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All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve' which was released on
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Report to the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2005:
Homeland Security:
DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities
Continue to Evolve:
GAO-05-652:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-652, a report to the Chairman and Ranking
Democratic Member, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management, House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in a greater focus on
the role of first responders in carrying out the nation’s emergency
management efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the
primary federal entity responsible for ensuring that first responders,
such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public health personnel,
have the capabilities needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive
response to any large-scale crisis. In the last 4 years DHS has awarded
$11.3 billion to state and local governments to enhance capabilities,
primarily to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of
terrorism. Presidential directives instruct DHS to develop a national
all-hazards approach—preparing all sectors of society for any emergency
event including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) What actions has DHS
taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development
of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first
responders? (2) How do first responders’ emergency management
capabilities for terrorist attacks differ to capabilities needed for
natural or accidental disasters? (3) What emphasis has DHS placed on
funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-
hazards emergency management capabilities?
What GAO Found:
DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives aimed at creating a
national, all-hazards coordinated and comprehensive response to large-
scale incidents: (1) a national response plan (what needs to be done);
(2) a command and management process (how it needs to be done); and (3)
a national preparedness goal (how well it should be done). GAO reviewed
these products and determined that each supports a national, all-
hazards approach. DHS has developed plans to implement three related
programs to enhance first responder capabilities: (1) to assess and
report on the status of first responders’ capabilities; (2) to
prioritize national resource investments; and (3) to establish a
national training and exercise program. Implementing these programs
will likely pose a number of challenges for DHS including integrating
internal and external assessment approaches, assessing state and local
risks in a national context to effectively prioritize investments, and
establishing common training requirements across responder disciplines.
Because terrorist attacks share some common characteristics with
natural and accidental disasters, 30 of DHS’ 36 capabilities first
responders need to support preparedness and response efforts are
similar. GAO’s analysis found that the baseline capabilities required
for terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more
similar for response and recovery and differ most for prevention.
Because terrorist attacks are planned, intentional acts, all of DHS’
prevention capabilities focus on terrorist attacks, while almost all
other baseline capabilities focus on all hazards.
Legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special
emphasis on preparedness for terrorism and DHS has directed that the
majority of first responder grant funding be used to enhance first
responder capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, grants funds can have all-
hazards applications.
First Responders in Action:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-652.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr.
at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Has All-Hazards Policy Initiatives and National Strategies Under
Development and Faces Challenges in Enhancing First Responders'
Emergency Management Capabilities:
Most Preparedness Capabilities Apply to All Emergency Events, but
Prevention of Terrorist Attacks Requires Unique Capabilities:
Federal Funding For Enhancing First Responders' Preparedness
Capabilities Emphasizes Terrorism but Can Be Applied To All Hazards:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5:
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8:
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DHS Suite of National Planning Scenarios:
Table 2: Natural and Accidental Disasters and Terrorist Attacks That
Have Similar Effects:
Table 3: Homeland Security Mission Areas:
Table 4: Arrangement of DHS's 36 Target Capabilities by Homeland
Security Mission Area and the Relative Emphasis on Terrorism
Preparedness for Each:
Figures:
Figure 1: First Responders in Action:
Figure 2: Homeland Security Policy Initiative Timeline:
Figure 3: Three Stages of DHS Capabilities-Based Planning Process Model
for Development of the National Preparedness Goal:
Figure 4: Scenarios, Tasks, and Capabilities for the National
Preparedness Goal:
Figure 5: Example of Target Capability Development: Pandemic Influenza
Scenario and Resulting Universal Tasks, Critical Tasks, and Target
Capability:
Figure 6: Most Fiscal Year 2005 DHS First Responder Grant Funding Is
for Three Programs that Focus On Terrorism:
Figure 7: DHS Grant Funding for Terrorism versus All Hazards, Fiscal
Years 2001 to 2005 and Projected for Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in
millions):
Abbreviations:
CBRNE: Chemical, biological, radiological nuclear, explosive:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
NIMS: National Incident Management System:
NRP: National Response Plan:
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 11, 2005:
The Honorable William Shuster:
Chairman:
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton:
Ranking Democratic Member:
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been concern among
senior federal officials that another terrorist attack on U.S. soil
could occur. According to testimony by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, it may be only a matter of time before a terrorist
group tries to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons in the United States. Concerns like these have prompted
increased federal attention on national emergency preparedness--that
is, the nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from large-scale emergency events. Through legislation and
Presidential directives, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
become the primary federal entity responsible for ensuring that first
responders, such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public health
personnel, have the capabilities needed to provide a coordinated,
comprehensive response to any large-scale crisis and to mount a swift
and effective recovery effort.[Footnote 1] In the last 4 years, DHS
agencies have awarded $11.3 billion to state and local governments to
enhance their national emergency preparedness capabilities, primarily
for terrorist attacks.
Long before the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism preparedness
was included in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's planning
approach to prepare for all types of emergency events, commonly
referred to as an all-hazards approach.[Footnote 2] Since the attacks,
the intensified federal attention and federal spending for national
preparedness has largely emphasized preparedness for terrorist attacks.
However, the nation's recent experience with large-scale natural
disasters, for example, wildfires in California in 2003, hurricanes in
Florida in 2004, and floods in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York
in 2005 provides a justification for taking an all-hazards approach to
national preparedness that considers the risks of natural and
accidental disasters, as well as terrorism.
Consistent with this approach, two Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPD) issued in 2003 require DHS to take an all-hazards
focus in implementing the directives. HSPD-5, issued in February 2003,
required DHS to establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans
for the management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist
attacks or large-scale natural or accidental disasters. Appendix I
contains the text of HSPD-5. HSPD-8, issued in December 2003,
established policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United
States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks and large-scale natural or accidental disasters.
Among other things, it required DHS to coordinate the development of a
national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that would establish
measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance
the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks and large-scale
natural or accidental disasters with the resources required to prevent,
respond to, and recover from them. The directive also designated the
Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for
coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the
United States. Appendix II contains the text of HSPD-8.
Because of the nation's increased focus on preparedness for terrorist
attacks as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, you requested
that we examine the extent to which DHS has considered all types of
emergency events, including both terrorist attacks and natural or
accidental disasters, in developing and implementing its approach to
enhance and sustain first responder capabilities. This report explores
the following questions:
1. What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that
promote the development of all-hazards emergency management
capabilities of first responders?
2. How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for
terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or
accidental disasters?
3. What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local
first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management
capabilities?
The scope of our work was focused on the extent to which the actions
taken by DHS to enhance first responder skills and abilities
encompassed all hazards, whether the result of nature, accident, or
terrorist action. To address these objectives, we analyzed DHS's
efforts to implement HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, including the process used to
develop national preparedness policies and the plans, goals, and
standards resulting from the process, as well as grant programs to
enhance the preparedness of first responders. We interviewed DHS
officials from the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness, and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness to obtain their views regarding the process and its
products, along with information on DHS assistance programs. To obtain
the views of first responders, we interviewed officials from
professional organizations that represent first responders on a
national level and reviewed relevant reports and studies on homeland
security and domestic preparedness. Finally, we conducted structured
interviews with 69 first responder departments[Footnote 3] and state
level emergency management officials in ten states, selected by non-
probability sampling to include metropolitan areas that crossed state
boundaries, tribal governments, states that face a variety of hazards,
sparsely and densely populated states, and states with townships and
city government structures, among other criteria. These first responder
departments responded to the questions in our structure interview guide
and provided additional observations during the course of our
interviews. The results of these interviews cannot be generalized to
first responders not participating in the interviews. An expanded
discussion of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix III.
We conducted our work from May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives to promote the
further development of the emergency preparedness capabilities of first
responders-development of (1) a national response plan (what needs to
be done to manage a major emergency event); (2) a command and
management process to be used during any emergency event nation-wide
(how to do what needs to be done); and (3) a national preparedness goal
(how well it should be done). Each initiative reflects an all-hazards
approach since each addresses emergency events that are the result of
terrorist attacks and large-scale natural and accidental disasters. To
develop a national preparedness goal, DHS is using an approach known as
capabilities-based planning that, according to DHS, provides
capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards, in an
environment of uncertainty and within an economic framework that
necessitates prioritization for allocation of finite resources. DHS
began this process using 15 emergency scenarios developed by the
President's Homeland Security Council, 12 of which are terrorist
events. The scenarios were not ranked according to relative risk
because, according to DHS, their purpose was to form the basis for
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide-range of major
emergency events. These 15 scenarios, which include an attack by
improvised explosive device and a pandemic flu outbreak as two
examples, were developed to identify a range of tasks, critical tasks,
and target capabilities, all of which would need to be performed at
various levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and recover from large-scale emergency events. DHS's planning process
resulted in a Target Capabilities List that identified 36 capabilities
that together encompass all critical tasks--what first responders must
be able to do, in terms of planning, training, equipment, and exercises
to achieve desired outcomes for all hazards. For example, for the
scenario based on a pandemic flu outbreak, critical tasks include the
ability to coordinate public health and medical services, provide
immunizations, and direct and control public information releases. In
March and April 2005, DHS published an interim national preparedness
goal and guidance that first responders can use to develop, implement
and maintain these target capabilities. Because no single jurisdiction
or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a
target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local
resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some
combination of the two. In October 2005, DHS plans to issue a final
version of the goal that would include assigning jurisdictions to tiers
based on their population density, critical infrastructure, and other
risk factors and also include performance metrics for those in each
tier. To achieve the goal, DHS prepared implementation requirements for
national programs to assess and report the status of first responders'
capabilities, to prioritize resource allocation, and to integrate
training and exercise programs. DHS's goal is to achieve full
implementation of these programs by October 1, 2008. Implementation of
each of the three systems may pose challenges for DHS--for example, a
key challenge will be establishing a standardized approach for
measuring and reporting the risks faced by diverse states and
localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate federal
resources.
Our analysis of the target capabilities established by DHS showed that
most of DHS's targeted capabilities--30 of 36--are common to both
terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. Capabilities
common to all hazards, for example, are on-site emergency management,
and search and rescue. DHS officials reviewed our analysis and agreed
with our assessment of the relative applicability of the 36 target
capabilities to all hazards. During our interviews with first
responders and other emergency management officials and experts, they
affirmed the idea that preparedness for natural and accidental
disasters is similar to preparedness for terrorist attacks. DHS
categorizes the capabilities in terms of 4 mission areas: prevention,
protection, response and recovery.[Footnote 4] Our analysis further
revealed that the preparedness capabilities required for terrorist
attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more similar for
protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention.
Terrorist attacks differ from natural or accidental disasters
principally because it is possible that terrorist attacks could be
prevented through actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can
lead to stopping or apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way
to prevent natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and
tornadoes. Therefore, prevention requires specific capabilities related
to intelligence and counterterrorism that are not normally used for
other hazards, such as the terrorism investigation and apprehension
capability.
Since September 11, 2001, funding appropriated by Congress for DHS
programs to enhance first responders' capabilities has largely
emphasized enhancing capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-
hazards approach to national emergency preparedness with a special
emphasis on terrorism. As a result, DHS grant guidance for the State
Homeland Security Grant and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant
programs, the two largest sources of DHS grants funds available to
states and local first responders have largely focused on enhancing
first responders' preparedness for terrorist attacks. State
preparedness officials and local first responders we interviewed said
that DHS's emphasis for grant funding was too heavily focused on
terrorism and they sought to acquire dual use equipment and training
that might be used for emergency event that occur more regularly in
their jurisdictions in addition to supporting terrorism preparedness.
In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within
the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS
officials, although officials stated that, prior to fiscal year 2005,
grant requirements allowed for dual usage and state grantees are
responsible for contacting DHS when questions regarding application of
grant guidelines arise. To ensure grant funds are used for their
designated purpose, the states and localities we visited reported they
have financial controls and monitoring procedures in place designed to
ensure that whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain
within DHS's program guidelines. In February 2005, we reported that in
fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits to 44 of 56 states and
territories that received grants as part of DHS's monitoring of states'
grant reporting and state homeland security strategy implementation. We
also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS revised its method of
reporting on grant expenditures, moving away from requiring itemized
lists of expenditures toward a more results-based approach where grant
managers must demonstrate how grant expenditures link to larger
projects that support one or more goals in the states' homeland
security strategies.[Footnote 5] Finally, in the absence of some basic,
comparable standards for first responder performance, it has been
difficult to assess the effect of grant expenditures on first responder
capabilities and performance.
Background:
Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government's role in
supporting emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily
to providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods,
hurricanes, and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after
such disasters. Historically, FEMA developed mitigation programs
designed to minimize risk to property or individuals from natural or
manmade hazards. These mitigation programs included the post-disaster
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and the pre-disaster Project Impact
program. In addition, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, established the process for
states to request a presidential disaster declaration in order to
respond and recover from a large-scale emergency event. However, in
response to the events of September 11, 2001, the federal government
has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments for
planning, equipment, and training to enhance the capabilities of first
responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent,
natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources reflect a
growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness.
First Responders are Responsible for Carrying out Emergency Management
Efforts:
The nation's first responders have the lead responsibilities for
carrying out emergency management efforts.[Footnote 6] The role of
first responders is to prevent, protect against, respond to, and assist
in the recovery from emergency events. Traditionally, first responders
have been trained and equipped, in the event of an emergency--natural
or accidental disasters and terrorist attacks--to arrive on the scene
and take action immediately. In the first hours of an event, first
responders from various disciplines, which could include police, fire,
emergency medical personnel and public works, must attempt to enter the
scene, set up a command center, establish a safe and secure perimeter
around the site in order to save lives and protect property, evacuate
those within or near the site, tend to the injured and dead and
transport them to care centers or morgues, restrict and redirect
traffic and pedestrians, reroute and restore public utilities, remove
debris, and begin the process of recovery.
Since September 11, 2001, the roles and responsibilities for first
responders to prevent emergency events and protect the public and
property have expanded. In July 2002, prior to the creation of DHS, the
President developed a National Strategy for Homeland Security which
recommended steps that federal, state and local governments, private
companies and organizations, and individual Americans should take to
improve homeland security. The National Strategy identified the need to
improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities of the various federal,
state, and local response assets that can intercede and prevent
terrorists from carrying out attacks. These assets include state and
local law enforcement and emergency response personnel which the
National Strategy considers crucial to preemption of terrorists, no
matter if they are part of the local SWAT team or the FBI's Hostage
Rescue Team.
Figure 1: First Responders in Action:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
First responder organizations across the county are to various degrees,
trained, staffed, and equipped to prepare for and respond to various
events. These organizations may differ in governmental role, size,
structure, and capabilities. For example, activities of local law
enforcement departments in smaller communities may be limited to day-
to-day law enforcement while, in larger communities, departments may
include specialized teams such as bomb squads or special weapons and
tactics units. Likewise, local fire departments may be volunteer
operations with basic firefighting capabilities or, in larger
communities, may include teams specializing in hazardous materials
response, search and rescue, or structural collapse. The local public
health system can consist of public or private emergency medical
services that provide immediate victim care and transport victims to
the area's public or private hospitals to receive patient care, along
with the state and local medical staff that monitor and detect disease
outbreaks. Supporting the response and recovery efforts of first
responders are other state and local officials who provide preparedness
planning, administration, and the communications systems needed to
command and control activities on the scene.
Natural and accidental disasters have provided all levels of government
in many locations with experience in preparing for different types of
emergency events. However, terrorist attacks potentially impose a
relatively new level of fiscal, economic, and social disruption within
this nation's boundaries. Today's threat environment includes not only
the traditional spectrum of large-scale manmade and natural hazards--
wilderness and urban fires, floods, oil spills, hazardous materials
releases, transportation accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes,
pandemics, and accidental or natural disruptions to the nation's energy
and information technology infrastructure--but also the deadly and
devastating arsenal of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosive weapons as exemplified by the attacks on New York
City and Oklahoma City. These attacks have resulted in greater public
and governmental focus on the role of first responders and their
capabilities to respond to large-scale emergency events.
DHS Is Responsible for Leading National Emergency Preparedness Efforts:
Two DHS organizational units have the primary responsibilities for
leading national emergency preparedness efforts--the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate and the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness. The Homeland Security Act
assigned responsibility to the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
for building a comprehensive national incident management system that
defines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local
governments, and the various first responder disciplines at each level
during an emergency event. The Act also charged the directorate with
consolidating existing federal government emergency response plans into
a single, coordinated national response plan, as called for by HSPD-5.
DHS assigned responsibility for developing a national preparedness goal
to its Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness, which includes the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness also
awards and administers the majority of DHS's first responder
preparedness federal grant programs.[Footnote 7] In large part these
grants are directed to the governor of each state, who in turn makes
these funds available to local jurisdictions within the state.
DHS Has All-Hazards Policy Initiatives and National Strategies Under
Development and Faces Challenges in Enhancing First Responders'
Emergency Management Capabilities:
To comply with HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, DHS has established a national plan
for emergency event response, a national management system to be used
during emergency events, and an interim national preparedness goal. DHS
also plans to develop national strategies for assessing and reporting
the status of first responders' capabilities, prioritizing federal,
state, and local resource investments to enhance these capabilities,
and standardizing training and exercise programs for first responders
to practice and improve emergency response capabilities. The
presidential directives on which these efforts are based correspond to
the major initiatives first developed in the National Strategy for
Homeland Security. Our analysis of the documents resulting from, and
plans for, these efforts showed that DHS has taken an all-hazards
approach to promote first responders' emergency management
capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of DHS's efforts to
develop these national initiatives and identifies the anticipated
results.
Figure 2: Homeland Security Policy Initiative Timeline:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS Has Developed All-Hazards Policies to Guide Response to Emergency
Events:
To comply with the initiatives of the National Strategy and the
timeframes and requirements established in HSPD-5, DHS implemented an
integrated all-hazards approach to emergency event management by
establishing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the
National Response Plan (NRP). NIMS is a policy document that defines
roles and responsibilities of federal, state and local first responders
during emergency events. The intent of this system described in the
document is to establish a core set of concepts, principles,
terminology and organizational processes to enable effective,
efficient, and collaborative emergency event management at all levels.
These concepts, principles, and processes are designed to improve the
ability of different jurisdictions and first-responder disciplines
(e.g., fire and police) to work together in various areas--command,
resource management, training, and communications. The NRP is designed
to integrate federal government domestic prevention, protection,
response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan for all
hazards and all emergency response disciplines. Using the framework
provided by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal
support to state, local, and tribal emergency managers and defines
situations where the federal authorities are to provide support and
situations where the federal authorities are to assume control. The NRP
organizes capabilities and staffing and equipment resources in terms of
functions that are most likely to be needed during emergency events,
describes common processes and specific administrative requirements
(e.g., public affairs, financial management, public health, etc.), and
outlines core procedures. The NRP also augments NIMS by defining roles
and responsibilities for specific types of emergencies.
To develop NIMS and NRP, DHS assembled a variety of stakeholders from
federal, state, and local levels such as national professional
associations, and state and local responders representing the full
range of response disciplines. During the development of NIMS,
stakeholder groups reacted to initial drafts developed by DHS. The
final draft of NIMS incorporated, in part, key elements of a widely-
used, interdisciplinary system of command--first used in conjunction
with wildfires in California during the 1960s--into a standardized,
national system that would apply across all emergency response
disciplines and levels of government. Similarly, the NRP was based on a
consensus among stakeholders of best practices to apply in integrating
prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans into one all-
discipline, all-hazards plan.
HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt and use
NIMS in their individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of
all actions taken to assist state and local governments. Further, the
directive requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of
NIMS by states a condition, to the extent permitted by law, of federal
preparedness assistance beginning in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year
2005 DHS required states and other jurisdictions that receive direct
funding to incorporate NIMS into existing training programs and
exercises, emergency operations plans, and intrastate mutual aid
agreements; to institutionalize the use of the Incident Command System;
and will require states and other jurisdictions to certify as part of
their fiscal year 2006 grant applications that they have met the fiscal
year 2005 NIMS requirements. However, final requirements for fiscal
year 2006 self certification have not been formulated, according to DHS
officials. DHS encouraged, but did not require, local governments to
implement these activities to the maximum extent possible.
We assessed NIMS and NRP to determine the extent to which the policy
documents discuss and emphasize different types of emergency events.
Our analysis showed that both documents had been developed in a manner
that reflects an all-hazards approach. For example, both NIMS and NRP
use the generic term "incident management" rather than specifying the
cause(s) of events, such as a terrorist act, accident, or natural
disaster. Moreover, NIMS and NRP are designed to promote
interdisciplinary efforts that consider the involvement of multiple
jurisdictions and multiple responders. The common processes and
specific administrative requirements listed in NRP also are described
in terms that are not specific to any type of threat or emergency. For
example, according to NRP, the plan is to be implemented during
"incidents of national significance."[Footnote 8]
First responders we visited affirmed that NIMS and the NRP do take an
all hazards approach--that is, they apply to natural and accidental
disasters, as well as terrorist attacks. For example, 12 first
responder officials we interviewed told us that they have long used the
incident command system upon which NIMS was based for a variety of
emergency events. Similarly, one homeland security director in a large
urban city said NIMS had only had a moderate impact on their operations
because the city has already been using an incident command system in
its all-hazards approach.
DHS Is Developing an All-Hazards National Preparedness Goal and Related
Products Using Capabilities-Based Planning:
To comply with the requirements established in HSPD-8, DHS is
developing a National Preparedness Goal. While NIMS defines "how" to
manage a large-scale emergency event and NRP defines "what" needs to be
done, the National Preparedness Goal is intended to generally define
"how well" it needs to be done. DHS issued an interim version of the
goal in March 2005. The interim version will remain in effect until
superseded by the Final National Preparedness Goal, which DHS intends
to issue in October 2005.[Footnote 9] According to officials from DHS's
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, the
final version is expected to remain largely the same as the interim;
however, the office is working with its state and local government
stakeholders to define appropriate jurisdictional tiers, and plans to
add this information to the final version of the goal. According to the
Interim National Preparedness Goal, the primary purpose of establishing
tiers is to account for reasonable differences in target levels of
capability (or system-specific elements of capability) among groups of
jurisdictions based on differences in risk factors such as total
population, population density, and critical infrastructure. Our review
of the interim goal indicates that it reflects an all-hazards focus by
consistently citing both natural and accidental disasters and terrorist
attacks as emergencies and the extent to which the nation's first
responders must develop their capabilities to address all hazards.
To develop the goal and determine the tasks and capabilities needed by
first responders on a nation-wide basis, DHS is using an approach known
as capabilities-based planning. The purpose of this approach is to
provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards,
in an environment of uncertainty and within an economic framework that
necessitates prioritization for allocation of finite resources,
according to DHS. As figure 3 shows, DHS's application of the
capabilities-based planning process model to the development of the
goal and related products involves three stages: (1) defining target
levels of capability; (2) achieving target levels of capability; and
(3) assessing preparedness.
Figure 3: Three Stages of DHS Capabilities-Based Planning Process Model
for Development of the National Preparedness Goal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based planning process
identifying concerns using 15 National Planning Scenarios that were
developed by the Homeland Security Council, as illustrated in table
1.[Footnote 10] The 15 scenarios include 12 terrorist attacks
(incorporating chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive,
and cyber attacks) and 3 natural disasters--an earthquake, a hurricane
and a pandemic influenza outbreak. According to DHS, the Homeland
Security Council excluded scenarios for which they considered well-
developed and tested response capabilities to be already available and
scenarios where the set of response capabilities would be a subset of
one of the 15 scenarios chosen. Examples of excluded scenarios are
industrial and transportation accidents and frequently occurring
natural disasters, such as floods, the nation's most frequent natural
disaster. According to DHS officials, there was less concern about
planning for natural disasters because there is a tremendous amount of
experience, actuarial data, geographical and seasonal patterns, and
other information that is not available in the context of terrorism.
Officials told us that the department chose to focus the identification
of its concerns on event consequences rather than event probabilities,
given the high degree of uncertainty related to preparing for terrorist
events.
Table 1: DHS Suite of National Planning Scenarios:
* Improvised nuclear device attack;
* Major earthquake;
* Aerosol anthrax attack;
* Major hurricane;
* Pandemic influenza;
* Radiological attack with dispersal device;
* Biological attack with plague;
* Improvised explosive device attack;
* Chemical attack with blister agent;
* Biological attack with food contamination;
* Chemical attack with toxic chemical agent;
* Biological attack with foreign animal disease (Foot and Mouth
disease);
* Chemical attack with nerve agent;
* Cyber attack;
* Chemical attack resulting in chlorine tank explosion.
Source: DHS National Planning Scenarios.
[End of table]
According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the planning
scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-
scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be
prepared. Some state and local officials and experts in the field of
emergency preparedness said that the scenarios did not appear to
reflect an assessment of risk or a relative ranking related to risk. As
a result, they questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs
for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility
and the number of scenarios (12 of 15) that are based on terrorist
attacks.[Footnote 11] Officials in DHS's Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness said that the scenarios were
not ranked according to risk, noting that this was unnecessary given
the purposes for which the scenarios were developed. They stated that
the 15 planning scenarios are not meant to be proscriptive, predictive,
or exhaustive nor were they intended to be ranked according to risk.
According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the objective of
developing the scenarios was to provide a minimum number of credible
scenarios that covered the range of response requirements. DHS's
executive summaries of the planning scenarios state that the scenarios
were not ranked according to risk and probability because they were
developed to test the full range of response capabilities and resources
for federal, state, and local governments as well as the private
sector, each of which could have different risks and rankings.
As it moved to the step in the process to develop a sense of
preparedness needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of
tasks that would be required to manage each of the 15 National Planning
Scenarios. Then, in consultation with federal, state, and local
emergency response stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate
redundancies and create a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete
tasks. This list was further refined to identify critical tasks that
would need to be performed at various levels of government to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale emergency
events. Next, DHS identified target capabilities that encompassed these
critical tasks. The relationship between the scenarios, tasks, and
capabilities is shown in figure 4.
Figure 4: Scenarios, Tasks, and Capabilities for the National
Preparedness Goal:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to DHS, the Universal Task List is intended to include all
unique, potential tasks at all levels of government that are needed to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all large-scale
emergency events, although every task would not necessarily be
applicable to each of the 15 planning scenarios and no single
jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task. From
this universe of potential tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to
identify a subset of about 300 critical tasks that must be performed
during a large-scale event to reduce loss of life or serious injuries,
mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success
of a homeland security mission.
The final step of the first stage of DHS's planning process is to
decide goals, requirements, and metrics. To complete this step, DHS,
working with its stakeholders, developed a Target Capabilities List
that identifies 36 capabilities needed to perform the critical tasks
for the events illustrated by the 15 scenarios. An example of a desired
outcome for the target capability of mass prophylaxis--prevention of or
protective treatment for disease--is to effectively reach an entire
affected population in time to prevent loss of life and injury. The
relationship between the Universal Task List, critical tasks, and
target capabilities for the pandemic flu scenario is illustrated in
figure 5.
Figure 5: Example of Target Capability Development: Pandemic Influenza
Scenario and Resulting Universal Tasks, Critical Tasks, and Target
Capability:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Target Capabilities List, according the National Preparedness Goal,
provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability
that federal, state, local, and tribal first responders will be
expected to develop and maintain. DHS has defined these capabilities
generically and expressed them in terms of desired operational outcomes
and essential characteristics, rather than dictating specific,
quantifiable responsibilities to the various jurisdictions. In the
final version of the National Preparedness Goal, DHS plans to organize
classes of jurisdictions that share similar characteristics such as
total population, population density, and critical infrastructure into
tiers to account for reasonable differences in capability levels among
groups of jurisdictions. According to the Interim National Preparedness
Goal, the purpose of defining these groups of jurisdictions is to be
able to appropriately apportion responsibility for development and
maintenance of capabilities among levels of government and across these
jurisdictional tiers, because both the risk and the resource base vary
considerably among jurisdictions across the United States.
According to observations from 12 of the first responder departments we
interviewed, radiological and biological attacks are among potential
emergency events they may face which they are least prepared for and
most concerned about their capabilities. However, because these types
of attacks may require that a greater number of capabilities be
exercised simultaneously or that a greater number or wider variety of
first responders be employed to provide specific capabilities, these
capabilities would necessarily be drawn from regional, federal, or
private resources. In this regard the National Response Plan defines
the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, private-
sector, and nongovernmental organizations and citizens involved in
support of domestic incident management, noting particularly that when
state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, state governors are
responsible for requesting federal assistance when it becomes clear
that state or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been
exceeded or exhausted.
As we have previously reported, state and local resources alone will
likely be insufficient to meet the terrorist threat, given the
specialized resources that are necessary to address some types of
terrorist attacks, the range of governmental services that could be
affected, and the vital role played by private entities in preparing
for and mitigating risks.[Footnote 12] Because no single jurisdiction
or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a
target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local
resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some
combination of the two. DHS encourages planning for regional
cooperation and notes in the NRP that mutual aid agreements provide
mechanisms to mobilize and employ resources from neighboring
jurisdictions to support the incident command. Facilitating effective
regional coordination may present some challenges. For example, our
work in the National Capital Region found that no regional coordination
methods had been developed for planning for the use of 15 of the 16
funding sources we reviewed.[Footnote 13] While the National Capital
Region has experience with working together for regional emergency
preparedness and response, officials from the National Capital Region
told us that they had not worked together to develop plans and
coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds.
DHS also issued National Preparedness Guidance in April 2005 that
provides information, instructions and examples on how to prepare for
implementation of the goal at the federal, state and local levels of
government. The guidance identifies the most urgent needs for enhancing
national first responder preparedness capabilities in terms of 7
national priorities: (1) implementation of NRP and NIMS; (2)
implementation of the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan;
(3) expanding regional cooperation; (4) strengthening capabilities in
interoperable communications; (5) strengthening capabilities in
information sharing and collaboration; (6) strengthening capabilities
in medical surge and mass prophylaxis; (7) strengthening capabilities
in detection and response for chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive weapons. Our review also indicated that the
National Preparedness Guidance largely reflects an all-hazards approach
and was developed in a manner that recognizes a range of possible
threats and origins. Six of the 7 national priorities established and
described by the guidance are generally applicable to all hazards. In
addition to implementation of the 7 national priorities, the guidance
identifies other all-hazards planning requirements for federal, state,
and local governments.
DHS's Implementation Plans May Address the Need for a Risk-Based,
Strategic National Approach to Enhancing First Responders' All-Hazards
Capabilities, But It Faces Implementation Challenges:
We reported in our 21st century challenges work that federal
investments in national preparedness have not been guided by a clear,
risk-based strategic plan. The objective of the second stage of DHS's
capabilities based planning process is to develop such a plan by
creating a decision framework that will allow first responders at all
levels of government to assess needs, update preparedness strategies,
and allocate resources to address capability gaps and make the greatest
improvements in preparedness. To support its planning efforts in the
second stage of implementing HSPD-8, DHS has developed program
implementation plans for (1) a national assessment and reporting of
capability status, (2) an approach for balancing national investments
in capabilities, and (3) programs for national training, national
exercises, and collection and dissemination of lessons learned and best
practices.
To develop these program implementation plans, DHS established task
teams composed of various stakeholders from within DHS as well as
representatives from state and local first responders and
representatives from their professional associations such as the
International Association of Fire Chiefs and Chiefs of Police, and the
International Association of Emergency Managers. These stakeholder
groups, called Integrated Concept Teams, developed the three program
implementation requirement plans. According to DHS, implementation will
be led by designated DHS program management offices along with
stakeholders comprised of federal, state, local, tribal officials and
private sector advisors; operational tasks will be performed by
contractors. DHS plans to issue contracts during fiscal year 2005, to
develop systems to meet the goals of the implementation plans, and
complete implementation of the three national systems by September 30,
2008.
National Preparedness Assessment and Reporting Program Implementation
Plan:
According to DHS's Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS
intends to implement an assessment and reporting system to collect
preparedness data to inform decision-makers at all levels on the
capabilities of the federal government, states, local jurisdictions,
and the private sector. According to the plan, DHS intends to collect
data from all governmental recipients of direct funding, using states
to collect data from local jurisdictions and using federal regulatory
agencies and other appropriate sources to collect private-sector data.
According to DHS, aggregating this data at all levels will provide
information needed to allocate resources, execute training and
exercises, and develop an annual status report on the nation's
preparedness. The purpose of the assessment and reporting system is to
provide information about the baseline status of national preparedness
and to serve as the third stage of DHS's capability-based planning
approach to ensure that state and local first responder capabilities
fully support the National Preparedness Goal. The proposed system is to
include the following components:
* Capability assessment: Using target capabilities, first responders
would be able to assess their preparedness to identify gaps, excesses,
or deficiencies in their existing capabilities or capabilities they
will be expected to access through mutual aid. In addition, this
information is to measure the readiness of federal civil response
assets and the use of federal assistance at the state and local level
and provide a means of assessing how federal assistance programs are
supporting the National Preparedness Goal.
* Compliance assessment: By establishing a mechanism for monitoring
compliance with mandated guidance such as compliance with NIMS, and
conformity with guidance on the preparation of homeland security
strategies and grants, the compliance assessment is intended to serve
as a check and balance on the self-reported information in the
capability assessment.
* Performance assessment: By using a standardized reporting that
documents performance in specific tasks relevant to the target
capabilities, first responders will be expected to demonstrate
accomplishments in exercises and real-world operations. Part of the
performance assessment is to include corrective action plans to
highlight and address areas in need of improvement.
As DHS implements the assessment and reporting system, it may encounter
several challenges, which were identified by the assessment and
reporting concept team in developing the implementation plan. These
challenges include:
* Determining how to aggregate data from federal state, local, and
tribal governments; private sector owners/operators; non-profit
agencies; and citizen volunteers;
* Determining assessment timeframes (i.e., snapshot, annual, real
time), and when and how often they should take place;
* Integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches; and:
* Resolving security classification limitations on information sharing
among participants.
National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan:
According to DHS's National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan,
DHS intends to establish an approach to support improved investment
decision-making, using the capability, compliance, and performance
information provided by the assessment and reporting system. The
purpose of the balanced investment program, according to the plan, will
be to direct federal preparedness assistance to the highest priority
capability gaps, balanced by significant risk factors. The proposed
system is to include the following components:
* All-Hazards Needs Assessment: Using information on preparedness gaps
and redundancies identified by the assessment and reporting system, DHS
intends to use state-developed needs assessments to identify and
quantify planning, equipment, training and exercises, and other
organizational needs. These needs assessments are to include input from
the first responder community, the private sector, the research and
academic community, citizen groups, and tribal entities. DHS plans to
direct the states to prioritize the needs they identify in the needs
assessments based on various factors, including threats and
vulnerabilities, tiers, universal tasks, probability, impact, risk, and
cost/benefit analysis. Then, DHS expects to use the needs assessments
to develop guidance, specifically tailored to state and local funding
recipients, to guide the allocation of federal funding and resources in
order to fill capability gaps.
* All-Hazards Preparedness Strategies: Needs assessments will provide a
consistent basis for developing preparedness strategies for federal,
regional, state, urban area, local and tribal first responders. DHS
plans to develop and provide guidance and requirements so that
strategies at all levels will align with the National Preparedness Goal
and facilitate cooperation, mutual aid, and standardization across
jurisdictions.
* All-Hazards Decision Framework: DHS intends to design a framework for
allocating resources to implement federal, regional, state, urban area,
local and tribal first responders' strategies. Using a structured
process to estimate the relative impact of alternative investments and
identify the optimal mix of investments for funding, DHS plans to
assess, prioritize and develop optimized ranking of potential
investments based on factors such as population concentrations,
critical infrastructure and other significant risk factors.
In the implementation of its balanced investment program DHS intends to
devise a process to prioritize investments in planning, personnel,
equipment, training, and exercises to close capability gaps identified
by the national assessment and reporting system. A key challenge will
be establishing a standardized approach for measuring and reporting the
risks faced by diverse states and localities in order to effectively
prioritize and allocate federal resources. Given that the 15 national
planning scenarios DHS used to identify capability gaps were selected
without regard to relative risk (i.e. probability of occurrence), it is
not yet clear how DHS will prioritize investments in capability gaps on
a national level. We have consistently advocated a risk management
approach as a basis for ensuring that specific programs and related
expenditures are prioritized and properly focused. Although risk
management is an evolving practice, we have encouraged the application
of certain key elements of a risk management approach, including a risk
assessment that defines risks based on the likelihood that they will
occur and the consequences of their occurrence. Another key element of
the risk management approach we have advocated is the identification of
risk mitigation alternatives and the ability to select among those
alternatives based on risk, cost, and effectiveness. The intent of
DHS's planned all-hazards decision framework to prioritize and optimize
investments based on population, critical infrastructure, and other
significant risk factors appears to offer the opportunity for such an
approach to managing risk. However, as DHS does not expect to fully
implement its balanced investment program before October 2008, it
continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs
without a solid risk-based decision framework, and we were unable to
evaluate whether and the extent to which such a framework will
incorporate these key elements of risk management. For example, it is
not clear how DHS will use the data collected in the all-hazards needs
assessment to consistently and comprehensively prioritize resource
allocations based on national threats and vulnerabilities or how the
department will define acceptable risks as it sets priorities.
National Training and Exercise and Lessons Learned Plan:
According to DHS's National Training and Exercises and Lessons Learned
Implementation Plan, DHS intends to implement a system to develop and
maintain state and local responders' all-hazards capabilities. The goal
of this system is to provide integrated national programs for training,
exercise, and lessons-learned that will reorient existing initiatives
at all government levels in order to develop, achieve, and sustain the
capabilities that are required to achieve the National Preparedness
Goal. The proposed system is to include the following components:
* National training program: Based on training needs defined by the
Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and the National
Incident Management System, the program is intended to provide criteria
for accreditation of training courses, a national directory of
accredited training providers, and a National Minimum Qualification
Standards Guide.
* National exercise program: This program is intended to reorient the
existing National Exercise Program to incorporate the capabilities-
based planning process and provide standardized guidance and
methodologies to schedule, design, develop, execute, and evaluate
exercises at all levels of government. This program is also intended to
provide requirements for the number and type of exercises that
communities of varying sizes should conduct to meet the National
Preparedness Goal.
* National lessons-learned program: This program is intended to create
a centralized source for sharing lessons learned information that will
be reviewed and validated at a national level using a standardized
reporting format and process.
DHS faces challenges to coordinate this effort across the many state
and local jurisdictions and among the variety of first responder
disciplines. According to this integrated concept team's meeting
minutes, its efforts were essential in order to develop a management
system to ensure there are standard processes across all agencies.
Among other things, DHS faces challenges related to:
* Disparate training requirements across disciplines,
* Different processes to manage training and exercises, and:
* Different terms and definitions among disciplines related to
emergency response functions.
Most Preparedness Capabilities Apply to All Emergency Events, but
Prevention of Terrorist Attacks Requires Unique Capabilities:
Terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and
accidental disasters. Our analysis of DHS's Target Capabilities List
and our discussions with first responders and other emergency
management stakeholders revealed that the capabilities required to
address terrorist attacks and to address natural and accidental
disasters are most similar for protection, response, and recovery, and
differ most for prevention. More specifically, 30 of the 36 target
capabilities yielded by DHS's capabilities based planning process apply
across all types of emergency events. It is possible that terrorist
attacks could be prevented through actionable intelligence (i.e.,
information that can lead to stopping or apprehending terrorists), but
there is no known way to prevent natural disasters, such as hurricanes,
earthquakes, and tornadoes. Natural or accidental disasters differ from
terrorist attacks in that they are unintentional and unplanned rather
than the result of deliberate, planned action. It is the deliberate,
planned nature of terrorist attacks that makes preventive efforts for
such attacks principally the responsibility of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.
Terrorist Attacks Share Common Characteristics with Natural and
Accidental Disasters, and Most Preparedness Capabilities are Similar
for All Emergency Events:
Because terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with
natural and accidental disasters, many of the capabilities first
responders need to support national preparedness efforts are similar.
As shown in table 2, many terrorist attacks are analogous to natural
and accidental disasters.
Table 2: Natural and Accidental Disasters and Terrorist Attacks That
Have Similar Effects:
Natural and accidental disasters: Fires;
Terrorist attacks: Arson.
Natural and accidental disasters: Explosions;
Terrorist attacks: Bombings.
Natural and accidental disasters: Plane/Train Crashes;
Terrorist attacks: Aviation/Rail Terrorism.
Natural and accidental disasters: Floods;
Terrorist attacks: Dam/Dike Sabotage.
Natural and accidental disasters: Chemical Spills/Releases;
Terrorist attacks: Chemical Warfare.
Natural and accidental disasters: Radiological Accidents;
Terrorist attacks: "Dirty Bombs".
Natural and accidental disasters: Nuclear Accidents;
Terrorist attacks: Nuclear Terrorism.
Natural and accidental disasters: Epidemics, Biological Accidents;
Terrorist attacks: Biological Terrorism.
Source: GAO analysis of research and historical information on
emergency events.
[End of table]
For example, chemical attacks would resemble hazardous materials spills
that release similar chemicals on highways or accidents that cause
toxic gases to leak from rail cars, a small-scale biological attack
using a common disease organism would resemble a natural outbreak, the
tasks required to respond following large explosions are analogous to
those necessary for responding to the aftermath of tornadoes, and
preparedness for "dirty bomb" attacks requires practices that
responders whose jurisdictions encompass nuclear power plants regularly
exercise, according to other emergency professionals we consulted and
the observations of selected officials from first responder departments
we interviewed. As one expert explained, managing the Pentagon scene on
September 11, 2001, consisted of five interrelated all-hazards response
routines: plane crash, building fire, collapsed structure, crime scene,
and crowd control. According to DHS officials, their analysis of the
Homeland Security Council's 15 scenarios revealed that approximately 80
percent of necessary tasks would need to be performed regardless of the
scenario. To achieve the performance of critical homeland security
tasks, DHS has adopted an approach to the implementation of HSPD-8 that
centers on building specific prevention, protection, response, and
recovery capabilities within and among four related homeland security
mission areas. Table 3 describes each mission area.
Table 3: Homeland Security Mission Areas:
Mission Area: Prevent;
Description: Deter all potential terrorists from attacking America,
detect terrorists before they strike, prevent them and their
instruments of terror from entering our country, and take decisive
action to eliminate the threat they pose.
Mission Area: Protect;
Description: Reduce the likelihood of attack on assets or systems and
limit the impact should an attack occur.
Mission Area: Respond;
Description: Implement immediate actions to save lives, protect
property, and meet basic human needs.
Mission Area: Recover;
Description: Develop, coordinate, and execute service-and site-
restoration plans and reconstitute government operations and services
through individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public
assistance programs.
Source: DHS Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1.
[End of table]
Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist attacks
and natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning, personnel,
training, and equipment that form the basis of protection, response,
and recovery capabilities are similar across all emergency events,
though certain mission areas are more similar than others.
Specifically, our analysis of DHS's detailed definitions and
descriptions of the 36 target capabilities showed that only 6 of the
capabilities are described as being specific to terrorist attacks. Five
of these 6 capabilities fall into DHS's prevention mission area, and
one is in the protection mission area. The remaining 30 capabilities
address preparedness for all hazards. DHS officials reviewed our
analysis and agreed with our assessment of the relative applicability
of the 36 target capabilities to various hazards. Table 4 lists the 36
target capabilities, the respective homeland security mission area
where the capability is found, and the extent to which the various
components of the capability address preparedness for all
hazards.[Footnote 14]
Table 4: Arrangement of DHS's 36 Target Capabilities by Homeland
Security Mission Area and the Relative Emphasis on Terrorism
Preparedness for Each:
Homeland security mission area: Capabilities common to all mission
areas;
Applicable to all hazards:
1. Interoperable communications;
2. Planning.
Homeland security mission area: Prevention capabilities;
Specific to terrorism:
1. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
detection;
2. Terrorism investigation and intervention;
3. Information collection and threat recognition;
4. Information sharing and collaboration;
5. Intelligence fusion and analysis;
Homeland security mission area: Protection capabilities;
Specific to terrorism:
6. Critical infrastructure protection against terrorist attack;
Applicable to all hazards:
3. Citizen preparedness and participation;
4. Food and agriculture safety and defense;
5. Public health epidemiological investigation and laboratory testing;
6. Risk analysis;
Homeland security mission area: Response capabilities;
7. Animal health emergency support;
8. Citizen protection: evacuation and/or in place protection;
9. Critical resource logistics and distribution;
10. Emergency operations center management;
11. Emergency public information and warning;
12. Environmental health and vector control;
13. Explosive device response operations;
14. Fatality management;
15. Firefighting operations/support;
16. Isolation and quarantine;
17. Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services);
18. Mass prophylaxis;
19. Medical supplies management and distribution;
20. Medical surge;
21. On-site incident management;
22. Public safety and security response;
23. Search and rescue;
24. Triage and pre-hospital treatment;
25. Volunteer management and donations;
26. Weapons of mass destruction/hazardous materials response and
decontamination;
27. Worker health and safety.
Homeland security mission area: Recovery capabilities;
Applicable to all hazards:
28. Economic and community recovery;
29. Restoration of lifelines;
30. Structural damage assessment and mitigation.
Source: GAO Analysis of DHS Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1.
[End of table]
Although almost all target capabilities in the areas of protection,
response, and recovery are similar across emergency events, terrorist
attacks could require that more of the specific prevention, protection,
response, or recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously, or that
a greater number or wider variety of capability elements (e.g.,
personnel, planning, and equipment) could be employed to provide the
capability. Nonetheless, many emergency response representatives we
consulted agreed that substantial overlap exists between capabilities
that are needed for natural and accidental disasters and those that are
needed for terrorist attacks. These shared capabilities would allow for
the performance of broad tasks such as controlling entry to emergency
areas, recovering victims, treating the ill and injured, providing
basic living needs for survivors and their families, transporting the
dead, restoring essential services, handling public inquiries,
providing a basis for recovery, and maintaining law and order.
Prevention Capabilities Differ for Terrorism Because of a Reliance on
Actionable Intelligence:
Terrorist attacks differ from natural and accidental disasters because
they are intentionally perpetrated acts that could possibly be
prevented or deterred. As a result, all five of the prevention
capabilities on DHS's target capabilities list focus exclusively on
terrorist attacks. Although first responders from the law enforcement
community are active in the prevention of crime, and all terrorist
attacks are crimes, the prevention of terrorist attacks differs from
traditional crime prevention in its heavy reliance on actionable
intelligence--information that can lead to stopping or apprehending
terrorists. Reflecting this reliance within the prevention mission area
are the capabilities to collect information of value to
counterterrorism and analyze this intelligence for possible threats;
recognize the wider threat picture and potentially harmful patterns
that may emerge from collected intelligence; and share this
intelligence across disciplines and jurisdictions. Reliance on
actionable intelligence also is used within the prevention mission area
to support investigation of terrorist activities and to interdict
weapons of mass destruction by preventing the import, transport,
manufacture, or release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive materials. During our interviews, 29 of 52 first
responder departments who replied to a question about the extent to
which prevention capabilities differ between terrorist and other
emergencies said that terrorism prevention is either more different
than similar or very different.
Protection Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks and Natural or Accidental
Disasters Are Similar, Even Though DHS Identifies Protection of
Critical Infrastructure in Terms of Terrorist Attacks:
Although the Target Capabilities List states that the purpose of
protection capabilities is to reduce the likelihood of attack and to
limit the damage should an attack occur, four of the five capabilities
that compose this mission area could also be applied to limit the
damage from natural and accidental disasters. For example, the
protection mission area includes capabilities such as the
identification and prioritization of hazards, vulnerabilities, and
risks; the identification and eradication of contaminants in the
nation's food supply; the investigation of disease outbreaks, both
deliberate and naturally occurring; and the involvement of citizens in
exercises and ongoing volunteer programs.
The only protection capability that DHS links exclusively to terrorist
attacks is Critical Infrastructure Protection.[Footnote 15] This
capability is intended to reduce the threat to and vulnerability of
high-risk targets such as the nation's infrastructure. The capability
summary states that this capability applies to all terrorist attack
scenarios. However, many of the critical tasks that compose this
capability are traditional mitigation activities: pre-event actions
that involve lasting, often permanent reduction of the exposure to,
probability of, or potential loss from a variety of emergency events.
These actions could include tasks as simple as fastening bookshelves to
walls to keep them from falling during earthquakes or as involved as
rewriting building codes and zoning ordinances to minimize future flood
damage. These types of actions are applicable to multiple emergency
scenarios--for example, installing shatterproof glass protects against
damage and injury from flying glass in the event of both a heavy storm
and a terrorist bombing. Similarly, taking protective measures to
improve the safety of rail cars in a mass transit system--an example of
a vital system as described in the Critical Infrastructure Protection
capability--could reduce the damage from terrorist attacks while also
mitigating the effects of accidental collisions.
Response Capabilities Apply Across All Emergency Types:
DHS's response mission area includes 21 response capabilities that are
each applicable to terrorist attacks and to natural and accidental
disasters. Examples of response capabilities include the ability to:
manage an emergency operations center; relocate affected and at-risk
members of the population to safer areas through emergency evacuation;
advise and update citizens through emergency public information;
conduct and support fire suppression operations; isolate and quarantine
individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed during a
contagious disease outbreak; provide mass prophylaxis following the
onset of a biological event; distribute medical supplies and provide
adequate medical evaluation and care during events that exceed the
limits of the normal medical capacity of an affected community--
referred to as medical surge; direct and control an emergency event
site through an incident command system; coordinate and conduct search
and rescue operations in collapsed structures; and protect first
responder health and safety during a response. During our interviews,
37 of 54 first responder departments who replied to a question about
the extent to which response differs between terrorist incidents and
natural or accidental disasters stated that terrorism response is
either more similar than different or very similar.
For example, the capability to distribute medical supplies and manage a
medical surge could be needed in both a terrorist attack and a natural
disaster. According to the Homeland Security Council, the number of
uninjured or "worried well" who sought medical treatment after the 9/11
World Trade Center attack was approximately 15 times the number of
people who sought medical treatment due to smoke inhalation. According
to one public health official we interviewed, physicians would observe
a similar "worried well" phenomenon in non-terrorism scenarios, for
example, among otherwise healthy patients who incorrectly attribute
common symptoms to a feared severe acute respiratory syndrome or SARS
infection.
The capability to successfully disrupt and dispose of an explosive
device, though generally directed toward an intentional act, is not
limited to terrorism preparedness. Eliminating explosive devices of
varying sizes and sophistication is part of a police department's
regular operations, and many public safety agencies had bomb squads
dedicated to this purpose before the attacks of September, 11, 2001,
focused the nation's attention on terrorism.
One of the capabilities in the response mission area--Weapons of Mass
Destruction/Hazardous Incident Response and Decontamination--
explicitly includes weapons of mass destruction in its title,
indicating that the capability may be terrorism-focused. However, this
capability is combined with the capability to respond to all hazardous
materials sites. Therefore, it is by definition an all-hazards
capability. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, however,
depending upon the size of the weapon, an emergency event could require
that a host of related response and recovery capabilities be exercised
simultaneously and that a greater number or wider variety of first
responders be asked to deliver these capabilities than might typically
occur during a natural or accidental disaster.
Initial awareness of the possibility of terrorist involvement has
become part of first responders' protocols for responding to any event.
For example, officials from 5 first responder departments we met with
said that they have developed protocols for entering the site of an
incident and have heightened their awareness of secondary devices or
attacks. These protocols have increasingly become part of the standard
response to any emergency event because responders must consider
attacks that are intended to kill and injure response personnel and to
otherwise impede response efforts. One fire department official
explained that the events of September 11, 2001, raised the
department's general awareness level and that, in the post-9/11
environment, response personnel are likely to think of terrorism first
when a catastrophic event occurs, which may lead to a greater
assessment of the situation before entering the scene. Moreover,
according to local fire department officials we visited in several
locations, fire departments have long been aware of secondary events,
like explosions or collapsing structures; the difference now is the
possible presence of intent, which means that these secondary events
may be targeted instead of random, and thus may be more likely to kill,
injure, and destroy.
Recovery Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks Apply Across All Emergency
Types:
There are three capabilities that compose DHS's recovery mission area,
and all three are all-hazards in nature. They consist of the capability
to: conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private
structures; restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other
essential services; and implement short-term and long-term economic and
community recovery processes. During our interviews, 31 of 51 first
responder departments who replied to the question about the extent to
which recovery differs between terrorist incidents and natural or
accidental disasters said that recovery capabilities were either more
similar than different or very similar. For example, a community's
buildings would need to be assessed after an earthquake or after a
terrorist attack that topples multiple structures. The capability to
restore transportation services would also be necessary whether a
city's bus service has been suspended due to a winter storm or to a
terrorist bombing. Long-term recovery processes may be necessary in the
case of terrorist events that result in long-term or permanent
evacuation from a geographic area: for example, an intentional
radiological release could contaminate the surrounding area in the same
way that accidental releases have done in past radiological events. In
this way, the aftermath of large-scale terrorist events could be
similar to the long-term or permanent evacuation from flood zones and
environmentally-compromised hazardous waste sites.
Federal Funding For Enhancing First Responders' Preparedness
Capabilities Emphasizes Terrorism but Can Be Applied to All Hazards:
Federal grant funding since September 11, 2001, has largely emphasized
enhancing first responders' capabilities to respond to terrorist
attacks. Legislative language has directed DHS to use these funds
chiefly to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from acts of
terrorism. Additionally, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards
approach to national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on
terrorism. As a result, DHS grant guidance has contained, in large
part, explicit direction that state and local grant recipients use the
funds to enhance first responders' capabilities for terrorist attacks.
State preparedness officials and local first responders we interviewed
said that DHS's emphasis for grant funding was too heavily focused on
terrorism; rather, they preferred to invest in dual use equipment and
training (i.e., could be used for all hazards, whether the source was a
terrorist act or a natural or accidental disaster.) In response, DHS
promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within the grant program
requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS officials. To
ensure grant funds are used for their designated purpose, the states
and localities we visited reported they all have financial controls
methods and monitoring procedures in place designed to ensure that
whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS's
program guidelines.
DHS Grant Funding for First Responders Has Focused on Terrorism:
DHS grant programs have largely focused on enhancing first responders'
capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks based on HSPD-8 and
legislation that emphasize preparedness assistance for catastrophic
terrorism as the highest priority for federal funding. For example,
HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national
emergency preparedness assistance and directs the department to place
special emphasis on terrorism in doing so.[Footnote 16] Moreover,
legislative requirements associated with the larger grant programs for
first responders focus on terrorist attacks, while smaller grant
programs focus on all-hazards preparedness. For example, the
legislative requirements associated with the 3 largest grant programs
specify that funds be used for preparedness against terrorist attacks:
* State Homeland Security Grant program funds are to be used to enhance
the capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare, for and
respond to, acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive
weapons.[Footnote 17]
* Urban Area Security Initiative grant funds are to be used to enhance
high threat, high density urban areas' ability to prepare for and
respond to threats or acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction.[Footnote 18]
* The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program is, as its name
suggests, to provide funds to assist state and local law enforcement
communities in their activities to prevent terrorist attacks.[Footnote
19]
The only other first responder grant programs that received an
appropriation of greater than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 were two
long standing programs that have historically had an all-hazards focus:
* The Emergency Management Performance Grant program was authorized to
provide emergency management planning and assistance to states for
multi-hazard preparedness and mitigation.[Footnote 20]
* The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program provides assistance to
fire departments for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of
the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related
hazards, including incidents of terrorism or use of weapons of mass
destruction.[Footnote 21]
As shown in figure 6, almost 3 of every 4 grant dollars appropriated to
DHS for first responders in fiscal year 2005 were for 3 primary
programs that had an explicit focus on terrorism. Congress appropriated
almost $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2005 for the three largest grant
programs: the State Homeland Security Grant program (about $1.1
billion), the Urban Area Security Initiative ($885 million) and the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program ($400 million). Congress
appropriated about $960 million in fiscal year 2005 for all-hazards
grant programs: the Emergency Management Performance Grant program
($180 million), the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program ($715
million), and other grant programs ($65 million)--such as Citizen Corps
and the Metropolitan Medical Response System.
Figure 6: Most Fiscal Year 2005 DHS First Responder Grant Funding Is
for Three Programs that Focus On Terrorism:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Our analysis of appropriations between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 for
these key first responder grant programs showed that while funding for
all grant programs increased substantially, funding for grant programs
with an all-hazards emergency management focus increased at a lesser
rate than funding for terrorism-specific programs, as shown in figure
7. This increase in terrorism-focused funding was due mainly to the
funding increases for appropriated programs related to the State
Homeland Security Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative
grant program, which increased from about $109 million and $21 million,
respectively, in fiscal year 2001, to almost $1.1 billion and $885
million, respectively, in fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 22]
Figure 7: DHS Grant Funding for Terrorism versus All Hazards, Fiscal
Years 2001 to 2005 and Projected for Fiscal Year 2006:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For fiscal year 2006, the Administration has proposed spending almost
$3.4 billion for homeland security preparedness grants, continuing
DHS's emphasis on terrorism and spending about 3 of every 4 dollars or
about $2.6 billion for terrorism-focused grant programs.[Footnote 23]
About $720 million would go toward those grant programs with an all-
hazards emergency management focus. The Administration's budget request
also proposes to merge the program activities currently under the
terrorism-focused grant programs by merging the program activities
under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program into the State
Homeland Security Grant and the Urban Area Security Initiative. Under
this proposal states and localities would be required to earmark no
less than 20 percent of their spending under these programs toward
terrorism prevention activities. Finally, the fiscal year 2006 budget
request reflects a continuation of decreased funding for the Assistance
to Firefighters Grant Program. In fiscal year 2006, the proposed budget
for this program is $500 million compared to $715 million in fiscal
year 2005 and $750 million in fiscal year 2004.
More than 87,000 state and local jurisdictions across the nation are
potentially eligible to receive first responder grants funds.
Legislative funding criteria affect allocation of these funds to states
who in turn allocate funds to local first responders. For example, the
fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, allocated a minimum
of 0.75 percent of the available first-responder funding to each state,
which accounted for 40 percent of the total allocations for this
program.[Footnote 24] Alternative approaches for the formula to
allocate State Homeland Security Program grants with varying degrees of
attention to the risks and threats of terrorism and natural or
accidental disasters are being considered by Congress. For example, one
proposed change in this formula would focus mainly on higher population
areas with critical infrastructure that may be more attractive to
terrorists. This approach is currently the basis for the Urban Area
Security Initiative program funds that are provided to 50 selected
urban areas that are chosen on the basis of population, population
density, presence of critical national infrastructure, threat and
presence of mutual aid compacts.
Some First Responders Disagreed With Emphasis of Federal Grant Programs
on Terror and Expressed Concerns about Current and Future Funding:
The priorities of some first responders we interviewed did not align
with DHS's priorities for enhancing capabilities. For example, during
our interviews, 31 of 39 first responder departments who replied to a
question about DHS's training programs, exercise activities and grant
funds, disagreed that these were focused on all-hazards. In addition,
officials from four first responder departments went on to say that DHS
required too much emphasis on terrorism-related activities in requests
for equipment and training--for example, combating weapons of mass
destruction and preventing and responding to terrorist attacks using
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
materials.[Footnote 25] However, responders said that they had a
greater need for assistance preparing for natural and accidental
disasters. During our interviews, 37 of the 69 first responder
departments who responded to a question about the programmatic
challenges they face cited the need for additional flexibility from DHS
or state agencies in order to use grant funds to enhance their ability
to respond to events that were more likely to occur in their
jurisdictions. State and local officials said they have been able to
identify uses for most of the training and equipment they receive that
include both terrorism and other hazards. Moreover, local first
responder departments and state officials we interviewed also noted
that they favored dual-use purchases for many reasons: to prevent
equipment from "rotting on the shelf," according to one official; to
maintain a level of comfort and proficiency with equipment on hand for
counterterrorism by using it for everyday responses; and to build
stronger all-hazards capabilities that will allow them to better
respond to terrorist attacks.
We have reported in the past that achieving national preparedness and
response goals hinges on the federal government's ability to form
effective partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders.[Footnote 26] By
working collectively with state and local governments, the federal
government gains the resources and expertise of the people closest to
the challenge. Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also
create challenges based upon the different interests reflected by each
partner. From the federal perspective, there is the concern that state
and local governments may not share the same priorities for use of
federal funds. For example, in 10 first responder departments we
interviewed, officials pointed out that they were much more likely to
face the threat of hurricanes, floods, or wildland fires than an attack
by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials and that
their priorities focused on fortifying their efforts to deal with these
natural and accidental disasters. In addition, 61 first responder
departments we interviewed reported that their emergency operations
plans and procedures are all-hazards plans and structured around the
full range of potential emergencies, incidents and risks.
In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within
the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS
officials. Officials from the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness said that the majority of the assistance
they offer to state and local first responders is required to be linked
to emergency management tasks related to terrorist attacks but that
some authorized equipment, training, and exercises can be used for
emergencies that are not related to terrorism. Officials stated, even
prior to fiscal year 2005, grant requirements allowed for dual usage
and state grantees are responsible for contacting DHS when questions
regarding application of grant guidelines arise. They also said that
although the DHS equipment list was not created with the intention that
equipment would be used for non-terrorism purposes, flexibility for
dual use was reasonable, acceptable, and expected. Given that DHS now
defines its targets for protection, response and recovery capabilities
in terms of all-hazards applicability, approved training and equipment
that are intended to enhance these capabilities of first responders
inherently have an all-hazards applicability.
First responders we interviewed also expressed concerns about both
current and sustained future funding for the personnel, training, and
equipment they need to respond to large-scale emergency events. In
addition to the start-up costs--the initial investment in new equipment
and training needed to enhance first responders' capabilities--the
costs of maintaining equipment, providing ongoing training and
exercises for responders, and replenishing perishable supplies and
stock are also likely to be significant. During our interviews, 48 of
69 first responder departments who replied to a question about
challenges said their departments faced funding challenges for
personnel, maintenance, equipment, training, and multi-year funding
sources for sustaining preparedness capabilities. In addition, in 59 of
69 first responder departments we visited first responders cited multi-
year funding as one of their top program challenges. For example,
officials from three state and local departments we interviewed
observed that a connection exists between multi-year funding and
sustainability because without multi-year funding, local first
responders cannot commit to sustaining the equipment purchased on an
ongoing basis. One first responder official worried that their
department is buying new equipment but were concerned that DHS might
not provide future funding for them to sustain the equipment. In
another locality, officials told us that equipment they had purchased
could not be maintained without continued DHS assistance. In response
to these types of concerns, state and local officials have different
options to ensure that capabilities can be sustained; for example,
contracts for equipment purchases could be designed to include
maintenance during the useful life of the equipment, according to DHS.
States and Localities Report Having Financial Controls and Procedures
to Ensure Compliance with Program Guidelines:
The states and localities we visited reported they have financial
controls and procedures in place designed to ensure that whatever
flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS's program
guidelines. State governments and local first responders we visited
identified various purchasing controls and monitoring procedures that
are in place at different levels of government to review the purchase
of goods and services. For example, first responder departments that we
met with said they are required to submit their grant requests to other
local, state or regional government bodies, or steering committees. In
some cases these interagency committees were made up of multiple
jurisdictions and multiple first responder disciplines working
collaboratively to develop the annual list of equipment and training
programs to be acquired for those jurisdictions. State preparedness
agencies and local first responders also identified internal review
processes that exist within the state's administrative agency for
homeland security grants and local internal controls. We have
previously reported on the management of first responder grant programs
and efforts to improve accountability and have examined these
procedures and processes in greater detail.[Footnote 27] In February
2005, we reported that in fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits
to 44 of 56 states and territories that received grants as part of its
monitoring of states' grant reporting and state homeland security
strategy implementation. We also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS
revised its method of reporting on grant expenditures, moving away from
requiring itemized lists of expenditures toward a more results-based
approach where grant managers must demonstrate how grant expenditures
link to larger projects that support one or more goals in the states'
homeland security strategies. Finally, in the absence of some basic,
comparable standards for first responder performance, it has been
difficult to assess the effect of grant expenditures on first responder
capabilities and performance.
Concluding Observations:
Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government's role in
supporting emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily
to providing guidance and grants for planning, mitigation, and
equipment before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes, and
earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such disasters.
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions
of dollars to state and local governments for planning, equipment, and
training to enhance the capabilities of first responders to respond to
terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent, natural and accidental
disasters. These extensive resources reflect a growing federal role in
promoting emergency preparedness. However, as we reported in our 21st
century challenges work, this federal financial assistance has not been
guided by a clear, risk-based strategic plan that would provide a basis
for realistic budgeting and resource planning. Ultimately, the federal
government must determine how much developing and maintaining the
national emergency preparedness capabilities needed for homeland
security will cost and what the nation's federal, state and local
governments can afford to pay. DHS, as the primary executive department
with responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts,
faces the challenge of working with state and local governments to
coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic budgets and
resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain
implementation of an efficient and effective an all-hazards national
preparedness program.
DHS's development of an all-hazards national preparedness goal, along
with related products and program implementation plans and
requirements, if properly planned and executed, may help guide the
development of realistic budget and resource plans. However, DHS may
confront several challenges in its attempts to fully realize the
preparedness goal and implement the three programs described by its
program implementation plans. For example, DHS's assessment and
reporting implementation plan, intended to accurately identify the
status of capabilities at the state, regional, and local levels is
vital for establishing a baseline and providing an ongoing feedback
loop, upon which decisions at these multiple levels of government about
preparedness needs will rest. However, DHS plans to rely extensively on
self-reported data. Therefore, as the team that devised DHS's
assessment and reporting implementation plan pointed out, it is likely
to be a challenge for DHS to determine how to aggregate data from
multiple governmental and nongovernmental emergency preparedness
actors. An effective assessment system will also have to balance self-
assessment approaches with appropriate external assessment checks in
order to provide consistent and accurate data that can drive these
budgeting and resource planning decisions.
A related challenge DHS may face is in continuing to coordinate efforts
to enhance first responder all-hazards capabilities among and across
various states and jurisdictions and to manage stakeholder
expectations. First, DHS's tiered approach to defining first
responders' required capabilities--either to possess or to secure
access--suggests that finding effective approaches for local
jurisdictions to work together to develop funding plans and coordinate
expenditures for the use of federal funds for regional emergency
preparedness and response will be an important step in the process of
developing a realistic budget. However, as our work on emergency
preparedness in the National Capital Region demonstrates, facilitating
effective regional coordination can be particularly challenging.
Additionally, as we have reported, achieving national preparedness and
response goals hinges on the federal government's ability to work
collectively with state and local governments in order to leverage
resources and expertise. Inconsistent expectations about dual use and
concerns about how to coordinate the national training and exercise
program, among other things, illustrate the importance of careful
attention to establishing and maintaining strong nonfederal
partnerships.
Finally, DHS's proposal for a national system to balance resource
investments may help to provide a strategic, risk-based approach to
prioritize federal, state and local resource investments, to the extent
that the department uses a systematic, comprehensive risk management
approach. We have consistently advocated such a risk based approach to
guide federal investments in homeland security that would consider
threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities, as well as the expected
value of investments in developing first responders' capabilities to
prevent terrorist attacks and to protect critical infrastructure
balanced with the potential costs of developing and maintaining
capabilities for responding and recovering from all types of emergency
events. Such an approach could provide a basis to formulate realistic
budget and resource plans at the national level. The intent of DHS's
planned all-hazards decision framework to prioritize and optimize
investments based on population, critical infrastructure, and other
significant risk factors appears to offer the opportunity for such an
approach to managing risk; however establishing a standardized approach
for measuring and reporting the risks faced by diverse states and
localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate federal
resources will be a key challenge. Moreover, as DHS does not expect to
fully implement its balanced investment program before 2008, it
continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs
without a solid risk-based decision framework, and it is not yet clear
whether and to what extent, when established, the proposed framework
will incorporate the key elements of risk management that we recommend.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, which had no comments or
concerns with the information included in this report. DHS also
provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide
copies of this report to the Secretary of DHS. Copies of this report
will also be made available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major
contributions to this report is listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins Jr.:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5:
The White House:
President George W. Bush:
For Immediate Release:
Office of the Press Secretary:
February 28, 2003:
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5:
Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents:
Purpose:
(1) To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic
Incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident
management system.
Definitions:
(2) In this directive:
(a) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(b) the term "Federal departments and agencies" means those executive
departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, together with the Department of
Homeland Security; Independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C.
104(1); government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the
United States Postal Service.
(c) the terms "State," local," and the "United States" when it is used
in a geographical sense, have the same meanings as used in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Public law 107-296.
Policy:
(3) To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United States
Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic
incident management. The objective of the United States Government is
to ensure that all levels of government across the Nation have the
capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a
national approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts,
with regard to domestic incidents, the United States Government treats
crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated
function, rather than as two separate functions.
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal
official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating
Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government's
resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks,
major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the
following four conditions applies:
(1) a Federal department or agency acting under Its own authority has
requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State
and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been
requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than
one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in
responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to
assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the
President.
(5) Nothing In this directive alters, or Impedes the ability to carry
out, the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform
their responsibilities under law. All Federal departments and agencies
shall cooperate with the Secretary in the Secretary's domestic Incident
management role.
(6) The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of
State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial
responsibility for managing domestic Incidents generally falls on State
and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and
local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal
interests are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and
local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and
exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to
State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and
capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of
the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans
are compatible.
(7) The Federal Government recognizes the role that the private and
nongovernmental sectors play in preventing, preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate with the private and
nongovernmental sectors to ensure adequate planning, equipment,
training, and exercise activities and to promote partnerships to
address incident management capabilities.
(8) The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal
investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or
groups inside the United States, or directed at United States citizens
or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal
jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence
collection activities within the United States, subject to the National
Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333,
and Attorney General-approved procedures pursuant to that Executive
Order. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and
agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall
also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law
enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt
terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist
threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal
jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United
States shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law and with
activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our
national security, to assisting the Attorney General to Identify the
perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the
Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for
cooperation and coordination between their two departments.
(9) Nothing In this directive Impairs or otherwise affects the
authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense,
Including the chain of command for military forces from the President
as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of
military forces, or military command and control procedures. The
Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil
authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when
consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the
circumstances and the law. The Secretary of Defense shall retain
command of military forces providing civil support. The Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and
mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two
departments.
(10) The Secretary of State has the responsibility, consistent with
other United States Government activities to protect our national
security, to coordinate international activities related to the
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic
incident, and for the protection of United States citizens and United
States interests overseas. The Secretary of State and the Secretary
shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for
cooperation and coordination between their two departments.
(11) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be
responsible for interagency policy coordination on domestic and
international incident management, respectively, as directed by the
President. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall work
together to ensure that the United States domestic and international
incident management efforts are seamlessly united.
(12) The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate, information
related to domestic incidents is gathered and provided to the public,
the private sector, State and local authorities, Federal departments
and agencies, and, generally through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security, to the President. The Secretary shall provide
standardized, quantitative reports to the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the Nation -
-at all levels of government --to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and
recover from domestic incidents.
(13) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to grant to any
Assistant to the President any authority to Issue orders to Federal
departments and agencies, their officers, or their employees.
Tasking:
(14) The heads of all Federal departments and agencies are directed to
provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as
appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for
protecting our national security, to the Secretary, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State in the
exercise of the Individual leadership responsibilities and missions
assigned In paragraphs (4), (8), (9), and (10), respectively, above.
(15) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland
Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System
(NIMS). This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for
Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and
efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
domestic Incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To
provide for Interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State,
and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts,
principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command
system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; training;
identification and management of resources (including systems for
classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and
the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and
incident resources.
(16) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland
Security Council, and administer a National Response Plan (NRP). The
Secretary shall consult with appropriate Assistants to the President
(including the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy) and the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other such
Federal officials as may be appropriate, in developing and implementing
the NRP. This plan shall integrate Federal Government domestic
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-
discipline, all-hazards plan. The NRP shall be unclassified. If certain
operational aspects require classification, they shall be included in
classified annexes to the NRP.
(a) The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with regard to response to domestic
incidents, provide the structure and mechanisms for national level
policy and operational direction for Federal support to State and local
incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and
responsibilities, as appropriate.
(b) The NRP will Include protocols for operating under different
threats or threat levels; incorporation of existing Federal emergency
and incident management plans (with appropriate modifications and
revisions) as either integrated components of the NRP or as supporting
operational plans; and additional operational plans or annexes, as
appropriate, including public affairs and intergovernmental
communications.
(c) The NRP will Include a consistent approach to reporting incidents,
providing assessments, and making recommendations to the President, the
Secretary, and the Homeland Security Council.
(d) The NRP will Include rigorous requirements for continuous
improvements from testing, exercising, experience with incidents, and
new information and technologies.
(17) The Secretary shall:
(a) By April 1, 2003, (1) develop and publish an initial version of the
NRP, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies; and
(2) provide the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security with a
plan for full development and implementation of the NRP.
(b) By June 1, 2003, (1) in consultation with Federal departments and
agencies and with State and local governments, develop a national
system of standards, guidelines, and protocols to implement the NIMS;
and (2) establish a mechanism for ensuring ongoing management and
maintenance of the NIMS, including regular consultation with other
Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments.
(c) By September 1, 2003, In consultation with Federal departments and
agencies and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security,
review existing authorities and regulations and prepare recommendations
for the President on revisions necessary to implement fully the NRP.
(18) The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall adopt the NIMS
within their departments and agencies and shall provide support and
assistance to the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the
NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies will use the NIMS In their
domestic Incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness,
response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as those actions
taken in support of State or local entities. The heads of Federal
departments and agencies shall participate in the NRP, shall assist and
support the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the NRP,
and shall participate in and use domestic incident reporting systems
and protocols established by the Secretary.
(19) The head of each Federal department and agency shall:
(a) By June 1, 2003, make Initial revisions to existing plans In
accordance with the initial version of the NRP.
(b) By August 1, 2003, submit a plan to adopt and implement the NIMS to
the Secretary and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall advise the
President on whether such plans effectively implement the NIMS.
(20) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and agencies
shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted
by law, for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants,
contracts, or other activities. The Secretary shall develop standards
and guidelines for determining whether a State or local entity has
adopted the NIMS.
(21) NSPD 1 ("Organization of the National Security Council System") is
amended by replacing the fifth sentence of the third paragraph on the
first page with the following: "The Attorney General, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their
responsibilities."
Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential
Directive-8 (NSPD8):
(22) NSPD8 ("National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for
Combating Terrorism") Is amended by striking -and the Office of
Homeland Security," on page 4, and inserting 'the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council' In lieu thereof.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-2 (HSPD2):
(23) HSPD-2 ("Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies") Is
amended as follows:
(a) striking "the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)" In the second sentence of the second paragraph In
section 1, and Inserting 'the Secretary of Homeland Security" in lieu
thereof;
(b) striking "the INS,' in the third paragraph in section 1, and
inserting "the Department of Homeland Security" in lieu thereof;
(c) inserting ", the Secretary of Homeland Security," after "The
Attorney General" in the fourth paragraph in section 1;
(d) inserting ", the Secretary of Homeland Security," after "the
Attorney General" in the fifth paragraph In section 1;
(e) striking "the INS and the Customs Service" In the first sentence of
the first paragraph of section 2, and Inserting "the Department of
Homeland Security" In lieu thereof;
(f) striking 'Customs and INS" in the first sentence of the second
paragraph of section 2, and inserting "the Department of Homeland
Security" in lieu thereof;
(g) striking "the two agencies" in the second sentence of the second
paragraph of section 2, and inserting "the Department of Homeland
Security" in lieu thereof;
(h) striking "the Secretary of the Treasury" wherever it appears in
section 2, and Inserting "the Secretary of Homeland Security" In lieu
thereof;
(I) inserting ", the Secretary of Homeland Security," after -The
Secretary of State' wherever the latter appears in section 3;
(j) Inserting ", the Department of Homeland Security," after 'the
Department of State,' in the second sentence in the third paragraph in
section 3;
(k) inserting "the Secretary of Homeland Security,' after "the
Secretary of State,' in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of
section 3;
(I) striking "INS" in the first sentence of the sixth paragraph of
section 3, and inserting "Department of Homeland Security" in lieu
thereof;
(m) striking "the Treasury" wherever It appears In section 4 and
Inserting "Homeland Security" In lieu thereof;
(n) Inserting ", the Secretary of Homeland Security," after "the
Attorney General" In the first sentence In section S; and:
(o) inserting ", Homeland Security" after "State' in the first sentence
of section 6.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-3 (HSPD3):
(24) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the responsibility for
administering the Homeland Security Advisory System to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Accordingly, HSPD3 of March 11, 2002 ('Homeland
Security Advisory System") is amended as follows:
(a) replacing the third sentence of the second paragraph entitled
"Homeland Security Advisory System" with "Except In exigent
circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall seek the views
of the Attorney General, and any other federal agency heads the
Secretary deems appropriate, including other members of the Homeland
Security Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned."
(b) inserting "At the request of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Department of Justice shall permit and facilitate the use of
delivery systems administered or managed by the Department of Justice
for the purposes of delivering threat Information pursuant to the
Homeland Security Advisory System." as a new paragraph after the fifth
paragraph of the section entitled "Homeland Security Advisory System."
(c) inserting ", the Secretary of Homeland Security" after "The
Director of Central Intelligence" in the first sentence of the seventh
paragraph of the section entitled "Homeland Security Advisory System".
(d) striking "Attorney General" wherever it appears (except In the
sentences referred to in subsections (a) and (c) above), and inserting
"the Secretary of Homeland Security" in lieu thereof; and:
(e) striking the section entitled "Comment and Review Periods."
GEORGE W. BUSH:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8:
December 17 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8):
The White House:
President George W. Bush:
For Immediate Release:
Office of the Press Secretary:
December 17, 2003:
December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8:
Subject: National Preparedness:
Purpose:
(1) This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness
of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual
domestic terrorist attacks. major disasters, and other emergencies by
requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal,
establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness
assistance to State and local governments. and outlining actions to
strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local
entities.
Definitions:
(2) For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term wall-hazards preparedness" refers to preparedness for
domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
(b) The term "Federal departments and agencies" means those executive
depart-means enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland
Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1);
Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United
States Postal Service.
(c) The term "Federal preparedness assistance" means Federal department
and agency grants, cooperative agreements, loans, loan guarantees,
training, and/or technical assistance provided to State and local
governments and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. Unless noted otherwise, the term "assistance" will refer
to Federal assistance programs.
(d) The term "first responder refers to those individuals who in the
early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and
preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment,
including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency
management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other
skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide
immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery
operations.
(e) The terms "major disaster and "emergency" have the meanings given
in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
(f) The term "major events" refers to domestic terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies.
(g) The term "national homeland security preparedness-related
exercises" refers to homeland security-related exercises that train and
test national decision makers and utilize resources of multiple Federal
departments and agencies. Such exercises may involve State and local
first responders when appropriate. Such exercises do not include those
exercises conducted solely within a single Federal department or
agency.
(h) The term "preparedness" refers to the existence of plans,
procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal,
State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to,
and recover from major events. The term "readiness" is used
interchangeably with preparedness.
(i) The term "prevention" refers to activities undertaken by the first
responder community during the early stages of an incident to reduce
the likelihood or consequences of threatened or actual terrorist
attacks. More general and broader efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart
terrorism are not addressed in this directive.
G) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (k)
The terms "State," and "local government," when used in a geographical
sense, have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
Relationship to HSPD-5:
(3) This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for
improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive
describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for
such a response, including prevention activities during the early
stages of a terrorism incident.
Development of a National Preparedness Goal:
(4) The Secretary is the principal Federal official for coordinating
the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States. In
cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies, the Secretary
coordinates the preparedness of Federal response assets, and the
support for, and assessment of, the preparedness of State and local
first responders.
(5) To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond
to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination
with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
and in consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a
national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments
and agencies will work to achieve this goal by:
(a) providing for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of Federal
preparedness assistance to State and local governments:
and:
(b) supporting efforts to ensure first responders are prepared to
respond to major events, especially prevention of and response to
threatened terrorist attacks.
(6) The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness
priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat
and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and
recover from them. It will also include readiness metrics and elements
that support the national preparedness goal including standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the
Nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially
those involving acts of terrorism.
(7) The Secretary will submit the national preparedness goal to me
through the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for review and approval
prior to, or concurrently with, the Department of Homeland Security's
Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission to the Office of Management and
Budget.
Federal Preparedness Assistance:
(8) The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first
responder preparedness, will establish a single point of access to
Federal preparedness assistance program information within 60 days of
the issuance of this directive. The Secretary will submit to me through
the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department and agency
programs to be part of the coordinated approach. All Federal
departments and agencies will cooperate with this effort. Agencies will
continue to issue financial assistance awards consistent with
applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that program
announcements, solicitations, application instructions, and other
guidance documents are consistent with other Federal preparedness
programs to the extent possible. Full implementation of a closely
coordinated interagency grant process will be completed by September
30, 2005.
(9) To the extent permitted by law, the primary mechanism for delivery
of Federal preparedness assistance will be awards to the States. Awards
will be delivered in a form that allows the recipients to apply the
assistance to the highest priority preparedness requirements at the
appropriate level of government. To the extent permitted by law,
Federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on adoption of
Statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies. The
strategies should be consistent with the national preparedness goal,
should assess the most effective ways to enhance preparedness, should
address areas facing higher risk, especially to terrorism, and should
also address local government concerns and Citizen Corps efforts. The
Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, will review and approve strategies submitted
by the States. To the extent permitted by law, adoption of approved
Statewide strategies will be a requirement for receiving Federal
preparedness assistance at all levels of government by September 30,
2005.
(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the
States, the Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the
Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that
provide assistance for first responder preparedness will base those
allocations on assessments of population concentrations, critical
infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly
terrorism threats, to the extent permitted by law.
(11) Federal preparedness assistance will support State and local
entities' efforts including planning, training, exercises,
interoperability, and equipment acquisition for major events as well as
capacity building for prevention activities such as information
gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related to
terrorist attacks. Such assistance is not primarily intended to support
existing capacity to address normal local first responder operations,
but to build capacity to address major events, especially terrorism.
(12) The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide
assistance for first responder preparedness shall coordinate with the
Secretary to ensure that such assistance supports and is consistent
with the national preparedness goal.
(13) Federal departments and agencies will develop appropriate
mechanisms to ensure rapid obligation and disbursement of funds from
their programs to the States, from States to the local community level,
and from local entities to the end users to derive maximum benefit from
the assistance provided. Federal departments and agencies will report
annually to the Secretary on the obligation, expenditure status, and
the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness assistance
programs.
Equipment:
(14) The Secretary, in coordination with State and local officials,
first responder organizations, the private sector and other Federal
civilian departments and agencies, shall establish and implement
streamlined procedures for the ongoing development and adoption of
appropriate first responder equipment standards that support nationwide
interoperability and other capabilities consistent with the national
preparedness goal, including the safety and health of first responders.
(15) To the extent permitted by law, equipment purchased through
Federal preparedness assistance for first responders shall conform to
equipment standards in place at time of purchase. Other Federal
departments and agencies that support the purchase of first responder
equipment will coordinate their programs with the Department of
Homeland Security and conform to the same standards.
(16) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local
governments, will develop plans to identify and address national first
responder equipment research and development needs based upon
assessments of current and future threats. Other Federal departments
and agencies that support preparedness research and development
activities shall coordinate their efforts with the Department of
Homeland Security and ensure they support the national preparedness
goal.
Training and Exercises:
(17) The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of HHS, the
Attorney General, and other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, shall
establish and maintain a comprehensive training program to meet the
national preparedness goal. The program will identify standards and
maximize the effectiveness of existing Federal programs and financial
assistance and include training for the Nation's first responders,
officials, and others with major event preparedness, prevention,
response, and recovery roles. Federal departments and agencies shall
include private organizations in the accreditation and delivery of
preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent permitted by
law.
(18) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall establish a national program and a
multi-year planning system to conduct homeland security preparedness-
related exercises that identified training standards, provides for
evaluation of readiness, and supports the national preparedness goal.
The establishment and maintenance of the program will be conducted in
maximum collaboration with State and local governments and appropriate
private sector entities. All Federal departments and agencies that
conduct national homeland security preparedness-related exercises shall
participate in a collaborative, interagency process to designate such
exercises on a consensus basis and create a master exercise calendar.
The Secretary will ensure that exercises included in the calendar
support the national preparedness goal. At the time of designation,
Federal departments and agencies will identify their level of
participation in national homeland security preparedness-related
exercises. The Secretary will develop a multi-year national homeland
security preparedness-related exercise plan and submit the plan to me
through the HSC for review and approval.
(19) The Secretary shall develop and maintain a system to collect,
analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, best practices, and
information from exercises, training events. research, and other
sources, including actual incidents, and establish procedures to
improve national preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from
major events. The Secretary, in coordination with other Federal
departments and agencies and State and local governments, will identify
relevant classes of homeland-security related information and
appropriate means of transmission for the information to be included in
the system. Federal departments and agencies are directed, and State
and local governments are requested, to provide this information to the
Secretary to the extent permitted by law.
Federal Department and Agency Preparedness:
(20) The head of each Federal department or agency shall undertake
actions to support the national preparedness goal, including adoption
of quantifiable performance measurements in the areas of training,
planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident management and
asset preparedness, to the extent permitted by law. Specialized Federal
assets such as teams, stockpiles, and caches shall be maintained at
levels consistent with the national preparedness goal and be available
for response activities as set forth in the National Response Plan,
other appropriate operational documents, and applicable authorities or
guidance. Relevant Federal regulatory requirements should be consistent
with the national preparedness goal. Nothing in this directive shall
limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to the
command and control, training, planning, equipment, exercises, or
employment of Department of Defense forces, or the allocation of
Department of Defense resources.
(21) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal
civilian departments and agencies, shall develop and maintain a Federal
response capability inventory that includes the performance parameters
of the capability, the timeframe within which the capability can be
brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness of such capability to
respond to domestic incidents. The Department of Defense will provide
to the Secretary information describing the organizations and functions
within the Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide
support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.
Citizen Participation:
(22) The Secretary shall work with other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies as well as State and local governments and the
private sector to encourage active citizen participation and
involvement in preparedness efforts. The Secretary shall periodically
review and identify the best community practices for integrating
private citizen capabilities into local preparedness efforts.
Public Communication:
(23) The Secretary, in consultation with other Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, and non-governmental
organizations, shall develop a comprehensive plan to provide accurate
and timely preparedness information to public citizens, first
responders, units of government, the private sector, and other
interested parties and mechanisms for coordination at all levels of
government.
Assessment and Evaluation:
(24) The Secretary shall provide to me through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security an annual status report of the Nation's
level of preparedness, including State capabilities, the readiness of
Federal civil response assets, the utilization of mutual aid, and an
assessment of how the Federal first responder preparedness assistance
programs support the national preparedness goal. The first report will
be provided within 1 year of establishment of the national preparedness
goal.
(25) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry
out, the authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform
their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal
authorities and presidential guidance.
(26) Actions pertaining to the funding and administration of financial
assistance and all other activities, efforts, and policies in this
directive shall be executed in accordance with law. To the extent
permitted by law, these policies will be established and carried out in
consultation with State and local governments.
(27) This directive is intended only to improve the internal management
of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not
intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States,
its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.
GEORGE W. BUSH:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
This report addresses the following questions: 1) What actions has DHS
taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development
of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first
responders? 2) How do first responders' emergency management
capabilities for terrorist attacks compare to capabilities needed for
natural or accidental disasters? 3) What emphasis has DHS placed on
funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-
hazards emergency management capabilities?
To address these questions, we met with local first responder officials
in ten states (California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington) and
31 local jurisdictions with a total of 69 first responder departments.
We selected states and localities to reflect variations in dimensions
such as: geographic diversity; population density including
metropolitan and non-metropolitan locations; fiscal capacity
differences between states; critical infrastructure issues such as
ports and international borders; governmental structure differences at
the local level (local focus versus strong county government
structure); differences in the states' homeland security/emergency
management organization and leadership models; and a sample of states
containing sovereign American Indian tribal lands. Within each state we
selected a sample of two to three localities, such as a combination of
jurisdictions for our visits, in order to maximize the range of
dimension described above. For example, we visited one of the large
urban areas within the state along with an adjacent suburban
jurisdiction. We also visited medium, small cities, rural jurisdictions
or Indian tribes. These local site visits included seven localities
that received Urban Area Security Initiative funding for fiscal years
2004 and 2005--Detroit, Michigan; Charlotte, North Carolina; Kansas
City, Missouri; San Diego, California; Tampa, Florida; New York, New
York; and Seattle, Washington--that we identified after selecting which
states to visit. At the local jurisdictions we visited, we requested to
meet with first responder officials from the following departments:
fire and emergency medical services, law enforcement, emergency
management, public health and public works. We also selected two
American Indian tribes that possessed their own public safety
departments--police and fire--to identify some of the challenges and
issues that these jurisdictions face. Our selection of localities was
to some extent dependent on the availability of officials to meet with
us, travel schedule limitations, and our effort to avoid any
respondent's bias due to overlaps with recent and current GAO
engagement teams. Because of the manner in which we selected our
locations, our results, however, cannot be generalized beyond the
individual locations.
Using a structured interview guide, we solicited local first responder
officials' insights and perspectives on a variety of topics, including:
the extent to which DHS uses an all-hazards approach in assisting state
and local first responders' emergency management capabilities, how DHS
coordinates its activities, how locations use federal homeland security
grant funds, what mechanisms DHS has in place to ensure that grant
funds are spent in accordance with grant guidelines, how local
departments assess and report their preparedness status, what gaps, if
any, they believe exist between current and needed capabilities in
selected locations, and what challenges, if any, they face in their
emergency management responsibilities.
Using a similar structured interview guide, we asked similar questions
to states' office of emergency management, their homeland security
office, their State Administrative Agency point of contact who is the
official recipient of DHS grants, and state-level public health
officials.
In addition, we met with officials from various professional
organizations that represent state government organizations and first
responders to capture their insights and perspectives on the extent to
which DHS has used an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local
first responders' emergency management capabilities, and how DHS
coordinates these activities externally with state and local first
responders.
To determine what actions DHS has taken to provide policies and
strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency
management capabilities of first responders, we reviewed DHS products
developed to comply with Presidential Homeland Security Directives 5
and 8. We reviewed the final documents for the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). We also
obtained and analyzed documents related to the development of the
National Preparedness Goal and its related products that were developed
by DHS and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness in order to implement HSPD-8. These documents include the
National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List and Target
Capabilities List, the Interim National Preparedness Goal, National
Preparedness Guidance and program implementation plans for balancing
national investments and resources, training and exercises, and
assessment and reporting. Our work did not include assessing either the
appropriateness of the scenarios used to identify needed first
responder capabilities or the tasks and capabilities developed based on
neither those scenarios, nor DHS's process and resulting work on the
three program implementation plans.
In addition, we met with DHS officials from the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, including the Office
for Domestic Preparedness. We also met with officials from DHS's
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate, which includes the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Finally, we met with officials
from 3 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's 10 regional
offices--Atlanta, Kansas City and Seattle--selected in order to capture
one regional office in an eastern, central and western location, and
selected based on the states and localities we selected for our site
visits.
To determine how first responders' emergency management capabilities
for terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or
accidental disasters, we reviewed relevant research on homeland
security and domestic preparedness developed by professional
organizations and other subject matter experts and research
organizations. We also reviewed the documents developed by DHS's Office
of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness designed to
establish a National Preparedness Goal. These included various drafts
of the National Preparedness Goal and Guidance, the Target Capabilities
List, the Universal Task List, and the National Planning Scenarios. We
also met with officials from first responder departments and
professional associations, as described above, to address this
question.
To determine the emphasis on grant funding awarded to state and local
first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management
capabilities, we reviewed DHS budget information and authorizing and
appropriations legislation. We also asked first responders a series of
questions related to DHS funding and their perceptions of DHS grant
guidance and, at our meetings with the professional organizations that
represent state government organizations and first responders, we asked
similar questions to obtain their views on these issues.
We conducted our work from May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William O. Jenkins Jr. (202) 512-8777:
Acknowledgments:
Mr. Christopher Keisling was the Assistant Director for this report. In
addition to the contact named above, David A. Brown, James Cook, Alice
Feldsman, Kathryn Godfrey, Wil Holloway, Dawn Locke, Nettie Richards,
and John Vocino made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] A capability provides the means to accomplish one or more tasks
under specific conditions and to specific performance standards through
proper planning, organization, equipment, training, exercises, and
personnel.
[2] All-hazards emergency preparedness efforts seek to prepare all
sectors of American society--business, industry and nonprofit, state,
territorial, local and tribal governments, and the general public--for
all hazards the nation may face, i.e., any large scale emergency event
including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. For
the purpose of this report, territorial and American Indian tribal
governments are included when we refer to state and local governments.
[3] "First responders," as defined in HSPD-8, refers to those
individuals who in the early stages of an emergency event are
responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property,
evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers.
For the purposes of this report, we typically met with officials
representing police, fire, emergency medical services, public works,
and public health departments.
[4] DHS defines prevention as activities intended to deter all
potential terrorists from attacking America, detect terrorists before
they strike, prevent them and their instruments of terror from entering
our country, and take decisive action to eliminate the threat they
pose. Protection is defined as activities intended to reduce the
likelihood of attack on assets or systems and limit the impact should
an attack occur. Response is defined as activities intended to
implement immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet
basic human needs. Recovery is defined as activities to develop,
coordinate, and execute service-and site-restoration plans and
reconstitute government operations and services through individual,
private-sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance programs.
[5] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant
Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 2, 2005).
[6] First responders have traditionally been thought of as local fire,
police, and emergency medical personnel who respond to events such as
fires, floods, traffic or rail accidents, and hazardous materials
spills. As a result of the increased concerns about bioterrorism and
other potential terrorist attacks, the definition of first responder
has been broadened. Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act defined
emergency response providers as including "Federal, State, and local
emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency
medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related
personnel, agencies, and authorities." Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296 §2(6), 116 Stat. 2135, 2140 (codified at 6 U.S.C.
§101(6)). HSPD-8 defined the term first responder as "individuals who
in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection
and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment,
including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency
management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other
skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide
immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery
operations."
[7] When the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness was created in January 2004, it combined the Office for
Domestic Preparedness with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination. At that time, grant programs from multiple agencies
within DHS were transferred to the new office. The Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness provides grant funds to
the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Puerto
Rico and the Northern Marianas, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands,
Guam under the State Homeland Security Grant program, and 50 urban
areas selected for funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative
grant program.
[8] The Secretary of Homeland Security declares Incidents of National
Significance--in consultation with other departments and agencies as
appropriate--and provides coordination for federal operations,
resources and communications with Federal, State, local, tribal,
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to maintain and
coordinate threat or incident response activities. Incidents of
National Significance can be declared based on one of the following:
1. A federal department or agency has requested the assistance of DHS,
2. The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and
federal assistance has been requested,
3. More than one federal department or agency has become substantially
involved in responding to an incident,
4. DHS has been directed by the President to assume responsibility for
managing a domestic incident.
[9] DHS has issued several products to support the National
Preparedness Goal, including a Target Capabilities List, a Universal
Task List, National Planning Scenarios, and National Preparedness
Guidance, which DHS has made available to state, and local first
responders and other emergency management professionals. DHS considers
all of these products to be drafts until the Department issues the
Final National Preparedness Goal.
[10] The President's Homeland Security Advisory Council is composed of
21 members appointed by the President selected from the private sector,
academia, professional service associations, federally funded research
and development centers, nongovernmental organizations, State and local
governments, and other appropriate professions and communities. The
Council convened a working group to help develop the scenarios with
officials who represented the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy,
Health & Human Services, Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation and Veterans Administration, as well as officials from
the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics & Space
Administration, the Terrorist Threat Analysis Center, the White House
National Security Council, and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
[11] The scope of our work was focused on the extent to which the
actions taken by DHS to enhance first responder skills and abilities
encompassed all hazards, whether the result of nature, accident, or
terrorist action. Thus, our work did not include assessing either the
appropriateness of the scenarios used to identify needed first
responder capabilities or the appropriateness of the tasks and
capabilities developed based on those scenarios.
[12] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the
Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local
Preparedness, GAO-02-550T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002).
[13] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433, (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).
[14] According to DHS, a capability is comprised of the following 10
components: capability description; expected outcome; emergency support
function/annex; the capabilities' location in the Universal Task List;
associated critical tasks; capability and performance measures;
necessary capability elements (e.g., personnel, planning, and
equipment); linked capabilities; event conditions; and references.
[15] The Target Capabilities List includes in the Critical
Infrastructure Protection capability those systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, that are so vital to the United States that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the
country.
[16] See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, paras. (5),
(10)-(11), 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1822 (Dec. 22, 2003).
[17] See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT
Act) of 2001 § 1014(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3714(a).
[18] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10, at 637 (2003); Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, tit. I, ch.
6, 117 Stat. 559, 583 (Apr. 16, 2003); Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1146
(Oct. 1, 2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1309 (Oct. 18, 2004).
[19] See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1146 (Oct. 1, 2003); Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118
Stat. 1298, 1309 (Oct. 18, 2004) (both appropriating funds pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 3714).
[20] See Act of Oct. 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-74, tit. III, 113 Stat.
1047, 1086 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195 note).
[21] See Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 §§ 33(b),
34(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2229(b), 2229a(a)(1)(A).
[22] For the purpose of this analysis we used the amount of funds
appropriated in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
program on which the Urban Area Security Initiative program was based,
beginning in fiscal year 2003.
[23] In addition to providing $1.02 billion funding each to the State
Homeland Security Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative,
about $600 million is proposed for the creation of a new state and
local homeland security assistance program called the Targeted
Infrastructure Protection Program. This proposed program would provide
funding to enhance security at ports, transit systems and other
infrastructure identified by DHS and would replace the current
discretionary grants for ports, rail, intercity bus and trucking.
[24] Including the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico along with other territories that receive 0.25 percent under the
allocation formula.
[25] Planned expenditures for equipment represented 78 percent and 74
percent, respectively, of the state and local first responder grant
activities under both the State Homeland Security Grant and the Urban
Area Security Initiative, while about 10 percent of fiscal year 2004
funds were used for planning, the next highest category, according to
DHS Annual Report on Preparedness Funding Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington,
D.C., December 2004). Planned expenditures for equipment were over $1.5
billion under the State Homeland Security Grant, and over $456 million
under the Urban Area Security Initiative.
[26] GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination
is Key to Success, GAO-02-1013T (Washington, D.C; August 23, 2002).
[27] See GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant
Programs and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve, GAO-
05-530T (Washington, D.C; April 12, 2005); GAO, Emergency Preparedness:
Federal Funds for First Responders, GAO-04-788T (Washington, D.C; May
13, 2004); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder
Grant Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121,
(Washington, D.C; Feb. 2, 2005).
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