This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-639
entitled 'Clean Water: Better Information and Targeted Prevention
Efforts Could Enhance Spill Management in the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor' which was released on July 7, 2006.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
Clean Water:
Better Information and Targeted Prevention Efforts Could Enhance Spill
Management in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
GAO-06-639:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-639, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
Spills of oil and hazardous substances in the St. Clair–Detroit River
corridor have degraded this border area between the United States and
Canada and are a potential threat to local drinking water supplies.
Within the United States such spills are reported to the National
Response Center (NRC), and in Canada to the Ontario Spills Action
Centre. This report discusses (1) how many oil and hazardous substance
spills greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were reported
in the corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how accurately reported spills
reflect the extent of actual spills; (2) what processes are used to
notify parties of spills, and if they contain explicit requirements for
reporting times and spill magnitude; and (3) the extent of
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard’s spill
prevention efforts and enforcement activities in the corridor from 1994
to 2004.
What GAO Found:
The NRC received 991 spill reports and the Ontario Spills Action Centre
received 157 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994 through 2004,
but these reports do not accurately portray the actual number or volume
of spills. Many spills go unreported by responsible parties because
they do not understand or fail to comply with reporting requirements.
Further, multiple reports for the same spill are often recorded by NRC
and provided to EPA and the Coast Guard for investigation. EPA does not
remove all duplicate spill reports or update its data after
investigating spills. Coast Guard officials update their spill data
after investigations but they are unable to update spill volume
estimates due to automated system limitations. GAO also found that,
according to agency data sets, other events—combined sewer overflows
(CSOs) and industrial permit violations—occurred more frequently than
spills in the corridor. While data on industrial permit violations and
CSOs might be subject to the same limitations as the spill data because
the data are self reported and facilities may not report all of these
events, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because
they are not part of a structured program as CSOs and industrial permit
violations are.
There are multiple parties involved in spill notification in the
corridor and agreements outlining U.S.–Canadian notification processes
are not explicit about reporting times or the magnitude of spills that
warrant notification. The coast guards of each country have agreed to
notify one another of spills primarily when a joint response may be
needed. Another agreement between Michigan and Ontario officials calls
for notifying each other of spills that may have a joint impact. We
reviewed six selected spill incidents that illustrate the various ways
that notification can occur. The drinking water facility operators we
contacted on the U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives
on current notification processes, and the majority expressed concern
that their facilities could be contaminated by spills if they are not
notified in a timely manner. Finally, efforts have been made to develop
informal notification processes between individual industries or trade
associations and drinking water facilities.
EPA’s spill prevention program is limited and the Coast Guard addresses
spill prevention as part of other compliance efforts. EPA’s prevention
program addresses only oil spills. Further, EPA is uncertain of which
specific facilities are subject to regulation under its spill
prevention program, and conducts varying numbers of inspections per
year. EPA inspections uncovered significant spill prevention
deficiencies, whereas the Coast Guard’s inspections revealed minor
issues. The agencies issued a total of 16 penalties for spills and
program noncompliance during the period we reviewed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that EPA Region 5 and the Coast Guard’s District 9
update spill information and determine whether existing spill
notification processes can be improved. GAO also recommends that EPA
consider gathering information on which facilities are regulated under
its spill prevention program and develop goals for its spill prevention
inspections. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our
findings and conclusions overall and EPA provided technical comments
only.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-639].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact John B. Stephenson at
(202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Agency Spill Data Are Not Sufficient to Accurately Determine the Actual
Number or Volume of Spills:
Spill Notification Occurs between and among Many Different Parties and
Agreements Outlining U.S.-Canadian Notification Processes Are Not
Explicit about Time and Magnitude:
EPA's Spill Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Are Limited and the
Coast Guard Addresses Spill Prevention as Part of Other Compliance
Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor, 1994-
2004:
EPA Spill Data:
Coast Guard Spill Data:
Michigan DEQ Spill Data:
Ontario SAC Spill Data:
Appendix III: CSO Data for the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor, 1999-
2004:
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent Violation Data for the St. Clair-
Detroit River Corridor, 1994-2004:
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected Incidents:
U.S. Spill: 2001 Hazardous Substance Spill:
U.S. Spill: 2002 Oil Spill:
U.S. Spill: 2004 Oil Spill:
Canadian Spill: 2003 Hazardous Substance Spill:
Canadian Spill: 2004 Hazardous Substance Spill:
Canadian Spill: 2004 Oil Spill:
Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and Notification System:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Characteristics of Six Selected Spill Incidents in the
Corridor from 2001-2004:
Table 2: Number of Coast Guard's Facility, Vessel, and Transfer
Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from 1994-
2004:
Table 3: EPA Spill Data by Year and Material:
Table 4: Coast Guard Spill Data by Year and Material:
Table 5: Coast Guard Spill Data by Water Body and Material:
Table 6: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Year and Material:
Table 7: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Water Body:
Table 8: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Year and Material:
Table 9: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Water Body:
Table 10: CSOs in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from 1999-2004
by Water Body:
Table 11: Volume of CSOs in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from
1999-2004 (in Millions of Gallons):
Table 12: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Volume per
Year:
Table 13: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Discharged
Material and Year:
Table 14: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Water Body
and Material for the 12 Most Frequently Violated Permits:
Figures:
Figure 1: Spill Materials in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
Figure 2: Pollution Entering the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from
Sources Such as Spills, Industrial Permit Violations, and CSOs:
Figure 3: Ontario SAC With Display Screens Showing Spill Incident
Summaries:
Figure 4: Relative Percentages of Reported Spills, Industrial Permit
Violations, and CSOs from 1999-2004 in the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor That Were Greater Than 50 Gallons (or of an Unknown Volume):
Figure 5: Spill Notification Processes in the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor:
Figure 6: Notification Processes for Six Selected Spills in the St.
Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
Figure 7: U.S. Drinking Water Facilities on the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor:
Figure 8: Existing and Proposed Water Quality Monitoring Stations in
the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
Figure 9: Number of SPCC Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair-Detroit
River Corridor from 1994-2004:
Figure 10: EPA and Coast Guard Spill-Related Penalties Assessed from
1994 to 2004 in the St. Clair--Detroit River Corridor:
Figure 11: 2002 Rouge River Oil Spill:
Figure 12: 2004 Rouge River Oil Spill:
Figure 13: ORSANCO Organics Detection System Monitoring Sites:
Figure 14: Water Quality Monitoring Equipment Used at ORSANCO Sites:
Abbreviations:
BMP: best management practices:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act:
CSO: combined sewer overflows:
DEQ: Department of Environmental Quality:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
EPCRA: Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act:
NPDES: National Pollution Discharge Elimination System:
NRC: National Response Center:
Oil Fund: Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund:
OSC: on-scene coordinators:
PEAS: Pollution Emergency Alerting System:
PECC: Pollution Emergency Communications Coordinator:
RP: responsible party:
SAC: Ontario Ministry of Environment's Spills Action Centre:
SLEA: Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association:
SPCC: Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 7, 2006:
Congressional Requesters:
Recent spills of large quantities of oil and hazardous substances like
vinyl chloride have raised public concerns about the safety of drinking
water for the more than 5 million people living within the St. Clair-
Detroit River corridor, which borders the United States and Canada. The
98-mile corridor formed by the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and the
Detroit River serves as a major shipping channel between the upper and
lower Great Lakes. Approximately 500 industrial facilities, including
chemical companies, oil refineries, power plants, and steel mills, are
located within the corridor. The heaviest concentration of industry on
the U.S. side is in the southern part of the corridor, around Detroit;
Canadian industry is concentrated on the northern part of the St. Clair
River, around Sarnia, Ontario. Seventeen drinking water facilities on
the U.S. side have intakes in the corridor close to these industrial
centers. The corridor is part of the Great Lakes Basin, whose waters,
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the two countries
recognized could not be restored and enhanced without cooperation
between the two countries. Yet because of contamination from spills and
other pollutant discharges, the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers have fish
consumption restrictions, and oil sheens and other debris are commonly
found on the waters' surface or along shorelines.
Figure 1: Spill Materials in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
To ensure that spill[Footnote 1]s are promptly reported, several
statutes--including the Clean Water Act[Footnote 2] and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(Superfund[Footnote 3])--require that the party responsible for a
discharge of oil or hazardous substance notify the National Response
Center (NRC) immediately. For oil spills, any amount that would create
a sheen on the water is a reportable quantity whereas, for hazardous
substances, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations
(prescribed under Superfund and the Clean Water Act) specify what
amounts the substances must exceed to be reportable. The NRC is the
national point of contact for spill reporting, and it distributes
reported spill information to agencies, including EPA and the Coast
Guard, which are tasked with spill response for inland and coastal
spills, respectively. In the corridor, EPA's Region 5 and the Coast
Guard's District 9 are responsible for responding to reported spills.
While the NRC is a major source of spill information for the agencies,
EPA and the Coast Guard may be contacted directly about a spill or
learn of it while conducting their regular duties. EPA and the Coast
Guard's spill-related responsibilities are outlined in the National
Contingency Plan, the federal government's guide to oil and hazardous
substance spill response. It describes how the agencies are to assess a
spill, and initiate response action if necessary. In addition to
federal agencies, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(Michigan DEQ) and Michigan State Police have a role in spill-related
response and notification. In Canada, the Ontario Ministry of
Environment has a prominent role in spill-related activities in the St.
Clair-Detroit River corridor, including notification and enforcement.
The Ontario Ministry of Environment's Spills Action Centre (Ontario
SAC) obtains and reports spill information to responders and other
stakeholders. Environment Canada, the federal-level regulatory agency,
has a lesser role in spill-related activities in the corridor.
To decrease the likelihood of spills, both EPA and the Coast Guard
administer spill prevention programs. EPA's program requires that non-
transportation related facilities (e.g., power plants) with a specified
storage capacity prepare spill prevention plans and meet certain
operational standards. These facilities must also provide containment
structures or explain in their plans why the structures are not
feasible. The Coast Guard's prevention program requires vessels with
the capacity to carry certain amounts of oil and hazardous substances-
-and certain facilities that transfer oil and hazardous substances--to
have written transfer procedures or operations manuals, meet minimum
equipment requirements, and follow prescribed procedures when
transferring oil on navigable waterways. EPA and the Coast Guard have
the authority to fine parties that are responsible for spills, or that
do not comply with spill prevention program requirements.
In this context, you asked us to examine (1) how many oil and hazardous
substance spills of more than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were
reported in the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and
how accurately reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2)
what processes are used to notify parties of spills, and whether they
contain explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude;
and (3) the extent of EPA and the Coast Guard's spill prevention
efforts and enforcement activities in the St. Clair-Detroit River
corridor from 1994 to 2004.
To obtain overall information relating to spills, we gathered
information from officials within various offices in EPA; the Coast
Guard; the state of Michigan; and Ontario, Canada. To determine the
number of spills over 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) reported in
the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and the Detroit River and its
tributary, the Rouge River, between 1994 and 2004 we obtained spill
data maintained by NRC, EPA, the Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and the
Ontario SAC. We also obtained EPA and Michigan DEQ data sets related to
other pollutant discharges, such as combined sewer overflows (CSO) and
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) industrial
permit violations to obtain more complete information on pollutants
discharged into the water bodies of the St. Clair-Detroit River
corridor. To assess what processes are used to notify parties of spills
and whether they contain explicit requirements for reporting times and
spill magnitudes, we reviewed applicable laws and spill notification
agreements and obtained information on implementation of these
agreements. We obtained and analyzed documentation on six spills to
better understand how the notification process was conducted under
varying circumstances, and to show a range of spill materials and
source locations. We also obtained information from all 17 of the
drinking water facility operators on the U.S. side of the corridor to
obtain their perspectives on the timeliness of spill notification. To
identify spill prevention efforts and enforcement activities, we
obtained and analyzed the relevant legislation, agency spill prevention
and enforcement policies, as well as agency data on spill-related
inspections and enforcement actions in the corridor since 1994. We
performed our work between September 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
description of our methodology is provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The NRC received 991 spill reports from the U.S. side of the corridor
and the Ontario SAC received an additional 157 spill reports from the
Canadian side of the corridor from 1994 to 2004, but these reports do
not accurately capture the actual number or volume of spills. U.S. and
Canadian officials believe that many spills go unreported because,
among other reasons, responsible parties may not understand or comply
with the reporting requirements. In addition, the NRC database often
includes multiple reports for the same spill. The response agencies--
EPA and the Coast Guard--are required to assess each reported spill and
therefore should have reliable spill information based on their
investigations, but this is not the case. EPA Region 5 does not remove
all duplicate spill reports, or update its data after investigating
spills. Furthermore, investigators do not consistently document their
activities, so it is unclear which spills have or have not been
investigated. In contrast, Coast Guard officials in District 9 document
their investigations and use the information to update their spill
data, but they do not update spill volume estimates after
investigations because of automated system limitations that do not
allow them to input revised estimates. As a result, complete
information on the extent of spills is not available to determine if
additional management or oversight is needed to address the problem.
Finally, we also found that, according to agency data sets, other
events--CSOs and industrial permit violations--occurred more frequently
than spills in the corridor.
There are multiple parties involved in spill notification in the
corridor and agreements outlining U.S.-Canadian notification processes
are not explicit about reporting times or the magnitude of spills that
warrant notification. Generally, spill notification involves the
following: (1) spill occurrence and reporting by a responsible party or
observer to a designated reporting center or a response agency; (2)
spill notification from response agencies to one another if determined
to be necessary; and (3) spill notification by response agencies to
drinking water facilities and other stakeholders. All spill
notification is dependent upon reporting by parties responsible for the
spill or others who provide initial notification of the spill. Spill
notification processes between the United States and Canada are
outlined in two agreements between the countries. One process is used
by the coast guards of each country, who have agreed to notify one
another of spills primarily when a joint response may be needed.
Another process is used at the state and provincial level, where
officials from the Michigan State Police and Ontario Ministry of
Environment have an agreement to notify one another of spills. However,
these two agreements are not explicit about what constitutes timely
reporting or what magnitude of spill triggers notification. According
to Michigan State Police officials, the Michigan-Ontario notification
agreement was meant to, among other things, expedite the dissemination
of information to the public, because responsibility for notifying the
public--including drinking water facilities--generally resides with
state and local authorities. We reviewed six selected spill incidents
to gain insight into the dynamics of spill notification processes from
initial reporting to drinking water facility notification. The drinking
water facility operators we contacted on the U.S. side of the corridor
had differing perspectives on current notification processes, and the
majority expressed concern that their facilities could be contaminated
by spills if notification was not timely. Finally, efforts have been
made to develop informal notification processes between individual
industries or trade associations and drinking water facilities.
EPA's spill prevention efforts are limited to potential oil spills,
whereas the scope of the Coast Guard's efforts are broader and included
as part of other compliance activities. EPA's Spill Prevention,
Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) program addresses only oil spills,
not spills of other hazardous substances. Agency officials told us that
their spill prevention regulations were written when oil spills were a
bigger problem, and they believed that the NPDES program already
addressed chronic pollution discharges in waterways. Unlike EPA's NPDES
program, which requires facilities to obtain a permit to discharge
pollutants, the SPCC program has no mechanism to identify the
facilities that it regulates. This creates a challenge in determining
which facilities are required to create spill prevention plans. To
date, EPA has not identified the universe of facilities to be inspected
under its SPCC program. EPA Region 5 officials have identified 59
facilities in the corridor that are regulated under the SPCC program as
a result of referrals from Michigan DEQ or through special inspection
initiatives. Inspections for SPCC program compliance vary in number per
year and are largely contingent upon other inspection initiatives
because of limited numbers of inspection staff, according to agency
officials. The inspections that were conducted disclosed significant
and numerous spill prevention deficiencies, such as failure to prepare
prevention plans. On the other hand, the Coast Guard inspected a
greater number of the facilities and vessels under their jurisdiction
than EPA--mainly because the inspections were not only focused on spill
prevention, but included other areas related to safety and security.
Officials from the Coast Guard reported that in nearly all cases, their
inspectors found that facilities and vessels were in compliance; those
that were not in compliance had only minor issues, such as incidental
omissions in operations manuals. In response to violations for spills
or program noncompliance, EPA and the Coast Guard issued a total of 16
penalties. From 1994 through 2004, EPA Region 5 fined four parties an
average of $39,000 each; three were for violations of the spill
prevention program and one was for a spill. In assessing reported
spills, EPA relies on Michigan DEQ to respond locally and does not
respond on-site to the majority of spills reported to them. Therefore,
it does not collect evidence from many reported spills that could be
used to take enforcement actions against responsible parties. In
contrast, officials from the Coast Guard told us they investigate all
spills reported to them, both on-site and indirectly (e.g., through
inquiries). Based on these spill investigations, the Coast Guard's
District 9 fined 12 parties an average of about $2,100 each in the time
frame we reviewed. Neither agency fined parties for failure to report
spills.
To improve spill management, we are making recommendations to EPA and
the Coast Guard aimed at providing better documentation of spill
investigation results, and identification of possible enhancements to
the notification process. We are also recommending that EPA develop an
inventory of facilities that are subject to its spill prevention
program and develop goals for the frequency and extent of its
inspections for such facilities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) agreed overall with our findings and conclusions, and
EPA provided technical comments only. DHS did not address our
recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation that it gather
information on SPCC-regulated facilities, EPA stated that there is no
authority in the Clean Water Act or the prevention regulations for
facilities to provide this information to EPA. Furthermore, it stated
that under the Paperwork Reduction Act the agency would need to seek
approval from the Office of Management and Budget to collect such
information. In this regard, we note that EPA has previously identified
SPCC-regulated facilities in the corridor. However, if EPA determines
that formal rulemaking is necessary for it to gather information on
which facilities are covered under its spill prevention program, then
we believe it should consider undertaking such a rulemaking. EPA also
commented on the feasibility of updating spill information maintained
by the NRC. While we acknowledge that EPA does not modify spill data
maintained by the NRC, our recommendation was that EPA update its own
spill data and explore the feasibility of updating spill information
maintained by NRC by informing the NRC of duplicate spill reports.
Background:
The St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, and Lake St. Clair, provide multiple
benefits to residents of Michigan and Ontario, Canada, who use the
water bodies as their primary source of drinking water as well as for
recreation such as boating and fishing. Sensitive ecological areas
located along the corridor include Humbug Marsh, the last Great Lakes
coastal marsh on the Michigan mainland of the Detroit River. It
contains the greatest diversity of fish species found in the Detroit
River and it is part of the migration route for 117 fish and 92 bird
species. The Detroit River itself was designated an American Heritage
River in 1998 for these ecological resources. Despite these and other
benefits, the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers are considered "Areas of
Concern" by the U.S. and Canadian governments under the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement as a result of beneficial-use impairments, such
as restrictions on fish consumption.
Pollutant discharges to the waters of the corridor include CSOs--caused
by heavy rains that force wastewater treatment plants to bypass their
overburdened systems and discharge raw or partially treated waste
directly into the water bodies. Michigan law requires that wastewater
treatment facilities report their combined and sanitary sewer overflows
to the Michigan DEQ within 24 hours. Discharges from industrial
facilities with NPDES permits account for additional pollutants that
enter the waters of the corridor. Industries with NPDES permits are
required to report on the quality of all discharges and to detail any
pollutants discharged that exceed their permit limits to EPA in
monitoring reports at intervals specified in their permits, commonly
monthly. As a result, NPDES-permitted industries regularly monitor
their discharges. In addition to these requirements, federal law
requires that parties that discharge oil or a hazardous substance
beyond specified quantities into waters of the corridor report these
incidents to the NRC. Spills and other pollutant discharges might also
be reported to the NRC by members of the public that observe pollutant
materials in waterways. When spills, industrial permit violations, and
sewer overflows contain oil, they are visible--and more likely to be
reported by observers. In contrast, releases of chemicals into the
water are oftentimes not visible, unless they can be detected by their
effects, such as fish kills. Figure 2 illustrates these sources of
pollution.
Figure 2: Pollution Entering the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from
Sources Such as Spills, Industrial Permit Violations, and CSOs:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, top and right photos; bottom photo U.S. Coast Guard; map.
MapArt.
[End of figure]
While EPA has federal regulatory responsibility for NPDES-related
discharges and CSOs, EPA and the Coast Guard share responsibility for
spill prevention and response on the U.S. side of the corridor. The
National Contingency Plan and the Southeast Michigan Area Contingency
Plan describe a geographic division of responsibility between these
agencies, but due to EPA's expertise, the Coast Guard may refer
chemical spills to EPA even if the spills are in locations otherwise
assigned to the Coast Guard.[Footnote 4] When spills originate on land
but impact the navigable waters, both agencies might be involved in
response. Within EPA, Chemical Preparedness officials enforce
regulations that address chemical release reporting requirements while
Oil Program officials coordinate spill response and oil spill
prevention inspections. When spills involve industrial permit
violations or sewage releases, EPA's NPDES program officials are also
involved--but because EPA approved Michigan's NPDES program, Michigan
officials are more directly involved in these cases. As agencies
respond to spills, they work with responsible parties to ensure that
they fund the cost of cleanup activities. If EPA and the Coast Guard's
spill responders do not identify the responsible party, however, they
may obtain funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Oil Fund) or
Superfund to finance their response efforts, including the cleanup.
According to officials from the Coast Guard, notification of
potentially affected parties is oftentimes a component of the agencies'
spill response efforts. In addition to federal agencies, the Michigan
DEQ and State Police also provide spill notification. On the Canadian
side of the corridor, the Ontario SAC consolidates spill reports routed
to their center, as well as to other agencies. For example, the Ontario
Ministry of the Environment has an agreement with Environment Canada
under which they receive all spill reports for the federal agency.
There are many potential pathways for spill notification in the
corridor. The overall process can be divided into spill occurrence and
reporting by a responsible party or observer to a designated reporting
center; spill reporting from designated spill reporting centers to
response agencies; and spill notification from response agencies to
stakeholders, including drinking water facilities. Sometimes parts of
the process are collapsed; for example, spill reporting centers may
notify other stakeholders as well as response agencies. Alternatively,
the process can be lengthened if multiple agencies are responsible for
notifying other stakeholders in sequence.
Agency Spill Data Are Not Sufficient to Accurately Determine the Actual
Number or Volume of Spills:
Agency spill data are not sufficient, for multiple reasons, to
accurately determine the actual number or volume of spills in the St.
Clair-Detroit River corridor. Many spills go unreported because
responsible parties may not understand or comply with reporting
requirements. On the other hand, there are oftentimes multiple NRC
reports for the same spill, since several observers may report them.
EPA Region 5 does not remove all duplicate spill reports from their
database, or update its data after investigating spills. In contrast,
Coast Guard officials in District 9 document their investigations and
use the information to update their spill data, but they do not update
spill volume estimates because of automated system limitations. Other
events, including CSOs and industrial permit violations, are reported
more frequently in the corridor.
Agency Officials Believe Responsible Parties May Not Report All Spills:
NRC, EPA, Coast Guard, and Canadian officials believe that many spills
are never reported, and therefore that spill data do not represent the
true number of spills. Though responsible parties are required by law
to immediately report spills in amounts beyond certain minimum
quantities, agency officials believe they may not do so for a variety
of reasons.[Footnote 5] U.S. and Canadian officials suggested that
responsible parties may not be aware of spills, may not understand the
reporting requirements, or that they may not want to receive "bad
press" or be forced to pay the costs of the cleanup. Reporting by
responsible parties and others is critical because only one water
quality monitoring station capable of detecting spills exists in the
corridor. The Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association (SLEA), a
Canadian industry consortium, maintains a monitoring station south of
the highly industrialized Sarnia area. Though SLEA monitors for a suite
of chemicals, it does not detect all types of discharges--and while it
shares spill data with the Ontario Ministry of Environment, its purpose
is not to collect spill-related information for regulatory agencies;
rather, it collects the information as a service to SLEA members, as
well as agencies and communities.
When spills are reported, in many cases the responsible party is
unknown. In many of these instances, a member of the public or party
other than the responsible party provides information to the NRC. EPA
and the Coast Guard's spill data indicate that 67 percent and 29
percent, respectively, of reported spills in the corridor were released
from an unknown source in the time period we reviewed. Ontario SAC data
indicate that 10 percent of Canadian spills were from an unknown
source.
NRC Data Contains Multiple Reports of the Same Spills:
Another reason spill data do not accurately represent the number of
actual spills is that NRC spill data record some spill events multiple
times. The NRC received 991 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994
to 2004, but these may include multiple reports of the same
spills.[Footnote 6] NRC officials are responsible for maintaining a
call center for obtaining spill information, and relaying the
information to the appropriate agencies that are tasked with response.
They are not required to assess whether multiple reports pertain to the
same spill, as this would require investigation. NRC officials told us
that, as a result, many duplicate spill reports exist. Coast Guard
officials from District 9 told us that they could, after investigating
spill incidents, identify duplicate spill reports provided by NRC, link
these duplicate reports to single spill incidents, and provide that
information to the NRC so that they can update their records.
Duplicate reporting has been addressed by Ontario's SAC, which obtained
157 reports of spills on the Canadian side of the corridor during the
same time period. Unlike the NRC, the Ontario SAC determines whether
each spill report is unique when it records its information. The
Ontario SAC is staffed by Ontario Ministry of Environment officials who
are responsible both for obtaining preliminary spill information for
the province, as well as for determining which spill reports relate to
the same incident. The Ontario SAC has a rolling summary of spill
incidents on a display screen and on staff computers, which allows them
to identify multiple reports that relate to a common incident. (See
fig. 3.) The Ontario SAC's Emergency Management Coordinator told us
that when these safeguards fail to eliminate a duplicative spill
report, subsequent corrections are made.
Figure 3: Ontario SAC With Display Screens Showing Spill Incident
Summaries:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Spills Action Centre.
[End of figure]
To develop a process similar to Ontario's for the U.S. side of the
corridor, Michigan State Police officials told us that between 1986 and
1988 state officials explored the option of creating a spills center.
At the time, they estimated that it would have cost $2 million to
operate and it would have required 10 staff, including a chemical
specialist and three shifts of phone operators. This was viewed as
prohibitively expensive by Michigan officials, and as an alternative,
the State Police and the Michigan DEQ's Pollution Emergency Alerting
System (PEAS) began operating as a spill notification system. The PEAS
system is used for reporting spills to the Michigan DEQ during non-
business hours, including holidays, weekends, and evenings. Spill data
from PEAS, however, are similar to NRC data in that they include
multiple entries for single spills because each call is logged, rather
than each unique spill event recorded.
EPA Does Not Eliminate All Duplicate Spill Reports or Update Spill
Information after Investigations:
Unlike the NRC, response agencies such as EPA are required to assess
each reported spill and therefore should have reliable spill
information, but this is not the case. EPA Region 5 does not eliminate
all duplicate spill reports because they do not respond on-site to the
majority of spills for which they receive reports. EPA Region 5
officials told us that they rely on Michigan DEQ to respond to the
majority of spills since they are in closer proximity. Region 5
officials respond to spills upon receiving a request for assistance
from Michigan DEQ officials, and when spills are over 1,000 gallons,
EPA officials respond to provide assistance even if they are not
requested to do so. They told us that they investigate very few spills
on-site--perhaps roughly one percent of spills--due to limited staff
resources. Instead, EPA Region 5 officials follow up with state spill
responders by phone to obtain more detail on spills. Though their
operating protocols state that responders are to complete pollution
reports and update spill data after investigation, EPA Region 5
officials told us that responders have not done so typically because
they fail to make it a priority. For this reason, EPA officials were
unable to tell us which spills in the corridor in our time frame were
investigated by their agency. They told us that EPA imports spill data
from the NRC and does not make modifications to the data; therefore,
EPA's spill data set is of limited use. EPA Region 5 officials
providing spill response in the corridor began using a new Web-based
spill data system, Web Emergency Operations Center (Web EOC), in the
fall of 2004. EPA officials are hopeful that spill responders will
update spill information in the system following their investigations;
however, they said that it is too soon to tell.
The Coast Guard Updates Most Spill Data but Does Not Update Spill
Volumes:
Like EPA, Coast Guard officials from District 9 told us that they
assess and investigate each spill, whether they go on-site or use phone
calls and other means to obtain information; however, Coast Guard
officials update spill information following these investigations.
While the Coast Guard's spill data sets included information on spill
materials, the cause of spills, and how each spill was resolved, the
formatting of the data sets makes it difficult to access accurate
information on spill volumes. For example, a spill listed in the Coast
Guard's data set as being a 2,000-gallon spill is also reported in the
Coast Guard's annual report as being over 8 million gallons. Similarly,
the Coast Guard's spill data set contains a reference to a 75-gallon
oil spill, but summaries written by the Coast Guard's District 9
responders to the spill state that over 66,000 gallons of oil were
recovered. When asked about the discrepancies in these cases and
others, Coast Guard officials from District 9 told us that they are
unable to update the field in their database that contains preliminary
volume estimates. Instead, they update volume information in narrative
fields. As a result, it is difficult to assess the severity of any
given spill in the Coast Guard's data sets.
Number of Reported CSOs and Industrial Permit Violations Exceed the
Number of Reported Spills in the Corridor:
The number of reported spills is exceeded by other types of events,
such as CSOs and industrial permit violations that are reported more
frequently in the corridor. EPA's data on U.S. industrial permit
violations indicate that approximately 2,200 were reported in the
corridor during the 11-year time period we reviewed; over 1,800 were
greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume). Michigan DEQ has
tracked CSOs on the U.S. side of the corridor since 1999. Their data
indicate that roughly 1,400 CSOs were reported in the corridor from
1999 to 2004. These data might be subject to the same limitations as
the spill data because industrial permit violations and CSOs are self-
reported and facilities may not report all of these events. However,
spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because they are
not part of a structured program--as CSOs and industrial permit
violations are. Figure 4 illustrates the relative percentages of
spills, industrial permit violations, and CSOs of greater than 50
gallons (or of an unknown volume) that were reported in the corridor in
the 6-year period between 1999 and 2004, the time period for which CSO
data were available.
Figure 4: Relative Percentages of Reported Spills, Industrial Permit
Violations, and CSOs from 1999-2004 in the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor That Were Greater Than 50 Gallons (or of an Unknown Volume):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EPA, Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and Ontario
Spills Action Centre spill data; Michigan DEQ combined sewer overflow
data, and EPA industrial permit violation data.
Notes:
(1) Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.
(2) This chart depicts the frequency, rather than the toxicity, of
pollutant events. The data used to determine relative frequencies are
limited by their reliance upon self-reporting by facilities.
[End of figure]
Typically, CSOs in the corridor contain biological waste, commercial
and industrial waste, and storm water runoff from streets and other
surfaces. In the Detroit area, however, CSOs are more likely to contain
industrial waste in concentrations that have the potential to
negatively impact water quality to a greater extent. In addition to
sewage from 3 million area customers and 78 municipalities that send
their waste to the Detroit plant, the wastewater treatment facility
treats industrial waste from over 250 major industries. The facility
has approximately 80 outfalls and is one of the largest wastewater
treatment plants in the world.[Footnote 7] While the facility has an
industrial pretreatment program that requires that industries' waste
meets certain limits before treatment, these limits may be relatively
lenient, according to EPA officials, resulting in high volumes of waste
flowing into the facility. For example, EPA officials told us that the
facility has lenient oil and grease pretreatment limits. In the event
of a CSO, the pretreated material that bypasses the Detroit wastewater
treatment facility and is discharged into the Detroit and Rouge Rivers
may contain industrial waste, including oil, grease, and other
materials. The Detroit facility has historically had difficulties
complying with permit requirements. To address these deficiencies, EPA
filed suit against the Detroit facility in the 1970s and the resulting
consent decree has, according to EPA officials, provided a basis for
many required changes to improve their facility[Footnote 8]. However, a
lawsuit filed by EPA in the 1980s which related primarily to the
facility's industrial pretreatment program was dismissed in federal
court.[Footnote 9]
Spill Notification Occurs between and among Many Different Parties and
Agreements Outlining U.S.-Canadian Notification Processes Are Not
Explicit about Time and Magnitude:
Spill notification may involve the following: (1) spill occurrence and
reporting by a responsible party or observer to a designated reporting
center or a response agency; (2) spill notification from response
agencies to one another; and (3) spill notification by response
agencies to drinking water facilities and other stakeholders. Spill
notification between the United States and Canada is outlined in two
agreements.[Footnote 10] The coast guards of each country and officials
from the Michigan State Police and Ontario SAC have agreed to notify
one another of spills; however, these two agreements are not explicit
about which spills warrant notification or how quickly notification
should occur. We reviewed six selected spill incidents to gain insight
into the spill notification process from initial reporting to drinking
water facility notification. Drinking water facility operators on the
U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives on current
notification processes, but the majority expressed concern that their
facilities could be contaminated by spills due to untimely
notification. Finally, efforts have been made to develop informal
notification processes between individual industries or trade
associations and drinking water facilities.
Spill Notification Is Multi-Faceted and May Follow Many Different
Pathways:
There are several potential pathways through which spill notification
may occur in the corridor. The overall process can be divided into
spill occurrence and reporting by a responsible party or observer to a
designated reporting center or response agency; spill reporting from
designated spill reporting centers to response agencies; spill
notification from response agencies to other response agencies; and
notification to stakeholders, including drinking water facilities.
Sometimes parts of the process are collapsed; for example, spill
reporting centers may notify other stakeholders as well as response
agencies. Alternatively, the process may be lengthened if multiple
agencies are responsible for notifying other stakeholders in sequence
(see fig. 5).
Figure 5: Spill Notification Processes in the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, Michigan State Police,
Michigan drinking water facilities, NRC, Environment Canada, and the
Ontario SAC.
[End of figure]
Two Agreements Outline Notification between the United States and
Canada:
The Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan states
that on-scene coordinators (OSC) from the U.S. and Canadian Coast
Guards may notify each other of spills when there is a substantial
threat of the spreading of pollutants across shared boundaries,
including the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor and other waters of the
Great Lakes. The plan arises from the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement between Canada and the United States that calls for
development of a joint contingency plan for use in the event or threat
of a spill involving oil or a hazardous substance. The notification
called for in the plan is conducted by phone between the two coast
guards. They also provide warning messages to each other when they are
uncertain as to whether a spill will impact the other's waters; when a
joint response is needed to address a spill, they call or communicate
via fax. Officials from the Coast Guard told us the plan has only been
utilized for joint response twice since 1994. While spill-related
warnings have not been systematically tracked between the U.S. and
Canadian Coast Guards, officials from the U.S. Coast Guard told us they
are starting to track the warning messages to and from Canada. Though
U.S. Coast Guard officials may notify Canadian Coast Guard officials of
spills, there is no guidance or directive for either party to notify
local stakeholders, such as drinking water facilities; however, they
told us that they sometimes do so as a courtesy.
Though the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards have had a spill notification
process in place since 1978, Michigan and Ontario officials believed
that another notification process was necessary at the state and
provincial level to expedite notification of stakeholders such as
drinking water facilities. To address this need, the State of Michigan
and Province of Ontario agreed in 1988 to contact one another by phone
if an unanticipated or accidental discharge of pollutants occurred and
the discharge was likely to adversely affect the adjoining jurisdiction
or drinking water supply. Michigan State Police were designated as the
authority responsible for this task by the state governor because they
have the capability to receive information on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a
week. According to Michigan State Police officials, this notification
process was intended to provide immediate spill-related information to
state authorities, who in turn could provide that information to
stakeholders such as drinking water facilities. These officials told us
that they believe that duplication in notification efforts at the
federal and state levels is beneficial, because stakeholders at all
levels are more likely to obtain information if multiple processes are
involved, since any one system might fail.
The responsibility for communicating spill information to the public
generally resides with state and local authorities, who are presumed to
be the first agencies on the scene. This responsibility was established
in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of
1986,[Footnote 11] which requires states to establish an emergency
planning and notification system. This system includes local emergency
planning commissions, which are charged with creating procedures for
receiving and responding to public requests for information. However,
there is no proactive notification requirement in the act for the local
planning commissions.
Neither Agreement is Explicit about When or How Quickly Notification
Should Occur:
Neither the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan nor the Ontario-
Michigan Joint Notification Plan contains explicit requirements for
what types of spills warrant notification or how quickly notification
must be given. For example, Ontario Ministry of Environment officials
told us that they classify some sewer overflows as spills. These
include sewage bypasses caused by equipment failure, power outages, and
maintenance shutdowns. Michigan officials, on the other hand, do not
consider these events to be spills because they are regulated
separately. U.S. Coast Guard officials said they do not regularly
provide information about sewer overflows to Canadian officials, since
they are not required to do so, these events occur too frequently, and
it would not be feasible to relay information on each occurrence in the
corridor. Even when Ontario and Michigan officials agree on what type
of event is considered a spill, they told us that they do not have a
common understanding of what magnitude of spill requires notification.
According to Michigan officials, the agreement does not specify spill
volumes that trigger notification, because the agreement's authors were
more concerned with spill-material toxicity. Michigan and Ontario
officials told us that they have tried to better define when
notification is required, but they are frustrated because they have not
yet reached consensus on the issue. For example, Michigan officials
independently explored the idea of notifying Ontario officials of
spills only when spills exceeded 1,000 gallons. Ontario officials, upon
learning of this limit, did not agree. They thought this figure was too
high and also indicated that volume alone is not an adequate measure of
potential impact. In their opinion, other factors such as toxicity and
concentration also need to be considered. Since two large chemical
spills occurred at Sarnia industrial facilities in 2003 and 2004,
Ontario officials told us they have notified Michigan officials of
spills of various sizes but have not always been informed of large U.S.
spills by Michigan authorities. Ontario officials provided some
examples of when the Province learned of spills originating in Michigan
and impacting Ontario through calls to the SAC from fisherman and other
local stakeholders. Michigan State Police officials told us they are
uncertain as to whether they are notified of all Canadian spills. These
officials have not tracked spill notification to and from Ontario;
however, they told us they intend to start doing so.
Though the Ontario-Michigan spill notification agreement specifies that
notification is to be immediate for those spills likely to adversely
affect the adjoining jurisdiction, officials on both sides told us that
they are not always notified in a timely manner. Michigan DEQ officials
told us that the greatest lag in the notification process is the time
between when a spill occurs and when it is reported by a responsible
party to agency officials. Ontario officials told us that they are not
always able to notify immediately because some assessment is often
required to determine if there is any likelihood of an impact on the
U.S. side. Ontario officials also told us that the number of parties or
steps involved in the Michigan notification process is greater than
those involved in their process, and this could contribute to delays in
Michigan's spill notification. A local official from a county bordering
Lake St. Clair also told us that the process employed by Michigan State
Police and Michigan DEQ officials to notify stakeholders has too many
steps, and drinking water facilities are too far down on their list for
timely notification. Two local officials told us that Michigan's spill
notification process should include electronic communication, rather
than relying exclusively on a phone tree, since this provides too many
opportunities for communication to be disrupted.
Six Selected Spill Incidents Illustrate the Various Ways Spill
Notification Can Occur:
Spill notification varies from spill to spill, depending on the unique
circumstances of the incident. We selected six spill cases to
illustrate the various ways that spill notification can occur. These
six cases were chosen to maximize variability among several factors
including country of origin, spill material, and whether the
responsible party was known. (See table 1.)
Table 1: Characteristics of Six Selected Spill Incidents in the
Corridor from 2001-2004:
Month/Year: May 2001;
Country of Origin: United States;
Location: Detroit River;
Material: Ethylene Glycol and Propylene Glycol;
Volume Estimate: 8.4 million gallons (CG[A]) 25 million gallons storm
water/ethylene glycol mixture (RP[B]);
Responsible Party: Known;
Cause: Pipe from containment pond to sewer system became blocked;
Impacts: Wildlife injury and death.
Month/Year: April 2002;
Country of Origin: United States;
Location: Rouge and Detroit River;
Material: Oil/sewage mixture;
Volume Estimate: 321,000 gallons of oil (EPA) > 66,000 gallons of oil
recovered (CG);
Responsible Party: Unknown;
Cause: CSO-related;
Impacts: Wildlife injury and death, Vessel transits delayed, cancelled,
and diverted, U.S. and Canadian shorelines oiled.
Month/Year: August 2004;
Country of Origin: United States;
Location: Rouge and Detroit River;
Material: Oil/sewage mixture;
Volume Estimate: 5,000 gallons (CG);
Responsible Party: Unknown[C];
Cause: CSO-related;
Impacts: None documented.
Month/Year: August 2003;
Country of Origin: Canada;
Location: St. Clair River;
Material: Vinyl chloride monomer;
Volume Estimate: 34 and 5 gallon spills (RP);
Responsible Party: Known;
Cause: Cracked tube in head exchanger;
Impacts: None documented.
Month/Year: February 2004;
Country of Origin: Canada;
Location: St. Clair River;
Material: Methyl ethyl ketone and methyl isobutyl ketone;
Volume Estimate: >39,000 gallons (RP);
Responsible Party: Known;
Cause: Leaking heat exchanger;
Impacts: Drinking water facilities intake closures.
Month/Year: May 2004;
Country of Origin: Canada;
Location: St. Clair River;
Material: Oily water;
Volume Estimate: Unknown;
Responsible Party: Known;
Cause: Rain caused oil separator overflows;
Impacts: None documented.
Source: EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, Ontario SAC, and Michigan DEQ.
[A] CG is an abbreviation for the Coast Guard.
[B] RP is an abbreviation for Responsible party.
[C] In this case, the City of Detroit was held accountable for the
spill and another that occurred later that month, because both
originated in their sewer system.
[End of Table]
In three of the six cases we reviewed, the public, rather than the
responsible party, was the first source of spill information to
response agencies. In one of these cases, the responsible party later
provided the approximate time that the incident occurred and therefore
we could calculate the time between spill occurrence and reporting,
which was about 24 hours. Notification of agency officials and then
drinking water facilities occurred most quickly when the responsible
party reported the spill within 2.5 hours of its occurrence. In
February and May of 2004, a spill of methyl ethyl ketone and then an
oily water spill occurred in Ontario; these entered the St. Clair
River. For these spills, Ontario officials notified Michigan officials
within 1 to 2 hours of the spill being reported. Michigan drinking
water facilities were then informed of the spill by Michigan officials
within the next 1 to 2.5 hours. For these incidents, notification took
less than 5 hours, from spill occurrence to notification of drinking
water facilities. When responsible parties did not promptly report the
spill, the notification process took 2 days or more. For two chemical
spills that we reviewed, including an ethylene and propylene glycol
spill in Michigan and a vinyl chloride monomer spill in Ontario, the
responsible party failed to notify regulatory officials until several
days after the spill occurred. The Canadian spill was not detected by
the responsible party, because their monitoring equipment was not
running as a result of a power outage. The U.S. spill was not detected
until a member of the public observed fish dying and reported it to
Michigan DEQ officials; the responsible party failed to notify state
officials of the spill. In addition, our review of six selected cases
illustrated that in five cases, agencies notified one another per the
notification agreements. In the case in which they did not, Michigan
officials determined that there was no potential impact to Canadian
waters. Finally, for the six spills we reviewed, drinking water
facilities were not notified in three instances. In these cases, agency
officials determined that it was unnecessary to notify the facilities
because, in their view, the facilities would not be affected or the
information was deemed too late to be useful. Figure 6 shows the
notification milestones for the six spills we profiled.
Figure 6: Notification Processes for Six Selected Spills in the St.
Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: EPA, Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and Ontario SAC.
[A] In these cases, the responsible party provided the approximate time
the spill occurred.
[B] For the April 2002 and August 2004 spills, the responsible party
was not identified and the time the spills occurred is unknown.
[End of figure]
Drinking Water Facility Operators' Opinions on Current Notification
Processes Varied but Many Expressed Concern That Potential for Plant
Contamination Exists:
Drinking water facility opinions varied--by location along the
corridor--about the timeliness of spill notification. While nearly all
drinking water facility operators with facilities along the St. Clair
River and northern half of Lake St. Clair told us that spill
notification was not timely, almost all facility operators with
facilities along the lower half of Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River
told us that notification was timely. These facility operators
indicated that proximity to spill locations makes a difference in their
definition of notification timeliness because they might have more or
less time to prepare for spill material to pass their intakes. Figure 7
illustrates the location of U.S. drinking water facilities in the
corridor. Despite the difference of opinion on notification timeliness,
the majority of the 17 drinking water facility operators all along the
corridor told us they would like to be notified of a spill immediately,
or within 1 hour or less of its occurrence. In the six spills we
profiled, notification never occurred in this time frame.
Figure 7: U.S. Drinking Water Facilities on the St. Clair-Detroit River
Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO and MapArt.
[End of figure]
Furthermore, many Michigan drinking water facility operators along the
corridor expressed concern that their facilities could be contaminated
by spills. Some cited factors that could increase the likelihood of
facility contamination, such as vessel traffic along the corridor or
the number of industries located along the corridor. They told us that
spill notification plays a key role in whether their facilities might
be contaminated. Some told us that spill notification is the most
important factor in their ability to protect the drinking water. Two
facility operators also indicated that their customers have expressed
concerns about the safety of their drinking water. Generally, facility
operators located along the St. Clair River and the top of Lake St.
Clair seemed to express greater concern than facility operators located
along the southern part of Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River. For
example, a facility operator in the northern part of the corridor told
us that he believes drinking water facility contamination due to spills
is "a matter of when, not if." However, Michigan DEQ officials told us
that several factors make it unlikely that spills in the St. Clair
River will contaminate drinking water:
* Drinking water intakes are 20-30 feet below the water's surface.
* The river has distinct channels, and it is difficult for a pollutant
originating on one side of the river to cross these channels.
* At 180,000 to 200,000 cubic feet per second, the river flows so
quickly that pollutants are flushed downstream before they affect
drinking water.
In contrast, Michigan DEQ officials told us that Canadian drinking
water facilities are more vulnerable to contamination from spills in
the St. Clair River. These officials noted that Canadian drinking water
facilities have shut down more often than Michigan facilities as a
result of spills in the corridor. They noted that the most vulnerable
Canadian drinking water facility is located on Walpole Island, directly
downstream of Sarnia, and it provides drinking water to members of a
First Nation community.[Footnote 12]
Efforts Have Been Made to Supplement Existing Notification Processes:
Currently there are, or will soon be, efforts under way to supplement
the existing spill notification processes employed by the U.S. and
Canadian Coast Guards, and Michigan and Ontario officials. Informal
notification processes are already being employed along the corridor.
For example, a local emergency management coordinator in the St. Clair
River area of the corridor has developed an informal agreement with
Canadian industry representatives to call and notify him directly of
any spills into the St. Clair River. Upon receiving spill information,
he provides the information directly to drinking water facility
operators along the portion of the corridor that borders the St. Clair
River. Three drinking water facility operators listed him as their
first source of spill information. In addition, Sarnia-Lambton
Environmental Association (SLEA) officials told us that their member
facilities contact Michigan drinking water facilities directly in the
event of a spill. Several drinking water facility operators confirmed
that they have received notification from members of this consortium of
Canadian industries.
In addition, two monitoring systems are being developed by officials
from counties bordering the corridor and Michigan DEQ officials, who
have obtained federal grants to install spill detection equipment in
the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers. These systems are designed to provide
spill information directly to drinking water facility operators with
water monitoring equipment located near their intakes. One monitoring
system, for the St. Clair River and Lake St. Clair, is funded by an EPA
grant of $962,200 to Macomb and St. Clair Counties. The other
monitoring system, for the Detroit River, is funded by a DHS grant of
$760,000 to Michigan DEQ. The officials involved in obtaining both
grants told us they are coordinating their efforts so that an overall
network of water quality monitors will be more seamless along the
corridor. For example, they plan to purchase the same monitoring
equipment so that maintenance can be shared. EPA and Michigan DEQ
officials estimate that the monitoring systems will be in place in the
St. Clair and Detroit Rivers no later than 2007 (see fig. 8). These
systems are based on the Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission's
(ORSANCO) spill detection and notification system, established in 1978
to protect drinking water intakes from chemical contamination. For
additional information on this system, see appendix VI.
Figure 8: Existing and Proposed Water Quality Monitoring Stations in
the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO; map, MapArt.
[End of figure]
EPA's Spill Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Are Limited and the
Coast Guard Addresses Spill Prevention as Part of Other Compliance
Efforts:
EPA's spill prevention program addresses only oil spills, and EPA is
uncertain as to which facilities are governed by its spill prevention
requirements. EPA Region 5 conducted varying numbers of spill
prevention-related inspections per year in the corridor for the time
frame we reviewed, and their inspections uncovered significant spill
prevention deficiencies. In contrast, the Coast Guard's spill
prevention efforts include oil and hazardous substances. The Coast
Guard's District 9 inspections targeted a greater number of the
facilities and vessels they regulate; however, the Coast Guard's
inspections were multi-mission rather than focused on spill prevention
exclusively. Their inspections revealed minor spill prevention-related
issues. In response to spills and noncompliance issues, EPA and the
Coast Guard issued a total of 16 penalties in the time period we
reviewed.
EPA's Prevention Program Addresses Only Oil Spills:
While EPA has the authority to address spill prevention for both oil
and hazardous substances, its program only addresses oil. In 1972, in
amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress called for regulations to
prevent discharges of oil and hazardous substances; in 1974, EPA's SPCC
program became effective. EPA's regulations require non-transportation
related facilities with specified oil storage capacities[Footnote 13]
which, because of their location, could reasonably be expected to
discharge oil into the navigable waters, to implement a SPCC plan that
has been certified by a licensed engineer. These plans should identify
the location and types of stored oil, discharge prevention measures,
drainage controls, and methods of disposal. Facilities must also meet
certain operational standards that include having:
* necessary containment structures or equipment;[Footnote 14]
* periodic integrity tests of containers and leak tests of valves and
piping; and:
* training for oil-handling personnel on equipment operation and
maintenance, discharge procedure protocols, pollution control laws and
rules, facility operations, and the contents of their facility's SPCC
plan.
In the late 1970s, EPA proposed hazardous substance spill prevention
regulations, but they were never finalized. EPA officials speculated
that, possibly, these regulations were not finalized because oil spills
were more prevalent, hazardous substance spills have shorter-term
effects than oil spills, and because EPA focused on the NPDES program
to control chronic pollutant discharges.
While EPA's spill prevention program targets oil spills, the Coast
Guard's program addresses spill prevention for both oil and hazardous
substances. The program applies to facilities or vessels that are
capable of transferring oil or hazardous materials, in bulk, to or from
vessels of certain minimum capacity. Facilities are required to develop
an operations manual, employ qualified personnel, and meet equipment
standards. The operations manual must contain a description of the
facility layout, the location of important equipment and personnel, and
a discussion of procedures for transfer operations and emergencies. The
manual must also include a summary of applicable laws and information
concerning personnel training and qualifications. Also, each facility
must have emergency shutdown capacity and specified discharge
containment features. Vessels are required to have written transfer
procedures for oil and hazardous substances, meet maintenance and
equipment standards, and employ qualified personnel.
In addition to the Coast Guard and EPA's prevention programs, the
Michigan DEQ has a spill prevention program that is administered in
conjunction with their NPDES program. This program requires that
facilities that store or use oil or polluting substances, or those that
may be deemed a hazard to waters of the state, create and implement
spill prevention plans and inform Michigan DEQ of the plan's completion
and availability upon request.[Footnote 15] Michigan DEQ's pollution
prevention plans are to include a:
* polluting material inventory;
* detailed facility plan, including floor drains and loading areas;
* secondary storage container description; and:
* discussion of precipitation management.
The plans are also to include spill control and cleanup procedures and
are required to be reevaluated every 3 years (or whenever a material
release occurs). If a facility is also subject to EPA's SPCC program,
it may submit a combination spill prevention plan that meets both state
and federal requirements. If the facility is only subject to the
Michigan DEQ's spill prevention planning requirements, it is not
required to have its plans certified by an engineer.
On the Canadian side of the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor, the
Ontario Ministry of Environment did not have spill prevention
regulations in place in the time frame we reviewed. Instead, the
Ministry issued orders which required individual companies to conduct
spill prevention planning, or it required spill prevention planning as
a requirement for companies seeking a Certificate of Approval, which is
required before operating. Due in part to the large chemical spills in
2003 and 2004 originating from facilities in Sarnia, the Ontario
Ministry of Environment introduced new legislation under its
Environmental Protection Act which addresses the requirement for spill
prevention planning.[Footnote 16]
EPA Is Uncertain As to Which Facilities Are Regulated by Its Spill
Prevention Program, and Conducts Varying Numbers of Inspections Per
Year:
EPA Region 5 does not know the universe of facilities that are subject
to its spill prevention program requirements and it conducts varying
numbers of inspections of known facilities under its jurisdiction in
the corridor. Facilities that must comply with SPCC regulations are not
required to report to the agency, so EPA does not have an inventory of
facilities it regulates. The challenge this presents is not limited to
the corridor, as EPA officials are uncertain as to how many facilities
should comply with SPCC program requirements nationwide. In the
corridor, EPA Region 5 has identified 59 facilities (of a greater
number) that are required to meet SPCC requirements, either through
special multi-media inspection initiatives or by referrals from
Michigan DEQ.
While SPCC plans must be reevaluated and reviewed every 5 years, a
specified inspection frequency is not contained in EPA's regulations.
EPA officials in Region 5, which encompasses the corridor, rely on
roughly three SPCC inspectors to conduct all plan reviews and provide
all compliance assistance for facilities in the six-state region.
According to these officials, with current SPCC resource constraints,
they could only inspect facilities once every 500 years or more. From
1994 to 2004, EPA Region 5 inspected an average of 10 percent of the 59
known SPCC-regulated facilities in the corridor per year. (See fig. 9.)
Figure 9: Number of SPCC Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair-Detroit
River Corridor from 1994-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
Note: In 2001, EPA Region 5 did not conduct any SPCC inspections in the
corridor.
[End of figure]
EPA Region 5 inspected a number of these SPCC-regulated facilities as
part of several multi-media inspection efforts conducted by their
Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Team, including the Detroit River
and Flyway Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Initiative. This
effort identified and inspected 28 facilities in the Detroit area for
compliance with multiple EPA programs, including the SPCC program; some
of the inspected facilities overlap with a portion of the facilities
along the corridor. When SPCC program officials inspect a facility they
use a standardized approach, which includes the following:
* an in-depth review of the facility's SPCC plan;
* an interview with the facility owner or operator;
* a physical inspection of the facility;
* a verification of equipment, containment structures, and buildings;
* a review of facility inspections and training records; security and
integrity testing; and:
* verification that the facility's SPCC plan has been certified by a
licensed engineer.
While EPA has a separate program for spill prevention, the Coast Guard
addresses spill prevention during its routine safety and security
inspections of facilities and vessels. The Coast Guard's District 9
regulates over 100 facilities and 23 vessels stationed in the corridor,
as well as vessels that travel through the corridor. It also regulates
the transfer of oil and hazardous substances. The Coast Guard inspects
facilities and vessels to a much greater extent per year than EPA;
however, its inspections are multi-purpose rather than focused
exclusively on spill prevention. The Coast Guard's annual facility
inspections incorporate spill prevention components that are similar to
EPA's SPCC inspection components, but their material transfer
inspections and spot checks are not comparable to EPA's focused spill
prevention inspections. From 1994 to 2004, the Coast Guard's District 9
inspected an average of 44 facilities, 135 vessels, and 30 material
transfer events per year, for safety, security, and pollution
prevention requirements. When material transfer events are excluded,
the Coast Guard inspected, on average, about 44 percent of the
facilities in their jurisdiction per year--compared to EPA's
inspections of roughly 10 percent of the known SPCC-regulated
facilities. However, we are uncertain as to how many of the Coast
Guard's yearly inspections were on-site inspections that are comparable
to EPA's SPCC inspections as opposed to spot checks or other multi-
purpose inspections that the Coast Guard conducts. The Coast Guard
conducts regular on-site inspections that consist of a check of
maintenance and operation procedures, as well as a facility or vessel's
spill prevention planning. For their annual facility inspections, Coast
Guard officials review, among other items:
* contents of operations manuals, including specifications for
containment equipment;
* transfer equipment requirements, including an examination of transfer
pipes for defects; and:
* facility operations, including whether the designated person in
charge has certification of completion of required training.
While some inspections are conducted on-site, the Coast Guard also
conducts remote examinations, such as viewing a transfer of materials
from a distance using binoculars. The specific type and number of
inspections conducted by the Coast Guard from 1994 through 2004 is
shown in table 2.
Table 2: Number of Coast Guard Facility, Vessel, and Transfer
Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from 1994-
2004:
Year: 1994;
Facility inspections: 92;
Vessel Inspections: 157;
Material transfer inspections: 37;
Total inspections: 286.
Year: 1995;
Facility inspections: 63;
Vessel Inspections: 172;
Material transfer inspections: 36;
Total inspections: 271.
Year: 1996;
Facility inspections: 42;
Vessel Inspections: 181;
Material transfer inspections: 33;
Total inspections: 256.
Year: 1997;
Facility inspections: 22;
Vessel Inspections: 166;
Material transfer inspections: 44;
Total inspections: 232.
Year: 1998;
Facility inspections: 17;
Vessel Inspections: 151;
Material transfer inspections: 19;
Total inspections: 187.
Year: 1999;
Facility inspections: 16;
Vessel Inspections: 89;
Material transfer inspections: 40;
Total inspections: 145.
Year: 2000;
Facility inspections: 14;
Vessel Inspections: 94;
Material transfer inspections: 62;
Total inspections: 170.
Year: 2001;
Facility inspections: 29;
Vessel Inspections: 122;
Material transfer inspections: 33;
Total inspections: 184.
Year: 2002;
Facility inspections: 31;
Vessel Inspections: 152;
Material transfer inspections: 14;
Total inspections: 197.
Year: 2003;
Facility inspections: 31;
Vessel Inspections: 99;
Material transfer inspections: 10;
Total inspections: 140.
Year: 2004;
Facility inspections: 131;
Vessel Inspections: 100;
Material transfer inspections: [Empty][A];
Total inspections: 231.
Total:
Facility inspections: 488;
Vessel Inspections: 1,483;
Material transfer inspections: 328;
Total inspections: 2,299.
Source: GAO analysis of the Coast Guard's data.
[A] Data were not provided for 2004.
[End of Table]
In addition to EPA and the Coast Guard, the Michigan DEQ inspects
facilities for compliance with its spill prevention program during its
regular NPDES program inspections. According to Michigan DEQ officials,
their inspectors do not keep track of the number of spill prevention
inspections conducted or deficiencies found due to a lack of funding
for its spill prevention program. Further, the universe of facilities
regulated by its spill prevention program is unknown--but approximately
400 facilities that are in Michigan DEQ's Southeast District, which is
a larger area that includes the U.S. side of the corridor--have
submitted certified spill prevention plans. On the Canadian side of the
corridor, Ontario's Ministry of Environment conducts inspections that
include a spill prevention component. Ministry of Environment officials
were able to provide inspection data from 2003 to 2005, which indicated
that they inspected roughly 35 petrochemical and related facilities per
year. The inspections conducted in 2004 and 2005 reflect the work that
an "Environmental SWAT Team" conducted.[Footnote 17] The focus of this
special initiative was on facilities with the potential for future
spills that could pose risks to human health and the environment. The
inspections included a comprehensive review of the facilities' air
emissions, water discharges, and spill prevention and contingency
plans.
EPA Inspections Uncovered Significant Spill Prevention Deficiencies,
Whereas the Coast Guard's Inspections Revealed Minor Issues:
EPA Region 5 officials told us that the spill prevention inspections
they conducted from 1994 through 2004 disclosed significant and
numerous deficiencies, such as failure to provide for secondary
containment or failure to prepare spill prevention plans. For example,
an SPCC inspector found that one company failed to prepare its SPCC
plan within 6 months of beginning operations, and failed to implement
its plan within 1 year. In addition, the facility never had its SPCC
plan certified by a professional engineer. The SPCC inspector found
that another facility had no additional containment around some bulk
storage tanks, and it failed to amend its SPCC plan as required. In
contrast, Coast Guard officials from District 9 told us that their
inspections revealed that nearly all facilities and vessels were in
compliance, and those that were not had only minor noncompliance issues
related to spill prevention, such as incidental omissions in operations
manuals. For example, Coast Guard officials found instances in which a
facility operator initialed only one section of a required form, rather
than at multiple sections. The Coast Guard officials also found other
minor violations that related to aged hoses outside their service life
and inadequate lighting.
Michigan DEQ officials told us that their inspections revealed that
some facilities do not have spill prevention plans, or did not certify
compliance with them. In some cases, facilities that already had some
secondary containment or protection in place needed further upgrades in
order to come into compliance with the state's spill prevention
requirements. For example, during one inspection, Michigan DEQ found
that a facility had developed a spill prevention plan, but it was not
adequately managing its materials in order to prevent storm water from
contacting the materials and discharging them into the waterways. On
the Canadian side, Ontario's Environmental SWAT Team found that 34 of
the 35 facilities inspected in 2004 and 2005 were not in compliance
with one or more legislative and regulatory requirements. Eight
facilities did not have spill prevention and contingency plans. Other
deficiencies found during inspections included:
* a Certificate of Approval was not obtained for operations;
* equipment, systems, processes, or structures were altered contrary to
the existing Certificate of Approval; and:
* chemicals were improperly handled, stored, and identified.
EPA and the Coast Guard Issued a Total of 16 Penalties during the
Period Reviewed:
EPA and the Coast Guard issued 16 penalties in response to spills,
noncompliance with spill prevention programs, or for failure to report
spills during the period we reviewed. EPA Region 5 issued four
penalties, primarily for SPCC violations, that were assessed at an
average of $39,000 each during the 11-year period. During the same time
period, the Coast Guard's District 9 issued 12 penalties for spills
that were assessed at an average of $2,100 each. See figure 10 for
total amounts of penalties assessed by EPA and the Coast Guard per year
from 1994 through 2004.
Figure 10: EPA and Coast Guard Spill-Related Penalties Assessed from
1994 to 2004 in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of EPA and Coast Guard data.
Note: In 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 no financial penalties were issued
by EPA or the Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
EPA Region 5 officials told us they rely primarily on assisting
companies in coming into compliance with spill prevention program
regulations, and they pursue enforcement actions and issue financial
penalties when companies fail to respond to their assistance. They also
explained that limited staff resources are available to pursue
enforcement actions. EPA Region 5 has the equivalent of roughly one and
a half full time staff persons devoted to spill-related enforcement
duties conducted by the Office of Regional Counsel and the Oil Program.
The Oil Program is responsible for determining noncompliance with the
SPCC program, which entails establishing a history of spills or
noncompliance; it is then responsible for determining penalty amounts.
Determining noncompliance and identifying responsible parties for
spills, however, can be problematic for EPA. While EPA Region 5
officials told us they use their spill data when pursuing an
enforcement case, the agency, for most spills, does not confirm the
validity of the spill data or gather additional information. Michigan
DEQ responds to most reported spills in the corridor, but EPA Region 5
does not coordinate with Michigan DEQ to collect information for
enforcement purposes. It is EPA's policy to collect spill information
directly because, according to EPA officials, it is preferable to have
first-hand knowledge in the event that staff have to testify or provide
a deposition for an enforcement case, among other reasons. To gather
additional information, Oil Program officials stated that they send
requests to facilities for spill-related information that they can then
use in enforcement cases. If spill information is obtained, EPA Region
5 officials told us that their informal policy is not to pursue an
enforcement case when the proposed penalty is less than $11,000 or the
spill involves less than 100 gallons or two barrels of oil. They also
stated that in most cases for which they issued a penalty, the amounts
were ultimately reduced substantially through negotiations with the
responsible party. For example, one facility was issued a financial
penalty of approximately $320,000 for a spill prevention violation and
the negotiated final payment was $25,000.
Like EPA, the Coast Guard relies primarily on assisting companies in
coming into compliance with spill prevention program regulations. The
average financial penalties that were assessed by the Coast Guard's
District 9 were relatively low compared to the maximum financial
penalty of $32,500 that it has the authority to issue for a spill
violation. Coast Guard officials from District 9 told us that, in
determining penalties, they take into account how much a facility or
vessel owner has already paid for the cost of cleaning up a
spill.[Footnote 18] In regard to why no penalties were assessed for
spill prevention program violations, officials from the Coast Guard
stated that they have the authority to order a facility or vessel to
cease operations if it does not comply with their spill prevention
program, and this serves as a strong deterrent to noncompliance. They
added that large financial penalties have not been needed due to the
cooperation of companies coming into compliance with their prevention
regulations.
Similar to the Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ did not issue penalties for
noncompliance with their spill prevention program in the time frame we
reviewed. Michigan DEQ did, however, issue four penalties averaging
$35,000 to responsible parties for spills in the corridor. Michigan DEQ
also issued three penalties for multiple violations including spills
and industrial permit violations; the penalties totaled approximately
$300,000. Lastly, in Ontario, the Ministry of Environment did not have
the authority to issue administrative penalties for spills until
2005.[Footnote 19] Prior to that time, the Ministry of Environment
pursued spill-related penalties through the provincial court system and
from 2002 to 2004, four facilities were assessed penalties averaging
approximately $171,000 in U.S. dollars after successful prosecutions.
In addition, though EPA and Coast Guard officials acknowledge that
spill reporting is not always occurring, the agencies did not penalize
responsible parties for failure to report chemical releases in the time
period we reviewed. We are, however, uncertain as to how many chemical
releases occurred in the corridor due to data limitations. The
authority provided under the EPCRA allows EPA officials to penalize
regulated industries for failure to report, in a timely fashion, spills
of reportable quantities of hazardous or extremely hazardous
substances. However, EPA Region 5's Chemical Preparedness officials who
administer EPCRA told us that they rely on 30 to 40 information
requests sent to companies per year for the entire six-state region to
gather the necessary information on reporting in order to pursue
enforcement. They stated that, with three staff for the region to
enforce the EPCRA and other regulations related to chemical releases,
they lack the resources to inspect more than roughly 15 facilities per
year to determine compliance with timely notification and other
reporting requirements. They did not issue any penalties for failure to
report chemical releases in the corridor in the time frame we reviewed.
Superfund authorizes EPA and the Coast Guard to issue penalties for
failure to report hazardous substance spills, but neither agency did so
in the time frame we reviewed. The Clean Water Act, on the other hand,
does not authorize civil penalties for a responsible party's failure to
notify NRC of an oil spill; only criminal sanctions are available.
Michigan DEQ officials may make a criminal complaint or request that
the state's Attorney General pursue civil action for failure to report
spills; however, they did not in the period we reviewed. On the
Canadian side of the corridor, Ontario's Environmental Protection Act
provides Ministry of Environment officials with the authority to
penalize responsible parties for failure to report spills, as this is a
violation of the act. The Ministry did so recently, and the company
responsible for a large chemical spill into the St. Clair River in 2003
was charged and convicted of failing to report the spill immediately.
Spill-related penalties that are collected by EPA and the Coast Guard
help supplement the funds that provide for response efforts when a
responsible party is not identified to pay costs. In these cases, EPA
and the Coast Guard may obtain financing from the Oil Fund or Superfund
to pay for their response efforts, including the cleanup[Footnote 20].
But these funds are being depleted by cleanup efforts in the corridor
and are not being replenished through the cost recovery process
because, in many cases, the responsible parties have not been
identified. Fund data maintained by the National Pollution Funds Center
show that, from 1994 to 2004,
* approximately $8.4 million[Footnote 21] from the Oil Fund financed
oil spill cleanups in the corridor, for which $80,067 was recovered to
offset those expenditures, and:
* approximately $17,000 from Superfund financed hazardous material
spill cleanups, with no additional funds recovered to offset those
expenditures.
Conclusions:
Spills of oil and hazardous substances into waters of the corridor
continue to be a concern, and agencies responsible for addressing this
problem face challenges on several fronts including obtaining accurate
spill information, and conducting spill notification and comprehensive
prevention efforts. Officials from EPA Region 5 and Coast Guard's
District 9 concur that accurate spill information is not available and
acknowledge that such information could be improved by better
incorporating data, including final spill volume estimates, obtained
through their spill response efforts. Coast Guard officials from
District 9 also acknowledge that they could help update the NRC's spill
information by documenting which duplicative NRC spill reports are
linked to common incidents. Better documentation of response efforts
and the results of spill investigations could assist EPA and the Coast
Guard in targeting inspection and enforcement efforts to the highest-
priority need. Spill notification under the agreement between the
United States and Canada, and Michigan and Ontario, while limited,
appears to be meeting its intended purpose. Effective spill prevention
helps reduce contaminants flowing into waters of the corridor. EPA's
spill prevention efforts are hampered by the fact that it does not know
the universe of facilities regulated by its program, the scope of its
program is focused only on oil, and limited resources are available for
implementing the program--particularly for inspections. Given the focus
and resource limitations which impact EPA's ability to pursue spill
prevention and enforcement activities, EPA could collect information
about the facilities that are regulated in order to better define goals
for the frequency and extensiveness of their inspections.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better ensure that spill data are available to target their
inspection and enforcement efforts, and to improve the overall
effectiveness of spill notification, we are recommending that the EPA
Administrator direct EPA Region 5; and that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Commander of
District 9 to take the following two actions:
* maintain and update spill information to include the results of
investigations and explore the feasibility of updating spill
information maintained by the NRC, and:
* determine whether existing spill notification processes can be
improved or modified to provide reduced and consistent notification
time frames.
In addition, to better utilize spill prevention resources, we recommend
that the EPA Administrator consider gathering information on which
facilities are regulated under its spill prevention program. We also
recommend that the EPA Administrator direct Region 5 to develop goals
for the frequency and extensiveness of its inspections.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
GAO provided a draft of this report to EPA and DHS for review and
comment. DHS provided comments on the draft report and generally agreed
with our findings and conclusions. EPA provided only technical comments
regarding the report. DHS did not address our recommendations. EPA
commented on the feasibility of our recommendations regarding gathering
information on SPCC regulated facilities and updating spill information
maintained by the NRC.
While DHS generally agreed with our findings and conclusions, the
agency commented on our observation that the Coast Guard does not
update spill volume estimates in its automated spill data system.
Specifically, the agency cited an example used in our report and noted
that it was the result of unusual circumstances that arose during the
transition from one data system to another. In addition, DHS noted that
Coast Guard investigators do have the ability to update spill volume
estimates in investigative report narratives. We acknowledge that the
Coast Guard transitioned from one data system to another in the time
frame we reviewed. However, Coast Guard officials told us that with the
current data system, initial spill volume estimates cannot be readily
updated, except in the narrative of the investigation reports. We
acknowledge that investigators do have the ability to update volumes in
the report narratives but initial volume estimates cannot be changed in
the volume data field of the current system. It is difficult to readily
assess the magnitude of spills based on the initial volume estimates
contained in the automated spill data. Furthermore, Coast Guard
officials told us that they would benefit from an additional field in
their spill data system which incorporated final spill volume
estimates. In addition, DHS commented that additional factors should be
considered in our report regarding agency efforts to penalize
responsible parties for failure to report spills. DHS acknowledged that
the responsible parties for many spills are not identified and, while
penalties were not assessed for failure to report spills in the
corridor in the time frame we reviewed, DHS stated that the Coast
Guard, with the Department of Justice, has successfully prosecuted
responsible parties for spills outside the corridor. The full text of
DHS's comments is included in appendix VII.
EPA provided the following three comments on our report. First, EPA
stated that it does respond to every spill, whether directly or
indirectly, in the same way that the Coast Guard responds. However, EPA
could not provide documentation of its response efforts whereas the
Coast Guard provided documentation that indicated what actions were
taken in response to each spill. In addition, EPA stated that its spill
responders rely heavily on Michigan DEQ to respond to spills and
coordinate response actions with the Coast Guard. EPA also said that it
responded directly to greater than one percent of spills--as opposed to
less than one percent, as previously stated by EPA officials.
Nevertheless, the level of EPA's response is unclear due to lack of
documentation. Second, EPA commented on our recommendation that it
update spill information maintained by the NRC. We acknowledge that EPA
does not modify spill data maintained by the NRC; however, our
recommendation was that it explore the feasibility of updating spill
information maintained by the NRC by informing NRC of duplicate spill
reports. While EPA maintains that information on spills can now be
updated using a new system called Web EOC, and our report acknowledges
that Web EOC is a method to update spill data electronically, the
extent of its use is uncertain according to EPA officials. Finally, EPA
commented on the feasibility of our recommendation that it gather
information on facilities that are covered under its spill prevention
program. EPA stated that there is no authority in the Clean Water Act
or the prevention regulations for facilities to provide this
information to EPA. It further stated that under the Paperwork
Reduction Act the agency would need to seek approval from the Office of
Management and Budget. However, EPA has previously identified SPCC
facilities in the corridor. If the agency determines that formal
rulemaking is necessary for it to gather information on which
facilities are covered under its spill prevention program, then we
believe it should consider undertaking such a rulemaking. EPA officials
also provided specific technical comments and clarifications on the
draft report that we have incorporated in the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to appropriate Congressional Committees, the EPA Administrator, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and various other federal and state
agencies. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-
3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
John B. Stephenson:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Debbie Stabenow:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Sander M. Levin:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We were asked to examine (1) how many oil and hazardous substance
spills of more than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were reported
in the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how
accurately reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2)
what processes are used to notify parties of spills, and whether they
contain explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude;
and (3) the extent of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Coast Guard's spill prevention efforts and enforcement activities in
the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor from 1994 through 2004.
To determine the number of oil and hazardous substance spills of more
than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) reported in the St. Clair-
Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and to what extent they
represent actual spills, we obtained information on spills with those
characteristics reported in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, the
Detroit River, and a highly industrialized tributary, the Rouge River.
We obtained data sets with these attributes from the National Response
Center (NRC), EPA Region 5, the Coast Guard's Headquarters, Michigan's
Department of Environmental Quality (Michigan DEQ), and the Spills
Action Centre (SAC) operated by the Ontario Ministry of Environment. To
assess the reliability of each data set we questioned and interviewed
knowledgeable officials about the data and the systems that produced
them, and manually reviewed the data. Limitations to the data are
discussed in the report and in appendix II. When appropriate, we
analyzed the data sets individually to determine spill frequency over
time and spill characteristics, such as volume and the type of material
spilled. We were not able to combine the spill data sets for analysis
because each entity tracks spills differently, and we were limited in
what we could conclude from the individual data sets because the degree
to which they are updated varies widely. We also obtained EPA and
Michigan DEQ data sets related to other pollutant discharges, such as
combined sewer overflows (CSO) and industrial discharge permit
violations, to provide context for the spill data and obtain more
complete information on pollutants discharged into the water bodies of
the St. Clair-Detroit River corridor. These data are likely subject to
the same limitations as the spill data, in that industrial permit
violations and CSOs are self-reported and facilities may be reluctant
to report these events; however, spills may be particularly subject to
underreporting because they are not part of a structured program as are
CSOs and industrial permit violations.
To assess what processes are used to notify parties of spills and
whether they contain explicit requirements for reporting times and
spill magnitude, we reviewed applicable laws and spill notification
agreements and obtained information on implementation of these
agreements from EPA, the Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, the Michigan State
Police, and Canadian officials. In addition, we obtained and analyzed
documentation on six spills to better understand how the notification
process was conducted in specific incidents. We selectively sampled the
spill data sets for spills to illustrate the implementation of
notification practices under various scenarios, including spills with
source locations in both the United States and Canada and spills of
differing materials and volumes. We questioned the 17 drinking water
facility operators on the U.S. side of the corridor to obtain their
perspectives on the timeliness of spill notification. We further
obtained information on the automated monitoring system maintained by
Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association, planned automated monitoring
on the U.S. side of the corridor, and the monitoring conducted by the
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission.
To determine the extent of EPA and the Coast Guard's spill prevention
efforts and enforcement activities in the St. Clair-Detroit River
corridor from 1994-2004, we first obtained and analyzed laws,
regulations, and agency policies regarding spill prevention and
enforcement. This included obtaining information on the potential
enforcement penalty dollar amounts. We also obtained data from EPA, the
Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and the Ontario Ministry of Environment on
spill-related enforcement actions taken in the corridor since 1994. We
analyzed the information to determine the number of inspections
conducted, the types of violations found, and the penalties assessed
for each documented violation. Finally, we obtained information from
the various agencies on the resources devoted to inspections and
enforcement; the use of those resources; and priorities in using the
resources.
We performed our work from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor, 1994-
2004:
Spill data sets were available from four sources: EPA, the Coast Guard,
Michigan DEQ, and the Ontario SAC. Each data set is unique; however,
some spill incidents are found in multiple data sets and therefore they
cannot be combined or consolidated. The relative quality of each data
set depends in part on whether it is updated after additional
information is obtained from spill investigations or whether minimal
updates are made, as with the EPA spill data set. Generally, all of the
spill data sets have a common data reliability limitation which stems
from uncertainty regarding whether all incidents are reported. Of note,
the data sets for EPA and the Ontario SAC contained a large number of
incidents with unknown volumes.
EPA Spill Data:
EPA's spill data set is not routinely updated after EPA responders
conduct investigations. Therefore, the data reflect preliminary
information about spills received from the NRC, and the data likely do
not represent the actual number and nature of spills. We are presenting
this data for informational purposes only. The data set contained a
total of 916 spill incidents that occurred in the St. Clair River, Lake
St. Clair, Detroit River, and Rouge River from 1994 through 2004 and
that had volumes of greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume).
About 45 percent of the spills were oil-related. The number of spills
has varied over time, not showing either an increasing or decreasing
trend. The EPA data showed that the greatest number of spills occurred
in 1994.
Table 3: EPA Spill Data by Year and Material:
Year: 1994;
Oils[A]: 71;
Unknown Material: 56;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 20;
Chemicals[C]: 2;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 149.
Year: 1995;
Oils[A]: 59;
Unknown Material: 22;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 11;
Chemicals[C]: 1;
Tars[D]: 2;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 96.
Year: 1996;
Oils[A]: 51;
Unknown Material: 39;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 8;
Chemicals[C]: 2;
Tars[D]: 1;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 101.
Year: 1997;
Oils[A]: 52;
Unknown Material: 23;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 14;
Chemicals[C]: 0;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 89.
Year: 1998;
Oils[A]: 49;
Unknown Material: 49;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 5;
Chemicals[C]: 2;
Tars[D]: 1;
Waste-water[E]: 1;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 108.
Year: 1999;
Oils[A]: 41;
Unknown Material: 27;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 16;
Chemicals[C]: 1;
Tars[D]: 1;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 87.
Year: 2000;
Oils[A]: 15;
Unknown Material: 24;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 5;
Chemicals[C]: 1;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 45.
Year: 2001;
Oils[A]: 22;
Unknown Material: 17;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 5;
Chemicals[C]: 0;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 46.
Year: 2002;
Oils[A]: 19;
Unknown Material: 23;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 8;
Chemicals[C]: 0;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 20.
Year: 2003;
Oils[A]: 18;
Unknown Material: 43;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 12;
Chemicals[C]: 0;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 74.
Year: 2004;
Oils[A]: 17;
Unknown Material: 43;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 7;
Chemicals[C]: 2;
Tars[D]: 0;
Waste-water[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 71.
Year: Total;
Oils[A]: 414;
Unknown Material: 366;
Gasoline and fuels[B]: 111;
Chemicals[C]: 11;
Tars[D]: 5;
Waste-water[E]: 1;
Other[F]: 8;
Total: 916.
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
[A] Spills in the oils category consist of water with oil (2),
miscellaneous waste oil (1), hydraulic oil (39), fuel oil (68),
miscellaneous oil (152), diesel oil (74), other oil (34), transmission
oil (3), waste oil (23), turbine oil (2), edible oils (4), epoxidized
vegetable oils (2), capacitor oil (1), petroleum products (1), crude
oil (3), compressor oil (1), engine oil (1), sludge oil (1), carbon oil
(1), and crank oil (1).
[B] Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of automobile
gasoline (81), jet fuel (20), kerosene (3), unleaded gasoline (3),
gasoline or diesel (1), bunker c fuel oil (2), and fuel and lubricant
(1).
[C] Spills in the chemicals category consist of mineral spirits (4),
other chemicals (1), solvents (2), paints (2), Anton battery release
(1), and hydrocarbon toluene (1).
[D] Spills in the tars category consist of coal tar pitch (3), crude
coke oven tar (1), and anthracene oil (1).
[E] Spills in the wastewater category consist of wastewater with
vegetable oil (1).
[F] Spills in the other category consist of brake fluid (1), asphalt
(3), parking lot runoff (1), industrial waste (1), white foam material
(1), and bilge slops (1).
[End of Table]
Coast Guard Spill Data:
Coast Guard officials update spill data after investigations are
conducted, thereby strengthening the reliability of their spill data.
However, they are unable to update preliminary volume estimates and
therefore these data are likely unreliable. There are 51 spill
incidents in the Coast Guard data set and the majority of spills--
roughly 70 percent--were oil-related. The Coast Guard's spill data set
indicates that 11 spills were traced back to storm or sanitary sewer
outfalls. In four of these instances, narratives completed by spill
responders indicate that sewage was mixed with other spill materials.
Table 4: Coast Guard Spill Data by Year and Material:
Year: 1994;
Oils: 7;
Gasoline and fuels: 1;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 8.
Year: 1995;
Oils: 2;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 1;
Chemical: 1;
Other: 1[A];
Total: 5.
Year: 1996;
Oils: 2;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 1;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 3.
Year: 1997;
Oils: 6;
Gasoline and fuels: 1;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 8.
Year: 1998;
Oils: 4;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 5.
Year: 1999;
Oils: 4;
Gasoline and fuels: 2;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 7.
Year: 2000;
Oils: 1;
Gasoline and fuels: 1;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 2.
Year: 2001;
Oils: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 1[B];
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 2.
Year: 2002;
Oils: 3;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 3.
Year: 2003;
Oils: 2;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 2.
Year: 2004;
Oils: 5;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 1;
Chemical: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 6.
Year: Total;
Oils: 36;
Gasoline and fuels: 6;
Coal tar: 3;
Chemical: 5;
Other: 1;
Total: 51.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[A] Asphalt.
[B] Jet fuel.
[End of Table]
The Coast Guard's data shows that the greatest number (26 of the 51)
spills occurred in the Detroit River. Most of the oil spills
investigated by the Coast Guard were in the Detroit and Rouge Rivers.
Similarly, most of the chemical spills that the Coast Guard
investigated were in the Detroit River, while most of the gasoline
spills were in Lake St. Clair.
Table 5: Coast Guard Spill Data by Water Body and Material:
Water Body: St. Clair River;
Oils: 3;
Gasoline and Fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemicals: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 3.
Water Body: Lake St. Clair;
Oils: 4;
Gasoline and Fuels: 5[A];
Coal tar: 0;
Chemicals: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 10.
Water Body: Rouge River;
Oils: 10;
Gasoline and Fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemicals: 0;
Other: 1[B];
Total: 11.
Water Body: Detroit River;
Oils: 18;
Gasoline and Fuels: 1;
Coal tar: 3;
Chemicals: 4;
Other: [Empty;
Total: 26.
Water Body: Not identified in data set;
Oils: 1;
Gasoline and Fuels: 0;
Coal tar: 0;
Chemicals: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 1.
Water Body: Total[C];
Oils: 36;
Gasoline and Fuels: 6;
Coal tar: 3;
Chemicals: 5;
Other: 1;
Total: 51.
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
[A] One of which was jet fuel.
[B] Asphalt.
[C] One spill incident did not have a water body listed.
[End of Table]
Michigan DEQ Spill Data:
Michigan DEQ officials update their spill data after investigations are
conducted, but some data fields (e.g., quantity of material released)
are not completed because the information is unknown. There are 21
spill incidents in the Michigan DEQ spill data set that occurred in the
St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, Detroit River, and Rouge River from
1996 through 2004 that have volumes of greater than 50 gallons (or of
an unknown volume). Michigan DEQ did not provide spills prior to 1996
because that is when they began collecting spill data electronically.
Table 6: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Year and Material:
Year: 1996;
Chemicals: 0;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 1.
Year: 1997;
Chemicals: 0;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 0.
Year: 1998;
Chemicals: 0;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 1;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 1;
Total: 2.
Year: 1999;
Chemicals: 0;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 1;
Total: 1.
Year: 2000;
Chemicals: 1;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 1;
Total: 2.
Year: 2001;
Chemicals: 1;
Oils: 1;
Wastewater: 1;
Gasoline and fuels: 1;
Tars: 0;
Other: 0;
Total: 4.
Year: 2002;
Chemicals: 1;
Oils: 4;
Wastewater: 0;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 1;
Total: 6.
Year: 2003;
Chemicals: 0;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 1;
Gasoline and fuels: 0;
Tars: 0;
Other: 1;
Total: 2.
Year: 2004;
Chemicals: 1;
Oils: 0;
Wastewater: 1;
Gasoline and fuels: 1;
Tars: 1;
Other: 0;
Total: 4.
Year: Total;
Chemicals: 4;
Oils: 5;
Wastewater: 4;
Gasoline and fuels: 2;
Tars: 2;
Other: 4;
Total: 21.
Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.
[A] Spills in the chemicals category consist of sodium bisulfate (1),
bromine (1), hydro fluranosilic acid (1), and sodium hydroxide (1).
[B] Spills in the oils category consist of non-PCB oil (1) and oils
(4).
[C] Spills in the wastewater category consist of untreated wastewater
(1), phosphorus wastewater (1), contact wastewater (1), and untreated
process wastewater (1).
[D] Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of diesel (2).
[E] Spills in the tars category consist of coal tars (2).
[F] Spills in the other category consist of brine (2), paper coatings
(1), and clay coatings (1).
Table 7: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Water Body:
Year: 1996;
Detroit River: 1;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 0;
Total: 1.
Year: 1997;
Detroit River: 0;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 0;
Total: 0.
Year: 1998;
Detroit River: 0;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 2;
Total: 2.
Year: 1999;
Detroit River: 0;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 1;
Total: 1.
Year: 2000;
Detroit River: 1;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 1;
Total: 2.
Year: 2001;
Detroit River: 2;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 2;
Total: 4.
Year: 2002;
Detroit River: 2;
Rouge River: 2;
St. Clair River: 1;
Total: 5.
Year: 2003;
Detroit River: 1;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 1;
Total: 2.
Year: 2004;
Detroit River: 3;
Rouge River: 0;
St. Clair River: 1;
Total: 4.
Year: Total;
Detroit River: 10;
Rouge River: 2;
St. Clair River: 9;
Total: 21.
Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.
[End of Table]
Ontario SAC Spill Data:
Ontario Ministry of Environment officials update spill data to reflect
additional information obtained. However, not all data fields are
completed because information such as spill quantities and materials
are not always known. There are a total of 157 spill incidents in the
SAC data that occurred in the St. Clair River (105), Lake St. Clair
(5), and the Detroit River (47) between 1994 and 2004 that have volumes
greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume). About 9 percent of
the 157 have unknown responsible parties, and 127 of the 157 have
unknown volumes or masses.
Table 8: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Year and Material:
Year: 1994;
Chemicals[A]: 8;
Oils[B]: 1;
Wastewater[C]: 11;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 0;
Unknown[E]: 3;
Other[F]: 3;
Total: 26.
Year: 1995;
Chemicals[A]: 6;
Oils[B]: 3;
Wastewater[C]: 2;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 0;
Unknown[E]: 1;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 14.
Year: 1996;
Chemicals[A]: 5;
Oils[B]: 1;
Wastewater[C]: 18;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 2;
Unknown[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 18.
Year: 1997;
Chemicals[A]: 10;
Oils[B]: 2;
Wastewater[C]: 2;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 1;
Unknown[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 17.
Year: 1998;
Chemicals[A]: 3;
Oils[B]: 1;
Wastewater[C]: 5;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 1;
Unknown[E]: 1;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 11.
Year: 1999;
Chemicals[A]: 4;
Oils[B]: 1;
Wastewater[C]: 0;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 3;
Unknown[E]: 2;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 12.
Year: 2000;
Chemicals[A]: 4;
Oils[B]: 4;
Wastewater[C]: 2;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 0;
Unknown[E]: 2;
Other[F]: 0;
Total: 12.
Year: 2001;
Chemicals[A]: 0;
Oils[B]: 0;
Wastewater[C]: 1;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 0;
Unknown[E]: 1;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 3.
Year: 2002;
Chemicals[A]: 0;
Oils[B]: 0;
Wastewater[C]: 4;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 1;
Unknown[E]: 0;
Other[F]: 1;
Total: 6.
Year: 2003;
Chemicals[A]: 0;
Oils[B]: 2;
Wastewater[C]: 1;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 0;
Unknown[E]: 10;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 15.
Year: 2004;
Chemicals[A]: 10;
Oils[B]: 0;
Wastewater[C]: 3;
Gasoline and Fuels[D]: 1;
Unknown[E]: 7;
Other[F]: 2;
Total: 23.
Source: GAO analysis of Ontario SAC data.
[A] Spills in the chemicals category consist of acetonitrile, ammonia,
benzene, butylene, cyclohexane, divinylbenzene, epoxy, ethylene, ethyl
hexyl nitrate, ethyl benzene, ferric chloride, iron, metabisulphate,
methylene chloride, methyl ethyl ketone, n-hexane, propylene
dichloride, rust inhibitor, sodium chloride, styrene monomer, toluene,
vcm, and xylene.
[B] Spills in the oils category consist of heating oil, oily material,
transformer oil, petroleum oil, vegetable oil, and waste oil.
[C] Spills in the wastewater category consist of ash and water,
chlorinated water, contaminated water, wastewater, wastewater with
aromatics, wastewater with chlorides, wastewater with hydrocarbons,
process water, effluent water, and water.
[D] Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of diesel fuel,
fuel, and gasoline.
[E] Spills in the unknown category consist of unknown, not applicable,
and blank fields.
[F] Spills in the other category consist of asphalt, brine, cement,
concrete, cooling water, foam, plastic material, sand and gravel,
sediment, silt, and suspended solids.
[End of Table]
Table 9: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Water Body:
Year: 1994;
Detroit River: 5;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 21;
Total: 26.
Year: 1995;
Detroit River: 4;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 10;
Total: 14.
Year: 1996;
Detroit River: 3;
Lake St. Clair: 1;
St. Clair River: 14;
Total: 18.
Year: 1997;
Detroit River: 6;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 11;
Total: 17.
Year: 1998;
Detroit River: 2;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 9;
Total: 11.
Year: 1999;
Detroit River: 6;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 6;
Total: 12.
Year: 2000;
Detroit River: 6;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 6;
Total: 12.
Year: 2001;
Detroit River: 1;
Lake St. Clair: 0;
St. Clair River: 2;
Total: 3.
Year: 2002;
Detroit River: 3;
Lake St. Clair: 1;
St. Clair River: 2;
Total: 6.
Year: 2003;
Detroit River: 7;
Lake St. Clair: 1;
St. Clair River: 7;
Total: 15.
Year: 2004;
Detroit River: 4;
Lake St. Clair: 2;
St. Clair River: 17;
Total: 23.
Year: Total;
Detroit River: 47;
Lake St. Clair: 5;
St. Clair River: 105;
Total: 157.
Source: GAO analysis of Ontario SAC data.
[End of Table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: CSO Data for the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor, 1999-
2004:
Michigan DEQ's CSO data were available as of 1999, when Michigan DEQ
began tracking sewer overflows. The CSO data, like spill data, have a
data-reliability limitation relating to uncertainty as to whether all
CSO events are reported; however, spills may be particularly subject to
underreporting because they are not part of a structured program as
CSOs and industrial permit violations are. CSO data provide additional
information in terms of the amount and location of pollutant discharges
into the waters of the corridor. According to EPA, CSOs contain storm
water, untreated human and industrial waste, toxic materials, and
debris. The roughly 1,400 CSOs that were greater than 50 gallons (or of
an unknown volume) greatly exceeded the number of spills that met these
criteria during the 6-year period. The largest category of CSOs was of
diluted raw sewage. The Rouge and Detroit Rivers received most of the
CSOs, with 1,296 incidents.
Table 10: CSOs in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from 1999-2004
by Water Body:
Water body: Detroit River;
Fully treated: 0;
Treated to NPDES limit: 39;
Diluted raw sewage: 316;
Partially treated sewage: 154;
Raw sewage: 1;
Not specified: 84;
No information: 0;
Total: 594.
Water body: Rouge River;
Fully treated: 0;
Treated to NPDES limit: 0;
Diluted raw sewage: 508;
Partially treated sewage: 98;
Raw sewage: 17;
Not specified: 78;
No information: 1;
Total: 702.
Water body: St. Clair River;
Fully treated: 0;
Treated to NPDES limit: 0;
Diluted raw sewage: 91;
Partially treated sewage: 0;
Raw sewage: 0;
Not specified: 38;
No information: 0;
Total: 129.
Water body: Lake St. Clair;
Fully treated: 0;
Treated to NPDES limit: 0;
Diluted raw sewage: 6;
Partially treated sewage: 16;
Raw sewage: 9;
Not specified: 22;
No information: 0;
Total: 53.
Water body: Total;
Fully treated: 0;
Treated to NPDES limit: 39;
Diluted raw sewage: 921;
Partially treated sewage: 268;
Raw sewage: 27;
Not specified: 222;
No information: 1;
Total: 1,478.
Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.
[End of table]
CSOs accounted for over 900,000 million gallons of partially treated
sewage discharged into waters of the corridor.
Table 11: Volume of CSOs in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor from
1999-2004 (in Millions of Gallons):
Water body: Detroit River;
Volume of diluted raw sewage: 4,741;
Volume of raw sewage: 1,718;
Volume of partially treated sewage: 26,588;
Total: 33,047.
Water body: Rouge River;
Volume of diluted raw sewage: 3,254;
Volume of raw sewage: 50;
Volume of partially treated sewage: 885,846;
Total: 889,149.
Water body: St. Clair River;
Volume of diluted raw sewage: 233;
Volume of raw sewage: 0;
Volume of partially treated sewage: 0;
Total: 233.
Water body: Lake St. Clair;
Volume of diluted raw sewage: 526;
Volume of raw sewage: 437;
Volume of partially treated sewage: 525;
Total: 1,488.
Water body: Total;
Volume of diluted raw sewage: 8,753;
Volume of raw sewage: 2,205;
Volume of partially treated sewage: 912,959;
Total: 923,917.
Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent Violation Data for the St.
Clair- Detroit River Corridor, 1994-2004:
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requires
industrial and municipal facilities to obtain permits to discharge
pollutants into U.S. waters. Such permits establish required effluent
limitations or best management practices. The industrial effluent
violation data we obtained from EPA rely upon self-reporting by
industries, and therefore the data have the same data reliability
limitation as spills and CSO data in terms of uncertainty about whether
all events are reported. In addition, volumes are not commonly reported
with effluent discharge violations as toxicity is a greater concern--
and therefore volume data are limited. However, the data provide
additional information on pollutant discharges in the corridor. From
1994 through 2004, there were a total of 2,257 NPDES industrial
effluent violations in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, Detroit
River, and Rouge River. Of these violations, 1,871 (or about 83
percent) of the total had volumes of greater than 50 gallons (or of an
unknown volume). The two largest NPDES discharge violations, in terms
of volume, related to oil and grease--and these were discharged by the
same facility in 1994 only a few months apart. The most frequently
discharged materials were solid pollutants, pH-altering materials, oil
and grease, and materials that had the potential to alter oxygen
availability in the receiving waters. Solid pollutants include
pollutants found in wastewater that were not removed during the
treatment process and can cause toxic conditions or contaminate
sediment.
From 1994 through 2004 the volume of discharged materials was available
for 204 of the 1,871 permit violations. For the remaining 1,667 (or 89
percent) of the violations, the volume was not available.
Table 12: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Volume per
Year:
Year: 1994;
Number of NPDES violations: 271;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 23,073,813.
Year: 1995;
Number of NPDES violations: 252;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 18,157.
Year: 1996;
Number of NPDES violations: 279;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 23,707.
Year: 1997;
Number of NPDES violations: 232;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 26,911.
Year: 1998;
Number of NPDES violations: 179;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 7.492.
Year: 1999;
Number of NPDES violations: 169;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 9,376.
Year: 2000;
Number of NPDES violations: 102;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 7,934.
Year: 2001;
Number of NPDES violations: 130;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 17,769.
Year: 2002;
Number of NPDES violations: 121;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 13,133.
Year: 2003;
Number of NPDES violations: 79;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 5,647.
Year: 2004;
Number of NPDES violations: 57;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 42,085.
Year: Total;
Number of NPDES violations: 1,871;
Volume per year if known (in gallons): 23,246,024.
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
[End of Table]
Over 50 percent of the materials discharged by industries in violation
of their permits were solid pollutants, oil and grease, zinc, or
materials that alter the pH or oxygen available in the receiving waters
into which they were discharged.
Table 13: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Discharged
Material and Year:
Year: 1994;
Solid pollutants: 37;
pH: 44;
Oil and grease: 37;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 21;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 30;
Other materials: 102;
Total: 271.
Year: 1995;
Solid pollutants: 54;
pH: 39;
Oil and grease: 11;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 23;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 12;
Other materials: 113;
Total: 252.
Year: 1996;
Solid pollutants: 48;
pH: 34;
Oil and grease: 23;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 18;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 15;
Other materials: 141;
Total: 279.
Year: 1997;
Solid pollutants: 46;
pH: 29; Oil and grease: 9;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 10;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 19;
Other materials: 119;
Total: 232.
Year: 1998;
Solid pollutants: 47;
pH: 31; Oil and grease: 4;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 13;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 5;
Other materials: 79;
Total: 179.
Year: 1999;
Solid pollutants: 30;
pH: 33; Oil and grease: 16;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 9;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 7;
Other materials: 74;
Total: 169.
Year: 2000;
Solid pollutants: 30;
pH: 12; Oil and grease: 4;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 2;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 0;
Other materials: 54;
Total: 102.
Year: 2001;
Solid pollutants: 30;
pH: 25; Oil and grease: 15;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 3;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 2;
Other materials: 55;
Total: 130.
Year: 2002;
Solid pollutants: 34;
pH: 8; Oil and grease: 15;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 3;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 5;
Other materials: 56;
Total: 121.
Year: 2003;
Solid pollutants: 11;
pH: 11; Oil and grease: 7;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 10;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 7;
Other materials: 33;
Total: 79.
Year: 2004;
Solid pollutants: 12;
pH: 9; Oil and grease: 6;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 7;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 1;
Other materials: 22;
Total: 57.
Year: Total;
Solid pollutants: 379;
pH: 275;
Oil and grease: 147;
Carbonaceous 05 day, 20c BOD: 119;
Zinc, total (as ZN): 103;
Other materials: 848;
Total: 1,871.
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
[End of table]
Over 52 percent of the NPDES violations occurred at 12 facilities, and
1 facility had 176 violations during the 11-year time frame.
Table 14: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Water Body
and Material for the 12 Most Frequently Violated Permits:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.
[End of Table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected Incidents:
U.S. Spill: 2001 Hazardous Substance Spill:
* From May 16 at 1:00 p.m. to May 17 at 1:00 p.m., two spills of
approximately 14-15 million gallons of storm water mixed with ethylene
glycol and propylene glycol (deicing agents) were discharged into a
storm sewer leading to the Detroit River.[Footnote 22] The responsible
party claimed that the release was due to blockage in a 10-inch pipe
from a holding pond containing the material to the sanitary sewer
system.
* Initially, EPA estimated that 10,000 fish were killed due to
depletion of dissolved oxygen in the waterway.
* On May 18, the NRC received a spill report from an observer who saw
fish dying. NRC reported the spill to EPA, the Coast Guard, and
Michigan DEQ shortly after 6:00 p.m. At 6:53 p.m., EPA contacted the
Michigan Pollution Emergency Alerting System (PEAS) hotline. At 8:00
p.m., the PEAS operator contacted Michigan DEQ Water Bureau staff. At
9:00 p.m., the EPA on-scene coordinator notified the Michigan DEQ and
the Coast Guard. When the Michigan DEQ spill responder did not arrive
on-scene, the PEAS operator called the Michigan DEQ District Supervisor
at 11:30 p.m. On May 19 at 12:15 a.m., the Michigan DEQ District
Supervisor contacted a spill responder, saying that EPA had been on the
scene and was requesting Michigan DEQ representation. At 8:00 a.m. on
May 19, DEQ staff arrived at the scene. At 10:30 a.m., two Coast Guard
responders arrived at the scene.
* At 5:00 p.m. on May 20, tanker trucks flushed out an isolated section
of the affected sewer drain with clean water. A pump was installed to
pump water to the nearby wastewater treatment facility. This lasted
until 10:00 a.m. on May 21.
* The responsible party notified Michigan DEQ of the May 16 and 17
discharges on May 22.
* The facility that is responsible for these discharges has an
industrial NPDES permit. Michigan DEQ agreed to accept best management
practices instead of numeric pollutant limits for the summer discharges
from this facility. So from May through September, the facility's
permit had no limitations on oxygen-depleting materials. Michigan DEQ's
understanding was that all discharges containing high amounts of oxygen-
depleting materials would be directed to the sanitary sewer, for
further treatment at the wastewater treatment facility.
U.S. Spill: 2002 Oil Spill:
Figure 11: 2002 Rouge River Oil Spill:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
* On April 9, at 9:50 a.m., an observer notified the Coast Guard's
Detroit Marine Safety Office of an oil spill near their property. At
10:00 a.m., the Coast Guard received a spill report from a nearby
bridge operator. At 10:01 a.m., the Coast Guard notified the NRC. At
approximately 11:00 a.m., the Coast Guard arrived on the scene. At 1:00
p.m., the Coast Guard briefed Michigan DEQ. At 2:05 p.m., the Coast
Guard notified EPA.
* On April 10, at 9:20 a.m., the Coast Guard and EPA discussed the
spill via phone. At 11:00 a.m., EPA and a contractor arrived at
Dearborn, MI, to begin emergency assessment activities. Also at 11:00
a.m., the Coast Guard issued a warning message to Canadian officials.
At 1:44 p.m., the Coast Guard began contacting Michigan drinking water
facilities. At 7:55 p.m., the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards agreed to
invoke the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan.
* On April 12, another spill occurred in the Rouge River.
* According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
Scientific Support Coordinator's report, the spill material was
weathered diesel mixed with used synthetic lube oil (such as "3 in 1
oil"), mixed with sewage.
* A Coast Guard summary from April 26 indicates 66,359 gallons of oil
were recovered. An EPA spill summary indicates that multiple agencies
recovered 63,000 gallons of oily water from open water and shorelines
and more than 771,564 gallons of oil, oily water, and oily sludge from
the municipal sewers of Dearborn and Detroit. EPA's final estimate for
total spill volume was 321,000 gallons of oil.
* The responsible party did not report the spills nor could officials
identify the party.
* A Coast Guard report from July 1 says that $3,989,905 was expended
for response. Coast Guard officials from the Detroit marine safety
office noted that there is not a funding mechanism for response when
the spill originates on one side of the international boundary and
damage occurs on the other. A Canadian report notes that $1,131,550 in
Canadian dollars was spent on spill response.
* EPA's cost of cleanup and response was about $2.5 million. An EPA
report says that the Coast Guard, EPA, and responding city governments
spent approximately $10 million on spill response and investigation.
* According to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 17 miles of U.S.
shoreline were affected and 16 kilometers (10 miles) of Canadian
shoreline were impacted. Two of the islands with shorelines that were
oiled were part of the newly created Detroit River International
Wildlife Refuge.
* Over 100 birds and reptiles were reported as dead, rehabilitated, or
observed oiled or otherwise impacted. A FWS representative believes
this number significantly underestimates the numbers impacted. She
believes a multiplier should be used, and estimated the actual number
of birds and reptiles impacted at approximately 720 to 900.
* Per the Coast Guard documents, the Captain of the Port closed the
Rouge River temporarily. Six vessel transits were delayed, one
cancelled, and two diverted to other ports as a result of the incident.
Two companies expressed concerns about staying open if Rouge River
closure extended past April 18. Some recreational boats and marinas
were oiled.
* On the Canadian side of the corridor, a drinking water intake
advisory was in effect on April 11.
U.S. Spill: 2004 Oil Spill:
Figure 12: 2004 Rouge River Oil Spill:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
* On August 3, at 7:00 a.m., a bridge operator notified the Coast
Guard's Detroit marine safety office of an oil sheen in the Rouge
River. At 8:00 a.m., the Coast Guard dispatched pollution investigators
to the scene. At 9:07 a.m., the Coast Guard notified Michigan DEQ. At
9:20 a.m., the Coast Guard notified the Ontario SAC. At 9:27 a.m., the
Coast Guard notified EPA. At 9:30 a.m., the Coast Guard notified the
NRC.
* At 10:05 a.m., a Coast Guard contractor started containment efforts.
The contractor diverted oil to a collection point and boomed the north
side of the Rouge River. Vacuum trucks and skimmers recovered oil on
the southern side of the Rouge River. At 11:30 a.m., the contractor
deployed an additional boom at the mouth of the Rouge River to collect
any oil that escaped.
* At 11:40 a.m., the Detroit Water and Sewage Department confirmed
multiple CSO discharges into the Rouge River, the last of which ended
at 9:55 a.m. At 2:10 p.m., the Coast Guard's District 9 reported that
Canadian authorities reported oil and debris on their side of the
Detroit River in the vicinity of Fighting Island, and it was consistent
with a CSO release. At 3:24 p.m., the NRC notified the Coast Guard and
Michigan DEQ of spill details provided by the Canadian Coast Guard. The
Canadian Coast Guard indicated that the Joint Marine Pollution
Contingency Plan was invoked. At 5:56 p.m., the NRC notified the Coast
Guard and Michigan DEQ of spill details provided by an observer who
stated that a black slick was seen coming from a freighter which
recently took on a load of salt. At 6:03 p.m., the NRC notified the
Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ of spill details provided by a power plant
regarding a sheen coming into the plant's inlet canal. On August 4, the
NRC notified the Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ of an oil sheen reported
again by the power plant.
* The spill material was an oil and sewage mixture. The Coast Guard
originally estimated that the spill was 100 gallons, however in their
database it is listed as a 2,000-gallon spill. The Coast Guard's final
estimate was 5,000 gallons.
* The responsible party did not report the spills, nor could officials
identify the party.
* EPA officials stated that officials from the City of Dearborn, the
City of Detroit, Michigan DEQ, EPA, and the Coast Guard inspected CSO
structures to the Rouge River in the area of concern, and no evidence
of oil accumulation was found in any of the sewers.
* On August 3, a project cost ceiling was set at $25,000. This was
raised on August 4 to $75,000. On August 6, the ceiling was raised from
$110,000 to $195,000.
* On August 28, another oil spill occurred in the Rouge River. An EPA
report indicates that the individual identifying the spill stated that
CSOs containing oil had been occurring for 15 months intermittently.
* The City of Detroit was held responsible for the August 3 and August
28 spills, and ultimately paid approximately $249,000 for response
efforts.
Canadian Spill: 2003 Hazardous Substance Spill:
* On August 14, at approximately 4:45 p.m., 34 gallons of vinyl
chloride monomer were discharged into the St. Clair River.[Footnote 23]
The spill lasted for almost 12 hours. On the following day, another
spill of 5 gallons of this substance was discharged into the river. The
cause of the spill was a cracked tube in a cooling water system heat
exchanger. The responsible party did not report the spill to the
Ontario SAC until August 19, because an electrical blackout caused
monitoring equipment to be inoperable.
* Ontario Ministry of Environment staff implemented procedures to warn
downstream intakes and take samples. All samples at Canadian reservoirs
came back negative. In addition, the Ministry of Environment ran models
to determine potential impacts. Ministry of Environment officials did
not issue an advisory, but Chatham Health Unit did issue a bottled-
water advisory for Wallaceburg municipal supply consumers.
* Models run by the Ministry of Environment showed that vinyl chloride
levels would be below the drinking water standards (2 parts per
billion).
* There are 12 intakes serving Michigan public water systems in the St.
Clair watershed between Port Huron and Detroit. Michigan DEQ scientists
reviewed the incident and determined that the amount of vinyl chloride
lost, based on a spill of 650 lbs., would not have resulted in
concentrations at Michigan drinking water plant intakes exceeding the
maximum contaminant level and that no human health risks resulted from
the event. No sampling of Michigan drinking water plant intakes was
conducted upon notification of the incident because data collected
would not have been useful due to the rapid flow rate of the river at
the time of the event.
Canadian Spill: 2004 Hazardous Substance Spill:
* On February 1, from 3:00 to 4:20 a.m., an estimated 39,626 gallons of
methyl ethyl ketone and methyl isobutyl ketone were discharged into the
St. Clair River.
* At 5:31 a.m., the responsible party reported to the Ontario SAC that
they had identified a leaking heat exchanger at the lube plant, which
resulted in contamination of their cooling water. At 6:40 a.m., SAC
staff briefed the Michigan State Police on the incident. At 7:22 a.m.,
the Michigan DEQ's Pollution Emergency Communications Coordinator
contacted the relevant Michigan DEQ staff. Michigan DEQ staff contacted
the SAC for more information at 7:45 a.m. Michigan DEQ then notified
Michigan drinking water facilities between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. After
11:00 a.m., the Michigan DEQ made a decision to recommend that drinking
water facilities shut their intakes. Drinking water facilities in Port
Huron, Marysville, St. Clair, East China Township, Marine City,
Algonac, Ira Township, New Baltimore, Mt. Clemens, Grosse Pointe Farms,
Highland Park, and Wyandotte were advised of the situation and all
plants except Port Huron, the Detroit plants, and Wyandotte were asked
to shut down by Michigan DEQ.
* The spill caused more than a dozen water plants on either side of the
river to close their intakes. About 36,000 customers in the St. Clair
and Macomb County communities of Marysville, St. Clair, East China
Township, Marine City, Algonac, and Ira Township were adversely
impacted by the intake closures.
Canadian Spill: 2004 Oil Spill:
* On May 23, at 4:10 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., an unknown number of gallons
of oily water were discharged into the St. Clair River. Heavy rains
caused three oil separators to overflow.
* At 6:05 a.m., the responsible party reported the spills to the
Ontario SAC. The responsible party began sampling and told Ontario
officials that there were no visible signs of oil or contaminants. At
7:40 a.m., the Ontario SAC notified Michigan officials through the PEAS
hotline. From 8:30 to 9:30 a.m., a Michigan DEQ official notified
Michigan drinking water facilities.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and Notification System:
The Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) was established
in 1948 in order to control and abate pollution in the Ohio River
Basin. ORSANCO is an interstate commission representing eight states
and the federal government. Member states include Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.
ORSANCO has programs to improve water quality in the Ohio River and its
tributaries. Their tasks include setting wastewater discharge
standards, performing biological assessments, monitoring the chemical
and physical properties of the waterways, and conducting special
surveys and studies. In addition, ORSANCO coordinates emergency
response activities for spills or accidental discharges to the river
and coordinates public participation in programs.
In 1977, an unreported discharge of hazardous chemicals contaminated
drinking water facilities in the corridor. Due to the lack of a
coordinated monitoring system, misinformation was distributed to the
public, causing concern for the safety of the drinking water. This
incident demonstrated the vulnerability of the Ohio River water intakes
to spills and led to the development of the Organics Detection System.
ORSANCO, in conjunction with drinking water utilities, identified
strategic locations along the river where monitoring for chemicals
would be most beneficial and protective of drinking water intakes.
ORSANCO suggested that water facilities located at strategic points
along the river could perform routine monitoring for oil and hazardous
chemical discharges. ORSANCO proposed that they serve as technical
coordinator and information clearinghouse, providing statewide
communications in the event of a spill.
Currently, ORSANCO maintains an inventory of water intakes, wastewater
discharges, and material transfers on the Ohio River. Also, a time-of-
travel model is used to estimate the arrival time of contaminant
discharges during spill events. The results of the model have been used
to identify the locations of the Organics Detection System. The
Organics Detection System was established in 1978 and participants
include 11 water utilities, one chemical manufacturer, and one power
generating facility. Data from each facility is to be downloaded for
review and evaluation on a weekly basis. Each instrument can detect and
quantify twenty-two organic compounds. The list of compounds represents
the organic chemicals of greatest concern to water utilities and most
likely to be detected based on an inventory of chemicals stored,
transported, and manufactured along the Ohio River.
Figure 13: ORSANCO Organics Detection System Monitoring Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Source: ORSANCO.
[End of figure]
Facility operators are required to notify ORSANCO when detection of a
compound over a specified threshold is observed or when an unidentified
compound is detected. When this occurs, plant operating personnel are
notified of the contaminant so treatment techniques to remove the
compound can be implemented. ORSANCO notifies downstream water
utilities and state and federal water quality and emergency response
agencies, including the NRC.
Figure 14: Water Quality Monitoring Equipment Used at ORSANCO Sites:
[See PDF for image]
Source: ORSANCO.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
May 11, 2006:
Mr. John B. Stephenson:
Director:
National Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stephenson:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report entitled Clean Water:
Better Information and Targeted Prevention Efforts Could Enhance Spill
Management in the St. Clair-Detroit River Corridor (GAO-06-639).
Overall, the report seems to present an accurate description of the
United States Coast Guard's processes for polluting incident
enforcement and investigation, and the associated management
information. However, a few clarifications are needed, as described
below.
Documentation of spill amounts:
The last paragraph on page 4, under "Results in Brief', states in part:
". . . In contrast, the Coast Guard District Nine officials document
their investigations and use the information to update their spill
data, but they do not update spill volume estimates after
investigations because of automated system limitations that do not
allow them to input revised estimates. . ."
This statement, which is repeated in several locations throughout the
report, may result from confusion about different data sources.
For the period of the GAO report, the Coast Guard recorded the results
of spill investigations in a system known as "Marine Information for
Safety and Law Enforcement" (MISLE) and the predecessor to MISLE, known
as the "Marine Safety Information System" (MSIS). In both MISLE and
MSIS, investigators had full control over the details of all pollutant
information in the incident reports. This includes substance
identification and the amounts spilled into and out of the water. The
pollutant information could be revised at any point until the reports
were closed and submitted for review. Further, if there was a reason to
revise a report it could be returned to the investigators.
The example cited by GAO on page 14 is the result of a combination of
extremely rare circumstances, due in part to the Coast Guard's
transition from MSIS to MISLE. The example reads as follows:
". . .For example, a spill listed in Coast Guard's dataset as being a
2,000 gallon spill is also reported in Coast Guard's annual report as
being over 8 million gallons. . ."
The incident in question occurred in May of 2001, with an initial spill
estimate of 2,000 gallons. Investigators entered the data into MSIS,
which was still in operation at that time. As noted above, the
investigators had full control of the report, including spill amounts.
On 25 June 2001 the investigator who initiated the report closed it,
indicating that the investigation was complete. It appears that, at
some point later, the spill estimate was increased to 8.4 million
gallons. However, it was only possible to reopen and revise the MSIS
report until 12 December 2001, when MSIS was shut down and replaced by
MISLE. At that point, all MSIS investigations were copied into MISLE. A
backup copy of the MSIS data remains on a Coast Guard server, for
reference purposes and cannot be updated. The MISLE copy of all spill
reports can be reopened and revised at any time, if requested by the
investigators. It should also be noted that the revised spill estimates
do not appear anywhere in the original MSIS report. Thus, normal
quality control procedures would not have detected the error. Further,
the "Coast Guard's annual report" noted by GAO was a local publication
that was not under the purview of Coast Guard Headquarters and not used
for nationwide reports or studies.
Consequently, the example given in the GAO report does not fairly
represent the true nature of the Coast Guard's polluting incident
databases or the procedures used to collect and record the data. In
fact, incident investigations in the MISLE system contain an extensive
set of business rules and edit-checks. Like any information system,
however, certain types of errors are possible. For example, it is
possible that an investigator can include a spill amount in the
narrative portions of a report that is different from the numeric
values included in the applicable data slots. Again, both MSIS and
MISLE systems gave investigators, who are responsible for correcting
any inconsistencies, full control of their reports.
After pollution investigations are completed, they are transferred
electronically to Coast Guard Headquarters, where additional reviews
are performed. When errors are detected, they are either corrected on
the spot, if the correct information is obvious, or the report is
returned to the investigating unit for correction. Given the number of
built-in and human edit checks that are applied to spill reports, the
Coast Guard believes that reported spill volumes are sufficiently
accurate for use by decisionmakers at all levels of the Federal
government.
Penalties for Failure to report a spill:
The second paragraph on page 41 states in part:
"In addition, though EPA and Coast Guard officials acknowledge that
spill reporting is not always occurring, the agencies did not elect to
penalize responsible parties for failure to report spills in the time
period we reviewed."
The Coast Guard believes that additional factors should be considered
by the GAO. A review of all incidents that occurred during the study
period showed that approximately 30% were mystery spills. Thus, no
party was identified for enforcement action. Of the remainder, civil
penalty enforcement actions were initiated for the actual spills under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33 of the US Code
Section 1321(b). There is no civil penalty provision to cite a party
specifically for "failure to report a spill." The Captain of the Port,
using guidance found in COMDINST M16201.1, Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Law, will evaluate various factors and then consult with
the District Commander to make a determination as to whether the nature
of the spill warrants criminal investigation and greater sanctions. As
found in COMDINST M16201.1, "The Department of Justice makes the final
decision on whether, and under what conditions, to prosecute violations
of the environmental laws as criminal cases."
While there were no enforcement actions in the small geographic area of
the GAO study, nationally the Coast Guard regularly refers cases to the
Department of Justice for failure to report oil pollution. Usually,
such offenses are part of a larger scheme to illegally dispose of
pollutants, including intentional discharges, fraudulent recordkeeping,
hidden changes in a vessel's piping systems, etc. A February 2006 Coast
Guard study of significant spills stated that: "The Coast Guard and the
Department of Justice have successfully prosecuted thirty criminal
cases between 1995 and 2005 involving the intentional discharge of oil,
(and) twenty-one since 2002." Thus, such prosecutions have been on the
increase in recent years. In fact, other enforcement actions are
ongoing with the most recent conviction on May 4th, against the
operating company and chief engineer of the M/V Texas Treasure. Among
the sanctions in that case, the operating company was ordered to pay a
$300,000 penalty.
For the period of the study, there were only 5 chemical spills where a
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
penalty for failure to report a spill might apply. Of those, all but
one was reported by the responsible party, as required. The remaining
incident, reportedly involving 8 million gallons of ethylene glycol and
described above, was under the jurisdiction of the Environmental
Protection Agency for enforcement purposes.
Thus, the Coast Guard's enforcement actions should be considered
appropriate for the circumstances of each incident.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Kevin Bray, John Delicath,
Michele Fejfar, Jill Roth Edelson, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Jamie
Meuwissen, and John Wanska made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For purposes of this report, "spill" refers to an unanticipated or
accidental discharge of pollutants into the waters of the corridor, but
excludes National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
violations and combined sewer overflows. However, we treat permit
violations and combined sewer overflows reported to the NRC as spills
within this report.
[2] Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act"), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387.
[3] Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("Superfund"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
[4] In accordance with Section 10(g) of Executive Order 12580 of
January 23, 1987, Coast Guard officials may use an instrument of re-
delegation to shift leadership of response efforts to EPA.
[5] Responsible parties are required to report spills by the Clean
Water Act and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA); Ontario's Environmental Protection Act also
requires that parties report spills.
[6] The NRC spill data include spills greater than 50 gallons (or of an
unknown volume).
[7] An outfall is any pipe or conduit used to carry either raw sewage
or treated effluent to a final point of discharge into a body of water.
[8] United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Mich.
1979).
[9] United States v. City of Detroit, 940 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (granting Detroit's motion for summary judgment).
[10] In addition to these spill notification agreements related to
marine spills, the Canada-U.S. Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan
provides for notification for inland spills. Environment Canada's
National Environmental Emergencies Centre notifies the NRC and vice
versa. Canadian officials told us the plan, as implemented, addresses
mainly air releases.
[11] Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986).
[12] First Nation tribes are composed of indigenous people of North
America located in what is now Canada.
[13] The regulation applies to non-transportation-related facilities
with a total above ground (i.e., not completely buried) oil storage
capacity of greater than 1,320 gallons, or total completely buried oil
storage capacity greater than 42,000 gallons. In addition to the
storage capacity criteria, to be regulated, a facility, due to its
location, must reasonably be expected to discharge oil into navigable
waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines, into the waters of
the contiguous zone, or that may affect federal natural resources.
[14] Alternatively, they may explain in the SPCC plan why such measures
are not practicable.
[15] Facilities subject to Michigan DEQ's Part 5 Rules are those that
meet the definition of oil storage or on-land facility and receive,
process, manufacture, use, store, or ship oil, salt, or polluting
materials above the specified threshold management quantities (TMQs).
The TMQs are: total above ground capacity of 1,320 gallons or one tank
larger than 660 gallons of oil; five solid tons or 1,000 gallons of
salt; and outdoor use or storage of 440 pounds (or indoor use or
storage of 2,200 pounds) of polluting materials.
[16] Section 91.1 of the act requires implementing regulations that
were not finalized as of the issuance of this report.
[17] The Environmental SWAT Team is a specialized group that can be
rapidly deployed to address critical environmental issues. It
complements ongoing work that the Ministry of Environment, including
its district offices, pursues, including inspection and enforcement
activities. The 2004 inspections in the Sarnia area were the result of
concerns raised by chemical spills that occurred in 2003.
[18] Coast Guard officials stated that penalties are determined by
hearing officers based upon multiple factors, including the size of the
spill, the product discharged, the environmental or economic
sensitivity of the impacted area, the measures in place by the
responsible party to prevent discharges, the steps taken by the
responsible party as a result of the discharge toward preventing
further discharges, as well as the financial impact of the cleanup
operations.
[19] Bill 133, also known as the Environmental Enforcement Statute Law
Amendment Act, was passed by the Ontario Legislature on June 9, 2005;
this legislation provides the Ministry of Environment with the
authority to issue penalties for spills.
[20] These funds may also be utilized when the responsible party is
known, but unable to pay for spill response.
[21] The 2002 Rouge River spill accounts for approximately $7 million
of the total spent in the 11-year time frame.
[22] Volume estimate provided by the responsible party.
[23] Volume estimate was provided by the responsible party. Vinyl
chloride is a potential human carcinogen when inhaled, and it has been
shown to cause liver cancer in laboratory animals exposed orally or by
inhalation.
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