has proposed using incremental funding to 
pay for the multiyear contract. Instead of fully funding the buy for 
each fiscal year, it plans four funding increments--economic order 
quantity, advanced buy, subsystem, and final assembly. Incremental 
funding for multiyear procurement is neither permitted by the annual 
DOD appropriations act,[Footnote 7] nor the multiyear authorizing 
statute which requires that funds only be obligated under a multiyear 
contract "for procurement of a complete and usable end item."[Footnote 
8] However, the Air Force is seeking an exception to these requirements 
in its request to Congress for statutory authorization for the 
multiyear contract. The Air Force's proposed F-22A multiyear strategy 
includes an increment of funding in each fiscal year to begin 
manufacturing subsystems, not considered a complete and useable end 
item. For example, the fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $1.5 
billion for subassemblies. It would not be until fiscal year 2008 that 
the final assembly would be fully funded. 

Design Stability--The baseline F-22A aircraft, designed primarily for 
the air superiority role, has successfully completed development and 
initial operational testing, and its design is stable for that 
particular mission. However, the Air Force has stated that to be 
"effective" in the future a more robust ground attack capability is 
needed for the F-22A. It plans to spend several billions of additional 
dollars to add this ground attack capability. A key to the success of 
this effort is the development and integration of a new radar. The Air 
Force expects to take delivery of the first aircraft with the new radar 
in November 2006 but the software needed to provide the robust ground 
attack capability will not be completed until 2010. According to a 
representative of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E), the key to achieving a more robust ground attack capability 
will center on the integration of this new radar. A December 2005 
report issued by the Defense Contract Management Agency stated that 
problems encountered during the test and integration of the new radar 
has added risk to the development program. Until software and 
integration testing in the F-22A have been successfully completed, we 
consider the design unstable creating the potential for significant 
cost overruns and schedule delays. 

Conclusions: 

The F-22A development has spanned more than a 19-year period during 
which time requirements have changed both in terms of the quantity of 
aircraft needed and the capabilities that would be incorporated. At the 
same time, new budgetary constraints have grown and other priorities 
have come to the forefront in DOD, including the need for funding the 
war on terrorism. While the Air Force's stated need is 381 F-22As, OSD 
will commit to fund only 183. The Air Force also states the basic 
capabilities developed for the F-22 are not sufficient to be effective 
in the current and future national security environment. The conditions 
facing the F-22A program are significantly different than those 
addressed by the original business case, yet despite these significant 
changes the Air Force has not developed a new business case to justify 
currently planned and proposed additional investments in the F-22A. 
Given our nation's growing fiscal challenges, the changing security 
threats, and prevailing best business practices for acquisitions, it is 
highly questionable whether it is prudent to continue in the current 
path proposed by the Air Force. DOD must begin to make the difficult 
choices required to counter current and credible future threats at 
current and expected future resource levels because it will not have 
enough money to purchase everything that it wants. Furthermore, going 
to a multiyear procurement strategy appears to be more costly than 
previous Air Force plans and would tie up significant amounts of funds 
at a time when DOD already has more wants than it is likely to be able 
to afford and sustain over time. The Department needs to reevaluate the 
value delivered by continuing production of the F-22A past what it has 
already committed to by examining the likely future threat and risk 
environment, the funding it can make available relative to other 
demands, and the alternative ways to achieve air-to-air and air-to- 
ground military superiority. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Because of the large disparity between what the Air Force wants for the 
F-22A program and what OSD has committed to fund, there is a 
significant break in the business case to justify buying more F-22As. 
For this reason, Congress may want to consider withholding additional 
funding for procurement and modernization until the Department 
completes a comprehensive business case that addresses the concerns we 
have raised herein. The additional issues surrounding this matter and 
our reporting are discussed in the Agency Comment section of this 
report. 

Recommendation: 

Because of the significant and continuing changes in the F-22A program 
that have created an environment of investment uncertainty as well as 
the significant mismatch between stated Air Force needs and wants and 
future resource levels, we recommend that Secretary of Defense delay 
further investments in F-22A procurement and modernization until it 
completes a comprehensive business case analysis that adequately 
considers alternatives, justifies the need for further investments, and 
reconciles the numbers of F-22As that are needed (i.e. based on 
credible current and future threats and considering other alternative 
approaches) as well as affordable and sustainable (i.e., based on 
current and expected DOD resource levels). 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it did 
not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense delay 
further investments in F-22A procurement and modernization until it 
completes a new business case analysis that adequately considers 
alternatives, justifies the need for further investments, and 
reconciles the numbers of F-22As that are needed. They stated a Joint 
Air Dominance (JAD) study conducted by DOD adequately identified the 
quantity and mix of tactical aircraft needed. DOD stated that delaying 
investments in the F-22A would disrupt production and create program 
instability. DOD also stated that keeping the F-22A production line 
active, preserves the Department's options and sustains the industrial 
base for efficient transition to Joint Strike Fighter production. 

Preserving options and the industrial bases will be costly. The 2007 
future year's defense plan added $1.05 billion for a 60 aircraft 
multiyear procurement contract and subsequently the Air Force 
identified an additional $674 million needed to fully fund this plan. 
Therefore, the total additional multiyear procurement cost is $1.724 
billion. Furthermore, it will add two years to the F-22A procurement 
program. This represents significant opportunity cost. That is, the 
funding used here will not be available to support other DOD 
priorities. If preserving options and the industrial base are primary 
reasons for these added costs and the extension of the procurement 
program, DOD should make them more transparent to the Congress as it 
seeks authorizations and appropriations to execute this plan. 

As to the Department's position that they have already conducted the 
business case called for in our recommendation, we asked OSD to provide 
us access to the JAD study, but they have not yet done so. Because 
Congressional deliberations are ongoing, we believe it is important to 
provide the data and analysis in the report at this time. Given the way 
this program has unfolded, with frequently changing OSD-approved 
requirements, repeated cost overruns, and delays in fielding capability 
to the warfighter, and given that DOD did not object to the data and 
analysis contained in the report, we are not changing our matter for 
Congressional consideration. If Congress does decide to provide more 
funding for the F-22A program, that funding should be conditioned on 
DOD providing the JAD study and subjecting it to independent review to 
ensure that it provides adequate justification for sound investment of 
taxpayer resources. 

- - - - -: 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 
this report, please contact Michael Sullivan on (202) 512-4163 or 
Michael Hazard on 937-258-7917. Principal contributors to this report 
were Marvin Bonner and Daniel Chen. 

Sincerely: 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General Of the United States: 

Enclosure: 

Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3015 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C 20301-3015: 
Acquisition And Technology: 

June 8, 2006: 

Mr. David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Walker: 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report, `Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22 Business Case 
Before Making Further Investments,' dated May 8, 2006 (GAO Code 120474/ 
GAO-06-455R). 

The Department does not agree with draft GAO report's recommendation to 
delay further investment in the F-22. While the Department agrees with 
the GAO's emphasis on the importance of supporting our procurement 
decisions with appropriate "Business Case" analysis, we have performed 
such analysis to support F-22 and tactical aircraft force structure 
decisions, and will continue to do so. Additional information and 
rationale for the Department's position is summarized below. 

Implementing the GAO's recommendation to delay investment in the F-22 
would disrupt production and create program instability. This 
instability would be detrimental to our nation's defense capabilities 
and our tactical aircraft industrial base. Over the past several 
procurement lots, the Air Force has been very successfully working with 
the prime contractor to drive down costs. Unit flyaway costs have come 
down 35% between Lot 1 and Lot 5. If stopped, production re-start would 
be very costly and difficult to resume, breaking this positive trend. 
Likewise, there is considerable modernization work ongoing. To stop 
this work would result in large termination costs and would be very 
costly to resume. Multiple GAO reports have noted the negative impact 
that program instability has on program cost, schedule, and 
performance. 

The assumptions on which the GAO's recommendations are based were not 
understood. The quantity and mix of tactical aircraft to be procured by 
the Department has been and remains an area of significant "Business 
Case" analysis. As the geopolitical and fiscal environment changes, we 
continually reassess national security requirements and adjust our 
force structure as needed. Keeping the F-22 production line active, 
preserves the Department's options and sustains the industrial base for 
efficient transition to Joint Strike fighter production. 

To support the Quadrennial Defense Review and preparation of the 
President's Fiscal Year 2007 Budget (PB07), the Department performed a 
Joint Air Dominance (JAD) Study. The JAD Study examined options for 
varying levels within the strike fighter mix. The Department looked at 
the war scenarios and cost implications of buying fewer variants of 
Joint Strike Fighters, increasing and decreasing the number of F-22s, 
and buying more legacy aircraft at the expense of fewer fifth 
generation platforms. The results of these analyses are reflected in 
PB07, which sets forth a balanced portfolio of tactical aircraft 
assets, including Joint Strike Fighter, F-22 and F/A-18E/F. The draft 
GAO report makes note of, "the large disparity between what the Air 
Force wants for the F-22A program and what OSD has committed to fund, 
there is a significant break in the business case to justify buying 
more F-22As." The 381 aircraft the Air Force analysis indicates are 
required is a fiscally unconstrained projection of Service needs. The 
QDR analysis reflects fiscal realities and the need to address 
competing defense priorities. The JAD analysis showed that a balanced 
force structure mix of fifth generation fighters, with legacy F/A-18E/ 
Fs, F-15Es and conventionally armed bombers, best met our requirements. 
Buying fifth generation tactical aircraft assets (F-22 and JSF), for 
both the Air Force and the Department of the Navy, optimized 
capability, affordability, and mitigated risk better than other 
options. 

A detailed response is attached. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this draft report. 

Signed by: 

James I. Finley: 

Attachments: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated May 8, 2006 Gao Code 120474/gao-06-455r: 

"Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present A New F-22 Business Case Before 
Making Further Investments" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation: 

RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense delay 
further investments in F-22A procurement and modernization until it 
completes a comprehensive business case analysis that adequately 
considers alternatives, justifies the need for further investments, and 
reconciles the numbers of F-22As that are needed (i.e., based on 
credible current and future threats and considering other alternative 
approaches) as well as affordable and sustainable (i.e. based on 
current and expected DOD resource levels) (p. 7 GAO Draft Report). 

DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur with the GAO recommendation. 

* The F-22 is currently in full rate production. A delay in F-22 
procurement would result in production shut down and impact the entire 
F-22 supplier base consisting of thousands of companies. Once 
interrupted, it would be very costly, and time consuming to resurrect. 
The F-22 industrial base involves many of the same companies that will 
manufacture components for the Joint Strike Fighter when it enters 
production. Disruption of F-22 production could cause many of those 
suppliers to move to other business activities, seriously weakening the 
nation's tactical aircraft industrial base. 

* The assumption on which this recommendation was made is not accurate. 
The quantity and mix of tactical aircraft to be procured by the 
department has been and remains the subject of continuous analysis. 
Most recently, in support of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the 
Department examined a number of options for varying levels within the 
strike fighter mix. The results of this Joint Air Dominance (JAD) study 
are reflected in the President's Fiscal Year 2007 Budget which sets 
forth a balanced portfolio of tactical aircraft assets, including Joint 
Strike Fighter, F-22 and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft that have 
already proven their worth in the Global War On Terrorism. We looked at 
the war fight and cost implications of buying fewer variants of Joint 
Strike Fighters, increasing and decreasing the number of F-22s, and 
buying more legacy aircraft at the expense of fewer fifth generation 
platforms. Our analysis showed that buying fifth generation tactical 
aircraft (F-22 and JSF), for both the Air Force and the Department of 
the Navy, optimized capabilities and mitigated risk better than other 
options. 

* In the JAD studies supporting the Quadrennial Defense Review, the F-
22 clearly demonstrated its superiority as an air dominance fighter 
with the JSF also showing strong capabilities. These fifth generation 
fighters are needed in the early days of a conflict to gain air 
dominance by neutralizing advanced air and surface threats, and thereby 
"opening the door" for follow-on joint forces, including non-stealthy 
legacy tactical aviation and long-range strike aircraft. The quantity 
of 183 F-22s, reflected in the P1307, incorporates the ability to 
reposition some of the F-22 aircraft to other theaters, or to the 
homeland, after suppression of the major threats to air dominance in 
the early days of a conflict. Changing the mix of F-22 and JSF aircraft 
only marginally increased effectiveness. When fielded, the tri-service 
Joint Strike Fighters, with their superior strike capability, will 
complement F-22 capabilities and can remain in theater with legacy 
aircraft to conduct strike missions and suppress any remaining air 
dominance threats. The logistics plans used in the analysis reflected 
the Combatant Commander's war plans. 

* The analysis used the projected enemy's order of battle provided by 
the Central Intelligence Agency/Defense Intelligence Agency-approved 
Joint Capability Force Assessment for the 2024 timeframe. The selected 
scenario for the modeling was the most challenging to air dominance in 
terms of enemy capability and quantity, and it was in accordance with 
the Joint Staff Multi-Service Force Deployment. The results showed that 
a balanced force structure mix of fifth generation fighters with legacy 
F/A-18E/Fs, F-15Es, and conventionally armed bombers met our 
requirements and balanced cost and risk. 

* Modernization and continuous improvement are characteristics of many 
defense programs and are essential to maintaining the military 
advantage of our forces in an environment of rapid proliferation of 
advanced technologies. The Department's decision to hold F-22 
procurement at 183 aircraft, increases the importance of the 
modernization program. With fewer aircraft than originally envisioned, 
the F-22 must bring a high level of capability with continuous 
improvement, to maintain the U.S. advantage in air dominance. 

(120558): 

[End of Section] 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the 
conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive 
interference by the enemy. 

[2] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to 
Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities, GAO-05-304 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 

[3] A business case provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the 
warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the chosen 
concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within 
existing resources--technologies, design, funding, and time. 
Establishing a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks 
and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case 
and invites failure. 

[4] Global Strike is one of six complementary concepts of operations 
laying out the Air Force's ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited- 
duration and extended attacks against targets. 

[5] F-22A and F-35 are considered 5TH generation fighter aircraft as 
compared to the F-15, F-16, F/A-18 and F-117. The primary 
characteristics are Very Low Observable (VLO) stealth and information 
fusion capabilities that make 5TH generation aircraft more survivable 
and lethal. 

[6] The Air Force needs statutory authorization for its proposed 
multiyear contract under 10 U.S.C. § 2306b and the annual DOD 
appropriations act. 

[7] Section 8008 of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 Department of 
Defense Appropriations Acts (Public Laws 108-287 and 109-148, 
respectively) require full funding of units to be procured. 

[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2306b (i)(4)(A). This restriction was added by section 
820 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (Public Law 107-314). 

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