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entitled 'U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners 
Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but 
Significant Challenges Remain' which was released on June 5, 2006. 

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Report to Congressional Committees and Senator Dianne Feinstein: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2006: 

U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: 

Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce 
Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain: 

GAO-06-519: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-519, a report to congressional committees and 
Senator Dianne Feinstein. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised questions about U.S. preparedness 
for such an event. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) leads U.S. detection and warning efforts and partners with 
federal and state agencies in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation 
Program (NTHMP) to reduce tsunami risks. In 2005, Congress appropriated 
$17.24 million in supplemental funding to enhance these efforts. 

This report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the greatest 
tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential impacts have been 
assessed, (2) discusses the effectiveness of the existing federal 
tsunami warning system, (3) describes efforts to mitigate the potential 
impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, and (4) assesses NOAA’s 
efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami programs. 

What GAO Found: 

NOAA has determined that the Pacific coast states of Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington, as well as Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea, face the greatest tsunami 
hazard. The east and Gulf coasts are relatively low-hazard areas. While 
high-hazard areas have been identified, limited information exists on 
the likely impacts of a tsunami in those areas. Some coastal areas lack 
inundation maps showing the potential extent of tsunami flooding in 
communities, and others have maps that may be unreliable. State 
assessments of likely tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure have 
been limited, in part, due to a lack of tsunami loss estimation 
software, as exists for floods and other hazards. Although federal 
warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and issue warnings, 
false alarms and warning system limitations hamper their effectiveness. 
Some state and local emergency managers have raised concerns about 
false alarms—the 16 warnings issued since 1982 were not followed by 
destructive tsunamis on U.S. shores—potentially causing citizens to 
ignore future warnings. Furthermore, limitations in the Emergency Alert 
System and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards may impede timely warnings to 
communities. For example, signal coverage for these two systems is 
insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal areas and failure to 
properly activate them has resulted in warnings being delayed or not 
transmitted to some locations. NOAA has begun addressing false alarms 
but, according to agency officials, lacking the states’ permission 
elsewhere, has only conducted “live” end-to-end testing of the warning 
systems in Alaska to identify problems. 

The at-risk communities GAO visited have mitigated potential tsunami 
impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public 
education, and infrastructure protection, but the level of 
implementation varies considerably by location. Most of the states and 
some communities GAO visited have basic mitigation plans identifying 
tsunami hazards. While all of these locations have multiple warning 
mechanisms in place, disruptions to key infrastructure such as 
telephone lines may hamper timely warnings. Furthermore, key 
educational efforts, such as distributing evacuation maps and 
developing school curricula have not been consistently implemented. In 
addition, few states and communities protect critical infrastructure 
from tsunamis through land-use and building design restrictions. 
Emergency managers attributed variability in their efforts to the need 
to focus on more frequent hazards like wildfires and to funding 
limitations. Furthermore, few communities participate in NOAA’s 
preparedness program, according to NOAA officials, because they 
perceive the threat of a tsunami to be low. The nationwide expansion of 
NOAA’s tsunami-related activities and NTHMP is under way; however, the 
future direction of these efforts is uncertain because they lack long-
range strategic plans. NOAA has yet to identify long-range goals, 
establish risk-based priorities, and define performance measures to 
assess whether its tsunami-related efforts are achieving the desired 
results. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that NOAA take steps to develop 
software for tsunami loss estimation, conduct periodic end-to-end 
warning system tests, increase high-risk community participation in its 
tsunami preparedness program and prepare risk-based strategic plans for 
its efforts. 

NOAA reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the 
findings and recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-519]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512-
3841or mittala@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean 
Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively 
Assessed: 

Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning 
Systems Have Limitations: 

State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, 
although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations: 

Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is 
Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

GAO Comment: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

GAO Comment: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Relative Tsunami Hazard for Distant and Local Tsunamis in U.S. 
Coastal Areas: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis: 

Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods: 

Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow: 

Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii: 

Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone: 

Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone: 

Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone: 

Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather 
Radio: 

Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs: 

Figure 10: TsunamiReady Sign for Communities: 

Abbreviations: 

DART: Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis: 
EAS: Emergency Alert System: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
HAZUS--MH: Hazards U.S.-- Multi-Hazard: 
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 
NTHMP: National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program: 
NWS: National Weather Service: 
USGS: U.S. Geological Survey: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

June 5, 2006: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Co-Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Don Young: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar: 
Ranking Democratic Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
United States Senate: 

The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 killed more than 200,000 
people, displaced more than 1.5 million, and caused significant damage 
in 12 countries in Asia and East Africa. Although the earthquake that 
triggered the tsunami was immediately detected, the existence of a 
tsunami was not quickly confirmed, and a warning message was not 
delivered to most of those in the tsunami's path. As a result, 
casualties and damage occurred not only near the earthquake's source, 
where communities had little time to react, but also in distant coastal 
communities that were impacted by tsunami waves hours later. The 
devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami has raised concerns 
about the vulnerability and preparedness of U.S. coastal communities 
and the ability of our detection and warning systems to help prevent a 
similarly destructive event. 

A tsunami is a series of ocean waves typically generated by an 
underwater earthquake.[Footnote 1] A tsunami wave may be very small in 
the deep ocean, but as it approaches land can increase to tens of feet 
in height and reach shore as a fast-moving wall of turbulent water. 
Tsunamis pose an inundation threat to low-lying coastal communities 
from multiple destructive waves that can penetrate far inland. Tsunamis 
are categorized as either distant or local. Distant tsunamis travel 
long distances from their triggering events to strike the coast hours 
later, allowing time to warn and evacuate threatened communities. Local 
tsunamis strike the coast minutes after their near-shore triggering 
event, allowing little time for warning and evacuation. However, the 
frequency of damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, 
compared with other natural hazards, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and floods. 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages 
federal tsunami detection and warning efforts. NOAA's National Weather 
Service (NWS) operates two tsunami warning centers whose staff monitor 
seismic data and, based on the location and magnitude of earthquakes, 
issue warnings when tsunamis are likely. The warning centers transmit a 
tsunami warning message to NWS forecast offices and state emergency 
management centers, among others.[Footnote 2] NWS forecast offices 
transmit the warning over NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NOAA Weather 
Radio) and the Emergency Alert System. NOAA Weather Radio is a 
nationwide network of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather 
information, including warnings, watches, forecasts and other hazard 
information, 24 hours a day directly from NWS weather forecast offices. 
The Federal Communication Commission's Emergency Alert System, designed 
to provide the President a means to communicate with the American 
people in the event of an emergency, can decode and retransmit NOAA 
Weather Radio warning messages over radio and television broadcast and 
cable systems. 

Federal, state, and local government agencies are all involved in 
efforts to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis through education, 
hazard assessment, mitigation planning, and other activities. For 
example, NOAA operates a tsunami preparedness recognition program known 
as TsunamiReady that encourages communities to educate citizens on 
tsunami hazards, develop tsunami hazard plans, and establish local 
warning systems, among other things. In addition, NOAA provides 
leadership and funding for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation 
Program (NTHMP). This program, initiated in 1996, has been a 
partnership between NOAA; the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and five states--Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington--to assess tsunami hazards, 
improve and coordinate tsunami warning systems, and develop state and 
local hazard mitigation programs.[Footnote 3] For example, under the 
NTHMP, NOAA provides funding and technical support to help the states 
produce inundation maps showing the extent to which coastal areas may 
be flooded by a tsunami. Communities use these maps to help identify 
people and property at-risk and to develop strategies for mitigating 
the hazard. Furthermore, the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000, requires all states and localities to develop 
FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plans to qualify for certain disaster 
relief funding.[Footnote 4] These plans provide a framework for states 
and communities to assess their vulnerability to all hazards and, if a 
significant tsunami threat exists, develop approaches to reduce tsunami 
impacts on people and infrastructure within their jurisdictions. 

In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $17.24 million in supplemental 
funds for NOAA to expand and improve its tsunami detection 
capabilities, enhance warning center operations and facilities, produce 
tsunami inundation forecast models, and expand the TsunamiReady program 
participation nationwide.[Footnote 5] In fiscal year 2006, $9.82 
million in appropriations were designated for tsunami-related 
activities, and NOAA requested $21.66 million for fiscal year 
2007.[Footnote 6] NOAA is initially spending these funds primarily on 
enhancing its tsunami detection capabilities, for example, by expanding 
its network of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) 
detection stations in the Pacific Ocean to 39 stations covering the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Caribbean Sea. 

To address questions regarding the status of national tsunami 
preparedness, this report (1) identifies U.S. coastal areas facing the 
greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which potential tsunami 
impacts on people and infrastructure have been assessed; (2) discusses 
the effectiveness of the existing federal tsunami warning system; (3) 
describes ongoing local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate 
the potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities; and (4) 
assesses NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal tsunami 
programs. 

In conducting our work, we visited the states participating in the 
NTHMP--Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington--as well as 
Puerto Rico and Florida. We met with federal, state, and local 
officials, reviewed documentation related to tsunami hazard assessment, 
warning and mitigation efforts, and analyzed plans for current and 
future tsunami preparedness activities. To identify the U.S. coastal 
areas facing the greatest tsunami hazard and the extent to which their 
vulnerability to tsunami impacts has been assessed, we reviewed 
historic and seismic data and analysis from NOAA and other federal and 
state sources. For the states facing the greatest tsunami hazards, we 
determined the extent to which tsunami inundation maps identifying the 
potential vulnerability of people and infrastructure have been 
prepared, and reviewed each state's FEMA-approved, all-hazard 
mitigation plan to determine how and to what extent tsunami impacts 
have been assessed. 

To discuss the effectiveness of the current federal tsunami warning 
system, we visited both of NOAA's tsunami warning centers and met with 
officials to discuss how they conduct their detection and warning 
responsibilities and how they measure their effectiveness. In addition, 
we visited selected NOAA warning forecast offices, met with officials 
to determine how tsunami warnings are disseminated and tracked, and met 
with state emergency managers to determine how they receive warnings 
and to obtain their views regarding the effectiveness of the warnings. 
We also reviewed reports prepared by NOAA and by state emergency 
managers that evaluated the effectiveness of warnings issued by NOAA on 
June 14, 2005, due to a potentially tsunami-generating earthquake off 
the Northern California coastline. 

To describe local, state, and federal agency efforts to mitigate the 
potential impacts of tsunamis on coastal communities, we initially met 
with state emergency managers and reviewed state mitigation documents. 
Because comprehensive statewide data on local mitigation activities 
does not exist, we next visited selected at-risk communities 
recommended by state emergency managers. The communities we visited are 
Seward and Kodiak, Alaska; San Mateo County and Crescent City, 
California; Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; 
Mayaguez and Rincon, Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, 
Washington. We discussed tsunami preparedness efforts with the 
community emergency managers, such as planning, warning, education and 
outreach, infrastructure protection, and the TsunamiReady program and 
obtained documentation of their efforts and activities in these areas. 
We also met with NOAA officials involved with the TsunamiReady program 
and reviewed program documentation. 

To assess NOAA's efforts to develop long-range plans for federal 
tsunami programs, we met with NOAA officials and reviewed plans for 
NOAA's ongoing tsunami activities, as well as schedules for the 
completion of NOAA's Tsunami Program expansion. We also met with 
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program participants, including 
NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and state representatives and reviewed program 
documentation to determine how NOAA is planning for the future 
management and direction of its tsunami activities. 

We conducted our work between April 2005 and March 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and 
U.S. territories in the Caribbean face the greatest tsunami hazard, but 
reliable and comprehensive assessments of the potential impacts on 
people and infrastructure have not been completed for many of these 
areas. According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both 
distant and local tsunamis are Hawaii and the west coast states of 
California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened primarily by local tsunamis. 
Historically, the east coast and the Gulf coast tsunami hazards are 
relatively low. Because inundation maps are the foundation for 
evaluating potential tsunami impacts on communities, map production has 
been a high priority for NOAA and the threatened states. However, 
progress on this front has been slow--for example, Alaska has 
inundation maps for only 5 of 60 at-risk communities--primarily because 
accurate maps are complex and costly for states to produce. To 
effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need to 
assess the potential impacts of a tsunami on people and infrastructure. 
While FEMA has standardized computer software for comprehensively 
estimating the likely human, structural, and economic damages from 
natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, no such 
tool exists for tsunamis. For this and other reasons, California and 
Alaska have not specifically assessed potential tsunami losses, while 
the other at-risk areas have produced limited tsunami damage 
assessments. Consequently, emergency managers in the at-risk states and 
U.S. territories do not have comprehensive information on how many and 
what types of structures would be exposed and damaged, how many people 
could be injured or killed, or the extent of potential short and long- 
term economic impacts of a tsunami. We are recommending that NOAA work 
with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss estimation 
software. 

Although NWS's warning centers can quickly detect potential tsunamis 
and issue warnings, the effectiveness of these warnings is hampered by 
false alarms and limitations in the federal systems that transmit 
warnings to the local level. NWS's warning centers have rapidly 
analyzed seismic data to detect potential tsunamis, and if the location 
and magnitude of an earthquake indicated that a tsunami was likely, the 
centers generally issued a warning within 5 to 10 minutes for local 
tsunamis. However, some state and local emergency management officials 
have raised concerns about false alarms, because the warnings proved to 
be unnecessary--no damaging waves actually reached U.S. shores 
following the 16 warnings issued since 1982--or were overly broad and 
included communities that were not imminently threatened. Such warnings 
can cause unnecessary and costly evacuations and, experts warn, may 
cause people to ignore future warnings. NWS has begun addressing false 
alarm concerns, for example, by expanding the network of DART stations 
that help warning centers confirm whether a tsunami has been generated, 
but it has not set specific performance targets for reducing the 
number, scope, and duration of false alarms. We are recommending that 
NOAA take specific steps, such as reexamining its rules for when a 
warning will be issued and to which areas, to reduce false alarms. 
Furthermore, although NWS warning centers effectively transmit tsunami 
warnings to NWS forecast offices, these offices do not always send 
timely warnings to affected local areas because the two primary federal 
warning alert systems--the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather 
Radio--have significant limitations. For example, signal coverage for 
these two systems is insufficient to transmit warnings to some coastal 
areas. This shortcoming was highlighted in June 2005, when an actual 
tsunami warning for the west coast was issued but signal problems 
prevented the warning from reaching portions of the coasts of 
Washington and Oregon. Also, to properly activate these warning 
systems, NWS forecast office staff must enter a tsunami-specific code 
into a computer. During the June 2005 event, failure to do so in a 
timely manner or at all resulted in warnings being delayed or not 
transmitted to some locations. NOAA has only conducted end-to-end tests 
of the tsunami warning system using actual "live" warning codes, rather 
than test codes, in Alaska to identify problems before actual events 
occur. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA said that it 
conducts such end-to-end testing where allowed and uses test codes in 
other states. We are recommending that NOAA continue to work with the 
states to conduct end-to-end testing that ensures the system will 
function as intended during an emergency. 

The at-risk communities we visited have taken actions to mitigate 
tsunami impacts through planning, warning system improvements, public 
education, and infrastructure protection; however, the level of 
implementation among these locations varies considerably. Each of the 
six states we visited have FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans 
that identify tsunami hazards; and most have taken the additional step 
of identifying actions to mitigate those hazards, such as relocating 
critical facilities out of inundation zones. However, only 4 of the 12 
communities we visited have developed FEMA-approved plans that include 
tsunami mitigation projects. Further, while all of the states and 
communities we visited have developed some mechanisms for warning 
people about a tsunami threat, communications problems may hamper some 
communities' ability to receive and disseminate warnings in a timely 
manner. For example, during the west coast tsunami warning in June 
2005, many 911 dispatch centers and telephone lines were overloaded, in 
some cases, preventing local emergency managers from quickly 
disseminating the warning to other local officials and preventing 
telephone-based warning systems from reaching residents. Moreover, 
while state and local officials recognize the need to educate the 
public, key efforts identified by tsunami preparedness experts--such as 
distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula--have not 
been consistently implemented across the states and communities we 
visited. For example, only two of the six at-risk states we visited 
have developed and implemented tsunami preparedness curricula in 
schools. In addition, few states and localities have implemented long- 
term mitigation efforts such as land-use restrictions and building 
design codes to prevent loss of life and reduce economic damage. 
Overall, state and local emergency managers attributed the variability 
in tsunami preparedness efforts to a variety of factors, including 
their focus on other higher priority natural hazards and a lack of 
funding. Furthermore, only a few communities in coastal areas have 
chosen to participate in NOAA's voluntary TsunamiReady program, which 
is designed to help them take the initial steps in tsunami mitigation. 
NOAA officials believe that TsunamiReady participation is limited 
because of community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived 
high cost versus benefit. We are recommending that NOAA evaluate the 
TsunamiReady program to determine how to increase participation by high-
risk communities. 

Efforts are under way to significantly expand federal tsunami detection 
and related activities as well as the NTHMP; however, the future 
direction of these efforts is uncertain because NOAA has not 
established long-range strategic plans to guide them. Strategic plans 
are important because they help agencies set specific program goals and 
objectives, define performance measures for assessing program 
effectiveness, ensure coordination of existing activities and establish 
risk-based priorities. Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 
2004, NOAA's various tsunami-related activities, such as warning center 
operations, the TsunamiReady program, and tsunami-related research, 
were not managed as a formal, integrated program. NOAA combined the 
activities in 2005 into a single program and is currently strengthening 
and expanding certain elements of the program. However, NOAA has not 
yet adopted a comprehensive, risk-based strategic plan to guide its 
expanded tsunami program into the future. NOAA officials told us they 
expect to finalize such a plan during 2006. In addition, the plan that 
NOAA is using to guide the NTHMP activities has not been updated since 
1996, and the program's performance has not been formally assessed 
since 2001. As a result, some issues raised in the 2001 assessment, 
such as lack of performance measures, remain concerns of state NTHMP 
members today. Representatives of the five original high-hazard NTHMP 
states are also concerned that the program's funding decisions and 
strategic direction may become less risk-based as states that face 
relatively low hazards join the program. Without an updated, risk-based 
strategic plan for the expanded NTHMP, NOAA will have difficulty 
ensuring that the most threatened states get the resources they need to 
continue and complete key mitigation activities. We are recommending 
that NOAA evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well and what 
high-priority activities remain to be completed and develop 
comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and 
NTHMP. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce 
representing NOAA agreed with all of our recommendations and indicated 
that steps will be taken to implement them. The Department of Homeland 
Security representing FEMA concurred with our recommendation that NOAA 
should work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized tsunami loss 
estimation software. However the department noted that FEMA does not 
have the resources to pursue such a request; and therefore, any request 
of assistance on this issue from NOAA would have to address these 
resource constraints. The Department of the Interior did not comment on 
our recommendations. The comments from the Departments of Commerce, 
Homeland Security, and the Interior appear in appendixes I, II and III. 

Background: 

Tsunamis are typically generated by underwater earthquakes-- 
landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are other known, but 
less common, tsunami sources. Tsunami generating earthquakes usually 
occur in subduction zones, such as those found in the Pacific Ocean off 
the U.S. western and Alaskan coasts, as well as in the Caribbean. 
Marked by deep trenches in the seafloor, subduction zones are formed 
where one of the earth's outer shell of tectonic plates plunges 
underneath another.[Footnote 7] Usually the plates are gradually moving 
past each other, but friction may temporarily lock them together, 
causing stress to build up between the plates. Sometimes the stress is 
relieved suddenly in the form of a large earthquake. As shown in figure 
1, the bottom plate dives farther down, snapping the top plate 
violently upward, disturbing the overlying seawater. The size of the 
resulting tsunami depends on a complex set of factors, including the 
size of the earthquake, its depth below the ocean floor, the depth of 
the water, the type and amount of seafloor movement and the energy 
released. 

Figure 1: Subduction Zone Earthquakes Generate Tsunamis: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Once generated, some tsunami waves move quickly inland while other 
waves head toward the open ocean, often at speeds up to 600 miles per 
hour. Therefore, a tsunami generated by an earthquake off the coast of 
Alaska would be a local tsunami for that state's coastal areas, and 
could strike within minutes of the event, while the same event is 
considered a distant tsunami for the coast of Washington state, which 
would not likely be hit until 3 or more hours later. 

While tsunamis can be a high impact natural hazard, the frequency of 
damaging tsunamis in the United States has been low, compared with 
other natural hazards. According to NOAA's records, the last tsunami 
causing significant impacts was at Skagway, Alaska, in November 1994, 
where the landslide and associated tsunami caused one death and $25 
million in damages. According to FEMA, flooding, severe storms, and 
hurricanes are the most common and costly causes of disaster 
declarations in the United States; at least 10 such events since 1989 
have each required FEMA relief expenditures in excess of a billion 
dollars. Although damaging tsunamis are relatively rare, the 
devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates the need 
for assessing the threat, and for monitoring and preparing for an event 
in at-risk areas, particularly low-lying, seismically active coastal 
areas. 

The West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, is 
responsible for warning Alaska, the west coast and east coast states, 
and states along the Gulf of Mexico, while the Richard H. Hagemeyer, 
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Ewa Beach, Hawaii, is responsible for 
warning Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean 
Sea.[Footnote 8] These warning centers use two types of data for 
determining when to issue a tsunami warning. First, they receive and 
analyze earthquake data from seismic networks operated by NOAA, USGS, 
the states, and universities to determine whether to issue a 
warning.[Footnote 9] If the seismic data indicate that a local tsunami 
may be generated, the responsible warning center issues a warning based 
on the earthquake data alone. Second, the warning centers analyze sea- 
level data to determine whether a tsunami has actually been generated, 
and if not, cancel the warning. The centers receive sea-level data 
through a network of DART stations and sea-level gauges, as shown in 
figure 2. DART stations consist of a seafloor bottom-pressure recording 
system that is capable of detecting tsunamis smaller than 1 inch and is 
connected to a surface buoy that transmits the data by satellite to 
NOAA. Scientists at the warning centers incorporate the data from the 
DART stations into tsunami forecast models to estimate the size of the 
expected waves and the potential impact on coastal areas. The tsunami 
warning centers have used forecast models they developed, as well as 
models developed by NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, 
which produce expected tsunami inundations at nine high-risk 
locations.[Footnote 10] 

Figure 2: Sea-Level Tsunami Detection Methods: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

A network of federal, state, and local government agencies are 
responsible for ensuring that a tsunami warning reaches the public. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the key components of this process. 
The federal tsunami warning centers send a warning to NWS forecast 
offices and state emergency management centers by multiple means, such 
as FEMA's National Warning System, a dedicated telephone hotline, and 
NWS's satellite-based National Weather Wire Service.[Footnote 11] The 
forecast offices, in turn, transmit the warning over NOAA Weather Radio 
and the Emergency Alert System (EAS). State emergency managers receive 
tsunami warnings from NWS and then warn counties and local communities 
using multiple methods, including a dedicated telephone network for 
state and local emergency management officials. Finally, county and 
local officials are responsible for warning the public and issuing 
evacuation orders, using a variety of methods including bullhorns, 
sirens, and telephone systems. 

Figure 3: Overview of Tsunami Warning Flow: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Federal, state, and local government agencies also conduct hazard 
mitigation activities to reduce the potential impacts of tsunamis. At 
the federal level, NWS operates the TsunamiReady community recognition 
program. Initiated in 2000, TsunamiReady is modeled after NWS's 
StormReady program for hurricanes and tornados. NWS meteorologists in 
regional forecast offices are responsible for reviewing applications 
from coastal communities and ensuring that they meet program 
requirements in conjunction with state emergency management officials. 
NOAA also provides a chairperson and funding for the NTHMP. From 1998 
through 2001, NOAA provided $2.3 million annually for the NTHMP, 
increasing to $4.3 million annually in 2002 through 2005, and returning 
to $2.3 million in 2006. Initially, the five participating states each 
received less than $100,000 annually from the NTHMP, but in recent 
years they have each received approximately $275,000 annually to 
directly supplement their individual mitigation efforts, while NOAA and 
the other federal partners used the remaining funds to support their 
own activities under the program. NOAA estimates that since the 
program's inception the states have matched the NTHMP funding by a 
ratio of six state in-kind or dollar contributions for every program 
dollar. 

The Tsunami Hazard Is Greatest in the Pacific States and Caribbean 
Territories, but the Potential Impacts Have Not Been Comprehensively 
Assessed: 

Tsunamis pose the greatest hazard to the coastal areas of the five 
states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S. territories in the 
Caribbean, but for many of these areas reliable, comprehensive 
assessments of potential tsunami impacts on people and infrastructure 
have not been completed. Some high-hazard coastal areas do not have 
tsunami inundation maps--the foundation for evaluating potential 
tsunami impacts on communities--showing the extent to which a tsunami 
would penetrate inland and flood communities, while others have maps 
that may not be reliable. Progress in developing these maps has been 
slow, primarily because accurate maps are complex and costly for states 
to produce. Furthermore, states and communities do not have 
comprehensive information on the potential human, structural, and 
economic impacts of a tsunami. While FEMA has standardized computer 
software for estimating losses resulting from natural disasters such as 
floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, no such tool exists for assessing 
tsunamis. 

The Coastal Areas of the Pacific United States, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands Face the Greatest Tsunami Hazards: 

According to NOAA, the general areas most threatened by both distant 
and local tsunami hazards are Hawaii and the west coast states of 
California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska and the Caribbean 
Islands of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are threatened 
primarily by local tsunamis, as shown in table 1. The hazard levels are 
primarily based on tsunami source, height, and frequency information 
since 1900--the most reliable and accurate information available--from 
NOAA's National Geophysical Data Center tsunami database. 

Table 1: Relative Tsunami Hazard for Distant and Local Tsunamis in U.S. 
Coastal Areas: 

Coastal area: Hawaiian; 
Distant tsunami hazard: High; 
Local tsunami hazard: High. 

Coastal area: Western; 
Distant tsunami hazard: High; 
Local tsunami hazard: Medium. 

Coastal area: Alaskan; 
Distant tsunami hazard: Low; 
Local tsunami hazard: High. 

Coastal area: Caribbean; 
Distant tsunami hazard: Low; 
Local tsunami hazard: High. 

Coastal area: Eastern; 
Distant tsunami hazard: Low; 
Local tsunami hazard: Low. 

Coastal area: Gulf; 
Distant tsunami hazard: Low; 
Local tsunami hazard: Low. 

Source: NOAA. 

[End of table] 

According to NOAA, Hawaii is a high-hazard area for distant and local 
tsunamis. Hawaii has experienced many destructive tsunamis because of 
its location in the Pacific Ocean, as shown in figure 4, where about 80 
percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred. More than one-half of 
all tsunamis recorded in the Hawaiian Islands were generated in the 
distant Aleutian regions of the northern and northwestern Pacific 
Ocean, and about one-fourth were generated along the western coast of 
South America. Hawaii's local tsunami threat stems from earthquake and 
volcanic activity, which cause underwater landslides off the coast. 
Hawaii suffered its greatest tsunami death and destruction in 1946, 
when an earthquake in the Aleutian Islands generated a tsunami that 
reportedly killed 159 people. Hilo, Hawaii suffered the greatest loss-
-96 deaths and the destruction of its waterfront area. Since 1946, an 
additional five tsunamis--four distant and one local--have caused a 
reported 63 deaths and widespread destruction. 

Figure 4: Pacific Ocean Subduction Zones Surround Hawaii: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

NOAA considers the west coast a high-hazard area for distant tsunamis 
and medium-hazard area for local tsunamis. Like Hawaii, the west coast 
historically has suffered the most destruction from tsunamis generated 
by Pacific earthquakes in the distant South America and Aleutian 
regions. In California, two tsunamis have caused significant damage. 
The 1960 Chilean earthquake caused estimated tsunami damages of over $1 
million, and the tsunami generated by the 1964 Alaskan event killed 12 
in Northern California and caused an estimated $15 million in 
destruction, including damages inside San Francisco Bay. Oregon and 
Washington both have sustained damages in coastal areas from distant 
tsunamis over the years. Although distant tsunamis historically have 
been most common, a local tsunami generated by the 750 mile long 
Cascadia subduction zone, lying just 50 to 100 miles off the coasts of 
Washington, Oregon, and Northern California, is considered a major 
threat. (See fig. 5.) Geologic and other records from a Cascadia 
earthquake in 1700 suggest that the fault could generate a tsunami wave 
of up to 30 feet that would likely reach the Oregon coast in 15 to 30 
minutes, raising concerns of a catastrophic future event. 

Figure 5: The Cascadia Subduction Zone: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Alaska is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis, but a low-hazard area 
for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local tsunami threat to 
Alaska is caused by seismic activity in the Aleutian subduction zone 
where the Pacific and North-American tectonic plates collide, as shown 
in figure 6. Tsunamis generated by earthquake induced landslides 
occurring inside bays have been responsible for most death and damage 
in Alaska. The 1964 Alaskan earthquake triggered several tsunamis that 
in some cases struck land within 2 minutes of being generated. The 
tsunamis caused 106 deaths in Alaska and caused significant damage in 
the towns of Kodiak, Seward, Whittier, and Valdez. Only once has a 
distant tsunami caused damage in Alaska; the 1960 Chilean earthquake 
caused relatively minor tsunami impacts on Alaskan harbors. 

Figure 6: The Aleutian Subduction Zone: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The Caribbean area, including the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, is a high-hazard area for local tsunamis but a 
low-hazard area for distant tsunamis, according to NOAA. The local 
tsunami threat posed to the islands comes primarily from the potential 
for earthquakes and underwater landslides in the Puerto Rico Trench 
subduction zone that lies to the north of both Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, as shown in figure 7. Puerto Rico's most devastating 
event of the last century occurred in 1918, when an earthquake off the 
northwest coast generated a tsunami of more than 15 feet, causing an 
estimated 140 deaths and about $4 million in property damages. In the 
town of Aguadilla, nearly 300 homes were destroyed. In the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, an 1867 earthquake in the Anegada Trench sent destructive 
waves into the harbor of Charlotte Amelie on the island of Saint 
Thomas, destroying boats, the wharf, and the waterfront. 

Figure 7: The Puerto Rico Trench Subduction Zone: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to NOAA, the Atlantic and Gulf state coasts are relatively 
low-hazard areas for distant or local tsunamis, with few reliable 
reports of tsunami waves of any size ever reaching either coast. This 
is a consequence of the low level of tsunami generating seismic 
activity nearby--the nearest subduction zones are in the Caribbean. 
Historically, none of the tsunamis generated in the Atlantic Ocean 
region has significantly affected the east coast of the United States. 
For example, the 1929 Grand Banks earthquake-induced landslide caused a 
tsunami which killed 29 in Newfoundland but only resulted in a wave 
height of 1 foot on the U.S. coast, and a distant tsunami generated by 
a massive earthquake near Lisbon, Portugal in 1755 had no observed 
impact on the U.S. coast. The potential distant threat from the 
collapse of a volcanic island off the coast of Africa is the subject of 
scientific debate, and the potential for a local tsunami-generating 
collapse of the continental shelf off of the east coast is being 
investigated but is unconfirmed. Regarding the Gulf coast, an 
earthquake in the Caribbean is considered the most likely source of a 
tsunami; however, scientists believe that Florida and Cuba protect the 
Gulf from Caribbean tsunamis and that the Gulf is unlikely to propagate 
a large, destructive tsunami wave. 

Potential Tsunami Impacts on People and Infrastructure Have Not Been 
Comprehensively or Reliably Assessed: 

Because inundation maps are the foundation for evaluating the potential 
impacts of tsunami events, producing such maps has been a high priority 
since 1996 for NOAA and the five states participating in the NTHMP. To 
optimize time and resources, the NTHMP partners agreed that (1) the 
states would identify the high-priority communities to be mapped; (2) 
NOAA, state, and university tsunami modeling scientists would use 
models to produce inundation information for high-priority areas 
identified by the states; and (3) state and local officials would 
produce and publish official inundation maps. NOAA's Center for Tsunami 
Inundation Mapping Efforts at its Pacific Marine Environmental 
Laboratory assists the modelers and the states in their efforts. 

Although the NTHMP planned to complete mapping for all at-risk U.S. 
coastal communities by 1999, progress has been slowed, primarily 
because more accurate--but also more complex and costly--mapping 
techniques have been adopted by the states. Initially, the NTHMP 
planned to use relatively simple modeling technology because this 
approach would require fewer resources than the more advanced 
technique, known as two-dimensional modeling, which requires detailed 
seafloor and coastal terrain data to accurately model wave action and 
impact. Upon comparison of these two technologies, the NTHMP decided in 
December 1996 to use two-dimensional modeling techniques for all 
mapping. While the NTHMP members recognized that adopting two- 
dimensional modeling would reduce the pace of modeling and mapping, 
they agreed that the decision would result in products of improved 
detail, quality, and reliability. 

Consequently, in the five states participating in the NTHMP, some 
coastal areas currently do not have two-dimensional tsunami inundation 
maps, while other coastal areas have inundation maps that predate 
current modeling standards and therefore may not be reliable.[Footnote 
12] Specifically: 

* Alaska has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 5 
communities, while 60 additional communities are prioritized, but have 
yet to be mapped; 

* California has produced two-dimensional inundation maps for 11 
coastal counties, excluding some areas such as harbors, while maps are 
being produced for the remaining 4 counties; 

* Hawaii has 66 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current 
modeling standards; because the existing maps may underestimate 
inundation areas, the state initiated a two-dimensional mapping program 
in 2005 that has produced one map; 

* Oregon has 52 maps covering the entire coastline that predate current 
modeling standards; since 1996 the state has produced two-dimensional 
maps for 9 communities, and 17 additional communities are prioritized 
but have not yet been mapped; and: 

* Washington has two-dimensional maps for its southern coast as well as 
many northern areas, while eight additional maps have been prioritized 
but remain incomplete for certain coastal bay and Puget Sound 
communities. 

To effectively prepare for a tsunami, states and localities also need 
to assess potential impacts on people and infrastructure. According to 
FEMA risk assessment guidance, after mapping how and where hazards will 
impact an area, planners should determine what elements of the 
population, infrastructure, and economy will be impacted by the hazards 
and estimate the potential losses that could occur. According to FEMA, 
estimating losses is essential for decision making at all levels of 
government, including providing a basis for developing mitigation plans 
and policies, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery 
planning. 

Each of the five Pacific region states, as well as Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, have identified tsunamis as a hazard in their FEMA-
approved, all-hazard mitigation plans.[Footnote 13] To obtain FEMA 
approval, states are required to describe and estimate losses--based on 
their own and local jurisdiction assessments--for state-owned or - 
operated buildings, infrastructure, and critical facilities in areas 
subject to hazards. According to FEMA, the agency deliberately took the 
approach of not being highly prescriptive regarding the development of 
the plans--focusing its requirements more on what should be done rather 
than how it should be done--in recognition of the inherent differences 
among states in terms of size, resources, capabilities, and 
vulnerability. For example, states are highly encouraged, but not 
required, to consider impacts on vulnerable populations, in particular 
elderly, disabled, and low-income persons, and to analyze the potential 
economic and human impact that each hazard would have statewide. FEMA 
also encourages the use of several tools in preparing damage 
assessments, such as HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S.--Multi-Hazard), which is 
standardized computer software for comprehensively estimating the 
likely human, structural, and economic damages from earthquakes, 
floods, and hurricane winds. However, HAZUS-MH does not include a 
tsunami loss estimation module; and according to FEMA, there is no 
similarly reliable tool for estimating tsunami losses. 

The National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on 
tsunami risk reduction specifically called for FEMA, NOAA, and USGS to 
take responsibility for developing a coordinated risk-assessment tool-
-e.g., HAZUS--for effective use in tsunami risk assessments.[Footnote 
14] The National Institute of Building Sciences--which produced the 
existing HAZUS-MH software for other hazards in partnership with FEMA-
-has estimated that developing tsunami loss estimation methods and 
software would take about 3 years, at a cost of up to $10 million. A 
standardized tsunami loss estimation tool would not only help the 
existing five NTHMP-member states conduct risk assessments, but it 
would also be useful to any additional states joining the NTHMP as it 
expands into a national program; and it could also help the NTHMP and 
NOAA prioritize tsunami activities to focus on the areas most 
vulnerable to tsunami losses. 

Because of the lack of tsunami inundation maps, the variability in 
approaches that was allowed in the all-hazard plans, and the lack of a 
standardized tsunami loss estimation tool, some at-risk states have not 
specifically assessed potential tsunami impacts, while other at-risk 
states or territories have produced assessments that do not provide 
complete loss information for all areas. Consequently, emergency 
managers in the at-risk states and territories do not have 
comprehensive information on how many and what types of structures 
would be exposed and damaged, how many people would likely be injured 
or killed, or the extent of likely short-and long-term economic impacts 
in the event of a tsunami.[Footnote 15] For example: 

* Alaska has not assessed tsunami impacts because the state lacks 
detailed inundation information for many at-risk coastal communities; 

* California assessed impacts from its high-risk earthquake hazard 
where tsunamis are identified as a subhazard, but the state has not 
specifically assessed tsunami impacts; and: 

* Hawaii assessed tsunami impacts on the state's critical 
infrastructure and estimated the average annualized property loss; but 
the state did not estimate injuries, deaths or the overall economic 
impacts due to tsunamis. 

According to NOAA officials, risk assessments for coastal areas 
requires the careful analysis of information such as tsunami frequency, 
site-specific tsunami inundation levels, and population density; but 
they acknowledge that such information is not available for many at- 
risk areas. Nevertheless, in March 2006, NOAA developed a preliminary 
estimate of the tsunami risk to people on beaches in various areas, 
including the Pacific region, Florida's east coast, and the Caribbean 
region. Based on historical tsunami frequency information from the 
1700's to the present, and estimates of current daily beach attendance, 
NOAA's analysis suggests that while large tsunamis occur more often in 
the Pacific region, over a 100-year time frame, the potential loss of 
life in the Caribbean and Florida regions could be greater due to 
higher beach attendance in these warm water locations. 

Federal Warning Centers Quickly Detect Potential Tsunamis, but Warning 
Systems Have Limitations: 

NWS's two tsunami warning centers quickly detect potential tsunamis and 
issue warnings, but the effectiveness of these warnings has been 
hampered by frequent false alarms and limitations in the federal 
systems that transmit warnings to the local level. Experts warn that 
false alarms may generate unnecessary and costly evacuations and cause 
people to ignore future warnings. NWS is working to reduce the number 
and duration of false alarms, but it has not established any specific 
performance targets for reducing them. Furthermore, although the 
warning centers quickly transmit tsunami warnings to NWS forecast 
offices, the forecast offices do not always send timely warnings to 
affected local areas because the two primary federal warning systems-- 
the Emergency Alert System and NOAA Weather Radio--have significant 
limitations. 

NWS Quickly Detects Potential Tsunamis and Issues Warnings, but False 
Alarms Are a Concern: 

NWS's tsunami warning centers' goal is to issue "timely, accurate, 
reliable, and effective" warnings to protect coastal populations from 
tsunamis. Based on warning center data, the centers issued timely 
warning bulletins, generally within 5 to 10 minutes for local 
events.[Footnote 16] The tsunami warning centers have consistently 
reduced their average annual time to issue bulletins--from 11 minutes 
in 1996 to 6.4 minutes in 2005 for the center in Alaska, and from 16 
minutes in 1996 to 4.5 minutes in 2005 for the center in Hawaii. 
According to tsunami warning center officials, more and better quality 
seismic data, as well as improved analysis techniques and computer 
equipment over the last decade, have enabled faster bulletin issuance. 

While the warning centers are able to detect potential tsunamis and 
issue timely warnings, some state and local officials have raised 
concerns about their accuracy and reliability due to false alarms. No 
destructive tsunami has reached U.S. shores following any of the 16 
warnings--primarily for local tsunamis--issued to states by the warning 
centers since 1982. According to warning center officials, their 
responsibility to provide timely warnings requires them to broadcast 
warnings based on limited, preliminary earthquake information before 
any resulting tsunami wave is actually observed. However, according to 
emergency response experts, such false alarms can generate costly, 
potentially dangerous evacuations and may cause people to ignore 
critical warnings in the future. For example, according to the state of 
Hawaii's most recent estimate, an evacuation from a tsunami false alarm 
in 1996 would have cost the state $58.2 million in economic losses, or-
-adjusted for inflation--about $71 million in 2006 dollars. 

According to some state and local emergency management officials, a 
false alarm occurred in June 2005, when they received a tsunami warning 
from NWS that they felt was too broad. On June 14, 2005, the warning 
center in Alaska detected a 7.2 magnitude earthquake 90 miles off the 
Northern California coast. The center quickly issued a warning for all 
coastal areas that were within two hours of the tsunami's forecasted 
travel time, including areas from the northern tip of Canada's 
Vancouver Island to the California-Mexico border. Knowing that it would 
take hours for the tsunami to reach his community, a Southern 
California emergency management official who received the warning 
sought to confirm the tsunami's existence by contacting his Northern 
California counterparts closer to the source. He learned that a 
destructive tsunami had not been generated and determined that his 
community should not evacuate. According to this official, because his 
area was not imminently threatened by a tsunami, it should not have 
been included in the initial warning. As a result of the feedback 
received after the June 14, 2005 event, the warning center in Alaska 
has changed its warning protocols so that it will issue a tsunami 
warning for only about half of the area that received a warning during 
the June event, if a similar situation should occur in the future. 

Seismologists outside of NOAA have suggested that the tsunami warning 
centers could reduce the duration--and perhaps the number--of false 
alarms by relying more on seismic analyses that assess the type and 
direction of an earthquake. For example, according to some state and 
USGS seismologists, the June 14, 2005, earthquake's horizontal motion 
should have indicated that the generation of a tsunami was highly 
unlikely, enabling the warning center to cancel the warning within 
minutes, rather than over an hour later. However, a NWS review of the 
event noted that horizontal-motion earthquakes can trigger submarine 
landslides that can in turn produce tsunamis, so the warning center 
should not cancel a warning solely based on seismic analysis. According 
to warning center officials, they receive feedback from outside 
seismologists regarding warning procedures through organizations such 
as the NTHMP. However, some outside seismologists are concerned that 
warning center seismologists are reluctant to seek feedback or adopt 
new analytical procedures for issuing and canceling warnings. 

NOAA expects that false alarms will be reduced with the expansion of 
the sea-level data network and through an upgrade of its forecasting 
tools. DART stations help reduce false alarms for distant tsunamis 
because the stations detect slight changes in deep-ocean waves far from 
shore that help forecast how these waves will grow as they approach the 
coast. In addition to expanding the DART network, NOAA is upgrading the 
models that use DART data to forecast tsunami flooding and is also 
expanding and upgrading its network of sea-level gauges that the 
warning centers use to confirm or cancel tsunami warnings. The tide 
gauge expansion plan calls for deploying a total of 16 new gauges and 
upgrading 33 gauges by November 2006. 

NOAA acknowledges the importance of reducing tsunami false alarms but 
has not yet established performance goals or related metrics for 
identifying progress toward this goal, such as tracking the number and 
duration of warnings to areas that do not experience destructive 
tsunamis. According to NWS officials, they are currently evaluating 
outcome goals and performance measures for warnings and other tsunami- 
related activities and expect to finalize these goals and measures in 
2006. 

Limitations in Federal Emergency Warning Systems Impede Rapid and 
Comprehensive Tsunami Warning Transmission: 

Technical gaps and procedural limitations have impeded federal 
emergency warning systems from broadcasting rapid and comprehensive 
tsunami warnings to affected local areas. For example, technical gaps 
such as weak signals and transmitter failures have prevented 
comprehensive warning transmission over the EAS and NOAA Weather Radio. 
Broadcasting tsunami warnings over EAS and NOAA Weather Radio requires 
NOAA-owned transmitters to relay a signal from the NWS forecast offices 
to the broadcast stations and NOAA Weather Radio, as shown in figure 8. 

Figure 8: Tsunami Warning Signal Transmission for EAS and NOAA Weather 
Radio: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to NOAA officials, NOAA transmitters provide signal coverage 
for 97 percent of the nation's population; however, some coastal 
locations including portions of Hawaii receive such weak signals that 
NOAA Weather Radio is unlikely to function. Transmitter failure has 
also prevented warnings from being sent over EAS and NOAA Weather 
Radio. For example, on June 14, 2005, some coastal communities in 
Washington and Oregon did not receive the warning over EAS or NOAA 
Weather Radio because transmitters failed to send a signal. A September 
2005 test of the federal tsunami warning systems in California, Oregon, 
and Washington found improvements in problematic transmission areas 
identified during the June event but uncovered new signal transmission 
issues in other areas. NWS is adding new transmitters to improve signal 
coverage and refurbishing old transmitters to improve their 
reliability. 

In addition, procedural limitations such as the NWS forecast offices' 
inconsistent activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio can impede rapid 
and comprehensive transmission of tsunami warnings. On June 14, 2005, 
the forecast offices responded to the tsunami warning in a variety of 
ways, some of which caused delays or nontransmission of EAS or NOAA 
Weather Radio warnings to affected local areas. For example, staff in 
some NWS forecast offices did not enter a tsunami-specific warning code 
into a computer, resulting in EAS and NOAA Weather Radio not activating 
rapidly, if at all. According to a subsequent NWS assessment of the 
event, guidance to forecast office staff on tsunami warning procedures 
was inadequate. Since the June 2005 event, coastal NWS forecast offices 
in Washington, Oregon, and California have received guidance that, for 
example, lists EAS activation as the proper first step when a tsunami 
warning is received. 

Although the warning centers conduct monthly tests of their 
communication systems to ensure that NWS forecast offices and state 
emergency management centers receive the warnings, NWS does not 
routinely conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami warning 
system using the actual "live" computer codes rather than test codes. 
Such an end-to-end test would check the systems and procedures used to 
transmit an actual tsunami warning from the tsunami warning center to 
the public and identify technical gaps and procedural shortcomings. NWS 
conducted the first such end-to-end test of the tsunami warning system 
in Alaska, including activation of EAS and NOAA Weather Radio in March 
2005. The test uncovered breakdowns in EAS warning transmission at 
television and radio stations whose EAS systems were not set up to use 
the tsunami warning code. NWS is working with emergency managers and 
broadcasters in Alaska to take corrective actions and retest the 
system. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that while 
it supports broadening end-to-end testing in at-risk states it can 
conduct end-to end testing using "live" warning codes for the EAS 
system only in those states that permit it to do so. In other states, 
end-to-end testing is conducted by using test codes for the EAS system. 
NOAA said it will continue to encourage state participation in the end- 
to-end testing of the tsunami warning system. 

State and Local Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Activities Are Under Way, 
although Implementation Varies Considerably among Locations: 

The 12 coastal communities in the six at-risk states and territories 
that we visited are taking actions to mitigate tsunami impacts through 
planning, warning system improvements, public education, and some 
infrastructure protection efforts, although the level of implementation 
varies considerably among locations.[Footnote 17] While state and local 
tsunami mitigation plans and warning systems have largely been 
developed, limitations exist that have raised concerns about their 
effectiveness. In addition, key public education efforts have not been 
consistently implemented in all coastal communities we visited, and 
only a few communities have taken steps to protect critical 
infrastructure from potential tsunami damage. Overall, tsunami 
mitigation efforts have been mixed due to a number of challenges, 
including competing priorities, funding constraints, and lack of 
authority to implement legislative or policy changes. Finally, while 7 
of the 12 communities we visited participate in NOAA's TsunamiReady 
preparedness program, nationwide few coastal communities have chosen to 
participate in the program. 

State and Local Tsunami Mitigation Plans and Warning Systems Have Been 
Largely Developed, but Concerns Exist about Warning System 
Effectiveness: 

According to FEMA guidance, the purpose of mitigation planning is to 
identify natural hazards, consider actions and activities to reduce 
potential losses from those hazards, and coordinate the implementation 
of a hazard mitigation plan. All six of the states and territories we 
visited have developed FEMA-approved, all-hazard mitigation plans, a 
requirement to qualify for certain disaster-related grant funds under 
the Stafford Act, as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 
2000.[Footnote 18] These plans identify tsunami hazards and describe in 
general terms the vulnerability of people and property to tsunami 
threats. Most of the state level plans we reviewed take the additional 
step of identifying specific actions to mitigate the risks identified, 
such as relocating critical facilities out of tsunami inundation zones. 
While only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have FEMA-approved plans, 
each of the four has identified projects to mitigate tsunami hazards. 
State and local emergency managers whom we spoke with cited resource 
and time constraints as significant barriers to improving mitigation 
planning. 

All of the states and communities we visited have developed warning 
systems, but they have various limitations that may impact their 
effectiveness. State and local tsunami warning systems help ensure that 
all at-risk residents and tourists are warned about a potential tsunami 
in a timely manner. Most of the coastal communities we visited employ 
some technologically sophisticated methods to warn residents. For 
example, 8 of the 12 communities we visited had at least one tsunami 
warning siren and three alerted residents by an automated telephone 
system. However, local emergency managers told us that inadequate 
warning siren coverage was a significant issue in many locations, such 
as Ocean Shores, Washington, and on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula. In 
addition, many of the warning methods used by communities--such as 
sirens and internet-based messaging systems--are dependent on telephone 
lines and other infrastructure that would likely be disrupted by a 
strong earthquake. During the June 2005 tsunami warning on the west 
coast, officials in several communities noted that telephone lines were 
overloaded by a surge of incoming 911 calls from concerned residents, 
in some cases, preventing emergency managers from contacting other 
local officials and preventing telephone-based warning systems from 
reaching all residents. Some emergency managers expressed concern that 
they do not have adequate backup systems to receive and disseminate 
warning messages if telephone lines fail. Finally, three of the 
communities we visited rely on warning methods such as verbal 
notifications by bullhorns or radio broadcasts. 

State and local emergency managers are aware of the limitations of 
existing tsunami warning systems and are involved in a number of 
projects to address them. For example, some of the communities we 
visited have attempted to obtain additional sirens and replace 
unreliable ones to provide better coverage to residents. For Crescent 
City, California, and Gold Beach, Oregon, county officials obtained a 
number of used civil defense sirens for a nominal cost but reported 
that installation and maintenance costs pose additional challenges. 
Washington state has provided seven at-risk communities with advanced 
All Hazard Alert Broadcasting sirens, but their high cost-- 
approximately $50,000, twice as much as a new, conventional siren--may 
be prohibitive for other communities.[Footnote 19] In addition, 
communities have taken actions to ensure more effective communications 
between emergency management officials and first responders. For 
example, some have purchased satellite phones and digital 
communications systems that are not vulnerable to earthquake damages or 
interoperable radios that ensure that first responders can talk to each 
other if telephone lines are disrupted. In coastal areas with high 
population and building densities--where roads, bridges, and other 
horizontal evacuation methods are limited or where warning time is 
short--vertical evacuation to the upper floors of buildings that are 
capable of withstanding the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami 
can be an alternative or supplement to horizontal evacuation.[Footnote 
20] 

Most of the states and communities we visited have made efforts to test 
their evacuation plans and warning systems, but few comprehensive 
drills have been conducted. Recent events, such as Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, have illustrated that robust training and testing are 
important to identify problems in advance of an actual event.[Footnote 
21] However, only Seaside, Oregon, has conducted comprehensive tsunami 
exercises involving multiple agencies and full public participation. 
Five of the communities we visited have conducted exercises involving 
multiple agencies in mock tsunami scenarios to discuss plans and 
procedures involved in responding to a real event. While these efforts 
are useful, their limited scope may not adequately identify all of the 
issues that would emerge in an actual event. For example, in an actual 
emergency, traffic control and public evacuations may take 
substantially longer than estimated. Local officials told us that more 
comprehensive drills would be beneficial, but they have limited funding 
and staff to plan and conduct them and getting community involvement is 
very difficult due to the disruption to the local economy. 

Tsunami Education and Outreach Efforts Have Not Been Consistently 
Implemented: 

Education and outreach efforts are important because plans and warning 
systems may do little to save lives if the public does not know what to 
do when it receives a warning. Two such efforts, distributing 
evacuation maps and posting tsunami evacuation signs, raise awareness 
of tsunami threats and educate the public on appropriate escape routes. 
Ten of the 12 communities we visited have either received evacuation 
maps from the state or developed their own maps identifying appropriate 
evacuation routes. However, only five of the communities reported 
distributing evacuation maps to all residents, either by mailing them 
to all registered utility customers, publishing them in the local 
telephone book, or in one case distributing them door-to-door.[Footnote 
22] A few communities have taken other actions to reach the public such 
as posting evacuation maps in police stations and on grocery store 
reader boards. Several communities have made efforts to reach tourists 
by providing evacuation maps at areas they frequent, such as the local 
visitor's center and distributing tsunami hazard information and 
evacuation maps to hotels. Regarding tsunami signs, 9 of the 12 
communities reported posting tsunami hazard or evacuation route signs 
in their communities, such as those shown in figure 9, although in a 
few locations, local emergency managers reported that the signs are 
frequently stolen. 

Figure 9: Tsunami Hazard Zone Signs: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to emergency management officials and other emergency 
preparedness experts, focusing on educating youth--the adults of 
tomorrow--has considerable promise for increasing tsunami preparedness. 
Specifically, two key efforts--developing and implementing school 
curricula and conducting tsunami evacuation drills in schools--may help 
improve tsunami preparedness now and in the future. Of the six at-risk 
states and territories we visited, only two-
-Oregon and Washington--have developed tsunami specific curricula and 
are teaching them in schools, according to state emergency 
managers.[Footnote 23] The Washington state curriculum is targeted at 
two age groups--grades K through 6 and grades 7 through 12--and 
provides various lessons to help students plan ahead for a tsunami and 
protect themselves and their families when a tsunami occurs. In 
addition, Hawaii has developed a tsunami specific curriculum that will 
be tailored to each of its counties. Oregon and Hawaii also require 
schools in tsunami inundation areas to conduct tsunami drills at least 
once a year, often in conjunction with Tsunami Awareness month 
activities. For example, in Hilo, Hawaii, an elementary school located 
in a known tsunami inundation area conducts an annual evacuation drill 
in which students practice responding to a tsunami warning by walking 
from the school to a safe location. Three of the communities we visited 
in Washington, Puerto Rico, and Alaska also reported conducting tsunami 
evacuation drills in schools at least once a year, even though the 
states do not require them. 

All six of the at-risk states and territories we visited have conducted 
a variety of education and outreach activities to distribute tsunami 
hazard information to communities. For example, the states we visited 
have developed a variety of print materials, produced videos, made 
tsunami information available on the Internet, and conducted forums and 
other workshops to educate citizens on tsunami risks and preparedness. 
At the community level, 11 of the 12 emergency managers we visited 
stated that forums and workshops have been conducted to educate 
residents and tourists about tsunami hazards.[Footnote 24] However, 
only two local emergency managers reported meeting with special needs 
populations, such as community hospitals and senior centers, to 
distribute tsunami hazard information and encourage them to develop 
tsunami evacuation plans. 

All of the at-risk states and territories acknowledged the need for 
additional education and outreach but cited two primary challenges to 
increasing and sustaining such efforts. First, many of the state 
emergency managers whom we spoke with noted that they are responsible 
for other, higher priority hazards--such as floods and wildland fires-
-that occur more frequently than tsunamis. Second, the states have 
limited funding dedicated to tsunami preparedness activities. Of the 
approximately $275,000 in NTHMP funds provided annually to each state, 
the states have chosen to use most of it to develop or upgrade existing 
tsunami inundation maps rather than for education or outreach efforts. 
Local emergency managers echoed these challenges. Moreover, in many 
areas that depend on tourism, local emergency managers said that 
businesses are reluctant to post tsunami hazard information because it 
may scare tourists and negatively impact the economy. Many noted, 
however, that since the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 
subsequent June 2005 tsunami warning on the west coast, community 
interest in workshops and forums has increased. Local businesses--in 
particular hotels and motels--have become increasingly interested in 
receiving tsunami hazard information to distribute to patrons. 

States and Localities Have Undertaken Few Efforts to Protect 
Infrastructure from Potential Tsunami Damage: 

According to tsunami experts, land-use planning and zoning strategies-
-for example, designating tsunami hazard areas for open-space uses, 
such as parks, and locating new infrastructure and critical facilities 
(i.e., police stations, hospitals, and potable water systems) out of 
tsunami hazard areas--can mitigate loss of life and property from a 
devastating tsunami.[Footnote 25] However, many of the at-risk states 
we visited have not adopted any land-use planning strategies to address 
the tsunami threat. Oregon is the only at-risk state we visited that 
has passed a land-use statute placing limits on the construction of 
certain high occupancy structures within tsunami inundation 
areas.[Footnote 26] Alaska also places restrictions on development in 
certain designated "natural hazard" areas, including coastal areas 
potentially affected by tsunamis.[Footnote 27] One at-risk community 
also has been successful in implementing a land-use strategy to 
mitigate future tsunami losses. The city of Hilo, Hawaii, developed an 
Urban Renewal Plan--based on the devastation from the 1960 tsunami-- 
that set aside certain "open areas" for limited use in order to 
minimize the danger of loss of life or damage to property in areas 
potentially subject to inundation from tsunamis.[Footnote 28] 

Tsunami experts believe that constructing new buildings in a tsunami 
inundation area to better withstand tsunami forces can reduce loss of 
life and property damage in cases where land-use planning and zoning 
are not feasible. Building design and construction in the United States 
is governed at the local level by building codes that establish minimum 
acceptable requirements for preserving public safety. Although the 
Uniform Building Code contains design requirements and standards for 
fire, wind, floods, and earthquakes, it does not include requirements 
for tsunami-resilient design.[Footnote 29] Nonetheless, two communities 
we visited, Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii, have developed guidelines for 
constructing tsunami-resilient structures. For example, a 2000 Honolulu 
building ordinance requires, among other things, that the inhabitable 
space in buildings at-risk from tsunamis must be elevated above the 
regulatory flood elevation through the use of posts, piles, piers or 
shear walls parallel to the expected flow of a tsunami wave.[Footnote 
30] None of the at-risk states we visited have developed guidelines for 
constructing tsunami-resilient structures although legislation 
establishing tax incentives for such construction is pending in 
Washington.[Footnote 31] Hawaii's state legislature is currently 
considering a bill to develop a state building code based on the 
International Building Code, which, according to state emergency 
management officials, would strengthen buildings against tsunamis and 
other hazards.[Footnote 32] In commenting on a draft of this report, 
FEMA noted that, the International Building Code, which has replaced 
the Uniform Building Code as the national model code, also does not 
contain specific requirements addressing the tsunami hazard. However, 
structures built in conformance with the International Building Code 
are likely to perform better during a tsunami because of other code 
provisions, particularly seismic requirements. 

Several states, including California and Oregon, have adopted laws and 
ordinances for retrofitting existing buildings to reduce losses from 
future earthquakes.[Footnote 33] For existing infrastructure, 
earthquake retrofits may improve tsunami resistance, or help minimize 
floating debris that can damage nearby buildings.[Footnote 34] 
Earthquake retrofits could be particularly important in the case of a 
locally generated tsunami off the west coast of the United States, 
where a magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquake is likely to precede a 
tsunami. FEMA has developed guidance for rehabilitating buildings to 
resist earthquake forces.[Footnote 35] 

Most of the states and coastal communities we visited have not 
attempted to mitigate tsunami risk through land-use planning and 
infrastructure requirements for several reasons. First, state and local 
emergency managers said that although they recognize the need for 
additional infrastructure protections, such decisions typically reside 
with a community's city council or other governing body. Second, many 
coastal communities rely on coastal-dependent development such as ports 
and harbors that, by their nature, must be situated on the coast; and 
in other cases, communities have already built to capacity in tsunami 
hazard areas, and relocation is not a practical or cost-effective 
option. Finally, few states or coastal communities have adopted tsunami 
building codes because model codes generally have not included 
requirements for designing tsunami-resilient structures and few have 
implemented retrofitting projects because of their high costs. 

Community Participation in NOAA's TsunamiReady Hazard Preparedness 
Program Is Limited: 

Of the approximately 500 coastal communities at-risk from a tsunami in 
five Pacific states and Puerto Rico, only 25 communities--including 7 
of the 12 we visited--have been recognized by NWS as TsunamiReady, the 
primary federal effort to encourage communities to prepare for tsunami 
hazards.[Footnote 36] According to NWS, the program was developed to 
provide minimum standard guidelines for communities to follow and to 
enhance tsunami readiness by increasing public awareness and 
understanding of the tsunami hazard, among other things.[Footnote 37] 
Communities that meet program standards are provided signs such as 
those shown in figure 10. 

Figure 10: TsunamiReady Sign for Communities: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

While the majority of at-risk coastal communities have not joined the 
TsunamiReady program, we found that four of the five at-risk 
communities we visited that are not yet recognized as TsunamiReady do 
plan to pursue recognition in the future. Two of the four communities 
are currently taking steps to meet program requirements by installing 
additional warning infrastructure, such as NOAA Weather Radios. 
Emergency management officials generally agreed that the TsunamiReady 
program is a good first step toward helping communities mitigate the 
potential impact of a tsunami. Specifically, in the TsunamiReady 
communities we visited, most officials stated that they sought 
recognition to increase community tsunami awareness, and officials 
noted that the TsunamiReady signs had helped them move toward that 
goal. One emergency manager whom we spoke with stated that the 
TsunamiReady recognition had "opened doors" to conduct outreach with 
hotels and that hotel managers had begun seeking tsunami hazard 
information. However, some of the state emergency managers with whom we 
spoke expressed three concerns about the TsunamiReady program: (1) it 
is too limited in scope--for example, emphasizing warning 
infrastructure but not requiring tsunami specific evacuation and 
mitigation plans; (2) it should be more focused on education, 
particularly regarding the local tsunami threat; and (3) the name 
"TsunamiReady" promotes a false perception of readiness, since 
preparedness is a continuous process. 

NOAA officials believe that the lack of program participation may be 
due to community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high 
cost versus benefit, but the agency has not formally assessed the 
program to identify barriers to participation or potential program 
modifications to encourage participation. The agency's 2005 Report to 
Congress on the Tsunami Community Preparedness Implementation Plan, 
identifies achieving tsunami preparedness recognition for at-risk 
communities in the United States as a vital part of its tsunami 
activities.[Footnote 38] To that end, according to the report, the 
agency has committed to work with each at-risk coastal community across 
the nation to ensure that community and emergency management officials 
fully understand the tsunami hazard and take action to prepare. 

Significant Expansion of National Tsunami Preparedness Activities Is 
Occurring in the Absence of Long-Term Strategic Planning: 

A significant expansion of federal tsunami detection, warning, and 
related activities, as well as the NTHMP, is under way; however, the 
future direction of these efforts is unclear because NOAA has not 
developed long-range strategic plans to guide them. In 2005, NOAA 
combined its various tsunami-related activities into a single program 
and is currently strengthening and expanding certain elements of the 
program. However, NOAA has not yet adopted a comprehensive strategic 
plan that sets specific program goals and objectives, defines 
performance measures, ensures coordination of existing activities, and 
establishes risk-based priorities to guide the expansion of the warning 
program into the future. Furthermore, with the likely expansion of the 
NTHMP from 5 state participants to potentially 28 state and territorial 
participants in 2006, it will be difficult for NOAA to ensure that the 
most threatened states receive the resources they need to continue and 
to complete key mitigation activities without an updated, risk-based 
strategic plan. 

NOAA Is Expanding Elements of Its Tsunami Program, but the Program 
Lacks a Long-Range Strategic Plan: 

Prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NOAA's various tsunami-related 
activities, such as warning center operations, the TsunamiReady 
program, and tsunami-related research were not managed as a formal, 
integrated program within the agency. The administration's initiative 
to expand NOAA's tsunami activities--and the receipt of supplemental 
funding from the Congress for that purpose--led NOAA in April 2005, to 
establish an integrated national Tsunami Program. NOAA is strengthening 
the Tsunami Program by (1) expanding the Pacific warning center and 
National Data Buoy Center facilities by the end of 2005;[Footnote 39] 
(2) expanding tsunami warning center operating hours to 24 hours, 7 
days a week in April 2006; (3) upgrading and expanding water level 
observation capabilities by November 2006; (4) expanding and upgrading 
the earthquake detection network by the end of 2006; (5) establishing a 
long-term tsunami data archive by late 2007; (6) increasing DART 
tsunami detection stations in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean by 
early 2008; (7) expanding TsunamiReady participation nationwide through 
2012; and (8) developing a tsunami forecast system, including 75 
inundation forecast models by 2013. 

While NOAA has developed a schedule for strengthening elements of the 
Tsunami Program, it has not developed a long-range strategic plan that 
includes specific detection, warning and mitigation outcome goals, and 
performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving them. For 
example, NOAA does not have program outcome goals and performance 
measures for reducing false alarms or other critical tsunami-related 
activities such as mapping, modeling, research, education, and 
outreach. Although strategic planning is required for the major 
functions and operations of agencies by the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, it is not specifically required for individual 
programs within agencies. However, our work related to the act and the 
experience of leading organizations have shown the importance of 
identifying long-term goals and establishing performance measures to 
guide program operations and help policy makers determine if program 
activities are achieving the desired results. In addition, the 
Department of Commerce's Inspector General has identified improving 
strategic planning as a top priority and reported on the need for 
NOAA's programs to improve how they report and measure performance 
toward achieving specific outcomes.[Footnote 40] 

In this context, a strategic plan would provide NOAA a framework for 
ensuring that its tsunami-related activities are planned and 
implemented in a risk-based manner. Our recent reports have emphasized 
the importance of federal agencies using risk-based planning. For 
example, in a June 2005 testimony on the Department of Homeland 
Security's resource allocation, we reported that the department must 
carefully weigh the benefit of activities and allocate resources where 
the benefit of reducing risks is worth the additional cost.[Footnote 
41] Any actions taken by NOAA absent risk-based analysis have the 
potential to divert funds away from locations, such as the Pacific and 
Caribbean regions, where the tsunami hazard--particularly from local 
tsunamis--is well documented. Some of NOAA's activities designed to 
strengthen the tsunami program are scheduled in a manner that raises 
questions about the extent to which they are risk-based. For example, 
there is little historical evidence of tsunamis on the Atlantic coast 
or Gulf coast, yet expansion activities already implemented or 
scheduled in 2006 include the placement of DART stations in the 
Atlantic Ocean, tsunami forecast modeling of an east coast community, 
and recognition of new TsunamiReady communities on the east coast. In 
addition, NOAA's initial strengthening efforts emphasize detection and 
warning for distant tsunamis, while the greater risk to most locations 
in the United States--according to NOAA data as well as the National 
Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on tsunami risk 
reduction--are likely to be posed by local tsunamis. For example, the 
deployment of DART stations and warning center enhancements will not 
reduce the local tsunami risk as directly as other strategies such as 
educating vulnerable populations to immediately head for high ground 
when the earth shakes near the coast. According to NWS officials, they 
are in the process of evaluating outcome goals and performance measures 
for the Tsunami Program, and expect to finalize a strategic plan in 
2006. In commenting on a draft of this report, NOAA stated that it will 
work with its partners to begin a risk assessment following the 
completion of a tsunami hazard assessment in November 2006, which will 
improve its future ability to allocate funds in a manner consistent 
with established risk management practices. 

Concerns Exist about the Management and Direction of the Expanded 
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program: 

Since its inception in 1996, NOAA has used the Tsunami Hazard 
Mitigation Implementation Plan to guide NTMHP activities. The plan has 
four specific goals: (1) raise awareness of affected populations, (2) 
supply tsunami inundation and evacuation maps, (3) improve tsunami 
warning systems, and (4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and 
federal all-hazards mitigation programs. In August 2001, an expert 
panel reviewed the NTHMP's progress and performance under the plan and 
provided a number of suggestions for improving the program. While the 
then-chairman of the NTHMP drafted some goals based on the suggestions, 
NOAA did not update or revise the plan to incorporate the experts' 
suggestions or the proposed goals because, according to the subsequent 
chairman, the plan's four original goals had not yet been achieved. 

Five years later, two key issues raised by the expert panel review 
remain concerns of the state NTHMP participants. First, the positive 
impacts of the program were being largely assumed and not effectively 
measured. State members of the NTHMP still believe that more needs to 
be done to measure the effectiveness of tsunami mitigation activities-
-such as surveys to measure the effectiveness of public education 
programs. Second, the NTHMP was "seriously out of balance," in terms of 
focusing on detection and risk assessment at the expense of working 
with communities to educate and modify behaviors in ways that could 
save lives. State members of the NTHMP remain concerned about the focus 
on detection and warning systems improvements, which are perceived as 
"federal solutions," rather than state and local educational and 
behavioral activities, such as conducting tsunami preparedness drills, 
which they see as key to community preparedness, particularly for local 
tsunamis. 

The NTHMP had planned to conduct another program review and develop an 
updated implementation plan in 2006. These plans have been placed on 
hold, according to the chairman of the NTHMP, because the decision to 
make the NTHMP a nationwide program--likely including representatives 
of the 23 states on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts as well as 
the two commonwealths and three U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean 
and Caribbean Sea--raised significant issues that needed to be settled 
before any revisions to the program's goals and objectives could be 
considered.[Footnote 42] However, failing to conduct a program review 
now means that the program will not have vital information regarding 
(1) what has worked or not worked in implementing the program since 
2001 and (2) what tsunami mitigation activities remain incomplete in 
the five original Pacific area states with high tsunami hazards. A 
program review could contribute to the development of a risk-based 
strategic plan that ensures that the activities that remain uncompleted 
in areas with the greatest threat get the highest priority for funding. 

According to NOAA officials, the agency expects to implement the nine 
recommended actions for the NTHMP and the Tsunami Program contained in 
the National Science and Technology Council's December 2005 report on 
tsunami risk reduction. The report, developed by NOAA, USGS, FEMA, and 
other federal agencies, recommends actions such as developing 
standardized and coordinated tsunami hazard and risk assessments for 
all U.S. coastal areas, improving tsunami detection and warning data 
and infrastructure, enhancing tsunami forecast and warning 
capabilities, promoting the development of model mitigation measures, 
and increasing outreach to communities. However, because the report and 
recommendations were developed without the participation of the NTHMP 
members, they question whether the recommendations and priorities 
represent the best strategic direction for the NTHMP. All of the state 
NTHMP members agree that full participation in program decision making 
by individuals with state and local level knowledge of tsunami 
mitigation activities is key to the efficiency and success of the 
NTHMP. 

In addition, state NTHMP members are particularly concerned that the 
program's funding decisions and strategic direction may become less 
risk-based with the inclusion of numerous eastern and southern coastal 
states with lower known tsunami hazards. These members want to ensure 
that communities facing the greatest threat obtain the greatest 
benefits from the program, particularly since many tsunami preparedness 
activities remain incomplete and unfunded in the original five at-risk 
states. For example, in 2005, the Director of the California Governor's 
Office of Emergency Services estimated that in California alone over 
the next five years about $19.5 million was needed for state 
preparedness activities and about $7.5 million for local government 
activities. As such, state NTHMP members were surprised to learn that 
some eastern states have already submitted proposals for NTHMP funding. 

Conclusions: 

In the hazardous Pacific region, NOAA and its federal and state 
partners are working to help prepare communities for tsunamis. However, 
much is left to be done to improve tsunami hazard assessment, 
detection, warning, and mitigation for these areas and other at-risk 
areas of the United States. It is particularly important that when at- 
risk states complete their inundation mapping, they then conduct 
comprehensive assessments of the expected damage from a tsunami. 
Without this basic information, emergency managers will not be able to 
effectively formulate plans to mitigate potential tsunami impacts on 
people and infrastructure. In addition, improved technical capabilities 
to detect tsunamis will be of limited value if the warning systems and 
processes that NOAA depends on to disseminate this information cannot 
reliably ensure that all threatened individuals and communities will 
receive an accurate and timely warning. 

Because tsunamis are an infrequent hazard that may be overlooked due to 
higher priority reoccurring natural hazards such as hurricanes and 
flooding, NOAA and its federal and state partners face a significant 
challenge ensuring that communities are sufficiently engaged in 
preparedness activities. The Indian Ocean tsunami, however, has created 
a window of opportunity by spotlighting the devastation and destruction 
that can result from a lack of planning, preparedness, and education 
for such an event--no matter how rare. We believe that federal and 
state partners can take advantage of this current sense of urgency and 
develop a strategic approach that will ensure that the significantly 
increased resources that have been made available to expand U.S. 
tsunami detection and preparedness programs are being effectively 
targeted. As part of this effort, all federal tsunami-related 
activities, including the TsunamiReady program and the NTHMP, should be 
reassessed to determine how to increase their effectiveness. Moreover, 
NOAA needs to address the lack of long-range, risk-based strategic 
planning for these activities. Without strategic planning and 
performance measures to guide these efforts, the Congress and the 
public will lack important information about the extent to which 
resources are being directed to activities that are of the greatest 
benefit to the most vulnerable communities and to what extent 
measurable progress is being made toward the desired results. We 
believe U.S. tsunami programs guided by long-term strategic plans with 
demonstrable achievements will be better able to sustain their efforts 
for vulnerable coastal communities into the future. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help improve national tsunami preparedness, we are recommending that 
the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the 
following six actions: 

* work with the FEMA Director and the USGS Director to create 
standardized tsunami loss estimation software to help communities 
determine the potential impact of tsunamis and identify appropriate 
mitigation actions; 

* reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms by (1) completing 
the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, (2) reexamining 
NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and to which areas, 
(3) establishing a routine process for other federal and state experts 
to formally review and comment on the centers' use of seismic data, and 
(4) setting performance goals to guide improvements; 

* work with the states to conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the 
tsunami warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency 
Alert System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a 
tsunami emergency; 

* evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, 
exist to participation and what modifications are needed to encourage 
more high-risk communities to participate; 

* evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well in the past and 
what high priority activities remain to be completed and to help inform 
strategic planning efforts, and; 

* develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans for the Tsunami 
Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program that consider 
input from states and federal partners and include metrics for 
measuring progress toward achieving program goals. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of 
Commerce, Homeland Security and the Interior for their review and 
comment. Commerce, representing NOAA, concurred with all six 
recommendations and generally agreed with our findings, although it 
provided technical and factual clarifications, which we have 
incorporated into the report as appropriate. However, in its comments, 
NOAA suggested a revision to one of the recommendations with which we 
disagree. In response to our recommendation that NOAA evaluate the 
TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to 
participation and what modifications are needed to encourage more high- 
risk communities to participate, NOAA suggested changing the 
recommendation's focus from "high-risk" to "at-risk" communities. 
According to NOAA all U.S. coastal communities should be prepared for a 
tsunami no matter how rare. While we agree that preparing all U.S. 
coastal communities for a tsunami may be a laudable long-term goal, 
given the agency's limited resources, it may be an unrealistic goal in 
the short-term. Therefore, we believe that NOAA should use a risk-based 
approach and target initial participation in the TsunamiReady program 
to those communities that face the greatest risk. Commerce's specific 
comments and our detailed responses are presented in appendix I. 

Homeland Security, representing FEMA, commented on one of the six 
recommendations and indicated that while it concurred with the 
recommendation that NOAA work with FEMA and USGS to create standardized 
tsunami loss estimation software, it was concerned that FEMA did not 
have the funding or the staff resources to pursue such a request and 
that such a request from NOAA would have to address these resource 
needs. Homeland Security also noted that the report did not mention 
other programs such as FEMA's Pre-disaster Mitigation Program and the 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which can be used by states and 
communities to fund tsunami mitigation projects. We revised the report 
to mention that these programs have funded tsunami mitigation projects. 
Finally, Homeland Security stated that the report's description of the 
TsunamiReady program as it relates to response, preparedness, and 
mitigation activities is unclear. We believe that we have clearly 
characterized the program as providing minimum guidelines that 
communities can use to enhance tsunami readiness and therefore have not 
revised the report in response to this comment. Homeland Security's 
specific comments and our detailed responses are presented in appendix 
II. 

The Department of the Interior commented that the report was a thorough 
well-researched examination of the nation's tsunami warning system and 
that it correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the 
federal, state, and local levels to have an effective tsunami warning 
system. Interior also said that it supports the need for a risk-based 
approach to prioritizing federal investments in this system and is 
actively collaborating with NOAA to provide the hazard assessments 
necessary for such an approach. In addition, Interior said that one 
area it felt was inadequately addressed in the report was the 
importance of a long-term federal role in research to improve tsunami 
warnings and mitigate tsunami risks and noted that none of our 
recommendations involved improving or expanding research. While we 
agree that tsunami-related research is an important issue, it was not 
included in the scope of our review, and consequently, this report does 
not cover issues related to tsunami research or offer any 
recommendations in this area. Interior's specific comments and our 
detailed responses are presented in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce, 
Homeland Security, and the Interior; appropriate congressional 
committees; and other interested Members of Congress. We also will make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Anu K. Mittal: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

The Deputy Secretary Of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

May 8, 2006: 

Ms. Anu K. Mittal: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Mittal: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled U.S. Tsunami 
Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate To Help 
Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But Significant Challenges Remain 
(GAO-06-519). I enclose the Department of Commerce's comments to the 
draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David A. Sampson:

Enclosure: 

Department of Commerce's Comments on the GAO Draft Report Entitled 
"U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate To 
Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But Significant Challenges 
Remain" (GAO-06-519/May 2006): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) appreciates the opportunity to review this 
report. The report captures and addresses the major elements of the 
tsunami program and acknowledges the involvement and roles of all 
levels of government. The U.S. Tsunami Warning System depends on multi- 
agency coordination where all parts must be working for optimal 
operation. While the Federal Government is the integrator of the 
program, the states play a key role in disseminating tsunami warning 
messages. The Nation's Tsunami Warning System's biggest challenge in 
most U.S. coastal areas is getting warning messages to those in the 
potentially hazardous area. The report acknowledges this issue, 
focusing primarily on NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) and the 
Emergency Alert System dissemination systems. While these are important 
systems, individuals are more likely to rely on local and state 
emergency management for their warnings. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

The draft GAO report states, "To help improve national tsunami 
preparedness, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct 
the NOAA Administrator to take the following six actions:" 

Recommendation 1: "...work with the FEMA Administrator and the USGS 
Director to create standardized tsunami loss estimation software to 
help communities determine the potential impact of tsunamis and 
identify appropriate mitigation actions;..." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and will work with 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the agency responsible 
for creating loss-estimation software and the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) to identify required modules and the state of research, prior to 
creating standardized tsunami loss estimation software. 

Recommendation 2: "...reduce the number of tsunami warning false alarms 
by (1) completing the planned expansion of tsunami detection stations, 
(2) reexamining NWS's rules dictating when a warning will be issued and 
to which areas, (3) establishing a routine process for other federal 
and state experts to formally review and comment on the centers' use of 
seismic data, and (4) setting performance goals to guide 
improvements;..." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and provides the 
following comments: 

(1) NOAH expects to complete the planned expansion of the tsunami Deep- 
ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) detection stations by 
mid-fiscal year 2008. 

(2) The Tsunami Warning Centers will continue to re-evaluate their 
rules specifying when a warning will be issued and for which areas, 
incorporating new technologies and modeling efforts as they become 
available. 

(3) NOAA will continue to solicit feedback on warning procedures 
through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) and the 
International Coordination Group/Pacific Tsunami Warning System. In 
addition, NOAA will consider the establishment of an ad hoc advisory 
committee under the NTHMP that would review warning center procedures 
and propose changes. 

(4) NOAA is reviewing and updating its performance measures (e.g., 
response time and false alarm rates). The review will be completed by 
the end of fiscal year 2006, and the performance measures will continue 
to be used to guide program improvements. 

Recommendation 3: "...conduct periodic end-to-end tests of the tsunami 
warning system, including NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert 
System, to ensure the system will function as intended during a tsunami 
emergency;..." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with the recommendation for end-to-end 
testing and will continue to perform these tests where permitted. NOAA 
can only conduct tests with live warning codes with permission from 
state emergency management agencies. To date, only Alaska has approved 
EAS tests with live warning codes. In states where tests with live 
warning codes are not permitted, NOAA conducts periodic tests fully 
exercising the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards, but only activates EAS 
with test codes. NOAA will continue to encourage state participation in 
end-to-end testing of the tsunami warning system. 

Recommendation 4: "...evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine 
what barriers, if any, exist to participation and what modifications 
are needed to encourage more high-risk communities to participate;..." 

NOAA Response: NOAA believes all of the Nation's coastal areas should 
be prepared for a tsunami - no matter how rare. As such, NOAA 
recommends changing the wording of this recommendation from ".evaluate 
the TsunamiReady program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to 
participation and what modifications are needed to encourage more high-
risk communities to participate;." to "...evaluate the TsunamiReady 
program to determine what barriers, if any, exist to participation and 
what modifications are needed to encourage more at-risk communities to 
participate;..." 

NOAA agrees with this recommendation to encourage more "at-risk" 
communities to participate in the TsunamiReady Program. NOAA will 
review the program at its annual Storm/TsunamiReady National Board 
meeting during summer 2006 and will coordinate any changes with members 
of the NTHMP. 

Recommendation 5: "evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well 
in the past and what high priority activities remain to be completed 
and to help inform strategic planning efforts;" 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation and will coordinate 
with NTHMP members during the next year to identify successes, areas 
for improvement, and high priority activity gaps. This information, 
along with existing planning documentation from the NTHMP subcommittee, 
will be used to inform strategic planning efforts, which acknowledge 
the: 

expansion of the program to other states and territories, as well as 
the types of projects the program funds. 

Recommendation 6: "...develop comprehensive risk-based strategic plans 
for the Tsunami Program and National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program 
that consider input from states and federal partners and include 
metrics for measuring progress towards achieving program goals..." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation; however, it is 
important to note that the necessary risk assessments cannot be begun 
until the tsunami hazard assessment is completed in November of 2006. 
NOAA will then work with its partners to begin the risk assessments, 
which require detailed information including inundation maps, land-use, 
and population. NOAA will incorporate risk assessments, once available, 
into the strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and the NTHMP. 

NOAA has developed a draft Tsunami Program Strategic Plan and will 
coordinate with state and federal partners. A final Tsunami Program 
Strategic Plan is expected to be released by January 2007. 

The NOAA will begin to develop an NTHMP Strategic Plan during Fiscal 
Year 2006. The success of the strategic plan depends heavily on the 
participation and commitment from state and federal NTHMP members. NOAA 
will work with its partners to complete an NTHMP Strategic Plan. 

Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Commerce's letter 
dated May 8, 2006. 

GAO Comment: 

1. Having all coastal communities be prepared for a tsunami may be a 
worthwhile long-term goal; however, given limited resources, in the 
short-term we believe that it is important to prioritize the efforts of 
the TsunamiReady program to encourage higher-risk communities to 
participate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

May 12, 2006: 

Ms. Anu K. Mittal, Director: 
Natural Resource and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Mittal: 

Re: Draft Report GAO Report 06-519 "U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal 
and State Partners Collaborate To Help Communities Reduce Potential 
Impacts, But Significant Challenges Remain. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. Although none 
of the recommendations are directed to DHS/FEMA, the following 
represents our response to the content of the report and the 
recommendations made to the Department of Commerce National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The GAO report does a very good job 
of introducing the hazard and the issues, and of describing the role of 
NOAA and the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP); 
however FEMA continues to have some significant concerns. These 
concerns are as follows: 

The first recommendation for Executive Action is that the "Secretary of 
Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to . work with the FEMA 
Administrator and the USGS Director to create standardized tsunami loss 
estimation software to help communities determine the potential impact 
of tsunamis and identify appropriate mitigation actions." FEMA agrees 
that this need exists and that the existing FEMA HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S. 
- Multi-Hazard) standardized loss estimation software program would be 
the most appropriate vehicle for such a tool. However, while FEMA work 
currently underway includes funding for the development and maintenance 
of modules that address earthquake, hurricane winds, coastal storm 
surge, and coastal and riverine flooding, we do not have or anticipate 
funding for additional modules to the HAZUS-MH package. While there are 
several additional hazards that could be added to the HAZUS-MH package, 
including wildfire and tornado as well as tsunami, FEMA does not have 
the funding or staff resources to pursue this. Any request from NOAA in 
this regard would need to address these needs. As a technical point, 
FEMA is led by a Director, not an Administrator. 

The GAO report makes no mention of other federal agency's programs that 
address the tsunami hazard and encourage the States and local 
communities to take preparedness and mitigation action. One example of 
this would be FEMA's Community Rating System (CRS) in the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP is a federally-backed flood 
insurance program administered by FEMA that makes flood insurance 
available for citizens of communities that adopt and enforce certain 
flood loss reduction ordinances. The NFIP also covers flooding due to 
tsunami. The CRS provides incentives to reward communities that take 
actions above and beyond the minimum requirements of the NFIP to help 
their citizens prevent or reduce flood losses or to initiate new flood 
protection activities, including "special" flood hazards like tsunami. 
The benefit for communities that undertake these CRS activities is 
lower flood insurance premiums for their citizens. Under the CRS, FEMA 
has worked over many years to develop tsunami credits in order to 
provide incentives for communities to implement special tsunami loss 
reduction activities. These activities range from direct acquisition 
and relocation projects to zoning to prohibit future development in 
high risk areas. 

FEMA programs that could be used to fund tsunami mitigation projects 
that have been identified as part of a State or communities mitigation 
plan should also be described in the report. These include FEMA's Pre- 
Disaster Mitigation Program, which is a competitive grant program 
available to all States, and FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, 
which is a grant program that is made available after a Presidentially- 
declared disaster. These programs should be described as another 
federal activity under the section entitled "State and Local Tsunami 
Hazard Mitigation Activities are Underway, Although Implementation 
Varies Considerably Among Locations", probably in the subsection that 
ends on page 37. 

FEMA continues to be concerned that the report's description of the 
NOAA TsunamiReady Program and how it relates to response, preparedness 
and mitigation is confusing. "Response" is immediate action taken to 
save lives, including responding to a warning. "Mitigation" is 
sustained actions taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people 
and property from natural hazards and their effects. Mitigation actions 
often involve safer land use measures and building practices, and the 
improvement of existing structures and supporting infrastructure. The 
NOAA TsunamiReady Program is an important program, but is limited in 
scope to identifying and improving a local community's tsunami warning 
system and how it would be used, which the report covers very well. The 
program "encourages" and "rewards" preparedness, but does not include 
preparedness and mitigation activities such as developing school plans 
and curriculum, facilitating community workshops or campaigns, working 
with various community target groups such as policy decision makers or 
businesses, or helping with planning beyond warning systems. 

Further, the report does not adequately describe the role of emergency 
management organizations at the local, State and Federal levels and how 
they deal with mitigation and preparedness issues. These government 
organizations work together in the NTHMP Mitigation Subcommittee, which 
is made up of State emergency managers and geoscientists and led by 
FEMA. This subcommittee developed and has been implementing a strategic 
plan for mitigation and preparedness, and has been producing outreach 
products since the NTHMP began in 1996. Under the subcommittee, 
community needs are prioritized and gaps reviewed and addressed, State 
program activities are shared and several multi-State products have 
been developed and disseminated. 

GAO may wish to include recent program discussions suggesting staff 
from the TsunamiReady Program could work more closely with or as part 
of the NTHMP Mitigation Subcommittee. This action would bring community 
preparedness, mitigation and outreach components together in a 
comprehensive and mutually supportive partnership between the emergency 
management members and National Weather Service (NWS) TsunarniReady 
Program staff that can build together on past successes as the NTHMP 
expands. 

The last sentence of the first paragraph on page 31 states "vertical 
evacuation to the upper floors of a building can be an alternative or 
supplement to horizontal evacuation" and then includes a reference to 
the FEMA/NOAA Tsunami Vertical Evacuation Shelter Guide currently under 
development. While vertical evacuation in a structure is certainly a 
feasible option, and in some cases the only option, the report needs to 
be careful to state that this should only be planned and promoted for 
buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial earthquake loads 
as well as the subsequent tsunami loads. Such a determination will be a 
key component of the FEMA/NOAA document. 

The first paragraph on page 36 references the Uniform Building Code 
(UBC). While this model building code may still be used in some areas, 
it is obsolete and has been replaced by the International Building Code 
(IBC). The last sentence in that paragraph states that the IBC "would 
strengthen buildings against tsunamis and other hazards." This 
statement needs to clarify that, like the UBC, the IBC does not contain 
specific requirements addressing the tsunami hazard, but that 
structures built in conformance with the IBC will overall tend to 
perform better due to other code provisions, particularly seismic 
requirements. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO report. We would be 
happy to answer any questions or address any information needs you or 
your staff may have. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Page numbers in draft report may differ from those in this report. 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland 
Security's letter dated May 12, 2006. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We revised the text to show the correct title for the FEMA Director. 

2. We describe FEMA's Community Rating System in a report footnote. For 
this reason, we did not revise the report. 

3. We revised the report to indicate that FEMA's Pre-disaster 
Mitigation Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program have funded 
tsunami mitigation activities. 

4. We believe that the report clearly describes the TsunamiReady 
program as providing minimum guidelines for communities to use to 
enhance tsunami preparedness, not as a program that requires all of the 
activities that could be taken to maximize community protection. For 
this reason, we did not revise the report. 

5. We believe that the report adequately describes the NTHMP's federal 
and state partnership as well as the roles of emergency management 
organizations at the federal, state, and local levels, not only for 
warning systems, but also for planning, education and outreach, and 
infrastructure protection mitigation activities. For this reason, we 
did not revise the report. 

6. We revised the report to clarify that vertical evacuation should 
only occur in buildings that are capable of withstanding the initial 
earthquake and subsequent tsunami. 

7. We revised the report to clarify the extent to which building codes 
address the tsunami hazard. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of the Interior: 
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Policy, Management And Budget: 
Washington, DC 20240: 

May 04 006: 

Ms. Anu K. Mittal: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Mittal: 

Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior (DOI) the 
opportunity to review the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
draft report entitled, "U.S. TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS: Federal and State 
Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, But 
Significant Challenges Remain" (Report Number GAO-06-519). 

The GAO staff is to be commended for conducting a thorough, well- 
researched examination of the Nation's tsunami warning system. The 
report correctly recognizes the need for close collaboration at the 
Federal, State, and local levels to have an effective end-to-end 
system. The report also acknowledges the unique challenge of providing 
adequate warning to coasts vulnerable to locally generated tsunamis, 
but the agencies could benefit from more specific recommendations in 
this regard. 

The DOI supports the need for a risk-based approach to prioritizing 
Federal investments in this system and is actively collaborating with 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to provide the 
hazard assessments that necessarily underpin such an approach. 

One area that we feel is inadequately addressed is the importance of a 
long-term Federal role in research to improve tsunami warnings and 
mitigate tsunami risks. None of the recommendations involve improving 
or expanding research. Yet because tsunamis are rare and tsunami risk 
reduction is a multi-decadal undertaking, major improvements to tsunami 
warning and risk reduction will come as a result of research. Multiple 
agencies support research programs in the geological and ocean sciences 
and in monitoring and observing systems, including satellite systems. 
Such research spanning fundamental investigations to applications will 
provide opportunities to apply new technologies such as the Global 
Positioning System and hydro-acoustic monitoring methods developed in 
other fields for other uses to advance tsunami warning and 
preparedness. 

We hope our comments will assist you in preparing the final report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

R. Thomas Weimer: 
Assistant Secretary: 

cc: Secretary Surname: 
ES: 
AS/WS: 
AS/PMB: 
Dir Files, MS 114: 
Dir Chron (4), MS 114: 
Office of Budget & Performance File, MS 105: 
Office of Budget & Performance Read, MS 105 Author, MS 105: 

USGS/DO/bbageant: cr/4/ 17/06: ext703-648-4328:2006332-DO: 

The following is GAO's comment on the Department of the Interior's 
letter dated May 4, 2006. 

GAO Comment: 

1. The analysis of the federal role in research on tsunami warnings and 
mitigation was not included in the scope of this report. Consequently, 
we did not examine issues related to tsunami research or offer any 
recommendations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Stephen D. Secrist, Assistant 
Director; Brad C. Dobbins; Joel A. Green; Ryan S. Lambert; and Susan M. 
Zimmerman made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to 
the report were Claudia K. Becker; John W. Delicath; Gregory A. 
Marchand; John G. Smale, Jr; Anne O. Stevens; and Randall B. 
Williamson. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Landslides, volcanic activity, and meteor strikes may also generate 
a tsunami. 

[2] NWS is the official U.S. source of warnings for life-threatening 
weather conditions, as well as tsunamis. NWS operates 122 weather 
forecast offices nationwide, providing weather, water and climate 
forecasts and warnings for the United States, its territories, adjacent 
waters and ocean areas to protect life and property and enhance the 
national economy. 

[3] As of March 2006, NOAA was expanding the NTHMP into a nationwide 
program open to participation by 28 coastal states and territories. 

[4] 42 U.S.C. § 5165. 

[5] After a tsunami-generating event, inundation forecast models 
combine actual wave data with precomputed flooding scenarios to predict 
the size of the wave and the extent of potential flooding for specific 
locations. 

[6] The $9.82 million designated for tsunami-related activities in 
fiscal year 2006 includes over $2.5 million for specific activities, 
such as $500,000 for warning sirens for the state of Washington. 

[7] Tectonic plates are the large plates of rock that compose the 
earth's outermost layer and move in relation to each other as they ride 
atop the hot, mobile material below them. 

[8] The warning center in Alaska is also responsible for providing 
warnings to Canada, and the warning center in Hawaii is responsible for 
warning 27 countries in the Pacific. In addition, each warning center 
provides operational backup for the other center. 

[9] In May 2005, the Congress appropriated $8.1 million in supplemental 
funds for USGS to, among other things, begin expanding the Global 
Seismographic Network. 

[10] The nine completed tsunami forecast models are for Kodiak, AK; 
Crescent City, CA; Hilo, HI; Newport, OR; Seaside, OR; San Francisco, 
CA; Willapa Bay, WA; Neah Bay, WA; and Port Angeles, WA. 

[11] The National Weather Wire Service transmits text-based weather 
forecasts and warnings to an array of subscribers, including the media. 

[12] Separate from the NTHMP, Puerto Rico has produced two-dimensional 
tsunami inundation maps for its entire coastline, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands has produced maps for St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas that 
roughly estimate tsunami inundation based on the wave that struck the 
islands in 1867. 

[13] In addition, the Atlantic coast states of Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maine, and North Carolina have also 
identified tsunamis as a hazard. 

[14] "Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for 
Action." National Science and Technology Council, December 2005. 

[15] The seven Atlantic coast states that identified tsunamis as a 
hazard did not assess tsunami impacts either because they concluded 
that the tsunami risk was low or because they lacked adequate 
information on the hazard to permit assessment of tsunami impacts. 

[16] Warning bulletins include "tsunami warnings" to inform areas where 
a tsunami is likely, "tsunami watches" that alert areas outside of a 
warned area, and "tsunami information bulletins" that inform areas that 
an earthquake has occurred but a tsunami is unlikely. 

[17] The six at-risk states and territories are Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, Puerto Rico, and Washington. The 12 communities are 
Seward and Kodiak, Alaska; Crescent City and San Mateo County, 
California; Hilo and Honolulu, Hawaii; Seaside and Gold Beach, Oregon; 
Mayaguez and Rincon, Puerto Rico; and Ocean Shores and Long Beach, 
Washington. 

[18] According to FEMA, the states used FEMA Pre-disaster Mitigation 
Program grant funds to develop their all-hazard mitigation plans. In 
addition, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has funded tsunami 
mitigation projects in Alaska and Puerto Rico. 

[19] The All Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radio is an outdoor system that 
provides both tone and voice alert and notification to residents/ 
visitors by federal, state, and local emergency authorities; an intense 
blue light is also activated at each location to further indicate the 
area is in a hazardous situation. 

[20] FEMA and NOAA, with a grant from the NTHMP and the National 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, are currently developing guidance 
for constructing vertical evacuation shelters. 

[21] See GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David Walker on GAO's 
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 
2006). 

[22] In Hawaii, evacuation maps are printed in each county's telephone 
book. 

[23] In 1995, the Oregon legislature passed Senate Bill 378, requiring 
that at least 30 minutes of earthquake, tsunami, and other disaster- 
related education be taught in schools each month, among other things. 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 336.071 (2003). 

[24] One comprehensive education effort was funded by the NTHMP. In 
September 2004, the city of Seaside, Oregon, launched a 9-month Tsunami 
Awareness Program to determine the feasibility of educating the public 
on tsunami hazards and preparedness practices. The community 
implemented five outreach strategies to reach target audiences, 
including a neighborhood educator project, business workshop, school 
outreach program, public workshop, and a tsunami evacuation drill that 
included Seaside residents, businesses, and visitors. 

[25] Designing for Tsunamis: Seven Principles for Planning and 
Designing for Tsunami Hazards. NTHMP, March 2001. 

[26] Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.446-447 (2003). 

[27] Alaska Admin. Code tit. 11, § 112.210 (2006). 

[28] Urban Renewal Plan for the Kaiko'o Project, Hawaii Redevelopment 
Agency, County of Hawaii, Hilo, Hawaii, June 1965. 

[29] Most local building codes in the Pacific states are based on the 
Uniform Building Code prepared by the International Conference of 
Building Officials. 

[30] Revised ordinances of Honolulu, Ch. 16-11, available at http:// 
www.co.honolulu.hi.us/refs/roh/16a11.htm. 

[31] H.B. 1022, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2006). 

[32] H.B. 3230, 23rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Hi. 2005). 

[33] See e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 8875 (2006); S.B. 2-5, 73rd Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Or. 2005). 

[34] Retrofitting is making changes to an existing building to protect 
it from flooding, or other hazards such as high winds and earthquakes. 

[35] FEMA-172, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, Handbook 
of Techniques for the Seismic Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings. 

[36] In January 2006, FEMA developed a proposal that encourages 
communities to map and manage tsunami hazards by providing credits in 
the Community Rating System that reduce their flood insurance rates. 
The Community Rating System, part of the National Flood Insurance 
Program, is a voluntary incentive program that recognizes and 
encourages community floodplain management activities that exceed the 
minimum program requirements. Communities that participate in the 
National Flood Insurance Program receive federally subsidized flood 
insurance. 

[37] As of March 2006, there were a total of 27 TsunamiReady recognized 
communities in the United States, including 2 on the East Coast - 
Indian Harbour Beach, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia. All counties in 
the state of Hawaii are also recognized as TsunamiReady. 

[38] NOAA, FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109- 
13), Report to Congress on NOAA's Tsunami Community Preparedness 
Implementation Plan. 

[39] The National Data Buoy Center, under the NWS, designs, develops, 
operates, and maintains a network of data collecting buoys and coastal 
stations. 

[40] National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements 
Needed in the Reporting for NOAA GOALS--Build Sustainable Fisheries, 
Recover Protected Species, and Predict and Assess Decadel to Centennial 
Climate Change, Final Audit Report No. FSD-15989-4-0001, September 
2004; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Improvements 
Needed in the Reporting of Performance Measures Related to Promoting 
Safe Navigation and Sustaining Healthy Coasts, Audit Report No. FSD- 
14998-3-0001, February 2003; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration: Improvements Needed in the Reporting of Performance 
Measures Related to Goals for Advancing Short-term Warnings and 
Implementing Seasonal to Interannual Climate Forecasts, Audit Report 
No. FSD-15643-3-0001, September 2003. 

[41] GAO, Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS 
Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities, GAO-05-824T (Washington, 
D.C.: June 29, 2005). 

[42] The commonwealths are Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana 
Islands, and the territories are American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. 

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