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entitled 'State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
Overseas Posts Can Be Improved' which was released on October 19, 2007.
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
October 2007:
State Department:
Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be
Improved:
GAO-08-23:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-23, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1988, the Department of State (State) has ordered over 270
evacuations from overseas posts due to civil strife, terrorist
incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and disease
outbreaks. To prepare for evacuation, overseas posts rely on a variety
of guidance, plans, and training, such as Emergency Action Plans (EAP).
GAO was asked to assess State’s (1) guidance and plans to prepare for
evacuation, (2) training and exercises to prepare post staff for
crisis, and (3) efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation
lessons learned into guidance and training. GAO examined State and
Department of Defense (DOD) documents, spoke with State and DOD
officials, conducted a survey of 243 overseas posts, and completed 22
structured interviews with State personnel.
What GAO Found:
Using its guidance and training, State has carried out numerous
evacuations in the recent past—notably the safe evacuation of nearly
15,000 American citizens and family members from Lebanon. However, GAO
found areas where State can improve its guidance, plans, and training
to prepare for and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
American citizens. For example, posts do not find State’s primary
guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition,
while State requires posts to update EAPs annually, almost 40 percent
of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer.
Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best
guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate
was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD that could limit
these agencies’ ability to effectively work together during a large-
scale evacuation.
While State provides crisis management training to post staff, GAO
found gaps in training related to preparing for evacuations. Over one-
quarter of posts reported that Emergency Action Committee (EAC) members
have not received training necessary to meet their emergency
responsibilities. In addition, officials from several posts reported
that newer staff have not received training for their EAC roles.
Although posts reported that crisis management exercises are an
important training tool, post staff said exercises should be more
practical and reflect scenarios more likely to occur at post.
State’s evacuation preparations are constrained by the lack of a
systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation
lessons learned. Almost 60 percent of posts evacuated in the past 5
years said they did not produce an evacuation “after action” report, as
required. Further, State has no entity to ensure posts are producing
after action reports and no formal review process to analyze and
incorporate lessons learned from these reports into guidance and
training. Although State has developed some documents on evacuation
lessons learned and distributed them to all U.S. overseas posts, the
documents are sometimes vague and can be overlooked by posts due to the
volume of material they receive. Limited institutional memory of prior
evacuations at posts reinforces the need for a process to collect,
analyze, and disseminate lessons learned from evacuations to all post
staff.
Photograph: U.S.-Assisted Evacuees from Lebanon in a Cyprus Seaport:
Source: U.S. Embassy Nicosia, Cyprus.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that State take four actions to improve its guidance and
training for staff and systematically collect, analyze, and incorporate
evacuation lessons learned. GAO also recommends that State and DOD
review their MOA for large-scale evacuations to improve planning and
coordination when State requires DOD assistance. State concurred with
three of our five recommendations and partially concurred with two. DOD
partially concurred with the recommendation regarding the MOA and did
not comment on other parts of the report.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-23]. To view our survey results, click on
GAO-08-24SP. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4268 or fordj@gao.gov:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to
Prepare for a Possible Evacuation:
There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post
Staff:
State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and
Incorporate Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under
Authorized and Ordered Departure Authority:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
August 2007:
Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the
Authorized or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents:
Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
Results:
Abbreviations:
CLO: Community Liaison officer:
CME: crisis management exercise:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DVD: digital video disc:
EAC: Emergency Action Committee:
EAP: Emergency Action Plan:
EPH: Emergency Planning Handbook:
FAQ: frequently asked question:
FSI: Foreign Service Institute:
MOA: memorandum of agreement:
SARS: severe acute respiratory syndrome:
State: Department of State:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 19, 2007:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Thelma Drake:
House of Representatives:
The Department of State (State) operates overseas posts[Footnote 1] all
over the world, some in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions
where threats against post staff, dependents, or private American
citizens can result in State-ordered evacuations. Evacuations can occur
in response to various types of crises, including civil strife,
terrorist incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and
disease outbreaks. They can range from the more common and relatively
simple departures of post staff and dependents on regularly scheduled
commercial flights to the more rare, complex, and massive sea and air
lift of thousands of American citizens on U.S. government-chartered and
U.S. military ships and planes. According to State officials, since
1988, State has ordered more than 270 evacuations from overseas posts.
Based on a survey we conducted, 1 in 5 overseas posts reported they had
experienced some type of evacuation of post staff and dependents in the
past 5 years.
To plan and prepare for possible evacuation, overseas posts rely on a
variety of guidance, plans, and training. Emergency Action Committees
(EAC) at overseas posts are responsible for assisting the ambassador in
planning and preparing for crises, including the possible evacuation of
post staff, dependents, and American citizens, with support from State
offices in Washington, D.C. State's primary guidance is the Emergency
Planning Handbook (EPH), which contains policies and procedures for
crisis management, including planning, preparing for, and conducting
evacuations. In addition, all posts are required to create and annually
update an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that includes planning for
potential, post-specific emergencies, using the EPH as a guide. State's
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) trains overseas-bound staff in crisis
management and conducts crisis management exercises (CME) at all
overseas posts every 1 to 2-1/2 years to improve crisis preparedness.
Due to your concerns regarding threats against overseas posts that have
resulted in evacuations, we reviewed State's efforts to plan, prepare
for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens. In this report, we (1) assess State's guidance and plans to
prepare for possible evacuations of post staff, dependents, and
American citizens; (2) assess the training, drills, and exercises used
to prepare staff at overseas posts for crises, including possible
evacuation; and (3) evaluate State's efforts to collect, analyze, and
incorporate lessons learned from previous evacuations into
modifications of guidance and training. As part of this review, we
collected information on State's and the Department of Defense's (DOD)
efforts to evacuate American citizens from Lebanon in July 2006. To
address questions specifically about the Lebanon evacuation, we briefed
members of your staff on April 30, 2007, and issued a separate report
on the Lebanon evacuation in June 2007.[Footnote 2]
To meet these three objectives, we examined State and DOD documents
related to evacuation planning, preparations, training, and execution.
We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and traveled
to Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, where we met with State and DOD
officials responsible for planning and implementing evacuations,
including the July 2006 evacuation from Lebanon. In addition, we
conducted a survey of all 243 EACs at State's overseas posts; 86
percent of these committees responded to our survey.[Footnote 3] We
requested that the post's EAC members collectively complete the
survey.[Footnote 4] We also conducted 22 structured interviews with
State employees who had experienced a variety of evacuation-related
events over the last 5 years. We performed our work from June 2006
through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of
our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
In recent years, State has conducted numerous evacuations--most notably
the safe evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens and family
members from Lebanon. State provides a variety of guidance and training
to prepare overseas staff for managing evacuations of post staff,
dependents, and American citizens. However, we found that State
guidance and plans to prepare for possible evacuation of post staff,
dependents, and American citizens could be improved. First, although
the EPH is State's primary guidance, posts reported it was too generic,
voluminous, and not particularly useful in preparing for the
possibility of evacuation. For example, one post reported that the EPH
had too much generic boilerplate language and another indicated the EPH
was large and not user-friendly. Second, while all posts are required
to review and update their EAPs once a year, we found almost 40 percent
of posts surveyed had not updated their EAP in 18 months or longer.
Without EAPs that are reviewed and updated on a timely basis, posts'
planning and preparedness for crisis situations, including evacuations,
can be impaired. Third, State requires posts to produce estimates of
the number of private American citizens in country; however, more than
three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only
somewhat accurate. State officials told us these estimates, called F-77
reports, were best guesses and not based on a particular methodology.
Lastly, when State requires DOD assistance with a large-scale
evacuation, the two departments rely on a memorandum of agreement
(MOA); but we found weaknesses in the agreement that could limit
State's and DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together
during a crisis, such as not addressing the logistical capabilities and
limitations of each department, and not referencing contact lists to
expedite practical communications between State and DOD personnel in a
crisis.
State provides crisis management training to post staff--including
instruction for EAC members, CMEs conducted at each post, and classroom
training for overseas-bound staff at FSI's U.S. campus. However, we
found gaps in this training as it relates to preparing for evacuations.
For example, while the EPH states that a "robust training program" for
overseas staff "is essential for emergency preparedness," over one-
quarter of posts reported that EAC members have not received training
necessary to meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. As a
result, EAC members may not be fully prepared to make decisions in a
crisis. Specifically, officials from several posts reported that newer
staff have not received training for their roles on the EAC. For
example, one post noted that the frequent turnover at unaccompanied
posts, where staff serve for only 1 year, means that EAC members at
these posts need training to make them better equipped to work as a
team. Although CMEs are widely recognized as an important tool, post
staff told us that the exercises should be more practical and reflect
scenarios that are more likely to occur at the post. Finally, FSI's
crisis management training for overseas-bound staff covers a variety of
topics, including evacuation, through various training methods.
However, regular input from staff with evacuation experience could
improve this training. State is beginning to implement new training
tools, such as recent workshops on hurricane-related evacuations, that
feature colleagues with evacuation experience and allow for more
relevant, frequent, and inclusive training.
State's preparations for evacuation are constrained by the lack of a
systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned
from previous evacuations. Most posts did not complete a required after
action report following an evacuation, and there is no State entity to
ensure their production. Almost 60 percent of posts that have had an
evacuation in the past 5 years reported that they did not produce such
a report. State has no standardized format for after action reports,
and these reports could include staffing and morale lessons learned.
When posts do submit after action reports, State has no formal review
process to analyze and incorporate lessons learned from these reports
into guidance and training. Although State has distributed some cables
and other documents on lessons learned from evacuations on an ad hoc
basis, these documents are sometimes vague and can be overlooked by
posts. We also found post staff have limited institutional memory of
prior evacuations, particularly at unaccompanied posts, which
reinforces the need for a process that captures, analyzes, and
disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations to all post staff.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from
overseas posts, we recommend the Secretary of State:
* designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are prepared
annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized evacuation after
action reports with lessons learned, and (3) systematically collect and
analyze these reports to assess State's performance and recommend
modifications to State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if
necessary;
* direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for that
particular country;
* review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members to
meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning and
preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for improving
training, particularly for less experienced EAC members; and:
* strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing them
and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the post into
exercise scenarios.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance, we
recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense:
* review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to ensure
it expedites practical communication and coordination between the two
departments before and during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in
areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of each
department (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger
aircraft and ships).
We received written comments on a draft of this report from State and
DOD, which are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State concurred with
our recommendations that the Secretary of State improve the F-77
process, review training for EAC members, and strengthen CMEs.
State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
State designate an entity within State to ensure that EAPs are prepared
annually. In its response, State said that it was already taking
actions to address this part of the recommendation. State concurred
with the rest of the recommendation.
DOD and State partially concurred with the recommendation in our draft
report that State and DOD review their MOA. While DOD and State agreed
on the need to review the MOA, both departments said that the current
coordination structure was working well. In addition, DOD expressed
concern that our recommendation could hinder DOD's ability to conduct
military operations. In response, we modified the recommendation to
clarify that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense review
the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical
communication and coordination between the two departments before and
during a large-scale evacuation.
We also received technical comments from State, which we have
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
Background:
Evacuations occur in response to diverse crises and differ considerably
in scope, size, and complexity; large-scale evacuations of American
citizens are rare. To pre-empt the need for or, if necessary,
facilitate, evacuations of American citizens, State has tools for
warning American citizens about potential crises. It also provides
varying degrees of assistance to Americans wishing to leave a country.
A number of State units, including the affected post, are involved in
planning for and implementing an evacuation, which typically takes the
form of an authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents;
State ends a departure of post staff and dependents by terminating the
authorization or order.
Evacuations Occur in Response to Diverse Crises and Differ Considerably
in Scope, Size, and Complexity:
State evacuates staff, dependents, or private American citizens in
response to various crises, including civil strife, terrorist
incidents, natural disasters, conventional war threats, and disease
outbreaks. For example, according to information compiled by
State,[Footnote 5] of the 89 evacuations over the past 5 years, almost
half were clustered in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan (see fig.
1). Twenty-three of these evacuations were due to the impending U.S.
invasion of Iraq in early 2003; the remaining evacuations in the Middle
East, Turkey, and Pakistan were due primarily to terrorist threats or
attacks. Ten other evacuations in Southeast Asia resulted from the
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of
2003, and nine in the Caribbean were due to hurricanes. During 2006 and
2007, State evacuated 11 posts for various reasons, including civil
unrest, elections that could lead to civil unrest, a coup attempt, a
U.S. embassy bombing, a hurricane, and war.[Footnote 6]
Figure 1: State Overseas Posts Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to
August 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the world, depicting State Overseas Posts
Evacuated by Country from March 2002 to August 2007. Different Bureaus
are shaded according to the number of times a country was evacuated
[A]. The depiction is as follows:
Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau:
Bahamas: 2;
Bolivia: 1;
Cuba: 2;
Guyana: 1;
Haiti: 3;
Jamaica: 3;
Mexico: 1;
Venezuela: 2.
African Affairs Bureau:
Burundi: 1;
Chad: 1;
Democratic Republic of Congo: 2;
Central African Republic: 1;
Guinea: 1;
Côte D'Ivoire: 2;
Kenya: 1;
Liberia: 1;
Madagascar: 1;
Togo: 1.
European Affairs Bureau:
Turkey: 1;
Uzbekistan: 1.
Near Eastern Affairs Bureau:
Bahrain: 2;
Israel: 2;
Jordan: 2;
Kuwait: 1;
Lebanon: 2;
Oman: 1;
Qatar: 1;
Saudi Arabia: 3;
Syria: 3;
United Arab Emirates: 1;
Yamen: 2.
South and Central Asian Affairs Bureau:
India: 1;
Nepal: 2;
Pakistan: 3.
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau:
China: 1;
Timor-Leste: 1;
Indonesia: 1;
Taiwan: 1;
Vietnam: 1.
Source: GAO (map) and State data on authorized and ordered departures
from March 2002 to August 2007.
[A] Number of times one or more posts in the same country were
evacuated simultaneously (e.g., State evacuated all posts in Turkey in
March 2003).
[End of figure]
Evacuations differ considerably in scope, size, and complexity and can
involve (1) authorized departure of post staff and dependents, (2)
ordered departure of post staff and dependents, or (3) assisted
departure of American citizens.[Footnote 7] When authorizing departure,
State grants permission to nonemergency post staff and all dependents
to voluntarily depart the country at U.S. government expense. In
contrast, when State orders departure, State directs nonemergency post
staff and all dependents to leave the country. The number and type of
post staff and dependents actually departing a country can vary greatly
depending on the size of the post, the nature of the crisis, and the
type of departure. For example, evacuations can range from massive,
complex events like the safe extraction of almost 15,000 Americans and
family members from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, to the relatively
small-scale evacuation from Conakry, Guinea, in February 2007 during a
period of civil strife. The latter involved flying a few dozen people
(dependents of embassy staff, State employees temporarily deployed to
the embassy, and private American citizens) to a nearby city in another
West African country, where U.S. embassy personnel assisted the
evacuees in obtaining commercial flights back to the United States or
an alternate approved safe haven.
While authorized departures and ordered departures of post staff and
dependents typically occur several times a year, according to State and
DOD officials large-scale evacuations of private American citizens are
rare.[Footnote 8] Based on the information State compiled, the
department has implemented 271 authorized and ordered departures from
overseas posts since 1988. According to the results of our survey,
approximately 20 percent of posts reported that they had experienced an
authorized departure within the past 5 years, and about 10 percent
reported experiencing an ordered departure within this period.
State Has Tools for Warning American Citizens and Provides Varying
Degrees of Assistance to Americans Wishing to Leave a Country:
State has several tools for helping American citizens during crises
overseas, including evacuation. These tools include (1) travel
warnings, (2) registration and warden systems, and (3) varying degrees
of assistance to Americans wishing to leave a country. State issues
travel warnings to urge Americans considering trips abroad to stay away
from potentially dangerous areas. For example, as of July 2007, State
had current travel warnings for 27 countries. The reasons for these
warnings include the threat of terrorism, civil strife, violent crime,
and targeted attacks against U.S. citizens. Almost 45 percent of posts
reported that State has issued a travel warning for their country
within the past 5 years.[Footnote 9]
State also encourages, but cannot require, U.S. citizens to register
with the department when traveling abroad.[Footnote 10] According to
State officials, this allows State to have better information on the
number and location of American citizens in a country should a crisis
arise. In the event of a crisis, wardens--which consist of business
contacts, hotel representatives, nongovernmental organization
officials, or other individuals connected to communities of Americans
in the country who have agreed to serve as a liaison between the post
and the parties they have agreed to contact--forward messages from the
post to these parties. These messages, often conveyed via phone trees
in the past but now typically sent via mass e-mails, text messages, or
faxes, contain information about potential security threats or urgent
directives such as where and when to gather in the event of an
evacuation. Almost three-quarters of posts reported issuing a threat or
security warning within the past 5 years.
Although State cannot order American citizens to leave a country due to
a crisis, State officials said they provide varying degrees of
assistance to Americans wishing to leave. State officials told us
American citizens typically leave on commercially available flights;
the U.S. government does not generally arrange transportation for
departing American citizens. State sometimes assists by creating
greater availability of commercial transport, such as by requesting
U.S. flag carriers to schedule more flights. Infrequently, when
commercial transportation is not available, State officials contract
transportation for American citizens.[Footnote 11] More serious crises
may require the assistance of DOD; according to data compiled by State,
DOD has provided assistance on only four occasions in the past 5 years.
For example, during a period of civil unrest in a Caribbean country in
2004, DOD provided military assistance to help embassy personnel and
their families depart the country. On very rare occasions, large
numbers of American citizens depart the country on U.S. government-
contracted and U.S. military transportation.[Footnote 12]
A Number of State Units Are Involved in Planning for and Implementing
Evacuations:
A number of State units are involved in planning for and implementing
the authorized or ordered departure of staff and dependents and
assisting American citizens who wish to leave (see fig. 2). In
Washington, D.C., State headquarters provides guidance and training to
prepare for evacuations. A Crisis Management Support unit coordinates
crisis response with other State units and U.S. government agencies,
supports taskforces that assist posts in handling crises, and trains
headquarters staff in evacuation procedures and policy. Several State
bureaus also are involved in preparations for possible evacuations and
implementing evacuations. These include the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, which generates emergency guidance and oversees planning for
crises; the Bureau of Human Resources, which includes a Family Liaison
Office that assists evacuated spouses and dependents; the Consular
Affairs Bureau, which responds to the needs of American citizens
abroad; and the Bureau of Administration, which is responsible for
chartering flights or other transportation out of the country, if
needed. In addition, FSI in Arlington, Virginia, provides training for
staff before they leave for their first overseas post or rotate to a
new post, and conducts periodic CME training at each post.[Footnote 13]
Figure 2: State Department Units Involved in Implementing the
Authorized or Ordered Departure of Staff and Dependents:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an organizational chart, depicting State Department
Units Involved in Implementing the Authorized or Ordered Departure of
Staff and Dependents.
Starting at the top of the chart, the following relationships of units
are depicted:
Secretary of State:
* Executive Secretariat Executive Secretary;
- Crisis Management Support (taskforces).
Secretary of State:
* Under Secretary for Political Affairs;
- Regional Bureau (e.g. Near Eastern Affairs);
* Embassy and consulates in country A;
* Embassy and consulates in country B.
Secretary of State:
* Under Secretary for Political Affairs;
- Regional Bureau (e.g. African Affairs);
* Embassy and consulates in country A;
* Embassy and consulates in country B.
Secretary of State:
* Under Secretary for Management;
- Administration; Transportation Logistics;
- Diplomatic Security;
- Consular Affairs; American Citizen Services;
- Foreign Service Institute; Crisis Management exercises;
- Human Resources; Family Liaison Office.
Secretary of State:
* Under Secretary for Management;
- Resource Management CFO; Funds for evacuation; promissory notes.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data; clip art (Corel).
[End of figure]
Overseas, posts also are responsible for preparing for crises,
including a potential evacuation of staff, dependents, and private
American citizens in the country. For example, the post's EAC develops
an EAP to prepare for crises; the plan includes trip wires that can be
used to determine when to authorize or order the departure of staff and
dependents. Each post also prepares an estimate of the number and
location of private American citizens present in the country and
practices responding to crises that could lead to an evacuation through
CMEs and other drills.
During a crisis, the ambassador can request that State headquarters
approve a departure of post staff and their families and is expected to
recommend post evacuations on a timely basis when circumstances warrant
it.[Footnote 14] These evacuations may be approved "when it is of
national interest to require the departure of some or all employees
and/or their eligible family members, or if there is imminent danger to
the life of the employee or the lives of the immediate family of the
employee." The formal decision on evacuating post staff and dependents
is made by the Under Secretary for Management in an Action Memorandum.
The decision is communicated to the relevant overseas post via an
approval cable, or if necessary, by other means. The Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for providing a safe and
secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, also plays a
role in this decision.
Beyond security concerns, other factors such as staff morale or
political considerations can affect an ambassador's decision regarding
whether to request evacuation of post staff and dependents. For
example, according to State officials, an ambassador may be reluctant
to disrupt the lives of staff and their families, particularly those
staff who would have to remove their children from school. The
officials also said an ambassador may be hesitant to authorize or order
people to leave due to concern that a drawdown of staff and dependents
could send a signal to the host country that the United States no
longer considers the country safe for its employees and their families.
Former and current State officials noted that these factors can
sometimes create tension between State headquarters in Washington,
D.C., which often is focused primarily on security concerns and
therefore in favor of evacuation, and leadership at post, which may be
more reluctant to initiate an evacuation.
While a post is in evacuation status, there is generally a change in
the composition of staff and an increased workload, both of which can
affect staff morale. Some staff, whom the ambassador[Footnote 15]
considers critical for addressing the crisis, assisting American
citizens in the crisis, or keeping the post up and running, remain at
the post. In addition, non-U.S. staff also generally remain at the
post. These staff, referred to as locally employed staff, are typically
from the country in which the post is located, although they can also
be from third countries.[Footnote 16] Locally employed staff range from
professional office staff to drivers, groundskeepers, and others. These
remaining U.S. and local staff are often joined by U.S. government
officials from State and other agencies who are sent to the post
temporarily to help manage the crisis. The changed work environment,
including the absence of family members, the crisis-related workload
that can involve long hours, and the addition of new co-workers can
affect staff morale both positively and negatively. According to State
officials, the crisis atmosphere can create a special bond among the
remaining post staff. In addition, these staff may feel freer to
dedicate more time to their work knowing they will not be neglecting
their families, who also are safely removed. On the other hand, State
officials said that staff remaining at the post can experience extreme
stress and feel isolated without the support of their families.
When the ambassador, in consultation with State officials at
headquarters, determines that it is safe for departed staff and
families to return to a post, the Under Secretary for Management
concludes an authorized or ordered departure by terminating the
authorization or order. If an authorized or ordered departure is not
terminated within 6 months, the post switches to "unaccompanied"
status. Since such posts have experienced prolonged crises, State deems
them more dangerous and Foreign Service officers rotate there for just
1 year instead of the more typical 2 to 4 years. Unaccompanied status
means that there are restrictions on whether spouses, children, or any
other dependents can stay at the post. There can be several gradations
of unaccompanied status. For example, Abidjan, Côte D'Ivoire, is
currently a partially unaccompanied post, where spouses and preschool-
aged children are allowed; however, State does not consider the post
safe enough for school-aged children who generally travel to and from
school and other activities on their own. A post can continue on
unaccompanied status for some time. Three posts in one Persian Gulf
country were placed on ordered departure in April 2004 and switched to
unaccompanied status in August 2004; all three remain unaccompanied as
of April 2007.
Deficiencies in State's Guidance and Plans Can Hinder Post Efforts to
Prepare for a Possible Evacuation:
Deficiencies in State's guidance and plans can hinder post efforts to
prepare for a possible evacuation of post staff, dependents, and
American citizens. State's primary crisis management guidance, the EPH,
has limited usefulness in preparing overseas posts for evacuation. In
addition, posts are not comprehensively reviewing and updating their
EAPs in order to plan and prepare for potential evacuation. Post-
produced estimates of American citizens in country are frequently
inaccurate best guesses, and weaknesses in a State and DOD MOA need to
be corrected to prepare for large-scale evacuations.
State's Emergency Planning Handbook Has Limited Usefulness in Preparing
Overseas Posts for Possible Evacuation:
The EPH contains State's emergency policies and procedures and is
State's primary crisis management guidance. State officials said the
EPH was revised in November 2005 to minimize boilerplate language and
simplify its presentation. However, we found in our survey conducted
from January 2007 to April 2007 that posts do not consider the EPH
particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation. In
our survey to posts' EACs, we asked respondents to rate the usefulness
of eight resources a post could use to prepare for the possibility of
evacuation.[Footnote 17] Among these eight resources, posts rated the
EPH last in terms of being "very useful" in preparing for the
possibility of evacuation. Almost 60 percent of respondents rated the
EPH, at best, only "somewhat useful" in preparing for the possibility
of evacuation.[Footnote 18]
In addition, a number of State officials reported that the EPH, which
is hundreds of pages long, was too generic, formulaic, and voluminous,
all of which inhibits its usefulness in preparing for possible
evacuation. For example, one post reported that the EPH had too much
boilerplate language, which concealed important information, and
another reported that the EPH was a large, unwieldy document with no
easy index and information that was not easy to access. One senior
State official told us that the EPH was not helpful during a major
evacuation because it was quickly rendered irrelevant by fast-moving
events.
Moreover, the EPH is missing some elements that could be useful to
prepare for the possibility of large-scale evacuation of American
citizens. For example, while the EPH provides guidance on communicating
with the media in various crisis situations, we found it has no
specific guidance for addressing the public through the media during a
mass evacuation of American citizens from a war zone. In addition, it
does not contain guidance, such as lessons learned, best practices, or
tips from experienced consular officers, on producing accurate
estimates of the number of American citizens in country for F-77
reports.
The handbook is also a post's principal reference for preparing and
revising its EAP. However, over half of posts reported that the EPH
was, at best, only "somewhat useful" in developing the post's EAP. For
example, some posts reported that the EPH is too general and cumbersome
to use to develop an EAP.
State Is Not Comprehensively Reviewing and Updating Emergency Action
Plans:
Posts are required to create and periodically update an EAP that
includes planning for crises and "trip wires" used to determine when to
authorize post staff and dependents to leave, order them to leave,
close down the post, or initiate the evacuation of American
citizens.[Footnote 19] According to State guidance, all posts are
required to conduct a comprehensive review and update of their EAPs
once a year. However, we found almost 40 percent of posts who gave a
date reported that it has been 18 months or longer since they most
recently updated their EAP. When EAPs are not comprehensively reviewed
and updated on a timely basis, important logistical information that is
critical during an evacuation may not be available to post. For
example, State officials told us that updated contact lists of local
government officials in an EAP are particularly important for the
Consular Section at post in the event that American citizens need
assistance to evacuate from a country.
Moreover, some posts have not updated trip wires in their EAPs to cover
likely threats. According to State officials, each post is required to
develop trip wires (an event such as the closure of the main road from
an embassy to a country's only airport) that can trigger a post
response (such as evacuation of post staff and dependents). Posts
reported that (1) protest and demonstrations, (2) natural disasters,
and (3) terrorism are the top three most likely threats at their posts.
Figure 3 illustrates posts' responses to the survey question, "Which
three of the following threats are the most likely to occur at your
post?"
Figure 3: Most Likely Threats to Occur at Post Identified in Survey
Results:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the types of threats
identified in survey results. The vertical axis of the graph represents
percentage from 0 to 90. The horizontal axis of the graph represents
bars for nine types of threats. The depicting is as follows, with an
estimate of the percentages depicted:
Protests/demonstrations: 80%;
Natural disasters: 65%;
Terrorism: 48%;
Avian Flu: 45%;
Sectarian violence/insurgency: 25%;
Other disease (nonavian flu): 22%;
Chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear attack: 8%;
Conventional war: 5%;
Other threats: 6%.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
However, almost 25 percent of posts reported that they do not know
whether their trip wires cover likely threats or, at best, their trip
wires leave some likely threats unaddressed. Trip wires in a post's EAP
need to be reviewed and updated to ensure that likely threats at post
are covered.
In addition, State guidance encourages posts to plan and coordinate
with other foreign missions during crises, such as evacuations.
However, almost 60 percent of posts reported that they do not have
standing arrangements with foreign missions on evacuation planning and
coordination or do not know if such arrangements are in place.[Footnote
20] The importance of working with other foreign missions in planning,
preparing, and coordinating an evacuation was highlighted by the July
2006 evacuation from Lebanon. State officials said that good
coordination with other foreign missions was an important contributor
to the success of the evacuation. Close coordination and communication
with other foreign missions can also be important for smaller
evacuations. For example, a State official reported that during an
evacuation of about 400 American citizens from West Africa in 2004, the
post extensively coordinated and communicated with foreign missions
because all American citizens were evacuated on foreign government-
arranged aircraft.
Estimates of American Citizens in Countries Abroad Are Frequently
Inaccurate and Not Based on a Particular Methodology:
State's estimates of the number of American citizens in countries
abroad are frequently inaccurate. Posts are supposed to provide an
estimation of the number of private American citizens in a country in F-
77 reports, based in part on traveler registration. These reports play
a central role in State and DOD's planning for and conducting
evacuations of American citizens. However, we found that more than
three-quarters of posts reported that the last F-77 at post was, at
best, only somewhat accurate in its estimation of the American citizen
population. In addition, of those posts able to provide an estimate of
the nature of the inaccuracies, over two-thirds reported that the F-77
report tends to underestimate the American citizen population.
Several factors may complicate the estimation of American citizens in
country. First, according to State officials, countries can experience
wide fluctuations in their American citizen populations at certain
times of the year (such as the summer tourist season, religious
festivals, or pilgrimages) and it can be challenging to estimate the
location of American citizens in country. Second, State encourages
American citizens to register with the department whenever they travel
internationally, and State relies on registration numbers to generate
estimates of American citizens in country. However, State officials
said that American citizens often do not register and cannot be
compelled to register. Third, State officials also said it is difficult
to estimate the number of dual nationals. For example, according to a
State official, there are a number of Saudis in Saudi Arabia who were
born in the United States when their parents were studying or traveling
abroad. These Saudis are eligible for U.S. citizenship and may choose
to obtain U.S. passports at any time, depending on the situation in
their country.
In addition, State officials said sometimes dual nationals with
passports are not captured in any U.S. citizen entry data received from
the host government. Dual nationals may use their non-American
passports to enter foreign countries to avoid host country-imposed fees
or to maintain a non-American profile in country. Even when a post can
make estimates of the number of dual nationals in country, it can be
difficult to predict when and if they would evacuate from a country.
Dual nationals often have close ties with friends and relatives in
country, which can influence their decision on when to evacuate.
According to State officials, the estimates posts produce in the F-77
are best guesses and not based on a particular methodology. Based on
our review of F-77 reports, the reports typically do not contain the
source data used to generate estimates or explanations from consular
officers on how they used these data to generate estimates. Considering
the complications of producing accurate estimates of American citizens
in country, consular officers need to document the processes and data
sources used to produce their estimates. If processes and data sources
used were documented, consular officers would have an understanding of
how prior estimates were generated using available information.
According to a State official, State is in the process of updating the
instructions for producing F-77 reports to include frequently asked
questions (FAQ) on preparing estimates of American citizens. However,
in our review of the FAQs, we found only basic guidance with little
detail on how to produce estimates or how to address the complexities
of estimating a diverse and changing American citizen population
overseas.
In addition to the above challenges to producing an accurate estimate,
some posts are not updating their F-77 reports on a timely basis.
According to State guidance, posts are to submit F-77 reports annually.
However, over one-quarter of posts reported that their F-77 was updated
18 months or longer ago or that they do not know when the F-77 was
updated. The F-77 plays a central role in evacuation and other crisis
management planning and provides the figures that State and DOD rely on
when planning for and conducting evacuations of American citizens. If
the F-77 reports are not updated on a timely basis, State and DOD risk
planning and preparing for evacuations with out-of-date information.
State and DOD's Memorandum of Agreement to Prepare for Large-scale
Evacuation Has Weaknesses:
When State requires assistance with a large-scale evacuation (e.g.,
during the 2006 evacuation from Lebanon), it may request help from DOD.
Guidance for coordination between State and DOD is included in an
MOA[Footnote 21] meant to define the roles and responsibilities of each
agency in implementing such large-scale evacuations. According to the
MOA, State is responsible for the protection and evacuation of all U.S.
citizens abroad and is generally responsible for evacuating U.S.
citizens. However, State may request assistance from DOD to support an
evacuation. Once DOD assistance has been requested, DOD is responsible
for conducting military operations to support the evacuation in
consultation with the U.S. ambassador. During an evacuation, the MOA
calls for coordination between State and DOD through a liaison group
responsible for evacuation planning and implementation.
However, we found weaknesses in the MOA (and its amendments) that could
reduce State and DOD's ability to quickly and effectively work together
during a crisis. The MOA does not address the logistical capabilities
and limitations of each department, such as DOD's substantial
capability to contract and track large volumes of aircraft and ships.
In addition, unlike EAPs at post, the MOA does not reference contact
lists (which could be updated on a regular basis) that could expedite
practical communications between State and DOD personnel in a crisis.
Moreover, a majority of posts reported that they have had little or no
training or preparations for a potential large-scale evacuation with
DOD.[Footnote 22] Since large-scale DOD-assisted evacuations occur
infrequently and posts have minimal training with DOD for such
evacuations, explicit guidance between State and DOD is needed to speed
communication and coordination between the departments. The lack of
readily available, hands-on information needed to quickly arrange
logistics could limit State and DOD's ability to quickly coordinate and
collaborate during a large-scale evacuation.
For example, as we reported previously,[Footnote 23] weaknesses in the
MOA and other factors, such as State and DOD having different
institutional cultures and systems, resulted in miscommunication
between State and DOD and possible delays in chartering ships and
planes to evacuate American citizens from Lebanon in July
2006.[Footnote 24] A State official in charge of logistics said State
personnel did not know DOD's chain of command, and it took time to
determine whom to contact at DOD for transportation logistics. State
officials found a DOD organization chart online, but it did not have
names and contact information. Consequently, State may have lost time
during the evacuation trying to determine whom to contact within DOD.
There Are Gaps in the Crisis Management Training State Provides to Post
Staff:
While State provides general crisis management training to overseas-
bound staff, there are gaps in this training as it relates to preparing
for and implementing evacuations. For example, insufficient EAC
training and infrequent drills can hurt posts' readiness to act in the
event of an evacuation. In addition, while CMEs are recognized as
useful, posts reported that they could be more relevant and practical.
Further, FSI crisis management training at its campus in Arlington,
Virginia, for new and returning Foreign Service officers covers a
variety of topics, including evacuation, and uses a variety of tools;
however, it does not regularly include input from colleagues with
evacuation experience. State is beginning to implement new training
tools that allow for more relevant, frequent, and inclusive training.
Insufficient EAC Training and Drills Can Hurt Posts' Readiness for
Evacuations:
As mentioned earlier, EAC members at overseas posts are responsible for
assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crises,
including possible evacuation. Almost 90 percent of posts reported that
the EAC has enough staff to meet its assigned emergency
responsibilities. According to the EPH, a "robust training program" for
staff manning overseas posts "is essential for emergency preparedness,"
including possible evacuation.[Footnote 25] Despite this guidance, we
found that insufficient training of EAC members, coupled with
infrequent drills for post staff, can hurt posts' readiness to act in
the event of an evacuation. The EAC is required to conduct at least one
tabletop exercise[Footnote 26] per year to ensure that all members
understand their roles and responsibilities, are familiar with the EAP,
and to identify out-of-date or flawed information in it. However, we
found that EAC members at several posts are not receiving the training
needed to be prepared to assist the ambassador in the event of an
evacuation or other crisis.
About 24 percent of posts reported that EAC members are only somewhat
aware or not aware of their responsibilities and need to make more
preparations for evacuation under the EAP. For example, officials from
several posts reported that newer staff have not received training
necessary to meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. EAC
members at one post reported that their newer EAC colleagues are not
familiar with retrieving and using evacuation-related information in
the EAP and could use more training in this area. Over 75 percent of
posts reported that EAC members receive training or rehearse their
assigned emergency action functions on the EAC at most once a year, if
at all. One post reported that no formal training of EAC members or
tabletop exercises have been conducted at the post since April 2003.
Even when exercises are conducted, not all EAC members are fully
engaged. For example, a Regional Security Officer who has led several
training exercises stated that there is little participation from other
EAC members and as a result, they are not prepared to make decisions in
a crisis. He added that other EAC members should be prepared to make
such decisions because the regional security officer often is engaged
in specific tasks during crises and does not make all the decisions
related to addressing them.
In addition, over one-quarter of posts reported that EAC members have
not received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
responsibilities. For example, one post noted that the frequent
turnover at unaccompanied posts, where staff serve for only 1 year,
means that EAC members at these posts need training to make them better
equipped to work as a team. Another post suggested that EAC members
should be better trained on how to coordinate crisis response with U.S.
government agencies other than State. A third post, which had received
a large influx of temporary duty staff to assist with the evacuation of
American citizens from Lebanon in the summer of 2006, commented that
its human resource officer needs training in coordinating temporary
duty staffing. Without such training, posts trying to address the needs
of temporary staff and deploy them where they would be most useful risk
diverting resources from the evacuation effort itself.
The EAC also is tasked with preparing and conducting briefings, drills,
exercises, and other crisis preparedness functions for the post as a
whole.[Footnote 27] For example, the EAC is supposed to conduct drills
that test the post's emergency notification system and the consular
warden system, which is used to notify American citizens in the country
in the event of a crisis. However, over 40 percent of posts reported
that they had never used drills or exercises to test parts of their EAP
related to drawing down post staff and dependents, and almost half of
posts reported that they had never used drills or exercises to test
parts of their EAP related to evacuation of private American citizens.
In addition, even though the EPH recommends that posts consider
involving host country response services in the training and drills
conducted, less than a third of posts reported that host government
officials have participated in evacuation drills or exercises to test
the post's EAP.[Footnote 28]
Crisis Management Exercises Considered Useful but Could Be More
Relevant to Posts:
While CMEs are widely recognized as an important tool, they could be
made more relevant to posts. CMEs are simulations meant to prepare
staff at overseas posts for handling crises, including evacuations.
According to the EPH, these exercises are supposed to be conducted at
each post every 2 to 2-1/2 years, and every year at 1-year
(unaccompanied) posts. FSI designs the exercise scenarios and hires
contractors to conduct them at the posts. FSI officials said the
training typically lasts 2 days, starting with an overview of the EPH
and EAP followed by several crisis simulations for all post staff on
the first day and continuing on the second day with longer and more
involved simulations for EAC members. Over 70 percent of posts reported
that they have used these exercises to refine their EAP, and more than
three-quarters of this group reported that the exercise was very or
extremely useful in doing so. Staff from a few posts characterized the
exercises as realistic and timely, and FSI officials cited several
instances in which the exercises improved crisis preparedness in a
concrete manner, such as by prompting post staff to identify a location
for their alternate command center.
State guidance directs that scenarios in CMEs be post-specific and
drafted with post input. However, staff from some posts described the
exercises either as not practical or relevant, too long, tying up too
many resources, or "too far-fetched." For example, staff at one post
said the exercises focused on a catastrophic but unlikely scenario,
such as a weapons of mass destruction attack, rather than smaller-
scale, more likely events, such as an ordinary bomb blast. Staff at
another post pointed out that such catastrophic scenarios are
inappropriate because they involve post staff making decisions that
would normally be made at a much higher level in Washington, D.C. The
Defense Attaché at this post said it would be helpful if after action
reports were collected on crises that have actually occurred, and if
CMEs could be designed to simulate those scenarios. The post's
management counselor added that FSI should do a better job of gathering
ideas on how to improve CMEs, and that one way to make the exercises
more realistic would be to have the post's more experienced staff
develop them and the more junior staff run through them. This would
allow the junior staff to prepare for possible crises, during which
they may have to fill in for more senior colleagues who may be absent.
Some post staff reported that more practical, frequent, and less
formal, hands-on exercises would be helpful, for example, "so people
can learn who does what, and when."
Staff at one post cited examples of shorter, more practical exercises,
or "mini CMEs," lasting only a few hours each that they had found
useful. For example, these included an exercise focused on bird flu,
which preceded an actual case of bird flu in the country, and one in
which they practiced text messaging their colleagues to warn of a car
bomb at the embassy so people would know not to go back to the building
after returning from lunch. Staff at this post also have used their
crisis management training time to discuss lessons learned after an
event. The event in this case was a large-scale evacuation of American
citizens, during which this post served as a temporary safe haven for
the evacuees. In a cable describing this CME, the ambassador wrote that
it "enabled us to 'Monday-morning quarterback' our recent experiences
while they were still fresh in our collective minds, and before
transfer season robbed us of considerable institutional knowledge." He
also said that the exercise allowed EAC members to consider lessons
learned and "allowed the crisis management trainer to hear firsthand
many of the difficulties overcome, which are details that often slip
through the cracks in the final wrap-up versions of after action
reports."
According to a State document on evacuations, locally employed staff
should be involved in all stages of emergency planning. The EPH also
encourages posts to include locally employed staff in crisis management
training. Further, a majority of posts reported that input from local
staff is "very useful" in preparing for the possibility of an
evacuation. A number of State officials with evacuation-related
experience said that these staff, who generally remain at the post
during a crisis, often at great risk to themselves, have played
critical roles during evacuations because of their contacts with the
host government and fluency in the local language. According to FSI,
local staff are included in the first day of crisis management training.
Regular Input from Staff with Evacuation Experience Could Improve FSI
Crisis Management Training:
Crisis management training at FSI in Arlington, Virginia, for new and
returning overseas staff covers a variety of topics. However, those
portions of the training we attended,[Footnote 29] which covered
evacuation-related information, were limited to tabletop exercises and
ad hoc input from participants who happen to have experienced
evacuations or other crises. FSI trains State and other U.S.-government
staff for their postings overseas. It provides courses for new Foreign
Service officers about to be sent to their first post and for more
experienced staff rotating to new posts. It also provides courses
targeted to specific positions, such as ambassadors and deputy chiefs
of mission, or Community Liaison officers (CLO).[Footnote 30] All these
courses have crisis management segments, which last anywhere from a few
hours to a few days, and cover evacuation-related information,
including a brief description of the EPH, EAP, EAC, the warden system,
and the post's obligations to private American citizens, among other
evacuation-related information. As a result, all staff receive some
training to prepare for possible evacuation before being sent overseas.
The training we attended included lectures accompanied by PowerPoint
presentations. Two of the three course segments we attended also
included tabletop exercises with hypothetical crisis scenarios
involving escalating trip wires and role playing as part of a mock EAC.
While the material presented in the courses provided some useful
information, such as descriptions of the EPH, EAP, and EAC, some of the
most practical, as well as engaging, parts of these course segments--
comments from participants who happened to have been through
evacuations--were included by chance rather than being formally
incorporated into the program. For example, a participant in one class
who had been evacuated twice from Jakarta, Indonesia provided much more
specific information than the instructor was able to provide regarding
the importance of contact information for evacuating family members.
Fifty percent more posts rated advice from experienced colleagues as
"very useful" in preparing for the possibility of evacuations compared
to the number that rated crisis management training at FSI "very
useful." Given this finding, FSI crisis management training could be
improved by incorporating guest speakers who have been through
evacuations (either as evacuees, critical staff remaining at post, or
temporary staff sent to help with the crisis). A consular official at
the embassy in Beirut who worked through the 2006 evacuation of
American citizens from Lebanon told us such training would be valuable
and she would like to contribute to it.
State Beginning to Implement New Training Tools:
State is beginning to implement training tools through which staff with
evacuation experience can share their insights with colleagues, and it
is experimenting with new mechanisms to allow more frequent and
inclusive training. For example, the Consular Affairs Bureau recently
conducted two workshops in the aftermath of Hurricanes Wilma and
Katrina that featured staff with experience evacuating American
citizens from hurricanes. In addition to State employees, the first
hurricane workshop included officials from other U.S. government
agencies, the private sector, and other entities, so participants could
learn what the roles of these entities were in the evacuations and
discuss any challenges in coordination.[Footnote 31] The second
workshop primarily included State employees but was conducted via
videoconference, which allowed local staff from affected posts to
participate. According to the Director of Consular Affairs' Office of
American Citizen Services, these staff are especially valuable because
they tend to remain at a post much longer than rotating U.S. staff and
therefore have long institutional memories and a wealth of experience.
The Consular Affairs Bureau also is in the process of developing
training based on lessons learned from staff involved in the 2006
evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon.[Footnote 32]
FSI is beginning to use new tools as well, including conducting some
exercises via videoconference. For example, it has used
videoconferencing to conduct exercises tailored to specific upcoming,
potentially crisis-prone events, such as major sporting events held in
overseas cities. It also has conducted videoconference-based exercises
from hubs in several countries that have allowed staff from outlying
posts to participate without having to travel to the training location.
While posts in some developing countries may lack the needed
infrastructure to participate in videoconferencing and differing time
zones can create scheduling problems, this technology can allow for
more frequent, on-demand exercises with greater participation from
staff at all posts as well as locally employed staff. In addition, a
State official involved in training said FSI would consider other
options for improving CMEs, including possibly reevaluating their 2-day
structure and introducing online training.
State's Lack of a Systematic Process to Collect, Analyze, and
Incorporate Lessons Learned Constrains Preparation for Evacuation:
State lacks a systematic process to collect, analyze, and incorporate
lessons learned from previous evacuations, which constrains posts'
efforts to prepare and plan for future evacuations. The majority of
posts do not complete after action reports detailing lessons learned
following an evacuation, and there is no State entity responsible for
ensuring their production. Evacuation-related after action reports do
not have a standardized format, and these reports could include lessons
learned on recurring staff and morale issues. State has no systematic
mechanism to ensure lessons learned included in after action reports
are analyzed and incorporated into modifications of training and
guidance. Although State headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc
guidance based on lessons learned from prior evacuations, the guidance
is sometimes vague and may be overlooked by posts due to the high
volume of material they receive. Post staff have limited institutional
knowledge of earlier evacuations, which points to a need for a more
comprehensive process that captures and disseminates lessons learned
from prior evacuations to all post staff.
Most Posts Did Not Complete an After Action Report Following an
Evacuation, and There Is No State Entity to Ensure Its Production:
Following an authorized or ordered departure, posts are required to
complete an after action report that includes lessons learned.
Furthermore, State guidance for cables terminating authorized or
ordered departure directs that posts submit an after action report
within 15 days. Despite this explicit guidance, almost 60 percent of
posts that have experienced an authorized or ordered departure in the
past 5 years reported that they have not produced an after action
report. As a result, State does not have the opportunity to assess most
posts' evacuation experiences. It is therefore difficult for State to
determine common themes or trends among evacuations. There may also be
similarities among posts that do produce after action reports that
would not be truly representative of post evacuations as a whole.
According to State officials, there is no single entity at State
responsible for ensuring that posts produce after action reports
following an evacuation. We were told of specific cases where valuable
lessons were learned during a recent post evacuation, but this
information remained generally unknown because State has not
systematically collected after action reports. For example, one
evacuation was due to civil unrest where several hundred Americans were
evacuated from an African country. The official told us the warden
system collapsed during the crisis; wardens either fled the violence,
could not get to their phone lists, or could not charge their cell
phones and make calls. The post had purchased a computer program that
allowed it to send text messages over cell phones en masse. The
official said this capability was critical to getting messages out to
American citizens, and the system undoubtedly saved lives. The official
further stated that the ability to text message is crucial in a crisis
and should be a standard tool for assisting American citizens. While
some posts also are implementing this communication tool, the lessons
learned from using this technology during an actual crisis may have
been lost because the official did not report the lessons learned to
State headquarters. In another example, a post in Asia went to
authorized departure during the SARS epidemic. An official who served
at the post during the epidemic said that before the event, there had
not been much thought on how posts would deal with a worldwide
epidemic, but the experience increased the post's preparedness for such
an event. However, the official said the post did not produce an after
action report detailing lessons learned during this event.
Evacuation After Action Reports Lack a Standard Format:
Though required after action reports are to include lessons learned,
policies to be clarified, resource needs, training needs, and an
assessment of host government actions, their lack of a standard
template may cause key information to be missed and make the
information hard to use and assess. We reviewed about a dozen after
action reports and found that while they were well-organized and
presented information in a logical manner, they generally varied in
style and presentation. For example, some after action reports we
reviewed presented information as a narrative, in which the author
described the event and reported observations. Other after action
reports we reviewed presented information on what went well, followed
by what could be improved or recommendations for action. A single post
also may produce multiple reports from different State entities at that
post, such as one report for lessons learned by Consular Affairs and
another report from the management officer. The lack of a standard
template that highlights key information to guide posts in their
reporting makes it possible that posts may omit important information.
For example, an ambassador at a post involved in a recent evacuation
noted that many challenges posts encounter during evacuation are not
included in after action reports.
After Action Reports Could Include Staffing and Morale Lessons Learned:
State's guidance to posts does not include providing lessons learned in
response to recurring staffing and morale issues, such as the process
of deciding whom to evacuate and what happens at a post after
nonemergency staff and family members have left. Problems involving
staff and morale can occur at posts during evacuations and may affect
the ability of posts to effectively carry out operations during and
after a crisis.
According to State officials, a challenge during evacuations is
determining which personnel will be designated as "emergency" and
required to stay at post and which staff will be designated
"nonemergency" and told to leave.[Footnote 33] There often are tensions
over who leaves and who stays. For example, some post staff have
appealed their designation as "nonemergency" in the hope of staying.
While certain senior and security-related positions would likely be
designated "emergency" positions in any situation, one State official
said that decisions regarding emergency personnel are often made based
on individual employees' ability to handle crises or their family
situation rather than their position.[Footnote 34] As a result, making
these decisions and communicating them to employees often requires
considerable skill and tact. State officials said that decisions
regarding the reasons for evacuations are sometimes not transparent,
and a State official said post staff can be suspicious of why certain
personnel were designated to leave. The State official said staff may
be concerned that an evacuation is really an attempt to "right size" a
post. After action reports could provide lessons learned on how to
improve personnel decisions in order to minimize damage to staff morale
and allow the post to function smoothly both during the crisis and when
the departing staff return.
Locally employed staff at two posts and one State official said another
concern is that local staff, who are generally from the host country or
a third country and typically remain at a post during an evacuation,
may be nervous over job security, since their supervisors are leaving
the post. They also may be unprepared for carrying out their duties in
the absence of a familiar supervisor. A State document to posts
recommends posts address local staff supervision issues before
departure and establish a clear chain of command for remaining
personnel. However, a State official said post staff who are evacuated
often do not explain to local staff who they will report to or what
their new responsibilities will be. In addition, State officials said
that local staff may fear for their personal safety during a crisis,
after nonemergency staff and dependents depart. A State official and a
State document emphasized that it is important to keep local staff as
informed as possible about an unfolding crisis, what actions the post
is taking and why, and what their roles should be. After action reports
could provide lessons learned on how to best keep local staff informed
about an unfolding crisis and what their new roles will be when
nonemergency staff and dependents leave.
Further, two State officials with extensive overseas experience told us
that after nonemergency staff and dependents leave the post, the role
of the CLO, who is responsible for addressing staff morale and related
issues, remains important. However, the CLO typically departs the post
with family members. These officials said post morale can drop
substantially when family members depart and staff can suffer burnout,
working exceedingly long hours. A State document to posts recommends
that posts retain as many CLO functions as possible after nonemergency
staff and dependents have left. After action reports could provide
lessons learned on the role of the CLO in maintaining staff morale and
could include best practices, such as the designation of a temporary or
backup CLO after the CLO departs.
State Has No Systematic Mechanism to Analyze and Incorporate Evacuation
Lessons Learned:
State has no systematic mechanism to ensure lessons learned from after
action reports are analyzed and incorporated into modifications of
State training and guidance. According to State officials, there is no
entity at State responsible for systematically reviewing and analyzing
the evacuation lessons learned contained in after action reports, and
no entity responsible for determining whether modifications to State
evacuation guidance and training are necessary. As a result, lessons
learned from evacuation-related events are not being comprehensively
analyzed, and lessons learned are not systematically incorporated into
guidance and training. Under the current system, the majority of posts
reported they have not received, or do not know if they received,
written guidance from State headquarters on earlier evacuations.
Although State headquarters has disseminated some ad hoc guidance based
on lessons learned from evacuated posts, the guidance can be overlooked
and is sometimes vague. State headquarters issued two lessons-learned
cables to all posts following the evacuation of almost 15,000 American
citizens from Lebanon in the summer of 2006.[Footnote 35] State also
has issued cables on lessons learned from evacuations related to
hurricanes and avian flu. However, the current system involves
distributing cables on lessons learned together with numerous cables on
other subjects, and posts easily can overlook these important lessons
due to the volume of cables received. In addition, cables do not always
include actions posts should take to prepare for evacuation. As a
result, the lessons from these sources can be inconsistent and vague.
Post Staff Have Limited Institutional Knowledge of Earlier Evacuations:
Posts reported that advice from colleagues experienced in evacuations
is one of the most useful tools in preparing for evacuations. However,
State's policy of changing staff assignments at overseas posts every 1
to 3 years limits the knowledge gained from evacuations, since staff
who experienced an evacuation at a post soon move on. The most frequent
rotations occur at unaccompanied posts, which are often in dangerous
and unstable areas. According to State officials, staff at
unaccompanied posts often are less experienced than other posts, and
staff generally change every year. Additionally, midlevel positions at
many hardship posts[Footnote 36] continue to be staffed by junior
officers who lack experience and have minimal guidance.
According to State officials, the number of positions at unaccompanied
posts is at its highest level in history. State officials said less
experienced staff can be stationed at unaccompanied posts for several
reasons; they have less seniority in State's posting process, they
often do not have families and are less affected by unaccompanied
status, or they may seek out placements at unaccompanied posts because
such postings may enhance their career development. For example, State
recently made service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion
to the senior Foreign Service. This may result in a trend toward less
experienced personnel serving shorter terms at unaccompanied posts that
could be vulnerable to future crises and potential evacuations. Since
post staff have limited institutional memory of prior evacuations,
particularly at unaccompanied posts, it is important to have a process
that captures and disseminates lessons learned from prior evacuations
to all post staff.
Conclusions:
State's diplomatic mission requires its staff and dependents to work in
posts all over the world, including in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-
prone regions from which staff and dependents might have to be
evacuated. In recent years, evacuations have occurred on a regular
basis--over the past 5 years, State has authorized or ordered the
evacuation of an average of one overseas post every 3 weeks. Private
American citizens also are present in increasing numbers all over the
world, sometimes in unstable, dangerous, or crisis-prone regions where
they might need evacuation assistance. To meet these challenges, State
has made a concerted effort to prepare staff to manage the wide variety
of crises they might face. For example, State has developed crisis
management guidance, plans, and training such as the EPH, EAP, and
instruction in Washington, D.C., and at post. State also has been
proactive in seeking to improve its ability to prepare for and
implement evacuations.
However, while we found no major adverse impacts, we did find
deficiencies in State's guidance and plans and gaps in its training to
plan, prepare for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents,
and American citizens. In addition, State lacks a systematic process to
collect, analyze, and incorporate lessons learned from previous
evacuations. As a result, State misses opportunities to assess its
performance and make modifications to improve its evacuation guidance
and training. Further, the memorandum of agreement governing State and
DOD's division of responsibility has weaknesses that could hamper
communication and cooperation between the two departments. State should
improve its planning, preparations for, and management of evacuations
through updating its guidance and plans and improving the training for
overseas staff with emergency responsibilities. With thousands of U.S.
government personnel and their families working at U.S. posts and ever-
increasing air travel of private American citizens living and traveling
overseas, evacuations will continue, and large-scale operations such as
the evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon could happen again.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens from
overseas posts, we recommend the Secretary of State:
* designate an entity within State to (1) ensure that EAPs are prepared
annually, (2) ensure that posts generate standardized evacuation after
action reports with lessons learned, and (3) systematically collect and
analyze these reports to assess State's performance and recommend
modifications to State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if
necessary;
* direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for that
particular country;
* review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members to
meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning and
preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for improving
training, particularly for less experienced EAC members; and:
* strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing them
and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the post into
exercise scenarios.
To help improve State planning, preparations for, and management of
large-scale evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens from overseas posts when State requires DOD assistance, we
recommend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense:
* review the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments) to ensure
it expedites practical communication and coordination between the two
departments before and during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in
areas regarding logistical capabilities and limitations of each
department (such as capabilities to contract and track passenger
aircraft and ships).
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report and our survey results to the
Secretaries of State and Defense for their review and comment. We
received written comments from the Departments of State and Defense
that are reprinted in appendixes III and IV. State concurred with three
of our five recommendations and partially concurred with two. State
also provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation regarding
the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments), which was the only
recommendation relevant to DOD, and did not comment on any other aspect
of the report.
Specifically, State concurred with our recommendations that the
Secretary of State:
* direct posts to complete narrative sections in the F-77 report
documenting the processes and data sources used to produce their
estimates, as well as lessons learned on generating estimates for that
particular country;
* review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members to
meet assigned emergency responsibilities, including planning and
preparing for possible evacuation, and identify areas for improving
training, particularly for less experienced EAC members; and:
* strengthen CMEs by having posts play a greater role in designing them
and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at the post into
exercise scenarios.
State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
State designate an entity within State to ensure that EAPs are prepared
annually. In its response, State said that this task is already covered
under existing State regulations and added that the department is
currently deploying a new software application that should facilitate
keeping EAPs up to date. While we welcome these efforts, it is not
clear that they are adequate to ensure that EAPs are updated on an
annual basis. State concurred with the rest of this recommendation,
which asks the Secretary of State to designate a central entity to
ensure that posts generate standardized evacuation after action reports
with lessons learned and systematically collect and analyze these
reports to assess State's performance and recommend modifications to
State guidance, plans, training, and exercises, if necessary.
Both State and DOD partially concurred with our recommendation
regarding the MOA between State and DOD (and its amendments). While
both agencies agreed to review the document, they misunderstood part of
our recommendation. We did not recommend that a contact list be added
to the MOA. Furthermore, State and DOD said they believed existing
interagency communication channels are adequate for managing and
implementing large-scale evacuations. In addition, DOD expressed
concern that explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations
in the MOA could adversely affect ongoing military operations. In
response, we have modified the recommendation to clarify that the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense review the MOA (and its
amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as capabilities
to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
State also questioned whether the survey results, as we presented them
in our report, accurately reflect posts' assessment of the usefulness
of existing crisis planning resources and whether survey results
contradict anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training. We
obtained a high response rate to our survey of overseas posts; the
survey results are a statistically valid reflection of posts' views on
the guidance and training available to plan and prepare for potential
evacuation. The survey results and findings derived from them are both
factually correct and methodologically valid. The survey was developed
based on a review of State documentation and interviews with State
officials and was reviewed with State officials from Crisis Management
Support, Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and the regional
bureaus. Survey methodology experts at GAO were directly involved in
the collection, analysis, and review of survey results, as well as the
findings and conclusions derived from those results.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Congressional
Committees and to the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will also
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this
report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the Department of State's (State) efforts to plan, prepare
for, and manage evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American
citizens from overseas posts, we (1) assessed State's guidance and
plans to prepare for possible evacuations of post staff, dependents,
and American citizens; (2) assessed the training, drills, and exercises
used to prepare staff at overseas posts for crises, including possible
evacuation; and (3) evaluated State's efforts to collect, analyze, and
incorporate lessons learned from previous evacuations into
modifications of guidance and training. We employed several
methodologies to address these three objectives. We conducted a survey
of all Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at State embassies and
consulates worldwide. In addition, we conducted structured interviews
with State employees who had experienced a variety of evacuation-
related events over the last 5 years.[Footnote 37] We also examined
State and Department of Defense (DOD) documents regarding efforts to
plan, prepare for, and manage evacuations. We met with State and DOD
officials overseas in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; in Washington,
D.C.; and at U.S. Transportation Command headquarters at Scott Air
Force Base in Illinois.
As part of our efforts to collect information on all three objectives,
we conducted a survey of all 243 EACs at State embassies and consulates
(posts) worldwide.[Footnote 38] EACs are responsible for crisis
management at post and therefore are best qualified to discuss crisis
management activities, including preparing for and implementing
evacuations. The survey consisted of 49 questions covering a range of
topics on how posts plan, prepare for, and implement evacuations, as
well as how lessons learned are reported. The survey was sent to the
principal officer at each post (typically the deputy chief of mission
or consul general). We requested that the survey be completed
collectively by members of the post's EAC, and completed surveys were
intended to reflect the views of the EAC as a whole. We received 210
completed surveys, for an overall response rate of 86 percent. State
posts are divided into six different geographical bureaus. The Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs had the highest response rate for any
geographical bureau at 92 percent, and the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs had the lowest response rate at 73 percent.[Footnote 39] The
survey was distributed by the heads of the State regional bureaus to
posts under their supervision via e-mail as a Word attachment on
January 30, 2007, and recipients were requested to complete the survey
within 2 weeks. On February 15, 2007, the regional bureaus sent
targeted e-mail reminders to posts that had not yet responded. We
contacted all remaining posts that had not yet responded by telephone,
starting on February 28, 2007. Completed surveys were accepted until
April 4, 2007.
The survey was developed based on a review of State documentation and
interviews with State officials. We conducted face-to-face pretests
with two former State regional security officers as well as two current
State officials who had recently served on an EAC. We also reviewed the
survey in a meeting with State officials from Crisis Management
Support, Consular Affairs, Resource Management, Human Resources,
Diplomatic Security, and the regional bureaus. We conducted the review
and pretests to make sure that (1) the questions were clear and
unambiguous, (2) terminology was used correctly, (3) the survey did not
place an undue burden on agency officials, (4) the information could
feasibly be obtained, and (5) the survey was comprehensive and
unbiased. We made changes to the content and format of the survey after
the meeting with State officials and after each of the four pretests,
based on comments received.
The majority of questions in the survey were close ended, which allowed
us to develop statistics that are representative of the entire universe
of Emergency Action Committees. The survey also allowed for some open-
ended responses. Commentary from open-ended questions is reflected in
the body of the report, but is not summarized statistically. Survey
percentages reported do not include nonresponses to each question in
our survey. Of responses analyzed in this report, there were relatively
few nonresponses to individual questions. Survey questions, results,
and number of respondents per question are presented in an electronic
supplement, which may be accessed at [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-
24sp].
We conducted 22 structured interviews, via e-mail and in person, with
State personnel who had served on an EAC and experienced a draw down or
evacuation within the last 5 years. Eighteen responded to our e-mail
with the structured interview questions. We also conducted four
structured interviews in person. The purpose of the structured
interview was to collect detailed qualitative information related to
evacuations through open-ended questions, such as training, guidance,
policies, implementation, morale, and lessons learned. We pretested the
structured interview in-person with two State officials currently
serving on an EAC who had experienced at least one evacuation. We made
changes to the content and format of the structured interview based on
comments from the pretests.
To identify candidates for structured interviews, we sent a brief
questionnaire, along with the survey, to all 243 EACs. The
questionnaire and survey were pretested at the same time to check for
clarity and usefulness. We made changes to the content and format of
the questionnaire based on comments we received. We received
approximately 100 completed questionnaires with respondents indicating
a willingness to participate in a structured interview via e-mail. We
reviewed the completed questionnaires and selected interview candidates
in order to obtain a wide variety of experiences. All six State
geographical bureaus were represented in the structured interviews.
Structured interview respondents had experienced many different crisis
situations, including natural disasters, disease epidemics, war
threats, and civil unrest. The respondents had experienced authorized
departure, ordered departure, assisting private American citizens in
evacuations, serving as a transit point for evacuees, departing posts
during evacuations, and traveling to posts to serve as temporary
employees while the post was in evacuation status. The respondents held
different positions at posts; such as ambassador, deputy chief of
mission, regional security officer, management officer, Consular
Affairs chief, public affairs officer, general services officer, U.S.
Agency for International Aid country director, and Peace Corps country
director.
To review State and DOD's planning, preparation for, and managing of
evacuations, we examined State and DOD documents, including State's
Emergency Planning Handbook, numerous post Emergency Action Plans,
several post-produced F-77 reports of potential evacuees, the
Memorandum of Agreement between State and DOD on the Protection and
Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals and Designated other Persons
from Threatened Areas Overseas, and various other State cables and
documents related to evacuations, including situation reports, lessons-
learned cables, and other documents discussing lessons learned.
In the United States, we met with numerous State and DOD officials to
assess how State and DOD plan, prepare for, and manage evacuations. In
Washington, we met with the Under Secretary of State for Management;
the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and other
officials from the Consular Affairs Bureau; officials from State's
regional bureaus; and from State's bureaus of diplomatic security,
administration, resource management, and political military affairs. We
also met with Crisis Management Support officials, who support State
taskforces during a crisis and train staff in evacuation policy and
procedures, and toured State's Operations Center, where taskforces are
located. In addition, we met with officials from State's Foreign
Service Institute, which conducts crisis management training.
To review how State and DOD implement staff draw downs and evacuations
of American citizens, and make observations on these agencies'
successes and challenges in doing so, we traveled to Lebanon, Cyprus,
and Saudi Arabia, where we met with U.S. embassy and host country
officials involved in staff draw downs and evacuations. State officials
in Lebanon and Cyprus implemented one of the largest evacuations of
American citizens in U.S. history. The consulate in Jeddah and the
embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, have each experienced three
evacuations in the past 5 years.
To assess how State interacts with DOD during DOD-assisted evacuations
or draw downs, we met with DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S.
Transportation Command's Military Sealift Command. We also traveled to
Scott Air Force Base in Illinois to meet with officials at U.S.
Transportation Command headquarters and its Air Mobility Command. In
addition, we spoke by telephone with Central Command officials in
Tampa, Florida.
We performed our work from June 2006 to July 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Number of Overseas Posts Evacuated Since 1988 under
Authorized and Ordered Departure Authority[A]:
This figure is a line graph depicting the number of overseas posts
evacuated since 1988 under Authorized and Ordered Departure Authority.
The vertical axis of the graph represents number of evacuations from 0
to 50. The horizontal axis represents years from 1988 to 2007. There
are three distinct peaks depicted: 1991; 1998; 2003. Those peaks are
also described as follows with the approximate number of evacuations:
1991: Gulf war, civil war, army mutiny, terrorism: 33;
1998: Iraq threat, terrorism, civil war, civil unrest, embassy bombing:
25;
2003: War in Iraq, SARS epidemic terrorism, civil war, hurricane: 40.
Source: State data on authorized and ordered departures from June 1998
to August 2007.
[A] In 1991, 1998, and 2003, the most frequent reasons for posts
evacuated under authorized and ordered departure authority are listed.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
October 2, 2007:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "State
Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can
Be Improved," GAO Job Code 320428.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mark
Libby, Crisis Management Coordinator, Office of the Executive
Secretariat, Crisis Management Support at (202) 647-7640.
Sincerely,
Signed by: Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO — David Maurer:
S/ES — Dan Smith:
State/OIG — Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved
(GAO-08-23; GAO Code 320428):
Summary and Comment:
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on GAO's draft report "Evacuation Planning and Preparations for
Overseas Posts Can Be Improved. "
The Department of State has built a strong record over many years in
managing crises overseas that threaten U.S. embassies, personnel,
citizens and interests. The GAO report notes that State has organized
temporary reductions in staff (often accomplished through voluntary
departures) or evacuations of U.S. personnel, dependents and private
American citizens over 260 times in the past twenty years alone. The
vast majority of those operations involved countries with limited
infrastructure beset by instability or violence, or suffering from a
natural disaster. Statistics alone cannot capture the enormous variety
in conditions experienced by official and private Americans overseas or
the wide range of possible scenarios to which the Department must be
prepared to respond. Advance planning and preparation, central subjects
of this report, are hallmarks of the Department's approach to crisis
management. So are flexibility and innovation needed to deal with
circumstances that do not fit the plan.
The Department's success in this regard reflects its determination to
improve continuously its crisis management performance and training. It
is strongly committed to learning from actual experience in order to
better prepare for future crises. Toward this end, the Department
welcomes the GAO review of crisis planning and preparation, and notes
that the Department has already undertaken many of the measures that
the GAO endorses. These include strengthened and sustained crisis
management training, efforts to develop and disseminate more
systematically lessons learned from crisis response and evacuations,
including better use of after-action reports, and development of best
practices that can be shared widely among posts.
Much of GAO's report focuses on basic planning and resources available
to all embassies, and the Department appreciates GAO's efforts to
review these planning efforts. This focus, while valid, perhaps
overlooked key components of the Department's overall preparedness for
crises and evacuations, including the process through which the
Department and specific posts collaborate intensively in:
* evaluating possible risks;
* refining a mission's generic planning;
* identifying mission crisis managers' key duties specific to that
crisis; and
* prioritizing required actions to respond safely and efficiently.
The Department is committed to supporting, including through
evacuations, U.S. personnel and private citizens in every country. It
believes every mission must have a base level of preparedness. But it
also understands that U.S. embassies and personnel operate in wildly
divergent threat environments. The most intense focus of its crisis
management planning and preparation is therefore on those missions
facing the greatest threats.
In handling these high-threat situations, moreover, the ongoing
dialogue between the Department and posts is critical to our success in
responding to situations that often escalate quickly and take
unexpected turns. Preparation and planning are vitally important, but
so is the ability to monitor conditions and adapt appropriately to ever-
changing circumstances.
Planning and Preparation
With regard to the basic crisis-management guidance that State provides
to overseas posts, the Department appreciates the GAO report's
observations and recommendations, but notes an apparent contradiction
between the report's suggestion, incorrect in our view, that Department
guidance to posts is too long, laden with "boilerplate" language, and
the report's recommendation that State provide additional, more
comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of crisis management to the
field. The Department notes that there is a fine balance between giving
our overseas missions the support they need and overburdening them with
additional guidance or reporting requirements. The wide range of
geographical, political, and other factors with which each post must
contend, moreover, means that no "one-size-fits-all" approach to crisis
preparation is appropriate. Instead, Department training and
contingency planning resources are designed to provide missions with a
toolbox from which they can develop plans that realistically reflect
their particular operating environments. The Department is nonetheless
committed to ensuring that crisis management training and other tools
used by posts for emergency planning (such as the Emergency Planning
Handbook and Emergency Action Plans) are as useful, relevant, and fresh
as possible. (See comment 1)
The Department partially concurs with the recommendation that it
designate an entity within State to ensure Emergency Action Plans
(EAPs) are prepared annually. Chiefs of Mission are already Charged
under 12 FAH 1 to "oversee the efforts of post personnel to prepare for
crises." The Department is currently deploying a new software
application (the Crisis and Emergency Planning Application - CEPA),
which will ensure wider participation and further familiarize employees
with Post's Emergency Action Plans. It will also help Emergency Action
Committee members at post better understand their roles in a crisis
situation -- and allow experienced staff at post to record useful
evacuation-related information and tips for their successors'
consideration. The Department believes this will largely address the
concerns behind the GAO's recommendation regarding preparation of EAPs.
The Department notes, however, that the conclusions drawn in some
sections of the GAO draft report regarding these basic planning tools
are at variance with the actual survey data collected by GAO about the
usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. On page 15, for
example, the report states that most posts feel the Emergency Planning
Handbook (EPH) is of only limited usefulness in preparing for an
evacuation. Yet the raw survey data shows that a solid 81% of
respondents view the EPH as either "somewhat" or "very" useful –
perhaps because the EPH includes guidance (such as checklists for
planning evacuation routes, establishing helicopter landing zones, and
identifying evacuation assembly areas) crucial to posts as they draw up
the EAPs that will guide them in an actual crisis. EAP checklists, EAPs
themselves, and crisis management exercises received even higher marks
for usefulness in preparing for an evacuation (90%, 87%, and 87%,
respectively). GAO's raw survey data indicates that nearly three-
quarters of posts reported using Crisis Management Exercises (CMEs) to
refine their EAPs, elements of which over 85% of respondents report
rehearsing at least once yearly. Most respondents report that their
EAPs address the likeliest threats at their post, including terrorism,
natural disaster, and civil unrest. (See comments 2, 3, and 4)
In addition, the Department's EPH and individual posts' EAPs address
contingencies (such as building fires, bomb threats, and certain health
emergencies) that might involve responses other than evacuation. Much
of the additional "volume" and "boilerplate language" identified by
survey respondents provides guidance to posts on how to plan for these
sorts of emergencies – and, while less useful for evacuation planning
per se, the Department believes that this guidance is still important
to include in the EPH.
The Department also notes that the draft report's discussion of F-77
reports on American citizens in consular districts overseas (pages 18-
20) incorrectly implies it would be possible for posts to generate a
definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
moment. The draft states that the Department "encourages but does not
require" U.S. citizens to register while overseas, implying that this
might be a policy decision or a question of resource allocation. In
fact, the Department cannot require or compel American citizens to
register while overseas. Because of this, consular officials must rely
on a range of other indicators to arrive at their F-77 estimates. These
indicators vary from country to country, depending on the unique
circumstances of each consular district, and therefore do not lend
themselves to the sort of standardized methodology the draft report
seems to recommend. The Department nonetheless feels that the
statistics in these F-77 reports, which are based on consular officers'
first-hand knowledge of the situations in their host countries,
represent the best possible estimates given the reality of overseas
operations. (See comments 5 and 6)
The Department concurs with the recommendation that it direct Posts to
complete the narrative sections in the F-77 report and is investigating
ways to implement the report's recommendation.
The GAO report criticized the lack of a "particular methodology" in
estimating the number of Americans in country. While it did not offer
suggestions on how the Department can reach more definitive estimates,
the report did recommend that posts document processes and data sources
in the F-77 report. When generating the F-77, many posts already use
the "comments" field to describe how they have estimated the number of
Americans present in their consular districts. These comments are
accessible to any reader on the Department's sensitive-but-unclassified
intranet website. The Department will explore modification of this
software application to make data entry in the comments field mandatory
— and require posts to use this field to identify their particular data
sources and methodology as they update their F-77s.
Crisis Management Exercises and Training:
The Department concurs with the recommendations that the Department
review post and FSI crisis management training for EAC members, and
that posts play a greater role in planning CMEs, but notes that this is
an existing and ongoing process carried out by FSI, in conjunction with
posts.
The overwhelmingly positive response and high marks given to FSI in the
GAO's comprehensive survey often contradict anecdotal
comments/criticisms regarding FSI training contained in the report.
These positive survey results reflect the views of the Department: that
our training is effectively preparing our people for the challenges
that they will face throughout their careers. (See comment 7)
While the Department is never "satisfied" with it training efforts — as
evidenced by our continual review and updating of the FSI curriculum,
including examining the possibility of distance learning programs for
EAC members — we would note GAO's survey reported 74% of the
respondents answered "Yes" to the question of whether EAC members have
received training necessary to meet their assigned emergency
responsibilities (question 11). (See comment 8)
The FSI role is to prepare Department and other US Government employees
for the full range of potential contingencies. In some countries the
stability of the society, economy, and political situation weighs
heavily against the possibility of a mass evacuation of American
citizens or a drawdown of our posts. Posts in these countries face a
far greater likelihood of other contingencies: terrorism, mass casualty
events (e.g., a plane crash), demonstrations near the embassy, etc.
Including evacuation training in all of our exercises—including posts
where evacuation is improbable—would not be the best use of training
time and resources. Conversely, in selected major transportation hubs,
an exercise that includes the receipt of evacuees from other posts is
certainly a viable scenario to include in crisis management exercises.
Our mission in Germany is not a likely candidate for evacuation, but
the Consulate General in Frankfurt, located at a major transit point
for international air travel, has received evacuees in the past from
other countries and posts. FSI has included such scenarios in its
training of many of those posts.
With regard to the design of CMEs, FSI trainers always coordinate post-
specific scenario development, working with each individual post
through the designated point of contact. The FSI trainer also requests
that members of the Emergency Action Committee be contacted for their
input. FSI seeks to incorporate post-preferred scenarios to the extent
possible into the actual crisis management exercise.
Regarding GAO's finding that crisis management exercises could be more
relevant to posts, the statistics provided in the report indicate that
the overwhelming majority of posts (72%) found they have used exercises
to refine their EAP and 76% of this group reported the exercise was
very or extremely useful in doing so (results of question 26 of the GAO
survey). (See comment 9)
Integrating Lessons Learned with Training and Planning Mechanisms:
The Department concurs with the recommendation that the Department
establish additional procedures to ensure that EAPs are updated, after
action reports are collected and that lessons learned are applied.
State has begun to implement procedures that will address GAO's
recommendation that the Department systematically capture and integrate
lessons learned in future crisis planning. The Department is already
implementing GAO's two recommendations regarding crisis management
training and crisis management exercises by constantly reviewing the
content and presentation of training modules and CMEs to ensure that
they are relevant and that they incorporate lessons learned from
previous evacuations. (See comment 10)
After-action reports are currently requested by the Executive Secretary
in the same memo that authorizes the establishment of a crisis
management task force. They are also requested by the Under Secretary
for Management in the cable s/he issues to terminate a post's
authorized or ordered departure status. In the future, the Executive
Secretariat will follow up these requests by tasking the lead regional
bureau to draft an after-action report that will incorporate lessons
learned by domestic players and the overseas post(s) involved. The
Executive Secretariat will work with the bureaus concerned to ensure
the after-action report is comprehensive, useful, and prepared on a
reasonable deadline -- and will archive the report for easy on-line
access in the future.
Once an after-action report is received, the Executive Secretariat's
Crisis Management Staff will follow up with the relevant bureaus and
offices within State (including the Bureau of Consular Affairs,
Diplomatic Security, the concerned regional bureau[s], the Foreign
Service Institute, representatives from the Under Secretary for
Management's office, the Family Liaison Office, and other regional and
functional bureaus as appropriate) to ensure consideration and
implementation, both domestically and at posts overseas, of crisis-
management and training lessons learned. As appropriate, the Executive
Secretariat will disseminate lessons learned to counterparts in other
agencies.
Coordination with the Department of Defense:
The Department partially concurs with the recommendation regarding
review of the State DOD Memorandum of Agreement and will continue to
review the MOA with DOD, but does not believe that it requires revision
at the present time.
The Department notes that although the GAO's draft report suggests
there may be a need to strengthen the State-Defense Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), there is little specific information about how the MOA
could be improved. With decades of experience managing successful
evacuations with DoD, the State Department feels that the two agencies
in fact have a clear idea of each other's capabilities and
organizational cultures. The standing contact list recommended by GAO
would not be a useful addition to the MOA since personnel in both
Departments regularly rotate duty stations and such a list would
quickly become obsolete. (See comment 11)
The Department notes there are already several more useful channels of
communication between State and DOD, including: consultation through
the interagency Washington Liaison Group; the Military Advisor
permanently stationed in State's 24-hour Operations Center; eighteen
military officers currently serving in the Department's Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs; and the State Department Political Advisors
detailed to the military's various combatant commands. These personnel
are experts who are in frequent contact with each other, and who
regularly play key roles in State-Defense coordination of evacuation-
related issues. Frequent contacts continue at other levels, as well.
For example, following the summer 2006 Lebanon evacuation,
representatives of State's Office of Logistics Management
traveled to USTRANSCOM headquarters to meet with their counterparts.
The Department of State plans future such visits to TRANSCOM to
maintain a positive working relationship and open communication
channels. Furthermore, both Departments have 24-hour watches – such as
State's Operations Center and Political Military Action Team (PMAT) and
DOD's National Military Command Center – that are also in frequent and
regular contact with each other, especially during crises.
The Department will ensure, through our ongoing training, that
personnel involved in crisis response understand the highly-effective
channels of interagency communication already available – and are aware
of the central coordination role the Executive Secretariat plays in
State's communications with DOD and other agencies.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter
dated October 2, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. State notes an "apparent contradiction" between our reference to
lengthy and cumbersome State guidance and a recommendation that State
"provide additional, more comprehensive guidance on specific aspects of
crisis management to the field." Our report contains no such
recommendation. According to the audit work we conducted, as detailed
in appendix I, we found the Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) to be
both "too generic" and "voluminous," as well as lacking in information
useful in preparing for and implementing a large-scale evacuation of
American citizens.
2. We disagree with State's assertion that some of the conclusions in
this report are at variance with the actual survey data collected by
GAO about the usefulness of existing crisis planning resources. The
survey results and findings derived from them are both factually
correct and methodologically valid. Survey methodology experts at GAO
were directly involved in the collection, analysis, and review of
survey results, as well as the findings and conclusions derived from
those results.
3. State has mischaracterized our statement. In our report, we stated
that, based on survey results, posts do not consider the EPH
particularly useful in preparing for the possibility of evacuation.
Half of overseas posts rated the EPH as "somewhat useful" in preparing
for an evacuation. This, along with the 9 percent who said the EPH was
"not very useful" or "not at all useful," as well as comments by a
number of State officials that it was too generic, formulaic, and
voluminous, indicate that while the EPH is of some utility, there is a
definite opportunity to improve the EPH when it comes to helping posts
prepare for an evacuation.
4. State has attempted to reinterpret our survey results by combining
the responses for "somewhat useful" and "very useful" for various
tools; this obscures the point that the EPH could be improved. Please
see the analysis as detailed in comment 3 above.
5. We did not imply that it would be possible for posts to generate a
definitive number of Americans in any given country at any given
moment; we understand that the F-77 is an estimate of American citizens
and estimates vary in terms of accuracy. We reported that more than
three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only
somewhat accurate in its estimation of the American citizen population.
6. We have modified the text in the report to reflect that State cannot
require American citizens to register with the department.
7. We disagree with State's assertion that our survey data contradict
anecdotal comments/criticisms regarding FSI training and that the
survey results are "positive." In our report, the survey results and
findings derived from them are both factually correct and
methodologically valid. We obtained a high response rate to our survey
of Emergency Action Committees (EAC) at overseas posts; the survey
results are a statistically valid reflection of posts' views on the
guidance and training available to plan and prepare for potential
evacuation.
8. We agree that 74 percent of the respondents answered "yes" to the
question of whether EAC members have received training necessary to
meet their assigned emergency responsibilities. However, the responses
to our survey came from EACs, whose members are responsible for
assisting the ambassador in planning and preparing for crisis,
including possible evacuation. We are concerned that more than a
quarter of EACs have reported that their members have not received
training necessary to meet their emergency responsibilities;
insufficient training for EAC members can hurt posts' readiness to act
in the event of evacuation.
9. We agree that crisis management exercises (CME) are generally
considered useful; in our report we have identified areas where CMEs
can be improved, such as by having posts play a greater role in
designing them and incorporating the most likely threats to occur at
the post into exercise scenarios.
10. While we appreciate State's concurrence with establishing
additional procedures to ensure that Emergency Action Plans (EAP) are
updated, we did not make a separate recommendation to this effect. This
is a misstatement of the first part of our first recommendation, which
asks the Secretary of State to designate an entity within State to
ensure EAPs are prepared annually.
11. We did not recommend that a standing contact list be added to the
memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we
have modified our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should
review the MOA (and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical
communication and coordination between the two departments before and
during a large-scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding
logistical capabilities and limitations of each department (such as
capabilities to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Security Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900:
October 2, 2007:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-08-23, 'State Department: Evacuation Planning and
Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved,' dated August 30, 2007
(GAO Code 320428).
The draft report contains several recommendations, one of which is
addressed to the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The
GAO recommends the two departments review the memorandum of agreement
on overseas noncombatant evacuations and focus that review on two
areas. DoD partially concurs in that recommendation with explicatory
comments enclosed with this letter.
The Department has no comment on the draft report, which assesses
Department of State programs, planning, and preparations for overseas
evacuations.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Benkert:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 30, 2007:
GAO-08-23 (GAO CODE 320428):
"State Department: Evacuation Planning And Preparations For Overseas
Posts Can Be Improved:"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense: review the Memorandum of Agreement between
State and DoD (and its amendments) to ensure it addresses the general
capabilities and limitations of each department, as well as ways to
expedite practical communication and coordination between the two
departments before and during a large-scale evacuation. (Page 36/GAO
Draft Report)
DOD Response: Partially concur.
GAO report 08-23 assesses Department of State programs, planning, and
preparations for overseas evacuations. Noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO) are included among the types of evacuations the report
addresses. As the report notes, DoD does not participate in the large
majority of State-ordered or authorized evacuations, but it does
participate in NEOs at the request of the State Department.
DoD and State signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) on NEOs several
years ago. Because the MOA is almost 10 years old, DoD agrees it would
be useful to review it. We will approach State to initiate a review by
November 2007. However, DoD does not agree that the MOA should include
a list of general capabilities or a contact list for the following
reasons. (See comment 1)
The MOA's procedures are designed to facilitate communication between
the agencies. It established the Washington Liaison Group (WLG),
regional liaison groups, and other interagency working groups as the
mechanisms to coordinate DoD's and State's NEO activities, logistics,
and information sharing. Those groups work very well responding to
requirements and including appropriate DoD support elements as needed.
The WLG is the point of contact for DoD on all NEO matters. The WLG
itself is augmented by the crisis management staffs of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. OSD recently established
a focal point for global crisis management activities within the office
of the ASD-Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. This office
serves as the entry point into DoD for the interagency during crisis
operations, such as NEOs. It collaborates closely with the Joint Staff
and shares information with State Department's operations center,
facilitating contact among the required subject matter experts. OSD's
crisis management staff maintains contact and responsibilities lists
across the organization. Thus, the required experts within the
organization can be identified according to the circumstances and
contacted rapidly, while minimizing confusion and duplication of tasks.
This approach is more enduring, more responsive, and less confusing
during a crisis.
The MOA covers DoD's roles, responsibilities and authorities for
noncombatant evacuations. It also contains a "Checklist for Increased
Interagency Coordination in Crisis/Evacuation Situations" as appendix
one, which sets up interagency processes that are used by the NEO-
related interagency working groups. Those procedures in tandem with the
WLG and other groups are well-established and work very well responding
to requirements. DoD makes every effort to respond quickly to identify
support requirements. Support capabilities will depend on the
operational environment in which the NEO will be conducted.
Capabilities and limitations should be identified during "Mission
Analysis" by the operational commander when a NEO is imminent.
Including a list of general capabilities and limitations has a high
risk of unwitting, adverse affects on ongoing operations and
operational planning if there are attempts to secure listed DoD
capabilities independent of military operations. Section E
"Responsibility for Military Operations" of the MOA further elucidates
and addresses that concern. Finally, DoD is willing to consider
participating in NEO training at State's Foreign Service Institute.
(See comment 2)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense letter
dated October 2, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. We did not recommend that a contact list be added to the memorandum
of agreement (MOA) between State and DOD. In addition, we have modified
our recommendation to clarify that State and DOD should review the MOA
(and its amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department (such as capabilities
to contract and track passenger aircraft and ships).
1. We have modified our recommendation to address DOD's concern that
explicitly specifying general capabilities and limitations in the MOA
could adversely affect ongoing military operations. The intent of the
recommendation is to have State and DOD review the MOA (and its
amendments) to ensure it expedites practical communication and
coordination between the two departments before and during a large-
scale evacuation, particularly in areas regarding logistical
capabilities and limitations of each department.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant
Director; Ian Ferguson; Jonathan Fremont; Kay Halpern; Catherine
Hurley; Monica Wolford; and Joe Carney made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Overseas posts are State-operated U.S. embassies and consulates in
other countries.
[2] GAO, State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American
Citizens from Lebanon, GAO-07-893R (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007).
[3] Survey questions, results, and number of respondents per question
are presented in an electronic-supplement to this report, which may be
accessed at [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-24sp]. Survey percentages
reported do not include nonresponses to each question in our survey.
[4] Survey responses collectively completed by State overseas posts'
EAC members will hereafter be presented as "Posts reported that..."
[5] State's FSI compiled these records on an informal basis to provide
context for its crisis management training.
[6] See app. II for a timeline showing authorized and ordered
departures by year since 1988.
[7] "Evacuations of post staff, dependents, and American citizens" will
be used interchangeably with "authorized or ordered departure of post
staff and dependents, and assisted departure of American citizens."
[8] Even less frequently, State will close a post after evacuating all
staff and dependents. The last time this occurred was Embassy Bangui,
Central African Republic, in November 2002.
[9] A list of current travel warnings issued by State can be found at
State's Web site,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html.
[10] According to statistics compiled by the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Travel and Tourism, U.S. citizen overseas air travel is
increasing. U.S. citizen overseas air travel rose over 50 percent from
1996 to 2006, from 19,786,300 to 29,947,055 U.S. citizen departures,
excluding travel to Canada and Mexico.
[11] Pursuant to statutory requirement, State has a mechanism for
seeking reimbursement from American citizens for commercial
transportation costs associated with an evacuation. State evacuates
U.S. citizens from overseas locations according to 22 U.S.C.
2671(b)(2)(A), which authorizes expenditures from the department's
appropriation for Emergencies in the Diplomatic or Consular Service
(the "K Fund") for "the evacuation when their lives are endangered by
war, civil unrest, or natural disaster of (i) United States Government
employees and their dependents; and (ii) private United States citizens
or third-country nationals, on a reimbursable basis to the maximum
extent practicable..."
[12] During the summer of 2006 evacuation from Lebanon, State suspended
its policy of collecting promissory notes from evacuees regarding
reimbursement for evacuation-related costs; State officials said they
viewed this policy as a potential hurdle in the evacuation process due
to the significant potential danger associated with the situation on
the ground in Lebanon.
[13] According to State guidance, CMEs are to be conducted annually at
1-year tour of duty posts, and every 2 to 2-1/2 years at other posts.
[14] Pursuant to the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of
Mission, the ambassador is responsible for protecting all U.S.
government personnel on official duty abroad, other than those under
the protection of a U.S.-area military commander or on the staff of an
international organization, and their accompanying dependents.
[15] Decisions regarding staff drawdowns at individual posts are made
by the chief of mission at the post. The chief of mission at an embassy
is the ambassador; the chief of mission at a consulate is the charge
d'affairs or the principal officer.
[16] For example, many locally employed staff at U.S. posts in Saudi
Arabia are not Saudi nationals.
[17] We asked posts to rate the usefulness (very, somewhat, not very,
not at all) of the following resources in preparing for the possibility
of evacuation: (1) Emergency Planning Handbook; (2) Emergency Action
Plan; (3) Emergency Action Plan checklists; (4) crisis management
exercises; (5) other crisis management training; (6) F-77 Report of
Potential Evacuees; (7) advice from colleagues who have experienced
evacuations; (8) input from local staff on situations in country,
including previous evacuations; (9) the Transfer and Evacuation
Management System; (10) the Crisis Management Support "Heads Up"
package, and (11) Other. The last three options were removed from the
analysis because these three options received a large number of "no
basis to judge" or non-responses in our survey.
[18] In rating the usefulness of the EPH in preparing for the
possibility of evacuation, 31 percent of respondents said it was "very
useful," 50 percent said it was "somewhat useful," 7 percent said it
was "not very useful," 2 percent said it was "not at all useful," and
10 percent said they had "no basis to judge."
[19] State has recently instituted an electronic system to facilitate
the drafting of EAPs, and many posts are currently using the system.
[20] In commenting on a draft of this report, State said standing
arrangements with other foreign missions are impractical in many
situations because State's first priority is assisting U.S. citizens.
According to our survey, 26 percent of posts reported that, during the
last 2 years, they had discussions with other foreign missions on at
least a quarterly basis regarding emergency evacuation planning and
coordination.
[21] "Memorandum of Agreement Between The Departments of State and
Defense on the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Nationals
and Designated Other Persons From Threatened Areas Overseas," last
updated July 1998.
[22] According to State officials, DOD conducts its own mock embassy
evacuation training exercises. On an ad hoc basis, DOD asks State staff
from Washington, D.C., to role play as embassy staff during the
exercises. However, this U.S.-based training is for DOD units tasked to
carry out such operations and is not typically conducted with overseas
posts.
[23] GAO-07-893R.
[24] For example, officials at both agencies noted that State and DOD
speak different "languages," which made it difficult for State to
communicate its needs and the urgency of the crisis to DOD. In
addition, State consular and DOD officials in Lebanon and Cyprus used
data systems with different classification levels, which inhibited the
exchange of important logistical information.
[25] EPH, 12 FAH-1 H-761.
[26] A tabletop exercise is a simulation in which an event, like a
crisis that could lead to an evacuation, is discussed along with
possible reactions to the event.
[27] According to the EPH (12 FAH-1 H-231), "Responsibilities of the
EAC include...drills, exercises and other crisis preparedness functions
(see 12 FAH-1 H-244 and 12 FAH-1 H-700) and...ensuring mission-wide
familiarity with the EAP and representative participation in its
preparation process."
[28] Almost three-quarters of posts have identified and contacted local
government officials, such as airport and seaport officials, who might
help facilitate the evacuation of large numbers of American citizens.
Further, 65 posts, or 31 percent of posts responding to our survey,
indicated that such officials would be both "extremely" or "very"
willing and "extremely" or "very" able to help facilitate the
evacuation of large numbers of American citizens. However, a majority
of these posts reported that they did not include local government
officials in evacuation drills or exercises to test the post's EAP.
[29] We attended crisis management segments for three courses: the
general course for experienced State and other U.S. government staff
about to rotate to new posts, one for new Foreign Service officers, and
one for CLOs.
[30] CLOs who work in conjunction with State's Family Liaison Office
typically are employee spouses who are paid to address the needs of
family members at an overseas post and ensure the cohesiveness and
morale of the post community, such as by planning social events. CLOs
are responsible for addressing families' practical and emotional needs
during an authorized or ordered departure and typically leave the post
with families.
[31] In addition to Consular Affairs staff, participants included staff
from affected posts in Mexico and the Caribbean, and related State
regional and functional units such as the Western Hemisphere Affairs
Bureau and Crisis Management Support; officials from other U.S.
government agencies such as DOD, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and the Federal Aviation Administration; private industry
representatives from the travel, airline, cruise, and other industries;
international organizations (the Pan American Health Organization); and
foreign government officials whose citizens had also been stranded by
the hurricanes.
[32] State previously produced a digital video disc (DVD) ("Crisis
Response") and a video ("Lives on Hold") that share lessons learned by
former Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and other State officials in the
aftermath of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings and crises,
including evacuations, at other posts.
[33] The EPH provides no specific definition of "emergency" or
"nonemergency" staff or positions, but states that "if an authorized or
ordered departure is necessary, post must plan to keep a sufficient
amount of staff available at post to maintain certain operating
functions..." (12 FAH-1 H-222 Drawdown Staffing). These functions
include security and logistics; communications with State personnel in
Washington, D.C.; U.S. citizen and other consular services;
communication of U.S. foreign policy; and public affairs.
[34] For example, single parents in a key role will likely need to
leave with their children.
[35] These two cables also were posted to the State Crisis Management
Web site.
[36] State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives of an additional 5
percent to 35 percent of base salary, depending on the severity or
difficulty of the conditions, to encourage employees to bid on
assignments to these posts and compensate them for the hardships they
encounter.
[37] These events included authorized departure, authorized departure
that became an ordered departure, ordered departure only, evacuation of
American citizens, or serving at a post that was a transit point for
one of the above events.
[38] The survey was not sent to small posts that do not have an EAC.
[39] Posts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not respond to our survey. Given
the ongoing political and security situations in both countries, State
officials told us it would not be feasible for these posts to complete
our survey.
[End of section]
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(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, DC 20548: