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entitled 'Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and 
Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe' which was 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Addressees: 

January 2011: 

Ballistic Missile Defense: 

DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future 
Capabilities in Europe: 

GAO-11-220: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-220, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach for 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and 
near-term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four 
phases as threats mature and new BMD technologies become available. 
Although the approach will include capabilities such as radars and 
land-and sea-based BMD assets, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not 
yet established EPAA life-cycle costs. EPAA is DOD’s first 
implementation of its new, regional approach to BMD. 

GAO was asked to evaluate DOD’s plans for implementing EPAA. GAO 
reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and 
addressed management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD 
planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance data. GAO 
reviewed key legislation, policy and guidance, and initial plans for 
implementation and asset allocation. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but 
faces three key management challenges—the lack of clear guidance, life-
cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule—which may result 
in inefficient planning and execution, limited oversight, and 
increased cost and performance risks. Since the September 2009 
announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD—including U.S. 
European Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military 
services—as well as the State Department, have taken steps to 
implement this policy, including considering options for the 
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, and 
analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires 
clear guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders, 
including the combatant commands and military services, believe that 
such guidance is not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles 
for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible 
estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions 
over the short-term as well as to assess long-term affordability. DOD 
has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers 
EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best 
practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid 
cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could 
serve as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and 
cost-effective ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if 
corrective actions are needed. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not 
fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel 
activities that will need to be synchronized. As a result, DOD is at 
risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased 
cost as it implements the phases of EPAA. 

DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet 
established key operational performance metrics that would provide the 
combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational 
capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ. 
DOD is incorporating some combatant commands’ requirements into BMD 
testing, in part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the 
test design process. However, the system’s desired performance is not 
yet defined using operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as 
how long and how well it can defend. The combatant commands are 
attempting to define operational performance metrics to enable 
credible assessment of operational performance gaps. However, these 
metrics have yet to be finalized and implemented. Without a more 
complete understanding of BMD operational capabilities and 
limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in EPAA 
operational planning. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD provide guidance on EPAA end states; develop 
EPAA life-cycle cost estimates; and integrate its phase schedule with 
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. GAO also 
recommends that DOD adopt operational performance metrics and include 
them in the BMD test program. DOD generally concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-220] or key 
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key Management 
Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the Lack of Life-Cycle Cost 
Estimates and an Integrated Schedule: 

Although Combatant Commands' Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased, 
Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations 
Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA: 

Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, 
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in Europe: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: General Description of EPAA: 

Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing 
EPAA: 

Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and 
Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates: 

Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA Schedule 
Compression: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Current Status of DOD's BMD Assets That May Be Part of EPAA: 

Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, 
Integration, and Location on Defended Area: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 26, 2011: 

The Honorable Michael R. Turner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jim Langevin: 
House of Representatives: 

On September 17, 2009, the President announced a revised approach for 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, with significant 
implications for the Department of Defense's (DOD) BMD program. In 
response to this guidance, DOD canceled the previously-planned 
European missile defense program--a fixed interceptor site in Poland 
and a fixed radar site in the Czech Republic--intended to defend 
against future long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[Footnote 1] 
Instead, DOD now will deploy in phases increasingly capable elements 
and interceptors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic 
missile threat.[Footnote 2] This "European Phased Adaptive Approach" 
(EPAA) to BMD is designed to defend against existing and near-term 
threats posed by short-and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as 
build up defenses against longer-range ballistic missile threats over 
time as those threats mature.[Footnote 3] The Administration stated 
that the new approach will augment current protection of the U.S. 
homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats and will use 
more flexible and survivable systems to provide for the defense of 
U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our allies in Europe sooner 
and more comprehensively than the previous approach. 

The President's announcement, further elaborated upon several months 
later in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,[Footnote 4] lays 
out the most comprehensive shift in U.S. BMD policy since 2002 when 
the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and 
the President directed fielding of an initial set of missile defense 
capabilities by 2004. To assist Congress in its review of this policy 
shift and its implications, we were asked to assess DOD's efforts to 
implement the phased adaptive approach for BMD in Europe. In December 
2010, we issued a correspondence on acquisition management and near- 
term development risks related to EPAA.[Footnote 5] For this report, 
we assessed: (1) the extent to which DOD has developed guidance and 
addressed management of cost and schedule in the planning and 
implementation of EPAA, and (2) the extent to which DOD planning for 
EPAA is informed by operational performance data. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe and DOD's overall approach for 
planning, implementing, and preparing to support BMD. To review the 
extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed management of 
EPAA cost and schedule, we interviewed DOD and State Department 
officials and reviewed documents and briefs that specifically 
described DOD efforts to plan for and implement EPAA and assessed 
their implications for managing EPAA cost and schedule. To review the 
extent to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational 
performance data, we interviewed DOD officials and reviewed DOD 
documents on policy and guidance needed for military planning. To 
address these objectives, we also conducted site visits and 
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
U.S. European Command and its components, as well as officials from 
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System Operational Test Agency, and various Navy, Army, and 
MDA offices. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional 
details on our scope and methodology are discussed in more detail in 
appendix I. 

Background: 

DOD revised its approach to BMD in Europe as part of the department's 
comprehensive review of BMD strategy and policy, which culminated in 
the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In that report, 
DOD set out to match U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities 
to the requirements of current and future threats and to inform DOD 
planning, programming, budgeting, and oversight. Judging that the 
current and planned defenses against intercontinental ballistic 
missiles will protect the United States against such threats from 
North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future, DOD is refocusing its 
resources to defend deployed forces and allies against regional 
threats. Each region will have a phased adaptive approach to BMD 
tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region, with 
a principal focus on Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. DOD's 
goal is to enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD threats around 
the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and cost-
effectively and concentrating on the use of mobile and relocatable BMD 
assets instead of fixed assets. In addition, DOD expressed a 
commitment to testing new assets before fielding to allow assessment 
under realistic operational conditions. Finally, DOD is emphasizing 
working with regional allies to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value. 

The European Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD is the first 
implementation of this revised strategy and policy. EPAA currently 
consists of four phases of increasing capability that spans to 2020. 
Table 1 summarizes DOD's proposed time frames and capabilities for the 
four phases of EPAA. For a further description of the various BMD 
assets that may be part of EPAA, see appendix II. 

Table 1: General Description of EPAA: 

Phase 1; 
Time frame: 2011; 
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Deploy existing 
missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic 
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include deployment of: 
* An existing sensor (the AN/TPY-2 radar),[A]; 
* BMD-capable Aegis ships (Aegis BMD),[B] and the currently fielded 
Standard Missile-3 interceptor (SM-3 Block IA). 

Phase 2; 
Time frame: 2015; 
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced 
capability to defend against short-and medium-range ballistic 
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include: 
* One Aegis Ashore--a land-based version of the Aegis BMD weapon 
system--in Romania and the more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptor. 

Phase 3; 
Time frame: 2018; 
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced 
capability to defend against medium-and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include: 
* One additional Aegis Ashore in Poland and the upgraded SM-3 Block 
IIA interceptor. 

Phase 4; 
Time frame: 2020; 
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced 
capability to defend against potentially longer-range threats, 
including intercontinental ballistic missiles. Planned BMD assets 
include: 
* Further upgraded SM-3 Block IIB interceptors. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD information. 

Notes: DOD plans for all four phases to include upgrades to the 
missile defense command and control system, known as the Command, 
Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC). 

[A] DOD intends to use the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance 
system (AN/TPY-2) both for defense against regional threats and for 
homeland defense. 

[B] Aegis BMD is a ship-based system that (1) provides a forward- 
deployed sensor capability for other BMD elements and (2) employs its 
own sensor and interceptors. The element is based on a modification to 
existing Navy Aegis ships and utilizes the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 
interceptor. For further details on the phases and elements, see 
figure 1 and appendix II. 

[End of table] 

A number of stakeholders within DOD play a role in the developing, 
building, fielding, and governing of BMD. MDA is responsible for the 
acquisition of the elements that comprise the integrated Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA continues to be exempted from DOD's 
traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and 
associated oversight processes and retains its expanded responsibility 
and authority to define BMD technical requirements, change goals and 
plans, and allocate resources. Although not required to build elements 
to meet specific operational requirements as it would be under 
traditional DOD processes, MDA is required to work closely with the 
combatant commands when developing BMD capabilities. DOD reported in 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that it would maintain its 
existing policy of developing, building, fielding, and governing BMD 
as it had prior to the EPAA announcement. Table 2 identifies some of 
the key DOD stakeholders that are involved in the implementation of 
EPAA. 

Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing 
EPAA: 

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 
Primary role in EPAA: Develops and integrates U.S. missile defense 
policy within the broader framework of national security strategy and 
ensures consistency between missile defense policy and development and 
acquisition plans and approaches. 

Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics; 
Primary role in EPAA: Provides acquisition policy direction, program 
guidance, and overall management oversight of MDA. Chairs the Missile 
Defense Executive Board, provides program guidance, and makes 
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on missile defense 
issues. 

Organization: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
Primary role in EPAA: Provides advice on desired BMD system 
capabilities and characteristics. Through the Joint Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense Organization, directly supports U.S. Strategic 
Command--the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority and 
operational proponent for global BMD. 

Organization: Missile Defense Executive Board; 
Primary role in EPAA: A senior-level body that reviews DOD's BMD 
efforts and provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense, as 
necessary, with a recommended BMD strategic program plan and feasible 
funding strategy for approval. 

Organization: U.S. European Command; 
Primary role in EPAA: The geographic combatant command whose area of 
responsibility includes all of Europe (including Russia and Turkey), 
Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It is the primary 
geographic combatant command responsible for planning and implementing 
EPAA. It is assisted in this effort by its service components--
principally U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air 
Forces in Europe[A,B]. 

Organization: U.S. Central Command; 
Primary role in EPAA: The geographic combatant command whose area of 
responsibility includes parts of the Middle East. Coordinates with 
U.S. European Command to defend against ballistic missile threats 
originating from their area of responsibility. 

Organization: U.S. Strategic Command; 
Primary role in EPAA: Functional combatant command with 
responsibilities to integrate global missions and capabilities that 
cross the boundaries of the geographic combatant commands, such as 
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense, 
including missile defense advocacy for the combatant commands.[C]. 

Organization: Missile Defense Agency; 
Primary role in EPAA: Responsible for the research, development, 
testing, and acquisition of the integrated BMDS, comprised of 
individual BMD elements. 

Organization: Military Services; 
Primary role in EPAA: Responsible for providing forces and resources 
to support fielding of the BMD assets, and assisting in planning for 
and managing the operations and maintenance and infrastructure needs 
of BMD assets. 

Organization: Army Corps of Engineers; 
Primary role in EPAA: Perform site studies for EPAA installations, 
help identify infrastructure requirements, and oversee construction to 
meet MDA and service requirements. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD information. 

[A] The six geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command, 
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command. 

[B] A service component command is a command consisting of the service 
component commander and all those service forces, such as individuals, 
units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the 
command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a 
combatant command. 

[C] The four functional combatant commands are U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and 
U.S. Transportation Command. 

[End of table] 

In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated 
with MDA's BMD efforts and DOD's broader approach to BMD planning, 
implementation, and oversight. For instance, we concluded in a 
February 2010 report that although MDA had shown progress in 
demonstrating increased performance, its cost estimates could not be 
thoroughly assessed and some planned capability could not be verified 
due to target shortfalls and modeling limitations.[Footnote 6] In 
addition, in September 2009, we reported that DOD had not identified 
its requirements for BMD elements and interceptors and had not fully 
established units to operate the elements before making them available 
for use.[Footnote 7] For additional GAO reports on BMD, see the 
Related GAO Products section. 

DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key Management 
Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the Lack of Life-Cycle Cost 
Estimates and an Integrated Schedule: 

DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA, 
including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting 
forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure needs, and 
gaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for BMD in 
Europe. DOD manages its BMD efforts by individual program elements and 
considers EPAA a flexible approach, not a program. However, the 
department faces three key management challenges--lack of clear 
guidance, life-cycle cost estimates,[Footnote 8] and a fully 
integrated schedule--that may result in inefficient planning and 
execution, increased cost and performance risks, and limited oversight 
of EPAA. First, DOD has not yet established clear guidance to help 
direct and align its EPAA efforts. Without such guidance, DOD faces 
uncertainty in planning and implementing this revised approach. 
Second, DOD has not yet developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and 
has indicated that it is unlikely to do so because EPAA is considered 
a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a result, DOD does not 
have a basis from which to assess EPAA's affordability and cost-
effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to monitor 
implementation progress. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully 
integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. 
As a result, DOD does not have the information it needs to assess 
whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify 
potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution 
of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule, 
performance, and cost risks. Without addressing these three management 
challenges, DOD will likely face difficulties in planning for and 
implementing EPAA, potentially resulting in significant cost increases. 

DOD and the State Department Have Taken Multiple Steps to Implement 
EPAA: 

Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout 
DOD--including U.S. European Command (EUCOM), MDA, and the military 
services--as well as the State Department, have taken steps to 
implement this policy, including considering options for the 
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, 
analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in 
Europe. For example, EUCOM initiated EPAA planning efforts and 
submitted an official request for some of the BMD assets it determined 
are needed for Phase 1, including the personnel to operate them. 
EUCOM, with the assistance of its service components, has been 
developing an operation plan for EPAA.[Footnote 9] DOD officials told 
us that this plan, covering Phase 1, is expected to be approved in the 
spring of 2011. EUCOM officials told us that their efforts have been 
informed by the command's close collaboration with MDA, which has 
provided it with information on the capabilities of BMD assets the 
command intends to employ in its operational plan. In order to 
facilitate the information exchange, MDA has located representatives 
at EUCOM headquarters. EUCOM has also been working with MDA to develop 
test designs for the BMD system that may be fielded in EUCOM's area of 
responsibility. In particular, EUCOM designed notional EPAA 
architectures[Footnote 10] that will be used in testing. The results 
of these tests are intended to provide the command with greater 
visibility into the performance of the BMD system it will be 
responsible for employing. 

MDA has also taken a number of steps to implement EPAA. As we reported 
in December 2010,[Footnote 11] MDA has made progress in acquisition 
planning for EPAA, including integrating and aligning its test 
planning efforts with EPAA phases through its semiannual Ballistic 
Missile Defense System Integrated Master Test Plan.[Footnote 12] MDA 
has collaborated with the combatant commands and members of the 
testing community to develop an Integrated Master Test Plan to support 
planning and execution of all BMD testing for the phased adaptive 
approach. Additionally, according to MDA, its Global Deployment 
Program Office has been actively engaged in an effort to align the 
acquisition activities of EPAA with the EPAA efforts of other 
stakeholders, such as the State Department, host country embassy 
personnel, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
EUCOM, the Joint Staff, and the military services. 

Officials from the military services and EUCOM's service components 
told us they are also pursuing activities to support EPAA planning, as 
the following examples illustrate. 

* The Navy has established the Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise, 
which is an effort aimed at coordinating all Navy BMD activities to 
support EPAA as well as other BMD missions.[Footnote 13] 

* The Army Corps of Engineers is working with MDA and the Navy on the 
preliminary stages of a technical analysis related to Aegis Ashore 
site options. 

* U.S. Naval Forces Europe is analyzing its Aegis BMD ship presence 
options and requirements as well as planning for Aegis Ashore. 

* U.S. Army Europe is conducting resource planning for potential 
basing concepts and manning requirements of Army BMD assets that may 
be allocated for EPAA, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) element and the AN/TPY-2 radar. 

* U.S. Air Forces in Europe is drafting a concept of operations 
[Footnote 14] that, when approved by the EUCOM Commander, will 
establish the command and control relationships for conducting BMD 
operations for EPAA. Similar efforts are in progress within NATO. 

The State Department, in coordination with DOD, has also made 
significant progress in achieving NATO support for BMD in Europe. NATO 
recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission--to protect 
its populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile 
attack--but now must undertake the challenging task of reaching 
agreement on how to implement this new mission. Poland and Romania 
have agreed to host U.S. BMD assets although the U.S. has not yet 
found a host nation for a critical sensor planned for deployment in 
2011. Finally, NATO members may provide BMD assets to assist in the 
defense of Europe. However, the U.S. currently is the only NATO member 
with BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. See appendix 
IV for more details of NATO support for BMD in Europe. 

DOD's Guidance for EPAA Is Not Yet Complete: 

DOD has initiated many efforts to implement EPAA, but the department 
has not yet established clear guidance to help direct and align its 
efforts. According to DOD, effective planning requires clear guidance 
on desired end states.[Footnote 15] In the context of BMD, this could 
include information such as the purpose and duration of the mission 
and areas to be defended, as well as priorities within a region and 
between regions. While senior DOD officials stated that the 
President's EPAA announcement and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
provide sufficient guidance to begin planning and implementation, a 
recent DOD study recommended planning guidance be further refined. 
Further, key BMD stakeholders, including those from the Joint Staff, 
combatant commands, and military services believe that additional 
guidance is needed for EPAA. 

Senior DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Staff, and MDA told 
us it was their view that the President's announcement and the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review[Footnote 16] provide sufficient 
guidance to enable the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and services 
to begin planning and implementing EPAA. The officials also noted that 
some additional guidance would be forthcoming through the regular 
updating of DOD's high-level policy and planning documents.[Footnote 
17] According to these officials, EPAA is a policy framework for the 
evolutionary development and fielding of missile defenses in Europe to 
defend against ballistic missile threats. They further indicated that 
the EPAA framework does not establish or dictate a specific 
architecture or force structure requirement. Additionally, the 
officials stated that the Joint Staff and the combatant commands are 
responsible for translating the overarching policy into specific 
requirements to allow military forces to execute the policy. Moreover, 
the senior officials also stated that the specific requirements for 
EPAA, including architecture, would be developed by the combatant 
commands and Joint Staff in consultation with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense using standard DOD planning processes and that 
any policy gaps that may emerge would be addressed as plans are 
iterated through the normal planning process. 

DOD examined the need for policy guidance in the Global Force 
Management Development Project, a study to clarify and more fully 
assess the scope and implications of the decision to adopt EPAA and 
the phased adaptive approach in general. This effort was led by the 
Joint Staff and included participation from U.S. Strategic Command, 
EUCOM, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern 
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, and technical assistance from MDA. The study 
was tasked with developing the plan and facts to be used to allocate 
limited BMD assets among the combatant commands as regional situations 
and national strategies require. The classified study was unable to 
fully address this task but concluded, among other things, that DOD 
needed to refine its BMD planning guidance, identifying 14 BMD-related 
general planning guidance questions that DOD needed to answer. 
According to Joint Staff officials, the study's findings were briefed 
to and endorsed by several senior DOD boards, including the Missile 
Defense Executive Board in May 2010. Officials from the Office of the 
Under Secretary for Defense for Policy told us that it takes time to 
fully develop all of the strategic planning and investment guidance 
necessary to implement a significant policy shift like EPAA. Further, 
the officials added that some of the guidance questions identified in 
the study could not be addressed immediately because they had to be 
sequenced with other events. They gave the example that some of the 
guidance would rely on decisions made by NATO, which has only recently 
adopted the territorial missile defense mission.[Footnote 18] 

Consistent with the study's findings, officials from the Joint Staff, 
combatant commands, and services told us that DOD needed to provide 
more clarity on desired EPAA end states to ensure that they were 
appropriately executing their responsibilities. For example, Army 
officials told us that the Army's primary concern with EPAA was the 
lack of clear guidance on end states and said that the Army could not 
be certain that it was appropriately preparing to support EPAA assets 
without knowing what assets would be deployed when, where, and for how 
long. In addition, the Navy created a new organization to help 
coordinate the service's BMD efforts and also developed its own set of 
EPAA facts and assumptions so that it could support EPAA requirements. 
However, Navy officials told us that although they coordinate with 
other BMD stakeholders regularly, they did not know if everyone was 
operating under the same end-state assumptions, including assumptions 
about force allocation and deployment deadlines. Combatant command 
officials also told us that existing guidance did not provide clarity 
on desired end states, including prioritization of regions to be 
defended. By contrast, other BMD policy decisions, such as the 2002 
decision to deploy BMD and the later decision to deploy an AN/TPY-2 
radar to Israel, were based on clear and formal policy guidance, 
according to Joint Staff officials. The officials told us that the 
lack of clear guidance for EPAA was leading different organizations to 
make different assumptions about desired end states and that this was 
resulting in inefficient planning and execution. 

A reason that BMD stakeholders throughout DOD may be seeking further 
planning guidance is that there is a lack of clarity on both the 
relative priority of EPAA to other BMD missions around the world and 
the extent to which BMD assets will be deployed forward. Although the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review presents the phased adaptive approach 
as pertaining to all geographic combatant commands, EPAA was a 
presidential policy decision, implying a certain priority for European 
BMD needs. However, this priority has not yet been formally codified 
through a presidential directive or memorandum. Additionally, 
statements by senior DOD officials have detailed potential EPAA plans 
that, if carried out, would consume a significant portion of DOD's BMD 
assets, depending on the amount of physical presence required. For 
example, depending on interpretation of existing guidance for EPAA, 
Aegis BMD ships could be tasked with maintaining a continuous physical 
forward presence; only needing to be available to surge into the 
theater in response to heightened threat situations; or be available 
for a mixture of forward presence and surge capability. The Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review also discusses the need to have a strategic 
approach to regional BMD and tailor the requirements to the unique and 
varied needs of each region, including Europe. DOD is undertaking 
several studies related to regional BMD led by the Joint Staff and 
U.S. Strategic Command that should help to better define force 
allocation and quantity needs for both surge and forward presence BMD 
forces. Additionally, senior officials from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and MDA said that 
there is a draft presidential directive that will help clarify EPAA 
policy. However, DOD has not yet issued formal guidance clarifying the 
EPAA mission, including its relative priority among the regions 
identified for the phased adaptive approach. DOD officials told us 
that combatant commands responded to the EPAA announcement and the 
uncertainty about priorities with a surge of requests for BMD forces 
to ensure that their requirements would be met. Without establishing 
guidance to more fully align understanding throughout the department 
on what the desired end states are for EPAA, including its relative 
priority to other regional BMD architecture requirements, the 
department faces uncertainty in planning and implementing this revised 
approach. 

DOD Has Not Established EPAA Life-Cycle Cost Estimates: 

DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA and 
therefore is missing an important management tool for preparing 
budgets, monitoring progress and assessing long-term affordability of 
its revised approach to BMD in Europe. DOD has stated two main reasons 
for not establishing life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA. First, DOD 
officials told us that DOD does not intend to prepare separate life- 
cycle cost estimates for EPAA because DOD views it as an approach, not 
a program, and so funding is provided through the individual BMD 
elements that make up EPAA. However, in introducing the revised 
approach to BMD, the department emphasized that it would be fiscally 
sustainable and affordable. Additionally, in referring to EPAA in 
prepared testimony before Congress, the MDA Director stated that DOD 
was "committed to fully funding this program."[Footnote 19] Although 
DOD reported that the acquisition cost estimates and annual BMD budget 
request for individual elements include EPAA costs, we found that such 
information does not include full life-cycle costs.[Footnote 20] 
Further, this budgeting method is fragmented and so does not provide 
decision makers with a transparent and holistic view of EPAA costs. 
Second, DOD has emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes 
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult. 
However, without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to 
determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally 
sustainable and affordable. 

We have found that key principles for managing major investments such 
as EPAA include that an organization should understand the financial 
commitment involved and ensure appropriate transparency and 
accountability.[Footnote 21] Further, according to the GAO cost 
estimating guide,[Footnote 22] a credible cost estimate is required in 
order to assess a program's affordability and cost-effectiveness and 
to serve as a basis for a budget.[Footnote 23] The guide identifies 12 
steps necessary for developing credible cost estimates.[Footnote 24] 
Following these steps ensures that realistic cost estimates are 
developed and presented to management, enabling them to make informed 
decisions about whether the program is affordable within the portfolio 
plan. Providing decision makers with a program's updated cost estimate 
helps them monitor the implementation of the program and ensure that 
adequate funding is available to execute the program according to 
plan. Finally, credible cost estimates serve as a basis for a 
program's budget and validate that a program's strategy has an 
adequate budget for its planned resources. 

Part of the challenge in determining EPAA life-cycle costs results 
from uncertainty about what elements and interceptors will be included 
in EPAA. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, the final 
accuracy of cost estimates depends on how well a program is defined. 
In order to develop credible estimates, an organization needs detailed 
technical, program, and schedule descriptions from which all life-
cycle cost estimates can be derived. Some of these details would 
include system architecture, deployment details, operational concepts, 
personnel requirements, and logistics support. DOD's phased schedule 
for EPAA is comprised of multiple elements and interceptors to provide 
ever-improving integrated BMD capability, but many aspects of the 
approach have not yet been determined. For example, DOD has thus far 
committed to using two Aegis Ashore facilities and at least one AN/TPY-
2 radar. Additionally, each EPAA phase could have as many as three 
Aegis BMD ship patrol areas, but DOD has not yet committed to a 
specific number of ships or SM-3 interceptors for each phase. As we 
reported in December 2010,[Footnote 25] DOD also has not yet committed 
to the specific type or number of the other elements and interceptors 
that will be part of the EPAA phases. Figure 1 summarizes the current 
status of DOD's BMD assets that may be part of EPAA. 

Figure 1: Current Status of DOD's BMD Assets That May Be Part of EPAA: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Element: 1 AN/TPY-2 sensor (location not established); 
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known. 

Element: Aegis BMD ships; 
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined. 

Element: Aegis BMD ships; SM-3 interceptors; 
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined. 

Element: PAC-3; 
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined. 

Element: THAAD batteries; 
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined. 

Element: THAAD batteries; THAAD interceptors; 
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined. 

Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Romania); 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known. 

Element: 
Element: SM-3 interceptors; 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known. 

Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Poland); 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty]; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known. 

Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Poland); SM-3 interceptors; 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty]; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known. 

Element: Additional AN/TPY-2 sensor; 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined. 

Element: PTSS; 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty]; 
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined. 

Element: ABIR sensor; 
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty]; 
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty]; 
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined; 
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be 
determined. 

ABIR (Airborne Infrared sensor); 
AN/TPY-2 (Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2); 
PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3); 
PTSS (Precision Tracking Space System); 
SM-3 (Standard Missile-3); 
THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; Missile Defense Agency (images). 

For a further description of the various BMD assets that may be part 
of EPAA, see appendix II. 

[End of figure] 

Despite the current lack of detail on the implementation of EPAA 
policy, best practices for cost estimating include methods by which to 
develop valid cost estimates when a program's details are limited and 
thus still provide markers for measuring progress and assessing 
affordability. The cost guide makes special mention of spiral 
development efforts that, like EPAA, do not have clearly defined final 
requirements.[Footnote 26] In such cases, valid cost estimates can be 
developed as long as they clearly state the requirements that have 
been included and account for those that have been excluded. The 
Congressional Budget Office and the Institute for Defense Analysis 
have completed such analyses for the previous approach to BMD in 
Europe and the Institute for Defense Analysis also completed a cost 
estimate for EPAA.[Footnote 27] As the types and quantities of 
elements and interceptors needed for EPAA become better defined over 
time, cost estimates should be updated to ensure that managers 
understand the impact of any changes. 

DOD has also emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes 
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult. 
According to senior DOD officials, the department could develop a life-
cycle cost estimate for the phased adaptive approach but they were 
unsure of the relevancy of characterizing unique costs for EPAA. The 
officials said that DOD places significant emphasis on flexibility in 
its new approach to regional BMD, calling EPAA flexible by nature. The 
officials also stated that DOD's focus on using mobile and relocatable 
BMD assets for EPAA and in other regions means that the mix of 
elements and interceptors in each region could be adjusted to adapt to 
changes in threat. The result of this flexibility, according to the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, is that the actual life-cycle cost 
of the missile defense system is difficult to determine because there 
is no final configuration for the system. However, an organization can 
develop estimates for a range of possible scenarios. A cost estimating 
best practice in developing technical baselines includes defining 
deployment details for various scenarios, such as peacetime, 
contingency, and war. By presenting a range of scenarios, decision 
makers can better understand the short-term and long-term cost 
implications of different options and better evaluate their choices. 
While we recognize that life-cycle cost estimates will have increased 
levels of uncertainty for the later phases compared to the near-term 
phases, the level of flexibility inherent in EPAA needed to respond to 
changes in threat or technology over the four phases of this approach 
is bounded and cost estimating practices are adaptive enough to allow 
for the development of valid cost estimates. Table 3 describes our 
assessment of DOD's rationales for EPAA flexibility, factors limiting 
flexibility or the need for it, and their impact on DOD's ability to 
develop life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA. 

Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and 
Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates: 

DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to respond to 
changes in quantity of threat missiles; 
Limitations: Large and growing numbers of threat missiles and 
relatively low numbers of BMD assets for the foreseeable future mean 
that high demand for BMD assets for EPAA is essentially a constant. 
Year-to-year change in numbers of threat missiles is relatively 
predictable, according to DOD officials; 
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: The marginal change 
in the already high EPAA demand for BMD assets caused by an unexpected 
increase in threat missiles should be limited and therefore should not 
impede the development of cost estimates. The Joint Staff is leading a 
study, expected to be completed in the spring of 2011, that should 
help identify the specific BMD assets needed to address this high 
demand. 

DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to respond to 
crises by surging mobile and relocatable BMD assets wherever needed; 
Limitations: A surge strategy assumes a baseline BMD capability as 
well as defined capabilities that could be surged to a given region as 
threats change; 
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: A developed surge 
strategy should include details on assumed baselines and surged assets 
and so would provide details that could improve the quality of a cost 
estimate. U.S. Strategic Command is leading a force allocation study, 
expected to be complete in the spring of 2011, that should help to 
better define DOD's surge strategy. 

DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to integrate 
new BMD technology that has been proven effective through 
operationally realistic testing[A]; 
Limitations: Taking new BMD technologies from concept to fielding, 
including testing them, can take many years. We have previously found 
that BMD testing schedules have tended to slip[B]; 
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: Given DOD's 
commitment to deploying only proven BMD capabilities means that 
timelines for deploying new technologies as part of EPAA should be 
relatively predictable, allowing for the updating of cost estimates. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The Ballistic Missile Defense Review lays out how DOD currently 
uses its testing approach to evaluate operational effectiveness. In 
sum, the Integrated Master Testing Plan identifies a number of ground 
and flight tests that an asset must participate in to obtain data 
needed to validate models and simulations that, in turn, are intended 
to provide further visibility into the asset's operational 
performance. DOD has also added additional operational test events 
controlled by the testing community and combatant commands that 
include additional ground and flight tests. According to DOD, it is 
the information gathered from this combination of efforts that can be 
used to evaluate an asset's operational effectiveness. 

[B] See for example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense 
Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, 
GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010). 

[End of table] 

There may be occasions when DOD, in response to more rapid than 
projected quantitative and qualitative developments in the existing 
threat or the emergence of new missile threats from an unexpected 
location, will need to adjust to those threats. Good life-cycle cost 
estimates are equipped to deal with such unforeseen circumstances 
because they clearly list the facts and assumptions on which they are 
based. In such circumstances, a life-cycle cost estimate would provide 
additional information to decision makers in DOD and Congress as they 
evaluate their options. Until DOD develops EPAA life-cycle cost 
estimates--which could potentially be part of a larger phased adaptive 
approach life-cycle cost estimate--the department will not have an 
accurate basis from which to determine the financial sustainability 
and affordability of the revised approach to BMD in Europe and is 
missing a tool with which to monitor its implementation. 

DOD's EPAA Phase Schedule Does Not Fully Integrate Key Acquisition, 
Infrastructure, and Personnel Activities: 

DOD established the EPAA phase schedule without fully integrating it 
with key acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities and, as 
a result, the department does not have an important management tool 
with which to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and 
achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how changes will 
impact the execution of this effort. As a result, the program may be 
exposed to schedule, performance, and cost risks. Implementing EPAA 
will require the synchronization of numerous efforts, including 
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. For example, 
DOD must develop and produce the BMD elements and interceptors for 
EPAA and must be able to integrate them into a system. The performance 
of a fielded BMD architecture, including the size of the area 
defended, is dependent on several factors, including the types and 
numbers of elements and interceptors fielded, the extent to which 
fielded elements are linked together operationally, and the geographic 
location of the elements (see figure 2). Further, DOD must also have 
the appropriate infrastructure in place--such as needed power, water, 
roads, facilities, and security--in time to support not only the EPAA 
elements and interceptors it intends to field as part of EPAA but also 
the personnel necessary to operate and maintain them. DOD must also 
have these trained personnel available in time to carry out those 
duties. The department is working to implement EPAA, but EPAA 
timelines may not match the time needed to integrate and execute the 
necessary acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. 

Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, 
Integration, and Location on Defended Area: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustration] 

Interactivity instructions: 
Click on each option to see the results. For print version, see
appendix III. 

Depicted on the illustration: 
BMD-capable ship; 
BMD sensor; 
Integrated; 
Defended area. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only. 

This graphic is interactive in the electronic version of this report. 
For the print version, the graphic is broken out by the different 
options in appendix III. 

[End of figure] 

Our past work shows that a program's success depends on the quality of 
its schedule.[Footnote 28] If it is well-integrated, a schedule 
clearly shows the relationships between program activities, activity 
resource requirements and durations, and any constraints that affect 
their start or completion. The schedule shows when major events are 
expected as well as the completion dates for all activities leading up 
to them, which can help determine if the schedule is realistic and 
achievable. When fully laid out, a detailed schedule can be used to 
identify where problems are or could potentially be. Moreover, as 
changes occur within a program, a well-integrated schedule will aid in 
analyzing how they affect the program. For these reasons, an 
integrated schedule is key in managing program performance and is 
necessary for determining what work remains and the expected cost to 
complete it. 

According to officials from MDA, the Navy, the Army, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and EUCOM, a principle 
challenge for implementing EPAA is meeting its schedule. DOD 
established the EPAA phase schedule based on a top-level evaluation of 
the implementation activities that could impact or be impacted by that 
schedule and, as a result, DOD may face challenges executing it. EPAA 
is a policy framework and not a fully developed architecture or 
program, according to senior DOD officials responsible for developing 
the policy. Further, the schedule for EPAA was largely based on the 
alignment of the changes in the threat to availability of new 
technology, including the various SM-3 interceptor variants. These 
officials said that they relied upon acquisition feasibility and 
affordability information for various options that was provided by MDA 
and that the Joint Staff represented service and combatant command 
concerns during the development of the phased schedule. However, they 
also stated that the military services and combatant commands began 
examining the specific implementation requirements of EPAA after the 
policy's announcement. 

Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Acquisition Activities: 

EPAA's phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities 
and so are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance, 
and increased cost. As we reported in December 2010,[Footnote 29] EPAA 
policy calls for DOD to deliver BMD capabilities on a timeline that 
requires concurrency among technology, design, testing, and other 
development activities; this concurrency introduces risk of increased 
costs, schedule delay, or performance shortfalls that must be 
addressed. A sound acquisition has firm requirements, mature 
technologies, and a strategy that provides sufficient time for design 
activities before the decision is made to start development and 
demonstration or to transition to production. As we reported, it is 
questionable whether DOD's approach allows sufficient time for these 
activities. Schedules for the individual elements are highly 
optimistic in technology development, testing, production, and 
integration, leaving little room for potential delays. 

Additionally, DOD has not formally or fully aligned acquisition 
programming to support EPAA or set acquisition decision points for 
each phase, including production decisions. An integrated schedule 
defines major decision points at which to review demonstrated progress 
and follow-on plans. It establishes exit and entrance criteria to show 
that components are ready to move from one developmental step to the 
next, and that the component fits within the context of the bigger 
system to which it contributes. While individual BMD elements have a 
schedule, DOD has not developed an integrated schedule for EPAA that 
aligns the necessary acquisition activities. As a result, decisions 
about production of individual elements, risks associated with 
individual elements and interceptors, overall BMD system 
interoperability and integration, and assessment of the integrated 
system do not appear to be fully linked to the phases. Additionally, 
the Missile Defense Executive Board, which is responsible for 
overseeing missile defense portfolio developments, has thus far 
focused program reviews solely at the element level, not the broader 
EPAA level.[Footnote 30] According to DOD, the department is 
developing an integrated acquisition schedule for EPAA. Without such a 
schedule, DOD acquisition managers, stakeholders, and Congress lack an 
integrated EPAA-level view of BMD development. Table 4 summarizes some 
development risks for the individual BMD assets as well as the 
integrated system that may be exacerbated by the EPAA schedule 
compression. 

Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA Schedule 
Compression: 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications; (C2BMC): 
The C2BMC element, which is designed to integrate the BMDS 
capabilities and provide planning, situational awareness, sensor 
management, and battle management, may present an incorrect picture of 
the battle space because it may not accurately group threat missile 
tracks to reduce multiple cues from sensors about the tracks. 

Aegis Ashore: 
The Aegis BMD weapon system currently in service on ships will require 
modifications for use on land as Aegis Ashore.[A] According to Navy 
officials, overall system design has not been selected. Also, detail 
design has not yet begun. The contract for a portion of Aegis Ashore 
is scheduled for award prior to preliminary or critical design reviews 
for Aegis Ashore; we have reported that such sequencing can lead to 
costly modifications later in the process.[B] Integration of Aegis 
Ashore with C2BMC, which links Aegis Ashore to cueing forward sensors, 
is critical and has not been demonstrated. Testing of Aegis Ashore has 
been reduced from four flight test intercepts to two intercept tests, 
eliminating opportunities for DOD to learn about the performance of 
the system. 

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IB: 
Technology development of a key subsystem is following a high-risk 
path. According to the Director, MDA, a flight test was recently 
rescheduled to allow time to complete all qualifications prior to the 
test. 

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 
Some production risks for THAAD batteries--including incomplete system 
and some component qualification, potential design changes, and 
demonstrated production rates for interceptor components not 
supporting production needs--have caused more than a six-month delay 
in production. The program has now addressed most of these risks and 
has mitigation plans in place for those remaining. 

Interoperability and Assessment of Integrated System Performance: 
As a system-of-systems, the BMDS is expected to perform as a whole, 
not just the sum of its individual parts; thus technical 
interoperability and integration among individual systems is key to 
whole system performance. Ability of testing and assessment plans to 
fully demonstrate BMDS capabilities in a regional context is 
constrained by existing limitations in models and simulations. These 
limitations include incorrect representations of how BMDS elements are 
linked in the real world and can result in overstating integrated 
system performance. Interoperability with friends and allies is 
uncertain; who will contribute, how, and the degree of technical 
feasibility and investment to interoperate with other nations has yet 
to be determined. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: This table is based on the findings of GAO-11-179R. For 
additional information and findings regarding EPAA acquisition issues, 
please see that report. 

[A] Modifications necessary for converting the Aegis BMD weapon system 
for shore use include design, integration, and fabrication of a new 
deckhouse enclosure for the radar, modification of the interceptor 
vertical launching system, and suppression or disabling of certain 
features used at sea, such as software for a ship's pitch and yaw. 

[B] GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points 
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-
322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009). 

[End of table] 

Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Infrastructure Requirements: 

Furthermore, the EPAA phase schedule is not yet integrated with key 
infrastructure activities and therefore is also exposed to risk of 
schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost. BMD assets, 
such as the AN/TPY-2 radar and Aegis Ashore, require infrastructure to 
support and secure the assets. Designing, funding, and building 
military infrastructure can take years. Officials from MDA, the Navy, 
EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and the Army Corps of Engineers 
[Footnote 31] stated that having the necessary infrastructure in place 
to support the scheduled 2015 operational date for the first Aegis 
Ashore could be challenging. There were some early design questions 
about how relocatable Aegis Ashore was supposed to be, which had 
direct implications for infrastructure requirements. According to 
officials from MDA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, initial 
design options included a modular construction option that allowed for 
placement or removal of Aegis Ashore from a site within 120 days. 
Infrastructure needs for the initial modular design option would have 
been minimal. Nevertheless, DOD decided not to pursue the initial 
modular design because of technical challenges that may have impacted 
performance and driven up the Aegis Ashore development and acquisition 
costs, as well as potentially increasing costs for operating and 
sustaining the element. However, there was disagreement among the 
officials to whom we spoke about the impact of pursuing a new design 
on infrastructure needs--ranging from no change to requiring 
significant additional infrastructure. 

Although DOD is beginning to narrow its design approach for Aegis 
Ashore, DOD is operating under a compressed schedule to meet the 2015 
operational date for Phase 2. Construction, and therefore funding, for 
all of the necessary Phase 2 Aegis Ashore facilities and associated 
infrastructure needs to begin in fiscal year 2013, according to 
officials from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Navy, and U.S. Naval 
Forces Europe. However, MDA reported to us and a senior DOD official 
testified to Congress that Aegis Ashore site construction will take 
approximately 1 year. According to officials from the Navy and U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, Aegis Ashore infrastructure costs remain 
unknown because the designs have not yet been finalized for the system 
itself or the supporting infrastructure. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
officials said that they are working closely with the Navy and MDA to 
reach basic agreement on the design of the infrastructure in March 
2011, which is in time for MDA to budget for the needed facilities in 
fiscal year 2013. However, Army Corps of Engineers officials said that 
the Romania Aegis Ashore site design and construction estimate will 
not be as mature as those of typical military construction projects, 
which may expose the Aegis Ashore construction site to increased risk 
of design modifications, increased costs, and possible delays. As we 
have previously reported, DOD underestimated its BMD support 
infrastructure requirements and military construction costs for the 
prior plan for BMD in Europe when it did not follow the traditional 
military construction requirements.[Footnote 32] Army Corps of 
Engineers officials noted that DOD is accepting this extra risk with 
Aegis Ashore, because waiting for a more complete design for Aegis 
Ashore in Romania would result in missing the 2015 deadline. 

A significant infrastructure-related schedule risk to EPAA over which 
DOD and the U.S. government in general has limited control but which 
can have significant implications for implementation is the entry into 
force requirements of agreements, such as ratification, with nations 
to host EPAA assets and personnel.[Footnote 33],[Footnote 34] Delays 
in ratification could impact the schedule for infrastructure because 
U.S. law prohibits DOD from constructing land-based BMD interceptor 
facilities in Europe until after the host nation ratifies the 
agreements it has reached with the U.S.[Footnote 35] State Department 
officials stated that the host nation negotiations and ratification 
process for the Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and Poland--to be 
completed as part of Phases 2 and 3 respectively--are in progress and, 
though they do not anticipate any significant delays, they also cannot 
predict when negotiations and ratification will be complete or when 
agreements will enter into force. For example, the U.S. government ran 
into unexpected delays in host nation agreement ratification when it 
was attempting to implement the previous approach to BMD in Europe. 
According to DOD, its schedule assumption in 2007 was that both Poland 
and the Czech Republic would complete the necessary ratification of 
host nation agreements by the end of fiscal year 2008. However, as we 
previously reported, delays in the ratification of key host nation 
agreements presented challenges to DOD's planning and implementation 
of its prior approach to BMD in Europe.[Footnote 36] In that report, 
we also noted that the ratification votes were delayed, in part, 
because of a desire on the part of both the Polish and Czech 
parliaments to wait for an indication from the current U.S. 
administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe. In the end, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic ratified the 
necessary agreements before September 2009 when the U.S. decided to 
take a new approach to BMD in Europe.[Footnote 37] Similar delays in 
host nation agreement ratification for Aegis Ashore could also impact 
EPAA and result in schedule slips, decreased performance, or increased 
cost. Additionally, the U.S. must also reach agreement with nations to 
host other land-based BMD assets that may be part of EPAA. For 
example, DOD's plans for EPAA Phase 1 include an AN/TPY-2 radar 
intended to provide early warning data to engage short-and medium-
range ballistic missile threats and provide additional tracking 
information for homeland defense. According to a senior Joint Staff 
official, the AN/TPY-2 will significantly increase the capability of 
Aegis BMD that is also intended to be part of Phase 1. However, the 
U.S. has not reached agreement with a country to host the AN/TPY-2. If 
such an agreement is not reached soon, there may not be enough time to 
construct the necessary facilities for the AN/TPY-2 and deploy it by 
the end of 2011, thereby diminishing DOD's expected EPAA Phase 1 
performance. 

Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Personnel Needs: 

The EPAA timeline is not yet integrated with key activities to ensure 
personnel needs are met. The military services are responsible for 
organizing and training personnel, a process that typically takes 
years once requirements are identified. DOD generally requires that 
major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized 
and trained personnel. As we previously reported, DOD has in the past 
put BMD elements into operational use before first ensuring that the 
military services had created units and trained service members to 
operate them and, as a result, combatant commanders sometimes lacked 
certainty that the forces could operate the elements as expected. 
[Footnote 38] DOD concurred with our recommendation that it require, 
in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational 
units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training 
needed to perform all of their BMD responsibilities before first 
making elements available for operational use. 

DOD's aggressive EPAA schedule runs the risk of deploying assets 
without the full complement of trained personnel needed to carry out 
the mission, which could lead to issues with operational performance. 
For example, Navy officials told us that they will likely have to 
extend sailors' rotations beyond the standard deployment length to 
meet possible EPAA ship requirements for Phase 1, thus placing a 
strain on the force and possibly affecting performance. The Navy is 
already dealing with manning issues that may affect BMD asset 
capabilities. In 2010, separate reports by the Navy found Aegis radar 
manpower and performance in decline. The reports stressed that the 
Navy's Aegis crews are already overextended and they lack sufficient 
numbers of qualified people to meet its radar maintenance 
requirements. Additional requirements for Aegis presence because of 
EPAA could contribute further to this problem. Reducing EPAA 
deployments to address these concerns would result in a decrease in 
expected capability. 

Moreover, DOD has yet to make key decisions that will affect its 
personnel needs and so does not yet know how these needs will affect 
the EPAA schedule. For example, Navy officials told us that they lack 
some crucial information such as the required Aegis ship presence for 
the early phases of EPAA or the design of Aegis Ashore for later 
phases. This hinders their ability to fully plan and develop the 
necessary organizations, personnel, and training requirements. Navy 
officials said that the Navy expects to keep training requirements for 
the personnel operating the Aegis Ashore weapon system very similar to 
the training needed for the Aegis weapon system on the ship, thus 
simplifying training requirements. However, Navy officials said that 
some support infrastructure jobs unique to Aegis Ashore are difficult 
to assess, and training for these will have to be developed as Aegis 
Ashore designs mature. The Navy has not yet been able to establish 
training requirements for maintaining the land-based vertical launch 
system that is part of Aegis Ashore, for instance, because design has 
not been finalized. Further, Navy officials told us that the personnel 
required for Aegis Ashore could differ significantly if it is required 
to operate at full readiness at all times or if it is required to 
operate at some lower level of readiness. A requirement for 
maintaining high readiness could increase personnel costs and 
challenge the service's ability to provide sufficient personnel. Also, 
Army officials told us that they need more guidance on what Army 
systems will be part of EPAA and when these systems will need to be 
operational. DOD is working to clarify many of its EPAA needs and 
doing so will help inform personnel needs and allow the services to 
prepare the necessary organizations and training for personnel. We 
have already mentioned several of these efforts, such as EUCOM's 
operational plan expected to be completed in spring 2011, the plan by 
the Navy, MDA, and Army Corps of Engineers to reach agreement on Aegis 
Ashore facilities needs in March 2011, and the U.S. Strategic Command-
led force allocation study that will inform DOD's decisions on force 
distribution. However, service processes to ensure that the full 
complement of trained personnel is in place will take time. Without an 
integrated schedule, DOD is missing a management tool with which to 
assess the effects of emerging personnel needs on the execution of the 
phased adaptive approach in Europe. 

Although Combatant Commands' Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased, 
Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations 
Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans: 

DOD has not yet established key performance metrics that would provide 
the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational 
capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ, 
creating potential challenges for EUCOM as it integrates BMD into its 
operational plans. DOD has already incorporated some combatant 
commands' testing needs into BMD testing; however, as of January 2011, 
the combatant commands' more detailed, operationally-relevant, 
quantifiable metrics had not yet been incorporated into DOD's BMD 
testing plans. Lack of such metrics inhibits EUCOM's understanding of 
the operational capabilities and limitations of the integrated BMD 
system they would have to employ. As a result, the combatant commands 
will lack key information they need to plan for the phased adaptive 
approach and so may face challenges in integrating BMD into 
operational plans. The combatant commands recognize this issue and are 
currently attempting to establish these metrics; however, they have 
yet to be finalized and implemented. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Increase Combatant Commands' Visibility into 
BMD Performance: 

Following the establishment of MDA in 2002, initial BMD system designs 
did not formally consider combatant command requirements because of 
MDA's exemption from DOD's requirements process; however, DOD has 
since taken multiple steps to increase combatant commands' visibility 
into BMD operational performance. According to U.S. Strategic Command, 
MDA initially achieved the rapid deployment of BMD capabilities 
because it was unconstrained by operational requirements. Moreover, 
its testing did not focus on verification of operational BMD system 
performance against combatant command requirements. The BMD 
development and assessment process presented challenges for the 
combatant commands because MDA's criteria for declaring a BMD element 
technically capable of performing some tasks did not always allow the 
combatant commands to thoroughly assess how the element could be 
operationally employed. For example, after DOD fielded the AN/TPY-2 
radar in Japan in 2006, the combatant commands realized they did not 
have a good understanding of the operational capabilities and 
limitations of the radar that would allow them to fully employ it. 

In response to these problems, U.S. Strategic Command, in its role as 
warfighter advocate for missile defense, began efforts to incorporate 
combatant command needs into BMD testing and evaluation in order to 
assess the operational utility of the elements being fielded. In 2008, 
U.S. Strategic Command published the Force Preparation Campaign Plan, 
which laid out a framework designed to help manage risk to the 
combatant commands' operations by identifying the information 
combatant commands need about BMD operational capabilities and 
limitations. For instance, the plan describes the need for designing 
BMD tests around combatant command operational plans and testing 
against validated scenarios and threats,[Footnote 39] since the 
integrated BMD system level performance is heavily threat, 
environment, and scenario-dependent. U.S. Strategic Command stressed 
that combatant commands need this information to develop flexible 
operational plans and assess BMD capabilities for supporting a 
command's missions. 

MDA has also taken steps to revise its testing program to incorporate 
combatant command needs, but testing continues to be driven by 
collection of data points needed to verify the models and simulations 
used to characterize BMD performance.[Footnote 40] MDA has integrated 
many combatant command testing needs into the Integrated Master Test 
Plan. For instance, MDA has added three Operational Test periods, each 
aligned with the first three phases of the phased adaptive approach, 
which, according to U.S. Strategic Command officials, allow the 
combatant commands to use the BMD system configuration unique to the 
particular phase for training and operational system evaluation. These 
ground tests[Footnote 41] are based on combatant command-developed 
architectures and the relevant validated threats. EUCOM has been 
involved in the test design process, including providing input 
regarding where BMD assets should be located for EPAA. According to 
EUCOM officials, the test designs were then vetted through EUCOM 
intelligence and operations experts. Officials also said that the 
results of the tests will be used by the command to inform its EPAA 
planning. 

Combatant Commands Lack Visibility into Key Operational Capabilities 
and Limitations of the BMD System That Is Important for EPAA 
Operational Planning: 

Although combatant commands are increasingly involved in BMD testing, 
they have expressed the need for additional metrics that can be used 
to assess the durability (how long it can defend) and effectiveness 
(how well it can defend) of the BMD system, which are important for 
planning the phased adaptive approach. For instance, one of MDA's 
metrics for effectiveness[Footnote 42] is based on a "one-on-one" 
engagement between a given element or group of elements and a single 
threat missile. According to DOD officials, it therefore has limited 
applicability to a more realistic operational scenario where combatant 
commanders employ an integrated BMD system against multiple threat 
missiles. 

The combatant commands have concluded that they need to understand BMD 
system effectiveness and durability in quantitative terms so that, as 
they prepare their operational plans, they understand BMD's 
contribution to the overall mission and appropriately balance it with 
other options. BMD is part of the defensive capabilities, and in 
combat operations, it alone cannot achieve or maintain effective 
defense against an adversary ballistic missile attack. DOD planning 
doctrine emphasizes that integrated and interoperable military forces 
improve the ability to not only defend against a ballistic missile 
attack with defensive counterair, such as BMD, but also ensure that 
offensive counterair can strike potential ballistic missile threats. 
[Footnote 43] 

As more ballistic defense assets are deployed into the EUCOM area of 
responsibility, creating a more complex BMD system, insight into the 
capabilities and limitations of the system and its overall 
contribution to EUCOM's operational plans will become more important. 
The balance between offensive and defensive options, and therefore the 
need for a clear understanding of the operational capabilities of the 
BMD system, is further complicated for EPAA since it requires 
coordination between two geographic combatant commands--EUCCOM and U.S 
Central Command--given where the threats may originate. A threat 
originating from the Middle East, which is primarily U.S. Central 
Command's area of responsibility, could be directed at Europe, which 
is in EUCOM's area of responsibility. Therefore, these two commands 
must work together to balance BMD with other options. Without metrics 
to credibly quantify BMD system performance, EUCOM, and other 
combatant commands will not be able to thoroughly analyze performance 
gaps. Moreover, without the full understanding of their BMD system 
capabilities and limitations, they will be limited in their ability to 
develop comprehensive plans that integrate defensive and offensive 
options. 

The combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic Command, created a 
process in 2006 to provide them with additional understanding of the 
operational utility of the BMD system but this process does not 
provide the specific performance information the combatant commands 
seek. Specifically, this BMD assessment process was initially intended 
to enhance visibility into BMD element capabilities by using 
subjective assessment criteria expressed in terms of yes or no 
judgments rather than quantified performance parameters. For example, 
the effectiveness criteria for the AN/TPY-2 radar includes whether 
that sensor possesses the ability to detect, classify, track and 
discriminate ballistic missile threats targeting U.S. defended areas. 
Thus, rather than assessing the extent to which a capability can 
perform a certain mission-essential function, the assessment focuses 
on whether or not a BMD component can perform a certain task. When the 
combatant commands first implemented this process, they concluded they 
would need to later introduce quantifiable mission-essential 
performance goals that would enable more complete operational 
assessments of BMD system capability in relation to their operational 
needs. 

To address the effort of developing quantifiable mission-essential 
performance goals, the combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic 
Command, are currently attempting to introduce quantifiable 
operational performance metrics into the testing program through an 
effort called "Assess-to." The combatant commands are defining metrics 
to measure BMD system effectiveness (how well it can defend) and 
durability (how long it can defend) against threats projected by the 
intelligence and operational communities. More specifically, as 
defined in a draft Assess-to criteria document, the metric used to 
measure effectiveness of a BMD system is expressed mathematically as 
the ratio of threats defeated to total threats launched. As such, this 
metric is designed to allow assessment of BMD system effectiveness 
against multiple ballistic missile threats. Durability, on the other 
hand, is defined as the length of time that an established BMD system 
can provide and sustain defensive capability at a specific level of 
protection against projected threats. 

U.S. Strategic Command officials agree that developing Assess-to 
criteria would help to quantify BMD system capabilities and 
limitations and thereby provide better data to the combatant commands 
as they develop their operational plans. The combatant commands have 
articulated the need for BMD system effectiveness and durability 
metrics since 2008 and developed a draft Assess-to document that 
describes them, but there are two main barriers that have prevented 
DOD from adopting Assess-to. First, various DOD officials stated that 
MDA is reluctant to have Assess-to metrics established due to concerns 
that these types of metrics could effectively turn into requirements 
to which MDA will be held accountable. As stated previously, MDA is 
exempt from formal acquisition requirements and the BMD elements it 
developed were not built to operational requirements. U.S. Strategic 
Command officials and documents describing Assess-to are sensitive to 
this concern and characterize Assess-to criteria in terms of 
communicating testing needs to MDA as well as goals to "build towards" 
rather than strict requirements. Second, an additional obstacle to 
Assess-to implementation is that current limitations in system-level 
modeling may limit DOD's ability to test against the identified 
metrics. Assess-to metrics are geared towards system-level assessment, 
and currently ground tests--the primary venue for such assessments--
rely on models and simulations, many of which continue to lack 
operational realism. Although MDA is working to validate models and 
simulations, they currently have technical limitations associated with 
their ability to represent system-wide operationally realistic 
scenarios. However, MDA officials told us that, while there are 
challenges associated with coming to agreement on how to quantify BMD 
effectiveness and durability, MDA believes that it is possible to do 
so. While various DOD officials told us that MDA and U.S. Strategic 
Command are collaborating to develop solutions to these issues, until 
quantifiable operational metrics for BMD system-level assessment are 
in place, the combatant commands will lack key information they need 
to plan for the phased adaptive approach and so may face operational 
risks should a conflict arise. 

Conclusions: 

DOD's revised approach to BMD in Europe reflects the Administration's 
desire to focus on threats currently facing the United States and 
allies while maintaining the flexibility to adapt the approach as 
threats change and new missile defense technologies become available. 
Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, DOD has taken steps to 
implement this policy, including considering options for the 
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, 
analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in 
Europe. However, this approach creates significant planning and 
implementation challenges that--if left unaddressed--could result in 
significant management issues and unforeseen costs. First, as a result 
of the lack of guidance on EPAA's desired end states, including its 
priority compared to other BMD missions, the department faces 
uncertainty in planning and implementing its revised approach, 
particularly in how it will allocate limited assets among multiple 
geographic regions. Second, without cost estimates for the life cycle 
of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether it is meeting its goal 
that EPAA be fiscally sustainable and affordable. The department will 
also have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of the program 
and ensuring that adequate funding is available to execute the program 
according to plan if it does not develop life-cycle cost estimates. 
Third, DOD does not have an EPAA schedule that integrates key 
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. As a result, 
the department does not have the information it needs to assess 
whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify 
potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution 
of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule, 
performance, and cost risks. Finally, without incorporating 
operationally quantifiable metrics--such as how long the system can 
defend (durability) and how well the system can defend 
(effectiveness)--into its test program, DOD will not be able to fully 
understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system and 
EUCOM will not have the most relevant performance data it needs to 
thoroughly assess the extent to which BMD capabilities support its 
mission objectives and judge how to best plan for and employ BMD 
assets. Unless the department addresses these challenges, DOD will 
likely face implementation risks that ultimately may increase the cost 
for this approach in Europe and potentially beyond as it expands this 
BMD approach to other regions of the world. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 
actions: 

* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide guidance on EPAA that describes 
desired EPAA end states in response to concerns raised by key 
stakeholders. 

* Direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate 
the development of: 

- life-cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and 
oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans 
for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are 
needed, and: 

- an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, 
and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation 
risks that need to be considered. 

* Direct U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Missile 
Defense Agency, to adopt BMD operational performance metrics for 
durability and effectiveness and include these metrics into the BMD 
test programs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two 
of our recommendations and partially concurred with two others. The 
department's comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD and the State 
Department also provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance on 
EPAA that describes desired end states in response to concerns raised 
by key stakeholders. In its comments, DOD stated that it recognizes 
the need to provide policy guidance on the decision to pursue the 
EPAA. The department also noted that it has taken steps to provide 
guidance in the 2012 Guidance for the Employment of the Force and that 
this would provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant 
commanders and other DOD components on end states, strategic 
assumptions and contingency planning, including for EPAA. However, 
since this guidance has not yet been approved by the Secretary of 
Defense, we cannot determine if the concerns raised by key 
stakeholders will be addressed. Additionally, since EPAA is a flexible 
approach, DOD will need to continue to refine its guidance over time. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Missile 
Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development of life-
cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and 
oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans 
for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are 
needed. In its comments, DOD stated that EPAA is an approach, not an 
acquisition program, and that it is designed to be flexible and match 
resources to the combatant commander's requirements. The department 
believes a more effective approach is to prepare BMDS program element- 
specific life-cycle cost estimates and use them to inform the 
management of ongoing acquisition programs and senior-level oversight 
of the phased adaptive approach as BMDS systems are applied to the 
defense of Europe. We recognize that life-cycle cost estimates for 
individual elements will provide decision makers with information on 
DOD's BMD efforts; however, we believe that DOD should also develop 
life-cycle cost estimates for its overall EPAA effort and that doing 
so will not impede flexibility. Without cost estimates for the life 
cycle of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether EPAA is affordable 
and sustainable. The department will also have difficulty in 
monitoring the implementation of EPAA and ensuring that adequate 
funding is available to execute the program according to plan. 

In its response to our third recommendation, DOD concurred that the 
Missile Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development 
of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure, 
and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation 
risks that need to be considered. DOD stated that MDA includes the 
anticipated phased adaptive approach requirements into the broader 
BMDS acquisition program and uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the 
emerging EPAA requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate 
detail and timing within the BMD element-level schedules. DOD further 
indicated that MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate the 
acquisition of discrete BMDS elements which make up the capability to 
be delivered in each of the EPAA phases. While the department has an 
integrated BMDS acquisition schedule comprised of element-level 
acquisition schedules, we found that the schedules for the individual 
elements are highly optimistic. Additionally, DOD has not developed an 
integrated schedule specifically for EPAA so that EPAA-related 
acquisition activities as well as EPAA-related infrastructure and 
personnel activities can be synchronized directly within that 
schedule. As a result, we continue to believe that the department does 
not have an important management tool with which to assess whether the 
EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential 
problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this 
effort. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to adopt BMD operational 
performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these 
metrics into the BMD test programs. In its comments, DOD stated that 
it recognizes the inherent value of measurable BMDS performance 
metrics and that, once provided with the warfighter's operationally 
defined metrics, DOD will crosswalk these metrics to the BMD System 
specification values assessed to be achievable, and determine whether 
the specifications meet the operational requirements. Taking such 
actions would meet the intent of our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretary of State; the Director, Missile Defense Agency; the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

During our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for 
implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we reviewed 
relevant documentation and met with representatives from numerous 
agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has provided 
guidance for the force structure requirements, identified costs, and 
established an integrated schedule for EPAA we reviewed relevant 
documentation and spoke with cognizant DOD, State Department, and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials. The documents we 
reviewed relating to guidance for force structure requirements 
included the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the President's 
announcement from September 2009, and testimony from senior DOD 
officials. We also reviewed U.S. Strategic Command's 2010 Military 
Utility Assessment and 2009 Prioritized Capabilities List. We spoke to 
senior-level officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Joint Staff about the 
presence or absence of a firm architecture for EPAA, any guidance that 
would be provided to the services, and how force structure for EPAA 
would be determined. Officials from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. 
European Command, and U.S. Northern Command informed us about the 
typical processes for determining ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
force structure. We spoke to service representatives from the Army and 
Navy, including the Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the 
Naval Air and Missile Defense Command, about the kind of guidance they 
will need to prepare cost and force structure estimates for EPAA. We 
also reviewed intelligence documents and threat assessments and met 
with intelligence officials from the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
National Air and Space Intelligence Center to become familiar with the 
threats that EPAA is intended to defeat and the type of force 
structure that might be required to accomplish this mission. To 
determine the extent to which DOD has identified the costs of EPAA, we 
reviewed the budget requests for some of the elements DOD stated would 
be part of EPAA and also met with representatives from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation). In 
evaluating whether DOD has an integrated schedule that considers the 
factors that may impact EPAA, we relied on policy documents such as 
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the statements made by 
the President and the Secretary of Defense about the timelines for 
EPAA. We reviewed MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan and the 
President's budget requests and justifications for BMD elements. We 
also met with service representatives to discuss the kinds of 
schedules they typically follow when preparing infrastructure, 
training personnel, and preparing force structure to be fielded. For 
example, the Army Corps of Engineers provided information related to 
the efforts involved with constructing facilities in foreign countries 
and the types of challenges they face with such construction. Further, 
State Department officials provided us with information about the 
activities and schedule involved in establishing government-to-
government agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets. We also spoke with 
NATO representatives about that organization's schedule for adopting 
the territorial missile defense mission and the process of making 
assets interoperable with U.S. missile defense assets. We also relied 
on our recent work dealing with the acquisition risks related to the 
EPAA schedule, contained in GAO-11-179R. 

To assess the extent to which the combatant commands are involved with 
testing for EPAA-related assets and understand the capabilities and 
limitations of the BMD system, we reviewed the Integrated Master Test 
Plan as well as U.S. Strategic Command's 2010 Military Utility 
Assessment, and the Force Preparation Campaign Plan. We also spoke to 
officials at U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command about 
their understanding and confidence in the BMD system as a whole and 
the individual assets that comprise it. Officials from these same 
commands provided information about efforts to establish "Assess-to" 
criteria for durability and effectiveness of the BMD system. We met 
with officials from the office of the Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation and the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test 
Agency to discuss the status of models and simulations for the BMD 
system and elements. 

To understand DOD's and the State Department's plans for cooperation 
and coordination with NATO, friends, and allies in implementing EPAA, 
we conducted site visits to numerous installations both in the U.S. 
and in Europe. We met with State Department officials to discuss their 
ongoing efforts to negotiate agreements with countries that may host 
U.S. BMD assets and received updates on the progress of negotiations. 
We interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy to discuss DOD's role in negotiating these 
agreements. We also met with MDA officials to discuss the efforts to 
make EPAA interoperable with the Active Layered Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense system of NATO. We also attended the Nimble Titan 2010 
wargame in Suffolk, Va., where we talked to the representatives of 
foreign governments and militaries and learned about the efforts 
already under way that may affect the collaboration and coordination 
amongst allies, as well as points of conflict that could hinder 
cooperation. In Europe, officials with the U.S. mission to NATO 
informed us of the process whereby NATO would decide whether or not to 
adopt the territorial BMD mission, the likelihood of such an adoption, 
and next steps following adoption of the mission. We also met with the 
European representatives from U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Air 
Forces in Europe to discuss their perspective on the efforts and 
challenges to cooperating with NATO and foreign allies on BMD. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January 
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA: 

BMDS element: Aegis Ballistic Missile; Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: A system that (1) provides a forward deployed 
capability to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all 
ranges and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs its own 
sensors and interceptors or exploits off-board sensors to protect 
deployed forces, large regions, and population centers. The element is 
based on a modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to provide these 
capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), 
designed to defend against short-to intermediate-range ballistic 
missile threats in the midcourse and ascent phases, and a modified 
Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) designed to defend against short-range 
threats in the terminal phase. 

BMDS element: Command, Control, Battle; Management, and; 
Communications (C2BMC); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: A networked computer and communications element 
developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing deliberate 
planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle 
management capabilities. 

BMDS element: Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2 
(AN/TPY-2); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: A transportable, land-based radar, similar in 
design to the THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic 
missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based locations. 

BMDS element: Terminal High-Altitude Area; Defense (THAAD); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: The THAAD element employs the THAAD Interceptor 
and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2 (AN/TPY-
2) (THAAD Mode) to engage ballistic targets in the late mid-course and 
terminal phases of their trajectory. THAAD can act as a surveillance 
sensor, providing sensor data to cue other elements of the BMDS. 

BMDS element: PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: PAC-3 provides simultaneous air and missile 
defense capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S. 
deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic missiles. 

BMDS element: Aegis Ashore; 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 2, 3, 4; 
Element description: Land-based element designed by MDA to provide 
capability to detect, track, and intercept threats. Aegis Ashore will 
leverage the Aegis BMD capability and deploy it at shore-based sites 
in Europe starting in 2015. DOD intends for it to employ the SM-3 for 
exoatmospheric defense against short-to medium-and some intermediate-
range ballistic missile threats in the later stages of flight. Use of 
the SM-3 at shore-based sites will broaden the BMDS use of the SM-3 
from its current sea-based applications and DOD plans for Aegis Ashore 
to employ SM-3 IIB in Phase 4 against intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. 

BMDS element: Airborne Infrared Radar (ABIR); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 3, 4; 
Element description: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based sensor in 
development designed to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid 
sizes. The sensor is also intended to provide tracking data of high 
enough quality to be used for launch-on-remote[A] and early 
intercept[B] engagements. 

BMDS element: Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS); 
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 3, 4; 
Element description: Space-based sensor system, in early development, 
designed to provide end-to-end intercept quality tracking of ballistic 
missile threats. 

Source: GAO summary of DOD data. 

[A] Launch-on-remote is a future capability designed to sense a threat 
remotely, transmit tracking information to the interceptor's flight 
computer, and launch the interceptor earlier and farther down range 
than other radars would allow. According to MDA, investments are also 
being made to develop an "engage-on-remote" technology that includes 
not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the 
ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This 
will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater 
ranges. 

[B] Early intercept is the concept of intercepting missiles early in 
their flight using currently planned interceptors and sensors. Early 
intercept is achieved by reducing the timelines associated with early 
sensor tracking and rapidly developing fire-control solutions so that 
today's missiles can intercept threat missiles much earlier in their 
flight. Early intercept should provide an additional opportunity to 
shoot at incoming threat missiles. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities, 
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas: 

Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only. 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 illustrations] 

Each illustration depicts the following: 
BMD-capable ship; 
BMD sensor; 
Integrated; 
Defended area. 

Option 1: 
The size of the area defended depends on the capabilities and numbers 
of the BMD elements deployed. In this notional case, the defended area 
of two BMD-capable ships is additive. 

Option 2: 
Integrating BMD elements into a system can increase their capability, 
including expanding the defended area. In this notional case, the 
defended area of the same two BMD-capable ships is vastly expanded 
when integrated with a sensor. 

Option 3: 
The geographic location of the BMD elements can impact their 
performance. In this notional case, the defended area of the same 
integrated elements from option 2 is vastly expanded by changing the
location of the sensor. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in Europe: 

Since the President's announcement of EPAA in September 2009, the U.S. 
has made significant progress in advancing cooperative efforts with 
NATO allies on BMD in Europe. Increasing international cooperation on 
BMD is a major focus of the Administration's new approach to BMD. 
According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a benefit of EPAA 
is that it offers increased opportunities for allied participation and 
burden sharing. The U.S. intends to make EPAA its national 
contribution to a future NATO BMD capability and is therefore not 
asking NATO for financial support for EPAA assets. However, the U.S. 
is seeking allied participation and burden sharing for EPAA that may 
be demonstrated in various ways. According to DOD and the State 
Department, burden sharing may come in the form of support for EPAA, 
including adoption of a NATO territorial BMD mission; expansion of 
NATO's command and control system for territorial missile defense; 
bilateral agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets; and contributions of 
allied BMD assets toward an expanded NATO BMD system capability. 

NATO's adoption of the territorial BMD mission at the Lisbon Summit in 
November 2010 fulfilled a major U.S. goal. NATO's prior BMD mission 
was limited to the protection of deployed troops and so was focused on 
defending smaller areas. The shift to a territorial defense mission 
means that NATO's BMD efforts will now focus on protecting much larger 
geographic areas, including population centers and countries. 
Additionally, DOD and State Department officials noted that the 
agreement at Lisbon will help facilitate cooperation with NATO allies 
on hosting U.S. BMD assets and provides justification for allies to 
pursue additional BMD efforts. NATO allies had expressed their support 
for EPAA prior to the Lisbon Summit. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign 
Ministers Meeting in Brussels, NATO welcomed the U.S. adoption of EPAA 
and declared that this approach would further strengthen European 
missile defense work in NATO. Further, the NATO Secretary General 
stated in October 2010 that building a missile defense for Europe was 
important, because missiles are increasingly posing a threat to 
European populations, territory, and deployed forces. 

Although the political endorsement at Lisbon was a significant 
accomplishment, the U.S. and its NATO allies must now overcome the 
difficult task of reaching consensus on how to carry out this new BMD 
mission, including prioritizing what areas to defend and establishing 
command and control relationships. According to DOD, State Department, 
and NATO officials, reaching agreement on these issues will be a 
challenge facing NATO's new territorial missile defense mission. DOD 
and State Department officials told us that reaching such an agreement 
on a bilateral basis can be extremely challenging and time-consuming 
and that reaching consensus with all 28 NATO member nations is 
therefore expected to be even more challenging and time-consuming. 

The U.S. and its NATO allies have already taken steps to address the 
political challenges inherent in multilateral BMD operations by 
beginning to explore and outline potential command and control 
relationships. One venue in which the U.S. and its allies have been 
examining BMD command and control challenges is the biennial U.S. 
Strategic Command-led wargame called Nimble Titan. In 2010, this 
wargame involved notional ballistic missile attack scenarios occurring 
a decade in the future against fictional adversaries. Nimble Titan 
2010 participants came from around the world including representatives 
from many NATO member nations, such as Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and United Kingdom and observers from Belgium, Italy, 
Romania, Turkey, NATO, and Russia.[Footnote 44] One of the outcomes of 
the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame was the development of a document that 
described notional command and control relationships and established a 
framework for coalition BMD concept of operations. Additionally, the 
U.S. has participated in a Dutch-led BMD exercise that, according to 
EUCOM officials, is also helping them to understand and overcome 
command and control challenges. EUCOM officials also told us that 
their command has begun drafting a concept of operations as well. 
However, they emphasized that NATO agreement on a final command and 
control concept of operations would remain a challenge and require 
significant effort. 

At Lisbon, NATO also agreed to expand its missile defense command, 
control, and communications program to incorporate the territorial 
missile defense mission, thereby fulfilling another burden sharing 
goal established by the U.S. The NATO system, called Active Layered 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) is currently designed to 
link allies' missile defense assets together to protect deployed 
forces. Prior to the Lisbon Summit, NATO commissioned technical 
studies that concluded it was feasible to expand ALTBMD capabilities 
to include the territorial missile defense mission. As a result of the 
agreement reached at Lisbon, NATO plans to modify ALTBMD to be the 
command and control backbone into which allied BMD assets will link 
and through which NATO will conduct territorial BMD planning, tasking, 
engagement coordination, and share situation assessment. MDA and 
ALTBMD program officials estimated that an expanded ALTBMD for 
territorial defense would be operational and interoperable with the 
U.S. command and control system, C2BMC, by 2018. NATO and DOD 
officials stated that they do not see major technical challenges in 
meeting the 2018 operational target date for the territorial missile 
defense mission and interoperability with C2BMC. However, GAO did not 
assess the technical feasibility, cost, and schedule of ALTBMD, 
including interoperability with C2BMC. According to NATO, expanding 
ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile defense mission 
would cost less than €200 million or around $260 million over 10 
years, to be paid for through NATO common funding. The Secretary of 
Defense and NATO Secretary General stated that, as such, expansion of 
ALTBMD to include the territorial missile defense mission is not a 
significant financial burden to the alliance. 

The U.S has made progress in negotiating key bilateral agreements for 
allies to host EPAA BMD assets. Romania and Poland have each agreed in 
principle to host an Aegis Ashore facility by 2015 and 2018, 
respectively. The U.S. must reach agreement with Romania and Poland on 
a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement and the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Agreement prior to construction of Aegis Ashore.[Footnote 45], 
[Footnote 46] The U.S. already has supplemental Status of Forces 
Agreements with Romania and Poland that have been ratified by the host 
nations and therefore only lacks ratified Ballistic Missile Defense 
Agreements with both countries. According to State Department 
officials, the U.S. and Romania are in the process of negotiating the 
terms of their Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Poland, having 
negotiated a prior Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement for the 
previously planned European fixed interceptor site, has completed 
negotiations with the U.S. on an amended agreement that adjusts the 
existing agreement's language to accommodate the new plan of 
establishing an Aegis Ashore facility. This revised agreement is now 
awaiting Polish parliamentary ratification.[Footnote 47] The U.S. has 
not yet reached agreement with a nation to host the AN/TPY-2 radar, 
which is a significant component of the first phase of EPAA and 
scheduled to be in place by the 2011 time frame. Although State 
Department officials expressed confidence that the U.S. could reach 
agreement with the yet to be determined host country for AN/TPY-2 in 
2011, they also acknowledged that the U.S does not have control over 
how long it will take to reach bilateral agreements with foreign 
countries or how long it will take foreign countries to bring those 
agreements into force. Additionally, since the U.S. has not yet 
identified where other potential EPAA BMD assets will be based, it is 
unknown what kind of bilateral agreements will be necessary with 
future BMD asset host countries. 

A way in which NATO allies can share the burden in providing 
territorial missile defense of NATO is by contributing their national 
BMD assets; however, the U.S. is thus far the only NATO member nation 
developing BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. BMD 
capabilities currently envisioned for a NATO territorial defense 
mission include point defenses using assets such as Patriot and area 
defenses such as THAAD and Aegis BMD. BMD assets that provide point 
defenses are designed to protect a relatively small area, such as an 
airport or port, primarily against short-range ballistic missiles 
whereas area defense BMD assets are designed to protect much larger 
swaths of territory and usually against medium-range or greater 
ballistic missiles. Territorial defense is thereby provided much more 
efficiently by area defenses than point defenses. For example, in a 
1999 report to Congress,[Footnote 48] DOD reported the same 
territorial area could be protected by either 6 THAAD batteries or 
more than 100 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries. The 
report concluded that the Patriot option was impractical for 
territorial defense. Further, a senior DOD official testified that 
territorial defense of Europe cannot be done using point defenses and 
requires area defenses. Several NATO member nations have BMD point 
defense assets and, should they choose to contribute them to the NATO 
mission, these could be used to defend strategic assets primarily 
against short-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, several NATO 
allies could also contribute sensors to the BMD mission that, if 
compatible and appropriately interoperable, could provide early 
warning data to tracking data that enhances the capability of area 
defense assets.[Footnote 49] However, the U.S. remains the only NATO 
member nation with BMD assets designed to provide area defense needed 
for the NATO territorial BMD mission. 

Although NATO has adopted the territorial defense mission, the current 
fiscal situation of many NATO allies makes it less likely that they 
will start expensive new BMD development programs for area defense. 
Many NATO countries are trying to cut down on government spending due 
to current instability in the European economy, which could cause 
decreases in defense expenditures. In a June 2010 speech, the NATO 
Secretary General recognized the major defense cuts being made across 
NATO nations due to the current fiscal climate and asked allies not to 
make drastic defense budget cuts that would compromise NATO's 
collective security missions. The Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense have also expressed their concern about defense budget cuts in 
NATO nations and the potential impact on NATO. Additionally, NATO and 
DOD officials stated that European countries are not likely to begin 
developing new area defense BMD programs in the near future. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology	And Logistics: 	
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

January 13, 2011: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GA0-11-220, "Ballistic Missile Defense: DoD Needs to Address 
Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in 
Europe," dated December 14, 2010 (GAO Code 351407). 

The DoD concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations and 
partially-concurs with two. The rationale for our position is included 
in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical and 
factual errors for your consideration. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point 
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, 703-697-5385, 
David.Crim@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated December 14, 2010: 
GA0-11-220 (GAO Code 351407): 

"Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs To Address Planning And 
Implementation Challenges For Future Capabilities In Europe" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff provide guidance on European Phased, Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) that describe desired EPAA end states in response to 
concerns raised by key stakeholders. (See page 34/GAO Draft Report) 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Department recognizes the need to 
provide policy guidance on the decisions reached in the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review, including the decision to pursue the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Department has taken steps to 
provide this guidance in the 2012 Guidance for the Employment of the 
Force (GEF), which is nearing completion. Once signed by the 
Secretary, it will provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff, 
Combatant Commanders and other DoD components on end states, strategic 
assumptions and contingency planning, including for EPAA. We expect 
the Secretary will sign this guidance soon. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to oversee and 
coordinate the development of life-cycle cost estimates that would 
provide for the management and oversight of EPAA and allow the 
Department to assess whether its plans for EPAA are affordable and 
determine if corrective actions are needed. (See page 35/GAO Draft 
Report) 

DoD Response: Partially concur. EPAA is an approach not an acquisition 
program. The phased adaptive approach is designed to be flexible and 
match resources to the Combatant Commander's requirements to counter a 
dynamic threat environment. Although the basic overall architecture of 
each phase of the approach is well understood, the ultimate regional 
architecture and force structure, including use of still-in-
development assets such as the Precision Tracking Space System, 
Airborne Infrared system, and advanced Standard Missile-3 
interceptors, is still being refined by the Department. Therefore, the 
Department believes a more effective approach is to prepare BMDS 
program element-specific lifecycle cost estimates and use them to 
inform the management of ongoing acquisition programs and senior-level 
oversight of the phased adaptive approach as BMDS systems are applied 
to the defense of Europe. The MDEB and its supporting Standing 
Committees review BMDS development on a regular basis. BMDS 
programmatic changes are reviewed and approved by the MDEB. Discrete 
BMDS elements make up the capability to be delivered in each of the 
EPAA phases and MDA has a strict process to manage each of these 
component elements through six acquisition baselines (resource (cost), 
schedule, technical, contracts, test, and operational capacity) as 
provided to Congress in the BMDS Accountability Report. Lifecycle cost 
estimates are part of these baselines which are established for each 
BMDS element, and they are reviewed quarterly to ensure appropriate 
execution against the baselines. 

To more accurately reflect the intent of the recommendation, DoD 
recommends that GAO modify this recommendation to read: 

"The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Missile 
Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to oversee and coordinate the 
development of life-cycle cost estimates of the component BMDS 
elements making up the EPAA phases as well as oversee the integrated 
BMDS schedule. This would provide for the management and oversight of 
EPAA for the Department to assess its plans for EPAA." 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate 
the development of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, 
infrastructure, and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA 
implementation risks that need to be considered. (See page 35/GAO 
Draft Report) 

DoD Response: Concur. We agree that acquisition schedules are 
important to managing acquisition programs and agree that the MDEB is 
instrumental in providing senior-level oversight of the phased 
adaptive approach. 

As stated previously, EPAA is an approach not an acquisition program. 
The Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Services establish the 
regional architectures and procurement objectives. MDA has included 
the anticipated PAA requirements into the broader BMDS acquisition 
program while at the same time coordinating with the Joint Staff, 
Combatant Commanders, and Services to refine those requirements over 
time. MDA uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the emerging EPAA 
requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate detail and 
timing within BMDS element-level schedules. Lead Services and the 
Combatant Commanders continue to develop operational and fielding 
schedules to satisfy requirements driven by the dynamic threat 
environment. This adaptive approach is designed to be flexible and to 
match acquisition schedules to the lead Service and Combatant 
Commander's requirements. 

MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate discrete BMDS 
elements which make up the capability to be delivered in each of the 
EPAA phases through six acquisition baselines (resource (cost), 
schedule, technical, contracts, test, and operational capacity). The 
MDEB and its supporting Standing Committees review the BMDS 
development priorities and progress on a bimonthly basis. BMDS 
programmatic changes are reviewed and approved by the MDEB. MDA also 
conducts quarterly (or more frequent if required) Board of Director's 
meetings with senior Service staff to discuss and coordinate Service 
and MDA issues. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with Missile 
Defense Agency, to adopt ballistic missile defense (BMD) operational 
performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these 
metrics into the BMD test programs. (See page 35/GAO Draft Report) 

DoD Response: Concur. The Department recognizes the inherent value of 
measurable BMDS performance metrics. Provided with the warfighter's 
operationally defined metrics, we will crosswalk these metrics to the 
BMD System specification values assessed to be achievable, and whether 
the specifications meet the operational requirements. The US Strategic 
Command currently develops operational performance metrics for the 
warfighter in close coordination with MDA and the BMDS Operational 
Test Agency Team, which is comprised of Joint and Service test 
organizations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director; 
Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-In-Charge; David Best; Cristina Chaplain, 
Laurie Choi; Tana Davis; Gregory Marchand; Wiktor Niewiadomski; Karen 
Richey; Matthew Spiers; Amie Steele; Alyssa Weir; Erik Wilkins-McKee; 
Gwyneth Woolwine; and Edwin Yuen made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face 
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 21, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects 
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-676]. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2010. 

Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 2009. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009. 

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 26, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 13, 2009. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates 
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for 
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces 
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2007. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting 
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between 
Flexibility and Accountability. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-727T]. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates 
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2007. 

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and 
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability 
but Falls Short of Original Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-962R]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-540]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 
2004. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency 
of DOD's Projected Resource Needs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-514]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and 
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-254]. Washington, D.C.: February 
26, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for 
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-600]. Washington, D.C.: August 21, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-597]. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but 
Risks Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce 
Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-631]. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2002. 

Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early 
National Missile Defense Flight Test. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-124]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2002. 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 
Patriot Missiles to Buy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-153]. Washington, D.C.: June 
29, 2000. 

Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 
Revised to Reduce Risk. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-121]. Washington, D.C.: May 
31, 2000. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO previously reported that DOD's $4 billion estimate that 
included the European Interceptor Site in Poland and the European 
Midcourse Radar in the Czech Republic was incomplete. See GAO, 
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009). 

[2] The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defines many of its major BMD 
systems as "elements," including the ship-based Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and 
Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a component of some 
ballistic missile defense elements that is used to destroy an 
adversary's ballistic missile. For example, MDA is currently building 
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be used as a ballistic missile 
defense interceptor as part of the Aegis BMD element. For a further 
listing and description of the elements that may be included as part 
of the revised approach to BMD in Europe, including any associated 
interceptors, see appendix II. 

[3] Ballistic missiles are classified by the distance they can fly as 
follows: Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)--up to 1000 km; Medium- 
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)--between 1000 km and 3000 km; 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)--between 3000 km and 5500 
km; and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)--range over 5500 km. 

[4] Congress mandated in the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234 
(2008) that the Secretary of Defense review and report on United 
States BMD policy, strategy, plans, and programs. In response to this 
direction, and guided by a presidential directive, DOD conducted a 
review and issued the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report in 
February 2010, referred to in this report as the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review. 

[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense: European Phased 
Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and 
Accountability Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 
2010). 

[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides 
Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 
2010). 

[7] GAO, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements 
and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 16, 2009). 

[8] Life-cycle costs are the total cost to the government for a 
program over its full life, consisting of research and development, 
production, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs and are 
helpful in assessing whether a program's cost is affordable. 

[9] Operation plan refers to any plan for the conduct of military 
operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 

[10] Architecture is a framework or structure that portrays 
relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or 
activity. See Joint Publication 1-02. For BMD, this would include the 
type, number, and location of elements and their linkages to each 
other. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. 

[12] The Integrated Master Test Plan is a semiannual MDA document that 
establishes the executable test program for the BMDS. The Integrated 
Master Test Plan is an overarching document that describes the BMDS 
test environment, supporting test organizations, developmental and 
operational test programs, and management of MDA test resources. The 
Integrated Master Test Plan is the definitive source for detailed BMDS 
test planning and execution guidance. 

[13] The Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise effort allows 
missile defense experts from across the Navy to meet regularly to 
discuss EPAA implementation issues and challenges, develop analyses of 
alternatives, and work to identify courses of action and solutions. 

[14] A concept of operations expresses what the joint force commander 
intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available 
resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the 
operation. It is also called commander's concept. See Joint 
Publication 1-02. 

[15] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 26, 2006). 

[16] See the Background section and footnote 4 for more details on the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

[17] The high-level DOD policy and planning documents the officials 
referred to include the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the 
Defense Planning and Programming Guidance, and the Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force is a 
DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that provides, 
among other things, comprehensive, near-term planning guidance and 
overarching policy for global posture, force allocations, and 
contingency planning. The Defense Planning and Programming Guidance is 
a DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that provides 
investment guidance to services and agencies. The Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan is a Joint Chiefs of Staff document that translates 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's overarching policy and 
planning guidance into combatant command direction to prepare specific 
contingency plans. 

[18] For further discussion of EPAA and NATO, including NATO's 
adoption of the territorial missile defense mission, see appendix IV. 

[19] Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, Director, Missile Defense 
Agency, Missile Defense in Europe, statement for the House Armed 
Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009). 

[20] We have previously reported that we were unable to assess MDA's 
actual costs against a baseline for total acquisition costs for BMD 
elements for 7 years in a row because MDA had not baselined such costs 
(GAO-10-311) and that DOD lacked independently verified life-cycle 
cost estimates for BMD elements (GAO-08-1068). GAO, Defense 
Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to 
Strengthen Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 
2010) and GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. 

[22] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

[23] The GAO cost estimating guide [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] refers to programs broadly to 
include not only a specific acquisition program but also projects or 
investments. The guide's applicability includes an investment or 
project that requires special management attention because (1) of its 
importance to the mission of the agency or component of the agency; 

(2) it supports financial management and obligates more than $500,000 
annually; (3) it has significant program or policy implications; (4) 
it has high executive visibility; (5) it has high development, 
operating, or maintenance costs; or (6) it is defined as major by the 
agency's capital planning and investment control process. The cost 
guide is therefore applicable to EPAA. 

[24] The 12 steps for developing credible cost estimates are: (1) 
defining the estimate's purpose; (2) developing the estimating plan; 
(3) defining the project's characteristics; (4) determining the 
estimating approach; (5) identifying ground rules and assumptions; 
(6) obtaining data; (7) developing the point estimate and comparing it 
to an independent cost estimate; (8) conducting sensitivity analysis; 
(9) performing a risk and uncertainty analysis; (10) documenting the 
estimate; (11) presenting the estimate to management for approval; and 
(12) updating the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes. See 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. 

[26] In spiral development, a desired capability is identified but the 
end-state requirements are not yet known. These requirements are 
refined through demonstration and risk management, based on continuous 
user feedback. This approach allows each increment to provide the best 
possible capability. Spiral development is often used in the 
commercial market because it significantly reduces technical risk 
while incorporating new technology. The approach can, however, lead to 
increased cost and schedule risks. Spiral development can also present 
contract challenges due to repeating phases, trading requirements, and 
redefining deliverables. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[27] Congressional Budget Office, Options for Deploying Missile 
Defenses in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009), Institute for 
Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-4359: Independent Assessment of the 
Proposed Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems in Europe 
(Washington, D.C.: July 2008), and Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA 
Paper P-4660: Independent Assessment of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach: Follow-on Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2010). The 
Congressional Budget Office study was prepared at the request of the 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee's 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. The first IDA study was undertaken in 
response to section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). The second IDA study was 
undertaken in response to section 235 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). We 
did not assess these estimates and have not yet obtained the latest 
IDA report from DOD. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. As noted 
earlier, the GAO cost estimating guide refers to programs broadly to 
include not only a specific acquisition program but also projects or 
investments, such as EPAA. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. 

[30] According to a DOD official, the Missile Defense Executive Board 
has performed a program review of the THAAD system and plans to do a 
program review of Aegis BMD. 

[31] The Army Corps of Engineers is assigned as the construction agent 
for most of Europe, including Romania and Poland. DOD Directive 
4270.5, Military Construction, para. 3.2; 4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12, 
2005). As such, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for 
awarding and monitoring construction contracts to build Aegis Ashore 
sites in Romania and Poland by 2015 and 2018, respectively. It is also 
involved in the design of the infrastructure. 

[32] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve 
Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for 
Proposed European Sites, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 
2009). 

[33] According to DOD, it is longstanding DOD policy to make best 
efforts to conclude a binding international agreement documenting the 
host nation's permission for the presence of DOD personnel and 
equipment in its territory as well as adequate status protections for 
such personnel. 

[34] According to the State Department, an agreement enters into force 
when the parties consent to be bound by the agreement, at which point 
the parties are legally obligated to comply with the agreement's 
provisions. Depending on the form of the agreement and the parties' 
domestic requirements, entry into force may require any number of 
events, including signature, ratification, exchange of notes, or some 
combination of these. 

[35] Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the 
obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond for 
site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense 
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach 
to missile defense in Europe until certain conditions are met, 
including host nation signing and ratification of basing agreements 
and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such 
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive 
the restrictions seven days after the Secretary submits to the 
congressional defense committees written certification that the waiver 
is in the urgent national security interests of the United States. 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771]. 

[37] According to the State Department, after the current 
administration came into office in January 2009, the U.S. government 
advised both the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic that the 
U.S. was reviewing its approach to European BMD. From that point 
forward, neither the Czech Republic nor Poland moved their 
ratification process forward while they awaited the U.S. decision 
regarding its approach to BMD in Europe that was announced in 
September 2009 and with the completion of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review in February 2010. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. 

[39] The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for validating 
threats and combat scenarios for DOD. 

[40] Models and simulations are tools used by DOD to represent 
potential BMD configurations, scenarios, and missile threats which are 
difficult to live test because of numerous possible combinations of 
BMD system configurations. Models and simulations allow demonstration 
of BMD system performance and communications without the need to 
expend interceptors and targets. However, to work effectively these 
models and simulations need to be anchored to data from ground and 
flight tests and validated by independent evaluators--the BMDS 
Operational Test Agency--in order to have confidence in their results. 

[41] Ground tests are tests designed to demonstrate element and BMD 
system-level capabilities in a lab environment or assess element 
communication networks between fielded assets. According to MDA 
officials, MDA obtains the vast majority of its information on BMD 
performance through ground tests. 

[42] One of MDA's effectiveness metrics is the Probability of 
Engagement Success (Pes), which is the probability that the BMD system 
will prevent an adversary warhead from carrying out its mission. 

[43] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and 
Missile Threats (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2007). According to Joint 
Publication 3-01, defensive counterair is defined as all defensive 
measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or 
negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly 
airspace. Offensive counterair is defined as offensive operations to 
destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch 
platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and 
after launch, but as close to their source as possible. The goal of 
offensive counterair operations is to prevent the launch of enemy 
aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting 
infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action 
against an adversary. The goal of defensive counterair operations, in 
concert with offensive counterair operations, is to provide an area 
from which forces can operate, secure from air and missile threats. 
Although offensive counterair and defensive counterair are considered 
separate operations, they must be mutually supporting to facilitate 
unity of effort. 

[44] Nimble Titan 2010 participant countries were Australia, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S. Nimble Titan 2010 observers were Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
EADTF (Extended Air Defense Task Force), Italy, Israel, NATO, Norway, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, and Turkey. 

[45] Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the 
obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond for 
site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense 
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach 
to missile defense in Europe until certain conditions are met, 
including host nation signing and ratification of basing agreements 
and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such 
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive 
the restrictions seven days after the Secretary submits to the 
congressional defense committees written certification that the waiver 
is in the urgent national security interests of the United States. 

[46] The supplemental Status of Forces Agreements supplement the 
multilateral NATO Status of Forces Agreement, originally signed on 
June 19, 1951. 

[47] The revised Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement was officially 
submitted by the Polish Prime Minister to the Polish Parliament on 
December 28, 2010, initiating the ratification process. 

[48] DOD, Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture 
Options for the Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 1999). 

[49] We did not assess the technical feasibility of NATO member nation 
BMD systems or these systems' interoperability with U.S. C2BMC or NATO 
ALTBMD. 

[End of section] 

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