This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-665 
entitled 'Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to 
Safely Consolidate Plutonium' which was released on August 19, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2005: 

Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: 

DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium: 

GAO-05-665: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-665, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and 
requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear 
weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of 
plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear 
weapons. Some of this plutonium is contaminated metal, oxides, 
solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production 
process. To improve security and reduce plutonium storage costs, DOE 
plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site 
(SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until 
it can be permanently disposed of in a geologic repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE 
can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS’s capacity to monitor 
plutonium storage containers. 

What GAO Found: 

DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several 
reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium 
into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, 
DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive 
all of the plutonium from DOE’s Hanford Site because it is not in a 
form SRS planned to store. Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford’s 
plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which 
Hanford had planned to ship intact to SRS as part of its efforts to 
accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. 
However, SRS’s storage plan called for storing DOE’s standard storage 
containers and not intact fuel rods. Recent changes in DOE’s security 
requirements have complicated SRS’s storage plans by eliminating one 
facility that DOE planned to use to store plutonium. Until DOE develops 
a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to 
SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements 
that consolidation could offer. Continued storage at Hanford will cost 
an additional approximately $85 million annually and will threaten that 
site’s achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of 
the plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility 
at SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety 
systems to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a 
monitoring capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental 
plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the 
environment. DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in 
another building at SRS that already had the safety systems needed to 
work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had 
sufficient security to conduct all of the required monitoring 
activities. In addition, this building also has other serious safety 
problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that 
it would have SRS’s storage facility upgraded to conduct plutonium 
monitoring. 

Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE’s Unneeded 
Plutonium: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOE (1) develop a comprehensive strategy to 
consolidate, store, and eventually dispose of its plutonium and (2) 
ensure that its facilities’ cleanup plans are consistent with its 
plutonium consolidation plans. In commenting on the report, DOE 
generally agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-665. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the 
Savannah River Site: 

DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored 
Plutonium at SRS: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site 
after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed: 

Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories: 

Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal 
Years 2005-2016: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's 
Unneeded Plutonium: 

Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container: 

Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers: 

Abbreviations: 

DBT: design basis threat: 

DE: destructive examination: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

HEPA: High-Efficiency Particulate Air: 

NDE: nondestructive examination: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Safety Board: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board: 

SRS: Savannah River Site: 

Letter July 20, 2005: 

The Honorable Joe Barton: 
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

Plutonium--a man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in 
nuclear reactors and used in nuclear weapons--is very hazardous to 
human health and the environment and presents an attractive target for 
theft by a terrorist. When the United States stopped producing nuclear 
weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories located in numerous 
Department of Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the United States. 
These facilities included the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky 
Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory in California, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South 
Carolina. 

DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed 
by the United States for nuclear weapons. The majority is in the form 
of pits (the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal, and 
oxides while the remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated 
metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear 
weapons production process.[Footnote 1] To improve security and reduce 
costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at SRS in the 
event it decides to consolidate its nonpit plutonium for interim 
storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a geologic 
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (See fig. 1.)

Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's 
Unneeded Plutonium: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Nonpit plutonium has particularly dangerous characteristics that demand 
special storage conditions. Unlike pits, nonpit plutonium is in forms 
that can be easily dispersed. If not safely contained, plutonium can be 
dangerous to human health, even in extremely small quantities. Because 
it can be highly radioactive, inhaling a few micrograms of plutonium 
creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer. Inhaling 
larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and death. In certain 
forms, plutonium can spontaneously combust in the presence of oxygen at 
temperatures above room temperature. Because of these hazards, nonpit 
plutonium must be stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the 
risk of accidental release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium 
must be properly equipped with safety systems that prevent it from 
escaping into the surrounding air, land, or water in the event a 
container is breached. This report addresses the storage and monitoring 
of nonpit plutonium (hereafter referred to as plutonium) at SRS. 

In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium stabilization 
and storage that it believes will allow it to safely store plutonium 
for a minimum of 50 years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear 
effort to stabilize and package plutonium at its sites across the 
United States into 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. Under 
DOE's standard, once the plutonium is safely packaged, DOE must 
periodically monitor the storage containers for changes in the 
plutonium's condition, particularly any pressurization or corrosion of 
the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a sample of 
storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage 
containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and 
the container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring 
program is intended to detect damaged storage containers or 
inadequately stabilized plutonium and will help DOE ensure the 
continued safe storage of the material. 

DOE must also provide security against potential terrorists interested 
in the plutonium's value for constructing a nuclear weapon, an 
improvised nuclear device, or even a "dirty bomb."[Footnote 2] For many 
years, a key component of DOE security has been the development of the 
design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the 
potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September 
11, 2001, the size of the potential threat has increased 
significantly.[Footnote 3]

DOE has cancelled two proposed construction projects at SRS that would 
have provided plutonium storage and monitoring and would have processed 
the plutonium for permanent disposition. In 2001, DOE cancelled a 
project initiated in 1995 to build a new facility at SRS, called the 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, that would have provided long- 
term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a 
secure environment. DOE cancelled the project because it expected to 
store the plutonium for only a few years until a facility to process 
the plutonium for permanent disposition was available. Instead, DOE 
decided to use existing buildings at SRS to package and store the 
plutonium until construction of the processing facility was completed. 
In addition, in 2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled its 
plans to construct the facility that would have processed its most 
heavily contaminated plutonium into a form for permanent disposition by 
a method known as immobilization. Immobilization involves mixing the 
plutonium with ceramics, placing the mixture in large canisters, and 
then filling the canisters with high-level radioactive waste that has 
been turned into molten glass that then hardens. These canisters would 
have then been shipped to a geologic repository for high-level 
radioactive waste that DOE plans to construct at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada. As a result of the cancellation of the immobilization facility, 
DOE has no means for processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium 
into a form suitable for permanent disposition. 

In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety 
Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress in 
1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex, reported 
that although the facilities DOE plans to use for plutonium storage can 
do so safely for a limited time, the facilities do not meet modern 
safety standards for long-term plutonium storage. The Safety Board 
concluded that DOE's lack of planning for plutonium storage forced SRS 
to focus on what can be done with existing facilities, foreclosing 
options that may have been both cost-effective and safe. The Safety 
Board proposed that DOE conduct a new study of the options for storing 
plutonium at SRS. In addition, it advocated the development of a 
complete, well-considered plan for permanently disposing of all of 
DOE's excess plutonium. 

In this context and as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the 
extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's 
capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. A forthcoming 
classified report will discuss SRS's plans for upgrading security to 
meet the 2004 DBT. 

To evaluate DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium, monitoring stored 
plutonium, and providing security, we reviewed plutonium storage, 
monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE's Office of 
Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA), DOE's operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company), and DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, 
Inc.) In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS 
produced by the Safety Board. Over the course of our work, we toured 
plutonium storage facilities at SRS. During these visits, we 
interviewed and received briefings from DOE Savannah River Operations, 
Westinghouse, and Wackenhut officials. We also visited plutonium 
storage facilities at DOE's Hanford Site, specifically Hanford's 
Plutonium Finishing Plant. Hanford currently stores the majority of the 
plutonium that could eventually be shipped to SRS. During this visit, 
we interviewed and received briefings from DOE Richland Operations 
officials. We also spoke with officials from DOE's operating contractor 
for Hanford (Fluor Hanford) and Fluor's security subcontractor for the 
Hanford Site (Protection Technology Hanford). In addition, we 
interviewed officials from the Safety Board, DOE's Office of 
Environmental Management, and DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and 
Performance Assurance. Additional information on our objectives, scope, 
and methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work from 
June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at the Savannah River Site 
for several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the 
plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a 
plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, even if this 
plan was in place, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's 
plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. 
Specifically, Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of 
its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed 
nuclear facilities. About one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the 
form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods. Because disassembling the fuel 
rods would delay cleanup activities, Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan 
calls for shipping these rods intact to SRS inside special shipping 
containers. However, SRS's storage plans called for storing Hanford's 
plutonium in DOE's standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage 
containers. SRS's storage plan assumed Hanford would disassemble the 
fuel rods and package the plutonium in storage containers. Despite 
these inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup 
plan and SRS's plutonium storage plans. Instead of developing an 
integrated plan for plutonium consolidation, DOE relied upon its 
individual sites to independently develop plans to achieve their own 
goals. Although SRS's storage facility has sufficient space to store 
the fuel rods, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to 
ship the fuel rods to SRS. These include obtaining Department of 
Transportation-certified shipping containers for the fuel rods and 
completing the appropriate safety analyses and documentation for SRS's 
storage facility. Changes to DOE's security requirements have 
complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE 
planned to use to store plutonium. Originally, DOE had planned to use 
two SRS facilities to store its excess plutonium. However, both 
facilities would need extensive and expensive upgrades to comply with 
the new 2004 DBT requirements. In order to save money, DOE has, 
therefore, decided to use only one facility to store plutonium. Until 
DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for permanent disposition, 
additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve 
the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium consolidation 
could offer. In particular, continued plutonium storage at Hanford will 
cost approximately an additional $85 million annually and will threaten 
that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup 
plan. 

In addition, DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the 
condition of the plutonium that is in storage containers as required by 
DOE's storage standard. According to the Safety Board, the facility at 
SRS that DOE plans to use to store the plutonium is not equipped to 
conduct the needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because 
this storage facility lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and 
filtration, DOE's standard storage containers cannot be removed from 
their outer packaging--35-gallon steel drums used to ship the 
containers to SRS. The only facility at SRS that can be used to safely 
remove the storage containers from their outer packaging, monitor them, 
and, if necessary, restabilize and repackage the plutonium, has closed 
in preparation for decommissioning. Without a monitoring capability 
that would detect whether the stored plutonium is becoming unstable and 
damaging the storage containers, DOE faces increased risks of an 
accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm workers, the 
public, and/or the environment. Because SRS's storage facility lacks 
the capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to 
construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS that 
already had the ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with 
plutonium. However, this building would not have had sufficient 
security to conduct all of the monitoring activities required by DOE's 
storage standard. In addition, the Safety Board has reported that, like 
the storage facility, this building lacks adequate fire protection as 
well as having other serious safety concerns. Given these challenges, 
DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility 
upgraded to allow storage and monitoring activities to be centralized 
in one facility. 

We are making recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a 
comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and 
disposition and that its facilities' cleanup plans are consistent with 
this strategy. 

We presented a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its 
comments, DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that 
its recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation 
Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the 
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear material. Upon 
completion of this plan, DOE stated that it will ensure that its sites' 
cleanup plans are revised accordingly. DOE also provided technical 
comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Background: 

SRS was constructed in the early 1950s by the DuPont Company under 
contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE) 
to produce tritium and plutonium-239 for use in nuclear weapons. 
Covering 310 square miles along the Savannah River and encompassing 
land across several counties in South Carolina, the site historically 
has supported five nuclear reactors, two chemical separation plants, a 
heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication 
facility, a tritium extraction facility, and waste management 
facilities. During the cold war, SRS was the only source of tritium in 
the United States and supplemented the production of weapons-grade 
plutonium at DOE's Hanford Site. Although SRS no longer produces 
plutonium, some of its missions continue, such as the extraction of 
tritium for nuclear warheads. SRS is currently managed under contract 
to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company. 

To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and 
inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard 
for the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.[Footnote 
4] This standard establishes the stabilization and packaging 
requirements for plutonium. Stabilization occurs by heating the 
material to remove moisture that could lead to a buildup of pressure. 
This buildup of pressure increases the risk of rupturing a container. 
Plutonium containers designed to meet this standard consist of an inner 
and outer container, each welded shut. (See fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The inner container is designed so that it can be monitored for a 
buildup of pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography, 
that do not damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to 
fire, leakage, and corrosion. Each storage container can hold a total 
of 5 kilograms of material, but a maximum of 4.4 kilograms of the 5 
kilograms can be pure plutonium. The remaining material is chemical 
impurities such as chlorides and fluorides that are mixed with the 
plutonium. 

Plutonium stabilization and packaging is completed at Rocky Flats, 
Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers 
from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at 
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once 
completed, DOE estimates that it will have nearly 5,700 plutonium 
storage containers being stored at locations across the United States 
that could eventually be shipped to SRS. (See table 1.)

Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site 
after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed: 

Site: SRS; 
Number of storage containers: 2,935. 

Site: Hanford; 
Number of storage containers: 2,275. 

Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory; 
Number of storage containers: 342. 

Site: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; 
Number of storage containers: 135. 

Total; 
Number of storage containers: 5,687. 

Source: SRS. 

Notes: 1,895 of the storage containers now stored at SRS were 
originally packaged and shipped from the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site in Colorado. 

[End of table]

In addition to 2,275 storage containers, Hanford has additional 
plutonium in the form of fuel rods that were to be used in the now- 
closed Fast Flux Test Facility nuclear reactor. These fuel rods contain 
enough plutonium that, if they were cut apart and the material 
packaged, would require approximately 1,000 additional storage 
containers. See pages 11 and 12 for additional discussion of Hanford's 
fuel rods. 

Until April 2005, SRS's plutonium storage plans called for using two 
buildings at the site for plutonium storage and monitoring operations: 
Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a 
nuclear reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and 
tritium until 1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby 
condition until its complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor 
components were removed and the facility is now primarily used to store 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 

Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used until the 
mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to power 
space probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and 
the Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store 
plutonium. 

DOE must provide extensive security for plutonium storage facilities at 
SRS because they contain Category I quantities of plutonium. Category I 
material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched 
uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test 
devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of 
plutonium or highly enriched uranium, such as major nuclear components 
and recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, such as carbides, 
oxides, solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with Category I 
special nuclear materials vary but include the nuclear detonation of a 
weapon or test device at or near design yield, the creation of 
improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear yield, theft 
for use in a nuclear weapon, and the potential for sabotage in the form 
of radioactive dispersal. 

To manage potential security risks, DOE has developed the DBT, a 
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities 
of terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites 
to develop security measures designed to defend against the threat 
contained in the DBT. While specific measures vary from site to site, 
SRS's security measures include: 

* a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting 
intruders;

* physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;

* numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, 
vehicle inspection stations, special nuclear material detectors, and 
metal detectors;

* operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that 
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear material;

* hardened facilities and vaults; and: 

* a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with such 
items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and 
chemical protective gear. 

DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the 
Savannah River Site: 

DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons. 
First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a 
form for permanent disposition, as required by the FY 2002 defense 
authorization act. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional 
plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's 
plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. 
Changes to the DBT have complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating 
one facility that DOE had planned to use for plutonium storage. DOE is 
facing these storage challenges because of its failure to adequately 
plan for plutonium consolidation and disposition. Until DOE develops a 
permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to 
SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements 
that plutonium consolidation could offer. For example, continued 
plutonium storage at Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 
million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the 
milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan. 

SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to Process the 
Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed: 

Section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002[Footnote 5] provides that if DOE decides not to construct either 
of two proposed plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,[Footnote 6] 
DOE is prohibited from shipping plutonium to SRS until a plan to 
process the material for permanent disposition is developed and 
submitted to the Congress. In 2002, DOE cancelled the plutonium 
immobilization plant and, to date, DOE has not developed a plan for the 
plutonium that would have been processed in that plant for permanent 
disposition. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE has requested $10 
million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that would process 
this plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design work would be 
completed and a plan prepared. 

SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium Because 
Hanford's Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's Storage Plans Are 
Inconsistent with One Another: 

Even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had 
been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS cannot 
currently accommodate some of Hanford's plutonium because Hanford's 
accelerated cleanup plans and SRS's storage plans are inconsistent with 
one another. DOE approved both plans even though Hanford's accelerated 
cleanup plan called for shipping some of its plutonium to SRS in a form 
that SRS had not planned on storing. 

Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of 12- 
foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE 
standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods 
were to be used in Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The 
reactor has been closed, and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford's 
plutonium is currently being stored at the site's Plutonium Finishing 
Plant--the storage containers in vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in 
large casks inside a fenced area. Hanford was preparing to ship 
plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and 
demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Although Hanford's 
original cleanup plan called for demolishing the Plutonium Finishing 
Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to accelerate the site's 
cleanup. Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan that was approved by DOE's 
Office of Environmental Management now calls for shipping the storage 
containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of fiscal year 2006 
so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing Plant by the end 
of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford planned to ship 
the fuel rods intact to SRS. 

Nevertheless, SRS's July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that 
Hanford would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in 
approximately 1,000 DOE standard storage containers before shipping the 
material to SRS. At the time the plan was issued, SRS planned to use 
Building 105-K and Building 235-F to store plutonium in standard 
storage containers and not intact fuel rods. Although Building 105-K is 
capable of storing the fuel rods intact, several steps are necessary 
before DOE would be able to ship the fuel rods from Hanford to SRS. 
First, there is currently no Department of Transportation-certified 
shipping container that could be used to package and ship the fuel 
rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among other things, to 
prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under the National 
Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K's safety 
documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel 
rods are stored, they would have to be disassembled prior to processing 
the plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack 
the capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study 
establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of 
a facility to process the plutonium for disposition. 

Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One Facility at SRS 
That DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium Storage: 

SRS originally planned to use both Building 105-K and Building 235-F to 
store plutonium storage containers. After the DBT was changed in 
October 2004, SRS was forced to reevaluate its storage plans. Because 
the DBT substantially increases the potential threat that SRS must 
defend against, significant additional security will be required for 
SRS facilities storing plutonium. SRS projected the total cost of this 
additional security at over $300 million. SRS estimated that it could 
save more than $120 million by consolidating plutonium in Building 105- 
K and not using Building 235-F for storage. Building 235-F was 
originally planned to store approximately 1,900 storage containers. 
Although SRS officials believe that Building 105-K has sufficient space 
to store all of DOE's plutonium storage containers from other DOE sites 
in the event that DOE decides to ship additional plutonium to SRS, 
DOE's estimates of the total number of containers have varied over time 
and may continue to change as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos conduct 
plutonium stabilization and packaging operations. 

DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation Will Lead 
to Additional Storage Costs and Threatens Hanford's Cleanup Plans: 

The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the 
department's failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. 
DOE has not developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for 
plutonium consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its 
facilities' requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop 
a permanent disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to 
SRS, and DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security 
improvements that plutonium consolidation could offer. According to DOE 
officials, the impact of continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence 
Livermore will be relatively minor because both laboratories had 
already planned to maintain plutonium storage facilities for other 
laboratory missions. However, according to Hanford officials, continued 
storage at the site could cost approximately an additional $85 million 
annually and will threaten the achievement of the goals in the site's 
accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically, maintaining storage vaults at 
Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant will prevent the site from 
demolishing the plant as scheduled by September 2008. 

DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored 
Plutonium at SRS: 

DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition of the 
plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE's storage 
standard. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K does not have 
adequate safety measures to monitor the containers. Therefore, DOE had 
planned to construct a monitoring capability in Building 235-F at SRS, 
which already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium. 
However, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to 
conduct all of the required monitoring. In addition, the Safety Board 
identified serious safety concerns with Building 235-F. Because of 
these concerns, DOE changed its plans again in April 2005 and announced 
that it would install monitoring equipment and the necessary safety 
systems in Building 105-K. 

SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety Measures to 
Conduct Plutonium Monitoring: 

Under DOE's plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be 
periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a 
monitoring capability that would detect whether storage containers are 
at risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental 
plutonium release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the 
environment. The following two types of monitoring activities are to be 
performed: 

* Nondestructive examination (NDE): Between 13 and 41 storage 
containers are to be tested annually for leaks or contamination and x- 
rayed to detect any increase in internal pressure that could rupture a 
container. 

* Destructive examination (DE): Between 13 and 15 storage containers 
are to be punctured and cut open annually. Samples of the gases inside 
the container are to be taken and analyzed and the containers 
themselves examined for indications of corrosion. In addition, the 
material inside is to be analyzed to detect any changes in the 
plutonium's condition. 

DOE has categorized the plutonium storage containers into three groups 
based on their risk of rupturing because of pressurization or 
corrosion. (See table 2.)

Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories: 

Category: Pressure and corrosion; 
Type of monitoring: NDE and DE; 
Characteristics: Containers with impure plutonium oxides contaminated 
with chlorides. The chlorides make the containers at risk for rupture 
due to both pressure and corrosion. Plutonium in these containers may 
also contain other impurities such as calcium, iron, magnesium, 
silicon, sodium, and potassium, among others; 
Number of storage containers: 1,597. 

Category: Pressure; 
Type of monitoring: NDE and DE; 
Characteristics: Containers with impure plutonium oxides without 
chlorides, but still at risk of rupture due to pressurization; 
Number of storage containers: 1,386. 

Category: Innocuous; 
Type of monitoring: NDE; 
Characteristics: Containers with relatively pure plutonium metal and 
oxides with little risk for rupture due to pressure or corrosion; 
Number of storage containers: 2,704. 

Total; 
Number of storage containers: 5,687. 

Source: SRS. 

[End of table]

A storage container's placement in one of the three groups--pressure 
and corrosion, pressure, or innocuous--determines the type of 
monitoring a container will be subjected to and how many containers 
will be monitored annually. Table 3 shows the number of examinations 
DOE plans to conduct beginning in fiscal year 2005. 

Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal 
Years 2005-2016: 

Category: Pressure and corrosion; 
Fiscal year: 2007: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2008: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2010: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2011: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2012: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2013: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2014: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2015: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2016: 14 NDE 14 DE. 

Category: Pressure; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 25 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 25 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2007: 25 NDE 2 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2008: 26 NDE 2 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 26 NDE 2 DE. 

Category: Innocuous; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 2 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 2 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2007: 2 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2008: 2 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 2 NDE. 

Category: Total; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 27 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2006: 27 NDE; 
Fiscal year: 2007: 40 NDE 15 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2008: 41 NDE 15 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 41 NDE 15 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2010: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2011: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2012: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2013: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2014: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2015: 13 NDE 13 DE; 
Fiscal year: 2016: 14 NDE 14 DE. 

Source: SRS. 

Note: According to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, 
gas pressurization and corrosion have been identified as the only 
mechanisms that could cause the failure of a storage container. Gas 
pressurization would likely be discovered early because gas generation 
decreases over time. Therefore, monitoring of the pressure category 
will stop after 5 years. Since corrosion is a slower phenomenon and is 
considered to have a longer term potential to cause failure, monitoring 
on the pressure and corrosion category will continue for 10 years. The 
innocuous category has little potential for pressurization or 
corrosion, therefore monitoring will stop after 5 years. 

[End of table]

Since an accidental release of plutonium would present an extreme 
hazard to workers, the public, and the environment, monitoring 
activities must occur in a facility that, among other things, is 
equipped to confine accidentally released plutonium through effective 
ventilation and appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must 
have a fire protection system to protect storage containers and prevent 
their contents from being released in a major fire. According to the 
Safety Board, Building 105-K is not currently equipped with adequate 
ventilation or fire protection. Specifically, SRS removed the High- 
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that were used when the 
building was a nuclear reactor. Such filters could prevent plutonium 
from escaping the building in the event of a release from the storage 
containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks automatic fire detection 
or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium storage containers 
cannot be removed from inside the outer packaging used to ship the 
containers to SRS. The outer package--a 35-gallon steel drum--is used 
to ship a single storage container and is designed to resist damage 
during transportation and handling. The outer package confines the 
plutonium in the event the storage container inside is breached. In 
addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of protection 
from fire for the storage container inside. (See fig. 3.)

Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, 
in some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the 
condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage 
containers must be removed from their outer packaging. In addition, SRS 
plans to establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating 
it in a specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the 
stored plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of 
rupturing a storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be 
packaged into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS 
currently capable of restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has 
closed in preparation for decommissioning.[Footnote 7]

Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented Safety and 
Security Concerns: 

Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage 
containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building 
235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was 
already equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to 
handling plutonium--multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan 
systems that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is 
further filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside 
atmosphere.[Footnote 8] Currently, Building 235-F is limited to 
removing storage containers from their outer packaging and performing 
nondestructive examinations. If nondestructive examination indicates 
pressurization in a storage container, DOE has installed equipment in 
Building 235-F that could puncture the storage container to relieve 
pressure. 

Although Building 235-F has the appropriate ventilation and filtration, 
it faced several challenges that would have affected its ability to 
monitor plutonium. Building 235-F is not currently equipped to conduct 
destructive examinations or to restabilize and package the plutonium in 
new storage containers if necessary. In addition, because of changes in 
the DBT, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store 
Category I quantities of plutonium. According to SRS officials, 972 
storage containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium. These 
storage containers are in the innocuous monitoring category and are at 
low enough risk for rupture that only two randomly sampled containers 
are subject annually to nondestructive examination. However, SRS would 
have been unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to 
monitor their condition, leaving these 972 storage containers 
unmonitored. According to SRS officials, security measures could have 
been established in Building 235-F should a safety issue have arisen 
that required opening a Category I container. 

Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety 
concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported 
the following: 

* The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the 
building lack fire detection and alarm systems. 

* The building's nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been 
removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile 
material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained 
nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality 
accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable 
radiation source that can be lethal to people who are nearby. 

* A number of the building's safety systems depend upon electrical 
cables that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their 
estimated life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may 
crack, increasing the potential for failure. 

* SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could 
present a hazard in the event of an earthquake. 

* The building's ventilation system still contains plutonium from its 
previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space 
probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for 
example, during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers 
in the building. 

Because of its concerns about Building 235-F's safety, the Safety Board 
reported in December 2003 that DOE should not plan extended storage of 
plutonium in this building and that it may be preferable from safety 
and cost perspectives to pursue plutonium storage elsewhere at SRS. The 
Safety Board suggested that DOE consider several options for plutonium 
storage, including constructing a new facility or installing safety 
systems such as fire protection and filtered ventilation in Building 
105-K. 

Similar to the problems that DOE faces with plutonium storage, the 
department's monitoring challenges are illustrative of its failure to 
adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive 
strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its 
storage standard, DOE's plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art 
storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety 
Board had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE's plans have 
subsequently changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 
million to begin modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it 
would only use the building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE 
plans to install the necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment 
in Building 105-K. 

Conclusions: 

DOE has not yet developed a comprehensive plan that is necessary to 
consolidate and eventually dispose of its excess plutonium. Instead, it 
has changed its consolidation, storage, and disposition plans numerous 
times. Furthermore, DOE has relied on its individual offices, sites, 
and facilities to independently develop plans to achieve their own 
goals rather than developing an integrated plan for the consolidation 
and permanent disposition of all of its excess plutonium. Specifically, 
DOE headquarters approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and 
SRS's plutonium storage plans without resolving conflicts between them. 
Moreover, we agree with the Safety Board that DOE's lack of careful 
planning has forced SRS to focus on what can be done with existing 
facilities, eliminating options that may have been both more cost- 
effective and safer than current plans. DOE has instead pushed forward 
with plans to use a 50-year-old building at SRS to perform functions it 
was not designed for. As a result, DOE is currently not able to 
consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. Because it is unable to 
consolidate its plutonium, DOE faces additional costs in excess of $85 
million annually to securely store plutonium at its current locations, 
and its cleanup goals for Hanford are in jeopardy. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure the continued safe and secure storage of DOE's excess 
plutonium inventories, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take 
the following two actions: 

* Develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and 
disposition of DOE's excess plutonium. In particular, this strategy 
should assess the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all 
of DOE's sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy 
should analyze the environmental impact, national security 
implications, costs, and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and 
eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities and/or at 
a new storage facility constructed at one of its sites. 

* When this comprehensive strategy is completed, we further recommend 
that the Secretary of Energy ensure that each of DOE's facilities' 
cleanup plans are reviewed to ensure that each site's cleanup goals and 
time frames are consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy 
for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment. 
DOE's letter is presented as appendix II. DOE generally agreed with our 
recommendations and stated that a Nuclear Materials Disposition and 
Consolidation Coordination Committee was formed earlier this year to 
provide a forum to perform nuclear materials disposition and 
consolidation planning. The objectives of this committee are to develop 
a plan that would provide the necessary security for DOE's nuclear 
material, identify paths for disposition, and reduce security and 
program costs. DOE stated that this committee would produce a strategic 
plan that would encompass the comprehensive strategy called for in our 
first recommendation. DOE also stated that the cleanup plans for its 
sites would be revised accordingly following completion of the 
committee's strategic plan. 

DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we incorporated into 
the report as appropriate. These technical comments focused primarily 
on DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium at SRS, the availability of 
sufficient storage space at SRS, and DOE's ability to monitor stored 
plutonium. Specifically, DOE emphasized in its technical comments that 
it has no plans at this time to further consolidate any plutonium at 
SRS. We recognize that a final decision to consolidate plutonium has 
not been made. However, it is important to note, as was stated in our 
draft report, that both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's 
storage plan assumed that DOE's surplus plutonium would be consolidated 
at SRS and that both plans were approved by DOE headquarters without 
resolving conflicts between them. We believe DOE's comments that it has 
no plans to further consolidate any plutonium at SRS reinforce our 
recommendation for a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, 
storage, and disposition of DOE's excess plutonium. 

Regarding the availability of sufficient storage space at SRS, DOE 
stated in its technical comments that, even without Building 235-F, 
Building 105-K has adequate storage capacity for all of its excess 
plutonium, including the Hanford fuel rods. However, it is important to 
note that DOE was proceeding with its plans to store plutonium in 
Building 235-F until changes to the DBT forced DOE to reevaluate its 
plans. Our draft report recognized that SRS officials believe Building 
105-K has sufficient space to store all of DOE's plutonium storage 
containers from its sites across the United States. Nevertheless, DOE's 
estimates of the total number of containers have varied over time and 
may continue to change because plutonium stabilization and packaging is 
still ongoing at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National 
Laboratories. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, additional safety 
analyses and documentation are necessary before Building 105-K would be 
able to store the Hanford fuel rods. 

Regarding DOE's ability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE stated in its 
technical comments that it has the capability in Building 235-F to 
monitor the condition of stored plutonium and that the building will 
not be shut down until a monitoring capability is established in 
Building 105-K. However, as our draft report noted, monitoring at 
Building 235-F is currently limited to removing storage containers from 
their outer packaging and performing nondestructive examinations of the 
containers. Building 235-F also has equipment that can puncture storage 
containers to relieve pressure if needed. However, Building 235-F does 
not have the capability to perform destructive examinations of the 
storage containers, which, according to SRS's plutonium surveillance 
and monitoring plan, must be conducted beginning in fiscal year 2007. 
In addition, SRS lacks the capability to restabilize and repackage 
plutonium if necessary. Until nondestructive examination, destructive 
examination, stabilization, and repackaging equipment is installed in 
Building 105-K, we believe that DOE's capability to monitor the 
condition of stored plutonium at SRS is incomplete. We modified our 
draft report to further clarify DOE's current monitoring capabilities. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, NNSA; the Chairman of 
the Safety Board; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 
appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. We 
also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House 
of Representatives, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
Representatives, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of 
Energy (DOE) can consolidate its nonpit plutonium at the Savannah River 
Site (SRS) and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage 
containers. A forthcoming classified report discusses SRS's plans for 
upgrading security to meet the 2004 design basis threat (DBT). 

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed independent studies of 
storage conditions at SRS performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board (Safety Board), an independent federal agency established 
by the Congress in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons 
complex. Specifically, we reviewed the Safety Board's December 2003 
report entitled Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's 
Savannah River Site: Report to Congress and its June 2004 report 
entitled Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's Savannah River 
Site: First Annual Report to Congress. In addition, we interviewed 
subject matter experts with the Safety Board. We also obtained and 
reviewed several SRS studies of plutonium storage options: 1999 
Savannah River Plutonium Storage Study, 2000 Evaluation of Savannah 
River Plutonium Storage and Stabilization Options, and 2004 Savannah 
River Site Storage of Surplus Plutonium Study: 2004 Update. A GAO 
analyst with subject matter expertise and a GAO senior methodologist 
with training and experience in evaluation research and methodology 
reviewed all of these studies to evaluate their methodological 
soundness and determine the reliability of their conclusions. These 
reviews entailed an evaluation of each study's research methodology, 
including its data quality, research design, and key assumptions, as 
well as a summary of its major findings and conclusions. We also 
assessed the extent to which each study's data and methods support its 
findings and conclusions. We determined that these studies were 
methodologically sound enough for the purposes of this report. 

In cooperation with a GAO economist, we attempted to determine the cost 
of plutonium storage at SRS by developing a model that evaluated costs 
under various storage scenarios, such as constructing a new 
consolidated storage facility or upgrading an existing facility to 
store plutonium. This model also attempted to determine the cost of 
continued storage of plutonium at Hanford for comparative purposes. 
However, we were unable to complete our model because we were unable to 
obtain complete cost data from DOE. Security costs are a major 
component of the total cost of storing plutonium, but security cost 
data were not available at the time of our review because neither SRS 
nor Hanford had yet determined how they will enhance security to meet 
the 2004 DBT. 

To determine the extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at 
SRS, we reviewed DOE's Records of Decision published in the Federal 
Register for plutonium storage and disposition activities at SRS, such 
as plans to construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and 
subsequent postponement and then cancellation of those plans, and 
relevant DOE orders, policies, and standards, such as DOE-STD-3013- 
2003, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing 
Materials. We visited SRS and inspected plutonium storage areas in 
Building 105-K and facilities in Building 235-F originally intended for 
plutonium storage and monitoring. We interviewed and received briefings 
from DOE's operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company); DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.); 
SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS's 
Nuclear Materials Programs Division. We also spoke with officials 
responsible for the management of Building 105-K and Building 235-F. 

We also visited the Hanford Site and toured the Plutonium Finishing 
Plant, where we observed plutonium storage containers that are 
currently stored inside the plant and nuclear fuel rods that are stored 
inside and outside the facility. We spoke with officials from DOE's 
Richland Operations Office, DOE's operating contractor for Hanford 
(Fluor Hanford), and Fluor's security subcontractor for the Hanford 
Site (Protection Technology Hanford). From these officials, we received 
briefings on Hanford's plans for plutonium storage and shipment. We 
also discussed the deactivation of the Plutonium Finishing Plant. 

In Washington, D.C., we met with DOE's acting Assistant Secretary for 
Environmental Management to discuss DOE's planned consolidation of 
plutonium at SRS and how SRS will store the material. We also discussed 
issues related to storage, monitoring, and security with officials from 
DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Independent 
Oversight and Performance Assurance, and DOE's National Nuclear 
Security Administration. 

To evaluate DOE's ability to monitor plutonium storage containers, we 
first examined the reliability of SRS's database for tracking inventory 
and for SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring project. We 
obtained responses to a series of data reliability questions covering 
issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. We asked follow-up questions 
whenever necessary. We also obtained and reviewed related documents, 
including Users Manual for the DOE Complex Integrated Surveillance 
Program Working Database and other manuals and data dictionaries. We 
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. 

To evaluate the safety of conducting monitoring activities in Building 
105-K and Building 235-F, we reviewed the Safety Board's 2003 and 2004 
reports described earlier, and discussed the safety conditions of the 
facilities with subject matter experts on the Safety Board. We observed 
the facilities where SRS plans to conduct monitoring activities and 
reviewed documents pertaining to SRS's monitoring plans. We received 
briefings from Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel 
responsible for plutonium monitoring and discussed the planned 
monitoring activities with officials responsible for managing Building 
105-K and Building 235-F. We also discussed monitoring with officials 
from the Safety Board; Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Wackenhut 
Services, Inc; SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency 
Services; and SRS's Nuclear Materials Programs Division. At the Hanford 
Site, we observed facilities and equipment for surveillance and 
monitoring of its plutonium and received a briefing on Hanford's use of 
that facility. 

We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

JUL 1 2005: 

Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

Thank you for your June 14, 2005, letter to the Secretary of Energy 
providing the draft report, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs 
to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium, and requesting written 
comments from the Department of Energy (DOE). Your draft report 
contains two recommendations for executive action: (1) the Secretary 
develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and 
disposition of DOE's excess plutonium, and (2) DOE's cleanup plans be 
reviewed to ensure they are consistent with the comprehensive strategy. 

With respect to your first recommendation, earlier this year former 
Secretary Abraham established the Nuclear Materials Disposition and 
Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC). Secretary Bodman 
subsequently approved the charter for this Committee. The principal 
mission of the NMDCCC is to provide a forum to perform cross-cutting 
nuclear materials disposition and consolidation planning with the 
objectives of providing the necessary security for DOE's nuclear 
material, identifying paths for disposition, as appropriate, and 
reducing out-year security and program costs. One of the 
responsibilities of this Committee, of which I am a member, is to 
develop and ensure implementation of a Strategic Plan for disposition 
and consolidation of special nuclear material. This Strategic Plan will 
encompass the comprehensive strategy called for in your first 
recommendation. 

Regarding your second recommendation, following completion of the 
NMDCCC's Strategic Plan, I will ensure that site cleanup plans are 
revised accordingly. My staff will review those revised plans to make 
certain they are consistent with the Strategic Plan and its associated 
implementation schedule. 

At a recent meeting with you and your staff, we provided comments to 
you on the bulk of the draft report. Although some revisions were made 
to the report as a result of those comments, we believe that the draft 
report still contains inaccuracies and statements that can be 
misinterpreted. Enclosed are detailed comments that we respectfully 
request be considered as you finalize your report. 

If you have any further questions, please contact me at (202) 586-7709 
or Mr. Mark A. Gilbertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental 
Cleanup and Acceleration, at (202) 586-0755. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Charles E. Anderson: 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robin 
Eddington, Doreen S. Feldman, Jonathan M. Gill, Sherry L. McDonald, 
Mehrzad Nadji, James D. Noel, Judy K. Pagano, Keith A. Rhodes, Paul 
Rhodes, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this 
report. 

(360467): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] The exact amounts of plutonium that are in pit and nonpit forms is 
considered classified information. 

[2] A dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device, uses 
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. While a dirty 
bomb would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals, 
it could potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those 
contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated 
areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic 
costs. 

[3] See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004). 

[4] U.S. Department of Energy, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of 
Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013-2003 (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2003). 

[5] Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001). 

[6] The two proposed plutonium disposition facilities are the plutonium 
immobilization plant and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility for 
surplus plutonium pits and nonpit plutonium. 

[7] This facility--FB Line--was constructed in the early 1960s at SRS 
to convert plutonium solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear 
weapons components. In recent years, its primary mission has been the 
stabilization of scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and 
packaging the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. It ceased 
operations and transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in 
March 2005. 

[8] Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete 
enclosures and filled with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As 
air flows upward through the bed, the rock, gravel, and sand filter out 
plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then flow 
into the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. 
nuclear facilities since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand 
filters can remove a large amount of radioactive material, are 
relatively low maintenance, and are fire resistant. 

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