This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-267 
entitled 'Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises 
Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan 
National Security Forces' which was released on February 12, 2009.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

January 2009: 

Afghanistan Security: 

Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns 
about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces: 

GAO-09-267: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-267, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security 
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of 
State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. 
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 
million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International 
donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account 
for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. 
GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, 
reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan 
officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory 
records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons. 

What GAO Found: 

Defense did not establish clear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow 
when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan 
National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in 
accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its 
own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, 
it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under 
U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC A did not maintain complete 
records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured 
weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could 
not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain 
records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with 
recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records 
for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. 
Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were 
primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. 
During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but 
indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing 
and other factors. 

Despite CSTC-A’s training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard 
and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have 
deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish 
accountability practices. CSTC-A’s policy is not to issue equipment 
without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures 
are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units’ 
ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major 
accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute 
to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including 
illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not 
begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. 

Figure: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to 
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008): 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

Weapons category: Rifles; 
Quantity shipped: 117,163. 

Weapons category: Pistols; 
Quantity shipped: 62,055. 

Weapons category: Machine guns; 
Quantity shipped: 35,778. 

Weapons category: Grenade Launchers; 
Quantity shipped: 18,656. 

Weapons category: Shotguns; 
Quantity shipped: 6,704. 

Weapons category: Rocket-propelled grenade launchers; 
Quantity shipped: 1,620. 

Weapons category: Mortars and other weapons; 
Quantity shipped: 227. 

Weapons category: Total; 
Quantity shipped: 242,203. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

To improve weapons accountability, GAO recommends the Secretary of 
Defense (1) establish clear accountability procedures, including serial 
number tracking and routine physical inventories, for weapons in U.S. 
control and custody; (2) direct CSTC A to assess and verify each ANSF 
unit’s capacity to safeguard and account for weapons; and (3) provide 
adequate resources to CSTC-A to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in 
equipment accountability matters. Defense concurred with these 
recommendations, but did not state when the shortcomings we identified 
would be addressed. State provided no comments. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-267]. For more 
information, contact Charles M. Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 
johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons: 

Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and 
Account for Weapons: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: International Donations Obtained for ANSF by CSTC-A: 

Appendix III: Timeline of Key Weapons Accountability Events: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Quantities and Estimated Value of Weapons Provided by 
International Donors for ANSF (June 2002 through June 2008): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Weapons Obtained for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and 
International Donations by Calendar Year (June 1, 2002-June 30, 2008): 

Figure 2: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to 
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008): 

Figure 3: Accountability Process for Weapons Provided to ANSF by the 
United States and International Donors: 

Figure 4: Timeline of Key Events Relating to Accountability for ANSF 
Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June 2002 to January 2009): 

Abbreviations: 

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces: 

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan: 

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 

FMS: Foreign Military Sales: 

IPO: International Programs Office: 

SAO: security assistance organization: 

USASAC: U.S. Army Security Assistance Command: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 30, 2009: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

As part of international efforts to train and equip the Afghan National 
Army and the Afghan National Police, collectively referred to as the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the U.S. Department of Defense 
(Defense) obtained and provided or intends to provide about 380,000 
small arms and light weapons[Footnote 1], as well as other equipment 
and supplies. Defense and 21 donor nations report the value of these 
weapons at over $223 million. Given the unstable security conditions in 
Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is 
significant. 

The United States has provided most of the U.S.-procured weapons to 
Afghanistan using an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program,[Footnote 2] which is managed by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in cooperation with other U.S. military 
organizations, including the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
(USASAC) and the Navy International Programs Office (IPO).[Footnote 3] 
Defense purchased weapons using funds appropriated by Congress for the 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, funds drawn down under authority 
provided in the Afghan Freedom Support Act, and Foreign Military 
Financing funds.[Footnote 4] The Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a joint service, coalition organization under the 
command and control of Defense's U.S. Central Command, is primarily 
responsible for the training and equipping of ANSF with support from 
the Department of State (State).[Footnote 5] As part of that 
responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the 
United States and international donors and distributes them to ANSF 
units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for conducting U.S. 
government security assistance activities in Afghanistan, including 
monitoring the end use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive 
equipment. 

At your request, we reviewed the accountability for weapons that 
Defense obtained, transported, stored, and distributed to ANSF. 
[Footnote 6] In particular, we examined (1) whether Defense can account 
for weapons intended for ANSF, and (2) the extent to which CSTC-A has 
ensured that ANSF can properly safeguard and account for weapons and 
other sensitive equipment issued to ANSF. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed 
officials from Defense, U.S. Central Command, CSTC-A, USASAC, and Navy 
IPO. On the basis of records provided to us, we compiled detailed 
information on weapons reported as shipped to CSTC-A in Afghanistan by 
the United States and other countries from June 2002 through June 2008. 
We traveled to Afghanistan in August 2008 to examine records and meet 
with officials at CSTC-A headquarters, visit the two central depots 
where the weapons provided for ANSF are stored, and meet with staff at 
an Afghan National Army unit that had received weapons.[Footnote 7] 
While in Afghanistan we attempted to determine the location or 
disposition of a random sample of weapons in order to reach general 
conclusions about CSTC-A's ability to account for weapons purchased by 
the United States for ANSF.[Footnote 8] We also discussed equipment 
accountability with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of 
Defense and Interior, the U.S. Embassy, and contractors involved in 
building ANSF's capacity to account for and manage its weapons 
inventory.[Footnote 9] We also met with officials from Defense's Office 
of Inspector General to discuss an audit it had completed relating to 
weapons accountability in Afghanistan during 2008 and reviewed the 
related report.[Footnote 10] 

We performed our work from November 2007 through January 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. A detailed description of 
our scope and methodology is included in appendix I of this report. 

Results in Brief: 

Defense did not provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel as to what 
accountability procedures applied when handling, transporting, and 
storing weapons obtained for the ANSF, resulting in significant lapses 
in accountability for these weapons. Although Defense has 
accountability procedures for its own weapons, including tracking by 
serial number and conducting routine physical inventories, it did not 
clearly establish to what extent these procedures would apply to 
weapons obtained for ANSF. USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete 
inventory records for an estimated 87,000 weapons--or about 36 percent-
-of the 242,000 weapons that the United States procured and shipped to 
Afghanistan from December 2004 through June 2008.[Footnote 11] For 
about 46,000 of these weapons USASAC and CSTC-A could not provide 
serial numbers, and for an estimated 41,000 weapons with recorded 
serial numbers,[Footnote 12] CSTC-A did not maintain any records of 
their location or disposition. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not maintain 
reliable records, including serial numbers, for any of the weapons it 
obtained from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008, 
which, according to CSTC-A, totaled about 135,000 weapons. Lapses in 
accountability occurred throughout the supply chain. For example, 
during the transportation of U.S.-procured weapons into Afghanistan, 
USASAC and Navy IPO did not provide serial number information to CSTC- 
A to verify receipt. Additionally, after receiving weapons in Kabul, 
CSTC-A did not record their serial numbers or routinely conduct 
physical inventories at the central depots where the weapons were 
stored. This was primarily due to a lack of clear direction from 
Defense and staffing shortages. Although the weapons were in CSTC-A 
control and custody until they were issued to ANSF units, U.S. Central 
Command and CSTC-A officials did not have a common understanding of 
when the weapons were considered formally transferred to ANSF and thus 
no longer subject to Defense accountability procedures. During the 
course of our review, USASAC indicated that it would begin recording 
serial numbers for all weapons it procures for ANSF, and in June 2008 
CSTC-A established standard operating procedures to track weapons by 
serial number in Afghanistan and began conducting routine physical 
inventories of the weapons stored at the central depots. However, CSTC- 
A has indicated that its continued implementation of these new 
accountability procedures is not certain, considering staffing 
constraints and other factors. 

Despite CSTC-A training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and 
account for weapons. As a result, weapons CSTC-A has provided to ANSF 
are at serious risk of theft or loss. Also, CSTC-A did not begin 
monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15 
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. 

* Development of ANSF equipment accountability. CSTC-A's policy is not 
to issue equipment to ANSF without verifying that appropriate supply 
and accountability procedures are in place. Recognizing the need for 
weapons accountability at ANSF units, CSTC-A and State have deployed 
hundreds of U.S. military trainers and contract mentors to help the 
Afghan army and police establish equipment accountability practices, 
among other things. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF 
units' ability to safeguard and account for weapons and other 
equipment, contract mentors have reported extensively on major ANSF 
accountability weaknesses. Contractors and CSTC-A officials have 
attributed these weaknesses to a variety of cultural and institutional 
problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance from 
Afghan ministries. 

* End use monitoring. According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured 
weapons and sensitive equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use 
monitoring, which is meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF 
is using equipment for its intended purposes. DSCA has published end 
use monitoring guidance that calls for, among other things, intensive 
controls over sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices, 
which are considered dangerous to the public and U.S. forces in the 
wrong hands.[Footnote 13] In May 2008, CSTC-A developed an end use 
monitoring plan and began implementing it in July 2008, but has not had 
sufficient staff to conduct the monitoring envisioned. CSTC-A also 
began monitoring the end use of sensitive and potentially dangerous 
night vision devices in October 2008--15 months after it had first 
issued them to the Afghan National Army. Of the 2,410 devices issued, 
10 are currently unaccounted for, according to CSTC-A. DSCA had not 
ensured that the appropriate end use monitoring was performed for these 
devices because it was not aware that CSTC-A had purchased them. To 
address this matter, DSCA and CSTC-A have established procedures to 
prohibit CSTC-A's procurement of weapons and sensitive equipment in- 
country without DSCA involvement. 

We are making several recommendations to help improve accountability 
for weapons and other sensitive equipment that the United States 
provides to ANSF. In particular, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense (1) establish clear accountability procedures for weapons while 
they are in the control and custody of the United States and direct 
USASAC, CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing 
these weapons to track all weapons by serial number and conduct routine 
physical inventories; (2) direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and 
verify each ANSF unit's capacity to safeguard and account for weapons 
and other sensitive equipment before providing such equipment, unless a 
specific waiver or exception is granted; and (3) devote adequate 
resources to CSTC-A's effort to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in 
equipment accountability matters. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to Defense 
and State. Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided 
additional information on its efforts to help ensure accountability for 
weapons intended for the ANSF. However, Defense did not state when it 
planned to address the shortcomings we identified. Defense also 
provided technical corrections, which we incorporated into the report 
as appropriate. State did not provide comments. 

Background: 

From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government provided 
approximately $16.5 billion for the training and equipping of Afghan 
National Security Forces. State and Defense officials told us they will 
request over $5.7 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police 
in fiscal year 2009. The goal of these efforts is to transfer 
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international 
community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, from June 
2002 through June 2008, CSTC-A obtained about 380,000 small arms and 
light weapons from the United States and other countries for the Afghan 
army and police. The United States purchased over 240,000 of these 
weapons for about $120 million and shipped them to Afghanistan 
beginning in December 2004. Also, CSTC-A reported that it coordinated 
the donation of about 135,000 additional weapons from 21 countries, 
which valued their donations at about $103 million (see appendix II). 
[Footnote 14] Figure 1 illustrates the number of weapons obtained for 
ANSF by USASAC, Navy IPO, and international donors since June 2002. 
[Footnote 15] 

Figure 1: Weapons Obtained for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and 
International Donations by Calendar Year (June 1, 2002-June 30, 2008): 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Calendar year: 2002 (June 1 -December 31): 
U.S. procured: None; 
International donations: 2,644. 

Calendar year: 2003; 
U.S. procured: None; 
International donations: 29,480. 

Calendar year: 2004[A]; 
U.S. procured: 137; 
International donations: 6,741. 

Calendar year: 2005; 
U.S. procured: 21,013; 
International donations: 42,087 

Calendar year: 2006; 
U.S. procured: 79,837; 
International donations: 19,474. 

Calendar year: 2007; 
U.S. procured: 70,023; 
International donations: 34,874. 

Calendar year: 2008 (January 1 -June 30)[B]: 
U.S. procured: 71,193; 
International donations: 6. 

Source: GAO analysis of USASAC, Navy, and CSTC-A data. 

[A] Includes 137 U.S.-procured weapons: 

[B] Includes 60 weapons from international donors: 

[End of figure] 

The United States and international donors have provided rifles, 
pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers, and other weapons. About 80 percent of the U.S.- 
procured weapons were "non-standard" weapons, which are not typically 
supplied by Defense.[Footnote 16] Many non-standard weapons, including 
about 79,000 AK-47 rifles,[Footnote 17] were received from former 
Warsaw Pact countries or were obtained from vendors in those countries. 
(See figure 2 for details on U.S.-procured weapons shipped to 
Afghanistan for ANSF.) 

Figure 2: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to 
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008): 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

Weapons category: Rifles; 
Quantity shipped: 117,163. 

Weapons category: Pistols; 
Quantity shipped: 62,055. 

Weapons category: Machine guns; 
Quantity shipped: 35,778. 

Weapons category: Grenade Launchers; 
Quantity shipped: 18,656. 

Weapons category: Shotguns; 
Quantity shipped: 6,704. 

Weapons category: Rocket-propelled grenade launchers; 
Quantity shipped: 1,620. 

Weapons category: Mortars and other weapons[A]; 
Quantity shipped: 227. 

Weapons category: Total; 
Quantity shipped: 242,203. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[A] This category includes missile and rocket launchers. 

[End of figure] 

USASAC and Navy IPO procured most of the 242,000 weapons for ANSF 
through an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program 
referred to by Defense as "pseudo-FMS." As in traditional FMS, pseudo-
FMS procurements are overseen by DSCA. However, in contrast to 
traditional FMS procurements, for Afghanistan, Defense primarily used 
funds appropriated by the Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund to purchase weapons to train and equip ANSF.[Footnote 18] USASAC 
procured about 205,000 (85 percent) of these weapons, including about 
135,000 non-standard weapons purchased from four U.S.-based 
contractors. Navy IPO provided the remaining 37,000 (15 percent) M-16 
rifles for the Afghan National Army. 

After procuring weapons for ANSF, Defense or its contractors 
transported them to Afghanistan by air, and CSTC-A received the weapons 
at Kabul International Airport.[Footnote 19] The Afghan National Army 
transported the weapons from the airport to one of two central storage 
depots in Kabul--one for the Afghan National Army and another for the 
Afghan National Police.[Footnote 20] Due to the limited operational 
capacity of the Afghan army and police and the extremely hostile 
environment in which they operate, CSTC-A retains control and custody 
of the weapons provided by the United States and international donors 
during storage at the central depots until the weapons are issued to 
ANSF units. In addition to maintaining the security and control of 
weapons stored at the central depots, CSTC-A trains ANSF in inventory 
management and weapons accountability. To this end, the central depots 
are staffed by U.S. and coalition military personnel, U.S. contractors, 
contract Afghan staff, and ANSF personnel. 

According to DSCA officials, equipment provided to ANSF is subject to 
end use monitoring,[Footnote 21] which is meant to provide reasonable 
assurances that the ANSF is using the equipment for its intended 
purposes. CSTC-A serves as the security assistance organization (SAO) 
for Afghanistan, with responsibility for monitoring the end use of U.S.-
procured weapons and other equipment provided to ANSF, among other 
security assistance duties.[Footnote 22] 

DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual provides guidance for end 
use monitoring, which is classified as either "routine" or "enhanced," 
depending on the sensitivity of the equipment and other factors, as 
follows:[Footnote 23] 

* Routine end use monitoring. For non-sensitive equipment provided to a 
trusted partner, DSCA guidance calls for SAOs to conduct routine 
monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance 
duties. As such, according to DSCA officials, DSCA expects SAOs to 
record relevant end use monitoring observations made during 
interactions with host country military and defense officials, such as 
visits to defense facilities, meetings or telephone conversations, 
military ceremonies, and dignitary visits. 

* Enhanced end use monitoring. For sensitive defense articles and 
technology transfers made within sensitive political situations, DSCA 
guidance calls for more intensive and formal monitoring. This includes 
providing DSCA with equipment delivery records with serial numbers, 
conducting routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial 
number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results. 

Figure 3 illustrates the accountability process for weapons that CSTC- 
A provides to ANSF. 

Figure 3: Accountability Process for Weapons Provided to ANSF by the 
United States and International Donors: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

Acquisition: 
* USASAC and Navy IPO procure weapons. 

Transport: 
* Defense and its contractors ship weapons to Kabul by air; 

* Afghan army transfers weapons to central storage depots in Kabul. 

Storage: 
* CSTC-A manages two central storage depots (one for Afghan army and 
one for police); 
* CSTC-A obtains weapons from international donors. 

Distribution: 
* CSTC-A issues weapons to Afghan army and police units. 

Monitoring: 
* CSTC-A is responsible for conducting end use monitoring. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by Defense and CSTC-A. 

[End of figure] 

Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons: 

Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability 
procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons 
obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international 
donations. As a result, our tests and analysis of inventory records 
show significant lapses in accountability for these weapons. Such 
accountability lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process. 
First, when USASAC and CSTC-A initially obtained weapons for ANSF, they 
did not record all the corresponding serial numbers. Second, USASAC and 
CSTC-A did not maintain control or visibility over U.S.-procured 
weapons during transport to the two ANSF central storage depots in 
Kabul. Third, CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory 
records or perform physical inventories of weapons stored at the 
central depots. Finally, inadequate U.S. and ANSF staffing at the 
central depots along with poor security and persistent management 
challenges have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to 
theft or misuse. These lapses have hampered CSTC-A's ability to detect 
weapons theft or other losses. CSTC-A has recently taken steps to 
correct some of the deficiencies we identified, but CSTC-A has 
indicated that its continued implementation of the new accountability 
procedures is not certain, considering staffing constraints and other 
factors. 

Lack of Clear Accountability Procedures: 

Defense did not clearly establish what accountability procedures 
applied to the physical security of weapons intended for ANSF. As a 
result, the Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for 
ANSF, including DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC- 
A, did not have a common understanding of what accountability 
procedures to apply to these weapons while they were in U.S. control 
and custody. 

Defense guidance on weapons accountability lays out procedures for 
Defense organizations to follow when handling, storing, protecting, 
securing, and transporting Defense-owned weapons.[Footnote 24] These 
procedures include (1) serial number registration and reporting and (2) 
100 percent physical inventories of weapons stored in depots by both 
quantity and serial number at least once annually. The objective of 
serial number registration and reporting procedures, according to 
Defense guidance, is to establish continuous visibility over weapons 
through the various stages of the supply process, including "from the 
contractor to depot; [and] in storage."[Footnote 25] However, Defense 
did not specifically direct U.S. personnel to apply these or any 
alternative weapons accountability procedures for the weapons in their 
control and custody intended for ANSF, and CSTC-A officials we spoke to 
were uncertain about the applicability of existing Defense guidance. 

In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
emphasized the importance of safeguarding weapons in accordance with 
existing accountability guidance until they are formally transferred to 
ANSF, stating that "the security of conventional [arms, ammunition, and 
explosives] is paramount, as the theft or misuse of this material would 
gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and 
installations world-wide."[Footnote 26] However, in October 2008, 
Defense's Inspector General reported that U.S. Central Command had not 
clearly defined procedures for accountability, control, and physical 
security of U.S.-supplied weapons to ANSF, and as a result, 
misplacement, loss, and theft of weapons may not be prevented.[Footnote 
27] The Inspector General recommended, among other things, that U.S. 
Central Command issue formal guidance directing the commands and forces 
in its area of responsibility, including CSTC-A, to apply existing 
Defense weapons accountability procedures. U.S. Central Command and the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred 
with this recommendation. Nonetheless, U.S. Central Command officials 
we spoke to in December 2008 did not have a common understanding of 
when formal transfer of the weapons to ANSF is considered to have 
occurred, and hence up to what point to apply Defense accountability 
procedures, if at all. As of December 2008, U.S. Central Command had 
not decided what new guidance to issue. 

In July 2007, we made Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq aware 
that they had not specified which accountability procedures applied for 
weapons provided to Iraq under the train-and-equip program in that 
country.[Footnote 28] To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches 
the Iraqi security forces as intended, we recommended that the 
Secretary of Defense determine which accountability procedures should 
apply to that program. In January 2008, the Congress passed 
legislation[Footnote 29] requiring that no defense articles may be 
provided to Iraq until the President certifies that a registration and 
monitoring system has been established and includes, among other 
things, the serial number registration of all small arms to be provided 
to Iraq, and a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and 
distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq 
Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program.[Footnote 
30] 

USASAC and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Complete Inventory Records for 
Weapons: 

On the basis of our data analysis and tests of weapons inventory 
records, we estimate that USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete 
records for about 87,000 weapons--about 36 percent of over 242,000 
weapons they procured for ANSF and shipped from December 2004 through 
June 2008.[Footnote 31] For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC did not 
maintain serial number records--information fundamental to weapons 
accountability--and for an estimated 41,000 weapons, CSTC-A did not 
maintain documentation on the location or disposition, based on our 
testing of a random sample of available serial number records.[Footnote 
32] Weapons for which CSTC-A could not provide complete accountability 
records were not limited to any particular type of weapon or a specific 
shipment period. Records were missing for six of the seven types of 
weapons we tested and from shipments made during every year from 2004 
to 2008.[Footnote 33] 

In addition, CSTC-A did not maintain complete or reliable records for 
the weapons it reported it had obtained from international donations 
from June 2002 through June 2008. According to CSTC-A, this totals 
about 135,000 weapons. 

Lapses in Accountability Began When Weapons Were Obtained: 

USASAC and Navy IPO records indicate that they procured over 242,000 
weapons and shipped them to Afghanistan from December 2004 through June 
2008. However, USASAC did not record and maintain the serial numbers 
for over 46,000 of the weapons it purchased.[Footnote 34] USASAC's 
records were incomplete because it did not require contractors to 
submit serial numbers for non-standard weapons they provided--a 
standard practice in traditional Foreign Military Sales. In July 2008, 
USASAC indicated that it would begin recording serial numbers for all 
weapons it procures for ANSF. (See appendix III for a timeline of key 
events relating to accountability for ANSF weapons and other sensitive 
equipment.) However, as of December 2008 USASAC had not yet included 
provisions in its procurement contracts requiring the vendors of 
nonstandard weapons to provide these serial numbers. 

Furthermore, CSTC-A did not record the serial numbers for the weapons 
it received from international donors and stored in the central depots 
in Kabul for eventual distribution to ANSF. In a July 2007 memorandum, 
the Commanding General of CSTC-A noted that for international donations 
there was "no shipping paperwork to confirm receipt, and equipment was 
not inventoried at arrival for validation." By not recording serial 
numbers for weapons upon receipt, USASAC and CSTC-A could not verify 
the delivery and subsequent control of weapons in Afghanistan. In July 
2008, CSTC-A began to record serial numbers for all the weapons it 
received, including U.S.-procurements and international donations. 
However, CSTC-A had indicated that its continued recording of serial 
numbers was not certain. In the standard operating procedures it 
established in July 2008, CSTC-A indicated that it would record these 
numbers "if conditions are favorable with enough time and manpower 
allotted to inventory." In December 2008, CSTC-A officials told us that 
to date they were fully implementing these new procedures. 

Defense and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Control or Oversight of Weapons 
during Transport or Document Title Transfer: 

USASAC, Navy IPO, CSTC-A, Defense shippers, and contractors have been 
involved in arranging the transport of U.S.-procured weapons into Kabul 
by air. However, these organizations did not communicate adequately to 
ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during 
transport. In particular, according to CSTC-A officials: 

* USASAC and Navy IPO did not always provide CSTC-A with serial number 
records for weapons shipped to Afghanistan against which CSTC-A could 
verify receipt.[Footnote 35] 

* Defense shippers sometimes split weapons shipments among multiple 
flights, making it difficult for CSTC-A to reconcile partial shipments 
received at different times with the information the suppliers provided 
for the entire order. 

* Suppliers did not always label weapons shipments clearly, leading to 
confusion over their contents and intended destinations. 

* CSTC-A did not always send confirmation of its receipt of weapons to 
the supplying organizations. 

Without detailed information about weapons shipments it was difficult 
for USASAC, Navy IPO, and CSTC-A to detect discrepancies, if any, 
between what weapons suppliers reported as shipped and those CSTC-A 
received. 

According to CSTC-A, when weapons arrived at the Kabul Afghanistan 
International Airport, CSTC-A personnel typically identified and 
counted incoming pallets of weapons but did not count individual 
weapons or record serial numbers. CSTC-A then temporarily gave physical 
custody of the weapons to the Afghan National Army for unescorted 
transport from the airport to the central depots in Kabul. Because CSTC-
A did not conduct physical inventory checks on weapons arriving at the 
airport, due to security concerns at that facility, CSTC-A had limited 
ability to ensure that weapons were not lost or stolen in transit to 
the depots. 

After the Afghan National Army transported weapons to the central 
depots, CSTC-A did not document the transfer of title for weapons to 
ANSF. Since no Afghan officers were present at the depots to take 
possession of the weapons, CSTC-A personnel received the weapons and 
processed them into inventory for storage. Although Defense did not 
provide direction to CSTC-A on how and when to transfer title to ANSF, 
CSTC-A officials told us they considered title transfer to have 
occurred, without any formal documentation, when information about the 
weapons was typed into computer inventory systems at the central 
depots. In February 2008, a revision to DSCA's Security Assistance 
Management Manual called for U.S. government officials delivering 
equipment to a foreign nation under pseudo-FMS to keep documentation 
showing when, where, and to whom delivery was made and report this 
information to the military organization responsible for procurement. 
[Footnote 36] CSTC-A officials told us that they were not certain 
whether this revised guidance applied to ANSF weapons and therefore 
have not provided any title transfer documentation to USASAC or Navy 
IPO, the procuring organizations. However, regardless of how and when 
title passed to ANSF and how title transfer was documented, because 
ANSF officials were not present at the depots to take possession, CSTC-
A retained control and custody of the weapons at the depots. 

CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Inventory Controls or Adequate Security at 
Storage Depots: 

CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records for 
weapons at the central storage depots and allowed poor security to 
persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A did not track all weapons at the 
depots by serial number or conduct routine physical inventories. 
Moreover, CSTC-A could not identify and respond to incidents of actual 
or potential compromise, including suspected pilferage, due to poor 
security and unreliable data systems. Specific gaps in accountability 
controls include the following: 

* Incomplete serial number recording. For over 5 years, CSTC-A stored 
weapons in the central depots and distributed them to ANSF units 
without recording their serial numbers. In August 2007, nearly 10 
months after CSTC-A's Commanding General mandated serial number 
control, CSTC-A began registering weapons by serial number as they were 
issued to ANSF units.[Footnote 37] While this established some 
accountability at the point of distribution, thousands of weapons under 
CSTC-A control had no uniquely identifiable inventory record. CSTC-A 
initiated comprehensive serial number tracking in July 2008, recording 
the serial numbers of all weapons in inventory at that time and 
beginning to register additional weapons upon receipt at the central 
depots. Nonetheless, CSTC-A officials told us that staff shortages made 
serial number recording challenging. 

* Lack of physical inventories. CSTC-A did not conduct its first full 
inventory of weapons in the central depots until June 2008. Without 
conducting regular physical inventories, it was difficult for CSTC-A to 
maintain accountability for weapons at the depots and detect weapons 
losses. 

* Poor security. CSTC-A officials have reported concerns about the 
trustworthiness of Afghan contract staff and guards at the central 
depot that serves the Afghan National Army. We also observed 
deficiencies in facility security at this depot, including Afghan 
guards sleeping on duty and missing from their posts. Demonstrating the 
importance of conducting physical inventories, in June 2008, within 1 
month of completing its first full weapons inventory, CSTC-A officials 
identified the theft of 47 pistols from this depot. CSTC-A officials 
also told us that a persistent lack of CSTC-A and responsible ANSF 
personnel at the central depots had increased the vulnerability of 
inventories to pilferage. 

* Unreliable inventory information systems. The information systems 
CSTC-A uses for inventory management at the central depots are 
rudimentary and have introduced data reliability problems. CTSC-A 
officials told us that for items received before 2006, they had only 
"limited data" from manual records at the Afghan National Army central 
depot. In 2006, CSTC-A's contractor installed a commercial-off-the- 
shelf inventory management database system. However, the system permits 
users to enter duplicate serial numbers, allowing data entry mistakes 
to compromise critical data. Furthermore, due to a limited number of 
user licenses, multiple users enter information using the same account, 
resulting in a loss of control and accountability for key inventory 
management records. CSTC-A also established an Excel spreadsheet record-
keeping system in 2006 for the central depot where Afghan National 
Police weapons are stored. However, training of Afghan National Police 
personnel at that depot has not yet begun, and training Afghan National 
Army personnel in the use of depot information systems has been 
problematic due to illiteracy and a lack of basic math skills. In a 
report about operations at the central depot that serves the Afghan 
National Army, CSTC-A's logistics training contractor noted that only 
"one in four [Afghan National Army personnel] have the basic education 
to operate either the manual or automated systems." 

Staffing and Other Management Challenges at Storage Depots Increased 
Weapons Vulnerability: 

According to CSTC-A, inadequate staffing of U.S. and Afghan personnel 
at the central storage depots along with persistent management concerns 
have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to theft or 
misuse. Although CSTC-A originally envisioned that ANSF would assume 
responsibility for the majority of central depot operations, ANSF has 
not asserted ownership of the central depots as planned, leaving U.S. 
personnel to continue exercising control and custody over the stored 
weapons. In addition, CSTC-A officials told us this resulted in 
ambiguities regarding roles and responsibilities and increased risk to 
stored weapons supplies. Specific challenges in this area include the 
following. 

* Difficulty providing adequate U.S. staff to maintain full 
accountability. CSTC-A officials told us that the increasing volumes of 
equipment moving through the central depots had compounded the 
management challenges they faced, which included insufficient U.S. 
personnel on site to keep up with the implementation of equipment 
accountability procedures. They specifically cited staff shortages as 
having limited CSTC-A's capacity to conduct full depot inventories, 
maintain security, and invest in the training of ANSF personnel. 

* Lack of accountable Afghan officers and staff. CSTC-A accountability 
procedures call for ANSF officers to be on site at the central depots 
to take responsibility for ANSF property. However, according to CSTC-A, 
the Afghan ministries did not consider the central depots to be ANSF 
facilities, given the high level of CSTC-A control. Thus, ANSF was 
reluctant to participate in central depot operations and did not post 
any officers or sufficient Afghan staff to the depots. According to 
CSTC-A officials, these problems resulted in ambiguities regarding 
roles and responsibilities at the central depots and placed an 
increased burden on limited U.S. forces to fulfill mandatory 
accountability and security procedures. 

* Difficulties raising the capacity of ANSF depot personnel. According 
to CSTC-A officials, efforts to develop the capabilities of ANSF 
personnel to manage the central depots have been hampered by the lack 
of basic education or skills among ANSF personnel and frequent turnover 
of Afghan staff. As of December 2008, no Afghan National Police 
personnel have been trained at the police depot. Contractors 
responsible for Afghan National Army equipment accountability training 
told us that their efforts have been hampered by the Afghans' 
reluctance to attend training and by a lack of basic literacy and math 
skills needed to carry out depot operations. CSTC-A officials also told 
us that their embedded military trainers were frequently unable to 
focus on training and mentoring at the Afghan National Army depot, 
given their operational imperatives. 

Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and 
Account for Weapons: 

CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and 
contract mentors to help ANSF units, among other things, establish and 
implement equipment accountability procedures. Although CSTC-A has 
instituted a system for U.S. and coalition military trainers to assess 
the logistics capacity of ANSF units, they have not always assessed 
equipment accountability capabilities specifically. However, as part of 
their reporting to CSTC-A and State, contract mentors have documented 
significant weaknesses in the capacity of ANSF units to safeguard and 
account for weapons. As a result, the weapons CSTC-A has provided are 
at serious risk of theft or loss. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not begin 
monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15 
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army Units. 

CSTC-A Has Sponsored Training for ANSF on Weapons Accountability: 

CSTC-A has recognized the critical need to develop ANSF units' capacity 
to account for weapons and other equipment issued to them. In February 
2008, CSTC-A acknowledged that it was issuing equipment to Afghan 
National Police units before providing training on accountability 
practices and ensuring that effective controls were in place. In June 
2008, Defense reported to the Congress that it was CSTC-A's policy not 
to issue equipment to ANSF units unless appropriate supply and 
accountability procedures were verified.[Footnote 38] 

As of June 2008, CSTC-A employed over 250 U.S. military or coalition 
personnel and contractors to advise ANSF on logistics matters, 
including establishing and maintaining a system of accountability for 
weapons. CSTC-A has also helped the Afghan Ministries of Defense and 
Interior establish decrees, modeled after U.S. regulations, requiring 
ANSF units to adopt accountability procedures. These procedures include 
tracking weapons by serial number using a "property book" to record 
receipt and inventory information, and conducting routine physical 
inventories of weapons. CSTC-A and State, with support from their 
respective contractors, MPRI and DynCorp, have conducted training for 
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police personnel on the 
implementation of these decrees.[Footnote 39] CSTC-A has also assigned 
contract mentors and U.S. and coalition embedded trainers to work 
closely with property book officers and other logistics staff in ANSF 
units to improve accountability practices. In addition, State assigns 
contract mentors to monitor Afghan National Police units that have 
received accountability training. These mentors visit the units and 
evaluate, among other things, the implementation of basic 
accountability procedures and concepts, such as maintenance of property 
books and weapons storage rooms. We previously reported that Defense 
has cited significant shortfalls in the number of fielded embedded 
trainers and mentors as the primary impediment to advancing the 
capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces.[Footnote 40] According to 
information provided by CSTC-A officials, as of December 2008, CSTC-A 
had only 64 percent of the 6,675 personnel it required to perform its 
mission overall and only about half of the 4,159 mentors it required. 

CSTC-A Has Not Consistently Assessed ANSF Accountability Capacity, but 
Significant Weaknesses Have Been Reported: 

While CSTC-A has established a system for assessing the logistics 
capacity of ANSF units, it has not consistently assessed or verified 
ANSF's ability to properly account for weapons and other equipment. 

* Afghan National Army. As Afghan National Army units achieve greater 
levels of capability, embedded U.S. and coalition military trainers are 
responsible for assessing and validating their progress.[Footnote 41] 
Trainers used various checklists in 2008 to assess and validate Afghan 
National Army units. One checklist we reviewed addressed seven 
dimensions of logistics capacity and performance, but did not 
specifically mention accountability for weapons or other equipment. The 
assessment category in the checklist most relevant to equipment 
accountability was a rating on whether a unit "understands the [the 
Ministry of Defense] logistical process and utilizes it with reasonable 
effectiveness." Another checklist we reviewed addressed 15 dimensions 
of "sustainment operations" and was used to assess units' overall 
demonstration of logistics management capacity and "ability to 
effectively receive, store, and issue supplies." However, the checklist 
did not address weapons or equipment accountability specifically. 
Furthermore, more detailed notes accompanying the completed checklists 
we reviewed provided virtually no information on equipment 
accountability as a factor in the logistics ratings the CSTC-A training 
team assigned to the unit. 

* Afghan National Police. CSTC-A has also introduced a monthly 
assessment tool to be used by its mentors to evaluate Afghan National 
Police capability and identify strengths and weaknesses.[Footnote 42] 
Prior to June 2008, CSTC-A did not specifically evaluate the capacity 
of police units to account for weapons and other equipment. CSTC-A 
changed the format of its police assessment checklist to specifically 
address four dimensions of equipment accountability. According to the 
reformatted assessments we reviewed, as of September 30, 2008, some 
trained and equipped Afghan National Police units had not yet 
implemented accountability procedures required by the Afghan Ministry 
of Interior. These assessments indicated that of the first seven police 
districts to receive intensive training and weapons under CSTC-A's 
Focused District Development Program, which began in November 2007, two 
districts were not maintaining property accountability, including 
property books, and one was not conducting audits and physical 
inventories periodically or when directed. 

Contract mentors employed by CSTC-A and State have reported extensively 
on weaknesses they observed in ANSF units' capacity to safeguard and 
account for weapons and other equipment. Reports we reviewed, prepared 
by MPRI and DynCorp mentors between October 2007 and August 2008, 
indicated that ANSF units throughout Afghanistan had not implemented 
the basic property accountability procedures required by the Afghan 
Ministries of Defense and Interior. Although these reports did not 
address accountability capacities in a consistent manner that would 
allow a systematic or comprehensive assessment of all units, they did 
highlight common problems relating to weapons accountability, including 
a lack of functioning property book operations and poor physical 
security. 

* Lack of functioning property book operations. Mentors reported that 
many Afghan army and police units did not properly maintain property 
books, which are fundamental tools used to establish equipment 
accountability and are required by Afghan ministerial decrees. In a 
report dated March 2008, a MPRI mentor to the property book officer for 
one Afghan National Army unit stated, "for 3 years, the unit property 
books have not been established properly" and that "a lack of 
functionality existed in every property book operation." Another 
report, from March 2008, concluded, "equipment accountability and 
equipment maintainability is a big concern; equipment is often lost, 
damaged, or stolen, and the proper procedures are not followed to 
properly document and/or account for equipment." In a 2008 MPRI 
quarterly progress report on Afghan National Police in Kandahar, a 
mentor noted that property book items were issued but not posted to any 
records, because personnel did not know their duties and 
responsibilities. The report further states that "at present the 
property managers are not tracking any classes of supplies at all 
levels" and that "ANSF is very basic in its day to day function," 
exhibiting no consideration for property accountability. 

* Poor security. MPRI reports also indicated that some Afghan National 
Police units did not have facilities adequate to ensure the physical 
security of weapons and protect them against theft in a high-risk 
environment. For example, a March 2008 MPRI report on Afghan National 
Police in one northern province stated that the arms room of the police 
district office was behind a wooden door and had only a miniature 
padlock, and that this represented "basically the same austere 
conditions as in the other districts." 

Defense and State contractor reports identified various causes of ANSF 
accountability weaknesses, including illiteracy, corruption, desertion, 
and unclear guidance from Afghan ministries. 

* Illiteracy. Mentors reported that widespread illiteracy among Afghan 
army and police personnel had substantially impaired equipment 
accountability. For instance, a March 2008 MPRI report on an Afghan 
National Army unit noted that illiteracy was directly interfering with 
the ability of supply section personnel to implement property 
accountability processes and procedures, despite repeated training 
efforts. In July 2008, a police mentor in the Zari district of Balkh 
province stated that, "a lack of personnel [at the district 
headquarters] who can read and write is hampering efficient 
operations," and added that there is currently one literate person 
being mentored to take charge of logistics. In addition, an August 2008 
DynCorp report on the Afghan National Police noted that in Kandahar, 
"concerns [have been] expressed over [the supply officer] maintaining 
control over the storage facility keys. He cannot read or write, does 
not record anything that is being given out or have a request form for 
supplies filled out. [He] is the same individual that was handing out 
automatic weapons to civilians the previous week." 

* Corruption. Reports of alleged theft and unauthorized resale of 
weapons are common. During 2008, DynCorp mentors reported multiple 
instances of Afghan National Police personnel, including an Afghan 
Border Police battalion commander in Khost province, allegedly selling 
weapons to anti-coalition forces. In a March 2008 report, mentors noted 
that despite repeated requests, the Afghan National Police Chief 
Logistical Officer for Paktika province would not produce a list of 
serial numbers for weapons on hand. The DynCorp mentors suggested this 
reluctance to share information could be part of an attempt to conceal 
inventory discrepancies. In addition, a May 2008 DynCorp report on 
police cited corruption in Helmand as that province's most significant 
problem, noting that the logistics officer had been named in all 
allegations of theft, extortion, and deceit reported to mentors by 
their Afghan National Police contacts. 

* Desertion. DynCorp mentors also reported cases of desertion in the 
Afghan National Police, which resulted in the loss of weapons. For 
instance, in July 2008, mentors reported that when Afghan Border Police 
officers at a Faryab province checkpoint deserted to ally themselves 
with anti-coalition forces, they took all their weapons and two 
vehicles with them. Another DynCorp mentor team training police in 
Ghazni province reported in July 2008 that 65 Afghan National Police 
personnel had deserted and would not be coming to the base to be 
processed. The police officers that did arrive came without their 
issued weapons. 

* Unclear guidance. MPRI mentors reported that Afghan ministry 
logistics policies were not always clear to Afghan army and police 
property managers. A MPRI report dated April 2008 stated that approved 
Ministry of Interior policies outlining material accountability 
procedures were not widely disseminated and many logistics officers did 
not recognize any of the logistical policies as rule. Additionally, a 
MPRI mentor to the Afghan National Army told us that despite the new 
decrees, Afghan National Army logistics officers often carried out 
property accountability functions using Soviet-style accounting methods 
and that the Ministry of Defense was still auditing army accounts 
against those defunct standards. 

Senior Afghan Ministry of Defense officials we met with also described 
similar accountability weaknesses. In a written statement provided in 
response to our questions about Afghan National Army weapons 
accountability, the ministry officials indicated that soldiers 
deserting with their weapons had a negative effect on the Afghan 
National Army and reduced supplies on hand in units. They also 
indicated that Afghan National Army units in the provinces of Helmand, 
Kandahar, and Paktika have been particularly vulnerable to equipment 
theft. 

CSTC-A Has Recently Begun Conducting End Use Monitoring of Weapons and 
Sensitive Night Vision Devices: 

According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured weapons and sensitive 
equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use monitoring, which is 
meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF is using the equipment 
for intended purposes. Under DSCA guidance, weapons are subject to 
routine end use monitoring, which, according to DSCA officials, entails 
making and recording observations on weapons usage in conjunction with 
other duties and during interactions with local defense officials. For 
specified sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices, DSCA 
guidance calls for additional controls and enhanced end use monitoring. 
This includes providing equipment delivery records with serial numbers 
to DSCA, conducting routine physical inventories, and reporting on 
quarterly inventory results. For night vision devices this also 
includes the establishment of a physical security and accountability 
control plan. 

In July 2007, CSTC-A began issuing 2,410 night vision devices to Afghan 
National Army units without establishing the appropriate controls or 
conducting enhanced end use monitoring. According to U.S. Central 
Command, these devices pose a special danger to the public and U.S. 
forces if in the wrong hands. DSCA did not ensure that CSTC-A followed 
the end use monitoring guidance because CSTC-A purchased these devices 
directly and without the knowledge or involvement of DSCA officials. To 
address this, DSCA and CSTC-A established procedures in April 2008 to 
prohibit CSTC-A's procurement of weapons and sensitive equipment in- 
country without DSCA involvement. 

In May 2008, CSTC-A first developed an end use monitoring plan that 
established both routine and enhanced monitoring procedures. The plan 
calls for the use of U.S. trainers and mentors embedded in ANSF units 
to provide reasonable assurances that the recipients are complying with 
U.S. requirements on the use, transfer, and security of the items. CSTC-
A informed us that it began implementing the plan in July 2008, but 
noted it did not have sufficient staff or mentors to conduct the 
monitoring envisioned. CSTC-A officials told us they started to conduct 
and document routine end use monitoring for weapons provided to the 
Afghan police in 31 of Afghanistan's 365 police districts.[Footnote 43] 
CSTC-A had not been able to undertake any monitoring in the remaining 
334 police districts due to security constraints. 

During the course of our review, CSTC-A began following DSCA's enhanced 
end use monitoring guidance for the night vision devices it had issued. 
CSTC-A started conducting inventories of these devices in October 2008, 
about 15 months after it began issuing them, and plans to conduct full 
physical inventories by serial number quarterly. As of December 2008, 
CSTC-A had accounted for all but 10 of the devices it had issued. 

DSCA and CSTC-A attributed this limited end use monitoring to a 
shortage of security assistance staff and expertise at CSTC-A, 
exacerbated by frequent CSTC-A staff rotations. Defense's Inspector 
General similarly reported in October 2008 that CSTC-A did not have 
sufficient personnel with the necessary security assistance skills and 
experience and that short tours of duty and different rotation policies 
among the military services hindered the execution of security 
assistance activities.[Footnote 44] We also noted these problems in 
2004, when we reported that the Office of Military Organization-
Afghanistan, CSTC-A's predecessor, did not have adequate personnel 
trained in security assistance procedures to support its efforts and 
that frequent personnel rotations were limiting Defense's efforts to 
train key personnel in defense security assistance procedures and 
preserve institutional knowledge.[Footnote 45] CSTC-A officials told us 
that the addition of a USASAC liaison to the CSTC-A staff in Kabul had 
helped to offset some of these challenges, as the liaison was 
knowledgeable in security assistance procedures and had been able to 
provide some basic training for CSTC-A staff. 

Conclusions: 

Oversight and accountability for weapons is critical in high-threat 
environments, especially in Afghanistan, where potential theft and 
misuse of lethal equipment pose a significant danger to U.S. and 
coalition forces involved in security, stabilization, and 
reconstruction efforts. Because Defense organizations throughout the 
weapons supply chain have not had a common understanding of what 
procedures are necessary to safeguard and account for weapons, 
inventory records, including serial numbers, are not complete and 
accurate. As a result, Defense cannot be certain that weapons intended 
for ANSF have reached those forces. Further, weapons stored in poorly 
secured central depots are significantly vulnerable, and the United 
States has limited ability to detect the loss of these weapons without 
conducting routine inventories. Although CSTC-A established new weapons 
accountability procedures during the course of our review, it is not 
yet clear that, without a mandate from Defense and sufficient 
resources, CSTC-A will consistently implement these procedures. Because 
Afghan army and police units face significant challenges in controlling 
and accounting for weapons, it is essential that Defense enhance its 
efforts in working with ANSF units in this area. Systematically 
assessing ANSF's ability to implement required weapons accountability 
procedures is particularly important for gaining reasonable assurances 
that ANSF units are prepared to receive and safeguard weapons as well 
as for evaluating overall progress in developing ANSF's accountability 
capacity. Moreover, adequately monitoring night vision devices and 
other sensitive equipment after it is transferred to ANSF will help to 
ensure that such equipment is used for its intended purposes. As 
development of the Afghan security forces continues, it is vital that 
clear oversight and accountability mechanisms are in place to account 
for weapons and other sensitive equipment. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that the United States can account for weapons that it 
procures or receives from international donors for ANSF, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense establish clear accountability procedures 
for weapons in the control and custody of the United States, and direct 
USASAC, CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing 
these weapons to (1) track all weapons by serial number and (2) conduct 
routine physical inventories. 

To help ensure that ANSF units can safeguard and account for weapons 
and other sensitive equipment they receive from the United States and 
international donors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
CSTC-A to (1) specifically and systematically assess the ability of 
each ANSF unit to safeguard and account for weapons in accordance with 
Afghan ministerial decrees and (2) explicitly verify that adequate 
safeguards and accountability procedures are in place, prior to 
providing weapons to ANSF units, unless a specific waiver or exception 
is granted based on due consideration of practicality, cost, and 
mission performance. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense devote the necessary 
resources to address the staffing shortages that hamper CSTC-A's 
efforts to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment accountability 
matters. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report (see 
appendix IV). Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided 
additional information on its efforts to help ensure accountability for 
weapons intended for the ANSF. Defense also provided technical 
corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 
State did not provide comments. 

Defense concurred with our recommendation to establish clear 
accountability procedures for weapons intended for ANSF. It noted that 
Defense requirements and procedures exist for small arms tracking by 
serial number. However, Defense went on to state that DSCA, in 
conjunction with U.S. Central Command, has been directed to implement 
in Afghanistan congressionally-mandated controls that Defense is 
implementing in Iraq. These include (a) the registration of serial 
numbers of all small arms, (b) an end-use monitoring program for all 
lethal assistance, and (c) the maintenance of detailed records for all 
defense articles transferred to Afghanistan. As we indicated in our 
report, Defense organizations did not have a common understanding of 
whether existing accountability procedures applied to weapons obtained 
for ANSF, underscoring the importance of these controls. Defense did 
not state when these measures would be implemented; however, if Defense 
follows through on these actions and, in addition, clearly requires 
routine inventories of weapons in U.S. custody and control, our 
concerns will be largely addressed. 

Defense also concurred with our recommendation to systematically assess 
each ANSF unit's capacity to account for and safeguard weapons and to 
ensure that adequate procedures are in place prior to providing 
weapons. Defense indicated that embedded mentors and trainers are 
assessing ANSF units' accountability capacity. It also stated that for 
the Afghan National Army, weapons are only issued with coalition 
mentors present to provide oversight at all levels of command; and for 
the Afghan National Police, most weapons are currently being issued to 
selected units that have received focused training, including 
instruction on equipment accountability. We note that at the time of 
our review, ANSF unit assessments did not systematically address the 
units' capacity to safeguard and account for weapons in its possession. 
We also note that Defense has cited significant shortfalls in the 
number of personnel required to train and mentor ANSF units. Unless 
these matters are addressed, we are not confident the shortcomings we 
reported will be adequately addressed. 

Finally, Defense also concurred with our recommendation that it address 
the staffing shortfalls that hamper CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor, 
and assess ANSF in weapons accountability matters. Defense commented 
that it is looking into ways to address the shortages, but did not 
state how or when additional staffing would be provided. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretaries of Defense and State and interested congressional 
committees. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO 
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have 
any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 
Director International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To determine whether Defense and the Combined Security Transition 
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account for weapons obtained, 
transported, stored, and distributed to Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), we conducted the following work. 

* We sought to determine which Defense accountability procedures are 
generally applicable to Defense equipment by reviewing documents and 
meeting with officials from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida; 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Defense's Office of 
Inspector General in Arlington, Virginia; and CSTC-A in Kabul, 
Afghanistan. We also reviewed relevant Defense regulations, 
instructions, and manuals. 

* We compiled detailed information on 242,203 weapons the United States 
procured for ANSF and shipped to Afghanistan from December 2004 through 
June 2008. We identified the types, quantity, shipment dates, and cost 
of these weapons by reviewing and analyzing pseudo-FMS case 
documentation provided by DSCA and data provided by the U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Command (USASAC) in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, 
and Navy IPO in Arlington, Virginia. To ensure we had a complete record 
of all weapons ordered and shipped during this time period, we checked 
USASAC and Navy shipment details against line-item details in Letters 
of Offer and Acceptance provided to us by DSCA. For each shipment of 
weapons we isolated in the USASAC and Navy International Programs 
Office (IPO) files, we compiled lists of serial numbers or determined 
the total number of weapons for which no serial number records were 
available. We identified 195,671 weapons for which USASAC and Navy IPO 
could provide serial numbers and 46,532 for which they could not. In 
some cases, quantities of weapons required by the Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance differed from those recorded as shipped; we followed up on 
these discrepancies with officials at USASAC, who explained that such 
differences were due to changes in market pricing between the time of 
the request and the time of purchase. We determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

* To assess Defense's ability to account for the location or 
disposition of weapons, we selected a stratified random probability 
sample of 245 weapons from the population of 196,671 U.S.-procured 
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers. The sample 
population of weapons included all years in which U.S.-procured weapons 
had been shipped to ANSF and seven specific categories of weapons 
obtained. Our random sample did not include certain miscellaneous 
weapon types, which we categorized as "other." Each weapon in the 
population had a known probability of being included in our probability 
sample. We divided the weapons into two strata, based on the format of 
the weapons lists we obtained. About half of the serial numbers were 
available to us in electronic databases, allowing us to select a simple 
random sample of 96 weapons from those records. The remaining 98,462 
serial numbers were provided to us in paper lists or electronic scans 
of paper files. From those records we selected a random systematic 
sample of 149 weapons by choosing a random start and selecting every 
subsequent 679th serial number. Each weapon selected in the sample was 
weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all the weapons 
in the population, including those that were not selected. In 
Afghanistan, we attempted either to physically locate each weapon in 
our sample or obtain documentation confirming that CSTC-A had recorded 
its issuance to ANSF or otherwise disposed of it. We used the results 
of our work to generalize to the universe of weapons from which we drew 
our sample and derive an estimated number of weapons for which CSTC-A 
cannot provide information on location or disposition. Because we 
followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample 
is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. 
Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express 
our confidence in the precision of our results as a 95 percent 
confidence interval (e.g. plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is 
the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 
percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 
percent confident that each of the confidence intervals we have 
reported will include the true values in the study. 

* We compiled detailed information on the approximately 135,000 weapons 
CSTC-A obtained for ANSF from international donors. We identified the 
estimated dollar values, types, quantities, and sources of these 
weapons by analyzing records from the office of CSTC-A's Deputy 
Commanding General for International Security Cooperation. We assessed 
the reliability of these data by interviewing CSTC-A officials 
knowledgeable about the data and by analyzing the records they provided 
to identify problems with completeness or accuracy. CSTC-A officials 
told us the dollar amounts they track for the value of weapons 
donations had been provided by the donors and were of questionable 
accuracy, as they had not been independently verified by CSTC-A. We 
also reviewed CSTC-A's records on the types, quantities, and sources of 
weapons donations. CSTC-A officials told us that due to a long-standing 
lack of accountability procedures for handling weapons donations 
received at the central storage depots, they had been unable to 
independently verify the quantities reported by donors. After our visit 
to Kabul, we continued to work closely with CSTC-A officials to 
identify additional data concerns. When we found discrepancies, such as 
data entry errors, we brought them to CSTC-A's attention and worked 
with its officials to correct the discrepancies, to the extent that we 
could, before conducting our descriptive analyses. While CSTC-A's 
procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have improved during 
the past year, documentation on procedures was lacking prior to March 
2007, which made it impossible for us to independently assess the 
data's accuracy. Because we still have concerns about the reliability 
of these data, we are only reporting them as background information and 
in an appendix to provide a sense of who donated the weapons and when. 

* We documented weapons accountability practices and procedures by 
examining records and meeting with officials from DSCA, USASAC, Navy 
IPO, and CSTC-A--the organizations directly involved with obtaining, 
transporting, storing, and distributing weapons for ANSF. In 
Afghanistan, we observed weapons accountability practices at the Kabul 
Afghanistan International Airport and the two ANSF central storage 
depots in Kabul where weapons intended for the Afghan National Army and 
the Afghan National Police are stored before distribution to ANSF 
units. While at the central depots, we discussed weapons management 
with CSTC-A officials and mentors employed by MPRI, Defense's ANSF 
development contractor. We also observed depot operations, including 
security procedures, storage conditions, and inventory information 
systems. In addition, we examined weapons inventory records at CSTC-A 
headquarters in Kabul. 

* We met with officials from Defense's Inspector General to discuss two 
audits it conducted during 2008 relating to weapons accountability in 
Afghanistan and reviewed a related report it issued in October 2008. 

To assess the extent to which CSTC-A has ensured that ANSF can properly 
safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive equipment issued 
to it, we conducted the following work. 

* We obtained information on ANSF weapons accountability practices by 
meeting with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of Defense 
and Interior. The Ministry of Defense also provided written responses 
to our questions on this subject. In addition, we reviewed ministerial 
decrees documenting equipment accountability requirements applicable to 
the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and discussed the 
development and the implementation status of those decrees with CSTC-A 
and MPRI. 

* We obtained information on CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor, and 
assess ANSF units on accountability for weapons and other equipment by 
reviewing documents and meeting with officials from CSTC-A and MPRI in 
Kabul. We reviewed all available weekly, monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc 
reports submitted by MPRI logistics mentors from October 2007 to August 
2008 that included observations regarding ANSF equipment accountability 
practices. We also reviewed all available reports, including checklists 
and assessment tools, prepared by CSTC-A's embedded military trainers 
to assess the logistics capabilities of Afghan army and police units. 
To gain a better understanding of ANSF weapons accountability practices 
and challenges, we visited an Afghan National Army commando unit near 
Kabul that had received weapons and night vision devices from CSTC-A 
and met with the unit's property book officer and MPRI mentors assigned 
to that unit. Due to travel restrictions imposed by CSTC-A based on 
heightened security threats during our visit to Afghanistan, we were 
unable to travel outside of the Kabul area, as planned, to visit other 
ANSF units in the country that had also received weapons from CSTC-A. 

* We obtained information on State's efforts to ensure accountability 
for weapons provided to the Afghan National Police by reviewing 
documents and meeting with officials from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and 
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
in Washington, D.C. We also reviewed all weekly reports submitted to 
State between January and August 2008 by State's Afghan National Police 
development contractor, DynCorp, that included observations regarding 
police equipment accountability practices. 

* We determined the end use monitoring procedures generally applicable 
to weapons transferred to foreign countries under Foreign Military 
Sales by reviewing DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual. We 
sought clarification on this guidance and views on its applicability to 
U.S. procured weapons and internationally donated weapons in 
Afghanistan from officials at DSCA and U.S. Central Command. 

* We determined end use monitoring policies and practices in 
Afghanistan by reviewing documents and meeting with officials from U.S. 
Central Command, CSTC-A, DSCA, and State. In Afghanistan, we met with 
officials in CSTC-A's Security Assistance Office, including the USASAC 
liaison to CSTC-A. We reviewed all available documentation of the end 
use monitoring CSTC-A had conducted as of December 2008 for weapons and 
other sensitive equipment, including night vision devices, provided to 
ANSF. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: International Donations Obtained for ANSF by CSTC-A: 

Since June 2002, CSTC-A's office of the Deputy Commanding General for 
International Security Cooperation has vetted, tracked, and coordinated 
the delivery of weapons donated to ANSF by the international community. 
CSTC-A officials reported to us that they had obtained about 135,000 
weapons for ANSF in this manner, though we were unable to independently 
confirm that figure. CSTC-A officials also told us they had not 
evaluated the reliability of the dollar values assigned by donors for 
these weapons and noted that some quantities may be overstated, as many 
of the donated weapons were damaged or unusable. (See table 1 for a 
summary of the data CSTC-A reported to us on weapons provided by 
international donors.) 

Table 1: Quantities and Estimated Value of Weapons Provided by 
International Donors for ANSF (June 2002 through June 2008): 

Donor: Hungary; 
Quantity: 46,944; 
Donor-estimated value: $16.5 million. 

Donor: Egypt; 
Quantity: 17,199; 
Donor-estimated value: $5.5 million. 

Donor: Slovenia; 
Quantity: 12,033; 
Donor-estimated value: $5.0 million. 

Donor: Romania; 
Quantity: 11,390; 
Donor-estimated value: $7.6 million. 

Donor: Lithuania; 
Quantity: 10,000; 
Donor-estimated value: $3.3 million. 

Donor: Germany; 
Quantity: 10,000; 
Donor-estimated value: $2.5 million. 

Donor: Bosnia; 
Quantity: 4,930; 
Donor-estimated value: $2.9 million. 

Donor: Turkey; 
Quantity: 4,088; 
Donor-estimated value: $8.4 million. 

Donor: Estonia; 
Quantity: 4,000; 
Donor-estimated value: $1.3 million. 

Donor: India; 
Quantity: 3,864; 
Donor-estimated value: $31.1 million. 

Donor: Canada; 
Quantity: 2,500; 
Donor-estimated value: $2.0 million. 

Donor: Montenegro; 
Quantity: 1,600; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.8 million. 

Donor: Slovakia; 
Quantity: 1,524; 
Donor-estimated value: $3.4 million. 

Donor: Bulgaria; 
Quantity: 1,224; 
Donor-estimated value: $3.1 million. 

Donor: Croatia; 
Quantity: 1,012; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.3 million. 

Donor: Albania; 
Quantity: 918; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.5 million. 

Donor: Pakistan; 
Quantity: 801; 
Donor-estimated value: $1.9 million. 

Donor: Ukraine; 
Quantity: 666; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.4 million. 

Donor: Greece; 
Quantity: 300; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.1 million. 

Donor: Spain; 
Quantity: 259; 
Donor-estimated value: $6.0 million. 

Donor: Poland; 
Quantity: 108; 
Donor-estimated value: $0.1 million. 

Donor: Total; 
Quantity: 135,360; 
Donor-estimated value: $102.8 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of CSTC-A data. 

[End of table] 

While CSTC-A's procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have 
improved during the past year, documentation was lacking prior to March 
2007, which made it impossible for us to independently assess the 
data's accuracy. Because we have concerns about the reliability of 
these data, we are only reporting them here to provide a sense of who 
donated the weapons. 

Included in CSTC-A's records were details indicating that weapons 
donations have included rifles, pistols, light and heavy machine guns, 
grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and mortars. 
According to this information, about 79 percent of the weapons donated 
were AK-47 assault rifles. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Timeline of Key Weapons Accountability Events: 

Since international donors began providing weapons for ANSF in June 
2002, CSTC-A and others have taken a variety of steps to improve 
accountability. Many of these steps occurred during the course of our 
review. Figure 4 provides a timeline of key events relating to 
accountability for ANSF weapons and other sensitive equipment. 

Figure 4: Timeline of Key Events Relating to Accountability for ANSF 
Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June 2002 to January 2009): 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the Timeline of Key Events Relating 
to Accountability for ANSF Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June 
2002 to January 2009): 

1/1/2002-mid-2009: International donations shipped to Afghanistan; 

Late 2004-1/30/2009: U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan; 

November 2006: CSTC-A’s Commanding General mandates serial number 
control for weapons issued to ANSF; 

July 2007: CSTC-A issues night vision devices to Afghan army units 
without establishing end use monitoring controls; GAO reports on 
accountability lapses for weapons provided to Iraq; 

August 2007: CSTC-A begins recording serial numbers for weapons issued 
to ANSF units; 

November 16, 2007: GAO review begins; 

January 2008: National Defense Authorization Act mandates serial number 
registration and monitoring of small arms provided to Iraq; 

May 2008: CSTC-A establishes end use monitoring plan; 

June 2008: CSTC-A completes first 100% weapons inventories at central 
depots; CSTC detects pistols missing from the Afghan army storage 
depot; 

July 2008: CSTC-A begins recording serial numbers for weapons received 
at central depots; CSTC-A begins to implement end use monitoring plan; 
CSTC-A introduces standard operating procedures for weapons 
transactions at central depots; 

Mid-August 2008: GAO team visits Afghanistan; 

October 2008: CSTC-A begins enhanced end use monitoring of night vision 
devices; Defense Office of Inspector General issues report addressing 
accountability and control of weapons in Afghanistan. 

January 30, 2009: GAO Review ends. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by Defense and CSTC-A. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Although the comments the Department of Defense provided to us were 
undated, we received them on January 23, 2009. 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Asian and Pacific Affairs: 
2700 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2700: 

Mr. Charles Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Mr. Johnson: 

The following are Department of Defense (DoD) comments to the GAO draft 
report (GAO-09-267), "Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking 
Raises significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to 
Afghan National Security Forces," dated 24 December, 2008 (GAO Code 
320556). DoD Comments are directed towards the draft report's three 
recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
establish clear accountability procedures for weapons in the control 
and custody of the United States, and direct U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command (USASAC), Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and other military organizations involved in 
providing these weapons to (1) track all weapons by serial number and 
(2) control routine physical inventory. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation, although notes that 
accountability requirements and procedures for small arms tracking and 
accountability currently exist in the Defense Logistics Management 
System Manual (DoD 4000.25-M Volume 2) and the U.S. Army's Inventory 
Management Asset and Transaction Reporting System Regulation (AR 710-
3). These instructions delineate the requirement to enter the serial 
number of any weapon (standard and non-standard) into the DoD Small 
Arms Serialization Program. 

DoD has also taken measures to establish a clear directive on weapons 
accountability in Afghanistan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
in conjunction with U.S. Central Command and the military departments, 
has been directed to implement in Afghanistan the best practices of 
section 1228 (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008, Public Law 110-181 (NDAA) which lays out controls for Iraq.
These include: 

1. The registration of the serial numbers of all small arms to be 
provided to the Islamic Government of Afghanistan or to other groups, 
organizations, citizens, or residents of Afghanistan; 

2. A program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles 
provided to such entities or individuals; and; 

3. The maintenance of detailed record of the origin, shipping, and 
distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Afghanistan 
Security Forces Fund or other security assistance program to such 
entities or individuals. 

DoD also notes that as a result of guidance issued by CENTCOM in July 
2008, CSTC-A currently tracks serial numbers of all U.S. procured and 
internationally donated weapons per guidance in DOD regulation 4000.25-
2-M (C18.7.4.3). Routine inventories are conducted by the U.S. military 
forces at the national, depot, and unit levels. Units with no coalition 
members present conduct monthly inventories that are reported to CSTC-A 
through a training readiness report. Afghan National Army leadership 
has confirmed that they have performed 100% physical serial number 
inventories of weapons annually and the Afghan National Police is 
currently in the process of conducting their first 100% weapon 
inventory. 

The U.S. military forces also use the same measures to ensure 
accountability of weapons donated by outer countries when we have 
visibility of them. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct CSTC-A to: 

1. specifically and systematically assess the ability of each Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) unit to safeguard and account for 
weapons in accordance with Afghan ministerial decrees; and; 

2. explicitly verify that adequate safeguards and accountability 
procedures are in place, prior to providing weapons to ANSF units, 
unless a specific waiver or exception is granted based on due 
consideration of practicality, cost, and mission performance. (p. 
22/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. As stated in the 
report, as of June 2008 CSTC-A has assisted the Afghan Ministries of 
Defense and Interior establish decrees requiring the Afghans to adopt 
accountability procedures and direct who is accountable for weapons at 
all levels of the command. DoD also notes that CSTC-A uses mentors and 
embedded training teams to assess the ability of the ANSF units to 
safeguard and account for weapons as established in accordance with 
Afghan Ministerial decrees. For the Afghan National Army, weapons are 
only issued with Coalition mentors present who provide oversight at all 
level of command. For the Afghan National Police most weapons are being 
issued through the Focused District Development (FDD) and the Focused 
Border Development (FBD) programs. The FDD and FBD programs ensure that 
the weapons are properly issued and that training is done on property 
accountability and sensitive items. CSTC-A issues weapons to police 
outside of these venues including the Crises Response Unit and the 
Counter Narcotic Unit which both have mentors to oversee these 
processes 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
devote the necessary resources to address the staffing shortages that 
hamper CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment 
accountability matters. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: DoD concurs with the comment and is looking at ways to 
address these shortfalls. 

My point of contact is Ms. Cara Negrette, (703) 695-2859, or email: 
cara.negrette@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Mitchell Shivers: 
Acting: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report include Albert H. Huntington III, 
Assistant Director; James B. Michels; Emily Rachman; Mattias Fenton; 
James Ashley; Mary Moutsos; Joseph Carney; Etana Finkler; Jena 
Sinkfield; and Richard Brown. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] These include grenade launchers, machine guns, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers, mortars, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. For the 
purposes of this report, we use the term "weapons" to refer to these 
small arms and light weapons. 

[2] Defense refers to this adaptation of FMS as "pseudo-FMS." 

[3] USASAC and Navy IPO implement U.S. security assistance programs, 
including Foreign Military Sales of defense articles and services, to 
eligible foreign governments. 

[4] See Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, P.L. 107-327, Dec. 4, 
2002. Funds were appropriated to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 
starting in 2005 in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109- 
13, May 11, 2005. FMS cases are typically funded with participating 
countries' own resources or by Foreign Military Financing funds 
generally appropriated in the annual foreign operations and export 
financing appropriations acts. Foreign Military Financing funds were 
used to purchase only about 550 weapons for ANSF. 

[5] For more information on this effort, see GAO, Afghanistan Security: 
Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a 
Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security 
Forces, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008). 

[6] Defense defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law, 
lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for 
keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or 
funds, with or without physical possession (DODI 5000.64, 
Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other 
Accountable Property, E2.2). 

[7] Due to travel restrictions imposed by CSTC-A based on heightened 
security threats during our visit to Afghanistan in August 2008, we 
were only able to travel to one ANSF unit located near Kabul. 

[8] All percentage estimates from this sample have a margin of error of 
plus or minus 5 percent or less, at the 95 percent confidence level. 
All numeric estimates have a margin of error of plus or minus 10,000 
weapons at the 95 percent confidence level. 

[9] The Ministry of Defense has authority over the Afghan National 
Army, while the Ministry of Interior has authority over the Afghan 
National Police. 

[10] Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of Arms, 
Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security 
Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces 
(Report No. SPO-2009-001), Oct. 24, 2008. 

[11] December 2004 reflects USASAC's earliest reported shipment of U.S.-
procured weapons for ANSF, and June 2008 reflects the latest shipment 
data available prior to our August 2008 fieldwork in Afghanistan. 

[12] This estimated amount reflects the results of our testing of a 
generalizable sample selected randomly from 195,671 U.S.-procured 
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers; the estimate 
has a margin of error of +/-10,000 weapons at the 95 percent confidence 
level. See appendix I for more detail about the random sample. 

[13] DoD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, Oct. 3, 
2003, Chapter 8. 

[14] CSTC-A officials told us they had not evaluated the reliability of 
the values assigned by donors for these weapons and noted that some 
values may be overstated, as many of the items donated were used, 
damaged, or unusable. Furthermore, we were unable to independently 
verify the weapons quantities that CSTC-A reported to us. 

[15] CSTC-A also received weapons from the disarmament of Afghan 
militias, but we did not include these in our analysis. 

[16] For the purposes of this report, we use the term "non-standard 
weapons" to indicate weapons that have not been assigned a U.S. 
National Stock Number. Defense Logistics Agency uses those numbers to 
identify items that are repeatedly bought, stocked, stored, issued, and 
used throughout the federal supply system. 

[17] Included in this sum are AMD-65 rifles, which are AK-47 variants. 

[18] FMS cases are typically funded with participating countries' own 
resources or by Foreign Military Financing funds generally appropriated 
in the annual foreign operations and export financing appropriations 
acts. Foreign Military Financing funds were used to purchase only about 
550 weapons for ANSF. 

[19] Weapons are flown into Kabul by the Defense Transportation 
System's Special Assignment Airlift Mission and commercial flights (for 
weapons procured by contractors working for USASAC). 

[20] One depot (called Depot 1) contains Afghan National Army weapons, 
while the other depot (called 22 Bunkers) contains Afghan National 
Police weapons as well as ammunition for both the army and police. 

[21] This includes weapons and other equipment provided through FMS and 
pseudo-FMS. 

[22] When no SAO is established in a country, security assistance 
functions are normally handled by the Defense attaché office, either as 
an additional duty or with augmented personnel. In a small number of 
embassies (primarily in developing countries) where there is no Defense 
attaché representation, the security assistance program is managed by 
Foreign Service personnel from State. 

[23] DoD 5105.38-M, Chapter 8. 

[24] This guidance includes DoD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of 
Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, August 12, 
2000; DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Material Management Regulation, May 1, 1998; 
and DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System, March 2008. 

[25] DoD 4000.25-M, Vol. 2, Chapter 18, C18.3.1. 

[26] The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence clarified the 
applicability of existing Defense guidance, specifically DoD 5100.76-M, 
indicating that "the policy remains unchanged as it applies to all 
[Defense] components involved in any procurement, use, shipment, 
storage, inventory control, disposal by sale, or destruction of any 
conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives. [Defense] components 
possessing or having custody of [these items] shall comply with 
protection requirements until formal transfer to a foreign nation." 

[27] See SPO-2009-001. 

[28] See GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded 
Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-771] (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2007). 

[29] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110- 
181, Jan. 28, 2008. 

[30] In April 2008, the Multinational Transition Command-Iraq issued 
logistics accountability standard operating procedures to implement 
U.S. law and policy and provide mandatory direction to all of its 
personnel for the maintenance of materiel accountability through the 
process of acquisition, receipt, storage, and distribution up to and 
including the point of issuance to the Government of Iraq. 

[31] December 2004 reflects USASAC's earliest reported shipment of U.S.-
procured weapons for ANSF, and June 2008 reflects the latest shipment 
data available prior to our August 2008 fieldwork in Afghanistan. 

[32] This estimated amount reflects the results of our testing of a 
generalizable sample selected randomly from 195,671 U.S.-procured 
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers; we could not 
conduct similar testing for about 46,000 U.S.-procured weapons for 
which serial number records were not available; the estimate has a 
margin of error of +/-10,000 weapons at the 95 percent confidence 
level. 

[33] Our random sample did not include any weapons from the "other" 
category. 

[34] Navy IPO kept a complete serial number accounting of all the M-16s 
it provided. 

[35] Transferring serial number records in this way is an element of 
the weapons accountability procedures defined in DoD 4000.25-M, Vol. 2, 
C18.2.2. 

[36] DoD 5105.38-M, Chapter 5, Table C5.T5. 

[37] In a November 2006 memorandum, the CSTC-A commanding general 
issued command guidance for fiscal year 2007, which stated, among other 
things, that "CSTC-A will not accept risk in… accountability of all 
equipment (to include issuing and serial number accountability) issued 
to the ANSF." The memo also established as a priority effort to 
"institute an accountability system throughout the [Afghan National 
Police] which ensures serial number accountability of all sensitive 
items and major end items and ensures that accountability of all 
equipment issued to the [police] (Total asset visibility and 
accountability)." 

[38] See Department of Defense, Report to Congress in Accordance with 
2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, P.L. 110-181), 
United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security 
Forces (Washington, D.C.: June 2008), p. 13. 

[39] CSTC-A obtains MPRI's services through delivery orders issued 
under a contract between the U.S. Army Research, Development and 
Engineering Command Contracting Center and MPRI, Inc. 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. 

[41] However, as we reported in June 2008 (see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]), the shortage of U.S. embedded 
trainers and coalition mentors assigned to Afghan National Army units 
delays this validation process and lengthens the amount of time it will 
take the Afghan National Army to achieve full capability. 

[42] However, as we reported in June 2008 (see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]), CSTC-A identified extremely 
limited mentor coverage of the police as a significant challenge to 
using this tool to generate reliable assessments. 

[43] CSTC-A has only been able to conduct routine end use monitoring in 
Afghan police districts where Focused District Development training has 
been provided. This training was initiated in November 2007 to address 
widespread corruption, lack of capacity, and inadequate training in the 
Afghan National Police. 

[44] SPO-2009-001, p. 32. 

[45] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police 
Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 30, 2005). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: