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entitled 'Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to take
Additional Steps to Improve Mobilization Data for the Reserve
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Military Personnel:
DOD and the Services Need to Take Additional Steps to Improve
Mobilization Data for the Reserve Components:
DOD's Deployment Data:
GAO-06-1068:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1068, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO has previously reported on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)
ability to track reservists deployed to the theater of operations and
made recommendations. Reliable mobilization and deployment data are
critical for making decisions about reserve force availability and
medical surveillance. Because of broad congressional interest, GAO
initiated a review under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct
evaluations on his own initiative to determine (1) what DOD data
indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in support
of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the selected demographic and
deployment characteristics of those deployed and (2) whether DOD’s
reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable. GAO
analyzed data and data analyses from DOD’s Contingency Tracking System
(CTS) and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found:
GAO’s analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists
have been mobilized in support of GWOT as of June 30, 2006, and more
than 378,000 reservists, or 71 percent of the number mobilized, have
been deployed. The number of reservists deployed increased through
fiscal year 2003 and remained stable through fiscal year 2005. The
majority of reservists have been deployed once. GAO’s analysis further
indicates that of the more than 378,000 reservists who have deployed in
support of GWOT, 81 percent have spent a year or less deployed and 17
percent of reservists have spent more than 1 year but less than 2 years
deployed. Of those who deployed, almost 98 percent were U.S. citizens.
Since GWOT began, about 78 percent of reservists who were deployed were
White, about 14 percent were Black or African American, and almost 90
percent identified themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as
Hispanic. Of those who were deployed, 89 percent were male and 11
percent were female. There were three variables—volunteer status,
location deployed, and unit deployed—required by DOD policy for which
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) could not provide data because
the data either did not exist or were not reliable enough for the
purposes of GAO’s report.
GAO found the deployment and mobilization data used to be reliable for
providing descriptive information. However, the mobilization data, some
deployment data fields, and DMDC’s processes for data analyses need
improvement. DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve
the reliability of mobilization data; however, additional steps are
needed to make mobilization data more reliable. DMDC and the services
have undertaken a large-scale, challenging effort to replace all
previous service-provided mobilization data in DMDC’s CTS database with
new data from the services, referred to as “rebaselining.” To date, the
Air Force has certified that it has rebaselined its data and Navy
officials say they have validated their personnel files and established
a common baseline of data with DMDC. The Army, which has mobilized the
largest number of reservists, has not completed its rebaselining effort
and has not set a deadline for completion. Also, DOD has not fully
addressed other data issues that could affect the accuracy and
completeness of the data, such as standardizing the use of key terms
and ensuring that the services address data issues identified by DMDC
as well as provide data for all required data fields, such as location,
to DMDC. Also, because the data analyses DMDC provided had numerous
errors, GAO questions the effectiveness of its verification procedures
and other supporting procedures, all of which DMDC has not documented.
Until DOD addresses data issues and DMDC documents the internal control
procedures it uses to analyze data and verify its analyses of the data,
the information provided to decision makers within Congress and DOD may
be unreliable and decision makers will not be in the best position to
make informed decisions about reserve force availability and
reservists’ exposure to health hazards.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD standardize the use of key terms; provide
required data, such as location; and document its internal procedures,
processes, and assumptions for analyzing and verifying data analyses.
DOD generally concurred except for the need for DMDC to document its
assumptions. GAO believes that basic key assumptions should be
documented.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1068].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202)
512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Data Show Demographic and Deployment Characteristics of Hundreds of
Thousands of Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT:
DOD and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve the Reliability of
Reserve Component Data, but More Needs to Be Done:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT through
June 30, 2006:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Citizenship Status of Reservists Deployed in Support of the
Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 200620:
Table 2: Race of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Table 3: Ethnicity of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War
on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Table 4: Gender of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by Reserve Component through June 30, 2006:
Table 5: Reserve Component Categories for Reservists Deployed in
Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30,
2006:
Table 6: State, Territories, and Armed Forces Areas of Residence for
Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through
June 30, 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organizational Hierarchy for DOD's Defense Manpower Data
Center9:
Figure 2: Reservists Mobilized and Deployed in Support of the Global
War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Figure 3: Reservists Mobilized in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006:
Figure 4: Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism
by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006:
Figure 5: Number of Reservists Who Have Deployed One, Two, or Three or
More Times in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30,
2006:
Figure 6: Number of Reservists Who Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 to 2
Years, or More Than 2 Years Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Figure 7: Percentage of Reservists Deployed in the Selected Reserve in
Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Figure 8: Citizenship Status of Reservists at the Time of Their Most
Current Deployment in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through
June 30, 2006:
Figure 9: Number of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by State through June 30, 2006:
Abbreviations:
CTS: Contingency Tracking System:
DEERS: Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System:
DFAS: Defense Finance and Accounting Service:
DIMHRS: Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System:
DMDC: Defense Manpower Data Center:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GWOT: Global War on Terrorism:
RCCPDS: Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System:
USD (P&R): Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 20, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
Since President Bush signed an Executive Order establishing the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT)[Footnote 1] on September 14, 2001, hundreds of
thousands of National Guard and Reserve servicemembers[Footnote 2] have
been activated, mobilized, and deployed[Footnote 3] in support of
efforts in, among other places, Afghanistan and Iraq. As the Department
of Defense (DOD) continues to rely on about 1.3 million reservists to
carry out its military operations domestically and abroad, there
continues to be congressional interest in the impact of GWOT on reserve
employment, income change, medical and health status of reservists, and
other issues.
For decades, DOD has been collecting and reporting information on
active duty and reserve component servicemembers. However, it was not
until October 2001, less than a month after the terrorist attacks, that
DOD emphasized the need for the services to specifically report
information about mobilized and deployed reservists who support
contingencies.[Footnote 4] While DOD has been collecting this
information, several reports have emphasized information about
reservists who have been mobilized, not deployed. Further, some of our
prior reports[Footnote 5] have raised concerns about DOD's ability to
effectively track reservists who are being deployed to the theater of
operation. Information about reservists' deployments is needed to
assess reserve force availability and to link reservists' locations
with exposure to medical hazards. Our past work has also confirmed that
it is critical that DOD collect, maintain, and report reliable
information on deployed reservists. In our experience, the data that
DOD has reported in the past about the number of reservists who have
been mobilized and deployed have not been consistent because, for
example, the data used came from different or varied sources and the
analyses performed were based on different analytical assumptions.
This report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative, addressed the following
issues: (1) what DOD data indicate are the number of reservists
mobilized and deployed in support of GWOT and the selected demographic
and deployment characteristics of those deployed and (2) whether DOD's
reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable.
For this report, we used data provided by the Defense Manpower Data
Center (DMDC), which is DOD's repository for departmentwide data. We
outline the major assumptions we used to analyze the data in the scope
and methodology section of this report (see app. I). Specifically, to
address our objectives, we obtained and analyzed data from DMDC's
Contingency Tracking System (CTS). CTS is DMDC's system that brings
together data about GWOT from many sources and, according to a senior
DMDC official, is the only source of these data within DOD. The Joint
Staff's Manpower and Personnel office is working toward using only CTS
data to determine reserve force availability for future operations. We
also performed reliability assessments on the data after obtaining an
understanding of the data file structure and the sources of the data.
Specifically, we (1) performed electronic testing of the data files for
completeness (that is, missing data), out-of-range values, and dates
outside of valid time frames; (2) assessed the relationships among data
elements; and (3) worked with agency officials to identify data
problems, such as which variables may be unreliable. We also analyzed
the extent to which data provided by DMDC changed during this review as
a result of DMDC's data cleaning effort, known as a rebaselining. Using
applicable guidance,[Footnote 6] we interviewed knowledgeable officials
at DMDC about internal control procedures and other matters. In
addition to the officials at DMDC, we also interviewed knowledgeable
officials from the services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower and
Personnel office. The data we report are sufficiently reliable for our
purposes (that is, providing descriptive information) with one caveat.
Since the Army is in the process of updating its mobilization data, we
could not assess the reliability of the Army's mobilization data to the
same extent as those of the other services. In comparing our analyses
of the data with the analyses reported by DMDC, we determined that
DMDC's analyses were not sufficiently reliable for this report. We
performed our audit work from December 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
more thorough description of our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists
have been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000
reservists, or almost 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been
deployed in support of GWOT as of June 30, 2006. The Army National
Guard has mobilized and deployed the greatest number of reservists--
more than 230,000 have been mobilized and more than 163,000 have been
deployed. The Navy Reserve had the fewest number of reservists
mobilized--with about 29,000 reservists--while the Marine Corps Reserve
had the fewest number deployed with about 19,000 reservists. The number
of reservists mobilized increased through fiscal year 2003 and has
declined since then, while the number of reservists deployed increased
through fiscal year 2003 and then remained stable through fiscal year
2005. In addition, the majority of reservists have been deployed once,
and of those deployed in support of GWOT, most--about 307,000
reservists, or 81 percent--have spent a year or less deployed.
Alternatively, more than 65,000 reservists, or 17 percent, have spent
more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed, and about 6,000
reservists, or fewer than 2 percent, have spent more than 2 years
deployed. The majority of those deployed were part of the Selected
Reserve[Footnote 7] and almost 98 percent were U.S. citizens. Since
GWOT began, about 78 percent of reservists who were deployed were
White; about 14 percent were Black or African American; about 2 percent
were Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander; and about 1
percent were American Indian or Alaskan Native. Almost 90 percent
identified themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as Hispanic. Of
those deployed, 89 percent were male and 11 percent were female, and 39
percent came from states in the southern[Footnote 8] United States, 23
percent from the midwest[Footnote 9], 18 percent from states in the
western[Footnote 10] United States, and 15 percent came from states in
the northeast.[Footnote 11] There were three variables--volunteer
status[Footnote 12], location deployed, and deploying unit--required by
DOD policy for which DMDC could not provide data either because the
data did not exist or because they were not reliable enough for the
purposes of this report.
We found the deployment and mobilization data we used to be reliable
for providing descriptive information. However, the mobilization data,
some deployment data fields, and DMDC's processes for data analyses
need improvement. DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to
improve the reliability of mobilization data; however, additional steps
are needed to make mobilization data and DMDC's analyses of
mobilization and deployment data more reliable, as is required by DOD
policy and federal government internal control standards. DMDC and the
services have undertaken an effort to "rebaseline" or replace all
previous service-provided mobilization data in DMDC's database with new
data from the services. To date, the Navy has validated its reserve
component data file and the Air Force has certified that it has
rebaselined its reserve component data. However, the Army, which has
mobilized and deployed the largest number of reservists, has not
completed its rebaselining effort and has not provided a time frame for
doing so. We recognize that the rebaselining effort is a considerable
undertaking replete with numerous challenges and that it is a positive
step in improving the reliability of the data. However, even if the
rebaselining effort were complete, outstanding issues with certain data
definitions across the services would continue to affect the accuracy
and completeness of the data. For example, the use of the terms
"activated," "mobilized," and "deployed" is not standardized within and
among the services. Similarly, there is variability across the services
in the completeness of other variables and data fields, such as
volunteer status, deployment location, and deploying unit. Along with
the rebaselining effort, ensuring that the services address these data
issues and provide all required data to DMDC is an important step in
improving the reliability of the data. With respect to DMDC's
quantitative analyses of its CTS data, DMDC has not documented many of
its procedures, including those for verifying the data analyses it
provides to its customers. Because the data analyses DMDC provided to
us had numerous errors--including overcounting the number of
reservists' deployments as well as overcounting the number of days some
reservists were deployed--and were thus unreliable, we question the
effectiveness of its verification procedures and other supporting
internal control procedures for ensuring accurate reporting. Federal
internal control standards require that data control activities, such
as edit checks, verifications, and reconciliations, be conducted and
documented to help provide reasonable assurance that agency objectives
are being met. Until DOD addresses continuing data definition issues
and DMDC documents the internal control procedures it uses to analyze
data and verify its analyses of data, the information provided to
decision makers within Congress and DOD may be unreliable. Without
reliable data and analyses, decision makers will not be in the best
position to make informed decisions that are grounded in accurate and
complete information about reserve component force availability and
medical surveillance issues.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide
guidance to the services to (1) better define and standardize the use
of key terms, like deployment, and (2) provide all required data, such
as volunteer status and location deployed, to DMDC as well as address
data inconsistencies identified by DMDC. We are also recommending that
DMDC document its internal procedures and processes, including the
assumptions it uses in its data analyses. The Under Secretary of
Defense, Personnel and Readiness provided written comments on a draft
of the report. In its comments, DOD generally concurred with our
recommendations, except for the recommendation to collaborate with
other DOD offices on the reasonableness of the assumptions established
and used by DMDC in its data analyses. DOD stated that DMDC is a
support organization and that each organization that requests reports
provides the assumptions that DMDC uses to develop the reports.
However, our audit work showed that DMDC has established and uses some
basic assumptions in analyzing data and that DMDC may not always
discuss these assumptions with other DOD offices, such as Reserve
Affairs. As a result, we continue to emphasize the need for DMDC to
document these assumptions and to collaborate with these offices to
ensure a common understanding of these assumptions. DOD stated it has
taken some action on the other recommendations. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated in the report, as
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix
III of this report.
Background:
In 1975, DOD implemented the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data
System (RCCPDS)[Footnote 13] to collect information on current and past
members of the six reserve components--Army National Guard, Air
National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and
Air Force Reserve. This information included data on reservists'
personal characteristics, such as name, Social Security number, date of
birth, gender, home address, and education, as well as data on their
military characteristics, such as service, reserve component, prior
service status, and date of initial entry into the reserve forces.
According to the director of DMDC, the services send daily, weekly, and
monthly updated data submissions to DMDC in accordance with applicable
guidance.[Footnote 14]
After the first Gulf War, in a May 15, 1991, memorandum,[Footnote 15]
DOD identified 16 recommendations requiring action by many offices
within DOD regarding Desert Storm personnel data issues. For example,
the memorandum said that DOD should consistently report on who
participated in the operations and cites examples of key terms, such as
in theater, that were being interpreted differently by DMDC, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, and the services. In December
1991,[Footnote 16] DOD reported on how DMDC provided information about
operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This report cited areas for
improvement. For example, the report indicated that DMDC created
makeshift procedures to establish and maintain the new data sources and
to accommodate varied data requests. The report cited that these
procedures sometimes resulted in inconsistent or incomplete data being
provided in response to a request. On May 2, 2001, DOD updated guidance
to the military services, among others, to maintain a centralized
database of active duty personnel.[Footnote 17] In this guidance, DOD
requires the services to report personnel information about all active
duty military servicemembers as well as reservists who are ordered to
active duty. While this instruction called for the services to report
information about servicemembers on active duty in support of a
contingency, the requirements for reporting contingency data were not
specific.
On October 4, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness (USD (P&R)),[Footnote 18] issued a memorandum[Footnote 19]
that required the services to report personnel information to DMDC on
all active and reserve component personnel mobilized or deployed in
support of GWOT, in accordance with DOD guidance.[Footnote 20] The
purpose of GWOT data was, among other things, to establish eligibility
for benefits and entitlements as a result of participation in the named
contingencies.[Footnote 21] The information is critical because it
provides a historical database with which to assess the impact of
policies and processes, events, and exposures on the health of deployed
reserve component servicemembers. DMDC was tasked with providing
reporting guidance to the services for these data submissions. DMDC
sent this guidance to the services on October 12, 2001.
DMDC is a civilian-led agency with a mission to deliver timely and
quality support to its customers, and to ensure that data received from
different sources are consistent, accurate, and appropriate when used
to respond to inquiries. DMDC reports to the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Program Integration, who is in the Office of the USD (P&R)
(see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Organizational Hierarchy for DOD's Defense Manpower Data
Center:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
In February 2002, USD (P&R) reminded the services in another memorandum
of its earlier requirement for reporting personnel data to DMDC and
informed the services that they had 2 weeks to provide plans to DMDC on
how they were going to correct any personnel data reporting problems.
On August 6, 2004, DOD updated prior guidance regarding RCCPDS[Footnote
22] to include an enclosure[Footnote 23] that set out specific
requirements for the services to report personnel information for all
reserve component servicemembers supporting a named contingency, unlike
previous guidance.[Footnote 24] The purpose of the new enclosure was to
ensure more accurate reporting on a named contingency, such as GWOT
missions, as well as to establish eligibility for benefits and
entitlements, and to develop a registry of participants for tracking in
support of research and evaluation of DOD programs and policies.
According to DOD officials, the services, in general, were still
reporting data according to previous guidance for a few years after the
new guidance was issued.
In August 2004, DMDC began operation of its CTS database to address
DOD's reporting requirements, including those in the new enclosure
(that is, enclosure 11). The CTS database is DOD's repository for
collecting activation, mobilization, and deployment data for reservists
who have served and continue to serve in support of GWOT. The CTS
database contains both an activation file, which contains mobilization
data, and a deployment file. Both files are updated monthly by service
submissions and cover GWOT from September 11, 2001, to the present. The
purpose of the activation file is to account for and provide medical
and educational benefits for all reservists called to active duty in
support of GWOT contingencies, and it allows DOD to provide data on the
number of reservists who have been mobilized in support of GWOT. The
purpose of the CTS deployment file is to account for a deployed
servicemember's deployment date and location during each deployment
event in support of deployment health surveillance and DOD
guidance.[Footnote 25] The database is also used to track and report
the number of reservists who have been deployed in support of GWOT
since September 11, 2001.
DOD Data Show Demographic and Deployment Characteristics of Hundreds of
Thousands of Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists
have been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000
reservists, or about 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been
deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see fig. 2). The
Army National Guard deployed the greatest number of reservists in
support of GWOT from September 2001 through June 30, 2006, and, of
those, the majority were deployed once. The data also indicate that the
vast majority of reservists who deployed in support of GWOT were U.S.
citizens, White, and male. Further, the data indicate that most of the
reservists spent 1 year or less deployed.
DOD guidance[Footnote 26] requires the services to report timely,
accurate, and complete activation, mobilization,[Footnote 27] and
deployment data. DOD guidance also requires DMDC to collect and
maintain mobilization and deployment data from the services about the
reservists. DOD is required by policy to report personnel data about
reservists, such as service, service component, reserve component
category, race, ethnicity, gender, citizenship status, occupation,
unit, and volunteer status regarding a current mobilization.[Footnote
28] In addition, DOD is required by policy to capture deployment
information such as the location a reservist is deployed to and the
dates the reservist was deployed to that location.[Footnote 29]
DOD Data on Selected Demographic and Deployment Variables:
Number of Reservists Mobilized and Deployed:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists
have been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000
reservists, or 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed
in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see fig. 2). The number of
mobilizations and deployments peaked in fiscal year 2003 with about
206,000 reservists mobilized and about 127,000 reservists deployed (see
figs. 3 and 4). Since fiscal year 2003, the total number of
mobilizations has declined, while the number of deployments remained
stable through fiscal year 2005. The Army National Guard has mobilized
and deployed the greatest number of reservists--more than 230,000
mobilized and more than 163,000 deployed. The Navy Reserve had the
least number of reservists mobilized--with about 29,000--while the
Marine Corps Reserve had the fewest number deployed with about 19,000
reservists (see fig. 2). The percentage of the total reservists
mobilized or deployed varies across the fiscal years (see figs. 3 and
4). For example, looking at the percentage of mobilizations by
component each year, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National
Guard mobilizations occurred early in GWOT and have generally declined
over time. Conversely, the percentage of Army National Guard and Army
Reserve mobilizations has generally increased over time. The greatest
number of Army National Guard deployments--more than 60,000--occurred
in fiscal year 2005 (see table 5 totals in app. II), while also in
fiscal year 2005, the Army National Guard represented the largest
deploying component, with 52 percent of deployments belonging to it
(see fig. 4).
Figure 2: Reservists Mobilized and Deployed in Support of the Global
War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Army mobilization data may change moderately upon completion of
the Army's rebaselining efforts with DMDC. Reservists were only counted
once to identify the total number of individuals who have been
mobilized and deployed in support of GWOT. Totals may not add to 100
percent because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Reservists Mobilized in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Army mobilization data may change moderately upon completion of
the Army's rebaselining efforts with DMDC. The sum of the number of
reservists mobilized for each fiscal year will be different from the
total number of reservists mobilized for all of GWOT because a
reservist can be counted more than once (that is, for each fiscal year
in which he or she began a mobilization). Totals may not add to 100
percent because of rounding.
[A] Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September
30, 2001.
[B] Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30,
2006.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism
by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The sum of the number of reservists deployed for each fiscal
year will be different from the total number of reservists deployed for
all of GWOT because a reservist can be counted more than once (that is,
for each fiscal year in which he or she began a deployment). Less than
1 percent of reservists deployed in fiscal year 2001 were Marine Corps
Reserve servicemembers. Totals may not add to 100 percent because of
rounding.
[A] Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September
30, 2001.
[B] Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30,
2006.
[End of figure]
Number of Reservists Who Have Deployed One, Two, or Three or More
Times:
Although reservists usually deployed only once, some experienced
multiple deployments (see fig. 5). For example, compared to the other
reserve components, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve
had nearly half of their reservists deploying two and three or more
times, but they tend to have shorter deployment cycles according to the
Air Expeditionary Force cycle. Under this cycle, reservists deploy for
about 120 days in a 20-month cycle. However, servicemembers assigned to
stressed specialties deploy for longer periods of time and in greater
frequency. At the unit level, some deployment rules have been modified
to increase volunteerism or to add stability to key missions. The Army
National Guard and the Marine Corps Reserve had the lowest percentage
of reservists deploying two and three or more times, but they tend to
have longer deployment cycles. In general, DOD policy[Footnote 30]
stipulates that Army units spend 1 year "boots on the ground" in
theater.[Footnote 31] This policy also states that Marine Corps units
below the regimental or group level deploy for 7 months while
regimental and group headquarters units and above deploy for 12 months.
This policy also states that the Chief of Naval Operations' goal is for
servicemembers to have a 6-month deployment with 12 months in a
nondeployed status.
Figure 5: Percentage of Reservists Who Have Deployed One, Two, or Three
or More Times in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June
30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: For the Marine Corps Reserve, very few reservists--less than 1
percent--served three or more deployments. Totals may not add to 100
percent because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Number of Reservists Who Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 to 2 Years, or
More Than 2 Years Deployed in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that across the services, the
majority of reservists have been deployed once, and of those deployed
in support of GWOT, most--about 307,000 reservists, or 81 percent--have
spent a year or less deployed. Alternatively, more than 65,000
reservists, or 17 percent, have spent more than 1 year but less than 2
years deployed, and about 6,000 reservists, or fewer than 2 percent,
have spent more than 2 years deployed. The data also indicate that the
Marine Corps Reserve had the highest percentage of reservists serving
more than 2 years. In addition, the data also indicate that very few--
less than 1 percent--of Air National Guard reservists served more than
2 years (see fig. 6).
Figure 6: Percentage of Reservists Who Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 to
2 Years, or More Than 2 Years Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: For the Air National Guard, very few reservists--less than 1
percent--served more than 2 years. Totals may not add to 100 percent
because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Reserve Component Categories for Reservists Deployed in Support of
GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that most reservists who have
deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were members of the
Selected Reserve (see fig. 7 and table 5 in app. II). The majority of
units and individuals in each reserve component are part of the
Selected Reserve. These units and individuals have been designated as
so essential to the initial wartime mission that they have priority for
training, equipment, and personnel over all categories of reservists.
Congress authorizes end strength for Selected Reserve personnel each
year. The authorized end strength for the Army National Guard has been
about 350,000 for the past several years. For fiscal year 2005, data
provided by the services to DMDC indicate that the Army National Guard
deployed more than 60,000 Selected Reserve servicemembers, which
represents the highest number of Selected Reserve servicemembers
deployed in a single fiscal year by a single reserve component since
GWOT began.
Figure 7: Percentage of Reservists Deployed in the Selected Reserve in
Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Although the services are authorized a maximum number of selected
reservists, the actual number of reservists will fluctuate when
additional reservists are recruited or others leave the reserve
component. In addition, reservists such as those in the Individual
Ready Reserve, are also available for deployment. In general,
reservists are trained to have specific skills and specialties and may
not be suited to deploy for a specific mission until additional
training is provided. In addition, some reservists may not be available
for deployment because they are in training, on medical leave, or
awaiting training.
Citizenship Status of Reservists at the Time of Their Most Current
Deployment in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that almost 98 percent of reservists
who have deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were U.S.
citizens at the time of their most current deployment (see fig. 8). The
data indicate that about 1 percent of reservists were non-U.S. citizens
or non-nationals at the time of their most current deployment. The
citizenship status of more than 1,400 reservists was unknown. DOD data
also indicate that 168 reservists' citizenship status changed. Table 1
shows the citizenship status of reservists by reserve component by
fiscal year.
Figure 8: Citizenship Status of Reservists at the Time of Their Most
Current Deployment in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through
June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
[A] U.S. nationals are non-U.S. citizens who owe permanent allegiance
to the United States, such as persons born in American Samoa or Swains
Island.
[End of figure]
Table 1: Citizenship Status of Reservists Deployed in Support of the
Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006:
Army National Guard;
U.S. citizen;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 3,622;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6,868;
Fiscal year: 2003: 40,083;
Fiscal year: 2004: 47,477;
Fiscal year: 2005: 59,513;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 23,542.
Army National Guard;
U.S. national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 0;
Fiscal year: 2003: 0;
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Army National Guard;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 25;
Fiscal year: 2002: 54;
Fiscal year: 2003: 288;
Fiscal year: 2004: 440;
Fiscal year: 2005: 708;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 273.
Army National Guard;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 0;
Fiscal year: 2003: 1;
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Air National Guard;
U.S. citizen;
fiscal year: 2001[A]: 1,469;
fiscal year: 2002: 18,935;
fiscal year: 2003: 21,967;
fiscal year: 2004: 13,086;
fiscal year: 2005: 12,259;
fiscal year: 2006[B]: 9,497.
Air National Guard;
U.S. national;
fiscal year: 2001[A]: 53;
fiscal year: 2002: 576;
fiscal year: 2003: 633;
fiscal year: 2004: 381;
fiscal year: 2005: 359;
fiscal year: 2006[B]: 376.
Air National Guard;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0; Fiscal year: 2002: 3;
Fiscal year: 2003: 0;
Fiscal year: 2004: 9;
Fiscal year: 2005: 11;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 9.
Air National Guard;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 1;
Fiscal year: 2003: 5;
Fiscal year: 2004: 3;
Fiscal year: 2005: 1;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Army Reserve;
U.S. citizen;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 1,158;
Fiscal year: 2002: 3,749;
Fiscal year: 2003: 35,401;
Fiscal year: 2004: 28,793;
Fiscal year: 2005: 24,316;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 12,948.
Army Reserve;
U.S. national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 0;
Fiscal year: 2003: 6;
Fiscal year: 2004: 4;
Fiscal year: 2005: 4;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Army Reserve;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 17;
Fiscal year: 2002: 77;
Fiscal year: 2003: 766;
Fiscal year: 2004: 588;
Fiscal year: 2005: 473;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 201.
Army Reserve;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 6;
Fiscal year: 2002: 1,379;
Fiscal year: 2003: 72;
Fiscal year: 2004: 89;
Fiscal year: 2005: 84;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 31.
Navy Reserve;
U.S. citizen;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 235;
Fiscal year: 2002: 2,464;
Fiscal year: 2003: 5,349;
Fiscal year: 2004: 5,192;
Fiscal year: 2005: 5,168;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 5,554.
Navy Reserve;
U.S. national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 6;
Fiscal year: 2003: 15;
Fiscal year: 2004: 9;
Fiscal year: 2005: 14;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 9.
Navy Reserve;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 2;
Fiscal year: 2002: 23;
Fiscal year: 2003: 84;
Fiscal year: 2004: 91;
Fiscal year: 2005: 77;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 131.
Navy Reserve;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 8;
Fiscal year: 2002: 87;
Fiscal year: 2003: 207;
Fiscal year: 2004: 222;
Fiscal year: 2005: 158;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 149.
Marine Corps Reserve;
U.S. citizen;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 8;
Fiscal year: 2002: 1,252;
Fiscal year: 2003: 9,440;
Fiscal year: 2004: 5,697;
Fiscal year: 2005: 3,177;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 895.
Marine Corps Reserve;
U.S. national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 1;
Fiscal year: 2003: 33;
Fiscal year: 2004: 14;
Fiscal year: 2005: 15;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 98;
Fiscal year: 2003: 479;
Fiscal year: 2004: 148;
Fiscal year: 2005: 107;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 34.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 0;
Fiscal year: 2003: 0;
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Air Force Reserve;
U.S. citizen;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 508;
Fiscal year: 2002: 11,630;
Fiscal year: 2003: 11,795;
Fiscal year: 2004: 8,927;
Fiscal year: 2005: 8,407;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 6,469.
Air Force Reserve;
U.S. national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 0;
Fiscal year: 2003: 0;
Fiscal year: 2004: 0;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Air Force Reserve;
Non-U.S. citizen or non-national;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 5;
Fiscal year: 2003: 4;
Fiscal year: 2004: 6;
Fiscal year: 2005: 6;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 7.
Air Force Reserve;
Unknown;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 0;
Fiscal year: 2002: 2;
Fiscal year: 2003: 4;
Fiscal year: 2004: 3;
Fiscal year: 2005: 0;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 0.
Total;
Fiscal year: 2001[A]: 7,111;
Fiscal year: 2002: 47,210;
Fiscal year: 2003: 126,632;
Fiscal year: 2004: 111,179;
Fiscal year: 2005: 114,857;
Fiscal year: 2006[B]: 60,125.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Reservists can be counted more than once if they deployed more
than once in different fiscal years.
[A] Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September
30, 2001.
[B] Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30,
2006.
[End of table]
Race and Ethnicity for Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that about 78 percent of those
deployed for GWOT were White; about 14 percent were Black or African
American; about 2 percent were Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Other Pacific
Islander; and about 1 percent were American Indian or Alaskan Native
(see table 2). Overall, about 5 percent of the deployed reservists
declined to indicate their race. The Army National Guard, the Air
National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve had the highest percentages
of the reservists who identified themselves as White. Further, about 90
percent of those who responded identified themselves as non-Hispanic
and 8 percent as Hispanic (see table 3).
Table 2: Race of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
White;
Army National Guard: 131,686;
Air National Guard: 44,759;
Army Reserve: 66,609;
Navy Reserve: 13,905;
Marine Corps Reserve: 14,096;
Air Force Reserve: 23,432;
Total: 294,487.
Black or African American;
Army National Guard: 21,285;
Air National Guard: 3,384;
Army Reserve: 19,541;
Navy Reserve: 2,611;
Marine Corps Reserve: 1,543;
Air Force Reserve: 3,191;
Total: 51,555.
Asian/Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander;
Army National Guard: 2,794;
Air National Guard: 592;
Army Reserve: 3,318;
Navy Reserve: 492;
Marine Corps Reserve: 292;
Air Force Reserve: 307;
Total: 7,795.
American Indian/Alaska Native;
Army National Guard: 1,193;
Air National Guard: 471;
Army Reserve: 497;
Navy Reserve: 138;
Marine Corps Reserve:
130; Air Force Reserve: 122;
Total: 2,551.
More than one race;
Army National Guard: 0;
Air National Guard: 132;
Army Reserve: 0;
Navy Reserve: 1,981;
Marine Corps Reserve: 64;
Air Force Reserve: 85;
Total: 2,262.
Declined to respond;
Army National Guard: 6,586;
Air National Guard: 1,836;
Army Reserve: 5,127;
Navy Reserve: 1,288;
Marine Corps Reserve: 3,163;
Air Force Reserve: 1,632;
Total: 19,632.
Total;
Army National Guard: 163,544;
Air National Guard: 51,174;
Army Reserve: 95,092;
Navy Reserve: 20,415;
Marine Corps Reserve: 19,288;
Air Force Reserve: 28,769;
Total: 378,282.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Although the 1997 governmentwide requirements for the collection
and reporting of information on race and ethnicity were to have been
implemented by January 1, 2003, DOD has not yet fully implemented the
requirements and its internal monthly reports continue to use some of
the former racial and ethnic categories.
[End of table]
Table 3: Ethnicity of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War
on Terrorism through June 30, 2006:
Non-Hispanic;
Army National Guard: 152,350;
Air National Guard: 48,497;
Army Reserve: 84,498;
Navy Reserve: 15,003;
Marine Corps Reserve: 11,531;
Air Force Reserve: 26,970;
Total: 338,849.
Hispanic;
Army National Guard: 11,193;
Air National Guard: 2,579;
Army Reserve: 10,465;
Navy Reserve: 1,851;
Marine Corps Reserve: 3,054;
Air Force Reserve: 1,699;
Total: 30,841.
Unknown;
Army National Guard: 1;
Air National Guard: 98;
Army Reserve: 129;
Navy Reserve: 3,561;
Marine Corps Reserve: 4,703;
Air Force Reserve: 100;
Total: 8,592.
Total;
Army National Guard: 163,544;
Air National Guard: 51,174;
Army Reserve: 95,092;
Navy Reserve: 20,415;
Marine Corps Reserve: 19,288;
Air Force Reserve: 28,769;
Total: 378,282.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Gender of Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that about 338,000 reservists, or
about 89 percent of the number deployed, were male (see table 4). About
11 percent of those deployed in support of GWOT were female. Of the
approximately 163,500 Army National Guard servicemembers who have been
deployed through June 30, 2006, more than 92 percent were male. Almost
98 percent of those deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006,
for the Marine Corps Reserve were male, representing the highest
percentage of males compared with females for all of the reserve
components.
Table 4: Gender of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by Reserve Component through June 30, 2006:
Male;
Army National Guard: 150,633;
Air National Guard: 45,674;
Army Reserve: 79,799;
Navy Reserve: 17,897;
Marine Corps Reserve: 18,806;
Air Force Reserve: 25,044;
Total: 337,853.
Female;
Army National Guard: 12,910;
Air National Guard: 5,500;
Army Reserve: 15,276;
Navy Reserve: 2,518;
Marine Corps Reserve: 482;
Air Force Reserve: 3,725;
Total: 40,411.
Unknown;
Army National Guard: 1;
Air National Guard: 0;
Army Reserve: 17;
Navy Reserve: 0;
Marine Corps Reserve: 0;
Air Force Reserve: 0;
Total: 18.
Total;
Army National Guard: 163,544;
Air National Guard: 51,174;
Army Reserve: 95,092;
Navy Reserve: 20,415;
Marine Corps Reserve: 19,288;
Air Force Reserve: 28,769;
Total: 378,282.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
State of Residence of Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that California, Texas,
Pennsylvania, and Florida had the highest numbers of reservists who
have deployed in support of GWOT through June 2006 (see table 6 in app.
II for the number of reservists deployed by state of residence by
reserve component by fiscal year). The 4 states combined had more than
76,000 reservists in residence at the time of their deployments. Eleven
states deployed more than 10,000 reservists each, accounting for more
than 160,000 reservist deployments. Of those deployed, about 39 percent
came from states in the southern United States, about 23 percent from
the midwest, about 18 percent from states in the western United States,
and about 15 percent came from states in the northeast part of the
country.[Footnote 32] More than 20,000 reservists indicated California
or Texas as their state of residence at the time they were deployed
(see fig. 9). Nineteen states and 5 territories had fewer than 5,000
reservists in residence at the time of their deployment and 20 states
and 1 territory had from 5,000 to 9,999 reservists in residence at the
time of their deployment.
Figure 9: Number of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on
Terrorism by State through June 30, 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
Occupational Information about Enlisted and Officer Reservists Deployed
in Support of GWOT:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that since GWOT began, the
occupational areas[Footnote 33] of enlisted reservists deployed in
support of GWOT have stayed somewhat consistent across all services.
For example, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the
Marine Corps Reserve have deployed reservists mostly in infantry
occupational areas including such groups as infantry, air crew, and
combat engineering. All six reserve components have deployed electrical
and mechanical equipment repairers, such as automotive, aircraft, and
armament and munitions. Three of the six reserve components--the Army
National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve--have
deployed reservists who are service and supply handlers, such as law
enforcement and motor transport.
Since GWOT began, the occupational areas most deployed for reserve
component officers have varied, but all reserve components primarily
deployed tactical operations officers, to include ground and naval
arms, helicopter pilots, and operations staff subgroups. The Army
National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Navy Reserve have
deployed engineering and maintenance officers, such as the
communications and radar and aviation maintenance occupational
subgroups. The Air National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Air Force
Reserve have deployed reservists in the health care officer
occupational areas, including physicians and nurses. The Army Reserve
and the Marine Corps Reserve have deployed supply and procurement
occupational areas that include transportation, general logistics, and
supply occupational subgroups. The Air Force Reserve has also deployed
intelligence officers in occupational subgroups such as general
intelligence and counterintelligence.
Data for the Volunteer Status, Location Deployed, and Unit Deployed
Variables Were Either Not Available or Not Reliable:
We were unable to analyze the volunteer status variable because the
data do not exist for all of the reserve components. Similarly, we were
unable to analyze the deployment location and deployment unit variables
because we determined, in agreement with DMDC officials, that the data
in these fields were not reliable. This issue is discussed further
below.
DOD and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve the Reliability of
Reserve Component Data, but More Needs to Be Done:
While we found selected deployment and mobilization data to be
sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive
data), some of the data were not reliable enough for us to report, even
for descriptive purposes. DMDC and the services, as required by DOD
policy, have taken steps to improve the reliability of the mobilization
data; however, more action is needed to improve the reliability of CTS
data and DMDC's analyses of those data. For example, (1) the
rebaselining effort resulted in substantial changes being made to the
mobilization data, and the Army--which has mobilized and deployed the
largest number of reservists for GWOT--has not completed this
rebaselining effort, which the Joint Staff tasked DMDC and the services
to do in November 2005; (2) we identified data issues that DOD has not
addressed that could further improve the reliability of the data, such
as standardizing the use of key terms like deployment; and (3) DMDC
does not have effective controls for ensuring the accuracy of its data
analyses used to produce reports as required by federal government
internal control standards. Although DMDC and DOD have undertaken a
major data cleaning--or rebaselining--effort to improve the reliability
of mobilization data, the effort does not address some fundamental data
quality issues. While we recognize that such a large-scale effort,
although replete with challenges, is a positive step toward better
quality data, if data reporting requirements and definitions are not
uniform, and if there are no quality reviews of DMDC's analyses, some
data elements and DMDC's analyses of those data may continue to be
unreliable. A senior DMDC official stated that it emphasizes getting
data to customers in a timely manner rather than documenting the
internal control procedures needed to improve the reliability of the
data and the data analyses produced. However, with proper internal
controls, DMDC could potentially achieve both timeliness and accuracy.
Without reliable data and analyses, DOD cannot make sound data-driven
decisions about reserve force availability. Moreover, DOD may not be
able to link reservists' locations with exposure to medical hazards.
DMDC and the Services Are Updating the Mobilization Data in CTS, but
Concerns Remain:
We have found the deployment and mobilization data we used to be
sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive
data), and DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve
the reliability of mobilization data. However, additional steps are
needed to make mobilization data more reliable. As previously noted,
DOD guidance[Footnote 34] requires the services to report timely,
accurate, and complete activation, mobilization,[Footnote 35] and
deployment data. DMDC officials responsible for overseeing the CTS
database stated that a rebaseline of the deployment data was not
necessary because the deployment data matched the data in the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service's (DFAS) systems[Footnote 36] by more
than 98 percent. Although DMDC and the services rebaselining of the
mobilization data in CTS has resulted in improvements, the Army, which
has mobilized the greatest number of reservists for GWOT, has not
completed its rebaselining effort. A senior-level DMDC official
responsible for overseeing the CTS database said that the mobilization
data in the CTS database prior to the rebaselining effort were less
than 80 percent accurate for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, but
that the Marine Corps' data were generally considered to be accurate
prior to the rebaselining effort. The official also stated that DMDC
expects that the mobilization data within the CTS database will be 90
percent accurate because of this rebaselining effort, which was still
ongoing through August 2006. While we recognize that this is a
considerable undertaking, to date, only the Navy and the Air Force have
validated or certified their mobilization data files. Navy officials
said that the Navy has validated its personnel records and established
a common baseline of data with DMDC. Air Force Reserve officials said
that their data within CTS are now 99 to 100 percent accurate. The
Chief of the Personnel Data Systems Division for the Air National Guard
certified that although file discrepancies are still being reconciled,
the data that were processed by DMDC on June 11, 2006, were the most
accurate activation[Footnote 37] data and that data accuracy will
improve with each future file sent to DMDC. The DMDC official said that
the Marine Corps had only partially completed its rebaselining effort
and would not be finished until the Marine Corps provided its August
2006 data file in September 2006. The Army National Guard and Army
Reserve are still working to rebaseline their mobilization data, and
the Army has not provided a time frame for completing the effort.
However, we still have concerns regarding the reliability of the
mobilization data, because the scope of the rebaselining effort changed
and the data changed substantially as a result of the rebaselining. At
the beginning of our review, DMDC and the services referred to the
rebaselining effort as a "reconciliation," which, according to a DMDC
official and a Reserve Affairs official, would have resulted in all
data (current and past) being reviewed and corrected as needed. We
acknowledge that some degree of change is expected in any data cleaning
effort, especially with large-scale, multisource collection methods
such as DMDC's data collection process. However, our experience has
shown that cleaning efforts that result in a large degree of change
would suggest systematic error. Such error raises concerns about the
reliability of both the original data and the "cleaned" data. If both
the source data and the cleaned data are populated with the same
assumptions and information, any reconciliation of data points should
result in relatively small change that correct simply for random error,
such as from keypunch or data source errors. However, for some
variables, the data changed substantially as a result of DMDC and the
services' rebaselining or data cleaning effort. Our analysis shows that
data from the period of September 2001 through December 2005 have
changed by about 4 percent to as much as 20 percent. For example:
* The number of reservists mobilized for GWOT through December 2005
went from about 478,000 to about 506,000--an increase of more than
27,000 reservists or a change of more than 5 percent.
* The Army Reserve data sustained the greatest change during this time
with a more than 19 percent increase in the number of reservists
mobilized. The number of mobilized Army National Guard reservists
increased more than 7 percent. According to a senior DMDC official, the
Army data are expected to continue to change, perhaps substantially
enough to require the rebaselining of the data again in the future.
* The number of Air National Guard reservists mobilized decreased by
more than 13 percent.
* The Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve
data all changed about 5 percent.
DOD officials stated that the rebaselining effort occurred because the
Joint Staff tasked DMDC and the services with ensuring that the data
the Joint Staff's Manpower and Personnel office was using in CTS were
the same data as the services were using to determine reserve force
availability. According to a senior-level DMDC official responsible for
overseeing CTS, the rebaselining effort's scope changed because all of
the services agreed that starting over and replacing all of the data
would make more sense than trying to correct transactions already in
CTS, because the services found errors in the CTS files initially used
for the reconciliation. Service officials said that some of the data
discrepancies developed because of a DMDC quality check procedure that
sometimes resulted in DMDC replacing the service-submitted data with
data from other sources. DMDC officials said that they did this because
the services were unable to report some of the required CTS data.
According to DMDC officials, service submissions have become more
complete over time, resulting in DMDC now using the quality check
procedures only to check the data rather than to populate the CTS
database. This DMDC official stated that DMDC expected the data to
change substantially based on the issues identified with service data
during the initial reconciliation effort and the subsequent
rebaselining effort.
Because the rebaselining effort is not complete and the Army--which has
mobilized and deployed the largest number of reservists for GWOT--has
not finished the rebaselining, we do not know how much the data will
continue to change as DMDC and the services work to finish this effort.
DOD data on reservists' mobilizations and deployments are important
because decision makers at DOD and in Congress need the data to make
sound decisions about personnel issues and for planning and budgeting
purposes.
DOD Has Not Fully Addressed Data Issues That Could Improve Data
Reliability:
Prior to the rebaselining effort, some services recognized that there
were data issues that needed to be addressed and took steps to do so,
as DOD guidance[Footnote 38] requires the services to report accurate
and complete mobilization and deployment data. However, some data
issues that would ensure more accurate, complete, and consistent
mobilization and deployment data across the services in the future have
not been fully addressed by DOD. Some examples of data issues being
addressed include the following:
* The Air Force and the Navy were having difficulty tracking
mobilizations based on reservists' mobilization orders, which has
resulted in both services independently working to develop and
implement systems that write reservists' orders.
* The Army Reserve recently began to modify its mobilization systems,
which Army officials expect will improve the collection of reservists'
mobilization data.
* The Air Force identified problems with the way in which the Defense
Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) processed end dates for
reservists' mobilizations, which resulted in some reservists not
receiving appropriate benefits (for example, dental benefits). Air
Force officials worked with officials from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and DMDC to identify and address the data processing logic
issues.
Despite these positive steps, service process improvements are not all
complete, and further, there has been no comprehensive review across
DOD to identify data issues that if addressed, could result in more
complete, accurate, and consistent mobilization and deployment data
across and within the services. Reserve Affairs officials in the office
of Reserve Systems Integration said that a more sustainable fix to the
processes of collecting data is needed to ensure that data captured in
the future are accurate and more efficiently collected. We agree and
have identified some issues that may continue to affect data
reliability, such as the following:
* The use of terms, such as activated, mobilized, and deployed, has not
been standardized across the services. Although the department has
defined these terms in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, the terms are used differently by the individual
services. In the Air Force, "activation" can refer to the time when a
reservist either volunteers or is involuntarily mobilized; however, the
term "mobilized" refers only to someone who is not a volunteer. Even
within a single service, these words can have different meanings. For
example, an Army National Guard official who participated in the
rebaselining effort said that Army National Guard servicemembers who
backfill active duty servicemembers are not considered deployed since
they have not left the United States. However, according to this
official, some staff in the Army National Guard use "deployed" to
include reservists who are mobilized within the United States.
* There is no single data entry process that would minimize the
potential for contradictory data about reservists in multiple systems.
Currently, data about reservists are entered separately into multiple
systems.
* There is no mechanism for DMDC to ensure that the services are
addressing the data inconsistencies DMDC identifies during its ongoing,
monthly validation process, such as Social Security numbers that are
duplicated in two reserve components.
* DOD has taken an ad hoc, episodic approach to identifying data
reporting requirements and to addressing data issues. DOD has
periodically issued policies regarding its need to collect and report
specific data, such as volunteer status and location deployed, about
active duty servicemembers and reservists. As a result of changing
requirements, many of these policies have addendums that include these
additional data requirements, which are not immediately supported by
the services' existing systems that are used to collect the data. Over
time, this has led to disjointed policies that overlap and that require
the services to modify their existing systems and processes, which can
take months to complete.
* There are incomplete data submissions across the services.
Specifically, data for volunteer status was not available in CTS for
all service components, and the location deployed and deploying unit
data were not reliable enough for the purposes of this report. Only
three of the six reserve components--the Air National Guard, the Marine
Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve--provide information on a
reservist's volunteer status, which neither we nor DMDC report because
it is not available for all six components. Further, DMDC officials
said that they consider CTS location data incomplete although the data
are improving with each fiscal year. DMDC officials said that most unit
information is based on the unit a reservist is assigned to and may not
represent the unit the reservist is currently deployed with in theater.
For this reason, we did not consider these data reliable enough to
report.
A DMDC official stated that DMDC does not have the authority to direct
the services to correct data errors or inconsistencies or to address
data issues. DMDC does, however, work with the services and tries to
identify and address data challenges. According to some service
officials, the department plans to implement a new, integrated payroll
and personnel system--Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System
(DIMHRS)--and that the services have been diverting resources needed to
modify their existing systems and relevant processes to support DIMHRS.
However, our past work has shown that DOD has encountered a number of
challenges with DIMHRS, which is behind schedule, and the current
schedule has it available no sooner than April 2008, when the Army is
scheduled to begin implementing the system.
In general, service officials said that they are working to collect
data on volunteer status, location deployed, and deploying unit;
however, Air Force officials stated that they do collect data on
location deployed and deploying unit and that these data are accurate
and are being provided to DMDC. Army Reserve officials stated that they
currently do not have plans to collect data on volunteer status.
DMDC Does Not Have Effective Controls for Ensuring the Accuracy of Its
Data Analyses Used to Produce Reports:
DMDC has not documented (1) its procedures for verifying that the data
analyses it performs are correct and (2) the procedures for monthly
validation of service data or the procedures used to perform analyses
of data. Either of these issues could, if documented as part of DMDC's
verification process, address some of our concerns about internal
controls. DMDC is required by policy[Footnote 39] to develop and
produce reports about mobilization data and respond to requests for
information about deployed personnel. DOD policy[Footnote 40] requires
DMDC and the reserve components to ensure the accuracy of files and the
resulting reports. Federal government internal control
standards[Footnote 41] require that data control activities, such as
edit checks, verifications, and reconciliations, be conducted and
documented to help provide reasonable assurance that agency objectives
are being met.
DMDC officials said that they have internal verification procedures
that require supervisors to review all data analyses used to generate
reports, although these procedures are not documented. Specifically,
the supervisors are to review (1) the statistical programming code used
to generate the data analyses to ensure that the code includes the
customer's data analyses parameters (that is, the assumptions used to
produce the analyses) and (2) the "totals" generated to ensure that
these totals match the control totals that show the number of
reservists currently or ever mobilized or deployed in support of GWOT.
DMDC officials acknowledge the importance of verifying the accuracy of
the data analyses prior to providing the reports to customers, and they
stated that they had verified the accuracy of the analyses provided to
us. However, we found numerous errors in the initial and subsequent
analyses we received of the GWOT data through May 2006, causing us to
question whether DMDC verified the data analyses it provided to us and,
if it did, whether the current process is adequate. For example, we
found that DMDC had done the following:
* Counted reservists with more than one deployment during GWOT also
among those who deployed only once during GWOT, which resulted in
overcounting the number of reservists' deployments.
* Used ethnicity responses to identify race despite having told us that
the internal policy was changed in 2006 and that this was no longer an
acceptable practice.
* Counted reservists whose ethnicity was "unknown" as "non-Hispanic"
although "unknown" does not necessarily mean someone's ethnicity is
"non-Hispanic" and there was a category for unknowns.
* Repeatedly categorized data based on a reservist's first deployment
(when there was more than one) despite agreeing to modify this
analytical assumption so that we could present data by the reservist's
most current deployment.
* Reported thousands of reservists as having changed citizenship status
during GWOT although, in our analyses, we found that only 168
reservists had changed status.
* Analyzed data by reserve component categories (for example, Selected
Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve) rather than by reserve component
as we had asked. By analyzing the number of days a reservist was
deployed by reserve component category, a reservist could be counted
multiple times within one component if he or she changed category. This
error affected the way in which the total number of days a reservist
was deployed was calculated. For example, if the same reservist served
350 days as an Army National Guard Selected Reserve member and an
additional 350 days as an Army National Guard Individual Ready Reserve
member, he or she would be counted as two reservists who were each
deployed for less than a year. However, our intent was to report that
the same individual had been deployed for a total of 700 days. In our
analysis, all of a reservist's days deployed were totaled and counted
once for each reserve component, regardless of which category he or she
belonged to when deployed.
* Miscoded the end date for the analysis of how many days reservists
were deployed for GWOT. This resulted in up to an additional 90 days of
deployment being counted for reservists who were still deployed at the
time the data were submitted to DMDC.
In our discussions with DMDC officials, they readily acknowledged that
errors had been made, although they stated that the analyses had
undergone supervisory review prior to our receiving them. During these
discussions, we also discovered that many of these errors occurred
because DMDC had not used all of our data analyses parameters, although
these officials had stated that this was one of the verification
process steps followed. Although we were able to work with DMDC
officials and identify the analytical assumptions they were going to
use to complete our analyses, without documented analytical procedures,
it is unclear to what degree the analyses DMDC provides to other users
of the data also contain errors since many may not similarly verify the
analyses provided to them by DMDC.
In addition, DMDC officials have not documented additional processes
that would further support a verification process, such as (1) the
ongoing, monthly validation process of service-provided data[Footnote
42] and (2) the procedures to perform analyses and generate reports,
including the assumptions DMDC uses when producing periodic and special
reports for customers. In the past, according to the services, the
ongoing, monthly validation process DMDC used resulted in two sets of
data--one set of service data and one set of DMDC data--that may not
have been the same. For example, we were told by the Air Force that, in
some cases, service data were replaced with default values because of a
business rule that DMDC applied to the data and that this change
resulted in errors to the service-provided data. These inconsistent
data caused the Joint Staff to request that the services and DMDC
reconcile the data. As stated above, there were errors in the analyses
performed to generate the reports DMDC provided to us, including DMDC's
not using many of the assumptions we agreed to for the analyses. DMDC
also made errors that contradicted its own undocumented policy.
A senior DMDC official said DMDC has not documented these procedures
because the organization emphasizes getting data and reports to its
customers in a timely manner rather than preparing this documentation.
This official said that documentation is not a top priority because
situations change rapidly, and it would be hard to keep these documents
up-to-date. The official also said that the errors made in the analyses
provided to us were caused by human error and the need to provide data
quickly. Further, the DMDC official said that while there are standard
data requests that are generated frequently, GAO's request was an ad
hoc request, and the procedures for addressing such requests, in
practice, are not as well defined. While we agree that our requests met
DMDC's definition of an ad hoc request, we disagree that sufficient
time was not allowed for DMDC to prepare the analyses. For the initial
request, we worked with DMDC over the course of about 5 business days
to define the analytical assumptions that would be used during the
analysis. DMDC then took about 8 business days to complete the analysis
and provide it to us.
DOD data analyses are important because decision makers at DOD and in
Congress need the data to make sound decisions about reserve force
availability, medical surveillance, and planning and budgeting. In the
absence of documented procedures and the necessary controls to ensure
that they are implemented, it is difficult for an organization to
ensure that it has established a robust process that is being
consistently applied and that accurate results are being achieved.
Joint Staff and Reserve Affairs officials are emphasizing the need to
use one data source for most analyses to further reduce the
inconsistencies in data analyses because service-produced analyses and
DMDC-produced analyses could differ if both are not using the same set
of data and assumptions. Otherwise, it is possible that the data
analyses provided to decision makers at DOD or in Congress will be
incomplete and inconsistent. If the data analyses are incorrect, users
could draw erroneous conclusions based on the data, which could lead to
policies that affect reservists in unanticipated ways.
Conclusions:
DOD recognizes the need for accurate, complete, and consistent data and
data analyses, and it has taken some preliminary, ad hoc steps to
improve its data, including undertaking a considerable effort to
rebaseline its mobilization data. It has not, however, addressed some
of the inconsistencies in data and data analyses departmentwide, such
as when terms are used differently from one service to the next.
Further, service officials stated that it is anticipated that a lot of
these problems will be addressed when DIMHRS is implemented. However,
the schedule for DIMHRS continues to slip, so it is unclear when this
solution will be available. We recognize that the need for accurate,
complete, and consistent data and data analyses about reservist
mobilization and deployment is always important, and even more so
during higher levels of mobilization and deployment, such as is the
case now with GWOT. This is especially true since, in general, there
are restrictions on the maximum length of time a reservist can be
involuntarily activated. Thus, having accurate and complete data on a
reservist's status is critical for determining availability for future
deployments. This is especially true of the CTS data since the Manpower
and Personnel office in the Joint Staff and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs mostly use the data found in
CTS. These data also help DOD and Congress to understand the potential
impacts of policy decisions as they relate to reservists who are
eligible for TRICARE Reserve Select and educational benefits based on
the number of days a reservist is deployed. DOD has not provided
guidance to the services to better define and standardize the use of
key terms. DOD also has not collected and maintained all essential data
nor has it established a process for ensuring that data inconsistencies
are resolved. Further, DOD has not documented key procedures and
processes for verifying the data analyses it provides to its customers,
thus compromising its ability to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and
consistency of these analyses. Until decision makers in DOD and
Congress have accurate, complete, and consistent data and analyses,
they will not be in the best position to make informed decisions about
the myriad of reserve deployment matters.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four
actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to
provide guidance to the services to better define and standardize the
use of key terms, like activation, mobilization, and deployment, to
promote the completeness, accuracy, and consistency of the data within
CTS.
* Direct the service secretaries to (1) take the steps necessary to
provide all required data to DMDC, such as volunteer status and
location deployed, and (2) have the services address data
inconsistencies identified by DMDC.
* Direct the service secretaries to establish the needed protocols to
have the services report data consistent with the guidance above.
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to
require DMDC to document its internal procedures and processes,
including the assumptions it uses in data analyses. In doing this, the
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should collaborate
on the reasonableness of the assumptions established and used by DMDC
in its data analyses with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, provided
written comments on a draft of this report and stated that we changed
one of our original audit objectives and did not inform the department
of this change. We disagree. While the scope of our audit did change
after our initial notification letter of June 17, 2005, was sent to
DOD, we notified the proper officials of this change in a December 2,
2005, email to the agency-designated liaison within the DOD Inspector
General's office. In this email, we specifically said that we would be
contacting DMDC and that we would be focusing on data for reserve
component activation, mobilization, and deployment for GWOT. In
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
(GAGAS),[Footnote 43] GAO analysts are expected, as appropriate, to
review an agency's internal controls as they relate to the scope of the
performance audit. Specifically, we are required by GAGAS[Footnote 44]
to review the reliability of the data and the data analyses provided to
us. To assess the reliability of data and data analyses, we often
review an agency's internal controls that are put in place to ensure
the accuracy of the data and analyses. As we discuss in our report, we
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However,
over the course of the work, the analyses of the data DMDC provided to
us continued to have errors. This raised concerns about the adequacy of
DMDC's internal controls for preparing and verifying these analyses,
which DMDC stated were not documented. In accordance with GAGAS, when
reporting on the results of their work, auditors are responsible for
disclosing all material or significant facts known to them which, if
not disclosed, could mislead knowledgeable users or misrepresent the
results. Consistent errors in DMDC's analyses led us to include an
audit objective on the reliability of the data and the data analyses.
In its written comments, DOD generally concurred with three of our
recommendations and did not concur with one of our recommendations. DOD
also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the
report, as appropriate. Regarding our recommendation that DOD provide
guidance to the services to better define and standardize the use of
key terms, DOD stated that this requirement has already been addressed
because these terms are defined. We acknowledged in our draft report
that these key terms are defined in the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. However, as we state in
our report, our audit work indicates that the services are not
operationalizing the use of the terms in a consistent manner. The
intent of our recommendation is to have DOD standardize the use of the
key terms across the services.
DOD generally concurred with our recommendation that the services
provide all required data to DMDC and address data inconsistencies, and
stated that the services have been directed to provide all necessary
data and are working to address data inconsistencies. While we agree
that the services are working with DMDC to address data inconsistencies
with regard to the rebaselining of mobilization data, we also
identified other data inconsistencies that DOD has not addressed, such
as Social Security numbers that are duplicated in more than one reserve
component. We agree with DOD that some requirements cannot be
immediately supported by service data systems and modifications to them
can take time to complete. However, as our report notes, some service
officials stated that resources are being diverted from these efforts
to the DIMHRS program, which we reported is behind schedule. We
continue to observe the need for the services to provide all necessary
data, to address these data inconsistencies, and to establish needed
protocols to have the services report data consistent with DOD
guidance, especially since the data are used to determine reserve force
availability and for medical surveillance.
DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that DMDC document
its internal procedures and processes, including the assumptions it
uses in data analyses. In its written comments, DOD stated that DMDC is
in the process of developing documentation on its internal procedures
and processes and has a draft that addresses the processes used from
receipt of the data from the service components to the final quality
control of the consolidated file. DOD also stated that DMDC has a draft
product regarding many of the data analyses procedures used. During
this engagement, we asked if these procedures and processes were
documented. As we say in the report, DMDC stated that they were
undocumented and that documenting them was not a priority. Although DOD
stated that it is in the process of drafting these procedures and
processes, we were never provided a draft of these documents. DOD also
stated that while DMDC attempts to document the assumptions made in
resulting report titles and footnotes, the disclosure of assumptions
used in data analyses remain the responsibility of the requester of the
data analyses. Although we agree that the requesters of the data bear
responsibility to disclose the analytical assumptions used in the data
analyses, our audit work indicates that there are basic assumptions
that DMDC establishes and uses that, if documented and discussed with
those who request data analyses, would allow the users to understand
how the information can be used, as well as the limitations of the data
analyses. For example, during a discussion with a Reserve Affairs
official, who uses the data analyses provided by DMDC to provide
information to senior DOD officials, we stated that DMDC defaults to
using a servicemember's first deployment rather than the most current
deployment when preparing data analyses. This official was unaware that
DMDC used this assumption and stated that the expectation was that DMDC
was using the most current deployment to generate the analyses. This
official planned to discuss this issue with DMDC in the future.
In its written comments, DOD did not concur with what it characterized
as our fourth recommendation. Specifically, DOD separated a single
recommendation into two recommendations. In the draft report we sent to
DOD, the recommendation read: "We recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness,
to require DMDC to document its internal procedures and processes,
including the assumptions it uses in data analyses. In doing this, the
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should collaborate
on the reasonableness of the assumptions used by DMDC in its data
analyses with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff." DOD stated that DMDC is a support
organization that generates reports for a multitude of organizations
and that each organization that requests reports provides the
assumptions that DMDC uses to develop the reports. However, our audit
work showed that DMDC has established and uses some basic assumptions
in analyzing data and that DMDC may not always discuss these
assumptions with other DOD offices, such as Reserve Affairs. As a
result, we continue to emphasize the need for DMDC to document these
assumptions and to collaborate with these offices to ensure a common
understanding of these assumptions. Although DOD organizations can
request data analyses using multiple assumptions, without written
documentation other organizations may not be fully aware of the
analytical assumptions used by DMDC and this may lead to
miscommunication and, ultimately, the data analyses may not be valid in
that it does not report what the user intended. We continue to believe
that the assumptions used need to be documented and discussed with
other DOD offices as we recommended. Based on DOD's comments, we
modified this recommendation to clarify our intent.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of
the Marine Corps; the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness; and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Derek B. Stewart:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ben Nelson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Personnel:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Chairman:
The Honorable Vic Snyder:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Military Personnel:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our objectives were to determine (1) what Department of Defense (DOD)
data indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in
support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the selected
demographic and deployment characteristics of those deployed and (2)
whether DOD's reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are
reliable.
We identified, based on congressional interest and our knowledge of DOD
issues, selected demographic and deployment variables to review. We
then worked with the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to identify
the data fields within DMDC's Contingency Tracking System (CTS) that
best provided information about the selected demographic and deployment
variables we wanted to analyze. Although we wanted to analyze the
locations to which reservists were deployed and the units with which
reservists were deployed, DMDC officials said, and we agreed based on
our review of the data, that the data were not reliable enough for
those purposes. Our selected variables included:
* the number of deployed reservists who volunteered for at least one
deployment;
* the number of deployed reservists who have served one, two, or three
or more deployments;
* the race and ethnicity of the deployed reservists;
* the gender of the deployed reservists;
* the state of residence of the deployed reservists;
* the number of deployed reservists who were Selected Reserve,
Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve;
* the number of deployed reservists who were citizens at the time of
their deployment;
* the number of days the reservists were deployed; and:
* the top occupational areas for reservists deployed in support of
GWOT.
To address objective 1, we obtained and analyzed data for September
2001 through June 2006 from DMDC's CTS. CTS consists of two files--the
activation file, which tracks activations and mobilizations, and the
deployment file, which tracks deployments. Using CTS data from both
files, we analyzed the number of National Guard and Reserve
servicemembers mobilized and deployed in support of GWOT, as well as
selected demographic and deployment variables, using statistical
analysis software.
To address objective 2, we performed a data reliability assessment on
the data provided by DMDC from CTS' activation and deployment files. We
requested DMDC reports that replicated our analyses and then compared
those report results to our analyses, and we reviewed the programming
code DMDC used to generate those reports. To assess the reliability of
CTS data, we obtained an understanding of the data, the file structure,
the sources of the data, and relevant DOD guidance.[Footnote 45]
Specifically, we (1) performed electronic testing of the data files for
completeness (that is, missing data), out-of-range values, and dates
outside of valid time frames; (2) assessed the relationships among data
elements (for example, determining whether deployment dates were
overlapping since each record in the deployment file is intended to
represent one deployment); (3) reviewed existing information about the
data and the systems that produced them; (4) interviewed department
officials to identify known problems or limitations in the data, as
well as to understand the relationship between the two files and how
data are received from the services, cleaned ("rebaselined"), and
processed by DMDC; and (5) compared "prerebaselined" mobilization data
to "postrebaselined" mobilization data to determine the extent to which
the data changed as a result of the cleaning effort.[Footnote 46] When
we found discrepancies (for example, overlapping deployment dates), we
worked with DMDC to understand the discrepancies.
In our interviews with DMDC officials, we discussed the purpose and
uses of CTS, the service data rebaselining effort and the internal
controls for verifying data analyses, monthly validation of data, and
performing data analyses. Similarly, we discussed data collection,
processing, and reliability issues as well as service-specific data
issues and the rebaselining effort with officials from the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and from each of
the reserve components, including the U.S. Army National Guard, the
U.S. Air National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, the U.S. Navy Reserve,
the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and the U.S. Air Force Reserve. We also
discussed the reliability of the services' data, the rebaselining
effort, and the results of a previous Joint Staff review of the quality
of service data within CTS with officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Manpower and Personnel office. Finally, we interviewed officials from
the Deployment Health Surveillance Directorate and the Army Medical
Surveillance Activity about the quality of the deployment data and how
they use the data.
In the course of our review, we determined that some data fields were
highly unreliable. For example, electronic testing indicated that data
on location and reservist unit information were missing in many cases.
Based on our conversations with DMDC and our understanding of the data
system, we decided not to conduct lower level analyses (for example,
analyses of reservists' assigned units) because the results would be
less reliable than aggregate level analyses. Although we are reasonably
confident in the reliability of most CTS data fields at the aggregate
level, because we could not compare source documentation from each of
the services to a sample of DMDC data, we could not estimate precise
margins of error. Consequently, we used the data for descriptive
purposes, and we did not base any recommendations on the results of our
analyses. In addition, we presented only higher level, aggregate data
from fields that we determined were sufficiently reliable for our
reporting purposes. For these purposes, and presented in this way, the
CTS data we use are sufficiently reliable with the following caveat:
The Army had not completed its rebaselining effort for mobilization
data before the completion of our review, and we could not, therefore,
assess the reliability of Army mobilization data to the same extent as
those of the other services. However, based on our electronic testing,
data comparisons, and interviews with officials, we believe that the
data are sufficiently reliable to present as descriptive information.
To assess the reliability of DMDC's reports (that is, its own analyses)
of CTS data, we compared our independent analyses of National Guard and
Reserve servicemembers' mobilization and deployment statistics with
results that DMDC provided from its own analyses of the same data. To
pinpoint differences in analytical assumptions, we reviewed the
statistical code DMDC used to produce its reports and compared it with
our programming code. Through an iterative process, we noted errors in
DMDC's programs and requested changes and reruns of the data. We worked
with DMDC to ensure that discrepancies were not caused by differences
in our analytical assumptions. Where there were discrepancies, we
reached the following consensus on how to address them:
* Removed the Coast Guard entries from our analyses of the CTS database
since, as we state in this report, the Coast Guard Reserve is under the
day-to-day control of the Department of Homeland Security rather than
DOD.
* Combined a reservist's Social Security number with his or her reserve
component to create a unique identifier. DMDC officials said they do
this because they are unsure where the source of the error is when they
find that a Social Security number corresponds with two reserve
components for a deployment during approximately the same time period.
DOD's policy,[Footnote 47] when there is a duplicate Social Security
number for more than one reserve component, is to count both
transactions. However, the use of duplicate Social Security numbers
results in overcounting. Specifically, the June 2006 file had 38
reservists with overlapping mobilizations, 20 reservists with
overlapping deployments, and more than 800 deployed reservists who
appeared to have legitimately changed components. To compensate for the
58 "errors" where DMDC did not know which mobilization or deployment to
count, it double-counted all 58 reservists. Likewise, the 800 deployed
reservists who changed reserve components during GWOT were also double-
counted.
* Removed reservists from all analyses when their reserve component
category is unknown, so that the numeric totals across analyses would
be consistent. DMDC officials said that this is an undocumented
standard operating procedure.
* Utilized the reservists' information for most recent deployment to
provide the most current information possible in cases where a
reservist deployed more than once.
* Calculated the length of a reservist's deployment by including both
the day the deployment began and the day on which the deployment ended.
Thus, the number of days deployed is inclusive of the beginning and end
dates.
* Combined the race categories for Asian, Native Hawaiian, and Other
Pacific Islander because, prior to 2003, the distinction between these
two groups was not captured in the data.
After clarifying and agreeing on the analytical assumptions, we again
reviewed DMDC's code and compared its results with our own to determine
whether and why there were remaining discrepancies. We also requested
written documentation of DMDC's internal control procedures for the CTS
data and, when no documentation was available, interviewed
knowledgeable officials about existing internal control procedures.
Using the framework of standards for internal control for the federal
government,[Footnote 48] we compared the information from those
documents and interviews with our numerous, iterative reviews of DMDC's
statistical programs used to generate comparative reports to assess the
reliability of DMDC-generated reports from CTS. We determined that the
reports DMDC generated for our review were not sufficiently reliable
for our reporting purpose. Thus, we completed our own data analyses.
We performed our work from December 2005 through August 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT through
June 30, 2006:
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that most reservists who deployed in
support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were part of the Selected
Reserve (see table 5). In addition, California, Texas, Pennsylvania,
and Florida had the highest numbers of reservists who have deployed in
support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see table 6).
Table 5: Reserve Component Categories for Reservists Deployed in
Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30,
2006:
Army National Guard;
Selected Reserve[C];
2001[A]: 3,647;
2002: 6,920;
2003: 40,355;
2004: 47,869;
2005: 60,172;
2006[B]: 23,765.
Army National Guard;
Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard[D, E];
2001[A]: 0;
2002: 2;
2003: 17;
2004: 48;
2005: 49;
2006[B]: 50.
Army National Guard;
Total;
2001[A]: 3,647;
2002: 6,922;
2003: 40,372;
2004: 47,917;
2005: 60,221;
2006[B]: 23,815.
Air National Guard;
Selected Reserve;
2001[A]: 1,522;
2002: 19,515;
2003: 22,605;
2004: 13,479;
2005: 12,630;
2006[B]: 9,882.
Air National Guard;
Total;
2001[A]: 1,522;
2002: 19,515;
2003: 22,605;
2004: 13,479;
2005: 12,630;
2006[B]: 9,882.
Army Reserve;
Selected Reserve;
2001[A]: 1,172;
2002: 4,994;
2003: 35,181;
2004: 27,915;
2005: 21,884;
2006[B]: 11,531.
Army Reserve;
Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard;
2001[A]: 9;
2002: 189;
2003: 951;
2004: 1,427;
2005: 2,853;
2006[B]: 1,516.
Army Reserve;
Standby/Retired Reserve[F, G];
2001[A]: 0;
2002: 22;
2003: 113;
2004: 132;
2005: 140;
2006[B]: 133.
Army Reserve;
Total;
2001[A]: 1,181;
2002: 5,205;
2003: 36,245;
2004: 29,474;
2005: 24,877;
2006[B]: 13,180.
Navy Reserve;
Selected Reserve;
2001[A]: 217;
2002: 2,506;
2003: 5,438;
2004: 5,348;
2005: 5,110;
2006[B]: 5,658.
Navy Reserve;
Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard;
2001[A]: 27;
2002: 73;
2003: 212;
2004: 163;
2005: 305;
2006[B]: 177.
Navy Reserve;
Standby/Retired Reserve;
2001[A]: 1;
2002: 1;
2003: 5;
2004: 3;
2005: 2;
2006[B]: 8.
Navy Reserve;
Total;
2001[A]: 245;
2002: 2,580;
2003: 5,655;
2004: 5,514;
2005: 5,417;
2006[B]: 5,843.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Selected Reserve;
2001[A]: 8;
2002: 1,169;
2003: 9,568;
2004: 5,593;
2005: 3,052;
2006[B]: 864.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard;
2001[A]: 0;
2002: 182;
2003: 378;
2004: 262;
2005: 242;
2006[B]: 62.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Standby/Retired Reserve;
2001[A]: 0;
2002: 0;
2003: 6;
2004: 4;
2005: 5;
2006[B]: 3.
Marine Corps Reserve;
Total;
2001[A]: 8;
2002: 1,351;
2003: 9,952;
2004: 5,859;
2005: 3,299;
2006[B]: 929.
Air Force Reserve;
Selected Reserve;
2001[A]: 502;
2002: 11,592;
2003: 11,591;
2004: 8,777;
2005: 8,157;
2006[B]: 6,421.
Air Force Reserve;
Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard;
2001[A]: 6;
2002: 35;
2003: 139;
2004: 137;
2005: 241;
2006[B]: 41.
Air Force Reserve;
Standby/Retired Reserve;
2001[A]: 0;
2002: 10;
2003: 73;
2004: 22;
2005: 15;
2006[B]: 14.
Air Force Reserve;
Total;
2001[A]: 508;
2002: 11,637;
2003: 11,803;
2004: 8,936;
2005: 8,413;
2006[B]: 6,476.
Total;
2001[A]: 7,111;
2002: 47,210;
2003: 126,632;
2004: 111,179;
2005: 114,857;
2006[B]: 60,125.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Title 10 U.S.C. 10145(b) provides that the Army National Guard
and the Air National Guard are to be in the Ready Reserve. Reservists
can be counted more than once if they deployed more than once in
different fiscal years.
[A] Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September
30, 2001.
[B] Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30,
2006.
[C] The Selected Reserve, part of the Ready Reserve, is composed of
those units and individuals designated by their respective services and
approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential
to initial wartime missions that they have priority for training,
equipment, and personnel over all other reserve elements.
[D] The Individual Ready Reserve consists mainly of trained individuals
who have previously served in active component units or in the Selected
Reserve and who have a remaining military service obligation.
[E] The Inactive National Guard consists of National Guard personnel
who are attached to a specific unit but are temporarily unable to
participate in regular training. Currently, only the Army National
Guard uses this category.
[F] The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who have completed all
obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready
Reserve because of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or
disability.
[G] The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been placed in a
retirement status based on the completion of 20 or more qualifying
years of active component or reserve component service.
[End of table]
Table 6: State, Territories, and Armed Forces Areas of Residence for
Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through
June 30, 2006:
Residence of deployed population[A]: Alaska;
Army National Guard: 471;
Air National Guard: 979;
Army Reserve: 147;
Navy Reserve: 4;
Marine Corps Reserve: 27;
Air Force Reserve: 42;
Total: 1,670.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Alabama;
Army National Guard: 5,301;
Air National Guard: 1,380;
Army Reserve: 2,484;
Navy Reserve: 387;
Marine Corps Reserve: 332;
Air Force Reserve: 596;
Total: 10,480.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Arkansas;
Army National Guard: 3,891;
Air National Guard: 830;
Army Reserve: 1,078;
Navy Reserve: 49;
Marine Corps Reserve: 139;
Air Force Reserve: 132;
Total: 6,119.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Arizona;
Army National Guard: 2,005;
Air National Guard: 583;
Army Reserve: 1,208;
Navy Reserve: 138;
Marine Corps Reserve: 430;
Air Force Reserve: 697;
Total: 5,061.
Residence of deployed population[A]: California;
Army National Guard: 6,811;
Air National Guard: 1,882;
Army Reserve: 5,910;
Navy Reserve: 3,769;
Marine Corps Reserve: 3,321;
Air Force Reserve: 2,811;
Total: 24,504.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Colorado;
Army National Guard: 939;
Air National Guard: 889;
Army Reserve: 1,441;
Navy Reserve: 27;
Marine Corps Reserve: 223;
Air Force Reserve: 759;
Total: 4,278.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Connecticut;
Army National Guard: 1,753;
Air National Guard: 627;
Army Reserve: 738;
Navy Reserve: 141;
Marine Corps Reserve: 206;
Air Force Reserve: 226;
Total: 3,691.
Residence of deployed population[A]: District of Columbia;
Army National Guard: 131;
Air National Guard: 27;
Army Reserve: 174;
Navy Reserve: 234;
Marine Corps Reserve: 9;
Air Force Reserve: 36;
Total: 611.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Delaware;
Army National Guard: 502;
Air National Guard: 386;
Army Reserve: 252;
Navy Reserve: 10;
Marine Corps Reserve: 39;
Air Force Reserve: 438;
Total: 1,627.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Florida;
Army National Guard: 5,232;
Air National Guard: 683;
Army Reserve: 4,478;
Navy Reserve: 1,347;
Marine Corps Reserve: 929;
Air Force Reserve: 2,448;
Total: 15,117.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Georgia;
Army National Guard: 5,860;
Air National Guard: 1,543;
Army Reserve: 3,623;
Navy Reserve: 407;
Marine Corps Reserve: 732;
Air Force Reserve: 913;
Total: 13,078.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Hawaii;
Army National Guard: 2,058;
Air National Guard: 453;
Army Reserve: 856;
Navy Reserve: 137;
Marine Corps Reserve: 63;
Air Force Reserve: 202;
Total: 3,769.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Iowa;
Army National Guard: 3,963;
Air National Guard: 941;
Army Reserve: 1,431;
Navy Reserve: 19;
Marine Corps Reserve: 153;
Air Force Reserve: 33;
Total: 6,540.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Idaho;
Army National Guard: 2,004;
Air National Guard: 710;
Army Reserve: 329;
Navy Reserve: 11;
Marine Corps Reserve: 54;
Air Force Reserve: 50;
Total: 3,158.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Illinois;
Army National Guard: 4,032;
Air National Guard: 1,910;
Army Reserve: 3,272;
Navy Reserve: 103;
Marine Corps Reserve: 683;
Air Force Reserve: 454;
Total: 10,454.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Indiana;
Army National Guard: 4,328;
Air National Guard: 1,188;
Army Reserve: 1,583;
Navy Reserve: 60;
Marine Corps Reserve: 331;
Air Force Reserve: 685;
Total: 8,175.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Kansas;
Army National Guard: 2,394;
Air National Guard: 978;
Army Reserve: 1,760;
Navy Reserve: 87;
Marine Corps Reserve: 100;
Air Force Reserve: 287;
Total: 5,606.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Kentucky;
Army National Guard: 2,803;
Air National Guard: 628;
Army Reserve: 1,347;
Navy Reserve: 33;
Marine Corps Reserve: 190;
Air Force Reserve: 90;
Total: 5,091.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Louisiana;
Army National Guard: 5,877;
Air National Guard: 416;
Army Reserve: 1,271;
Navy Reserve: 112;
Marine Corps Reserve: 435;
Air Force Reserve: 613;
Total: 8,724.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Massachusetts;
Army National Guard: 2,965;
Air National Guard: 1,006;
Army Reserve: 1,684;
Navy Reserve: 76;
Marine Corps Reserve: 357;
Air Force Reserve: 758;
Total: 6,846.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Maryland;
Army National Guard: 1,839;
Air National Guard: 1,195;
Army Reserve: 2,215;
Navy Reserve: 584;
Marine Corps Reserve: 432;
Air Force Reserve: 487;
Total: 6,752.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Maine;
Army National Guard: 1,407;
Air National Guard: 647;
Army Reserve: 417;
Navy Reserve: 79;
Marine Corps Reserve: 26;
Air Force Reserve: 22;
Total: 2,598.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Michigan;
Army National Guard: 3,560;
Air National Guard: 1,542;
Army Reserve: 1,824;
Navy Reserve: 72;
Marine Corps Reserve: 681;
Air Force Reserve: 403;
Total: 8,082.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Minnesota;
Army National Guard: 4,699;
Air National Guard: 1,209;
Army Reserve: 2,064;
Navy Reserve: 46;
Marine Corps Reserve: 126;
Air Force Reserve: 592;
Total: 8,736.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Missouri;
Army National Guard: 4,199;
Air National Guard: 1,032;
Army Reserve: 2,605;
Navy Reserve: 110;
Marine Corps Reserve: 262;
Air Force Reserve: 580;
Total: 8,788.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Mississippi;
Army National Guard: 5,647;
Air National Guard: 1,308;
Army Reserve: 1,263;
Navy Reserve: 219;
Marine Corps Reserve: 126;
Air Force Reserve: 190;
Total: 8,753.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Montana;
Army National Guard: 1,302;
Air National Guard: 582;
Army Reserve: 472;
Navy Reserve: 5;
Marine Corps Reserve: 35;
Air Force Reserve: 25;
Total: 2,421.
Residence of deployed population[A]: North Carolina;
Army National Guard: 6,287;
Air National Guard: 935;
Army Reserve: 2,909;
Navy Reserve: 284;
Marine Corps Reserve: 697;
Air Force Reserve: 755;
Total: 11,867.
Residence of deployed population[A]: North Dakota;
Army National Guard: 1,627;
Air National Guard: 167;
Army Reserve: 173;
Navy Reserve: 2;
Marine Corps Reserve: 4;
Air Force Reserve: 28;
Total: 2,001.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Nebraska;
Army National Guard: 2,007;
Air National Guard: 687;
Army Reserve: 1,262;
Navy Reserve: 16;
Marine Corps Reserve: 73;
Air Force Reserve: 58;
Total: 4,103.
Residence of deployed population[A]: New Hampshire;
Army National Guard: 1,121;
Air National Guard: 417;
Army Reserve: 553;
Navy Reserve: 30;
Marine Corps Reserve: 54;
Air Force Reserve: 71;
Total: 2,246.
Residence of deployed population[A]: New Jersey;
Army National Guard: 2,234;
Air National Guard: 1,332;
Army Reserve: 1,506;
Navy Reserve: 215;
Marine Corps Reserve: 479;
Air Force Reserve: 839;
Total: 6,605.
Residence of deployed population[A]: New Mexico;
Army National Guard: 978;
Air National Guard: 482;
Army Reserve: 531;
Navy Reserve: 52;
Marine Corps Reserve: 79;
Air Force Reserve: 122;
Total: 2,244.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Nevada;
Army National Guard: 612;
Air National Guard: 541;
Army Reserve: 335;
Navy Reserve: 73;
Marine Corps Reserve: 153;
Air Force Reserve: 137;
Total: 1,851.
Residence of deployed population[A]: New York;
Army National Guard: 4,571;
Air National Guard: 2,566;
Army Reserve: 4,833;
Navy Reserve: 179;
Marine Corps Reserve: 1,406;
Air Force Reserve: 898;
Total: 14,453.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Ohio;
Army National Guard: 4,047;
Air National Guard: 2,552;
Army Reserve: 4,452;
Navy Reserve: 125;
Marine Corps Reserve: 613;
Air Force Reserve: 1,402;
Total: 13,191.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Oklahoma;
Army National Guard: 2,951;
Air National Guard: 1,406;
Army Reserve: 1,151;
Navy Reserve: 51;
Marine Corps Reserve: 135;
Air Force Reserve: 597;
Total: 6,291.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Oregon;
Army National Guard: 3,112;
Air National Guard: 301;
Army Reserve: 419;
Navy Reserve: 49;
Marine Corps Reserve: 223;
Air Force Reserve: 302;
Total: 4,406.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Pennsylvania;
Army National Guard: 6,053;
Air National Guard: 2,368;
Army Reserve: 5,415;
Navy Reserve: 269;
Marine Corps Reserve: 828;
Air Force Reserve: 1,322;
Total: 16,255.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Rhode Island;
Army National Guard: 1,092;
Air National Guard: 474;
Army Reserve: 253;
Navy Reserve: 109;
Marine Corps Reserve: 61;
Air Force Reserve: 14;
Total: 2,003.
Residence of deployed population[A]: South Carolina;
Army National Guard: 3,760;
Air National Guard: 817;
Army Reserve: 1,767;
Navy Reserve: 268;
Marine Corps Reserve: 179;
Air Force Reserve: 996;
Total: 7,787.
Residence of deployed population[A]: South Dakota;
Army National Guard: 1,916;
Air National Guard: 571;
Army Reserve: 246;
Navy Reserve: 1;
Marine Corps Reserve: 2;
Air Force Reserve: 23;
Total: 2,759.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Tennessee;
Army National Guard: 5,519;
Air National Guard: 1,612;
Army Reserve: 1,855;
Navy Reserve: 103;
Marine Corps Reserve: 368;
Air Force Reserve: 94;
Total: 9,551.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Texas;
Army National Guard: 6,901;
Air National Guard: 1,503;
Army Reserve: 7,271;
Navy Reserve: 1,233;
Marine Corps Reserve: 1,475;
Air Force Reserve: 2,421;
Total: 20,804.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Utah;
Army National Guard: 2,697;
Air National Guard: 811;
Army Reserve: 986;
Navy Reserve: 10;
Marine Corps Reserve: 228;
Air Force Reserve: 569;
Total: 5,301.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Virginia;
Army National Guard: 3,238;
Air National Guard: 879;
Army Reserve: 3,756;
Navy Reserve: 1,759;
Marine Corps Reserve: 905;
Air Force Reserve: 585;
Total: 11,122.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Vermont;
Army National Guard: 1,294;
Air National Guard: 410;
Army Reserve: 135;
Navy Reserve: 1;
Marine Corps Reserve: 12;
Air Force Reserve: 13;
Total: 1,865.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Washington;
Army National Guard: 4,320;
Air National Guard: 839;
Army Reserve: 1,808;
Navy Reserve: 225;
Marine Corps Reserve: 383;
Air Force Reserve: 1,274;
Total: 8,849.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Wisconsin;
Army National Guard: 4,177;
Air National Guard: 1,291;
Army Reserve: 2,257;
Navy Reserve: 39;
Marine Corps Reserve: 282;
Air Force Reserve: 603;
Total: 8,649.
Residence of deployed population[A]: West Virginia;
Army National Guard: 1,975;
Air National Guard: 879;
Army Reserve: 1,137;
Navy Reserve: 6;
Marine Corps Reserve: 45;
Air Force Reserve: 75;
Total: 4,117.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Wyoming;
Army National Guard: 694;
Air National Guard: 407;
Army Reserve: 115;
Navy Reserve: 4;
Marine Corps Reserve: 9;
Air Force Reserve: 16;
Total: 1,245.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Territories and Armed Forces
areas;
Army National Guard: 4,366;
Air National Guard: 670;
Army Reserve: 3,390;
Navy Reserve: 4,701;
Marine Corps Reserve: 15;
Air Force Reserve: 243;
Total: 13,385.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Unknown or Not applicable;
Army National Guard: 22;
Air National Guard: 703;
Army Reserve: 651;
Navy Reserve: 2,345;
Marine Corps Reserve: 139;
Air Force Reserve: 743;
Total: 4,603.
Residence of deployed population[A]: Total;
Army National Guard: 163,544;
Air National Guard: 51,174;
Army Reserve: 95,092;
Navy Reserve: 20,415;
Marine Corps Reserve: 19,288;
Air Force Reserve: 28,769;
Total: 378,282.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Territories include the District of Columbia, American Samoa,
the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto
Rico. Armed Forces areas include Armed Forces of the Americas, Armed
Forces Europe, and Armed Forces Pacific. This population represents
13,385, or about 4 percent, of the total number of deployed reservists.
[A] Reservists who had more than one deployment are counted by the
state of residence of record for the most current deployment.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary Of Defense:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-4000:
Personnel and Readiness:
Sep 8 2006:
Mr. Derek B. Stewart:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stewart:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-06-1068, "Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to
Take Additional Steps to Improve Mobilization Data for the Reserve
Components," dated August 25, 2006 (GAO Code 350682). DoD has reviewed
the subject draft report and strongly non-concurs with the methodology
applied in the conduct of this audit. We also strongly non-concur with
Recommendation 4. Our response to the specific recommendations listed
in the report is enclosed.
The original audit announcement letter, dated June 15, 2005, was
entitled, "DOD's Reporting of Financial Costs and Personnel Data for
Specific Engagements." On February 21, 2006, the Senior Analyst from
GAO sent an email to the DoD IG stating ".we have refocused the
objectives to look more at the data and less at the implications for
the DoD budget. Specifically, we'll be looking more at the extent to
which DOD and the services are able to track the number of and length
of Reserve Component service member deployments in support to the
global war on terrorism." The draft audit, dated August 25, 2006, now
states that one purpose of the audit was to determine ".whether DOD's
reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable."
This purpose was never provided to DOD during the audit period and
deviates from the original audit engagement purpose and the revised
purpose provided February 2006. I believe this to be an unacceptable
auditing practice.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David S. C. Chu:
Enclosure:
As stated:
GAO Draft Report - Dated August 25, 2006 GAO Code 350682/GAO-06-1068:
"Military Personnel: DOD and the Services Need to Take Additional Steps
to Improve Mobilization Data for the Reserve Components"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
provide guidance to the Services to better define and standardize the
use of key terms, like activation, mobilization, and deployment, to
promote the completeness, accuracy, and consistency of the data within
the Contingency Tracking System (CTS).
DOD Response: Partially concur. In addition, Joint Publication 1-02
defines these terms and all participants of the Reserve Component
Mobilization Policy Forum (OSD, Joint Staff, and all Services), which
met in January 2006, concurred with the published terms and definitions
and these are in use today. For the purposes of reporting and
collecting CTS "deployment" data, DODI 6490.03, dated August 11, 2006,
references Joint Publication 1-02 for definitions of these terms, so
this requirement to standardize the term has already been addressed.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Service Secretaries to: (1) take the steps necessary to
provide all required data to the Defense Manpower Data Center, such as
volunteer status and location deployed; (2) have the Services address
data inconsistencies identified by the Defense Manpower Data Center;
and (3) establish the needed protocols to have the Services report data
consistent with the guidance above.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. All of the Services have been directed
to provide DMDC all required data, to include volunteer status (DODI
7730.54) and location deployed (DODI 6490.03). As you mentioned in your
report, the Service Components are working with DMDC to address data
inconsistencies with the "mobilization" data. The Air National Guard
and Navy Reserve have completed their review, and the Army National
Guard, Army Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve are actively working this
issue. As noted in the GAO report, some requirements cannot be
immediately supported by service data systems and modifications to them
can take time to complete.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
require the Defense Manpower Data Center to document its internal
procedures and processes, including the assumptions it uses in data
analyses.
DOD Response: Partially Concur. DMDC is in the process of developing
documentation on its internal procedures and processes, and has in
draft "A Guide to File Management at DMDC" which addresses the
processes used from receipt of the data from the Service Components to
the final quality control of the consolidated file. With respect to
data analyses, many of the procedures already being used by DMDC have
been collated in the draft document, "Ensuring a Quality Product." With
respect to "the assumptions it uses in data analyses," those
assumptions are made not by DMDC, but by its customers. DMDC attempts
to document those assumptions made in the resulting report titles and
footnotes, but also expects the recipient of the report to recall the
guidance under which the original request was made.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to
collaborate on the reasonableness of the assumptions used by Defense
Manpower Data Center in its data analyses with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Director,
Joint Staff.
DOD Response: Strongly Non-concur. As stated in our response to
Recommendation 3, "the reasonableness of the assumptions used by DMDC"
does not put the onus on the correct organization. DMDC is a support
organization, and accordingly, the reports it generates are for a
multitude of organizations, from the Services, to OSD to the Joint
Staff. Each of the organizations makes independent report requests, and
often the methodology DMDC is asked to use in the development of these
reports are not "DMDC assumptions" but rather parameters of the
requestor of the report. Since DMDC is not always in a position to know
what the requested report is ultimately going to be used for, it is not
appropriate for DMDC, or OUSD (P&R) to make an assessment of the
"reasonableness" of the data request.
[End of section]
Appendix IV; GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Derek Stewart (202) 512-5559 or Hstewartd@gao.govH:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cynthia Jackson, Assistant
Director; Crystal Bernard; Tina Kirschbaum; Marie A. Mak; Ricardo
Marquez; Julie Matta; Lynn Milan; Rebecca Shea; and Cheryl Weissman
made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GWOT includes missions such as Operation Enduring Freedom with
operations in and around Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom with
operations in and around Iraq.
[2] National Guard and Reserve servicemembers include the collective
forces of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, as well
as the forces from the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps
Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve. They are known collectively as the
reserve component. This report does not address the Coast Guard Reserve
because it comes under the day-to-day control of the Department of
Homeland Security rather than the Department of Defense (DOD). The
Coast Guard does, however, assist DOD in meeting its commitments and
DOD data indicate that 7,053 Coast Guard reservists were mobilized and
204 were deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006.
[3] According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, a servicemember is activated when he or she is
ordered to full-time duty in the active military of the United States.
A servicemember is mobilized when he or she becomes part of the process
of assembling and organizing personnel and equipment, activating or
federalizing units and members of the National Guard and Reserves for
active duty, and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for
war or other national emergency. A servicemember is deployed when he or
she becomes part of the process to relocate forces and materiel to
desired operational areas. For the purposes of this report, the term
mobilized will refer to reservists who have been activated, mobilized,
or both in support of GWOT.
[4] Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel
and Readiness, memorandum, "Reporting of Personnel Data in Support of
the National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks," October
4, 2001.
[5] See, for example, GAO, Defense Health Care: Medical Surveillance
Improved Since Gulf War, but Mixed Results in Bosnia, HGAO/NSIAD-97-136
H(Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1997); Military Personnel: DOD Actions
Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces,
HGAO-03-921 H(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003); Military Personnel: DOD
Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related
Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, HGAO-04-1031 H(Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); and Defense Health Care: Improvements Needed in
Occupational and Environmental Health Surveillance during Deployments
to Address Immediate and Long-term Health Issues, HGAO-05-632
H(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005).
[6] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
HGAO/AIMD-00-21H.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[7] The Selected Reserve is composed of those units and individuals
designated by their respective services and approved by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to initial wartime missions
that they have priority for training, equipment, and personnel over all
other reserve elements (10 U.S.C. § 10143).
[8] The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition
of the southern United States: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West
Virginia. The District of Columbia is also included.
[9] The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition
of the midwestern United States: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
[10] The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition
of the western United States: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming.
[11] The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition
of the northeastern United States: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.
[12] The legal authority used to involuntarily activate reservists in
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, limits the
number that may be involuntarily activated to 1,000,000 (10 U.S.C. §
12302(c)).
[13] RCCPDS is an automated information system and associated database
that was established as the official source of statistical tabulation
of reserve component strengths and related data for various users, to
include DOD and Congress.
[14] DOD Instruction 1336.5, Automated Extract of Active Duty Military
Personnel Records, May 2, 2001, and DOD Instruction 7730.54, which has
been updated several times since it was first released in 1975.
[15] DOD Manpower Data Center Memorandum, "Recommendations Based on
Desert Storm Personnel Data Base Conference of 23-25 April 1991," May
15, 1991.
[16] "Defense Manpower Data Center Support for Desert Shield/Desert
Storm," December 1991.
[17] DOD Instruction 1336.5.
[18] The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Total Force Management, as relates to
readiness, National Guard and Reserve component affairs, health
affairs, and personnel requirements and management.
[19] Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel
and Readiness, memorandum, "Reporting of Personnel Data in Support of
the National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks," October
4, 2001.
[20] DOD Instruction 1336.5.
[21] The data are also used for research, actuarial analyses,
interagency, mobilization and contingency reporting, and evaluation of
DOD programs and policies.
[22] DOD Instruction 7730.54, March 15, 1999, was updated with enc. 11
on August 6, 2004.
[23] DOD Instruction 7730.54, enc. 11, August 6, 2004.
[24] DOD Instruction 1336.5, enc. 5, May 2, 2001.
[25] DOD Instruction 6490.03, Deployment Health, August 11, 2006.
[26] DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03.
[27] DMDC's activation and mobilization data are contained in the CTS
activation file. For the purposes of this report, the term mobilized
will refer to reservists who have been activated, mobilized, or both in
support of GWOT.
[28] DOD Instruction 7730.54.
[29] DOD Instruction 6490.03.
[30] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness, "Action Memorandum: Force Deployment Rules for Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom," July 30, 2004.
[31] "Boots on the ground" is defined in a DOD action memo issued July
30, 2004, as the window of time from when a unit physically arrives in
theater until the unit physically departs from the theater. In addition
to time spent "boots on the ground," Army servicemembers usually have a
period prior to mobilization in which they train at a mobilization
station and a time following deployment where they demobilize.
[32] Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding and because
we did not include the percentage for territories or Armed Forces
areas.
[33] Occupational areas, groups, and subgroups are defined by DOD's
Occupational Database. Examples given represent DOD's areas,
occupational groups or subgroups.
[34] DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03.
[35] DMDC's activation and mobilization data are contained in the CTS
activation file. For the purposes of this report, the term mobilized
will refer to reservists who have been activated, mobilized, or both in
support of GWOT.
[36] The DFAS systems contain data on special pays and allowances
provided to servicemembers including combat zone tax exclusions and
imminent danger pay.
[37] For this report, Air Force activation data are the same as
mobilization data.
[38] DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03.
[39] DOD Instruction 7730.54.
[40] DOD Instruction 7730.54.
[41] HGAO/AIMD-00-21H.3.1.
[42] During the ongoing monthly validation process, DMDC officials said
that they apply a series of undocumented business rules to identify and
address inconsistencies in the data provided by the services and
comparable data reported in DEERS and by DFAS.
[43] GAO, Government Auditing Standards, HGAO-03-673G H(Washington,
D.C.: June 2003).
[44] HGAO-03-673GH, sections 7.12 b, 7.31, and 7.59.
[45] DOD Instruction 6490.03, DOD Instruction 1336.5, and DOD
Instruction 7730.54.
[46] To assess the extent the data changed, we first received and
analyzed data provided by DMDC in a December 2005 file about reservists
deployed in support of GWOT. While DOD's rebaselining effort was still
being completed, we received updated data from DMDC in a June 2006 file
about reservists deployed in support of GWOT through June 2006, which
allowed us to compare prerebaselined December 2005 data with
postrebaselined December 2005 data. We compared these two data
submissions and analyzed the extent to which the data had changed
during the rebaselining effort.
[47] DOD Instruction 7730.54.
[48] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
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