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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Congressional Requesters: 

April 2011: 

Commercial Nuclear Waste: 

Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and 
Lessons Learned: 

[Note: This report was reissued on April 13, 2011, with clarifications 
to the Highlights page] 

GAO-11-229: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-229, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Spent nuclear fuel-—considered very hazardous-—is accumulating at 
commercial reactor sites in 33 states. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, as amended, directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to study 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a site for a repository for this spent fuel. 
In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application for the repository, 
but in March 2010 moved to withdraw it. However, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the courts—-as a result of lawsuits—-
could compel DOE to resume the licensing process. 

This report examines (1) the basis for DOE’s decision to terminate the 
Yucca Mountain program, (2) the termination steps DOE has taken and 
their effects, (3) the major impacts if the repository were terminated, 
and (4) the principal lessons learned. GAO reviewed documents and 
interviewed knowledgeable parties. 

What GAO Found: 

DOE decided to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program 
because, according to DOE officials, it is not a workable option and 
there are better solutions that can achieve a broader national 
consensus. DOE did not cite technical or safety issues. DOE also did 
not identify alternatives, but it did create a Blue Ribbon Commission 
to evaluate and recommend alternatives. 

Amid uncertainties about the status of the repository license, DOE 
took an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca Mountain program 
by September 30, 2010. DOE has taken steps to preserve scientific and 
other data, eliminated the jobs of all federal employees working on 
the program, and terminated program activities by contractors. DOE 
also disposed of property from its Las Vegas offices by declaring the 
property abandoned. This procedure saved DOE time and costs, according 
to officials. However, DOE’s documentation for this process was 
limited, given the variety and volume of property disposed of. In 
addition, DOE did not finalize a plan for the shutdown, nor did it 
identify or assess risks of the shutdown, consistent with federal 
internal control standards and DOE orders. Some of DOE’s shutdown 
steps would likely hinder progress, should NRC or the courts require 
DOE to resume the license application review process. 

Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program could bring 
benefits, such as allowing DOE to search for a more acceptable 
alternative, which could help avoid the costly delays experienced by 
Yucca Mountain. However, there is no guarantee that a more acceptable 
or less costly alternative will be identified; termination could 
instead restart a costly and time-consuming process to find and 
develop an alternative permanent solution. It would also likely 
prolong the need for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor 
sites, which would have financial and other impacts. For example, the 
federal government bears part of the storage costs as a result of 
industry lawsuits over DOE’s failure to take custody of commercial 
spent nuclear fuel in 1998, as required. These costs exceed $15.4 
billion and could grow by an additional $500 million a year after 2020. 

Published reports and our interviews—with federal, state, and local 
government officials and representatives of various national 
organizations—suggest two broad lessons for developing a future waste 
management strategy. First, social and political opposition to a 
permanent repository, not technical issues, is the key obstacle. 
Important tools for overcoming such opposition include transparency, 
economic incentives, and education. Second, it is important that a 
waste management strategy have consistent policy, funding, and 
leadership, especially since the process will likely take decades. 
Some federal and other stakeholders suggested that a more predictable 
funding mechanism and an independent organization may be better suited 
than DOE to overseeing nuclear waste management. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO suggests that Congress consider whether a more predictable funding 
mechanism would enhance future efforts and whether an independent 
organization would be more effective. GAO also recommends that DOE 
assess remaining risks of the shutdown; create a plan to resume 
licensing if necessary; and report on federal property and its 
disposition. NRC generally concurred with a draft of this report, but 
DOE strongly disagreed with the draft and the recommendations, 
questioning the veracity of GAO’s information. GAO continues to believe 
its findings and recommendations are sound. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229] or key 
components. For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-
3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. [End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Basis for DOE's Decision to Terminate the Yucca Mountain 
Repository Program: 

Steps DOE Has Taken to Terminate the Yucca Mountain Repository Program 
and Their Effects: 

Termination of the Repository Program Could Provide Some Benefits, but 
Adverse Impacts Are Likely: 

Past Experience May Yield Potential Lessons for Future Nuclear Waste 
Management Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: A List of Reports Reviewed: 

Appendix III: Organizations We Obtained Input From: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Name, State, NRC Region, and Status of Commercial Nuclear 
Reactors Sites We Contacted: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Current Storage Sites for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel and 
Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository Site: 

Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Dry Casks at the Trojan 
Independent Fuel Storage Installation in Oregon: 

Abbreviations: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NWPA: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: 

OCRWM: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management: 

WIPP: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 8, 2011: 

The Honorable Fred Upton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Chairman Emeritus:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Cliff Stearns:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Greg Walden:
House of Representatives: 

Nuclear energy, which supplied about 20 percent of the nation's 
electric power in 2010, offers a domestic source of energy with low 
emissions but also presents difficulties--including what to do with 
nuclear fuel after it has been used and removed from commercial power 
reactors. This material, known as spent nuclear fuel, is highly 
radioactive and considered one of the most hazardous substances on 
earth.[Footnote 1] The current national inventory of nearly 65,000 
metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored at 75 sites in 
33 states and increases by about 2,000 metric tons each year. 

Since the publication of a 1957 report by the National Academy of 
Sciences,[Footnote 2] a geologic repository has been considered the 
safest and most secure method of isolating spent nuclear fuel and 
other types of nuclear waste from humans and the environment. In 1983, 
the President signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 
which directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for 
a federal deep geologic repository to dispose of spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level nuclear waste.[Footnote 3] DOE studied six sites in the 
West and three sites in the South, and by 1986, DOE recommended three 
candidate sites for site characterization: Hanford in Washington 
state, Deaf Smith County in Texas, and Yucca Mountain in Nevada. In 
1987, however, Congress amended the act to direct DOE to focus its 
efforts only on Yucca Mountain--a site about 100 miles northwest of 
Las Vegas. Under this amendment, DOE was to perform studies to 
determine if the site was suitable for a repository and make a site 
recommendation to the President if it met certain requirements. DOE 
was also authorized to contract with commercial nuclear reactor 
operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for disposal at 
the repository beginning in January 1998. Ultimately DOE was unable to 
meet this 1998 date because of a series of delays due to, among other 
things, state and local opposition to the construction of a permanent 
nuclear waste repository in Nevada and technical complexities. 
[Footnote 4] DOE issued a viability assessment in 1998 that stated 
Yucca Mountain was still a viable alternative and, in 2002, 
recommended the site to the President. In turn, the President 
recommended the site to Congress, which subsequently approved the 
Yucca Mountain site as the location for the nation's geologic 
repository. 

In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking authorization to construct a high- 
level waste repository at Yucca Mountain. NRC has regulatory authority 
to authorize construction of the repository, as well as operations and 
closure of a repository, which are separate licensing actions. In the 
application, DOE planned to open the repository in 2017, but later 
delayed the date to 2020. In March 2009, however, the Secretary of 
Energy announced plans to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository 
program and instead study other options for nuclear waste management. 
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, released in February 
2010, proposed eliminating all funding for the Yucca Mountain 
repository program and the DOE office responsible for nuclear waste 
management--the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
(OCRWM). At about the same time, the administration also directed DOE 
to establish a Blue Ribbon Commission of recognized experts to study 
nuclear waste management alternatives. The commission is scheduled to 
issue a report by January 2012. 

On March 3, 2010, DOE submitted a motion to the NRC's Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board to withdraw its license application with 
prejudice, a term described by DOE to mean the Yucca Mountain site 
would be excluded from further consideration as a repository site. On 
June 29, 2010, the licensing board denied DOE's motion, ruling that 
DOE was obligated under NWPA to continue with the licensing effort. 
The board noted that, even if it approved the license application, 
there was no guarantee the Yucca Mountain repository would ever be 
constructed for any number of reasons, including congressional action 
changing the law or a decision by Congress not to fund the proposed 
repository. In the meantime, DOE took steps to dismantle OCRWM and the 
Yucca Mountain repository program by the end of September 2010. In 
response to DOE's attempt to withdraw the license application, several 
states and parties sued DOE and NRC, arguing that DOE had no authority 
to terminate the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.[Footnote 5] 

In this context, you asked us to review the termination of the 
repository. Our objectives were to determine (1) the basis for DOE's 
decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program; (2) the 
steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program 
and the effects, if any, of these steps; (3) the likely major impacts 
if the Yucca Mountain repository program were to be terminated; and 
(4) the principal lessons that can be learned from the various past 
nuclear waste management efforts and how these might be applied to 
future efforts. 

To answer these objectives, we reviewed pertinent DOE documents; 
analyzed both our and other agencies' reports on nuclear waste 
management; and interviewed federal, state, local, industry and other 
knowledgeable officials. For more information on our methodology, see 
appendix I. Specifically, to determine the basis for DOE's decision to 
terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program, we contacted the 
Secretary of Energy by letter requesting his views. To determine the 
steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program 
and the effects, if any, of these steps. We reviewed DOE documents and 
spoke with DOE federal and contractor officials from various offices 
involved with the termination efforts, including OCRWM, the Office of 
Nuclear Energy, the Office of Environmental Management, the Office of 
Legacy Management, and the Office of General Counsel. We also reviewed 
pertinent DOE Office of Inspector General reports related to Yucca 
Mountain and the termination efforts. To evaluate the likely major 
impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program and the 
principal lessons that can be learned, we conducted analysis of our 
work and that of other agencies within the legislative branch[Footnote 
6] on issues related to siting and building a permanent geological 
repository for nuclear waste (see app. II). We focused on the likely 
impacts of termination on commercial spent nuclear fuel. We are 
preparing a separate report on the impacts of termination on waste 
that is in the custody of DOE--mostly high-level waste that is a by-
product of nuclear weapons production.[Footnote 7] We also spoke with 
a variety of stakeholders including industry representatives, state 
and local officials, community leaders, and others (see app. III). 
Specifically, we spoke with representatives from key national 
associations and organizations whose members were either affected by 
the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program or were in a 
position to comment on the impact as a result of studies or analyses. 
To gain a local perspective of the possible impacts of a Yucca 
Mountain repository program termination and any lessons that could be 
learned, we also contacted communities near the proposed Yucca 
Mountain site and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New 
Mexico--the nation's only federal geologic repository for radioactive 
waste.[Footnote 8] We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of 
nuclear power reactors--three operational reactors, one reactor that 
is no longer operating, and one decommissioned reactor. The reactor 
sites were located in Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and 
Tennessee. We interviewed stakeholders including state and local 
government officials, industry representatives, and local community 
groups. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Spent nuclear fuel is considered one of the most hazardous substances 
on earth. Without protective shielding, its intense radioactivity can 
kill a person exposed directly to it within minutes or cause cancer in 
those who receive smaller doses. Although some elements of spent 
nuclear fuel cool and decay quickly, becoming less radiologically 
dangerous, others remain dangerous to human health and the environment 
for tens of thousands of years. The nation's inventory of over 65,000 
metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel--enough to fill a 
football field nearly 15 feet deep--consists mostly of spent nuclear 
fuel removed from commercial power reactors. The volume of commercial 
spent nuclear fuel is expected to more than double by 2055--assuming 
currently operating reactors receive license extensions and no new 
reactors are built--and is currently accumulating at 75 sites in 33 
states (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Current Storage Sites for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel and 
Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository Site: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Commercial sites: 

Arkansas Nuclear One, Arkansas: 
Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania: 
Big Rock Point, Michigan: 
Braidwood, Illinois: 
Browns Ferry, Alabama: 
Brunswick, North Carolina: 
Byron, Illinois: 
Callaway, Missouri: 
Calvert Cliffs, Maryland: 
Catawba, South Carolina: 
Clinton, Illinois: 
Columbia Generating Station, Washington: 
Comanche Peak: Texas: 
Cooper Station, Nebraska: 
Crystal River, Florida: 
Davis-Besse, Ohio: 
D.C. Cook, Michigan: 
Diablo Canyon, California: 
Dresden & Morris, Illinois: 
Duane Arnold, Iowa: 
Edwin I. Hatch, Georgia: 
Fermi, Michigan: 
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska: 
Ginna, New York: 
Grand Gulf, Mississippi: 
Haddem Neck, Connecticut: 
H. B. Robinson, South Carolina: 
Humboldt Bay, California: 
Indian Point, New York: 
Joseph M. Farley, Alabama: 
Kewaunee, Wisconsin: 
LaCrosse, Wisonsin:
La Salle, Illinois: 
Limerick, Pennsylvania: 
Maine Yankee, Maine: 
McGuire, North Carolina: 
Millstone, Connecticut: 
Monticello, Minnesota: 
Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick, New York: 
North Anna, Virginia: 
Oconee, South Carolina: 
Oyster Creek, New Jersey: 
Palo Verde, Arizona: 
Palisades, Michigan: 
Peach Bottom, Pennsylvania: 
Perry, Ohio: 
Pilgrim, Massachusetts: 
Point Beach, Wisconsin: 
Prairie Island, Minnesota: 
Quad Cities, Iowa: 
Rancho Seco, California: 
River Bend, Louisiana: 
Salem & Hope Creek, New Jersey: 
Seabrook, New Hampshire: 
Sequoyah, Tennessee: 
Shearon Harris, North Carolina: 
South Texas Project, Texas: 
St. Lucie, Florida: 
Summer, South Carolina: 
Surry, Virginia: 
Susquehanna, Pennsylvania: 
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania: 
Trojan, Oregon: 
Turkey Point, Florida: 
Vermont Yankee, Vermont: 
Vogtle, Georgia: 
Waterford, Louisiana: 
Watts Bar, Tennessee: 
Wolf Creek, Kansas: 
Yankee River, Vermont: 
Zion, Illinois: 

Proposed Repository: 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

Source: DOE. 

Note: Locations are approximate. DOE has reported that it is 
responsible for managing nuclear waste at 121 sites in 39 states, but 
this includes high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel at 5 sites 
managed by DOE--2 of which are licensed by NRC and contain commercial 
spent nuclear fuel, at Fort St. Vrain in Colorado and the Idaho 
National Laboratory--and several sites that have only research 
reactors that generate small amounts of waste that will be 
consolidated at the Idaho National Laboratory for packaging prior to 
disposal. 

[End of figure] 

Operators of commercial nuclear power facilities must actively manage 
the spent nuclear fuel--consisting of thumbnail size pellets filling 
12-to 14-foot rods bound together in assemblies--by isolating and 
continually monitoring it to keep humans and the environment safe. 
Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at operating reactor sites, immersed 
in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the 
environment. With nowhere to move the spent nuclear fuel, the racks in 
the pools holding spent fuel have been rearranged to allow for more 
dense storage of assemblies. Even with this re-racking, spent nuclear 
fuel pools are reaching their capacities. Some critics have expressed 
concern about the remote possibility of an overcrowded spent nuclear 
fuel pool releasing large amounts of radiation if an accident or other 
event caused the pool to lose water, potentially leading to a fire 
that could disperse radioactive material. As reactor operators have 
run out of space in their spent nuclear fuel pools, they have turned 
in increasing number to dry cask storage systems that generally 
consist of stainless steel canisters placed inside larger stainless 
steel or concrete casks (see fig. 2). To protect humans and the 
environment, NRC--which regulates commercial nuclear power plants--
requires protective shielding, routine inspections and monitoring, and 
security systems to isolate the spent nuclear fuel. 

Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Dry Casks at the Trojan 
Independent Fuel Storage Installation in Oregon: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Portland General Electric Co. 

[End of figure] 

Progress toward developing a geologic repository was slow until NWPA 
was enacted. Since the 1950s, prior to operation of the first U.S. 
commercially licensed nuclear power plant, the government recognized 
the need to manage the back end of the fuel cycle--specifically, what 
to do with the spent nuclear fuel. A 1957 National Academy of Sciences 
report endorsed deep geological formations to isolate spent nuclear 
fuel, but during the 1950s and 1960s waste management received 
relatively little attention from policymakers. The early regulators 
and developers of nuclear power viewed waste disposal primarily as a 
technical problem that could be solved when necessary by application 
of existing technology. Attempts were made to reprocess the spent 
nuclear fuel, but they were not successful because of economic issues 
and concerns that reprocessed nuclear materials raise proliferation 
risks. The Atomic Energy Commission attempted to develop high-level 
waste repositories in Kansas and New Mexico in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, but neither succeeded because of local community and 
state opposition. Citing the potential risks of the accumulating 
amounts of spent nuclear fuel, the NWPA's purpose is, among other 
things, to establish the federal responsibility, and a definite 
federal policy, for the disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear 
fuel.[Footnote 9] The act required DOE to evaluate a permanent 
geologic repository to protect public health and safety and the 
environment for current and future generations. DOE, its national 
laboratories, and contractors have all worked together on this project. 

DOE's June 2008 submission seeking a construction authorization for a 
repository at Yucca Mountain initiated two concurrent review processes 
at NRC. The first process is the technical licensing review by NRC 
staff, to assess the merits of the repository design and formulate a 
position on whether to issue a construction authorization for the 
repository. The second process consists of hearings before one or more 
of NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, to hear challenges by 
participants on technical and legal aspects of DOE's application. 
Based on the results of the licensing review and the hearings, NRC 
will determine whether to authorize construction of the Yucca Mountain 
repository. If construction of the Yucca Mountain repository were to 
be authorized, DOE would have to update a separate application 
requesting authorization to receive and possess high-level waste at 
Yucca Mountain, before DOE could begin operations. This application 
would also be subject to the technical review and hearing processes. 

Since 1983, DOE has spent nearly $15 billion[Footnote 10] to evaluate 
potential nuclear waste repository sites, evaluate the Yucca Mountain 
site in more depth, and develop and submit the license application for 
it. About 65 percent of this expenditure, or about $9.5 billion, came 
from the Nuclear Waste Fund, established under NWPA to pay industry's 
share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain repository and funded by a 
fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour of nuclear-generated 
electricity. The federal government collects this fee from electric 
power companies, and the fund balance is currently estimated at about 
$25 billion.[Footnote 11] The approximately $5 billion in additional 
costs for repository development activities came from other 
congressional appropriations. This does not include an estimated $956 
million already paid by taxpayers from the U.S. Treasury's judgment 
fund, resulting from 74 industry lawsuits, in which courts have 
ordered the government to compensate utilities for not accepting spent 
nuclear fuel starting in 1998, as required under NWPA. In addition to 
these liabilities, according to the Department of Justice, it has 
incurred costs of about $168 million as of the end of fiscal year 
2010, to defend DOE in litigation. Industry officials said that, for 
proprietary reasons, they could not provide a total for their 
litigation costs, but that they are also incurring expenses. 

With the future of a permanent repository unclear, spent nuclear fuel 
may remain at commercial nuclear reactor sites for an extended period. 
NRC has stated that, as a matter of policy, it will not license 
reactors if it does not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can 
be disposed of safely. Regulators have stated that the spent nuclear 
fuel, if properly stored and monitored, can be kept safe and secure on-
site for decades. In December 2010, NRC published an update to its 
Waste Confidence Decision and Rule, first issued in 1984, and updated 
in 1990.[Footnote 12] A key premise of the update is that spent 
nuclear fuel can be safely stored for at least 60 years--rather than 
the 30 years specified in the 1990 update--beyond the licensed life of 
a commercial power reactor, including license extensions. This would 
give most reactors about 120 years of safe storage.[Footnote 13] NRC 
officials consider these storage measures interim, however, and stated 
that a deep geologic repository is necessary for the ultimate disposal 
of the spent nuclear fuel. Currently, NRC, as well as DOE and 
industry, are working to study the safety and security impacts of 
prolonged storage of spent nuclear fuel, but the results of their 
studies will not be known for several years. 

In the meantime, DOE has established the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
America's Nuclear Future, which has been tasked to evaluate existing 
fuel cycle technologies, options for prolonged storage of spent 
nuclear fuel, permanent disposal options, and other options involving 
the full nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing. The commission 
comprises three subcommittees: Disposal, Reactor Fuel Cycle 
Technology, and Transportation and Storage, all of which have been 
holding hearings with experts around the country. It has not been 
charged with choosing or recommending facility sites, including a site 
for a potential permanent repository. The commission is scheduled to 
issue a report by January 2012. 

The Basis for DOE's Decision to Terminate the Yucca Mountain 
Repository Program: 

DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program was 
made for policy reasons, not technical or safety reasons.[Footnote 14] 
In a June 2010 letter to us, the Acting Principal Deputy Director of 
OCRWM, responding on behalf of the Secretary, stated that the 
Secretary's decision was based on a proposed change of department 
policy for managing spent nuclear fuel. He did not, however, cite any 
technical concerns or safety issues related to the Yucca Mountain 
repository. The Acting Principal Deputy Director explained that the 
Secretary believes there are better solutions that can achieve a 
broader national consensus to the nation's spent fuel and nuclear 
waste storage needs than Yucca Mountain, although he did not cite any. 
He went on to say that the Secretary has repeatedly stated his 
conclusions that Yucca Mountain has not proven to be a workable option 
for a permanent repository for high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel 
and that the technical and scientific context is significantly 
different today than it was at the time of the 1983 enactment of the 
NWPA. 

DOE also filed a reply before NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 
which provided additional information about the reasoning for 
attempting to withdraw its license application. Specifically, the 
reply explained that "the Secretary's judgment is not that Yucca 
Mountain is unsafe or that there are flaws in the license application, 
but rather that it is not a workable option and that alternatives will 
better serve the public interest." 

DOE established a Blue Ribbon Commission to conduct a comprehensive 
review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, including alternatives for the storage, processing, and 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and materials 
derived from nuclear activities. The commission, however, is not to 
evaluate individual sites for a repository, including Yucca Mountain, 
a position made clear by the Secretary of Energy in public statements. 
[Footnote 15] Industry representatives we spoke with, however, stated 
that even with a change in policy, a geologic repository or some other 
disposal pathway will eventually be needed for the permanent disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste. For example, even if 
the nation decides to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, the high-level 
waste residues from the process will still need to be disposed of. 
[Footnote 16] Furthermore, DOE stated that public acceptance is a key 
component of a workable effort to build a permanent repository and 
that acceptance is lacking from the people of Nevada. Over the past 
several decades, however, no states have expressed an interest in 
hosting a permanent repository for this spent nuclear fuel and other 
types of nuclear waste, including the states with sites currently 
storing the waste. 

NRC officials stated that no new technical or safety issues related to 
the Yucca Mountain repository had been reported to them since DOE 
submitted its license application in 2008. In its June 29, 2010, 
ruling on DOE's motion to withdraw its license application, NRC's 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board stated that the NWPA provided the 
Secretary of Energy with an opportunity to report any reasons that the 
Yucca Mountain site was not suitable prior to submitting its license 
application, but DOE reported no such issues. According to the board, 
the NWPA required DOE to submit a license application and NRC to rule 
on its merits by approving or disapproving the issuance of a 
construction authorization, the first authorization required in the 
license application process.[Footnote 17] Many DOE and NRC officials, 
scientists, and industry representatives we spoke with told us that 
completing the license review process and obtaining NRC findings on 
the technical merits of the license application would provide valuable 
information that could be applied to future efforts, even if Yucca 
Mountain was not pursued as a repository. Additionally, the board 
stated that, even if approved, such approval did not ensure that a 
repository would be built or become operational for any number of 
reasons, including separate congressional action changing the law or a 
decision by Congress not to fund the proposed repository. 

As of February 2011, the status of the Yucca Mountain license 
application and associated review process is uncertain. On June 30, 
2010, the day after the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied DOE's 
motion to withdraw its license application with prejudice, the NRC 
commissioners issued an order inviting parties--including the state of 
Nevada, local counties, and industry--to file briefs addressing 
whether the commissioners should review the board's decision and, if 
so, whether they should uphold or reverse it. As of March 4, 2011, 
however, the commissioners have yet to announce whether they plan to 
review the board's decision. In a separate action, the United States 
District Court of the District of Columbia that is hearing the 
lawsuits against DOE decided to stay its proceedings until the NRC 
commissioners ruled on the board's decision. Absent any action from 
the NRC commissioners, however, the plaintiffs in the lawsuits have 
asked the federal court to expedite the hearings to prevent DOE from 
shutting down the Yucca Mountain repository program. The court granted 
the request on December 10, 2010, and later scheduled oral arguments 
to begin on March 22, 2011. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 
with no further input from the NRC commissioners or federal courts, 
announced its intention to continue with its consideration of the 
challenges to the license application. In these proceedings, the Board 
will consider approximately 300 contentions submitted by stakeholders 
questioning certain aspects of DOE's license application and related 
participant filings and evidence. It is not yet clear whether NRC or 
the courts will rule that the license application review process 
should resume. 

Steps DOE Has Taken to Terminate the Yucca Mountain Repository Program 
and Their Effects: 

DOE undertook an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca 
Mountain repository program. However, concerns have been raised about 
DOE's expedited procedures for disposing of property from the program, 
and its documentation of these procedures was limited. In addition, 
DOE did not consistently follow federal policy and guidance for 
planning or assessing risks of the shutdown. Some of these steps to 
dismantle the program will likely hinder progress if the license 
application review process resumes--should NRC or the courts require 
it. 

DOE Took Steps to Terminate the Repository Program: 

Amid a backdrop of uncertainty concerning the status and future of the 
Yucca Mountain repository license review process, DOE undertook an 
ambitious schedule to terminate the repository program and dismantle 
OCRWM and the Yucca Mountain repository program by September 30, 2010, 
when funding would have ended under the President's budget proposal. 
Starting in February 2010, DOE redirected the remaining fiscal year 
2010 OCRWM budget to fund closeout activities; hired a contractor to 
archive project documents, such as those supporting the license 
application; eliminated the jobs of all federal employees working on 
the project; terminated project activities carried out by contractors, 
including national laboratory scientists; terminated leases for office 
space; transferred dozens of truckloads of office equipment and 
computers to other DOE facilities and local schools; and closed most 
of its 500 contracts and subcontracts.[Footnote 18] DOE officials told 
us that DOE met its September 30, 2010, deadline for closure and 
believed that despite the difficult task, the shutdown was orderly. 
However, while OCRWM's Yucca Mountain project activities have ceased, 
several termination tasks are still ongoing, such as disposing of 
federal property and closing down contracts and subcontracts. These 
tasks have been divided among various DOE programs, including the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Environmental 
Management, the Office of Legacy Management, the Office of Nuclear 
Energy, and the Office of General Counsel. 

DOE has undertaken extensive efforts to preserve data related to its 
licensing efforts, as well as other scientific information relevant to 
the storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel. 
The Federal Records Act requires the heads of federal agencies to 
preserve certain data and gives authority to the National Archives and 
Records Administration to determine which types of documents should be 
archived. DOE stated that, consistent with the Federal Records Act, it 
is preserving millions of documents related to the licensing effort at 
Yucca Mountain, as well as scientific information related to the 
storage and disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel. 
First, DOE has been maintaining a collection of 3.6 million documents 
pertaining to its license application in its Licensing Support Network 
Collection, a database of key licensing documents accessible through 
NRC's Web site. NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board recently 
highlighted the importance of preserving those documents, and DOE 
officials stated that they were committed to preserving them. A DOE 
official in charge of managing DOE's Licensing Support Network 
collection stated that DOE plans on maintaining it through the NRC's 
Web site until the courts have resolved the issues surrounding DOE's 
motion to withdraw its license application, then for 100 years after 
that. It is not clear, however, who will be responsible for preserving 
the Licensing Support Network or whether it will continue to be 
accessible by scientists and the public, particularly in light of 
budget pressures and changing priorities that may occur over the next 
century. A February 18, 2011, memo from NRC's Licensing Support 
Network Administrator to members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board, however, stated that, under the administration's budget 
proposal for fiscal year 2012, the NRC's Licensing Support Network 
faces a shutdown as of October 1, 2011. The memo went on to say that, 
when the Licensing Support Network Web site is shut down, the parties' 
document collections will no longer be electronically accessible by 
others and suggested alternatives that NRC may consider, which may 
limit the public's or scientists' access to the document collections. 

DOE officials stated that they are also taking steps to maintain 
several other databases for the use of future scientists, the largest 
of which is called the Records Information System. These databases 
generally consist of relevant scientific information related to the 
storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel. 
According to a DOE contractor responsible for archiving the Records 
Information System, this database--consisting of 1.8 million 
electronic documents and 11,000 boxes of hard-copy documents--will be 
usable and preserved in the same quality as it existed under OCRWM and 
for 25 years after the termination of the Yucca Mountain program. An 
official with DOE's Office of Legacy Management, which assumed 
responsibility for archiving the data, stated that DOE is on track to 
complete data preservation efforts by April 2011. 

In contrast to the data preservation efforts, efforts to retain Yucca 
Mountain project staff were minimal. Staff were encouraged to seek 
other employment and given no incentive to stay with OCRWM to assist 
with the shutdown. Some DOE and contractor officials told us that 
retaining key staff during the shutdown process would have been 
helpful. Nevertheless, the roughly 180 federal staff at OCRWM were all 
told in March 2010 that their positions would be eliminated by 
September 30, and they began leaving as soon as they found alternate 
employment, placing increasing stress on the remaining staff to 
effectively complete an orderly shutdown. In addition, 60 scientists 
and engineers who were contractors from Sandia National Laboratories 
were assigned to other projects. This raised questions among some 
former site officials we spoke with about whether an orderly shut down 
had actually been achieved. 

DOE also took steps to dispose of large volumes of federal property in 
office buildings in Las Vegas and in storage containers and warehouses 
at the Yucca Mountain site. Most of the property in Las Vegas 
consisted of office furniture and computers, but the property at the 
Yucca Mountain site varied, including scientific and construction 
equipment, such as water monitoring equipment and tractors. 

DOE Used Expedited Procedures to Dispose of Property, but Its 
Documentation Was Limited: 

DOE used expedited property disposition procedures after the shutdown-
-procedures that officials said were similar to those used to transfer 
excess property in 2009. The 2009 transfers were necessary, according 
to DOE officials, because OCRWM's budget was cut by nearly $100 
million from fiscal year 2008 levels, because OCRWM selected a new 
management and operating contractor, and because there was a shift in 
focus from preparing the license application to defending the 
application and planning for repository design and construction. 
According to DOE officials, the change in budget and the contractor 
resulted in a downsizing in the staff in Las Vegas from over 1,000 
office suites to about 100 office suites, leaving a large volume of 
office equipment that had become excess to the program. Upon DOE's 
termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program, the remaining 
office suites and supporting office and computer equipment were also 
considered excess by OCRWM. 

The General Services Administration (GSA) generally has responsibility 
for regulating the disposition of federal property.[Footnote 19] 
According to GSA regulations, federal agencies must follow a screening 
process for excess property, unless they declare the property 
abandoned. In the standard screening processes, agencies first 
determine if other offices within the agency want the property and, if 
not, whether other federal agencies would want the property. In either 
event, the agency can directly transfer the property internally or 
externally as needed, but it generally should notify GSA of transfers 
outside the agency. If no other federal agency wants the property, 
then GSA offers the property for sale first to state and local 
governments and finally to private citizens through a national sales 
database. To make the process of property disposition easier, GSA and 
DOE have developed a simplified Energy Asset Disposal System that is 
designed to support the screening, reporting, and transferring of 
property within DOE and subsequently to automatically pass information 
on unwanted property to GSA for possible transfer to other agencies or 
for sale. 

As an alternative, federal regulations also allow for an agency to 
declare its excess property abandoned and to dispose of the property 
on its own. To do so, the agency must first make a determination that 
the property has no commercial value or that the estimated cost of its 
continued care and handling would exceed the estimated proceeds from 
its sale. This regulation is a common-sense rule, according to a GSA 
official, allowing agencies to dispose of property in cases where it 
might not make sense to transfer or sell it. In this case, no 
screening or reporting to GSA is required. 

DOE officials stated that, when the agency had such a large reduction 
in staff between fiscal years 2008 and 2009, agency officials--with 
advice from DOE's Office of General Counsel--chose the more 
expeditious route of declaring the excess property to be abandoned. 
DOE officials explained this was the most efficient pathway because 
disposing of property quickly would reduce landlord costs by emptying 
buildings of their equipment, save on utilities and security, and, in 
some cases, reduce lease costs. In addition, they said they found 
ready takers for their property within DOE who would be willing to pay 
the dismantlement, packing, and transportation costs, saving OCRWM 
money. An internal DOE memo reported in March 2010 that DOE 
transferred 80 truckloads of office furniture and equipment to DOE's 
Hanford Site during the previous year, saving the Hanford Site about 
$2.1 million. 

A GSA official with authority over property management in the West 
noted that DOE's use of the abandonment regulation was unusual for 
such a large volume and variety of property. The regulation is usually 
used when agencies are considering smaller volumes of property for 
disposal. However, the GSA official stated that the determination of 
how to apply the regulation is left up to the agency and the fact that 
DOE found a way to reuse the equipment addressed the overall intent of 
federal property regulations, as long as DOE did not destroy useful 
equipment to meet deadlines. According to the abandonment regulation, 
DOE had to determine that its property had no commercial value or that 
the cost of its continued care and handling exceeded the estimated 
proceeds from the sale. DOE documented its decision to abandon the 
property in an internal memo. DOE's memo stated that storing the 
furniture and equipment cost about $680 per day. The memo further 
stated that, in an OCRWM review of a GSA database, officials found 
examples of three pallets of miscellaneous computer equipment that 
were similar to what OCRWM had, but that GSA had not received any 
offer matching its asking price of $10. Thus, OCRWM determined that 
the care, storage, and processing of its property "far surpassed the 
estimated proceeds from sale." DOE officials stated that their 
documentation was sufficient for regulatory purposes and added that 
the time frames for transferring the property would have prohibited 
additional analysis or documentation. The GSA official said that 
agencies determine on their own the level of analysis required to 
declare property abandoned, but that DOE's limited analysis did not 
seem to address the large volume or variety of property that DOE was 
transferring. 

When DOE decided to shut down the Yucca Mountain repository, it 
reported in June 2010 that an additional 400 federal and contractor 
staff would be terminated, again resulting in excess property in the 
Las Vegas office. DOE used the abandonment regulation again and 
applied the same example of computer equipment that it used to justify 
its prior decision. DOE officials explained that a factor in their 
decision in this case was the closure date of September 30, 2010, 
which was not flexible and not under the control of OCRWM officials. 
Several DOE officials told us that they had never seen such a large 
program with so much pressure to close down so quickly. DOE 
transferred most of its equipment--about 25 truckloads--to the Hanford 
Site, as well as to the West Valley site in New York, the National 
Nuclear Security Administration in Las Vegas, and Sandia National 
Laboratories. In addition, DOE donated computer equipment to area 
schools under the Computers for Learning program. 

As of February 2011, DOE officials had transferred very little of the 
property from the Yucca Mountain site, and it may have lost some of it 
to break-ins. DOE officials said that, although they had a good 
inventory of the property they transferred from the office buildings 
in Las Vegas, they did not have a good inventory of property at Yucca 
Mountain. DOE kept most of the property at the Yucca Mountain site in 
locked buildings and storage trailers. After storing this property, 
DOE officials found the locks broken on at least three occasions. DOE 
officials said that some property may have been taken, but without an 
inventory they could not be certain what, if anything, was missing. 
The Yucca Mountain site is very remote, only accessible by little-
known rugged back roads through lands managed by the Bureau of Land 
Management and the Nevada National Security Site, the latter of which 
has guarded gates.[Footnote 20] Given the remoteness of the site and 
the cost of guarding the excess equipment, a DOE official said that 
DOE did not place guards at the buildings or the storage trailers. 
OCRWM has passed responsibility for managing this property to DOE's 
Office of Nuclear Energy, and a DOE official stated that an inventory 
of the property at the site had been completed by February 2011. A DOE 
official stated that DOE planned to screen the remaining property at 
the Yucca Mountain site through the Energy Asset Disposal System. He 
also noted that, due to the proximity to the former Nevada Test Site, 
the property will have to be surveyed for radioactivity before it is 
released. 

According to DOE officials, some of the property meeting certain 
thresholds at the Yucca Mountain site cannot be transferred under the 
abandonment regulation but, under DOE guidance, must be sold at fair 
market value and the proceeds returned to the Nuclear Waste Fund. 
[Footnote 21] DOE officials said that they directed the contractor in 
several transactions to sell excess property at fair market value and 
to return the proceeds to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The DOE officials 
provided documentation of one transaction that directed the contractor 
to sell property and reimburse OCRWM, but DOE was not able to provide 
us with documentation that showed the sale actually took place or that 
the fund had been properly reimbursed. DOE officials said that 
documentation would become available during the contract close-out 
process. DOE officials further told us that the proceeds from the 
sales that did take place went back into the Nuclear Waste Fund to 
support OCRWM's shutdown efforts. 

Finally, DOE, under separate statutory authority, transferred about 
$400,000 worth of firefighting equipment to Nye County. DOE officials 
stated that they had originally loaned the equipment to Nye County 
under a cooperative agreement and that, upon termination of the Yucca 
Mountain program, the county requested transfer of the equipment. In 
this case, DOE determined that it was not required to follow GSA's 
general property disposition provisions or its abandonment regulation. 
Instead, DOE's Office of General Counsel authorized the transfer of 
the equipment to Nye County, citing the Atomic Energy Act, which DOE 
officials said gives them the authority to transfer property in this 
situation. DOE officials said they made the transfer to assist the 
county in addressing safety concerns. 

DOE Did Not Follow Federal Policy and Guidance for Planning and 
Assessing Risks of Termination: 

Federal internal control standards and DOE orders require that DOE 
sufficiently plan for major activities--including shutdowns--and 
assess the risks of doing so. According to the Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government, a federal agency should adequately 
plan to achieve its objectives, such as those in its strategic plans, 
and identify and analyze the risks it faces.[Footnote 22] Such risk 
assessments form a basis for determining how risks should be managed. 
In analyzing such risks, the standards require agency management to 
consider all significant interactions between the agency and other 
parties as well as internal factors both agencywide and at the 
activity level. This would include ensuring an orderly project 
termination, as well as considering the possible impacts of a ruling 
by the NRC commissioners or the federal courts that could require that 
the Yucca Mountain license application review process be resumed. 
Furthermore, DOE's own orders direct officials to adequately plan 
projects to maintain effective and efficient use of federal resources 
and to ensure it has adequate resources to implement its projects, 
whether the project is new construction or the termination of an 
existing program.[Footnote 23] Under these orders, DOE must also 
assess the risks associated with its efforts. 

In implementing its ambitious shutdown schedule, however, DOE did not 
complete formal approved plans to guide its shutdown activities or 
assess risks. Although DOE had drafted a shutdown plan by February 
2010, DOE officials told us that it was never approved. DOE thus had 
no formal implementation goals or milestones to guide progress, which 
our past work has shown to be a key practice in implementing 
organizational transformations.[Footnote 24] The department's 
Inspector General also expressed concern about the lack of such a 
plan, given the scope and complexity of the shutdown and the possible 
effects on areas, such as the preservation of intellectual, 
scientific, and technological information and the disposition of 
property. In written comments to the Inspector General, DOE responded 
that it had developed groups organized around functional areas 
identified in its draft shutdown plan. The Inspector General noted 
that DOE's efforts, while significant, were still no substitute for 
having a shutdown plan. According to DOE General Counsel and former 
OCRWM leadership, the September 30 deadline did not allow time for 
formal planning, although officials stated that they believed that the 
necessary planning did occur. For example, at least weekly meetings 
were held with key staff to discuss the shutdown, identify and address 
any problems, and keep progress on track. DOE officials stated that 
they believe that, despite the lack of formal approved plans, the 
shutdown was orderly and they accomplished what they set out to do. 

However, some DOE and contractor officials stated that more time to 
plan for the shutdown would have been helpful, but the 
administration's budget proposal only funded the shutdown effort 
through the end of fiscal year 2010. Former OCRWM officials said that 
they did the best they could to meet the shutdown target, but as they 
were carrying out the shutdown, there were concerns that the schedule 
was too short. DOE's primary contractor at Yucca Mountain also 
expressed concern. The contractor noted in a June 2010 letter that 
contracts of this scale generally take 2 years or more to close out. 
The contractor agreed in June to meet DOE's September 30 date--less 
than 4 months away--by adopting "creative and unusual approaches," 
such as the transfer of residual work to other parties and saving 
interim technical work products as-is with no additional effort to 
document objectives, plans, status, or path forward. 

Risk assessment, a key part of planning, was also not formally carried 
out. Specifically, risk assessment requires identifying and analyzing 
relevant risks associated with achieving objectives and forming a 
basis for determining how risks should be managed. DOE officials told 
us, however, that the September 30 shutdown date did not provide 
sufficient time for both a formal risk assessment and the actual 
shutdown tasks. Officials added that although they did not complete a 
formal risk assessment, they did consider the possible risks of 
shutting down the program as they were carrying out the work, 
including the risk to DOE's ability to resume the licensing review 
process, if necessary. As an example, officials noted that DOE did not 
cancel its management and operating contract, in part so that it would 
be easier to resume licensing activities if it were required to do so, 
according to testimony by the former Acting Principal Deputy Director 
of OCRWM. Similarly, DOE helped federal employees at OCRWM to remain 
at DOE, in part to facilitate efforts to reconstitute the Yucca 
Mountain work force, should the need arise, according to the 
testimony.[Footnote 25] Although DOE General Counsel and other 
officials said they considered planning and risk issues as the program 
was being dismantled, they also told us they would not prepare any 
formal plans or risk assessments unless DOE was ordered to resume 
licensing activities and they were required to do so. 

Loss of Staff Expertise Could Slow Progress If License Review Is 
Resumed: 

The loss of staff with experience at Yucca Mountain could hinder the 
license review if the process is resumed because DOE plays an 
important role in defending the license application. DOE has taken 
extensive efforts to preserve data from the Yucca Mountain project. 
However, experienced and trained staff are also necessary if DOE is to 
successfully carry out this role. Specifically, DOE would need to: 

* Provide technical, scientific, and legal support for court 
challenges. 

* Maintain and update the license application and supporting documents 
as issues resulting from about 300 contentions--legal challenges to 
the license application--were resolved and NRC information requests 
were responded to. 

* Prepare DOE witnesses and testimony for hearings. 

Before their positions were eliminated in 2010, about 180 federal 
staff at OCRWM and an additional 60 scientists and engineers who were 
contractors from Sandia National Laboratories were on staff, in part 
to defend the license application. A DOE official stated that, 
although the licensing process could be carried out with fewer staff, 
it would nevertheless require 25 to 30 highly trained scientists and a 
larger number of support personnel. 

Reconstituting this expertise and teamwork could be difficult should 
the licensing process be resumed. According to DOE and Sandia National 
Laboratories officials, it took DOE years to recruit and train the 
proper mix of scientists and engineers--from diverse disciplines such 
as hydrology, geology, and mathematics--to work on the license 
application. The officials stated that a difficult but important part 
of this effort was turning a group of independent researchers into a 
team that could work together under a nuclear safety and regulatory 
framework. One result of their work was the development of models that 
simulated Yucca Mountain's safety performance, a key element of the 
license application. According to DOE and NRC officials, the team of 
scientists that developed the models would have been the most 
qualified to explain and defend these models during the hearings of 
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. These officials expressed 
doubt that many of these specialists would return to work on Yucca 
Mountain if the license review were resumed because most have moved on 
to new projects and assignments, many in other parts of the country. 
Some stakeholders we spoke with, including former OCRWM employees, 
said some of the former staff would likely not return to a program 
they felt that the administration did not support. According to DOE 
officials, about 25 percent of former OCRWM employees are no longer 
with DOE. Nonetheless, DOE General Counsel officials stated that it 
would be possible, if the staff were still working at DOE, to 
encourage or require them to work on the Yucca Mountain repository 
program should it be resumed. The officials stated that they believed 
that a team could be reassembled, but that it might take many months 
to do so and it might not have some of the staff who performed the 
original work. 

Other officials with whom we spoke expressed concerns about DOE's 
ability to reassemble its team. A former Acting OCRWM director stated--
in an April 2010 declaration filed in federal court[Footnote 26]--that 
he had years of experience on the Yucca Mountain program and 
overseeing the creation of teams and, based on his experience, "it 
will take well more than 2 years to put a team back together, and even 
then it may not be successful." In addition, an official at Sandia 
National Laboratories with management responsibilities over the Yucca 
Mountain program stated that, if DOE were to resume licensing 
activities, it would be helpful to reconstitute staff with original 
experience in the technical aspects of the license application, but 
that the more time that passes, the harder it would be to do so. He 
noted that it would be possible to find replacements, but that 
training them to become proficient may take time, and the quality of 
the license defense could be jeopardized. 

DOE officials said they took some measures to mitigate the risk of 
losing technical expertise for the license application review process. 
For example, although OCRWM managers did not track staff, they said 
that DOE's Office of Human Capital did have access to the locations of 
the former OCRWM staff that still work for DOE. OCRWM officials stated 
they had no access to information on location and availability of 
former laboratory or contractor staff, but that they felt the 
laboratories or the contractor could provide that information, if 
needed. Also, in May 2010, OCRWM asked its prime contractor for a plan 
to shut down Yucca Mountain. OCRWM initially gave the contractor 6 
days to produce a plan but granted the contractor's request for an 
extension to 14 days. The contractor produced a $2.8 million proposal 
to prepare, among other things, a plan for "knowledge retention 
packages" that included an effort to mitigate the threat of the 
irrecoverable loss of expert knowledge as staff members depart the 
Yucca Mountain repository program. The contractor said these packages 
would give DOE the ability to more easily resume the license 
application review proceedings, if required. According to the 
contractor, these packages would have included a strategy for 
addressing contentions and preparation for officials who might serve 
as witnesses during hearings. The proposal stated that the aim was to 
capture the knowledge of current witnesses in a manner that would be 
readily available and understandable should the proceeding be 
restarted with a different individual as the witness. In a written 
response to this proposal, however, DOE stated that the knowledge 
retention packages were "both costly and unnecessary." DOE officials 
further stated that this proposal extended beyond the September 30, 
2010, closure date and would require a large expenditure of government 
funds that DOE managers found wasteful, such as videotaping 
scientists. As a result, the knowledge retention packages were not 
approved by DOE and were not prepared by the contractor. 

In addition to DOE, NRC has also taken some actions that could also 
hinder the resumption of the license review process for Yucca 
Mountain. NRC effectively suspended the technical review of the 
license application on October 4, 2010, after Congress, on September 
30, 2010, passed a continuing resolution that continued fiscal year 
2010 funding levels for fiscal year 2011 appropriations from October 1 
through December 3, 2010. NRC then issued guidance that it would apply 
fiscal year 2010 funding levels for all programs except the Yucca 
Mountain license review process. For that program, NRC announced it 
would fund at the President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, which 
included a close-out of the license review activities at the end of 
the fiscal year. Although no NRC staff have been eliminated, an NRC 
official said that they are being reassigned to other programs. The 
NRC staff had originally planned to issue a key safety evaluation 
report in November 2010 as part of NRC's technical review, but NRC 
announced it no longer plans to issue that report. Also, even though 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board announced plans to continue with 
the licensing proceeding in consideration of challenges to the license 
application in late 2010, pursuant to the October 4, 2010, budget 
guidance the board is now closing out its activities. According to 
NRC's Chief Financial Officer, both the NRC staff and the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board are to submit plans to the NRC 
commissioners for an orderly shutdown of activities in 2011. The NRC 
Inspector General is investigating whether NRC had the authority to 
adopt the fiscal year 2011 budget proposal. In a separate action, the 
parties that are currently suing DOE and NRC asked the court to lift 
its stay and expedite proceedings, in part, because of NRC's actions. 
In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit announced that oral arguments would be held on March 
22, 2011. 

Termination of the Repository Program Could Provide Some Benefits, but 
Adverse Impacts Are Likely: 

Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program could bring 
benefits, primarily the opportunity for DOE to seek new approaches to 
nuclear waste management that could be more widely accepted by the 
public, particularly since Yucca Mountain had little support from the 
state of Nevada. However, termination would also restart the costly 
and time-consuming process of finding a permanent disposal repository 
or some other solution for spent nuclear fuel and could take decades 
and billions of additional dollars. Furthermore, termination would 
likely prolong the need for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel at 
reactor sites, which would have financial and other impacts. 

Termination Would Provide a Key Benefit: 

A key benefit of terminating the Yucca Mountain repository program, 
cited by the Secretary when explaining the termination decision, is 
the opportunity to seek other approaches that might achieve broader 
acceptance than Yucca Mountain. The proposal to build a permanent 
repository at Yucca Mountain has faced significant opposition from 
some politicians and members of the public, particularly in Nevada. 
Past proposals for repositories at other sites, such as the Hanford 
Site, faced similar opposition. If a more widely accepted alternative 
is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding costly delays 
experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. However, there 
is no guarantee that a more acceptable alternative will be identified. 
The Secretary stated that advances in technology have provided the 
nation with time to develop an alternative approach to permanent 
disposal that might be more widely accepted. DOE, in a statement to 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, stated that recent advances in 
methods for storing spent nuclear fuel in dry casks, rather than pools 
of water, will allow the spent fuel to be stored on site for a much 
longer period of time--perhaps as long as 300 years. During this time, 
scientists could research and develop other alternatives for a 
permanent solution. Furthermore, DOE stated that reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel has the potential to reduce the amount of nuclear waste 
and improve waste forms for disposal, although DOE noted that the 
technology is still in its early stages. DOE has not yet identified 
other alternatives and has tasked the Blue Ribbon Commission with 
doing so. 

The full significance of this benefit is not yet clear because there 
is not yet an effective, affordable alternative to a permanent 
geologic repository. Although alternatives for managing spent nuclear 
fuel might be identified in the future, the National Research Council 
of the National Academies reported that, for the foreseeable future, 
the only alternatives capable of ensuring the safety and security of 
spent nuclear fuel are continued storage and geologic disposal. 
[Footnote 27] For example, alternatives--such as disposal in narrow 
shafts bored deep into the ground--could be feasible but face cost or 
technical constraints. We reached the same conclusion in our November 
2009 report, for which we consulted 147 national experts about 
alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository.[Footnote 28] 
Technologies to reduce the radioactivity or volume of spent nuclear 
fuel, such as reprocessing or the use of advanced reactors, still face 
technical and economic challenges and do not eliminate the need for a 
permanent disposal alternative.[Footnote 29] In addition, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute told the Blue Ribbon 
Commission that, even with reprocessing, the nation will still need a 
geologic disposal facility.[Footnote 30] 

Termination Would Restart a Costly, Time-Consuming Process: 

The termination of Yucca Mountain essentially restarts a time-
consuming and costly process. In the case of Yucca Mountain, this 
process has already cost nearly $15 billion through 2009 and, if work 
on Yucca Mountain had continued, it could have cost an additional $41 
billion to $67 billion more to complete, as we reported in 
2009.[Footnote 31] DOE officials told us that many factors, including 
some outside DOE's control, could have affected when the Yucca 
Mountain repository would have opened, or whether it would have opened 
at all. If work on licensing and constructing Yucca Mountain had 
continued, DOE would have had to obtain NRC license approval, certain 
crucial permits from the state of Nevada, funding from Congress, and 
other key congressional actions, such as permanently withdrawing 
public land for the repository. Despite these challenges, DOE's 2008 
estimate for opening the Yucca Mountain repository--before DOE took 
steps to terminate it--was 2020. While we recognize this 2020 date was 
not certain, we know of no better assumption to meaningfully assess 
the impact of a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program. 
In written comments to us, DOE officials stated it is speculation to 
say a new strategy will take longer to implement than continuing with 
the Yucca Mountain program because there was no guarantee of when, if 
ever, the many significant steps for opening the Yucca Mountain 
repository would have been completed. Since the comment provides only 
a hypothetical bounding possibility--the Yucca Mountain repository 
might have never opened, even without DOE's current steps to terminate 
it--rather than a new estimate for when the repository might have 
opened, we note the DOE officials' position but, with the exception of 
noting prior work, we do not analyze it further. 

DOE officials told us that it is conceivable that an alternative to 
Yucca Mountain could be developed and implemented before Yucca 
Mountain might ever have opened, such as opening a centralized interim 
storage facility. Although DOE suggested that the Blue Ribbon 
Commission may come up with alternatives that could be implemented 
sooner than Yucca Mountain might have opened--particularly if the 
alternative has more public acceptance and avoids costly delays due to 
local opposition--we reported in 2009 that there were no other 
permanent alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository that could be 
implemented sooner than the 2020 projected date of opening Yucca 
Mountain. Although any permanent disposal alternatives would come with 
uncertainties as to their cost and schedule--as well as to their 
public acceptance--it is likely to take decades to develop. We 
reported in 2009 that, according to a manager of an industry effort to 
establish a centralized interim storage facility, even a federal 
centralized interim storage facility is likely to take 17 to 33 years 
to plan and implement.[Footnote 32] An interim storage facility would 
include, among other things, siting, licensing, and constructing the 
facility and accompanying transportation infrastructure, as well as 
coordinating transportation routes with states. If such a facility 
were initiated in 2011, this makes the most likely initial opening 
date somewhere from 2029 to 2045.[Footnote 33] It is possible that 
industry might develop and implement its own interim storage 
facilities sooner, but, as we reported in 2009, an interim storage 
facility is not a permanent alternative to a repository. 

Nevertheless, by terminating work on Yucca Mountain, DOE likely would 
have to restart the process for any alternative repository site, since 
every site is unique, according to NRC officials. Some of the 
officials we spoke with estimated that the termination of Yucca 
Mountain could set back the opening of a new geologic repository by at 
least 20 years and cost billions of dollars. Some stakeholders 
referred to the termination as "kicking the can down the road." 
Moreover, several DOE and NRC officials and industry representatives 
stated that ending the license review process before allowing NRC to 
review the merits of the application was a loss of potentially 
valuable information, particularly NRC's assessment regarding 
acceptability of the license application. 

As a result of the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository 
program, DOE may also need to seek additional funding for an 
alternative repository. About 60 percent of the cost of developing a 
repository has thus far been paid for by the nuclear waste fund, but 
utilities only pay into the fund for as long as their reactors are 
operating. Most of the reactors in this country are working to obtain 
a license extension or have already obtained one for an additional 20 
years of operation, and it is not clear how much longer reactor 
operators will be paying into the nuclear waste fund. As reactors 
retire, they will need to be replaced by new reactors paying into the 
fund, or, according to DOE officials, the fund will be drawn down 
faster than it can be replenished. According to DOE officials, the 
nuclear waste fund was designed to build a large surplus that could be 
relied upon for when the very high construction costs exceed annual 
contributions; then, the generally high, but decades-long costs for 
operations, during which the nuclear waste fund is likely to be drawn 
down. For example, our analysis of DOE's cost projections for Yucca 
Mountain shows that construction of a repository would have averaged 
over $1.7 billion annually, but with some years exceeding $2 billion. 
Although the costs of siting, licensing, constructing, and operating 
an alternate repository site are uncertain, or even if a repository 
will be the path followed by DOE in the near future, DOE has already 
spent about $9 billion from the nuclear waste fund. If DOE were to 
pursue an alternate repository--assuming an alternate repository would 
have costs similar to the Yucca Mountain repository--it is not certain 
that the fund will have built up a sufficient surplus to site, 
license, construct, and operate it. DOE makes an annual assessment of 
the adequacy of the nuclear waste fund to ensure that full costs of a 
disposal program will be fully recovered. In November 2010, the 
Secretary determined that the fund was adequate, even though an 
attachment stated that DOE had no alternative to the Yucca Mountain 
repository, and that the Yucca Mountain repository provided the 
closest "proxy"--in terms of cost--to an alternative. If the nuclear 
waste fund does not have a sufficient surplus for an alternate 
repository, additional funding would have to be found. One option, 
according to DOE officials, is for the Secretary to propose an 
adjustment of the fee in accordance with the NWPA, but they said the 
agency must do so while nuclear reactors are still operating. 
Moreover, since the taxpayers have paid a proportion of the costs to 
establish a repository for DOE-managed high-level waste and spent 
nuclear fuel, the taxpayers may also end up paying more for an 
alternate repository. In addition, the proposed termination has 
prompted calls from industry for DOE to suspend collection of payments 
into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Industry has argued that their customers 
should not pay for a repository effort that has been shut down, with 
no work being done on an alternative. Suspending payments into the 
Nuclear Waste Fund could reduce the funds set aside for a repository. 

Termination Would Prolong On-site Storage and Increase Costs: 

The proposed termination of Yucca Mountain, which had been planned to 
be opened in 2020, will likely prolong storage at reactor sites, which 
would increase on-site storage costs. Because of delays in opening the 
Yucca Mountain repository, on-site storage at commercial nuclear 
facilities has been the de facto near-term strategy for managing spent 
nuclear fuel. Most spent nuclear fuel is stored at reactor sites, 
immersed in pools of water designed to cool it and isolate it from the 
environment. With the extension of on-site storage because of the 
delays in opening Yucca Mountain, some reactors are running out of 
space in their pools and have turned to dry-cask storage systems. In 
2009, we reported that such systems for reactor operators cost from 
about $30 million to $60 million per reactor, with costs increasing as 
more spent nuclear fuel is added to dry storage.[Footnote 34] We also 
reported that the spent nuclear fuel would likely have to be 
repackaged about every 100 years, although experts said this is 
uncertain and research is under way to better understand the longevity 
of dry-cask systems. This repackaging could add from about $180 
million to nearly $500 million, assuming initial repackaging 
operations, with costs dependent on the number of casks to be 
repackaged and whether a site has a transfer facility, such as a 
storage pool. 

Prolonging on-site storage would add to the taxpayer burden by 
increasing the substantial liabilities that DOE has already incurred 
due to on-site storage at commercial nuclear reactors. Were DOE to 
open Yucca Mountain in 2020, as it had planned, and begun taking 
custody of spent nuclear fuel, it would still have taken decades to 
take custody of the entire inventory of spent nuclear fuel. Assuming a 
2020 opening of Yucca Mountain, DOE estimated that the total taxpayer 
liabilities for the backlog as of 2020 would be about $15.4 billion 
and would increase by $500 million for each year of delay thereafter. 
[Footnote 35] It is important to recognize that these liabilities are 
outside of the nearly $15 billion already spent on developing a 
repository and the estimated $41 to $67 billion still to be spent if 
the Yucca Mountain repository were to be constructed and become 
operational, most of the cost of which is borne by the Nuclear Waste 
Fund. Instead, these liabilities are borne by taxpayers because of the 
government's failure to meet its commitment to take custody of the 
waste has resulted in lawsuits brought by industry.[Footnote 36] 
Furthermore, not all of the lawsuits have been resolved and industry 
has claimed that the lawsuits still pending could result in 
liabilities of at least $50 billion. Some former DOE officials and 
industry and community representatives stated that the termination of 
the Yucca Mountain program could result in an additional delay in the 
opening of a repository by at least 20 years, which would lead to 
additional DOE liabilities in the billions of dollars. Until a final 
disposition pathway is determined, there will continue to be 
uncertainties regarding the federal government's total liabilities. 

At decommissioned reactor sites, prolonged on-site storage could 
further increase costs or limit opportunities for industry and local 
communities, according to industry and community representatives. 
[Footnote 37] As long as the spent nuclear fuel remains, the sites 
would not be available for other purposes, and the former operators 
may have to stay in business for the sole purpose of monitoring, 
storing, and providing costly security for the fuel. Local communities 
could lose the potential use of the site for alternative purposes, 
potentially impacting economic growth and tax revenue. For example, 
according to an industry representative, a local government in 
Illinois would like to encourage development of property fronting Lake 
Michigan near a shutdown nuclear reactor planned for decommissioning. 
A local government official stated in an interview with the media, 
however, that it may be difficult to develop and sell the property 
because prospective buyers may feel uneasy about living next to a site 
storing spent nuclear fuel. Similarly, a local government official 
from Minnesota expressed concern about having to provide security and 
emergency response for the Prairie Island reactor site and its spent 
nuclear fuel because tax revenues from the facility will decrease 
substantially after it is decommissioned. However, these issues may 
not affect all reactor sites. For example, officials in Oregon told us 
they did not feel dry-cask storage at Trojan, a decommissioned 
reactor, adversely affected economic growth or tax revenue. This site 
is about 42 miles north of Portland, Oregon, and is not in a major 
metropolitan area. 

Prolonging on-site storage could also increase opposition to expansion 
of the nuclear industry, according to state and industry officials. 
Without progress on a centralized storage facility or repository, some 
experts have stated that some state and local opposition to reactor 
storage site recertification will likely increase and so will 
challenges to nuclear power companies' applications for reactor 
license extensions and for new reactor licenses.[Footnote 38] For 
example, Minnesota officials noted that negative public reaction to a 
proposal to increase dry-cask storage at a nuclear plant led the state 
legislature to impose a moratorium on new nuclear plants. At least 12 
other states have similar prohibitions on new construction, 9 of which 
can be lifted when a means of disposing of spent nuclear fuel can be 
demonstrated. Representatives from some tribal and environmental 
organizations said they were concerned with the long-term on-site 
storage of spent nuclear fuel. They said nuclear plants should take 
additional measures to ensure the safety and security of dry-cask 
storage sites, and they have raised these concerns in objecting to the 
relicensing of commercial reactors in Minnesota and New Jersey. For 
instance, tribal officials from the Prairie Island Indian Community in 
Minnesota told us they opposed relicensing the Prairie Island Nuclear 
Generating Plant because of environmental and safety concerns they 
have about living just 600 hundred yards from spent nuclear fuel. 

Termination Could Further Damage DOE's Credibility: 

A final impact of terminating Yucca Mountain is that communities may 
be even less willing to host spent nuclear fuel repositories or other 
storage sites in the future due to further erosion of DOE's 
credibility. Credibility has long been a problem for DOE. For 
instance, in 1984, a DOE expert panel found that DOE's credibility was 
already low in the early 1980s because of its past "ill-handled" 
repository siting experiences in Kansas, Michigan, and New Mexico. 
According to the panel's report, DOE's credibility was further 
strained at that time during initial site selection efforts because 
its site selection guidelines were criticized as being "superficial 
and vague." DOE continued to face credibility issues over the next 2 
decades because of delays in the Yucca Mountain project. Several 
stakeholders--including former DOE officials and officials from state 
government, and representatives from industry and community groups--
said that DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository 
program has further damaged DOE's credibility. 

Past Experience May Yield Potential Lessons for Future Nuclear Waste 
Management Efforts: 

Our review of reports and interviews with DOE and NRC officials and 
representatives of various national associations, local and state 
governments, and community organizations suggest two broad lessons for 
future repository efforts or other nuclear waste management efforts. 
First, overcoming social and political opposition is crucial, and 
transparency, economic incentives, and education are important tools 
in doing so. Second, in developing a waste management alternative, it 
is important to have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, since 
any such effort will take decades. 

Transparency, Incentives, and Education Are Important in Overcoming 
Opposition: 

Reports spanning several decades cite societal and political 
opposition as key obstacles to siting and building a permanent 
repository. In 1982, the Office of Technology Assessment, an office of 
Congress from 1972 to 1995 that provided congressional members and 
committees with analysis of scientific and technical issues, reported 
that after 3 decades of study, there are "no insurmountable technical 
obstacles" and that the "greatest single obstacle" to building a 
repository is an erosion of public confidence in the federal 
government.[Footnote 39] The National Research Council of the National 
Academies reiterated this conclusion in a 2001 report, stating that 
the most significant challenge to siting and putting into service a 
repository is societal.[Footnote 40] This lesson has also been borne 
out by previous U.S. attempts to build repositories. At Yucca 
Mountain, lack of public support in Nevada was a key reason DOE 
decided to terminate the effort, according to DOE. In contrast, local 
community support was a key element in the success of the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository in New Mexico. WIPP is 
currently the world's only operating permanent geologic repository for 
nuclear waste, although it only accepts defense-related transuranic 
waste and, according to a New Mexico state official, did not win 
support from the state to accept high-level waste. 

No nation has built a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel or 
high-level radioactive waste. Therefore, as industry and community 
representatives pointed out, there is no model or set of lessons that 
will guarantee success in this complex, decades-long endeavor. Various 
reports and stakeholders noted that transparency, incentives, and 
education were important features that could improve the likelihood of 
success. However, some social and political opposition may be 
extremely difficult to overcome, regardless of any of these features. 
For example, in 1992, DOE sought to develop a temporary spent nuclear 
fuel storage facility in Wyoming, but the Wyoming governor stopped 
that effort. In a letter to the county seeking to host the facility, 
the governor wrote that, despite the assurances of federal officials, 
even those with personal integrity and sincerity, he could not be sure 
that the federal government's attitudes or policies would remain the 
same over the next 50 years. He wrote that, once the federal 
government gains a foothold to a nuclear program in the state, the 
state may be powerless to have any further say in the program. 

Transparency and Cooperation: 

Several reports, DOE and state government officials, and industry and 
community representatives noted that transparency in dealing with 
local and state governments and affected parties may help overcome 
local and state opposition to a repository. Transparency demonstrates 
a willingness to address concerns openly and fosters the dialogue 
necessary to resolve differences and enhance cooperation, according to 
reports and interviews. DOE and state and local government officials 
said that transparency was an important factor in the successful 
opening of WIPP. For example, DOE evaluated key technical issues in 
the design of WIPP in part by using panels of independent experts, 
whose internal discussions and results were open to the public. 
Furthermore, according to a DOE report, stakeholders and the public 
were invited to actively participate in many WIPP technical meetings, 
and the public was allowed access to technical documents on 
characterizing the WIPP site. A report by scientists and managers at 
Sandia National Laboratories found that these efforts built confidence 
in the acceptability and integrity of the science program and built 
public trust. 

Conversely, state government officials told us that, if local 
communities or states feel that the federal government is not willing 
to address their concerns in a transparent way, they will be less 
inclined to work cooperatively with the federal government. For 
example, during the 1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission attempted to 
develop a high-level waste repository in a salt formation near Lyons, 
Kansas. Critics charged that the commission was not transparent in its 
efforts, instead rushing to its decision and refusing to address the 
concerns of local and state officials. The commission abandoned its 
plans for the Lyons site in 1972, after opposition intensified and 
additional technical questions arose, such as whether it was possible 
to plug exploratory gas and oil shafts at the site. Similarly, 
according to a former DOE official and state and local government 
officials, DOE lacked transparency in developing its plans for the 
Yucca Mountain repository. For example, during studies of the mountain 
over the past 20 years, DOE found that water moved through the area 
faster than previously realized. As DOE site characterization and 
design activities continued, DOE's engineering designs changed, such 
as improved alloys for waste canisters to delay corrosion and titanium-
based drip shields to keep the canisters dry. According to a former 
DOE official and representatives from state and local governments and 
a community group, DOE did not consult with the local or state 
governments or other affected parties in developing these new 
solutions; it also did not establish independent scientific panels or 
any form of state oversight that might have given affected parties 
more confidence in the solutions. DOE included these technologies in 
its license application, but they have now become the focal point of 
several of the challenges raised in the licensing proceeding. 

Another way to gain support is to promote state involvement in key 
decisions and oversight, according to a state government official and 
DOE contractors. This is important because, although many communities 
might be found willing to host a repository, most states would not be 
willing to do so because of broader constituencies and issues related 
to federal-state relations. For example, despite the growing 
willingness of the community of Carlsbad and of communities along the 
transportation routes to host the repository, the state of New Mexico 
continued to oppose WIPP, as did many activist groups. The project 
might have ended due to state opposition, but DOE conceded some of its 
authority to the state, agreeing to fund the Environmental Evaluation 
Group in 1978, a technical oversight group made up of independent 
technical experts and funded through a DOE contract. The state did not 
consider this enough to address its key concerns, however. 
Specifically, the state was concerned that DOE had already made a 
decision to site a repository in New Mexico before technical 
assessments had been completed and that the state had no enforceable 
legal mechanism for asserting its rights. As a result, the state sued 
DOE and, in exchange for the state's dropping the lawsuit, DOE made 
further concessions when DOE and the state signed the Consultation and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1981, giving the state greater input and 
oversight on WIPP. The agreement, according to a state government 
official, set the stage for both sides to work cooperatively together 
to resolve future differences. Without these concessions and 
agreements, WIPP might have been further delayed in opening or might 
never have opened at all, according to a WIPP project leader for the 
state of New Mexico. In contrast, although the NWPA established an 
independent oversight group and DOE held public meetings, DOE and the 
state of Nevada never established an agreement similar to the 
Consultation and Cooperation Agreement DOE signed with New Mexico, 
which would have given Nevada an oversight role over the Yucca 
Mountain repository.[Footnote 41] 

Long-term Incentives: 

Many stakeholders we talked to, including officials from DOE and state 
government, a former DOE official, and representatives from community 
groups, said substantial, long-term investments in the host community 
and state can help win support. Long-term investments keep key parties 
committed to a repository effort after it has begun, which is 
important in an effort that will take several decades. Several of the 
stakeholders said that significant investments in infrastructure or 
local economic development are preferable to cash payments, which can 
end at any time. State government and DOE officials said that the 
benefits package for Yucca Mountain in the NWPA--including $20 million 
per year in cash after receipt of the first spent fuel until closure 
of the facility--was not enough to be considered an incentive for 
Nevada, particularly since Nevada was expected to make a concession 
for other states without any commensurate contribution from those 
states. Although Nevada currently purchases electricity from utilities 
that generate electricity from nuclear power, this may not have been 
the case when Yucca Mountain was first selected. In the case of WIPP, 
a New Mexico state official stated that one agreement DOE negotiated 
with New Mexico guaranteed funding for highway improvements along 
WIPP's transportation routes for 15 years, totaling $300 million. In 
addition to a benefits package, comments reflecting views from DOE, 
local government, and the National Academy of Sciences, suggested that 
the federal government should consider penalties designed to 
discourage local and state governments from taking advantage of 
benefits without upholding long-term commitments. According to 
reports, many other countries are also offering benefits for 
communities willing to host a geologic repository. The amount and type 
of benefit varies. For example, Sweden provided a cash payment of $60 
million to the community selected to host a repository in that 
country. Although France is still in the planning stages for its 
repository, it is planning long-term economic development for the host 
community. 

Education: 

Some stakeholders told us that education may be needed to overcome 
misperceptions about nuclear waste and its storage to gain public 
acceptance. Members of community and academic groups, including the 
National Academy of Sciences, told us that some members of the public 
incorrectly equate spent nuclear fuel with nuclear weapons. They 
associate spent fuel with images of mushroom clouds from the 
detonation of a nuclear warhead, when in fact spent nuclear fuel 
cannot explode. Education has proved useful. For example, DOE's 
contractor at WIPP involved local communities situated along the 
transportation routes throughout the state, providing education and 
training programs and equipment related to the safe transportation of 
radioactive waste. These efforts resulted in increased acceptance of 
the project, according to local government officials and community 
representatives. Other countries are also pursuing education. For 
example, Canada's initial efforts at developing a geologic repository 
were tabled due to a lack of public support, and the country's newly 
created Nuclear Waste Management Organization has made education one 
of several key issues related to long-term management of spent nuclear 
fuel. This is a key effort to gain public acceptance for its new 
repository project, according to a report recently issued by the 
organization. 

Consistent Policy, Funding, and Leadership Are Important in Any Waste 
Management Effort: 

Based on reports and interviews with DOE and NRC officials, 
representatives of various national associations and community 
organizations, and local and state government officials, we identified 
a second broad lesson--emphasizing consistent policy, funding, and 
leadership--that may help address societal and public opposition to a 
repository or other waste management alternative over the decades it 
will take to complete the effort. 

Consistent Policies: 

Our previous reports about programs at DOE and other agencies have 
highlighted the importance for policies to be credible and consistent 
to be effectively implemented.[Footnote 42] Several stakeholders we 
interviewed and the reports we reviewed reaffirmed this. 

According to reports and interviews, the nation's nuclear waste 
management policies over the past several decades have not been 
consistent, which has contributed to public opposition. In particular, 
an independent report issued in 1984 on alternative methods for 
financing and managing the nuclear waste program stated that there was 
a serious and inherent lack of stability and continuity in the 
nation's nuclear waste management program that adversely impacted 
DOE's credibility.[Footnote 43] More recently, stakeholders we spoke 
with from states, industry, and community groups pointed out changes 
in nuclear waste management policy that they considered inconsistent. 
For example, some stakeholders said that the NWPA originally 
contemplated several sites in the West and several in the East to be 
evaluated for a potential nuclear waste repository, with the final 
result being one repository in the West and one in the East. However, 
a 1987 amendment to the NWPA eliminated this approach and directed DOE 
to focus its site characterization efforts only on Yucca Mountain. 

In addition, federal agencies have at times been inconsistent in their 
policies on safety standards for a repository, considered one of the 
more critical issues for public acceptance. For example, the federal 
government did not have post-closure safety standards in place for 
either WIPP or Yucca Mountain when it began work assessing the likely 
performance of each repository's design, making it difficult for the 
federal government to determine how well the repository needs to 
perform to protect public health or what reliance to place on natural 
or engineered systems. Although work began at WIPP in 1974, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not given authority to issue 
safety standards for offsite releases from radioactive material in 
repositories until NWPA, in 1983. EPA issued generic safety standards 
in 1985 and standards specific to WIPP in 1996. EPA did not issue 
safety standards specific to Yucca Mountain until 2001, even though 
DOE had begun to focus its work there in 1987. EPA's standards 
directed that the repository's safety must be demonstrated over a 
10,000-year period. However, after several groups filed suit, alleging 
that certain standards were not sufficient, EPA revised some standards 
in 2008 to use a 1-million-year period during which safety must be 
demonstrated. A former DOE official and a community group 
representative said the initial lack of standards galvanized 
opposition in both New Mexico and Nevada, and the 1-million-year 
standard, which many stakeholders we interviewed, including 
scientists, described as an unreasonably long time period for accurate 
projections, brought the credibility of Yucca Mountain standards into 
question. 

For example, some reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed 
from state and community groups, stated that to achieve consistency, a 
nuclear waste management program should be insulated from the 
political influences and changes in policy that have plagued the 
process for decades. They stated that policies are inherently likely 
to change over the time it will take to implement a program. Although 
there was general agreement that affected parties needed to be part of 
the process, there were different viewpoints on how best to insulate 
the program. The 1985 independent report on alternative methods for 
financing and managing the nuclear waste program recommended that a 
federally chartered, government-owned corporation should be 
responsible for the siting and construction of the repository in an 
environment largely free from political influence. The report noted 
that the organization model would effectively involve key affected 
parties in siting decisions, which the report called probably the most 
essential element in ensuring the long-term success of the program. 
The 1982 report from the Office of Technology Assessment concluded 
that an independent agency may be the best, if not the only, way to 
maintain credibility. Some stakeholders agreed with these assessments, 
noting that DOE was subject to political influences and had lost a lot 
of its credibility as a result of changes in policy. They stated that 
an independent organization could bring the credibility necessary to 
draw key affected parties to an open and transparent discussion on 
siting. In addition, they stated that an independent organization 
could be structured to have more financial independence, free of some 
of the conditions that limited OCRWM in DOE, but they noted that such 
an organization would still require oversight. Some quasi-governmental 
organizations have been developed and implemented with varying degrees 
of success. We have reported on quasi-governmental organizations and 
issues related to risky behaviors because of their federal sponsorship 
and the need for adequate oversight.[Footnote 44] Still other 
stakeholders we talked with had different viewpoints, stating that DOE 
remains an adequate entity for the process, noting that it had 
successfully sited and built WIPP. 

Conversely, some DOE officials and a community representative said 
that the site selection process is inherently political. They stated 
that the selection of a site--assuming the candidate sites are 
technically satisfactory--should be addressed through a political 
process involving all stakeholders. Some stakeholders suggested that a 
final decision should be made by Congress if it is to have any lasting 
authority. 

Consistent funding: 

DOE and state officials and community representatives told us that 
OCRWM's annual budget was not predictable. OCRWM's annual 
appropriations varied by as much as 20 percent from year to year, and 
its average annual shortfall of appropriations from its budget request 
was about $90 million each year. Stakeholders, including former DOE 
officials, said that this makes long-term planning difficult. 
According to DOE, the original intent of NWPA was to provide 
consistent funding for a repository and, until this is addressed, the 
uncertainty of funding may impact the long-term plans for a repository. 

According to current and former DOE officials, unless changes are 
made, the Nuclear Waste Fund might not be sufficient to license, 
construct, operate, and close a new repository. This is in part 
because as time goes on, reactors will likely retire and, unless more 
reactors come on line to replace the retiring reactors, payments to 
the fund will dwindle. According to DOE, The fund was originally 
designed to build up an initial surplus to allow it to be self-
sustaining as reactors retire. 

Continuity of Leadership: 

People we spoke with, including former DOE officials and industry 
representatives, told us that continuity of leadership is important 
for demonstrating commitment to local and state governments and other 
affected parties and for providing quality management for a long-term 
program. They said OCRWM operated with a revolving-door style of 
management that hurt its relationships with local and state government 
officials. For example, from 1983 through 2010, OCRWM had 17 
directors, more than half of them acting directors. Some former DOE 
officials and industry representatives commented that, as part of DOE, 
OCRWM was not always a high priority and the quality of managers 
running the program varied. Some stakeholders said this illustrates a 
lack of commitment for the program and undermined public trust in the 
nuclear waste management program. Former OCRWM officials stated that 
OCRWM had not been consistent in developing positive relationships 
with the local communities and the state. One former OCRWM director 
noted the lack of regular meetings with local community groups when he 
arrived. 

Former DOE officials also told us that scientific leadership needs to 
ensure a consistent focus on complying with the regulations or 
standards. At WIPP, Sandia National Laboratories was named the lead 
laboratory in 1975, and its director for science remained in a key 
leadership position for most of the time DOE worked to open the 
facility. Former DOE officials said that this helped DOE keep its 
focus and prioritize its research over the many years of study. In 
contrast, some stakeholders said the science at Yucca Mountain was not 
as focused, primarily due to a lack of scientific leadership. For 
example, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board noted that some of 
the site's early studies were not focused on the performance 
assessment modeling needed to develop a license application. DOE named 
Sandia National Laboratories as the lead laboratory for Yucca Mountain 
in 2007, and former DOE officials and industry representatives 
credited its leadership with contributing to the completion of the 
license application, submitted in 2008. 

Conclusions: 

After decades of effort and nearly $15 billion in spending, DOE 
succeeded in submitting a license application for a nuclear waste 
repository. However, since then, DOE has dismantled its repository 
effort at Yucca Mountain and has taken steps that make the shutdown 
difficult to reverse. DOE focused on a rapid dismantlement because the 
administration ended funding on September 30, 2010. Amid uncertainty 
over whether it had the authority to terminate the Yucca Mountain 
repository program, DOE terminated the program without formally 
assessing the risks stemming from the shutdown, including the 
possibility that it might have to resume the repository effort. 
Without a formal risk assessment, DOE cannot be assured that it is 
aware of any risks it is still facing from the shutdown, such as from 
missed opportunities to preserve institutional knowledge that may be 
needed in future efforts. Furthermore, as more time passes without a 
plan for resuming the licensing process at Yucca Mountain, DOE may 
find it increasingly difficult to resume the process if it reconsiders 
its decision or is compelled to do so. For example, DOE may find it 
increasingly hard to gather staff with previous experience at Yucca 
Mountain, since over time more will retire, relocate, or change 
careers. Without an adequate closeout plan that included a risk 
assessment, DOE has left itself vulnerable to losses in both 
experienced staff and physical property. When DOE eliminated 
experienced staff, it did not tap them for lessons learned that could 
be helpful for future efforts. Furthermore, DOE did not complete an 
inventory of OCRWM property before it closed out the Yucca Mountain 
site and does not know if equipment was stolen, even though some of 
its storage sites were breached. Nor did DOE demonstrate that it fully 
documented the return of any proceeds from sales of OCRWM to the 
Nuclear Waste Fund. Until these issues are resolved, DOE remains 
vulnerable to losses and may not be able to ensure it has 
appropriately managed federal property and funds. 

The potential termination of Yucca Mountain also has consequences 
beyond DOE. On the one hand, it could offer a chance for the nation to 
reconsider its approach to nuclear waste management, assess emerging 
technologies, and possibly develop new technologies. On the other 
hand, termination would once again defer the permanent disposal of 
some of the nation's most hazardous materials. In doing so, it would 
essentially restart the search for a permanent solution. DOE has begun 
this process by charging the Blue Ribbon Commission with evaluating 
nuclear waste management and disposal alternatives. The commission has 
not been charged with siting a new repository, the process around 
which so much opposition has been focused. It is not clear what the 
nature of the commission's recommendations will be and whether they 
will endorse a particular final disposal pathway. What is clear, 
however, is that developing and implementing any alternative to Yucca 
Mountain will likely involve considerable time and cost. 

Although much time and cost was involved in efforts to develop a 
repository, similar mistakes have been repeated at different sites 
over the decades--from Lyons, Kansas, to Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 
Specifically, efforts have needed the transparency and other features 
that helped win public support at WIPP, the nation's only federal 
geologic repository. They have also needed consistent policies, 
consistent funding, and a sustainable funding mechanism, and 
continuity of leadership, which could have kept the efforts focused 
and improved public acceptance of a repository. The nation's next 
investment of significant time and resources may be more successful if 
these lessons are understood and implemented. Specifically, improved 
policies, funding, program leadership, and departmental priorities may 
help to ensure that costly past mistakes are not repeated. Nuclear 
waste disposal is extremely controversial, and no strategy can 
guarantee success. However, given the past and the consequences of 
failure, many knowledgeable sources suggested that the task may 
require a more predictable funding mechanism and more independence 
than DOE is able to provide. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Because successfully resolving the issue of what to do with spent 
commercial nuclear fuel will likely be a decades-long, costly, and 
complex endeavor, which can be disrupted by changing views and 
unpredictable funding, Congress may wish to consider whether: 

* a more predictable funding mechanism would enhance the federal 
government's future efforts to develop and implement a disposal 
solution for the nation's spent nuclear fuel, and: 

* an independent organization, outside DOE, could be more effective in 
siting and developing a permanent repository for the nation's nuclear 
waste. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help minimize the impact of the rapid shutdown, improve 
accountability for assets related to Yucca Mountain, and improve the 
likelihood of success of future nuclear waste management efforts, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the appropriate 
officials to take the following two actions: 

* Assess the risks stemming from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain 
and develop a preliminary plan to restart the project, in case DOE is 
required to do so. 

* Provide Congress with an inventory of property from the Yucca 
Mountain repository program, including its value, and an accounting of 
the property disposed of, the funds received from property 
transactions, and the disposition of these funds. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE and NRC with a draft of this report for their review 
and comment. DOE provided written comments on March 30, 2011, which 
are summarized below and reproduced in appendix IV. DOE stated that it 
strongly disagreed with many of the findings in our draft report and 
both of our recommendations. NRC provided written comments on March 
17, 2011, which are reproduced in appendix V. NRC stated it had no 
significant comments on our report and thanked us for the time and 
effort taken to review this important topic. DOE and NRC also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

In its written comments, DOE stated that it strongly disagreed with 
many of the findings in the report. 

First, DOE questioned the veracity of information supplied by some 
parties we interviewed. Specifically, DOE stated that some parties we 
interviewed were "either ill-informed or had self-interested (for 
example, financial) reason to disagree with DOE's considered 
judgments." In order to address the objectives of our report, we 
developed a methodology to ensure we obtained a complete, accurate, 
and balanced view of the Yucca Mountain situation. As part of this 
approach, it was important to include not only DOE's viewpoint but 
that of other knowledgeable officials and individuals. Collectively, 
we conducted more than 100 interviews with officials from NRC and the 
Department of Justice as well as representatives from industry, 
independent organizations, national associations and organizations, 
academia, and community groups. It is important to note that many of 
these knowledgeable individuals represent the views of national 
organizations, are considered experts in their fields, or have 
appeared as witnesses before the Blue Ribbon Commission. We spoke with 
five former DOE OCRWM directors and other former and current DOE 
officials and staff, some of whom worked on or managed various aspects 
of DOE's shutdown efforts. Several of these officials and staff 
provided views that conflicted with those of senior DOE managers. For 
example, several of these former and current DOE officials expressed 
concerns or reservations about aspects of DOE's steps to terminate the 
Yucca Mountain repository project, such as how property was 
dispositioned. In addition to the officials interviewed, we reviewed 
thousands of pages of documents and reports. We used information from 
all of these sources to develop our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. 

Second, DOE's comments questioned our assumption that the Yucca 
Mountain repository would have opened in 2020. We believe that using a 
2020 opening date is reasonable for analyzing the effects of a 
possible termination of the program. As we made clear in our draft 
report, 2020 was the target opening date that DOE itself established 
in 2008. In developing this date, as we noted in the draft report, DOE 
considered the many steps, including legislative and regulatory 
actions, needed in order to open the repository. At any point in time, 
DOE could have changed its target date or related assumptions, but it 
did not. We recognized in our draft report that the opening date for 
the Yucca Mountain repository was not certain, but DOE did not suggest 
an alternative date for us to use in our analysis. Furthermore, DOE 
used its Yucca Mountain repository plans, in which DOE assumes a 2020 
opening date, in its annual 2010 assessment of the adequacy of the fee 
that utilities pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund. More specifically, in 
its 2010 assessment, DOE stated that the Yucca Mountain repository 
scenario is the closest "proxy" to an as yet undefined alternative. We 
have therefore retained this assumption while making clear its 
limitations. 

DOE also questioned our assumption that alternatives to Yucca Mountain 
would likely take longer to implement and would lead to longer on-site 
storage and increased costs. DOE stated that the Blue Ribbon 
Commission will provide advice and make recommendations including 
alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, implying that such 
alternatives could be implemented sooner than the Yucca Mountain 
repository, but provided no additional information necessary for a 
meaningful analysis of such alternatives. Moreover, the Blue Ribbon 
Commission itself, in a March 2011 summary of data it has compiled so 
far, stated that a mined, geologic disposal facility still seems to be 
the most widely accepted approach and that most challenges to nuclear 
waste disposal are political and social, not technical.[Footnote 45] 
It is not clear whether the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations 
can or will address these challenges, whether DOE will choose to 
implement any of the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations, or how 
quickly they can be implemented. In contrast, key interim or permanent 
alternatives to the Yucca Mountain repository that we reviewed--
centralized storage, reprocessing, or even a different repository--
could take decades to implement. Although DOE stated in its comments 
that it could begin operations of a centralized storage facility in as 
little as 6 years, the evidence does not support this. The only effort 
to open a centralized facility for storing dry casks of commercial 
spent nuclear fuel--a private industry venture--began about 16 years 
ago, but continues to face legal and political challenges and at least 
3 years of construction before it can begin operations. DOE itself 
acknowledged that it might only succeed in opening a centralized 
storage facility in 6 years if various complex statutory, regulatory, 
siting, construction, and financial issues were expeditiously 
resolved. As we note in our report, the termination of the Yucca 
Mountain repository essentially restarts a time consuming and costly 
process that has already cost nearly $15 billion through fiscal year 
2010. The significant opposition to the Yucca Mountain repository, 
particularly from Nevada, is not a new development and DOE's pursuit 
of the repository in the face of this opposition, followed by its 
citing of this opposition in its decision to terminate the project 
after more than 20 years, raises great uncertainty and questions about 
DOE's credibility on this issue. 

Third, DOE stated that it acted responsibly in carrying out the Yucca 
Mountain repository shutdown, including assessing risks and ensuring 
an orderly project termination. We included in our report DOE 
officials' descriptions of steps taken to plan the shutdown of the 
program, such as weekly meetings, but that does not constitute an 
endorsement of those steps as being complete and comprehensive. As we 
and DOE's Inspector General noted, DOE's efforts, while significant, 
were still no substitute for having an approved shutdown plan that 
includes a risk assessment. Such a plan can establish a shared 
understanding of goals and the methods to be used to reach them. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive risk assessment would identify not just 
the immediate risks of shutting down the program, but the longer-term 
risks that could impact future waste management efforts. Such a risk 
assessment would help the department ensure that it has considered all 
of the likely risks and taken appropriate actions to mitigate possible 
impacts. Given the significant time and funds invested in the Yucca 
Mountain effort, and the time and funds likely to be invested in a 
future effort, it is reasonable to expect that a formal shutdown plan, 
including a risk assessment, be completed. 

Fourth, DOE stated that it complied with governing legal principles 
for disposal of property related to the Yucca Mountain repository 
program. However, DOE's property management decisions and its 
ambitious property disposition schedule raised questions that we 
sought to highlight in our draft report. For example, the 
justification that DOE used in selecting the method it used to dispose 
of its large volume of property, while complying with federal property 
regulations, seemed "unusual," according to a GSA official with 
authority over property management in the West. Specifically, DOE used 
only a small sample of property that could not be sold--three pallets 
of miscellaneous computer equipment--to document the decision to 
transfer as abandoned property over 100 truckloads of office furniture 
and equipment. Also, DOE's statement in its comments to us that our 
draft report "inappropriately suggests that DOE should have conducted 
an inventory of the property remaining at the Yucca Mountain site 
prior to the shutdown of OCRWM," raises another question. A DOE order 
concerning personal property management directs managers to perform 
regular physical inventories of personal property that they are 
responsible for, and the fact that DOE officials could not ascertain 
whether any property was taken when storage units were broken into 
seems to illustrate that this was not done.[Footnote 46] Finally, DOE 
provided us with little documentation on certain property that was to 
be sold at fair market value, with the proceeds returned to the 
Nuclear Waste Fund. Although we acknowledge that DOE still has to 
reconcile its contracts, the lack of available documentation--
including for one transaction that occurred in October 2009--raises 
questions about whether DOE documentation is sufficient to support 
timely oversight of such sales. 

Fifth, DOE stated that it took steps during the shutdown that gave DOE 
the ability to resume an active licensing proceeding, if so required. 
Our concern is not that DOE would be unable to resume the process but 
that it may be significantly slowed, and possibly less successful, 
with the loss of knowledgeable and experienced staff. It is unclear 
whether any of these staff would return to work if the licensing 
should resume. For example, although DOE stated that it took steps to 
retain federal DOE employees within other DOE units, many left DOE 
employment. As stated in the report, according to DOE, its Office of 
Human Capital had information on the location of the federal employees 
who found other employment within DOE, but DOE officials stated that 
they were not certain all those former employees would be interested 
in returning to a licensing effort. DOE officials stated that they 
could also use staff without Yucca Mountain experience, but the 
substitution of these staff could jeopardize the quality of the 
license defense, according to a key Sandia National Laboratories 
official with management responsibilities over the Yucca Mountain 
repository. Additionally, under normal attrition rates, as DOE stated 
in its comments, DOE might be expected to successfully hire and train 
a few individual employees and successfully integrate them into an 
existing team, but recruiting an entire new team would, by DOE's own 
admission, require years of training in technical and regulatory roles. 

Lastly, DOE disagreed with our two recommendations, but, based on the 
discussion above, we continue to believe they are appropriate. First, 
DOE disagreed with our recommendation that it assess the risks 
stemming from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain and develop a 
preliminary plan to restart the project. DOE stated that it had 
already assessed and taken steps to mitigate the key risks associated 
with the shutdown and cast doubt on any useful purpose being served by 
conducting an after-the-fact risk assessment. However, as we have 
stated, DOE management did not approve a formal shutdown plan or a 
risk assessment, and DOE relied instead on focus groups of DOE staff 
and meetings between DOE staff and management. As a result, DOE may be 
unaware of all the risks it faces, particularly long-term impacts on 
future waste management efforts. In addition, the future of the Yucca 
Mountain project remains uncertain, and more comprehensive planning 
and risk assessment could help DOE more efficiently respond with a 
quality defense of its license application if it is required to resume 
the license review proceedings. 

DOE also disagreed with our recommendation that it provide Congress 
with an inventory of property from the Yucca Mountain repository 
program. It stated that an inventory of the property at Yucca Mountain 
has already been completed, that reconciliation of property 
transactions and inventory will take place as part of contract close- 
outs, and that the applicable property disposition procedures were 
followed. However, the actions DOE took would appear to be 
insufficient in light of the facts. Specifically, DOE officials could 
not ascertain whether any property was taken when storage units at the 
Yucca Mountain site were broken into, and the department had little 
documentation on certain property that was to be sold so that the 
proceeds could be returned to the Nuclear Waste Fund. If DOE had an 
inventory of its property and an accounting of the property disposed 
of and funds received, as it should have, compiling this information 
to provide Congress with a more complete understanding should not be 
particularly difficult or time-consuming. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, Secretary of Energy, Chairman of 
NRC, and other interested parties. In addition, the report also will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at 202-512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Mark E. Gaffigan: 
Managing Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the basis for the Department of Energy's (DOE) decision 
to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository program, we wrote the 
Secretary of Energy in May 2010 and requested that he provide his 
input. We also reviewed key actions--and related documents--taken by 
DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and affected parties, 
including the June 29, 2010, ruling by NRC's Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board that denied DOE's motion to withdraw its license 
application and court filings related to DOE's termination of the 
Yucca Mountain repository program. Finally, we interviewed NRC 
officials about DOE's decision. 

To identify the steps DOE has taken to terminate the Yucca Mountain 
repository program, and their effects, if any, we reviewed DOE budget 
documents, memoranda, and correspondence. We visited the Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) offices in Las Vegas and 
the Yucca Mountain site. We also spoke with DOE federal and contractor 
officials from various offices involved with the termination efforts, 
including OCRWM, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the Office of 
Environmental Management, the Office of Legacy Management, the Office 
of General Counsel, and Sandia National Laboratories. We also reviewed 
pertinent DOE Office of Inspector General reports and interviewed 
Inspector General officials. We used our Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 47] to assess DOE's plans 
to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository and OCRWM. 

To identify the likely major impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain 
repository program, we reviewed our prior reports and those of other 
agencies within the legislative branch issued during the period from 
1998 to 2010 (see appendix II). We limited the analysis to this period 
because under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982(NWPA), 1998 was the 
year that DOE was to begin taking custody of spent nuclear fuel from 
commercial reactors. We felt that the issues raised in these reports 
would adequately capture a range of impacts associated with a 
potential closure of Yucca Mountain repository program. We limited the 
scope of our review to identifying primary impacts, such as increased 
storage costs. We also spoke with representatives from key national 
associations and organizations whose members were either affected by 
the termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program or were in a 
position to comment on the impact as a result of studies or analyses. 
These organizations are all national in scope or are part of a 
national organization. They presented views that reflected those of 
industry, government, academia, and concerned groups. See appendix III 
for a list of these organizations. To gain a local perspective on the 
possible impacts of a Yucca Mountain termination, we contacted state 
and local government officials and community groups near the proposed 
Yucca Mountain site and near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
site. We also selected a nongeneralizable sample of nuclear power 
reactors--three operational reactors, one reactor that is no longer 
operating but has not yet been decommissioned, and one decommissioned 
reactor. We interviewed officials from state and local governments, 
and representatives from industry and local community groups at these 
sites. We conducted a site visit to the decommissioned reactor, in 
Oregon. We considered several factors when selecting the reactors. For 
example, we wanted to include both the oldest and most recently 
licensed nuclear power reactors because we assumed they would reflect 
different viewpoints on the impacts of terminating the Yucca Mountain 
repository program. Table 1 gives details of the reactors we selected. 

Table 1: Name, State, NRC Region, and Status of Commercial Nuclear 
Reactors Sites We Contacted: 

Reactor site: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station; 
State: New Jersey; 
NRC region: Region I; 
Status: Oldest operating reactor, commercial operations began in 1969. 

Reactor site: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant; 
State: Minnesota; 
NRC region: Region III; 
Status: Operating reactor. 

Reactor site: Trojan Nuclear Plant; 
State: Oregon; 
NRC region: Region IV; 
Status: Decommissioned reactor. 

Reactor site: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant; 
State: Tennessee; 
NRC region: Region II; 
Status: Newest operating reactor, licensed in 1996. 

Reactor site: Zion Nuclear Power Station; 
State: Illinois; 
NRC region: Region III; 
Status: Reactor shut down but not yet decommissioned. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC data. 

[End of table] 

In assessing potential impacts, we used DOE's estimate of a 2020 
opening date for the Yucca Mountain repository in our analysis. DOE's 
2008 estimate for opening the Yucca Mountain repository was 2020, 
before it took steps to terminate the program. While we recognize this 
2020 date was not certain, we know of no better assumption to 
meaningfully assess the impact of a termination of the Yucca Mountain 
repository program. 

To identify the principal lessons learned from the various past 
nuclear waste management efforts and how these might be applied to 
future efforts, we reviewed our reports and those of other agencies 
within the legislative branch issued during the period from 1982 to 
2010 (see appendix II). We limited the analysis to this period because 
Congress passed the NWPA in 1982. We felt that issues raised in these 
reports would address a range of key lessons learned from the past 
nearly 30 years of U.S. nuclear waste management. In addition to this 
analysis, we reviewed selected reports from the federal government, 
academia, and industry relevant to lessons learned. We interviewed 
DOE, NRC, and Sandia National Laboratories officials who had worked on 
the Yucca Mountain project for their views on principal lessons 
learned. We also talked to former DOE employees, including five past 
directors of OCRWM. To obtain stakeholder perspectives on lessons 
learned, we interviewed representatives from key national associations 
and organizations, local and state governments, and community 
organizations. To identify possible lessons learned from the nation's 
only federal radioactive waste geologic repository at WIPP located in 
New Mexico, we conducted a site visit at the repository and 
interviewed officials from DOE, Sandia National Laboratories, and 
state and local governments. To identify possible lessons learned from 
the repository experiences at other countries, we reviewed documents 
from organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and we 
interviewed officials from DOE, Sandia National Laboratories, and the 
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to March 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: A List of Reports Reviewed: 

Congressional Budget Office: 

CBO. Budget Options, Volume 2. Publication No. 3191. Washington, D.C.: 
August 2009. 

CBO. The Federal Government's Responsibilities and Liabilities Under 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Testimony statement of Kim Cawley, Chief 
Natural and Physical Resources, Cost Estimation Unit, before the 
Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, 
D.C.: July 16, 2009. 

CBO. Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel. Testimony Statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, before the 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate. 
Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2007. 

CBO. The Federal Government's Liabilities Under the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act. Testimony Statement of Kim Cawley, Chief, Natural and 
Physical Resources, Cost Estimates Unit before the Committee on the 
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 
2007. 

CBO. Budget Options. Publication No. 2921. Washington, D.C.: February 
2007. 

CBO. Budget Options. Publication. Washington, D.C.: February 2005. 

CBO. Homeland Security and the Private Sector. Washington, D.C.: 
December 2004. 

CBO. Cost Estimate: Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1999. 
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1999. 

CBO. Cost Estimate: H.R. 45, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999. 
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1999. 

CBO. Cost Estimate: H.R. 1270, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. 
Washington, D.C.: September 25, 1997. 

CBO. Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options. Washington, 
D.C.: August 1996. 

Congressional Research Service: 

CRS. Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal. RL33461. Washington, D.C.: April 
9, 2010. 

CRS. Energy and Water Development: FY2011 Appropriations. R41150. 
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2010. 

CRS. The Yucca Mountain Litigation: Liability under the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982. R40996. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2010. 

CRS. Energy and Water Development: FY2010 Appropriations. R40669. 
Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2010. 

CRS. Nuclear Energy Policy. RL33558. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 
2009. 

CRS. Nuclear Waste Disposal: Alternatives To Yucca Mountain. R40202. 
Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2009. 

CRS. EPA's Final Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain. 
RL34698. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2008. 

CRS. Radioactive Waste Streams: Waste Classification for Disposal. 
RL32163. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2006. 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

GAO. Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs 
for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 4, 2009. 

GAO. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: DOE Should Reassess Its 
Approach to Designing and Building Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling 
Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-483]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2008. 

GAO. Yucca Mountain: DOE Has Improved Its Quality Assurance Program, 
but Whether Its Application for a NRC License Will Be High Quality Is 
Unclear. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1010]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2007. 

GAO. Yucca Mountain: Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste 
Repository Needs Increased Management Attention. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-313]. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 
2006. 

GAO. Yucca Mountain: Persistent Quality Assurance Problems Could Delay 
Repository Licensing and Operation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-460]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2004. 

GAO. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Options Exist to Further Enhance Security. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-426]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 15, 2003. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Technical, Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of the 
Yucca Mountain Repository Project. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-191]. Washington, D.C.: December 
21, 2001. 

GAO. Radiation Standards: Scientific Basis Inconclusive, and EPA and 
NRC Disagreement Continues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-152]. Washington, D.C.: June 
30, 2000. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Impediments to Completing the Yucca Mountain 
Repository Project. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-30]. Washington, D.C.: January 
17, 1997. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Observations on the Future of the 
Department. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-96-224]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 4, 1996. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Management and Organization of the Nevada 
Repository Project. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-95-27]. Washington, D.C.: 
December 23, 1994. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is 
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-299]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1994. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Foreign Countries Approaches to High-Level Waste 
Storage and Disposal. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-172]. Washington, D.C.: August 
4, 1994. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Funds Spent to Identify a Monitored Retrievable 
Storage Facility Site. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-199]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 7, 1993. 

GAO. Radioactive Waste: EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and 
Coordination Problems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-126]. Washington, D.C.: June 
3, 1993. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing 
Major Scientific Uncertainties. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-93-124]. Washington, D.C.: May 
21, 1993. 

GAO. Transition Series: Energy Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-93-13TR]. Washington, D.C.: 
December 1992. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Status of Actions to Improve DOE User-Fee 
Assessments. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-165]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1992. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and 
Difficult Task. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-92-73]. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 
1992. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Facility Is Unlikely by 1998. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-91-194]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 24, 1991. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of March 31, 1990. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-91-55]. Washington, D.C.: 
February l5, 1991. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments to 
Avoid Funding Shortfall. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-65]. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 
1990. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of December 31, 1989. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-130]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 30, l990. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of September 30, 1989. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-103]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 2, 1990. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report on DOE's Nuclear Waste Program as 
of June 30, 1989. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-59]. Washington, D.C.: 
December 12, 1989. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE's Budgeting Process for Grants to Nevada Needs 
Revision. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-90-20]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1989. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Quarterly Report as of March 31, 1989. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-89-178]. Washington, D.C.: August 
14, 1989. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Termination of Activities at Two Sites Proceeding 
in an Orderly Manner. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-89-66]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 6, 1989. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Repository Work Should Not Proceed until Quality 
Assurance Is Adequate. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-88-159]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 29, 1988. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Fourth Annual Report on DOE's Nuclear Waste 
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-88-131]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1988. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: DOE Should Provide More Information on Monitored 
Retrievable Storage. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-92]. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
1987. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Status of DOE's Implementation of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-17]. Washington, D.C.: April 
15, 1987. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Institutional Relations under the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1982. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-87-14]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 9, 1987. 

Office of Technology Assessment: 

OTA. Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste. 
OTA-O-171. Washington, D.C.: March 1985. 

OTA. Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste 
(summary). Washington, D.C.: April 1982. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Organizations We Obtained Input From: 

AREVA Inc. 

Association of American Railroads: 

Carlsbad Department of Development (New Mexico): 

Carlsbad Mayor's Office (New Mexico): 

City of Red Wing, Office of the Mayor (Minnesota): 

Clark County Department of Comprehensive Planning (Nevada): 

Columbia County Board of Commissioners (Oregon): 

Columbia Riverkeeper: 

Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office: 

Eastern Environmental Law Center: 

Energy Communities Alliance: 

EnergySolutions: 

Exelon Nuclear: 

Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety (New Jersey): 

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research: 

International Nuclear Associates: 

Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce: 

Minnesota Department of Commerce: 

National Academy of Sciences: 

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners: 

National Conference of State Legislatures: 

Natural Resources Defense Council: 

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: 

New Jersey Environmental Federation: 

New Mexico Environment Department: 

North American Water Office: 

Nuclear Energy Information Service: 

Nuclear Energy Institute: 

Nuclear Information and Resource Service: 

Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition: 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board: 

Nye County (Nevada): 

Ocean County Sheriff's Department (New Jersey): 

Oregon Conservancy Foundation: 

Oregon Public Power Coalition: 

PECOS Management Services, Inc. 

Portland General Electric: 

Prairie Island Indian Community: 

PSEG Nuclear: 

Public Utility Commission of Oregon: 

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control: 

Southern Nuclear: 

Southern States Energy Board: 

Southwest Research and Information Center: 

State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects: 

Tennessee Environmental Council: 

Tennessee Valley Authority: 

URS Corporation: 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce: 

Western Interstate Energy Board: 

Xcel Energy: 

Note: We also obtained input from other organizations not listed here. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

March 30, 2011: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Subject: DOE's Response to GAO's Conclusions and Technical 
Misstatements (GAO-11-229): 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The Department of Energy strongly disagrees with many of the 
conclusions drawn in GAO's Draft Report. In some areas, those 
conclusions are based upon misapprehensions of fact. In others, the 
Draft Report appears to accept on faith assertions by parties who are 
either ill-informed or have self-interested (for example, financial) 
reason to disagree with DOE's considered judgments. 

More generally, the Draft Report appears premised on two mistaken 
assumptions: first, that the Yucca Mountain repository would have 
opened, on a date certain (notwithstanding the many hurdles still 
remaining before it); and, second, that any alternative to the Yucca 
Mountain repository will take longer to implement and therefore lead 
to longer storage times at reactor sites and increased costs. To the 
contrary, there was considerable uncertainty whether the Yucca
Mountain repository would ever have opened — let alone when. Among 
other things, the project would have required new legislation, an NRC 
license, and many additional permits. And it suffered over many years 
from persistent community opposition. In shutting down the Yucca
Mountain Project, DOE is committed to pursuing better, more workable 
alternatives. To that end, the Secretary has established a Blue Ribbon 
Commission on America's Nuclear Future to conduct a comprehensive 
review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. The Commission will provide advice and make recommendations on 
issues including alternatives for the storage, processing, and 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Its interim report 
is due in July of this year and its final report is due by January 
2012. 

The Department has acted responsibly in carrying out the Yucca 
Mountain Project shutdown and will continue to do so in pursuing new 
options with the guidance of the Blue Ribbon Commission. Accordingly, 
it is unwarranted to assume, as the Draft Report appears to do 
throughout, that the shutdown of Yucca Mountain will impair the 
Government's ability to meet responsibly its waste management 
obligations. 

That said, the Department welcomes GAO's efforts to glean lessons from 
the Yucca Mountain experience to guide future waste management 
efforts. And it appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's Draft 
Report, while nevertheless feeling it necessary to register 
substantial disagreement with many of the conclusions drawn therein. 

A. Shutdown Planning: 

From senior management on down, the Department was committed to 
closing down the Yucca Mountain Project in a responsible manner, and 
it successfully did so. DOE's senior management worked closely with 
the Department's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
(OCRWM) and other relevant offices to plan for and implement the 
shutdown. This included ensuring that scientific information and other 
records were preserved, that DOE's Licensing Support Network 
collection of more than 30 million pages was maintained and remained 
online via the NRC portal, that all Project property was properly 
disposed of, that contracts requirements were met, and that federal 
employees were given priority placement within the Department or 
provided other assistance in finding new employment. All these 
activities were based on a master plan developed by management and 
overseen and supported on an ongoing basis by appropriate personnel 
within OCWRM and other relevant offices within the Department. 

Nevertheless, the Draft Report concludes that DOE lacked an "adequate 
closeout plan." Draft Report at 43. This "finding" rests on GAO's 
apparent belief that "DOE did not consistently follow federal policy 
and guidance for planning ... the shutdown." Id at 14. That is 
simply inaccurate. 

1. Risk Assessment: 

The Draft Report asserts that "DOE terminated the program without 
assessing the risks stemming from the shutdown, including the 
possibility that it might have to resume the repository effort." 
[Footnote 1] Id. at 43. That assertion ignores the substantial 
attention DOE gave to risk assessment and the steps it took in 
response. Indeed, elsewhere the Draft Report itself specifically notes 
that DOE considered and addressed these risks. For example, the Draft 
Report acknowledges statements by DOE officials that "although they 
did not complete a formal risk assessment, they did consider the 
possible risks of shutting down the program ... including the risk to 
DOE's ability to resume the license review process, if necessary." Id. 
at 22-23 (emphasis added). Even more to the point, as the Draft Report 
specifically acknowledges, such consideration led to numerous steps by 
DOE to mitigate those risks. Id at 23. Those steps included: (1) "not 
canceling its management and operating contract, in part so it would 
be easier to resume licensing activities if it were required to do 
so;" (2) "helping federal employees at OCRWM to remain at DOE, in part 
to facilitate efforts to reconstitute the Yucca Mountain work force, 
should the need arise;" and (3) consideration by DOE's Office of the
General Counsel of "planning and risk issues as the program was being 
dismantled." It is therefore clear — and apparently was to GAO — that 
DOE did carefully consider the risks inherent in shutting down the 
Yucca Mountain Project and took prudent action to abate such risks as 
it identified. 

2. Ensuring an Orderly Project Termination: 

a. Existence of a Shutdown Plan: 

The Department acted to ensure that the Yucca Mountain Project closed 
down in a responsible manner. These efforts have largely been 
successful, and included significant work to plan for and implement 
the shutdown. 

For example, in the Draft Report's own words, the Department undertook 
"extensive efforts" to "preserve data related to its licensing 
efforts, as well as other scientific information relevant to the 
storage or disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel." Id. 
at 15. Likewise, the shutdown ensured all Project property was 
properly disposed of, that contracts requirements were met, and that 
federal employees were given priority placement within the Department 
or provided other assistance in finding new employment. All these 
activities were based on a draft master plan developed by DOE 
management and overseen and supported on an ongoing basis by 
appropriate personnel within OCWRM and other relevant offices. 

To ensure that the Department closed down the Yucca Mountain Project 
in a responsible manner that minimized harm to federal employees — and 
did so within the timeframe necessary to account responsibly for the 
likelihood of no funding in Fiscal Year 2011 — the then-Under
Secretary of Energy, Dr. Kristina Johnson, held weekly meetings with 
the senior management of OCRWM and other DOE units. Those units 
included the Office of Environmental Management, the Office of Legacy 
Management, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the Office of the Chief
Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, the 
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of the General 
Counsel. The Draft Report acknowledges these meetings, see id at 22, 
but fails to appreciate the extent to which this process ensured that 
shutdown efforts were reviewed and coordinated by the Department's 
senior leaders. As part of this process, for example, the Under 
Secretary and affected Departmental offices executed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) clearly delineating each office's roles and 
responsibilities for functions continuing after the closure of OCRWM. 
[Footnote 2] 

The Draft Report recognizes the view of DOE officials involved "that 
DOE met its September 30, 2010 deadline for closure and believed that 
despite the difficult task, the shutdown was orderly." Id. at 15. As 
if to contradict this, however, the Draft Report observes that, "while
OCRWM's Yucca Mountain Project activities have ceased, several 
termination tasks are still ongoing, such as disposing of federal 
property and closing down contracts and subcontracts." Id.
To the extent this is meant to imply that the shutdown has been less 
than successfully executed, that implication is misguided. Rather, as 
any responsible organization would, DOE appropriately prioritized its 
shutdown activities. By September 30, 2010, all activities that needed 
to be completed by the close of the Fiscal Year had in fact been 
completed. It was entirely appropriate to defer until after September 
30, 2010 activities that did not need to be completed by the end of 
the Fiscal Year. Moreover, it is significant that the Draft Report 
does not, because it cannot, identify a single unrealized benefit that 
would have resulted from DOE adopting "formal" plans instead of the 
working plans that it actually implemented. 

b. Adequacy of Shutdown Staffing: 

The Draft Report questions whether the shutdown effort was 
appropriately staffed. Specifically, it asserts that "in contrast to 
the data preservation efforts, efforts to retain Yucca Mountain 
project staff were minimal." Id. at 16. "Staff were encouraged to seek 
other employment and given no incentive to stay with OCRWM to assist 
with the shutdown. Some DOE and contractor officials told us that 
retaining key staff during the shutdown process would have been 
helpful." Id at 16-17. 

This misunderstands an important part of DOE's shutdown planning and 
execution. Requiring additional staff to remain in their previous 
posts throughout the shutdown process would have been inconsistent 
with the important goal of assisting OCRWM employees to find new 
positions in the Department by September 30, 2010. Moreover, GAO fails 
to identify any specific aspect of the shutdown process that might 
have been improved had OCRWM retained a larger staff than it did in 
the months leading up to September 30, 2010. Further, OCRWM worked 
with management of other DOE offices to delay the departure of 
essential OCRWM personnel to their new positions where circumstances 
permitted. 

B. Property Disposition: 

Contrary to the impression created by the Draft Report, DOE's 
decisions regarding property disposition were made with great care and 
with a clear understanding of — and in compliance with — the governing 
legal principles. 

The Draft Report asserts that DOE is "vulnerable to losses in ... 
physical property" and "may not be able to ensure it has appropriately 
managed federal property and funds." Id. at 43. However, the Draft 
Report itself demonstrates that DOE successfully disposed of unneeded 
property in a financially sound, common-sense manner that complied 
with applicable federal property regulations. See id. at 18-21. 
Likewise, the Draft Report criticizes DOE for "not completing an 
inventory of OCRWM property before it closed out the Yucca Mountain 
site," adding that DOE "does not know if equipment was stolen, even 
though some of its storage sites were breached." Id. at 43. But the 
facts contained in the Draft Report show that an inventory of property 
at the Yucca Mountain site was completed when necessary and the 
equipment allegedly at-risk was actually protected by multiple layers 
of security. See id. at 20. The Draft Report also asserts that DOE 
failed to "demonstrate that it fully documented the return of any 
proceeds from sales of OCRWM [property] to the Nuclear Waste Fund." Id 
at 43. However, the Draft Report shows that DOE did document the 
initial stage of this reimbursement process and acknowledges that full 
documentation would be available once certain contracts are closed 
out. See id. at 20. Finally, the Draft Report criticizes DOE's 
property disposition documentation as "limited." Id. at 17. Yet it 
fails to identify any actual flaws or insufficiencies in that 
documentation. 

The apparent basis for all these misconceptions is provided under the 
misleading heading "DOE Used Expedited Procedures to Dispose of 
Property, but Its Documentation Was Limited." Id. This heading implies 
that the process employed by the Department for the disposal of 
property was inadequately documented and somehow flawed. That is 
simply not the case. Indeed, virtually all of the facts discussed in 
this section of the Draft Report demonstrate that DOE followed both 
the letter and intent of the federal property regulations by disposing 
of property in a financially sound, common-sense manner. 

To facilitate an accurate understanding of DOE's property disposition 
procedures, DOE has organized its response around four issues: (1) 
Property Disposition Prior to the Shutdown of OCRWM; (2) Property 
Disposition During the Shutdown of OCRWM; (3) Property at the Yucca
Mountain Site; and (4) Return of Certain Proceeds to Nuclear Waste 
Fund. 

1. Property Disposition Prior to the Shutdown of OCRWM: 

The Draft Report acknowledges that the property disposition procedures 
DOE used during the shutdown, which began in 2010, were consistent 
with procedures followed in other circumstances. See id. Specifically, 
the Draft Report acknowledges that they were "similar to those used to 
transfer excess property in 2009." Id. The 2009 transfers primarily 
involved office furniture that was excess to OCRWM's needs after the 
transition of OCRWM's management and operation (M&O) contractor in 
April of that year. During this transition, the Project vacated the 
majority of its leased offices and downsized from over 1,000 office 
suites to approximately 100 office suites. As a result of this 
downsizing, OCRWM had a significant quantity of excess furniture that 
was ultimately transferred to other DOE sites. The Draft Report 
contains no finding that this process was in any way flawed. 

2. Property Disposition During the Shutdown of OCRWM: 

The Draft Report describes the typical screening process that an 
agency must follow, as dictated by the General Services Administration 
(GSA), unless the agency declares that the property is "abandoned." 
See id. at 17-18. The Draft Report then explains that federal 
regulations allow an agency to employ an alternative property 
disposition process in "common-sense" situations where it "might not 
make sense to transfer or sell" the property. Id. at 18. As the Draft 
Report explains: 

Federal regulations also allow for an agency to declare its property 
abandoned and to dispose of the property on its own. To do so, the 
agency must first make a determination that the property has no 
commercial value or that the estimated cost of its continued care and 
storage could exceed the estimated proceeds from its sale. 

Id. 

Subsequently, the Draft Report acknowledges DOE officials' explanation 
that declaring the unneeded property as abandoned and transferring it 
within the Department "was the most efficient pathway" because this 
allowed the Department to "reduce landlord costs by emptying buildings 
of their equipment, save on utilities and security, and in some cases, 
reduce lease costs." Id at 18. As the Draft Report recognizes, through 
this process, approximately 80 truckloads of office furniture and 
equipment were transferred to DOE's Hanford Site, which saved that 
site about $2.1 million. Furthermore, the Draft Report cites a GSA 
official who correctly stated that "the determination of how to apply 
the regulation is left up to the agency and the fact that DOE found a 
way to reuse the equipment addressed the overall intent of the federal 
property regulations." Id. at 19. The same GSA official also explained 
that, "according to the abandonment regulation, DOE had to determine 
that its property had no commercial value or that the cost of its 
continued care and handling exceeded the estimated proceeds from the 
sale." Id. 

DOE did in fact determine that the property it planned to abandon had 
no commercial value. The Draft Report itself demonstrates that this 
determination by DOE was carefully reasoned and appropriately 
documented. The Draft Report summarizes the analysis used by the 
Department in reaching this determination. See id. Namely, storing the 
furniture and equipment costs the Department about $680 per day. OCRWM 
had reviewed the GSA database and found examples of three pallets of 
equipment that were similar to the material that OCRWM had, but GSA 
had not received any offers for the asking price of only $10. In light 
of this, OCRWM determined that the care, storage, and processing of 
its property "far surpassed the estimated proceeds from sale." Id. 
According to the Draft Report, "DOE officials stated that their 
documentation was sufficient for regulatory purposes." Id. 

In support of its contrary assertion, the Draft Report contains a 
single statement by a GSA official who opined that, "agencies 
determine on their own the level of analysis required to declare 
property abandoned, but ... DOE's limited analysis did not seem to 
address the large volume or variety of property that DOE was 
transferring." Id. As the first part of that statement indicates, 
under the abandonment regulations, the level of analysis required to 
declare property abandoned is left to the discretion of the agency. 
Those regulations specifically provide that a federal agency does not 
need to report abandonment or destruction of excess personal property to
GSA.[Footnote 3] DOE had discretion regarding the abandonment of 
property and the implementation of the property regulations. It 
exercised that discretion responsibly, and GSA does not have 
supervisory, oversight, or enforcement responsibilities over abandoned 
property. 

3. Property at the Yucca Mountain Site: 

The Draft Report states that although very little of the property from 
the Yucca Mountain site had been transferred, DOE "may have lost some 
of it to break-ins." Id. Further, the Draft Report asserts that the 
Department did not have a good inventory of the property at Yucca 
Mountain. For support, the Draft Report quotes a DOE official as 
saying broken locks had been found on at least three occasions and 
that, "some property may have been taken, but without an inventory 
they could not be certain what, if anything, was missing." Id. at 20. 
In short, the Draft Report inappropriately suggests that DOE should 
have conducted an inventory of the property remaining at the Yucca 
Mountain site prior to the shutdown of OCRWM, and that if such an 
inventory had been conducted DOE would know whether any property was 
in fact missing. 

It is important to understand that, unlike the property at OCRWM's Las 
Vegas offices, the majority of the property located at the Yucca 
Mountain site was not slated for disposal and in fact remains in DOE 
custody. As such, the Department determined that it was not necessary 
to conduct a complete inventory of the property located at the site 
because the property did not need to be moved from the site prior to 
shutdown and would remain in DOE's control at a secure site.[Footnote 
4] Appropriately, during the shutdown of OCRWM, the primary focus was 
placed on disposing of the property in the Las Vegas offices, because 
the Project had physically to vacate those offices. In addition, the 
Department took numerous steps to transfer responsibility and 
oversight of the Yucca Mountain site including the property and its 
ultimate disposition to other DOE organizations ensuring continuity of 
stewardship. The surface facilities at the site are part of DOE's 
Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and remain under DOE control 
after the shutdown of OCRWM. As such, DOE determined that the 
inventory and disposal of property at the site could be deferred until 
after the shutdown of OCRWM. As the Draft Report acknowledges, an 
inventory of the property at the site has now been completed and the 
property will be screened through the Energy Asset Disposal System. 
See id. at 20. 

Furthermore, the Department did in fact take reasonable steps to 
protect the property remaining at the Yucca Mountain site by placing 
it either in locked storage buildings or trailers or in the tunnel, 
which was shut down and secured behind a fence and locked gate. In 
addition, it strictly limited the distribution of keys to specified 
responsible officials. Finally, the storage buildings, trailers, and 
the tunnel are all located on a remote corner of the NNSS, which is 
itself a heavily guarded facility with restricted access. In light of 
these multiple layers of security, DOE determined that placing 
additional guards outside of the storage buildings, trailers and 
tunnel entrance at the site would not be a prudent use of resources. 
This determination was entirely appropriate. 

4. Return of Certain Proceeds to Nuclear Waste Fund: 

The Draft Report notes that DOE guidance prohibits the transfer of 
certain property under the abandonment regulation and instead requires 
that it be sold at fair market value, with the proceeds to be 
deposited into the Nuclear Waste Fund. See id. However, the Draft 
Report's assertion that DOE failed to demonstrate appropriate 
reimbursement of the Nuclear Waste Fund for property sold for fair 
market value is premature at best. As the Draft Report acknowledges,
DOE did provide documentation showing that it "directed [its] 
contractor to sell property and reimburse OCRWM." Id. As it further 
acknowledges, documentation showing that such sales did in fact occur 
and tracking the flow of proceeds is not yet available, but "would 
become available during the contract close-out process." Id. Given 
that the contract has not yet been closed out, any implication that 
the Nuclear Waste Fund has not been appropriately reimbursed is 
premature. 

C. Ability to Resume the Licensing Proceeding: 

As DOE has made clear in public filings,[Footnote 5] it could and 
would resume an active licensing proceeding if required to do so. DOE 
has taken numerous steps to ensure that it can support an active 
licensing proceeding, provided Congress appropriates it funds with 
which to do so. Nonetheless, the Draft Report draws the unwarranted 
conclusion that "DOE may find it increasingly difficult to resume the 
[licensing] process if it ... is compelled to do so." Id at 43. 
In support of this conclusion, the Draft Report makes several 
assertions, each of which is addressed below. 

1. Preservation of Scientific Knowledge: 

First, the Draft Report asserts that DOE "missed opportunities to 
preserve institutional knowledge that may be needed in future 
efforts." Id. That is simply not the case. Indeed, the
Draft Report recognizes that "DOE has taken extensive efforts to 
preserve data related to its licensing efforts, as well as other 
scientific information relevant to the storage or disposal of high-
level waste and spent nuclear fuel." Id. at 15. As the Draft Report 
further recognizes, those efforts included "maintaining a collection 
of 3.6 million documents pertaining to its license application" and 
"taking steps to maintain several other databases for the use of 
future scientists, the largest of which is called the Records 
Information System." Id. at 16. As the Draft Report recognizes, the 
databases DOE is preserving "generally consist of relevant scientific 
information related to the storage of high-level waste and spent 
nuclear fuel" and the Records Information System "will be usable and 
preserved in the same quality as it existed under OCRWM and for 25 
years after the termination of the Yucca Mountain program." Id. 

Additionally, DOE preserved core federal capabilities in the areas of 
science and program management by retaining key OCRWM personnel within 
other Departmental units. Specifically, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy 
(NE) expanded its Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition Research and 
Development to ensure that the expertise that had been developed 
within OCRWM could be maintained within the Department to conduct the 
scientific research required to implement recommendations from the 
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. These actions 
would also facilitate a resumption of the licensing process, if DOE 
were ordered to do so. 

2. Maintenance of the Licensing Support Network (LSN): 

Second, the Draft Report asserts that "it is not clear ... who will be 
responsible for preserving the [LSN] or whether it will continue to be 
accessible by scientists and the public, particularly in light of 
budget pressures and changing priorities over a long period of time." 
Id. 

To the contrary, DOE has made it clear that its Office of Legacy 
Management will be responsible for preserving DOE's LSN collection. 
[Footnote 6] Furthermore, DOE has stated that it will continue to make 
its LSN collection electronically accessible through the NRC's LSN 
portal until all appeals related to the Yucca Mountain proceeding have 
been exhausted. DOE has further committed that after the Yucca 
Mountain proceeding has been terminated, or if the NRC website portal 
is shut down prior to such termination, DOE will preserve the LSN in 
accordance with the determinations rendered by the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) which is the agency vested with 
authority to determine whether records should be archived on a 
temporary or permanent basis. DOE has recommended that a 100-year 
retention period would be appropriate for the LSN, although, again, 
NARA will make the final determination. 

Thus, while DOE cannot control whether the NRC eliminates 
accessibility to the LSN via the NRC portal, the Department is 
committed to taking numerous steps to ensure that its LSN collection 
will be preserved. As a result, DOE will retain the capability to 
search the DOE LSN collection and provide responsive documents. 

3. Contractor's "Knowledge Retention" Proposal: 

Third, the Draft Report implies that DOE missed an opportunity to 
preserve institutional knowledge when it refused to accept a $2.8 
million contractor proposal to prepare "knowledge retention packages." 
Id. at 25. The Draft Report characterizes that proposal as "an effort 
to mitigate the threat of the irrecoverable loss of expert knowledge 
as staff members depart the Yucca Mountain repository program." Id. 
Yet the Draft Report fails to cite a single example of such 
"irrecoverable" knowledge and — significantly — skips over the fact 
that DOE required that all scientific and technical materials be 
sufficiently documented in writing to allow use by other scientific 
and technical experts without the need for recourse to the originator. 
As DOE explained to GAO, the Department requires that scientific 
knowledge be documented in writing because it has long been aware that 
the original authors of scientific and technical materials might not 
be available for the duration of the proceeding. 

Indeed, the Draft Report itself appropriately recognizes that DOE 
management reviewed the contractor proposal and determined that the 
suggested tasks were far too expensive and wholly unnecessary for DOE 
to comply with its obligations to preserve existing records and 
scientific information that would be needed were the proceeding ever 
to resume.[Footnote 7]	The Draft Report should also acknowledge, but 
does not, the contractor's inherent self-interest in suggesting the 
work at issue. Simply put, the proposed "knowledge retention" plan 
was, in the eyes of the experienced DOE managers who reviewed it, a 
multi-million dollar boondoggle, entirely unnecessary at this stage of 
the application proceeding.[Footnote 8] 

4. Ability to Reconstitute Staff: 

Fourth, the Draft Report asserts that during the shutdown process, DOE 
"eliminated experienced staff' without "tapping them for lessons 
learned that could be helpful for future efforts," id. at 43, and that 
this "loss of staff with experience at Yucca Mountain could hinder the 
license review if the process is resumed," id. at 23. This assertion 
ignores the fact that the Department took significant steps to assist 
OCRWM employees to find alternate employment with the Department. The 
Department tailored these steps in order to maintain core federal 
capabilities in the science and program management areas that would be 
required (and, as a result of DOE's efforts, available), in the event 
DOE were ordered to resume the license application process. 
Additionally, in terms of non-federal employees, the vast majority of 
contractor personnel who worked on the Yucca Mountain Project did so 
under contracts with either Sandia National Laboratories or USA RS. 
Those contracts have not been terminated, and through them the 
Department could access substantial contractor expertise in the event 
the licensing proceeding was to resume. 

The Draft Report further asserts that "DOE may find it increasingly 
hard to gather staff with previous experience at Yucca Mountain, since 
over time more will retire, relocate, or change careers." Id. at 43. 
Clearly, the possibility of staff "retiring, relocating, or changing 
careers" would exist even had the Project not been terminated. 
Likewise, the Draft Report questions DOE's ability to reassemble its 
licensing team based on concerns raised by some DOE, NRC, and Sandia 
National Laboratories officials. See id at 24. As documented above, 
however, DOE has taken steps to mitigate such concerns, for example by 
retaining key OCRWM employees at DOE and maintaining its contracts 
with Sandia National Laboratories and USA RS. These concerns should 
also be balanced against the reality, as noted above, that the license 
application was developed under institutional controls requiring 
extensive and transparent documentation. In sum, DOE has taken steps 
to ensure that, while there would be some delay, it could resume the 
licensing proceeding if so ordered, provided Congress appropriates it 
money with which to do so. 

D. Timing and Cost of Alternatives to Yucca Mountain: 

The Draft Report asserts that "any alternative to Yucca Mountain will 
likely involve considerable time and cost," and catalogues a variety 
of negative impacts that may allegedly arise because DOE's decision 
will supposedly cause "delay" in removing materials from existing 
locations. Id. at 43. This is an assumption running through the Draft 
Report. GAO appears to presume that any alternative to Yucca Mountain 
will take longer to implement, resulting in longer storage times at 
reactor sites, and will cost more than Yucca Mountain. This 
presumption, however, is speculative and unfounded. 

1. Prolonged Storage at Reactor Sites: 

The Draft Report asserts that DOE's decision to terminate the Project 
"will likely prolong storage at reactor sites," which could lead to a 
chain of negative impacts including "increased on-site storage costs," 
increased "taxpayer burden by increasing the substantial liabilities 
that DOE has already incurred due to on-site storage at commercial 
nuclear reactors," "[reduced] opportunities for industry and local 
communities" to use existing storage sites for alternative uses, and 
"increase[d] opposition to expansion of the nuclear industry." Id. at 
30-32. These assertions are premised on the assumption that the Yucca 
Mountain Project would have resulted in an operating repository by 
2020. In fact, the opening of Yucca Mountain was always subject to 
numerous contingencies, including legislative and regulatory actions, 
that might well have prevented it from opening by 2020 or any other 
date.[Footnote 9] Moreover, these assertions ignore the possibility 
that alternatives to Yucca Mountain, such as interim storage, could 
well result in waste being transferred from sites more quickly than it 
would have had DOE continued to pursue a repository at Yucca Mountain. 
[Footnote 10] 

The Draft Report's speculation regarding the likelihood of prolonged 
storage is also premised upon a significant factual error — one that 
misrepresents not only DOE's position but also a prior GAO Report. 
Specifically, the Draft Report cites a 2009 GAO Report (GAO-10-48) for 
the mistaken proposition that, "according to dozens of experts, even a 
federal centralized interim storage facility is likely to take 17 to 
33 years to plan and implement.... If such a facility were initiated 
in 2011, this makes the most likely initial opening date somewhere 
from 2029 to 2045." Draft Report at 29. In fact, the 2009 Report 
attributes this estimate to a single unnamed centralized storage 
expert, not dozens of experts.[Footnote 11] The Draft Report then 
states that "DOE generally agreed with our findings in [the 2009] 
Report." Id. at 29 n.33. This statement is misleading. Specifically, 
the single expert estimate in the 2009 Report immediately followed a 
statement by DOE "that if various complex statutory, regulatory, 
siting, construction, and financial issues were expeditiously 
resolved, a centralized facility nuclear waste could begin operations 
as early as 6 years after its development began."[Footnote 12] DOE did 
not address the estimate attributed to the unnamed expert in its 
comments on the 2009 Report since its disagreement had already been 
acknowledged in that Report itself. 

The current Draft Report further speculates that storage at utility 
sites will be prolonged because "communities may be even less willing 
to host spent nuclear fuel repositories or other storage sites in the 
future" due to the termination of the Project. Id at 33. Here the 
Draft Report fails to recognize the significance of DOE's experience 
with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), where there has been 
significant community support for the construction and operation of a 
waste repository. DOE's pursuit of improved alternatives to Yucca 
Mountain will be informed by its successful experience with WIPP. It 
will likewise be aided by the expertise and imprimatur of the 
distinguished Blue Ribbon Commission the Department has convened to
recommend alternative approaches. For these reasons among others, the 
Draft Report's assertion that community acceptance will prove elusive 
in the future is speculative at best. 

DOE is confident that pursuing improved alternatives to Yucca Mountain 
will result in a better approach to waste disposal. Moreover, it is 
entirely possible that the DOE may actually be able to accelerate the 
schedule by which it is able to remove spent fuel from utility sites. 
The Draft Report's speculation to the contrary is thus premature and 
unfounded. 

2. Costs of Alternatives to Yucca Mountain: 

The Draft Report asserts that, "as a result of the termination of the 
Yucca Mountain repository program, DOE may also need to seek 
additional funding for an alternative repository." Id. at 30. This 
statement appears to imply that an increase in the waste fee will be 
necessary. This is pure speculation, and it is contrary to the 
Secretary's recent determination that the waste fee need not be 
altered at this time. 

It also ignores the very real possibility that Yucca Mountain might 
never have been operational and that an alternative might ultimately 
cost less and not require an increase in the fee. As noted, the 
opening of Yucca Mountain was always subject to numerous contingencies 
that might well have prevented it from opening by 2020 (or any other 
date). The effect of such contingencies on the amount of funding 
necessary to open Yucca Mountain is unknown. Moreover, speculation 
that an alternative disposal solution would cost more than Yucca 
Mountain is premature at least until the Blue Ribbon Commission issues 
its recommendations and actions have been taken in light of those 
recommendations. 

The Draft Report further asserts that "if DOE were to pursue an 
alternative repository, it is not certain that the [Nuclear Waste 
Fund] will have built up a sufficient surplus to site, license, 
construct, and operate it." Id. at 30. This is not only speculative; 
it evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. DOE is required 
by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA), to conduct 
a review every year precisely to determine whether more (or fewer) 
funds are necessary. Thus, if more funds ultimately are required, 
there is an adequate statutory mechanism to address that issue. The 
Draft Report expresses concern that DOE can collect funds pursuant to 
that statutory mechanism only "while nuclear reactors are still 
operating," apparently suggesting that the Fund may experience a 
shortfall when nuclear reactors stop operating. Id. This, too, is 
speculative. In short, nothing in the Draft Report suggests, or would 
support the suggestion, that the existing statutory mechanism is 
inadequate. 

E. DOE's Response to GAO's Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In light of the foregoing, the Department respectfully submits that 
neither of the Draft Report's two recommendations for executive action 
is warranted. 

First, the Draft Report recommends that DOE "assess the risks stemming 
from the rapid shutdown of Yucca Mountain and develop a preliminary 
plan to restart the project, in case DOE is required to do so." Id. at 
45. As more fully set forth above, DOE has already assessed (and taken 
steps to mitigate) the key risks associated with the Project shutdown 
process. DOE therefore doubts whether any useful purpose would be 
served by expending additional funds to engage in a formalistic, after-
the-fact "risk assessment." 

Second, the Draft Report recommends that the Department "provide 
Congress with an inventory of property from the Yucca Mountain 
repository program, including its value, and an accounting of the 
property disposed of, the funds received from property transactions, 
and the disposition of these funds." Id. at 45. The Department 
believes no useful purpose would be served by engaging in such an 
exercise at this time and further believes this would be a waste of 
scarce funds. Moreover, the Department does not believe it has an 
obligation to provide a separate accounting, especially since an 
inventory of the property at the Yucca Mountain site has already been 
completed and reconciliation of property transactions and inventory 
will take place as part of contract close-outs. Finally, as discussed 
more fully above, the Department notes that the applicable property 
disposition procedures were followed. Accordingly, the Draft Report's 
recommended inventory and accounting would add little if anything of 
value to the public record. 

F. Technical Misstatements: 

Footnote 1 of the Draft Report incorrectly states that "spent nuclear 
fuel ... when it is accepted for disposal, is considered to be high-
level waste." Id. at 3 n.1. The NWPA draws a clear distinction between 
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste and this 
distinction does not disappear simply because DOE accepts spent 
nuclear fuel for disposa1.[Footnote 13] 

The Draft Report misuses the statutory-defined term "surplus" several 
times. Id. at 17-20. "Surplus" property has a specific meaning in the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. That statute 
defines "surplus" as "excess property that the [GSA] Administrator 
determines is not required to meet the needs or responsibilities of 
all federal agencies."[Footnote 14] The term "excess," which is also a 
term of art, is defined as "property under the control of a federal 
agency that the head of the agency determines is not required to meet 
the agency's needs or responsibilities."[Footnote 15] In this case, 
the GSA Administrator had not made a determination regarding the DOE 
property in question. At the end of page 17 of the Draft Report, and 
the beginning of page 18, the use of the term "surplus" is 
appropriate, since that discussion addresses GSA's responsibilities. 
However, the term "unneeded" should be substituted for the following 
references to "surplus": (1) page 17, two references in the third 
paragraph; (2) page 18, third paragraph; (3) page 19, second 
paragraph, and (4) page 20, first and second paragraph. 

The Draft Report states that DOE "did not establish independent 
scientific panels ... that might have given affected parties more 
confidence" in certain technologies included in the license 
application. Id at 36. In fact, the NWPA established the Nuclear Waste 
Technical Review Board (NWTRB) for the sole purpose of providing 
independent scientific and technical oversight of DOE's disposal 
program,[Footnote 16] but the Draft Report gives this important 
oversight mechanism only passing notice that underplays its importance 
in maintaining transparency. The NWTRB is an independent federal 
agency consisting of a panel of 11 experts in science and engineering 
nominated by the National Academy of Sciences and appointed by the 
President.[Footnote 17] Between NWTRB's inception and the shutdown of 
the Project, the NWTRB received approximately $45 million of 
Congressional appropriations,[Footnote 18] published dozens of studies 
and reports on a wide range of scientific and technical aspects of the 
Project,[Footnote 19] and corresponded regularly with DOE regarding 
the Project.[Footnote 20] In addition, DOE itself convened independent 
scientific and technical panels through the use of expert elicitations 
and independent experts. For example, two of the most extensive 
elicitations conducted by DOE were the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard 
Analysis (PSHA) and the Probabilistic Volcanic Hazard Analysis (PVHA). 
Both the PSHA and the PVHA were formal expert elicitations with panels 
of independent technical experts. The PSHA was convened to analyze the 
potential effects of seismicity on the region surrounding Yucca
Mountain. and the PVHA was convened to analyze the potential effects 
of volcanic activity in that region. The results of both of these 
expert elicitations are included in the Yucca Mountain License 
Application.[Footnote 21] 

The Draft Report also states that DOE "did not consult" with the local 
community in developing technological solutions for the Project. Id at 
36. This is wrong.	For example, a local Nye County technical 
representative was collocated with DOE technical staff in DOE 
facilities. In addition, DOE held numerous public workshops and public 
meetings on a broad range of topics. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Peter B. Lyons: 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy: 

Appendix IV Footnotes: 

[1] The Draft Report further asserts that, "although uncertainty [sic] 
over whether it had the authority to terminate the Yucca Mountain 
repository program, DOE terminated the program." Draft Report at 43. 
To the contrary, DOE conducted a thorough legal review prior to 
terminating the program and proceeded only when confident it had the 
legal authority to do so. 

[2] DOE, Memorandum of Understanding: Closure of RW and Maintenance of 
the Yucca Mountain Site (September 16, 2010). 

[3] 41 C.F.R. § 102-36.305. 

[4] See Memo to File from James. W. Hollrith, Former Director Office 
of Construction and Site Management, OCRWM, (January 31, 2011). 

[5] See DOE Response in Opp. to Petitioners' Motion for P.I., In re 
Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-1050, at 16-17, 19-20 & nn. 10, 11, 
and Exhibit 1 thereto (April 23, 2010). 

[6] See DOE, Memorandum of Understanding: Closure of RW and 
Maintenance of the Yucca Mountain Site (September 16, 2010). 

[7] See DOE, "Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) 
Contracting Officer Direction to Stop Contract License Application 
Contract Tasks to USA Repository Services LLC (USA RS), Contract 
Number DE-RW0000005" (June 7, 2010). 

[8] Examples of the wasteful and unnecessary tasks suggested by the 
M&O contractor included developing recordings, orientation materials, 
and sketches that may have provided no benefit if the licensing 
proceeding were restarted. See USA RS, "Contract No. DE-RW0000005 — 
USA Repository Services LLC (USA RS) Response to U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) Request for Information," Attachment C (May 24, 2010). 

[9] See Brief for Respondents, In re Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-
1050, at 65-67 (January 3, 2011). 

[10] See DOE Response in Opp. to Petitioners' Motion for P.1., In re 
Aiken County, D.C. Cir., No. 10-1050, at 16 (April 23, 2010). 

[11] GAO-10-48, November 2009, page 30. 

[12] GAO-10-48, November 2009, page 30. 

[13] Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (hereinafter "NWPA"), sec. 
2(12), 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12); see also Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(hereinafter "AEA"), sec. I ldd, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(dd). 

[14] 40 U.S.C. § 102(10). 

[15] 40 U.S.C. § 102(3). 

[16] NWPA, sec. 503, 42 U.S.C. § 10263. 

[17] NWPA, sec. 502, 42 U.S.C. § 10262. 

[18] OCRWM, Office of Business Management, Summary of Program 
Financial & Budget Information, at slide 9 (January 31, 2010), 
available at: [hyperlink, 
http://www.energv.gov/media/ocrwm-budget-summarv.pdf]. 

[19] NWTRB Reports, available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.nwtrb.tto,reports:reports.html]. 

[20] NWTRB Correspondence, available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.nwirb.vvicorr/corr/html]. 

[21] See References cited by U.S. Department of Energy for Yucca 
Mountain License Application, available at: [hyperlink, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app/references.html]. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

March 17, 2011: 

Ms. Janet Frisch, Assistant Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2700: 
Seattle, WA 98104: 

Dear Ms. Frisch: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on 
the March 2011 draft of the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report, "Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of 
the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned," (GA0-11-
229). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed the draft 
report and has no significant comments. We appreciate the time and 
effort that you and your staff have taken to review this important 
topic. 

Should you have any questions about our response, please contact Mr. 
Jesse Arildsen of my staff at (301) 415-1785 or at 
Jesse.Arildsen@nrc.qov. 

Sincerely, 

/RA/R. W. Borchardt: 

R. W. Borchardt: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Mark E. Gaffigan, (202) 512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Janet Frisch, Assistant 
Director; Arkelga Braxton; Kevin Bray; Penney Harwell-Caramia; Robert 
S. Fletcher; Anne Rhodes-Kline; Steve Lipscomb; Mehrzad Nadji; Risa 
Pavia; Robert Sánchez; Benjamin Shouse; Vasiliki Theodoropoulos; Mary 
Welch; and Arvin Wu made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Spent (or used) nuclear fuel is no longer efficient in generating 
power in a nuclear reactor. It is potentially a resource, since parts 
of it can be reprocessed to separate out uranium and plutonium so that 
they can be used as fuel again in a reactor. Reprocessing, however, 
still results in nuclear waste residues that require disposal. The 
United States does not reprocess its spent nuclear fuel, and this 
fuel, when it is accepted for disposal, is considered to be high-level 
waste as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the regulating 
agency. 

[2] National Academy of Sciences, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on 
Land (Washington, D.C.: September 1957). This report suggested several 
potential alternatives for disposal of nuclear waste, including spent 
nuclear fuel, stressing that there are many potential sites for 
geologic disposal of waste at various depths and in various geologic 
formations. Subsequent reports by the National Academy of Sciences and 
others have continued to endorse geologic isolation of nuclear waste 
and have suggested that engineered barriers, such as corrosion- 
resistant containers, can provide additional layers of protection to 
such sites. International consensus also supports geologic disposal. 

[3] DOE manages about 13,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel as well 
as other high-level waste--primarily generated by the nation's nuclear 
weapons program. We issued a separate report on the impacts of 
terminating Yucca Mountain on the spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
waste managed by DOE. See DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed 
on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a Result of the Yucca Mountain 
Shutdown, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-230] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2011). 

[4] Some technical complexities, such as DOE's assessment of how heat 
from the spent nuclear fuel might impact the performance of the 
repository, became the focus of years of scientific inquiry. 

[5] The parties include the states of Washington and South Carolina; 
Aiken County, South Carolina; and individuals from the state of 
Washington. DOE's Hanford Site and one commercial nuclear power 
reactor are located in Washington, DOE's Savannah River Site and four 
commercial nuclear power reactors are located in South Carolina, and 
the Savannah River Site is located in Aiken County. 

[6] These reports were written by GAO, the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of 
Technology Assessment, which is no longer in existence. 

[7] NRC considers high-level radioactive wastes to be the highly 
radioactive materials produced as a byproduct of the reactions that 
occur inside nuclear reactors. High-level wastes take one of two 
forms: (1) spent nuclear fuel when it is accepted for disposal and (2) 
waste materials remaining after spent fuel is reprocessed. 

[8] WIPP was designed to accept transuranic waste, not spent nuclear 
fuel. Generally, transuranic waste consists of clothing, tools, rags, 
residues, debris, soil, and other items contaminated with radioactive 
elements heavier than uranium, mostly plutonium, as a result of work 
related to the defense industry. 

[9] In addition to spent nuclear fuel and defense-generated high-level 
waste, the nation also generates so-called greater than class C waste 
from the maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; from 
radioactive materials that were once used for food irradiation or for 
medical purposes; and from miscellaneous radioactive waste, such as 
contaminated equipment from industrial research and development. Under 
section 3(b)(1)(D) of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, DOE 
is responsible for disposing of greater than class C waste. DOE had 
considered Yucca Mountain as a disposal option at one time, but is now 
evaluating its disposal options. Greater than class C waste is 
currently stored at commercial reactor sites throughout the country-- 
including at decommissioned reactors--along with spent nuclear fuel. 

[10] All amounts are in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars, unless 
otherwise noted. 

[11] Nominal dollars. 

[12] 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010). 

[13] The states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont have sued the 
NRC in federal court regarding this waste confidence rule, arguing 
that NRC should have performed an environmental review of the impact 
of extending on-site storage before making a decision. Several 
environmental groups have filed similar lawsuits. 

[14] DOE characterized its motion to withdraw its license application 
as an interim step toward a final decision, not a decision that might 
be considered a final agency action for the purposes of the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 

[15] Secretary Chu reiterated this position in a February 11, 2011, 
letter to the Blue Ribbon Commission. 

[16] Reprocessing is the chemical treatment of used nuclear fuel to 
separate out plutonium and uranium that can be used again as fuel, but 
which leaves a highly radioactive liquid that is referred to as high- 
level waste. 

[17] The license application process involves three phases. In the 
second phase, NRC must review DOE's submission to update its license 
application to receive and possess high-level radioactive waste. If 
authorized, DOE would be able to begin operations. The third phase 
occurs upon conclusion of operations when DOE must request an 
amendment to the license application to permanently close the 
repository. At each phase, NRC is to ensure that DOE meets certain 
regulatory requirements. 

[18] DOE stated that, as of December 2010, it had closed over 400 of 
the contracts and subcontracts, but that the DOE Inspector General has 
identified at least $175 million in prior-year costs that still need 
to be resolved and stated that DOE needs to ensure that the closeout 
process is managed effectively and that all disallowed costs are 
settled and funds recouped. (See: Office of the Inspector General for 
DOE, Special Report: Resolution of Questioned, Unresolved, and 
Potentially Unallowable Costs Incurred in Support of the Yucca 
Mountain Project (Washington, D.C.: July 2010)). In addition, DOE 
identified at least $9.4 million in costs for close-out activities 
since September 30, 2010, which includes $8.6 million in employee 
benefits. Although activities for key contracts were terminated, the 
contracts themselves are still in place, in part, to ensure that 
certain benefits--such as pensions--are continued. 

[19] See 41 C.F.R. pts. 102-36, 102-37. 

[20] As of October 1, 2010, responsibility for security of the site 
has been transferred to the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

[21] DOE Accounting Handbook, chapter 19. 

[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[23] For example, see DOE Order 413.1B, Internal Control Program and 
DOE Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition 
of Capital Assets. 

[24] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003). 

[25] This testimony was given in a deposition from DOE's Acting 
Principal Deputy Director of OCRWM filed with DOE's response to a 
motion filed in federal court by the state of Washington seeking a 
preliminary injunction to prevent DOE from taking any further actions 
to terminate or dismantle the Yucca Mountain program. 

[26] This declaration was filed on April 2, 2010, as part of a federal 
lawsuit brought by Robert L. Ferguson, Gary Petersen, and William 
Lampson asking the federal court to review the final determination of 
the President and the Secretary of Energy to terminate Yucca Mountain. 

[27] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition 
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal 
and Technical Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 2001). 

[28] GAO, Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and 
Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential 
Alternatives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009). 

[29] We previously reported that construction of a reprocessing plant 
could cost as much as $44 billion. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that annual costs for operating a reprocessing facility 
could cost between $2 billion and $4 billion. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. 

[30] Statement of Marvin Fertel, Chief Executive Officer of the 
Nuclear Energy Institute, before the Blue Ribbon Commission on May 25, 
2010. Note also that the Nuclear Energy Institute favors consolidated 
storage of spent nuclear fuel, rather than leaving it on site. See 
http://brc.gov/may2010_meeting.html. 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Amounts are 
in 2009 present value. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. Dozens of 
experts reviewed our assumption for centralized interim storage, which 
we assumed would take 19 years to begin operations. The experts did 
not recommend changing that assumption. Some of the experts 
represented DOE, NRC, the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear 
Waste Technical Review Board, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the National Association of 
Nuclear Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Council of 
State Legislators, and the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear 
Projects, and a variety of other academic, industry, and independent 
groups. 

[33] DOE generally agreed with our findings in this report. 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. 

[35] These amounts do not include $956 million already paid by 
taxpayers through the Department of Treasury's judgment fund. These 
amounts are in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars. 

[36] In addition, the Department of Justice has already incurred costs 
of over $168 million through fiscal year 2010 to defend DOE in 
litigation. With ongoing litigation, these costs will continue. There 
are no estimates of the future liability of these costs. 

[37] Decommissioning is the safe removal of a facility from service 
and the reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits 
release of the property and termination of the license. In the case of 
decommissioned nuclear power plants, the spent nuclear fuel may remain 
on site, so that the NRC would continue to license the site as an 
independent spent fuel storage installation. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. 

[39] Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-level 
Waste (Washington, D.C.: 1982). 

[40] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition 
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal 
and Technical Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 2001). 

[41] The NWPA created the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an 
independent federal agency to provide scientific and technical 
oversight for Yucca Mountain. The board's mission and reports can be 
found at [hyperlink, http://www.nwtrb.gov/]. 

[42] See, for example, GAO, Department of Energy: Actions Needed to 
Develop High-Quality Cost Estimates for Construction and Environmental 
Cleanup Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-199] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010); and Environmental Health: High-
level Strategy and Leadership Needed to Continue Progress toward 
Protecting Children from Environmental Threats, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-205] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 
2010). 

[43] Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing and Managing 
Radioactive Waste Facilities, Managing Nuclear Waste - A Better Idea 
(Washington, D.C.: 1984). This report was authorized by the Secretary 
of Energy in 1983 in response to Sec. 303 of the NWPA, which required 
the Secretary of Energy to study alternative approaches to managing 
the construction and operation of all civilian nuclear waste 
management facilities. 

[44] See, for example, GAO, The Cooperative Model as a Potential 
Component of Structural Reform Options for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-33R] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 15, 2010). 

[45] Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Future, What We've Heard: A 
Staff Summary of Major Themes in Testimony and Comments Received by 
the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future To Date 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2011). 

[46] DOE, Department of Energy Personal Property Management Program, 
DOE O 580.1, Chg. 1 (May 8, 2008). 

[47] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[End of section] 

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