GAO-09-181, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command


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Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs 
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2009. 

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Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

February 2009: 

Defense Management: 

Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency 
Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa 
Command: 

Defense Management: 

GAO-09-181: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-181, a report to Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In February 2007, the President directed the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to establish the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to help strengthen 
U.S. security cooperation with African nations and bring peace and 
stability to the continent. For this review, GAO assessed DOD’s (1) 
efforts to establish the command and communicate its mission, (2) 
progress in integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies 
into AFRICOM, and (3) plans and costs for establishing a permanent 
headquarters and supporting offices in Africa. In assessing DOD’s 
efforts to establish AFRICOM, GAO analyzed relevant documentation and 
obtained perspectives from the combatant commands, military services, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State (State), U. S. 
Agency for International Development, and nongovernmental 
organizations. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD declared AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008, and had 
more than 950 military and civilian personnel assigned to the command; 
however, concerns about its planned mission and activities persist. DOD 
created AFRICOM to bring a more cohesive and strategic focus to its 
efforts in Africa. However, initial statements made about its mission 
and the scope of its activity raised concerns among U.S. and African 
stakeholders that AFRICOM could militarize diplomacy and development. 
Since the initial announcement, DOD has taken some steps to clarify its 
mission and in May 2008 published an approved mission statement. But 
concerns persist and DOD has not yet finalized a strategy for future 
communication with the wide range of stakeholders. It will take time 
for concerns generated by the initial announcement to subside and will 
largely depend on AFRICOM’s actions. Unresolved concerns about 
AFRICOM’s intentions could limit support from key stakeholders like 
State and potential African partners. GAO’s prior work shows that a 
communications strategy can help address stakeholder concerns and 
clarify expectations. 

AFRICOM has begun integrating personnel from other U.S. government 
agencies into the command but it has not yet determined the ultimate 
extent of desired interagency representation. DOD officials said that 
integrating personnel will help AFRICOM develop plans that are more 
compatible with U.S. agencies. DOD set some initial personnel goals, 
but continues to revise them. Initially, DOD conceived of a command in 
which about a quarter of the staff (about 125 people) would be from 
other agencies. DOD later reduced the goal to 52 positions, but this 
number is under review and expected to change. These goals did not 
fully consider the perspective of contributing civilian agencies, which 
is important because some face personnel shortages. AFRICOM is now 
taking steps to involve agencies in determining personnel goals, but 
this process does not guarantee commitments from agencies to provide 
personnel. Without agreed-upon interagency personnel commitments, 
AFRICOM could continue to develop unrealistic targets and ultimately 
risk losing the knowledge and expertise of interagency personnel. 

DOD cannot reliably estimate AFRICOM’s total future costs because 
decisions on the locations of a permanent headquarters and supporting 
offices in Africa have not been made. DOD is re-examining its initial 
concept for AFRICOM’s command presence because of concerns over its 
initial headquarters concept, authorities under which it would operate, 
and sensitivities about a U.S. military presence. In the meantime, 
AFRICOM is increasing its representation in some U.S. embassies in 
Africa and spending about $140 million to renovate facilities in 
Stuttgart, Germany, for its interim headquarters. Current cost 
projections exceed $4 billion through 2015, but these estimates do not 
include an operations center or component commands, which could 
increase costs. DOD plans to make decisions in fiscal year 2012 on 
command locations. GAO’s prior work shows that an assessment of 
tangible and intangible benefits and costs can help organizations 
decide between alternatives. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that AFRICOM include three key elements in its 
communications strategy, seek formal commitments for interagency 
personnel, and develop a comprehensive assessment of the possible 
locations of its permanent command headquarters and offices in Africa. 
In responding to a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 
GAO’s recommendations and noted that in some cases it was already 
taking action. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-181]. For more 
information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

AFRICOM Declared Fully Operational but Stakeholder Concerns Persist: 

AFRICOM Has Not Determined Needed Interagency Representation: 

Total Costs to Establish AFRICOM Are Uncertain, and Depend on the 
Location of AFRICOM's Permanent Headquarters and Supporting Offices: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: DOD's Initial Concept for Headquarters Location and 
Command Locations in Africa: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Military, Civilian, and Interagency 
Personnel Planned and Assigned for U.S. Africa Command Headquarters as 
of October 2008: 

Table 2: Embedded Interagency Personnel on AFRICOM staff as of October 
2008: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands and Areas of Responsibility, as 
of December 2008: 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities Being 
Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant Commands: 

Figure 3: AFRICOM's Plans for Interim Headquarters Location and Command 
Presence, as of October 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
State: Department of State: 
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

February 20, 2009: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jeff Flake: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The 2008 National Defense Strategy describes a spectrum of security 
challenges facing the United States that range from violent 
transnational extremist networks to natural and pandemic disasters and 
growing competition for resources. U.S. experiences in Africa, the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq over the last several years have 
demonstrated that U.S. government agencies need to improve the 
coordination and integration of their activities to address security 
challenges. In February 2007, in order to provide a more strategic, 
holistic approach to U.S. military activities in Africa, the President 
directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), a new geographic combatant command that consolidated the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) activities in Africa under one command. 
Previously, these activities had been managed by the U.S. European, 
Central, and Pacific Commands. AFRICOM is primarily focused on 
strengthening U.S. security cooperation with African nations, creating 
opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, and 
enhancing U.S. efforts to bring peace and stability to the 
continent.[Footnote 1] To do this, AFRICOM is integrating personnel 
from other U.S. government agencies into the command structure and is 
considering options to establish a permanent headquarters outside 
Africa as well as placing personnel in Africa. 

The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform requested that we review the establishment of the new 
U.S. Africa Command. In July 2008 we provided testimony to the Chairman 
and Ranking Member on our preliminary observations on DOD's progress 
and challenges associated with establishing AFRICOM.[Footnote 2] We 
testified that the initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed 
by DOD, met resistance from within the U. S. government and African 
countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, 
DOD had encountered some concerns from civilian agencies, African 
partners, and nongovernmental organizations over the command's mission 
and goals. Second, DOD was having difficulties integrating interagency 
personnel in the command, which DOD viewed as critical to synchronizing 
military efforts with other U.S. government agencies. Third, DOD had 
not yet reached agreement with the Department of State (State) and 
potential host nations on the structure and location of the command's 
presence on the continent of Africa. This report expands on the 
information provided in that testimony and makes recommendations to 
enhance DOD's efforts to establish AFRICOM. Specifically, we assessed 
DOD's (1) efforts to establish the command and communicate its mission, 
(2) progress in integrating personnel from other U.S. agencies into 
AFRICOM, and (3) plans and costs for establishing a permanent 
headquarters as well as supporting offices in Africa. 

To assess DOD's efforts in establishing AFRICOM and communicating its 
mission, we met with a variety of DOD officials and reviewed a wide 
range of DOD guidance, plans, directives, speeches, testimony 
statements, and reports. We interviewed officials at State and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to obtain 
other agencies' perspectives on the establishment of the command and 
input into the process. We also interviewed representatives from an 
organization representing U.S.-based international nongovernmental 
organizations for their perspectives on AFRICOM. In addition, we 
interviewed officials from AFRICOM on their efforts to communicate the 
mission of the command to multiple audiences. To assess the extent to 
which AFRICOM has taken steps to improve interagency collaboration, we 
obtained information on its plans and goals for integrating personnel 
from other U.S. government agencies and on its efforts to align its 
plans and activities with federal agencies. To assess DOD's plans to 
establish a permanent headquarters and supporting offices in Africa, we 
obtained information related to the initial and current plans for 
AFRICOM's presence in Africa, including DOD implementation guidance, 
planning documents, budget proposals, and facility renovation plans. We 
conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to February 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD designated AFRICOM fully operational on September 30, 2008, and the 
command has assumed responsibility for DOD activities in Africa; 
however, it continues to face concerns from U.S. government, 
nongovernmental, and African stakeholders about its mission and 
activities, which could limit support for the command. In October 2007, 
AFRICOM began assuming responsibility for existing DOD activities 
conducted by U.S. European, Central, and Pacific Commands in Africa and 
began to staff its headquarters with DOD military personnel, DOD 
civilian personnel, and interagency personnel. DOD subsequently 
approved 1,356 positions for the command's headquarters, of which 639 
are positions that are to be filled by military personnel, 665 are to 
be civilian DOD employees, and 52 are to be filled by non-DOD agencies 
like State and USAID. As of October 2008, about 70 percent (959) of the 
total personnel were assigned to AFRICOM. Most of the military 
personnel were in place, but only about half of the DOD civilians and 
about a quarter of the interagency personnel had been assigned. In 
addition, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Special 
Operations Command have each begun to establish component and theater- 
level commands that will support AFRICOM's operations and will also 
require hundreds of additional personnel. Although DOD declared AFRICOM 
fully operational, concerns surrounding the command's mission and 
activities persist among its various stakeholders. DOD established 
AFRICOM to bring a more cohesive and strategic focus to its activities 
in Africa; however, initial statements about the new command's intended 
mission and scope of its activities met with concerns from U.S. 
government, nongovernmental, and African partner stakeholders. Concerns 
are particularly keen in areas like humanitarian assistance and other 
non-combat activities that involve non-DOD agencies and organizations. 
Their concerns center on the view that AFRICOM could blur traditional 
boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense. In some cases, 
these apprehensions stem from DOD having more resources than other 
agencies and thus could dominate U.S. activities and relationships in 
Africa. In response to the concerns AFRICOM took steps to clarify its 
mission and goals, such as shifting its emphasis from a whole-of-
government approach to more traditional military missions, and AFRICOM 
now has a mission statement that was approved following consultation 
with other U.S. government agencies. Stakeholders remain skeptical 
about AFRICOM's intentions, however. Our previous work suggests that to 
build trust with stakeholders, clarify misperceptions, and create 
shared expectations, a communication strategy can be an effective tool, 
although it alone cannot resolve all concerns. A communication strategy 
should allow for early and frequent communication, ensure a consistent 
message, and encourage two-way communications with stakeholders. DOD 
and the State previously issued guidance on communicating AFRICOM's 
mission to an early AFRICOM planning team and to U.S. embassies in 
Africa, but these documents did not address the full range of AFRICOM's 
stakeholders. According to AFRICOM officials, the command is currently 
developing an approach to address stakeholder concerns and clarify 
expectations for the command, but it is unclear what this approach will 
include or when it will be completed. Until AFRICOM has a 
communications strategy that ensures a consistent message and 
facilitates two-way communication with stakeholders, it may be limited 
in its ability to reduce persistent concerns from U.S. government, 
nongovernmental, and African stakeholders and garner support for the 
command. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Commander, U.S. Africa Command to include all appropriate audiences, 
encourage two-way communication, and ensure consistency of message 
related to AFRICOM's mission and goals as it develops and implements 
its communications strategy. 

AFRICOM has taken initial steps to integrate personnel from other U.S. 
government agencies into the command, but it has not yet determined the 
ultimate extent of interagency representation. AFRICOM has focused on 
integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies into staff, 
management, and leadership positions. According to DOD and AFRICOM 
officials, integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies is 
essential to achieving AFRICOM's mission because it will help AFRICOM 
develop plans and activities that are more compatible with those 
agencies. As of October 1, 2008, AFRICOM had 13 personnel from six 
other agencies assigned to the command, including the Deputy to the 
Commander for Civil-Military Activities, who is from the State. DOD 
continues to revise its interagency personnel goals and has not yet 
determined the total number of interagency positions it will ultimately 
need in the command. Initially, DOD conceived of a command with about a 
quarter of the headquarters staff (roughly 125 people) being filled by 
other agencies, but later reduced this goal once it became clear that 
other agencies would not be able to provide that level of personnel 
support.[Footnote 3] DOD later established a goal of 52 interagency 
personnel for fiscal year 2009, but said that this number would also 
change as the command learned about the skills other agencies could 
provide to the command. Both DOD and AFRICOM officials said that these 
initial personnel goals were notional and not based on an analysis of 
the skill sets needed to accomplish its mission. In addition, agencies 
that would be contributing personnel were not always included in 
developing or reviewing AFRICOM's initial personnel targets, and 
therefore, personnel shortages at some agencies were not fully taken 
into consideration. For example, the State Department, which is facing 
a 25 percent shortfall in mid level personnel, did not have the 
opportunity to provide input until after the personnel target for that 
agency had been established. DOD has officially requested that State 
fill 13 positions at AFRICOM in addition to the 2 it has already 
filled; however, State officials told us that they would not likely be 
able to fill these positions due to personnel shortfalls. Our previous 
work indicates that successful organizations need valid and reliable 
data about the personnel number and skills required to accomplish their 
mission, stakeholder involvement in determining those elements, and 
strategies to address gaps in number and skills. AFRICOM has recently 
begun taking steps to work with other agencies to help identify the 
number of interagency positions by inviting representatives to the 
command to survey the need for their personnel to help carry out the 
mission of the command. Because contributing agencies ultimately decide 
whether or not to provide personnel to fill requested positions, this 
process does not guarantee a commitment to contribute personnel to 
AFRICOM. In addition, AFRICOM officials told us that they had not 
developed action plans or alternative solutions to gain other agencies 
perspectives should interagency positions go unfilled. Without 
including all relevant stakeholders in assessing needed interagency 
skills and obtaining commitments from them, AFRICOM could continue to 
develop unrealistic personnel goals that contributing agencies are not 
able to support or acquire skill sets that are less relevant for its 
mission. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Commander, U.S. Africa Command to seek formal commitments with 
contributing agencies to provide personnel as part of its efforts to 
determine interagency personnel requirements and to develop 
alternatives for how AFRICOM can obtain interagency perspectives in the 
event that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to personnel 
shortfalls in contributing agencies. 

The total future cost for AFRICOM will be significant but remains 
unclear because decisions on the locations of AFRICOM's permanent 
headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa have not been made. 
DOD is re-examining its initial concept for AFRICOM's command presence 
in Africa because issues surrounding the location of AFRICOM's proposed 
headquarters and the authorities under which it would operate caused 
concern with State and several African nations. In the interim, DOD 
located AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and now estimates 
it will spend about $140 million in fiscal years 2007 through 2009 to 
renovate those facilities, which is more than double the initial cost 
estimates. In addition to renovation costs, cost projections exceed $4 
billion through 2015 to operate AFRICOM's interim headquarters, expand 
DOD's presence in 11 U.S. embassies in Africa, and improve existing 
facilities for a combined joint task force in Djibouti. However, these 
projections do not include the costs to establish AFRICOM's permanent 
headquarters or other supporting offices in Africa, a potential joint 
operations fusion center to support the headquarters, or costs 
associated with its new component and theater special operations 
commands.[Footnote 4] DOD officials told us that decisions on command 
locations will have a significant effect on future cost projections. 
DOD does not intend to decide the locations of AFRICOM's permanent 
headquarters and supporting office locations until fiscal year 2012. 
Our prior work provided key business practices that can inform DOD's 
decisions on command locations, such as discussing alternatives with 
key stakeholders to incorporate their insight and conducting an 
analysis of the costs and benefits, both tangible and intangible, of 
potential alternatives. Such considerations include infrastructure 
costs, risks to the effectiveness of DOD operations, and geopolitical 
impact on U.S. relationships with African partners. Until decisions are 
made on the structure and locations of AFRICOM's headquarters and 
supporting offices in Africa, the total investments required for the 
command will remain unclear. The merits of infrastructure investments 
in Germany in the interim may be difficult to assess without knowing 
how long AFRICOM will use these facilities or how they will be used 
after permanent locations are established. We are recommending that the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State as 
appropriate, conduct an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
potential alternative locations for AFRICOM's permanent headquarters 
and supporting offices to help in determining the long-term fiscal 
investment for AFRICOM infrastructure and limit additional expenditures 
on interim AFRICOM infrastructure until decisions are made or 
investment plans developed. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with each of 
our three recommendations, stating that in some cases, actions were 
already underway that would address the issues identified in this 
report. Based on these comments we modified two of our recommendations 
to incorporate DOD's comments. State did not provide written comments 
on our report. In written comments, USAID affirmed its support of 
AFRICOM and stated that it had met its personnel requirements in 
support of AFRICOM. DOD and USAID's written comments appear in their 
entirety in appendix III. 

Background: 

To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates 
geographic combatant commands that conduct missions and activities 
within assigned areas of responsibility (figure 1 illustrates the 
boundaries for each of the geographic combatant commands' areas of 
responsibility). Combatant commands are responsible for a variety of 
functions including tasks such as deploying forces to carry out a 
variety of the missions that range from humanitarian assistance to 
combat operations; providing administration and support, including 
control of resources and equipment and training; and assigning command 
functions to subordinate commanders. Combatant commands are supported 
by service component commands (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) 
and a theater special operations command. Each of these has a 
significant role in preparing the detailed plans and providing the 
resources that the combatant commands need to execute operations in 
support of their mission and goals. On February 6, 2007, the President 
directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a new geographic 
combatant command to consolidate the responsibility for DOD activities 
in Africa that had been shared by U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific 
Command, and U.S. European Command.[Footnote 5] AFRICOM was officially 
established as a sub unified command within the European Command on 
October 1, 2007, and designated fully operational as a separate, 
independent geographic combatant command on October 1, 2008. 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands and Areas of Responsibility, as 
of December 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the geographic combatant commands and areas of 
responsibility, as of December 2008. 

Geographic Combatant Commands and Areas of responsibility include: U.S. 
Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. 
Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; mapCorelCorp., all rights 
reserved. 

[A] The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's Area 
of Responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to 
multiple commands. 

[End of figure] 

In November 2005, DOD directed that stability operations be given 
priority on par with combat operations.[Footnote 6] DOD has defined 
stability operations as an overarching term encompassing various 
military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United 
States in coordination with other U.S. government agencies to maintain 
or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and 
humanitarian relief.[Footnote 7] This new policy emphasized that 
integrating civilian and military efforts is key to successful 
stability operations and it recognized that these types of activities 
will not always be led by the military and that DOD needs to be 
prepared to provide support to both government and nongovernmental 
organizations when necessary. DOD's efforts to address this shift are 
captured in numerous publications and documents, including the 2008 
National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Employment of the Force, 
and guidance for joint operations and joint operation 
planning.[Footnote 8] AFRICOM is primarily focused on this shift toward 
emphasizing the importance of stability operations. Its mission is to 
act in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international 
partners to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to- 
military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military 
operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African 
environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. Some of AFRICOM's 
programs, activities, and operations are either conducted jointly or 
coordinated with State and USAID, and other departments and agencies as 
required. 

According to the President's National Security Policy, defense, 
diplomacy and development comprise three key elements of the U.S. 
foreign policy apparatus. While DOD is responsible for national 
defense, State plans and implements foreign diplomacy, and USAID leads 
foreign development, including efforts to support economic growth and 
humanitarian assistance. For example, in implementing the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership in the countries of northwest Africa, 
State has hosted educational and cultural exchange programs intended to 
marginalize violent extremism; USAID has supported efforts to improve 
education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training 
and distributed equipment to the program's partner countries.[Footnote 
9] Although State and USAID work together closely on strategic and 
program planning, they are independent agencies, both of which 
coordinate with AFRICOM. 

AFRICOM Declared Fully Operational but Stakeholder Concerns Persist: 

On September 30, 2008, DOD declared AFRICOM to be fully operational, 
but the command continues to face persistent concerns from U.S. 
government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and African 
partners over its mission and scope of activities. To establish the 
command, AFRICOM focused on obtaining staff and building the 
capabilities necessary to assume responsibility for all existing DOD 
activities in Africa. DOD, however, continues to face persistent 
stakeholder concerns, such as fears of AFRICOM militarizing foreign aid 
because of initial statements about the new command's intended mission. 
Our previous work suggests that to build trust with stakeholders, 
clarify misperceptions, and create shared expectations, a communication 
strategy can be an effective tool. Although it alone cannot resolve all 
concerns. It will take time for concerns generated by the initial 
announcement to subside and will largely depend on AFRICOM's actions. 
AFRICOM has taken some steps to clarify its mission after it received 
initial pushback from stakeholders and, after consultation with other 
agencies, now has an approved mission statement. But concerns persist 
and DOD has not yet finalized a strategy for future communication with 
the wide range of stakeholders. Until AFRICOM has a strategy that 
ensures a consistent message and facilitates two-way communication and 
that is linked to other U.S. government communication efforts, AFRICOM 
may be limited in its ability to address stakeholder concerns and 
achieve their acceptance and support for the command. 

AFRICOM Has Assumed Responsibility for Existing DOD Missions in Africa: 

After the President announced the creation of AFRICOM, the command 
focused its efforts on building the capabilities necessary to assume 
responsibility for all existing DOD activities inherited from the U.S. 
European, Central, and Pacific Commands without disrupting them or 
other U.S. government and international efforts. To accomplish this 
task, AFRICOM officials created a process to manage the transfer of 
ongoing activities that it had identified within its area of 
responsibility. These activities ranged from efforts to combat HIV/AIDS 
in foreign militaries to programs that provide training opportunities 
for foreign military personnel and include the two largest U.S. 
military activities in Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 
Africa and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara. [Footnote 
10],[Footnote 11] The areas of responsibility and examples of 
activities being transferred to AFRICOM from the U.S. European, 
Central, and Pacific Commands are presented in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility and Examples of Activities Being 
Transferred to AFRICOM from Other Combatant Commands: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the areas of responsibility and examples of 
activities being transferred to AFRICOM from other combatant commands. 

U.S. European Command: 

Number of Countries Involved: 42; 

Examples of Activities Being Transferred: 

* Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara: 

- A series of military-to-military exercises designed to strengthen the 
ability of regional governments to police the large expanses of remote 
terrain in the trans-Sahara; 

* Africa Partnership Station: 

- A program to enhance maritime safety and security through ship 
visits, training and the provision of equipment to African host 
nations;  

* Medical Exercises: 

- Exercises in which U.S. military doctors and other medical personnel 
interchange medical information and techniques with African host nation 
medical personnel and provide humanitarian assistance such as 
immunizations to the population; 

* International Military Education and Training: 

- Program that provides military education, training, and professional 
development to African military personnel on a grant basis through 
funding from the Department of State; 

* Humanitarian Assistance Activities: 

- Various activities including providing HIV/AIDS prevention education 
to African military personnel, drilling wells, improving school 
buildings, and developing infrastructure; 

U.S. Central Command: 

Number of Countries Involved: 7; 

Examples of Activities Being Transferred: 

* Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: 

- One of the two largest military programs in Africa, includes 
operations, training, and humanitarian activities to help nations 
improve their capacity to combat terrorism and prepare for challenges 
such as natural disasters; 

U.S. Pacific Command: 

Number of Countries Involved: 3; 

Examples of Activities Being Transferred: 

* Pacific Endeavor: 

- Workshops that bring nations together to test the compatibility and 
interoperability of their communications systems and assist in their 
integration; 

* Tempest Express: 

- Biannual workshop with multinational military personnel aimed to 
increase the speed of multinational crisis response and improve force 
interoperabily. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; mapCorelCorp., all rights 
reserved. 

[End of figure] 

Beginning in October 2007, AFRICOM began staffing its headquarters with 
DOD military personnel, DOD civilian personnel, and personnel from 
other U.S. government agencies. Officials explained that staffing the 
command's positions was the most critical and limiting factor in the 
process for assuming responsibility for activities in Africa because 
activities could not be transferred without personnel in place to 
execute them. DOD approved 1,356 positions for the command's 
headquarters, of which 639 are positions that are to be filled by 
military personnel, 665 are to be civilian DOD employees, and 52 are to 
be filled by non-DOD agencies like State and USAID. Table 1 illustrates 
the number of authorized and assigned positions as of October 2008. 

Table 1: Number and Percentage of Military, Civilian, and Interagency 
Personnel Planned and Assigned for U.S. Africa Command Headquarters as 
of October 2008: 

Fiscal year 2009: Military; 
Authorized number of positions: 639; 
Number assigned: 628; 
Percentage of authorized positions with personnel assigned: 98. 

Fiscal year 2009: Civilian; 
Authorized number of positions: 665; 
Number assigned: 318; 
Percentage of authorized positions with personnel assigned: 48. 

Fiscal year 2009: Interagency; 
Authorized number of positions: 52; 
Number assigned: 13; 
Percentage of authorized positions with personnel assigned: 25. 

Fiscal year 2009: Total; 
Authorized number of positions: 1356; 
Number assigned: 959; 
Percentage of authorized positions with personnel assigned: 71. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD budget justification materials, Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and AFRICOM documents. 

[End of table] 

In addition to establishing AFRICOM as a combatant command, DOD 
directed the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Special 
Operations Command to establish component command or theater-level 
headquarters that would support the planning and execution of AFRICOM's 
operations. Each of the services and the Special Operations Command has 
either initiated or completed steps to identify the organizational 
structure and resource requirements to establish the various component 
and theater-level commands. For example, in terms of resources, 
personnel requirements for the various component commands range from 
approximately 90 personnel for the Marine Corps to more than 400 for 
the Army.[Footnote 12] Army officials have said that they will likely 
face difficulties in filling positions because of the limited number of 
personnel with the rank or level of experience required due to the high 
demand for these individuals to support operational requirements 
already underway around the world. 

AFRICOM Faces Persistent Stakeholder Concerns about Its Mission: 

AFRICOM continues to face persistent concerns among stakeholders within 
the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, and African 
countries over its mission. Beginning in February 2007, DOD held 
numerous press conferences, briefings, and meetings with State, USAID, 
and African nations in an effort to convey the purpose and goals for 
establishing AFRICOM. According to officials, DOD created AFRICOM to 
bring a more cohesive and strategic focus to its activities in Africa. 
Although DOD often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not 
lead, U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, some State 
officials expressed concerns that AFRICOM would become the lead for 
U.S. government activities in Africa, even though U.S. embassies lead 
decision making on U.S. government non-combat activities conducted in 
African countries. Other State and USAID officials noted that the 
creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, 
development, and defense, thereby militarizing U.S. foreign policy. At 
the same time, however, some saw AFRICOM as a key organization that 
could support other U.S. government activities on the continent. 

An official from an organization that represents U.S.-based 
international nongovernmental organizations told us that many 
nongovernmental organizations shared the perception that AFRICOM would 
further militarize U.S. foreign aid and lead to greater U.S. military 
involvement in humanitarian assistance. An official from another 
nongovernmental organization testified before a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in August 2007 on fears of the military using 
humanitarian assistance for its own purposes. Nongovernmental 
organizations are concerned that this could put their aid workers at 
greater risk if their activities were confused or associated with U.S. 
military activities. In our discussions with USAID officials, they 
stated that these concerns persist within this community. In some 
cases, these concerns stem from the fact that DOD has more resources 
and capacity than other U.S. agencies and could therefore overwhelm non-
DOD agencies' and organizations' activities in Africa. 

Among African countries, there is some apprehension that AFRICOM will 
be used as an opportunity to increase the number of U.S. troops and 
military bases in Africa. African leaders also expressed concerns to 
DOD that U.S. priorities in Africa may not be shared by their 
governments. For example, at a DOD-sponsored roundtable, a group of 
U.S.-based African attachés identified their most pressing security 
issues as poverty, food shortages, inadequate educational 
opportunities, displaced persons, and HIV/AIDS, while they perceived 
U.S. priorities were focused on combating terrorism and weakened 
states. 

AFRICOM has taken some steps to clarify its mission after it received 
initial pushback from stakeholders. For example, initial stakeholder 
concerns led to a shift in how DOD portrayed AFRICOM's mission, moving 
from an emphasis on a whole-of-government approach to a reorganization 
within DOD with an emphasis on traditional military missions, like 
exercises with African militaries. AFRICOM's mission statement also 
went through several iterations between February 2007 and May 2008, 
ranging in its emphasis on humanitarian-oriented activities to more 
traditional military programs. The mission statement was approved 
following DOD's consultation with U.S. government stakeholders, but 
some stakeholders remain skeptical of AFRICOM's intentions. According 
to an official from an organization representing nongovernmental 
organizations, the emphasis on humanitarian assistance as part of 
AFRICOM's mission early on has contributed to their fears that AFRICOM 
would be engaged in activities that are traditionally the mission of 
civilian agencies and organizations. 

Our prior work notes that during large-scale organizational 
transformations, such as the establishment of AFRICOM, a communications 
strategy can be an effective tool for building trust with stakeholders, 
clarifying misperceptions, and creating shared expectations.[Footnote 
13] Such a strategy should include early and frequent communication 
with stakeholders, a consistent message, and two-way communication. By 
communicating early and often, organizations help build an 
understanding of the purpose of planned changes and trust among 
stakeholders. Ensuring that the message is consistent in tone and 
content can help reduce stakeholder misperceptions and uncertainties. 
Encouraging two-way communication that facilitates an honest exchange 
with and allows feedback from stakeholders can help organizations make 
appropriate changes and create effective partnerships that are vital to 
the organization's success. 

DOD and State developed two separate documents to guide U.S. government 
communication on the establishment of AFRICOM, but neither document 
addressed the widely varying interests among U.S. government, 
nongovernmental, and African stakeholders. DOD's initial planning team 
on AFRICOM included in its December 2006 final report a section on 
strategic communications, but this document was focused on government- 
to-government interactions and did not include shaping public 
opinion.[Footnote 14] DOD officials noted that negative public opinion 
in Africa has influenced African governments' public responses. AFRICOM 
officials also noted that this document was also focused more on 
process, rather than the messages that would be communicated. State, 
which has a role in strategic communications through its Office of 
Public Diplomacy and embassies, issued an interagency strategic 
communications strategy in December 2007 for use in U.S. embassies in 
Africa. This document was issued about 10 months after AFRICOM had been 
announced and was facing significant stakeholder concerns. According to 
DOD officials, it emphasized strategic communications tools but did not 
provide guidance on how to use them. Both DOD and State officials noted 
that neither document included efforts to communicate with other U.S. 
government agencies on the establishment of AFRICOM or its mission and 
goals. 

According to AFRICOM officials, the command recognizes the need to 
address persistent concerns and is working on a strategic 
communications approach. However, at the time our review, it was 
unclear what the effort would include or how the views of State and 
other stakeholders would be incorporated. Officials told us that they 
plan to complete this effort in early 2009 but the publication date is 
not firm. Officials told us that the approach will be based on DOD-wide 
guidance on strategic communications and draw on State's interagency 
strategic communications documents. Given the underlying concerns 
inside and outside the U.S. government about AFRICOM and its mission, 
we believe a communications strategy is an important first step in 
reducing stakeholders' concerns, but we also recognize that it alone 
may not be able to resolve all of them. It will take time for concerns 
generated by the initial announcement to subside and will largely 
depend on AFRICOM's actions. Until AFRICOM has a comprehensive 
communications strategy that includes all appropriate audiences, 
encourages two-way communication with stakeholders, and ensures a 
consistent message, the command may continue to be limited in its 
ability to reduce persistent skepticism and garner support for the 
command. 

AFRICOM Has Not Determined Needed Interagency Representation: 

AFRICOM has taken initial steps to improve interagency collaboration, 
focusing mainly on integrating interagency personnel into the command, 
but it has not yet determined the extent of interagency representation 
it ultimately needs. DOD officials have said that embedding personnel 
from other agencies is essential to AFRICOM carrying out its mission 
because it will help its plans and activities to be more compatible 
with other agencies. DOD set some initial interagency personnel goals, 
but they were notional and did not take into consideration perspectives 
or resource constraints of potential contributing agencies. AFRICOM has 
recently taken steps to involve stakeholders by inviting 
representatives to the command to survey the need for their personnel 
in achieving AFRICOM's mission. This process, however, does not 
guarantee that other agencies will commit to filling interagency 
positions. In addition to seeking interagency participation at its 
headquarters, AFRICOM is also adjusting its planning to involve other 
agencies and better align its plans and activities with those agencies. 
Without interagency collaboration and synchronized effort with its U.S. 
government partners, AFRICOM may not be able to achieve the level of 
effectiveness it expects from its plans and activities. 

AFRICOM Has Some Interagency Personnel in Place, but Has Not Yet Fully 
Identified Positions to Be Filled by Other Federal Agencies: 

To facilitate interagency collaboration, AFRICOM initially focused on 
integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies into the 
command, which according to DOD and AFRICOM officials, is essential to 
AFRICOM carrying out its mission. By bringing knowledge of their home 
agencies into the command, personnel from other federal agencies, such 
as USAID and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, are expected 
to improve the planning and execution of AFRICOM's plans, programs, and 
activities and to stimulate collaboration among U.S. government 
agencies. Unlike liaisons in other combatant commands, AFRICOM is 
integrating personnel from other federal agencies into leadership, 
management, and staff positions throughout the command 
structure.[Footnote 15] For example, AFRICOM's Deputy to the Commander 
for Civil-Military Activities, one of two deputies in the command, is a 
senior Foreign Service officer from State. As members of the AFRICOM 
staff, embedded interagency personnel are intended to be involved at 
the beginning of AFRICOM's planning process to help ensure that 
AFRICOM's plans and activities are compatible and aligned with plans 
and activities of other agencies. DOD will reimburse agencies for the 
salaries and expenses for these personnel. 

As of October 1, 2008, AFRICOM had filled 13 embedded interagency 
positions with personnel from six federal agencies into the command, as 
seen in table 2. These positions constitute about 1 percent of 
AFRICOM's authorized headquarters staff level, which is in sharp 
contrast with DOD's original concept of a command with significant 
interagency involvement. 

Table 2: Embedded Interagency Personnel on AFRICOM staff as of October 
2008: 

Agency: Department of State; 
Number of Positions Filled: 2; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Deputy to the Commander for Civil-
Military Activities; 
Director for Outreach. 

Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development; 
Number of Positions Filled: 2; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Deputy Director for Strategy, 
Plans, and Programs; 
Humanitarian Assistance Branch Chief. 

Agency: Department of Homeland Security; 
Number of Positions Filled: 3; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Acting Illicit Traffic Branch 
Chief; 
Operations and Logistics Directorate; 
Strategy, Plans, & Programs Directorate, Engagement Division. 

Agency: Director for National Intelligence; 
Number of Positions Filled: 3; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Unspecified. 

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
Number of Positions Filled: 2; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Treasury Terrorist Finance Policy 
Advisor; 
AFRICOM Liaison Specialist. 

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
Number of Positions Filled: 1; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: Deputy Director for Resources. 

Agency: Total; 
Number of Positions Filled: 13; 
Position Titles for Filled Positions: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO from AFRICOM data. 

[End of table] 

Establishing AFRICOM with interagency involvement is more challenging 
than establishing a command staffed only with DOD personnel because DOD 
has to rely on other federal agencies to help meet its personnel needs. 
Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number 
of personnel required to meet an agency's needs are critical because 
personnel shortfalls can threaten an organization's ability to perform 
missions efficiently and effectively. To build a staff with the 
necessary skills and competencies to accomplish strategic goals, 
successful organizations should involve stakeholders in the workforce 
planning process and conduct systematic assessments and analysis to 
determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve 
results.[Footnote 16] Involving stakeholder agencies in developing 
personnel goals is important for ensuring goals are realistic and for 
gaining stakeholder commitment. Getting buy-in is especially critical 
in an interagency context because DOD cannot compel civilian agencies 
to assign personnel to fill interagency positions in a DOD command. 

Even though AFRICOM has begun integrating interagency personnel into 
the command, it has not yet finalized the number of interagency 
positions it will ultimately need in the command. DOD set some initial 
personnel targets, but continues to revise them. Initially, DOD 
conceived of a command that had about a quarter of its headquarters 
staff filled with personnel from other U.S. government 
agencies.[Footnote 17] After recognizing that agencies would not be 
able to provide that level of personnel support, AFRICOM established a 
new goal of 52 interagency positions for fiscal year 2009, which is 4 
percent of its staff. Both DOD and AFRICOM officials, however, told us 
that this goal will also change as they learn more about what skills 
they need and what other agencies can provide. According to DOD and 
AFRICOM officials, these initial goals were notional and were not based 
on an analysis of specific skill sets needed to accomplish its mission. 

AFRICOM's personnel goals continue to change in part because DOD did 
not always involve stakeholder agencies in developing personnel 
targets. As a result, personnel shortfalls in contributing agencies 
were not fully taken into consideration. State officials said that the 
interagency personnel goals were not evaluated or accepted by those 
agencies that would be providing personnel to AFRICOM and could be 
unrealistic in light of personnel shortfalls in other agencies. For 
example, DOD has requested that State fill 13 mid level positions in 
AFRICOM in addition to the two senior positions already filled. State 
and DOD officials told us, however, that DOD had requested State input 
only after the positions had been established. Moreover, State 
officials told us that they would not likely be able to provide active 
employees to fill the positions requested because they are already 
facing a 25 percent shortfall in mid level personnel. Given these 
shortfalls, State officials are considering alternatives to filling 
positions, such as technological tools, as a way to engage in AFRICOM's 
plans and activities without having to physically locate personnel in 
the command in Stuttgart. 

AFRICOM has recently begun taking steps to involve stakeholder agencies 
in identifying the number of interagency positions and skill sets 
needed in each position. Agencies are now sending representatives to 
AFRICOM on a temporary basis to develop a better understanding of the 
command and its mission, survey the need for their personnel to help 
carry out AFRICOM's mission, and help determine their level of 
participation and the role their personnel could play in the command. 
These representatives work with the AFRICOM staff to identify the skill 
sets for their agencies' personnel within the AFRICOM structure. DOD 
then sends a formal request inviting the contributing agency to provide 
personnel. While this process does allow other agencies to provide 
input into the development of interagency positions, it does not 
guarantee commitments in filling those positions. Contributing agencies 
ultimately decide whether or not to provide personnel after weighing 
DOD's request against their own resource priorities. 

Without taking into consideration stakeholder agencies as it determines 
its level of needed interagency representation, AFRICOM could develop 
unrealistic personnel goals that agencies may not be able to support, 
acquire skill sets that are less relevant for its mission, or be unable 
to obtain commitments from agencies to provide needed skills. Our 
previous work on effective workforce planning recognizes the need for 
strategies to address gaps in critical skills and 
competencies.[Footnote 18] If AFRICOM is not able to fill interagency 
positions or lacks necessary skill sets, AFRICOM risks losing the full 
benefit of the knowledge, skills, and expertise it can derive from 
other federal agencies' personnel, which is the cornerstone of 
interagency collaboration for the command. And even though integrating 
interagency personnel is considered essential to its mission, AFRICOM 
officials told us that they have not developed specific action plans to 
fill needed personnel slots or alternative solutions to address the 
growing likelihood of shortfalls in interagency personnel. 

AFRICOM Is Taking Steps to Involve Other Agencies in Its Strategic 
Planning Process: 

In addition to its efforts to integrate interagency personnel into the 
command, AFRICOM has also taken steps to reach out to other agencies in 
developing its first theater strategy and theater campaign 
plan.[Footnote 19] DOD strategic documents call for collaboration among 
federal agencies to ensure that their activities are integrated and 
synchronized in pursuit of common goals, and DOD guidance notes that 
the quality of DOD planning can improve with early and regular 
involvement from relevant U.S. government agencies. In developing its 
theater campaign plan, AFRICOM is one of the first combatant commands 
to employ DOD's new planning approach to involve other U.S. government 
agencies at the beginning of the planning process and may result in a 
better informed DOD plan for its activities in Africa.[Footnote 20] As 
part of the campaign planning process, AFRICOM met with representatives 
from 16 agencies in a series of workshops in the summer of 2008 
designed to gain interagency input on the plan's strategic end states 
and on how to align the plan with other agencies. For example, 
participants noted that security cooperation activities to enhance 
African military professionalism needed complementary efforts from 
other agencies in law enforcement, judicial, and economic reform. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the end result of this 
process will be a DOD product and not reflect an overarching national 
strategy or whole-of-government approach, one of many current national 
security system issues that are discussed in detail in the November 
2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform.[Footnote 21] 

Our past work indicates that AFRICOM may encounter some challenges as 
it moves forward in seeking to align its plans and activities with U.S. 
government agencies. For example, DOD planning guidance acknowledges 
that U.S. government agencies have their own unique approaches and 
processes for planning, which may be based on different time frames and 
different purposes. Our 2007 report on stability operations also noted 
that a lack of understanding of planning processes and capabilities 
among DOD and other federal agencies and differing planning cultures 
and capacities limited the effectiveness of interagency collaboration 
efforts.[Footnote 22] U.S. Joint Forces Command reported in 2007 that 
military campaign planning assumes a starting point and an established 
end state, which can be compatible with USAID's planning process, but 
other civilian planning is continuous and seeks to achieve certain 
thresholds, such as an acceptable level of criminal activity. In a 2008 
report on the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a multi-agency 
program in Africa led by the State, we found that the program lacked a 
comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide the implementation of 
State, USAID, and DOD activities aimed at strengthening country and 
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of 
extremist ideology in northwest Africa.[Footnote 23] Our work showed 
that, as a result, State, USAID, and DOD developed separate plans 
focused on their respective program activities. Although these plans 
reflected some collaboration, such as in assessing a country's 
development needs, they did not constitute an integrated approach and 
may have hampered the ability of key agencies to collaboratively 
implement their activities. 

In addition, different agencies involved in diplomatic, development, or 
defense activities can have varying strategic priorities based on their 
respective agency missions, and definitions of success can vary. One 
Joint Staff official said that deconflicting differing priorities among 
federal agencies has been a significant challenge over the last few 
years and will likely pose a challenge for AFRICOM in the future. 
Furthermore, according to Joint Forces Command, restrictions exist on 
how funding for many programs can be used, which can result in stove- 
piped funding streams that inhibit the integration of programs and 
activities into comprehensive solutions. Given the differences in 
planning cultures, strategic priorities and definitions of success, the 
outcome of AFRICOM's efforts to involve federal agencies in its 
planning efforts and the ability of AFRICOM to align its plans and 
activities with other agencies remains to be seen. 

Total Costs to Establish AFRICOM Are Uncertain, and Depend on the 
Location of AFRICOM's Permanent Headquarters and Supporting Offices: 

DOD cannot reliably estimate AFRICOM's total future costs because 
decisions on the locations of the permanent headquarters and supporting 
offices in Africa have not been made. AFRICOM has already projected 
that its current plans for an interim headquarters in Stuttgart, 
Germany, and expanded presence in U.S. embassies in Africa could exceed 
$4 billion through 2015. However, the location of AFRICOM's permanent 
headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa will have a 
significant effect on AFRICOM's total future costs. DOD initially 
delayed decisions on its command presence after concerns arose 
surrounding the location of the headquarters, the authorities under 
which some supporting offices would operate, and resistance from a 
number of African countries. DOD has since postponed decisions on 
command locations until fiscal year 2012. Without deciding on the 
locations of AFRICOM's permanent headquarters and supporting offices, 
DOD will be unable to estimate the future costs of the command. 

Future Costs for AFRICOM Are Unknown but Likely Significant: 

AFRICOM's total future costs are still unknown but will likely be 
significant and could expand dramatically once decisions are made on 
the locations of AFRICOM's permanent headquarters and supporting 
offices in Africa. Senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials 
stated that preparing budget estimates for future fiscal years is 
difficult without a clear plan for AFRICOM's headquarters and 
supporting offices because DOD will derive the assumptions it uses to 
estimate future costs from such a plan. 

Current cost estimates for operating AFRICOM's interim headquarters in 
Stuttgart, Germany, and expanding DOD's presence in 11 U.S. embassies 
in Africa already exceed $4 billion for fiscal years 2010-2015; 
however, these estimates do not include potential cost for establishing 
a permanent AFRICOM headquarters or its supporting offices. During this 
time period, DOD projects that AFRICOM will require a total of $2.1 
billion to operate its headquarters, pay for interagency personnel, 
fund improvements to computer and communications systems, conduct 
exercises and training for headquarters personnel, and cover operating 
costs in Africa such as leases and transportation. Facilities costs are 
also projected to be significant. DOD projects that improvements to 
facilities used by AFRICOM personnel in Africa on a temporary basis and 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa will total $2 billion. In 
addition, AFRICOM estimates that the construction of offices and 
housing for AFRICOM personnel in Africa will cost $179 million. 

The infrastructure requirements for AFRICOM's interim headquarters in 
Stuttgart, Germany, have already proved more costly than anticipated. 
Altogether, completed and future renovations for AFRICOM's interim 
headquarters are estimated at $140 million. In fiscal year 2007, DOD 
spent more than $28 million to renovate facilities for AFRICOM's 
interim headquarters. In fiscal year 2008, they spent an additional $62 
million to continue renovating pre-World War II facilities to meet 
minimum military standards, such as providing adequate ventilation and 
asbestos remediation. These renovation costs were more than double the 
initial cost estimates. AFRICOM is projecting future renovations in 
Stuttgart will cost approximately $50 million more. AFRICOM plans to 
keep its headquarters in Stuttgart at least until its permanent 
location is determined in fiscal year 2012. 

Other potential costs are not included in DOD's estimates. For example, 
these estimates do not include constructing a joint operations fusion 
center to support the headquarters and improve coordination and 
collaboration among AFRICOM and key partners, which could cost $200 
million or more to construct; the long term costs to meet health care, 
education, and housing requirements for AFRICOM's soldiers and 
families; or the costs to establish and operate AFRICOM's four service 
component commands and theater special operations command which are not 
included in AFRICOM's initial cost estimates because they are 
considered service expenditures. These costs are expected to be 
substantial, however. 

DOD Postponed Decisions on the Location of AFRICOM's Permanent 
Headquarters and Supporting Offices: 

DOD has scaled back its initial concept for AFRICOM's headquarters and 
regional presence in Africa and postponed making decisions on the 
location of its permanent headquarters and supporting offices until 
fiscal year 2012. Decisions about the ultimate location of AFRICOM's 
permanent headquarters and its supporting offices in Africa will have a 
significant impact on the command's future costs. 

Originally, DOD intended to have a forward headquarters element in 
Africa where the commander would be located, a rear headquarters 
element outside of Africa where the bulk of the staff would be located, 
5 regional offices, and an expanded presence in 11 U.S. embassies in 
Africa. In addition, the military services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Air Force) and the Special Operations Command would establish 
headquarters outside of Africa to provide operational and planning 
support to AFRICOM. DOD's initial concept for AFRICOM is illustrated in 
Appendix II. According to DOD officials, having a command presence in 
Africa would provide a better understanding of the regional environment 
and African needs, help build relationships with Africa partners and 
regional economic communities and associated standby forces, and 
promote a regional dimension to U.S. security assistance.[Footnote 24] 

After encountering resistance from stakeholders on its initial concept, 
AFRICOM shifted its focus to maintaining an interim headquarters in 
Stuttgart, Germany, and establishing 5 new offices in U.S. embassies in 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009. These offices provide in-country management 
support and oversight for U.S. security assistance programs. Figure 3 
illustrates DOD's near term plans for AFRICOM's command presence, 
including its interim headquarters in Stuttgart, component and theater 
supporting commands outside of Africa, and embassy-level offices in 
Africa. 

Figure 3: AFRICOM's Plans for Interim Headquarters Location and Command 
Presence, as of October 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure shows AFRICOM's plans for interim headquarters location and 
command presence, as of October 2008. A map of Africa is accompanied by 
the following information: 

Type of Presence: Headquarters; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Permanent headquarters location 
and structure undetermined; 
- Analysis of alternatives underway for a command headquarters location 
outside of Africa for implementation no earlier than fiscal year 2012; 
- Interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany to serve as its central, 
main operating base through at least fiscal year 2011; 
- No headquarters element located in Africa for the foreseeable future. 

Type of Presence: Supporting Commands; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Establish headquarters for a 
Theater Special Operations Command and four service component commands 
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force); 
- DOD and State are in the process of negotiating locations for these 
headquarters outside of Africa. 

Type of Presence: Country Level; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Establish 11 new offices in U.S. 
embassies by fiscal year 2012; 
- Three new offices approved by State for establishment in fiscal year 
2008; 
- DOD and State negotiating locations for the remaining 8 offices. 

Existing: 
Algeria: 
Botswana: 
Djibouti: 
Ethiopia: 
Ghana: 
Kenya: 
Liberia: 
Morocco: 
Nigeria: 
Senegal: 
South Africa: 
Tunisia: 

Proposed[A]
Angola: 
Cameron: 
Chad: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
Gabon: 
Tanzania: 
Mali: 
Mauritania: 
Niger: 
Rwanda: 
Uganda: 

Refer to accompanying map for further information. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; Copyright Corel Corp. All rights 
reserved (map). 

[A] AFRICOM has not confirmed whether these 11 embassies are the same 
embassies in which it currently intends to establish offices, but is 
still negotiating with State. 

[End of figure] 

AFRICOM postponed decisions on the location of AFRICOM's permanent 
headquarters and supporting offices in Africa after concerns arose 
among its U.S. government stakeholders and African partners. As DOD 
coordinated its initial concept for a headquarters and regional offices 
in Africa with the State, concerns surfaced over where AFRICOM's 
headquarters element in Africa would be located and how the AFRICOM 
commander and State would exercise their respective authorities. 
Although State officials were involved in DOD's early planning teams 
for AFRICOM, the agencies did not reach agreement on a location for 
AFRICOM's proposed headquarters in Africa, and State officials voiced 
concerns about DOD's regional office concept. Locating AFRICOM 
headquarters and supporting offices in Africa requires an international 
agreement with host nations; however, an international agreement may 
not be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the United States 
without prior consultation with the Secretary of State.[Footnote 25] 
One State official who participated in the planning process described 
selecting a headquarters location for AFRICOM as a contentiously 
debated issue between State and DOD. In addition, DOD and State 
officials said that State was not comfortable with DOD's concept of 
regional offices because they would not be operating under the 
ambassador's chief of mission authority and preferred DOD expand its 
presence in U.S. embassies in Africa.[Footnote 26] DOD also experienced 
resistance from some African nations after it announced its intention 
to establish a headquarters on the continent. This resistance was the 
result of concerns over greater U.S. influence in the region and a 
perceived increase in U.S. military troops in the region. 

DOD officials told us that after reviewing a number of alternatives the 
Secretary of Defense decided in October 2008 to delay decisions 
regarding AFRICOM's permanent headquarters until fiscal year 2012. 
According to officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Africa, the Secretary determined that it was 
more important to build relationships at this stage of the command and 
that postponing the decision for three years would allow AFRICOM to 
better understand its headquarters and operational requirements. Our 
prior work has identified key practices that can help agencies identify 
and decide between alternatives, such as those for headquarters' and 
supporting offices' locations, in a manner that promotes stakeholder 
buy-in, maximizes benefits, and minimizes costs given the constraints 
and barriers agencies face. These practices include conducting an 
analysis of potential alternatives to provide a basis for decision 
makers to use in selecting feasible options that meet performance 
goals. An analysis includes quantitative and qualitative estimates of 
the expected tangible and intangible benefits and costs; utilizes 
clearly articulated criteria, methodology, and assumptions; considers 
the potential of each alternative to achieve desired performance goals; 
takes into account the full cost and timeframes of implementation; and 
assesses barriers and risks in implementing each alternative. For 
example, infrastructure costs, effects on the effectiveness of DOD 
operations, and geopolitical impact on U.S. relationships with African 
partners could be taken into consideration in such an analysis. 

Unless DOD understands the costs and benefits of its alternatives, sets 
a long-term strategy based on that analysis, and is judicious in its 
infrastructure and other investments in the meantime, the delays in 
deciding AFRICOM's future locations could unnecessarily drive up 
overall costs. Renovations to the interim headquarters in Stuttgart are 
estimated to cost about $140 million by the time they are completed but 
these interim facilities will not include state-of-the-art 
capabilities, like a fusion center. Until decisions are made on the 
structure and locations of AFRICOM's headquarters and supporting 
offices in Africa, the total investment that the command will require 
will remain unclear and will make it difficult to assess the merits of 
additional investments and create uncertainty about the future of 
AFRICOM. 

Conclusions: 

DOD established AFRICOM with many unanswered questions about what role 
the command would ultimately play in helping to stabilize the African 
continent. The military's large size brings the promise of increased 
resources but has also created worries among some stakeholders about 
potential encroachment into civilian responsibilities like development 
and diplomacy. On one level, AFRICOM can be viewed as an internal 
reorganization of DOD's combatant command structure to clarify lines of 
authority and provide focus on Africa. Early on, however, DOD did not 
effectively reach out to key stakeholders in communicating its plans 
for the command and this contributes to lingering concerns today. While 
DOD has taken steps to clarify AFRICOM's intended goals and mission, 
AFRICOM will also need to demonstrate that its actions are consistent 
with its stated mission. Given the interagency nature of the command 
and its activities, AFRICOM will need to be clear in communications 
with stakeholders, be consistent in message, and listen to stakeholders 
in crafting a message during this period. At a broader level, AFRICOM 
is viewed by many as a test bed for a new focus on interagency 
collaboration in promoting stability in the region. However, AFRICOM 
should not be viewed as the U.S. government's vehicle for creating an 
overarching strategy for Africa or ensuring a whole-of-government 
approach to the region. 

This report addresses three challenges that could affect the ultimate 
success of AFRICOM. First, DOD has not yet fully allayed concerns about 
the command's role and mission both inside the U.S. government and with 
potential African partners. Second, AFRICOM has not yet determined how 
many personnel it needs from other U.S. government agencies or what 
functions they will perform, and interagency planning processes are 
still immature. Third, DOD has not yet decided the locations for 
AFRICOM's permanent headquarters and presence on the continent, or 
agreed upon criteria with stakeholders for making such decisions, 
leaving considerable uncertainty about future costs at a time when 
defense budgets are projected to become increasingly constrained. DOD 
and AFRICOM are working to address these challenges but it is unclear 
when their efforts will be completed. Unless these challenges are 
addressed, the effectiveness of the command may suffer and costs are 
likely to escalate. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To establish a more effective means to communicate with all 
stakeholders, clarify perceptions and create shared expectations of 
what stakeholders can realistically expect from AFRICOM; and to address 
personnel resource constraints of agencies that are intended to fill 
interagency positions in the command, we recommend the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Africa Command to take the following 
two actions: 

* Include all appropriate audiences, encourage two-way communication, 
and ensure consistency of message related to AFRICOM's mission and 
goals as it develops and implements its communications strategy. 

* Seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide 
personnel as part of the command's efforts to determine interagency 
personnel requirements, and develop alternative ways for AFRICOM to 
obtain interagency perspectives in the event that interagency personnel 
cannot be provided due to resource limitations. 

To determine the long-term fiscal investment for AFRICOM's 
infrastructure, we recommend the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, as appropriate, conduct an assessment of 
possible locations for AFRICOM's permanent headquarters and any 
supporting offices in Africa that: 

* is based on transparent criteria, methodology, and assumptions, 

* includes the full cost and time-frames to construct and support 
proposed locations, 

* evaluates how each location will contribute to AFRICOM's mission 
consistent with the criteria and methodology of the study, 

* considers geopolitical and operational risks and barriers in 
implementing each alternative, and: 

* limits expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until 
decisions are made on the long-term locations for the command. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report DOD partially agreed with 
each of our three recommendations, stating that in some cases, actions 
were already underway that would address the issues identified in this 
report. State did not provide written comments on our report. In its 
written comments, USAID affirmed its support for AFRICOM and stated 
that it had met its personnel requirements in support of AFRICOM. DOD 
and USAID's written comments appear in their entirety in appendix III. 

Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Commander, U.S. Africa Command to develop a comprehensive 
communications strategy that includes all appropriate audiences, 
encourages two-way communication, and ensures consistency of message 
related to AFRICOM's mission and goals, DOD partially agreed and stated 
that AFRICOM has already been directed, through existing guidance, to 
develop a comprehensive communications strategy and therefore 
additional direction is not necessary. DOD noted that, subsequent to 
our draft report, AFRICOM has developed a Strategic Communications 
Roadmap and Instruction guidance and a strategic communications annex 
to its Theater Campaign Plan that is under development. DOD's response 
also indicated that these documents had not yet been released but did 
not provide any detail about the content of these documents or the 
extent to which they address the specific elements outlined in our 
recommendation. Therefore, until they are completed and released, we 
have no basis for determining whether they will address the issues 
raised in our report or the intent of our recommendation. We believe 
our recommendation is still warranted, but we modified it to emphasize 
that DOD's communications strategy that is currently being developed 
should include all appropriate audiences; encourage two-way 
communication; and ensure consistency of message related to AFRICOM's 
mission and goals. 

In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Commander, AFRICOM, as it develops its interagency personnel 
requirements, to develop an action plan with contributing agencies to 
fill agreed-upon interagency positions and, as necessary, develop 
alternative approaches to obtain perspectives and expertise from other 
U.S. government stakeholders to mitigate any interagency personnel 
shortfalls, DOD partially agreed and stated that AFRICOM has been 
working with all potential contributing agencies to fill identified 
positions, and therefore an action plan is not needed. To address 
potential shortfalls in contributing agencies' ability to fill 
positions, DOD commented that the command has directed two of its 
directorates to work on such issues as they arise. As stated in our 
report, we acknowledge that AFRICOM has involved other agencies in 
identifying interagency requirements and is refining its processes for 
determining interagency goals for the command. However, we also point 
out that AFRICOM's approach does not guarantee a commitment from 
contributing agencies to fill identified positions, and significant 
personnel shortfalls exist in some agencies such as State which can 
limit their contributions to AFRICOM's personnel requirements. DOD's 
response provides little information as to how the department will 
obtain specific commitments from other agencies for meeting interagency 
personnel requirements or outline alternative ways for AFRICOM to 
obtain interagency perspectives. We continue to believe a more formal 
approach is needed to achieve these objectives and have modified our 
recommendation to more clearly reflect our position. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, conduct an 
assessment of possible locations for AFRICOM's permanent headquarters 
and any supporting offices in Africa that (1) is based on transparent 
criteria, methodology, and assumptions; (2) includes the full cost and 
time-frames to construct and support proposed locations; (3) evaluates 
how each location will contribute to AFRICOM's mission consistent with 
the criteria and methodology of the study; (4) considers geopolitical 
and operational risks and barriers in implementing each alternative; 
and (5) limits expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until 
decisions are made on the long-term locations for the command. In its 
comments, DOD stated that it plans to use those broader criteria in its 
decision. However, DOD comments did not address how its plans to limit 
expenditures on temporary AFRICOM infrastructure until long term 
decisions are made. Given the significant and growing costs associated 
with AFRICOM's temporary stationing and DOD's intent to apply the 
elements listed in the recommendation in future decisions for the 
command's headquarters and supporting offices in Africa, we believe 
that our recommendation is still warranted. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from the issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; 
the Secretary of State; the Administrator, United States Agency for 
International Development; and the Director, Office of Management and 
Budget. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

John H. Pendleton Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess DOD's efforts to establish the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) and address stakeholder concerns, we reviewed a wide range of 
Department of Defense (DOD) and command documentation including AFRICOM 
guidance, plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and 
reports; implementation plans and directives for creating its new 
mission organizations; and documentation related to DOD's efforts to 
create the new command. We also spoke with various officials involved 
in the command's implementation efforts about their roles, related 
plans, and actions. When possible, we met with the command and other 
organizations' senior leadership to discuss and obtain their views on 
various command issues. Specifically within DOD, we interviewed 
officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Undersecretary of Defense 
Comptroller; the Joint Staff; the Services; two Geographic Combatant 
Commands (European Command and Africa Command); and U.S. Joint Forces 
Command. We also interviewed officials at the Department of State's 
Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, and 
the Office of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, as well as 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
obtain other agencies' perspectives regarding DOD's process of 
establishing the command and the inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in 
establishing of the command. In these interviews, we reviewed relevant 
information and discussed implementing guidance for establishing the 
command and the range of stakeholder concerns, the interviewees' 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities in establishing the 
command, progress in establishing the command, and challenges that have 
been encountered. To gain an understanding of African perspectives, we 
interviewed U.S. government agencies that worked with representatives 
of African governments on issues related to AFRICOM. Finally, we 
interviewed InterAction, an organization that represents U.S.-based 
international governmental organizations on these organizations 
perspectives on AFRICOM's mission and goals. 

To assess the extent to which AFRICOM has taken steps to improve 
interagency collaboration, we obtained information on its plans and 
goals for integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies and 
on its efforts to align its plans and activities with other federal 
agencies. We interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of State, 
and USAID. Within DOD, we spoke with officials from the AFRICOM 
transition team, the U.S. Africa and Joint Forces Command, the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Joint Staff. 
During these interviews, we obtained information on AFRICOM's initial 
and current interagency personnel targets; the process for identifying 
positions and requesting personnel from other agencies, including 
memorandums of agreement and position descriptions; personnel systems; 
and host nation agreements. We also received documentation on Joint 
Forces Command's interagency mission analysis, including preliminary 
reports, and on AFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan, including briefings, 
guidance, and workshop proceedings. During interviews with the 
Department of State and USAID, we discussed their personnel resource 
shortfalls and their roles in providing input to AFRICOM's interagency 
personnel goals, its plans and activities, and Joint Forces Command's 
interagency mission analysis. 

To assess DOD's plans to establish a permanent headquarters and 
supporting offices in Africa, we obtained information related to the 
initial and current plans for AFRICOM's presence in Africa, including 
DOD implementation guidance, planning documents, budget proposals, and 
facility renovation plans. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the 
Department of State, and InterAction, an organization representing U.S.-
based international nongovernmental organizations. Within DOD, we 
interviewed officials from the AFRICOM transition team; the U.S. 
European and Africa Commands; the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Undersecretary of Defense 
Comptroller, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; the Joint Staff; 
and the U.S. Army Installation Management Command. During these 
interviews, we received information on the status of DOD's 
determination of an initial and future command headquarters location, 
locations for its components' headquarters and its determination of a 
presence in Africa. We also discussed its process for making these 
determinations, its plans for their implementation, their anticipated 
budget implications, and feedback DOD has received from stakeholders. 
During interviews with the Department of State officials we discussed 
the agency's involvement in the determination of AFRICOM's command 
locations, its role in negotiating an AFRICOM presence outside of the 
United States, and its views on various alternatives for AFRICOM's 
command presence. Finally, we interviewed InterAction, and during those 
interviews we discussed the positions of nongovernmental organizations 
on AFRICOM's presence in Africa and relevant feedback these 
organizations have received from representatives of African nations. We 
did not, however, consult directly with representatives of African 
nations to elicit their views on AFRICOM's command presence in Africa. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: DOD's Initial Concept for Headquarters Location and 
Command Locations in Africa: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure shows DOD's initial concept for headquarters location and 
command locations in Africa. 

Type of Presence: Headquarters; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Permanent headquarters location 
and structure undetermined; 
- Analysis of alternatives underway for a command headquarters location 
outside of Africa for implementation no earlier than fiscal year 2012; 
- Interim headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany to serve as its central, 
main operating base through at least fiscal year 2011; 
- No headquarters element located in Africa for the foreseeable future. 

Type of Presence: Supporting Commands; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Establish headquarters for a 
Theater Special Operations Command and four service component commands 
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force); 
- DOD and State are in the process of negotiating locations for these 
headquarters outside of Africa. 

Type of Presence: Country Level; 
New Term Plan for AFRICOM Presence: * Establish 11 new offices in U.S. 
embassies by fiscal year 2012; 
- Three new offices approved by State for establishment in fiscal year 
2008; 
- DOD and State negotiating locations for the remaining 8 offices. 

Existing: 
Algeria: 
Botswana: 
Djibouti: 
Ethiopia: 
Ghana: 
Kenya: 
Liberia: 
Morocco: 
Nigeria: 
Senegal: 
South Africa: 
Tunisia: 

New: 
Angola: 
Cameron: 
Chad: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
Gabon: 
Tanzania: 
Mali: 
Mauritania: 
Niger: 
Rwanda: 
Uganda: 

Refer to accompanying map for further information. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data; Copyright Corel Corp. All rights 
reserved (map). 

[A] AFRICOM has not confirmed whether these 11 embassies are the same 
embassies in which it currently intends to establish offices, but is 
still negotiating with State. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2400 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2400: 

International Security Affairs: 

January 1, 2009: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-09-181, "Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address 
Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine 
Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command," (GAO Code 
351071/GAO-09-181). 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide you the information you 
requested. Our detailed response is attached. 

Please contact us if we can provide any additional information. 

My point of contact on this issue is Mr. Dan Pike at (703) 614-0421 or 
electronic mail address: dan.pike@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Theresa Whelan:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs:  

Attachment: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report — Dated December 23, 2008 GAO Code 351071/GAO-09-181:  

"Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, 
Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated 
with the U.S. Africa Command" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Commander, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) to develop a 
comprehensive communications strategy that includes all appropriate 
audiences, encourages two-way communication, and ensures consistency of 
message related to AFRICOM's mission and goals. 

DOD Response: Partially concur — The Secretary of Defense directed 
USAFRICOM in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF, Page 37) 
dated May 1, 2008 to develop a comprehensive communications strategy. 
Therefore, this recommendation for the Secretary of Defense to re-
direct the commander is not necessary. Subsequent to the GAO request 
for information, USAFRICOM has developed a Strategic Communications 
(SC) Roadmap and Instruction guidance as well as appropriate SC annexes 
for USAFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan, which is currently being staffed 
and will be released upon the commander's approval. 

Recommendation 2: As U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) develops its 
interagency personnel requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct USAFRICOM to also develop an action plan with 
contributing agencies to fill agreed-upon interagency positions and, as 
necessary, develop alternative approaches to obtain perspectives and 
expertise from other U.S. government stakeholders to mitigate any 
interagency personnel shortfalls. 

DOD Response: Partially concur - USAFRICOM, in line with OSD guidance, 
has been working with all potential contributing agencies to continue 
plan development to fill those positions as stated in the 
recommendation. Therefore there is no need for the Secretary of Defense 
to direct USAFRICOM to develop an action plan. As for developing 
alternative approaches to mitigate agency shortfalls, USAFRICOM has 
directed two of its directorates (Outreach and Resource) to work such 
issues as they arise. This includes working with inter- agency partners 
when identifying personnel shortfalls. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, conduct an assessment of 
possible locations for U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) permanent 
headquarters and any supporting offices in Africa that: 

* is based on transparent criteria, methodology, and assumptions: 

* includes the full cost and timeframes to construct and support 
proposed locations; 

* evaluates how each location will contribute to USAFRICOM's mission 
consistent with the criteria and methodology of the study; 

* considers geopolitical and operational risks and barriers in 
implementing each alternative, and; 

* limits expenditures on temporary USAFRICOM infrastructure until 
decisions are made on the long-term locations for the Command. 

DOD Response: Partially concur – DoD has been in consultations with the 
Department of State on potential USAFRICOM locations in Africa since 
November 2006 using similar criteria. When DoD takes up this issue for 
re-evaluation in 2011, DOD should, in collaboration with the Department 
of State, use this broader criteria to identify possible overseas 
locations as the permanent headquarters location in Africa. The 
decision, however, on USAFRICOM's permanent headquarters location 
resides with the Secretary of Defense. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

January 27, 2009: 

John Pendleton:
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled Defense 
Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve 
Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the 
U.S. Africa Command (GAO-09-181). USAID has been supportive of Africa 
Command from its inception by providing initial and sustained planning 
assistance in determining the Command's mission and development 
personnel requirements. We are also pleased to report that USAID has 
met its personnel requirement for Africa Command. We look forward to a 
continued partnership with Africa Command as it addresses military to 
military requirements for a more secure Africa. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 
review. 

Sincerely,

Drew Luten: 
Acting Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue. NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
[hyperlink, http://wmw.usaid.gov]

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Robert L. Repasky, Assistant 
Director; Tim Burke; Leigh Caraher; Taylor Matheson; Amber Simco; Grace 
Coleman; Ron La Due Lake and Lonnie McAllister made key contributions 
to this report. 

[End of section] 

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Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2008. 

Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and 
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-947T]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 2008. 

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Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve 
Corps. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-39]. 
Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2007. 

Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve 
Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future Operations. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-228T]. Washington, 
D.C.: October 30, 2007. 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability 
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-549]. Washington, D.C.: May 
31, 2007. 

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Protection Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
07-200NI]. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007. 

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Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
852]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. 

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Command to Strengthen Implementation of Its Many Missions and 
Organization. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-
847]. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006. 

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Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 
21, 2005. 

21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to Meet Current and 
Emerging Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
05-830T]. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 
Military Capabilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-70]. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2004. 

Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce 
Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-39]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003. 

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-669]. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003. 

Overseas Presence: More Data and Analysis Needed to Determine Whether 
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[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] A security cooperation activity is defined as military activity 
that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational 
environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises 
that the U.S. military conducts with other nations to improve mutual 
understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or 
potential coalition partners. These activities are designed to support 
a combatant commander's theater strategy. 

[2] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and 
Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 15, 2008). 

[3] AFRICOM's initial interagency personnel goal was based on a 
headquarters size of 500-600 personnel; therefore, one quarter would be 
approximately 125 people. 

[4] AFRICOM will have four service component commands and a theater 
special operations command. They are: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF); U.S. 
Naval Forces, Africa; U.S. Marine Forces, Africa; U.S. Air Forces 
Africa Command; and Special Operations Command, Africa. 

[5] AFRICOM's area of responsibility will include the African continent 
and its island nations, with the exception of Egypt. Egypt will remain 
within U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, and AFRICOM and 
U.S. Central Command will have overlapping but distinct relationships 
with Egypt, which will be addressed under separate memorandum of 
agreement. 

[6] DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stabilization, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, 
D.C. November. 28, 2005). 

[7] Joint Publication 1-02, DOD's Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, D.C. September. 2008). 

[8] Guidance for Employment of the Force (May 2008), Joint Publication 
3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, D.C. September. 2006), and Joint 
Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.: December. 
2006). 

[9] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation 
of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 31, 2008). 

[10] The Horn of Africa countries include Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen. The Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa was formed to work with Horn of Africa 
governments to promote capacity building, support professionalization 
of militaries, and counter the proliferation of terrorism. 

[11] Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara is designed to strengthen 
the ability of regional governments to police large expanses of remote 
terrain in the Trans-Sahara. 

[12] The staff for these component commands are in addition to the 
staff the military departments are providing for the headquarters. For 
example, in fiscal year 2009, Department of Army is providing 260 
personnel for AFRICOM headquarters and approximately 400 personnel to 
staff its component command to support AFRICOM. 

[13] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003). 

[14] DOD defines strategic communication as focused U.S. government 
efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, 
strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of 
U.S. government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of 
coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products 
synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. 
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, D.C. September. 
2006). 

[15] AFRICOM also has several non-DOD personnel in non reimbursable 
liaison positions, such as the Foreign Policy Advisor and the 
Humanitarian Assistance Advisor. 

[16] GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Workforce 
Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] 
(Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003). 

[17] AFRICOM's initial interagency personnel goal was based on a 
headquarters size of 500-600 personnel; therefore, one quarter would be 
approximately 125 people. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]. 

[19] A theater strategy outlines concepts and courses of action for 
achieving the objectives established in national policies and 
strategies through the synchronized and integrated use of military 
forces and other instruments of national power. See Joint Publication 1-
02. A theater campaign plan encompasses the activities of a geographic 
combatant command and translates national or theater strategy into 
operational concepts and those concepts into unified action. See Joint 
Publications 1-02 and 5-0. 

[20] DOD planning guidance provides for a process that enables 
combatant commands to attain headquarters level involvement of other 
departments and agencies in DOD campaign and contingency plans. AFRICOM 
is one of two combatant commands that will be the prototype test cases 
for campaign planning. Guidance for Employment of the Force (May 2008). 

[21] Project on National Security Reform, Forging A New Shield, 
(Arlington, VA: Nov 26, 2008) 

[22] GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's 
Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 2007). 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. 

[24] Africa has 5 regional economic communities, which are the Arab 
Magreb Union in the north, the Economic Community of West African 
States, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Inter- 
Governmental Authority on Development in the east, and the Southern 
African Development Community. The African Union, a continent-wide 
intergovernmental organization, established the African Standby Force, 
which has 5 regional brigades corresponding to each of the regional 
economic communities. The African Standby Force is intended to conduct 
peacekeeping operations. 

[25] 1 U.S.C. § 112b(c). 

[26] A Chief of Mission is the principal officer, usually the 
ambassador, in charge of a U.S. diplomatic mission abroad, and has full 
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 
U.S. government executive branch employees in that country. See 22 
U.S.C. § 3927. 

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