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entitled 'Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More 
Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment 
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

June 2005: 

Military Transformation: 

Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and 
Develop a Long-term Investment Approach: 

GAO-05-540: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-540, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and 
conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only 
the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive 
conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a 
revitalized defense infrastructure (see figure).

GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified 
the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long term investment approach to 
identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.

What GAO Found: 

Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during 
the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not 
developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans 
to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next 
few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help 
inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and 
to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD 
has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not 
identified all associated spending. GAO’s notional analysis of New 
Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall 
spending could be significantly greater than DOD’s limited analyses 
have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully 
identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad 
scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a 
“virtual major force program,” could help DOD address these obstacles 
and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better 
visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad.

DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New 
Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-
term investment approach to identify the projected resource 
requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad 
capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term 
capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations 
establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face 
significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the 
mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the 
vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to 
reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile 
defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-
term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a 
comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan.

Transformation of U.S. Strategic Capabilities: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take actions designed to provide greater 
visibility of the projected spending and future investments for DOD’s 
efforts to create the New Triad and acquire future capabilities.

Although GAO requested them, DOD did not provide comments by the time 
the final report went to print.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-540.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP: 

DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach 
for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: U.S. Strategic Command Missions: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected 
Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities: 

Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad 
Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009: 

Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions: 

Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program 
Elements: 

Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program 
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The New Triad: 

Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified 
in DOD and GAO Analyses: 

Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary Appropriation 
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD Organizations, 
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FYDP: Future Years Defense Program: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

Letter June 30, 2005: 

The Honorable Terry Everett: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes: 
Ranking Member: 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,[Footnote 1] the Department 
of Defense (DOD) presented a conceptual framework for transforming U.S. 
strategic capabilities.[Footnote 2] The review proposed that the United 
States move away from depending heavily on nuclear weapons and instead 
bring together the capabilities of nuclear and conventional offensive 
strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense 
infrastructure, to create a New Triad to achieve the desired strategic 
effects. Enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence 
capabilities would also support the New Triad. The review stated that 
the synergism achieved through the integration of nuclear and 
conventional offensive strike and defensive capabilities would provide 
the President and Secretary of Defense with a broad array of military 
options to better address the spectrum of potential opponents and 
contingencies that may arise in the coming decades. 

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review also concluded that new defense 
initiatives and investments would be required to transform U.S. 
strategic capabilities and realize the full potential of the New Triad. 
The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), a DOD centralized report 
consisting of thousands of program elements[Footnote 3] that provides 
information on DOD's current and planned out year budget requests, is 
one of DOD's principal tools to manage the spending for its 
transformation of strategic capabilities. The FYDP provides visibility 
over DOD's projected spending and helps inform DOD and Congress about 
resource data relating to identifying priorities and trade-offs. 

DOD is transforming its strategic capabilities at a time when it is 
also faced with fiscal challenges brought about by ongoing military 
operations and other major initiatives to transform the way it prepares 
to fight and win wars. In our February 2005 report entitled 21st 
Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of Government, we concluded 
that the magnitude of funding and potential for current investments and 
operations to turn into long-term financial commitments are prompting 
real questions about the affordability and sustainability of the rate 
of growth in defense spending.[Footnote 4] We also observed that the 
role, size, and structure of forces and capabilities comprising the 
strategic triad are key issues that may need to be assessed in view of 
the new security and fiscal environment. 

At your request, we reviewed the progress made by DOD in determining 
and allocating resources needed to implement the New Triad today and in 
the future. Specifically, you asked us to determine the extent to which 
DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its 
FYDP and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and 
manage future investments needed to achieve the synergistic 
capabilities envisioned for the New Triad. 

To obtain information on DOD's efforts to identify projected spending 
and develop future investment strategies for the New Triad, we reviewed 
documents and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps 
headquarters, and the U.S. Strategic Command. We also conducted a 
notional analysis to identify projected spending for the New Triad by 
analyzing resource data for program elements related to the New Triad 
included in the FYDP prepared to support the President's fiscal year 
2005 budget submission to Congress. The results of our notional 
analysis are not meant to provide a definite accounting of the 
projected New Triad spending included in the FYDP but rather to 
illustrate an approach that could be used to align the concepts and 
capabilities of the New Triad with program elements in the 
FYDP.[Footnote 5] We did not analyze resource data from the FYDP 
prepared to support the President's fiscal year 2006 budget submission 
because the data were not yet available during our review. In 
conducting our analysis, we determined that the automated FYDP data 
were sufficiently reliable for meeting our objectives. Additionally, we 
compared DOD's investment planning actions for the New Triad against 
the best practices identified for leading capital decision making to 
determine the extent that DOD has followed these practices. We 
conducted our review from December 2003 through April 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 
appendix II for a more complete description of our scope and 
methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has not developed a 
way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad programs in its 
FYDP. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic 
capabilities in the current fiscal environment, decision makers need to 
have the best and most complete data available about the resources 
being allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has identified some 
spending related to the New Triad in the FYDP, our notional analysis of 
such spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates that overall 
spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD's limited 
analyses have identified. DOD has not fully identified New Triad 
spending because the diversity and scope of the New Triad and ambiguity 
of the concept make it difficult for DOD officials to reach agreement 
on a complete list of programs, according to DOD officials. 
Additionally, the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and 
aggregate New Triad spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending, 
known as a "virtual major force program," has been used by DOD to 
identify space funding and could be beneficial in tracking New Triad 
funding, according to some DOD officials including the Commander of the 
U.S. Strategic Command. Without some mechanism to aggregate funding 
associated with the New Triad, DOD will be limited in its ability to 
guide and integrate New Triad spending. 

Despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and acquire new 
systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD 
has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment 
approach for acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of 
its aging systems that provide New Triad capabilities. Best practices 
show that long-term capital planning is needed to help organizations 
define direction, establish priorities, and plan future budgets. While 
DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are 
incomplete because some key capabilities for the New Triad have not 
been fully assessed in context of the New Triad and long-term 
replacement of key platforms have not been assessed in the context of 
the new security environment and DOD-wide affordability challenges. 
Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term investment approach, 
it has not begun to develop one because its concepts for nonnuclear 
strike and missile defense are not fully mature. However, delaying the 
preparation of a long-term investment approach puts DOD at risk of not 
developing an affordable strategy. Additionally, DOD and Congress will 
not have sufficient information to effectively determine future 
investment costs, the priorities, and trade-offs needed to sustain New 
Triad implementation. While we agree that some concepts are continuing 
to evolve, and that new systems are still under development, we do not 
believe that these circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan 
for the future of the New Triad. As new information becomes available, 
we would expect to see adjustments in DOD's plans-that is the nature of 
long-term planning. 

We are making recommendations designed to provide greater visibility of 
the projected spending and future investments for DOD's efforts to 
create the New Triad and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 
2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. 
As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had not provided 
comments as requested. 

Background: 

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the 
range of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, 
which consisted of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also 
conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive 
capabilities. The review also called for revitalizing the U.S. research 
and development and industrial infrastructure that would develop, 
build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems and be 
capable of responding in a timely manner to augment U.S. military 
capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the three legs of the 
New Triad-offensive strike, active and passive defenses, and responsive 
infrastructure-are intended to be supported by timely and accurate 
intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and control 
capabilities. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its 
supporting elements. 

Figure 1: The New Triad: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles. 

[End of figure] 

DOD concluded in the 2001 review that while nuclear weapons will 
continue to play a critical role in defending the United States, the 
combination of capabilities included in the New Triad would increase 
the military options available to the President and Secretary of 
Defense and allow for the development of responsive, adaptive, and 
interoperable joint forces that could be employed in a wider range of 
contingencies. DOD's review indicated that the additional capabilities 
provided by the New Triad would partially mitigate the effects of any 
reductions in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads that are planned through 2012.[Footnote 6] Table 1 shows the 
weapons systems and capabilities that make up the New Triad. 

Table 1: New Triad Weapons Systems and Capabilities: 

Leg: Offensive strategic strike; 
Element: Nuclear strike; 
Weapon system or capability: 
* Intercontinental ballistic missiles; 
* Submarine- launched ballistic missiles; 
* Strategic bombers; 
* Nuclear-armed sea- launched cruise missiles (held in reserve). 

Element: Nonnuclear strike; 
Weapon system or capability: 
* Advanced conventional weapon systems; 
* Offensive information operations; 
* Special operations forces. 

Leg: Defenses; 
Element: Active defense; 
Weapon system or capability: 
* Ballistic missile defenses; 
* Air defenses. 

Element: Passive defense; 
Weapon system or capability: Measures that: 
* Reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, redundancy, 
deception, concealment, and hardening; 
* Warn of imminent attack; 
* Support consequence management activities. 

Leg: Responsive infrastructure; 
Element: Research and development and industrial infrastructure; 
Weapon system or capability: 
* Research facilities; 
* Manufacturing capacity; 
* Skilled personnel. 

Element: Elements that support the New Triad: 
* Adaptive planning; 
* Enhanced command and control; 
* Timely and accurate intelligence. 

Source: Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress, 2002, 
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense. 

[End of table]

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD indicates that new initiatives 
and investments would be required to achieve a mix of new or improved 
capabilities that compose the offensive, defensive, and responsive 
infrastructure legs and supporting command and control, intelligence, 
and adaptive planning elements of the New Triad. In particular, the 
review found that major investment initiatives would be needed in the 
areas of advanced nonnuclear strike, missile defenses, command and 
control, and intelligence. DOD also plans to improve existing New Triad-
related capabilities by modernizing existing weapon systems and 
enhancing the tools used to build and execute strike plans to provide 
more flexibility in adapting or developing military options during 
crises. An Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics official in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that DOD intends to 
partially address near-term affordability issues for the New Triad by 
enhancing capability characteristics of current weapon systems, such as 
range, and leveraging capabilities already in development. In March 
2003, DOD published a Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan that 
is intended to identify initiatives for developing the New Triad and 
institutionalizing the Nuclear Posture Review.[Footnote 7] DOD plans to 
implement the New Triad concept and many of the capabilities identified 
by the Nuclear Posture Review by 2012. However, DOD states that further 
investments are likely to be needed beyond that time frame as existing 
nuclear platforms age, such as the Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missile system,[Footnote 8] and follow-on nuclear weapon 
systems are proposed. 

The Nuclear Posture Review also states that DOD should conduct periodic 
assessments to determine its progress in developing and integrating 
capabilities for the New Triad. Specifically, these strategic 
capability assessments are to review the (1) progress to date in 
reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons, (2) state of the security environment, and (3) progress made 
in the development of the New Triad. An assessment team, which included 
representatives from DOD and the Department of Energy, completed its 
first Nuclear Posture Review strategic capability assessment and 
associated report in April 2005. An Office of the Secretary of Defense 
official told us that DOD plans to update its first assessment in the 
fall of 2005 to support the department's conduct of the Quadrennial 
Defense Review. DOD intends to conduct subsequent assessments about 
every 2 years through 2012. 

Many DOD organizations, including the Joint Staff, military services, 
combatant commands, and defense agencies, and the Department of Energy, 
have responsibilities for implementing various aspects of the New 
Triad. These responsibilities are broadly defined in relevant New Triad 
implementation and guidance documents. Within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, two organizations have key responsibilities for 
overseeing and managing the New Triad implementation efforts: 

* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is 
responsible for developing the policy and guidance to implement the 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review and for establishing an organizational 
framework for coordinating New Triad initiatives within DOD. 

* The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics is responsible for providing oversight for the 
development and deployment of New Triad capabilities. 

The U.S. Strategic Command also has a significant role in implementing 
the New Triad and supporting its missions. In addition to its 
responsibilities for strategic nuclear deterrence and military space 
operations missions, the command was assigned several new missions 
related to the New Triad in January 2003. These missions are: global 
strike; integrated missile defense; DOD information operations; and 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance. In January 2005, the Secretary of 
Defense also assigned the command responsibility for the mission of 
combating weapons of mass destruction. Appendix I provides additional 
information about the U.S. Strategic Command's missions. 

Additionally, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for assembling and 
distributing the FYDP, which DOD uses to formulate the estimated 
projected resources and proposed appropriations to support DOD 
programs, projects, and activities, including those related to the New 
Triad. The office is also responsible for coordinating with DOD 
components any proposed changes to the FYDP's structure, such as 
updates to existing program element titles and definitions. The Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has responsibility for 
the annual budget justification material that is presented to Congress. 
These offices work collaboratively to ensure that the data presented in 
the budget justification material and the FYDP are equivalent at the 
appropriation account level. 

The FYDP is a report that resides in an automated database, which is 
updated and published at least 3 times a year to coincide with DOD's 
internal budget development activities and annual budget submission to 
Congress. It provides projections of DOD's near and midterm funding 
needs and reflects the total resources programmed by DOD, by fiscal 
year. The FYDP includes data on estimates for the fiscal year reflected 
in the current budget request and at least 4 subsequent years.[Footnote 
9] Both detailed data and a summary report are generally provided to 
Congress with DOD's annual budget submission. 

The FYDP is used as a source of data both for analysis and as an input 
to alternative ways of displaying and portraying actual and programmed 
resources. It contains data related to the forces, manpower, and total 
obligation authority for each program element. The FYDP is organized 
into 11 major force program categories, comprising combat forces and 
support programs, which are used as a basis for internal DOD program 
review. The major force program categories include strategic forces, 
general-purpose forces, research and development, and special 
operations forces. The FYDP is further arranged according to the 
appropriation structure utilized by Congress to review budget requests 
and enact appropriations, which includes major appropriation categories 
for procurement; operation and maintenance; military personnel; 
research, development, test, and evaluation; and military construction. 
Therefore, the FYDP's structure serves the purpose of crosswalking 
DOD's internal review structure with the congressional review 
structure. 

In 2003, DOD began implementing the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) process to identify improvements to existing 
capabilities and guide development of new capabilities from a joint 
perspective that recognizes the need for trade-off analysis. The new 
process is designed to provide an approach to defense planning that 
looks at the broad range of capabilities to address contingencies that 
the United States may confront in the future. When fully implemented, 
JCIDS is intended to provide an enhanced methodology utilizing joint 
concepts that will identify and describe existing or future 
shortcomings in capabilities and identify integrated solutions that 
meet those capability needs. The system is also expected to provide 
better linkage to the acquisition process and improve prioritization of 
validated joint warfighting capability proposals. Specifically, it is 
intended to provide a broader review of proposals than did the previous 
planning process by involving additional participants, including the 
combatant commands, early in the process. The analyses conducted during 
the process are to result in a set of potential solutions, including 
additional resources or changes to doctrine and training designed to 
correct capability shortcomings. These solutions are then incorporated 
into roadmaps that show the resource strategies to develop and acquire 
the needed capabilities. 

DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP: 

DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in 
the FYDP to date. In light of the challenges DOD faces in transforming 
strategic capabilities, decision makers need to have the best and most 
complete data available about the resources being allocated to the New 
Triad in making decisions on the affordability, sustainability, and 
trade-offs among the efforts to develop and acquire capabilities. The 
FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and 
Congress about resource data relating to these efforts. While DOD has 
identified some New Triad spending in its analyses and in relevant New 
Triad documents, our notional analysis of New Triad-related program 
elements indicates that overall projected spending for the New Triad 
through fiscal year 2009 could be much greater when other program 
elements that provide New Triad capabilities are considered. 
Additionally, the current FYDP data structure does not expressly 
identify and aggregate New Triad program elements that would allow 
identification of New Triad spending, and the program elements included 
in the FYDP's existing major force program category for strategic 
forces do not fully capture the broader range of strategic capabilities 
that were envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review. DOD does not plan 
to develop a complete and approved inventory of New Triad-related 
program elements in its FYDP because DOD officials believe that it is 
difficult to reach agreement on the program elements to be included in 
such an inventory. However, an inventory of New Triad-related program 
elements that provides a more complete and clear identification of the 
projected spending currently planned for the New Triad could help DOD 
and Congress make decisions on the affordability and spending needed 
for programs to develop and acquire New Triad capabilities. 

DOD Has Not Fully Aligned Projected Spending with New Triad 
Capabilities: 

While DOD has identified some program elements related to the New Triad 
in documents and internal reviews, it still has not fully identified 
projected spending associated with the New Triad. DOD documents related 
to the New Triad, including the Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear 
Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the Secretary of Defense's 
fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report to the President and the 
Congress, broadly describe the capabilities of the New Triad and 
indicate the range and types of activities and weapon systems that 
provide these capabilities. DOD has also identified and directed 
resources for some New Triad programs. For example, as the Nuclear 
Posture Review was being completed in late 2001, DOD issued guidance 
for preparing its fiscal year 2003 budget that identified 12 
initiatives that were considered key to developing the New Triad, such 
as programs to provide capabilities to defeat hard and deeply buried 
targets.[Footnote 10]

In anticipation of a potential requirement to identify New Triad 
program elements in the FYDP, DOD's Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation conducted an analysis in 2003 that identified a list of 188 
FYDP program elements, which accounted for about $186.7 billion in then-
year dollars of projected spending for fiscal years 2004 through 
2009.[Footnote 11] The office identified another $17.4 billion for 
programs and activities that are not readily identifiable in the 
FYDP,[Footnote 12] bringing the total to about $204.1 billion. However, 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation officials told us that the 
analysis included only those program elements that supported the 
initiatives identified in DOD's programming guidance or otherwise 
clearly provide New Triad capabilities. The officials said that the 
list of programs identified in this analysis was never agreed upon and 
approved within DOD and there are no current plans to update the 
analysis. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that the team 
conducting the first strategic capability assessment for the New Triad 
performed a subsequent survey of current program elements in the FYDP 
to determine the capabilities these program elements would provide for 
the New Triad by 2012. An Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
official said that the survey included all of the program elements on 
their list. However, the official did not know whether the survey 
identified any additional program elements. 

In addition to DOD's projected spending in the FYDP for the New Triad, 
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration 
identified $41.7 billion for nuclear weapons activities for fiscal 
years 2004 through 2009 in its Future Years Nuclear Security Program 
prepared for the fiscal year 2005 President's budget submission. This 
agency is responsible for maintaining the infrastructure to support 
nuclear weapons capabilities, including the refurbishment and service- 
life extension of currently deployed nuclear warheads. 

New Triad Spending Could be Much Greater Than DOD Has Currently 
Identified: 

DOD's analyses of FYDP program elements did not include many of the 
program elements that make up several capabilities identified for the 
New Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review, such as special operations and 
intelligence, or those that provide capabilities that are needed to 
perform New Triad missions but also have wider military applications. 
If these additional program elements are considered, the overall 
projected spending for the New Triad could be much greater than DOD has 
currently identified in New Triad-related documents and in either of 
the analyses conducted by its Office of Program Evaluation and Analysis 
or strategic capability assessment team. 

We conducted a notional analysis to identify any additional spending 
for New Triad-related program elements included in the FYDP. Our 
notional analysis considered a broader range of FYDP program elements 
than either of the analyses conducted by DOD's Office of Program 
Evaluation and Analysis or strategic capability assessment team and 
included many elements that provide capabilities for conducting New 
Triad missions, but also have wider military applications, such as 
communications, intelligence, and special operations program elements. 
Using available DOD definitions of New Triad capabilities, we reviewed 
each of the FYDP's 4,725 program elements to determine to what extent 
the elements provided capabilities needed for New Triad missions. We 
further distinguished the program elements we identified as being fully 
dedicated to the missions of the New Triad or not fully dedicated to 
the New Triad because the capabilities provided by these latter program 
elements could be used in a wider range of military applications than 
just for the New Triad. 

Compared to the 188 program elements and $204.1 billion in then-year 
spending for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 identified by the Office of 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, our notional analysis identified a 
total of 737 program elements in the FYDP that are aligned with New 
Triad capabilities, with a total associated spending of $360.1 billion 
over the same period, or about $156.0 billion more than the DOD 
analysis.[Footnote 13] Of the 737 program elements that we identified, 
385 program elements provide capabilities that would be fully dedicated 
to New Triad missions, such as program elements for weapons of mass 
destruction defense technologies and for the Joint Theater Air and 
Missile Defense Organization. The other 352 program elements we 
identified provide capabilities, such as special operations, that would 
be used in conducting New Triad missions but could also be used for 
other military missions. Figure 2 shows the number of New Triad program 
elements identified by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
and the number of additional program elements identified in GAO's 
analysis. 

Figure 2: Comparison of New Triad-Related Program Elements Identified 
in DOD and GAO Analyses: 

[See PDF for image]

[A] In its analysis, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
determined that the capabilities provided by about 7 of the 188 program 
elements it had identified, or 4 percent, were not fully dedicated to 
the New Triad. However, using the criteria we developed for our 
analysis, we determined that all 188 program elements were fully 
dedicated. 

[End of figure]

Of the $360.1 billion we identified in projected spending for the New 
Triad, $231.8 billion was for programs that are fully dedicated to the 
New Triad and $128.3 billion for programs that are not fully 
dedicated.[Footnote 14] As table 2 shows, we broke out the spending 
into the New Triad's four capability areas-offensive strike; active and 
passive defenses; responsive infrastructure; and command and control, 
intelligence, and planning-and created a fifth area for program 
elements that supported more than one capability area. Our notional 
analysis shows that projected spending for offensive strike and 
enhanced command and control, intelligence, and planning capability 
areas almost doubles when program elements that are not fully dedicated 
to the New Triad are included. The offensive strike capability area 
represents the largest amount of the projected spending, $156.0 billion 
in then-year dollars, and the command and control, intelligence, and 
planning capability area is next with $108.0 billion in projected 
spending. Together, these two capability areas account for 73 percent, 
or about $264.0 billion, of the $360.1 billion total projected spending 
identified in our analysis. Most of the $86.3 billion of projected 
spending for the active and passive defenses capability area is in the 
fully dedicated category. Appendix III provides additional information 
on the results of our analysis. 

Table 2: GAO Notional Analysis of Projected Spending for New Triad 
Program Elements in the FYDP for Fiscal Years 2004-2009: 

Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars. 

New Triad capability areas: Offensive strike; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $82.4; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $73.6; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $156.0. 

New Triad capability areas: Active and passive defenses; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $85.2; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $1.1; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $86.3. 

New Triad capability areas: Responsive infrastructure[A]; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $1.3; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $0.1; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $1.4. 

New Triad capability areas: Command and control, intelligence, and 
planning; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $56.6; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $51.4; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $108.0. 

New Triad capability areas: Multiple capability areas[B]; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $6.3; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $2.1; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $8.5. 

Total; 
Projected spending for program elements fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $231.8; 
Projected spending for program elements not fully dedicated to the New 
Triad: $128.3; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $360.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Spending amounts do not include $41.7 billion from fiscal years 
2004 through 2009 in the Department of Energy's Future Years Nuclear 
Security Program for nuclear weapons activities. 

[B] Projected spending associated with program elements that support 
more than one New Triad capability area. 

[End of table]

Officials with Program Analysis and Evaluation, Policy, and 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and the U.S. Strategic Command stated that the methodology 
we used for our notional analysis was reasonable. Officials from the 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation and from U.S. Strategic 
Command told us that the program elements we identified were consistent 
with the capabilities defined for the New Triad. Officials from the 
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation also said that our analysis 
used a more systematic approach in identifying New Triad-related 
program elements included in the FYDP than was followed in DOD's 
analyses. The officials added that when they were compiling their own 
analysis of New Triad-related program elements, many of the documents 
that GAO used to identify relevant programs had not yet been published. 
Therefore, while DOD did not include many program elements that are not 
fully dedicated to the New Triad in their analyses, the officials told 
us that it was not unreasonable to include those program elements in 
our analysis. As our notional analysis shows, including these program 
elements not only provides greater transparency of the projected 
spending for the New Triad in the FYDP but also identifies many 
additional program elements that provide capabilities necessary for 
carrying out New Triad missions. 

New Triad Spending Is Not Readily Identified in the FYDP's Structure: 

While the FYDP is a report that provides DOD and Congress with a tool 
for looking at future funding needs, the current FYDP structure does 
not readily identify and aggregate New Triad-related program elements 
to provide information on current and planned resource allocations- 
including spending changes, priorities, and trends-for the New Triad. 
In conducting our analysis of FYDP program elements, we observed that 
DOD has not created any data fields in the FYDP's structure that would 
expressly identify program elements as being relevant to the New Triad. 
According to DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, there is no 
plan to modify the data fields in the FYDP structure to allow the ready 
identification of New Triad program elements and associated spending 
because they have not received direction to do so. Additionally, these 
officials told us that if DOD were to modify the FYDP structure to 
allow such identification, it would need to develop an approved list of 
existing New Triad program elements to allow capture of these elements 
in the data fields. 

Additionally, as we have reported in the past, the FYDP's 11 major 
force program categories have remained virtually unchanged since the 
1960s.[Footnote 15] Our notional FYDP analysis indicates that the 
FYDP's definition of the existing major force program for strategic 
forces[Footnote 16]-one of the key major force program categories 
associated with the New Triad- does not fully capture the projected New 
Triad spending for the broader range of strategic capabilities that are 
envisioned for the New Triad in the Nuclear Posture Review. We 
determined that only $55.6 billion, or about 15 percent of the $360.1 
billion of projected spending that we identified in our notional 
analysis of FYDP program elements, is associated with the FYDP's 
strategic forces major force program category, which largely captures 
projected spending on offensive nuclear capabilities. The remaining 
$304.6 billion is dispersed among the other 10 major force programs. 
For example, program elements for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile, which is an autonomous, stealthy, long-range, conventional, 
air-to-ground, precision cruise missile designed to destroy high-value, 
well-defended fixed or moveable targets, and the Patriot missile 
defense system, which contributes to the defense leg of the New Triad, 
are included in the FYDP's general- purpose forces major force program. 
Similarly, intelligence-related program elements for hard and deeply 
buried targets and to support U.S. Strategic Command are part of the 
FYDP's command, control, communications, and intelligence major force 
program. 

In the past, DOD created new aggregations of program elements and 
changed the FYDP's structure as decision makers needed information not 
already captured in the FDYP. For example, a recent aggregation allows 
data that relate to every dollar, person, and piece of equipment in the 
FYDP to be identified as being in either a force or infrastructure 
category. DOD has also made it possible to identify program elements in 
the FYDP that are related to activities to capture the resources 
associated with specific areas of interest, such as space activities. 
In 2001, DOD established a "virtual major force program" for space to 
increase the visibility of resources allocated for space activities. 
This is a programming mechanism that aggregates most space-unique 
funding by military department and function crosscutting DOD's 11 
existing major force program categories.[Footnote 17] The Commander of 
the U.S. Strategic Command, who has key responsibilities for 
implementing the New Triad, told us that creating a virtual major force 
program for the New Triad could help align New Triad capabilities with 
the projected spending in the FYDP, identify responsible organizations, 
reduce ambiguity of the New Triad concept, and provide better 
visibility and focus for DOD efforts to develop and acquire New Triad 
capabilities. The Commander suggested that it could be necessary to 
create more than one virtual major force program, possibly one for each 
of the New Triad legs, because of the diversity and scope of New Triad 
capabilities. Some Office of the Secretary of Defense officials also 
told us that creating a virtual major force program could provide 
Congress with more visibility of DOD's efforts underway to develop the 
capabilities needed for the New Triad. Until such time as a tool such 
as a virtual major force program becomes available that can capture and 
categorize the projected spending for the New Triad in the FYDP, we 
believe that DOD will be limited in its ability to guide and direct all 
its efforts to develop, acquire, and integrate New Triad capabilities 
and Congress will not have full visibility of the resources being 
allocated. 

DOD Lacks a Plan to Fully Identify New Triad Spending: 

DOD has not established a requirement to develop a complete and 
approved list of the program elements included in the FYDP that are 
associated with New Triad spending. Office of the Secretary of Defense 
officials told us that DOD has not established such a requirement 
because the diversity and scope of the New Triad make it difficult for 
DOD officials to reach agreement on a complete list of programs. They 
also told us that because the New Triad is an ambiguous concept, the 
program elements included in such a list would change as the New Triad 
evolves and becomes better defined. 

However, without a complete and approved DOD list of New Triad program 
elements included in the FYDP, there is some uncertainty about the 
total range of programs and projected spending that are being pursued 
to achieve New Triad capabilities. It also will be difficult for 
Congress to assess DOD's progress in achieving the goals identified in 
the Nuclear Posture Review without having complete information on the 
resources being spent or needed in the future to meet those goals. 
Additionally, the broad scope of the New Triad concept and large number 
of organizations with New Triad-related spending responsibilities makes 
it even more important to have complete information available on the 
projected spending being provided for each of the New Triad capability 
areas and for each of the many organizations developing and acquiring 
New Triad capabilities. For example, our notional analysis identified 
as many as 23 defense organizations, including the military services, 
offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 
several combatant commands, and defense agencies, with FYDP spending 
related to the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials 
told us that having an approved program list would promote a common 
understanding of the New Triad and benefit future department program 
reviews. Additionally, an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
official told us that an approved program list would aid DOD in making 
resource decisions for the New Triad. In preparing DOD's fiscal year 
2006 budget, the official told us that an approved list of programs 
would have made it easier to evaluate the effects of programming 
changes proposed by the military services on capabilities being 
acquired for the New Triad. 

DOD Lacks an Overarching and Integrated Long-term Investment Approach 
for Acquiring and Sustaining New Triad Capabilities: 

While several New Triad documents and DOD's recent strategic capability 
assessment identify investment needs through 2012, DOD's near-term 
investment direction is incomplete. Additionally, DOD has not yet 
developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach 
to identify and plan investments needed to acquire and sustain 
capabilities for the New Triad. A long-term investment approach is an 
important tool in an organization's decision-making process to define 
direction, establish priorities, assist with current and future 
budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve goals. Although DOD 
recognizes the need for a long-term investment approach, it does not 
plan to develop one until nonnuclear strike and missile defense 
concepts are mature. DOD has not identified a specific date for when 
this will occur. The new JCIDS process could complement any long-term 
investment approach developed for the New Triad by providing additional 
analysis and discussions to support New Triad investment and the 
development of a plan. 

Long-term Investment Approach Is a Useful Tool to Establish Priorities: 

In our past reporting on leading capital decision-making 
practices,[Footnote 18] we have determined that leading organizations 
have decision-making processes in place to help them assess where they 
should invest their resources for the greatest benefit over the long 
term. These processes help an organization determine whether its 
investments are the most cost effective, support its goals, and 
consider alternatives before making a final selection. A long-term 
investment approach is an important tool in an organization's decision- 
making process to define direction, establish priorities, assist with 
current and future budgets, and plan the actions needed to achieve 
goals. Our analysis of several investment plans showed that such an 
approach includes information on future investment requirements, 
projected resources, investment priorities and trade-offs, milestones, 
and funding timelines, and is intended to be a dynamic document, which 
would be updated to adapt to changing circumstances. 

In the past, DOD has developed and maintained long-term investment 
planning documents for major defense capabilities-such as the Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027 and the "Bomber Roadmap"-to provide 
senior decision makers options in the development of broad strategies 
that will define future DOD force structure and help with the resource 
allocation process.[Footnote 19] In 2003, DOD also published an 
Information Operations Roadmap, which supports collaboration of broad 
information operations efforts and endorses the need for the department 
to better track information operations investments. 

DOD's Near-term Investment Direction for the New Triad Is Incomplete: 

As noted earlier, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us 
that New Triad documents-including the Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear 
Posture Review Implementation Plan, and the first strategic capability 
assessment-identify some of the near-term investments needed to provide 
capabilities for the New Triad. However, this investment direction is 
incomplete and does not address long-term affordability challenges that 
DOD may be faced with in sustaining and developing new capabilities to 
implement the New Triad. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials 
told us that the strategic capability assessment provides a near-term 
investment approach by identifying priorities for focusing resources to 
keep investment efforts on track to reach New Triad implementation 
goals for 2012. According to the officials, the team conducting the 
strategic capability assessment developed a list of capabilities that 
were needed in key areas, such as strategic strike and missile defense, 
from the Nuclear Posture Review's vision of the New Triad. The team 
then reviewed current operation activities, acquisition programs of 
record, and a potential range of new technologies to determine any 
capability shortcomings. Based on this review, the assessment team was 
able to determine whether initiatives to develop New Triad capabilities 
in the key areas were (1) met or on track to be satisfied by 2012; (2) 
on track, but would not be met by 2012; or (3) not on track to be met 
by 2012 unless additional funding was provided. Office of the Secretary 
of Defense officials told us that by determining the status of meeting 
capabilities in each of the key areas, DOD would be able to better 
prioritize future investment decisions for the New Triad. 

However, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy officials 
acknowledge that the first strategic capability assessment provides 
only a limited, near-term investment approach for the New Triad. These 
officials told us that the assessment did not review and assess some 
key capabilities of the New Triad, such as cruise missile defense, 
information operations, and passive defense, and may not have fully 
surveyed existing capabilities in the areas that were included in the 
assessment. Further, it does not address the potential for further 
investments to replace one or more existing nuclear platforms that will 
approach the end of their useful lives. These officials told us that 
they expect future strategic capability assessments to include New 
Triad key areas not reviewed in the first assessment. Additionally, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that while the 
assessment's recommendations are not binding on DOD programming and 
budgeting decisions, the assessment was used during the department's 
last program review in developing the fiscal year 2006 defense budget. 

DOD, in its 2003 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, called for 
the creation of an overarching strategic planning document for the New 
Triad that would establish the strategies and plans for developing new 
strategic capabilities to meet national security goals stated in the 
Nuclear Posture Review. The plan also was to provide broad guidance for 
integrating the elements of the New Triad as new capabilities came on 
line and for the development of future forces, supporting systems, 
planning and the creation of a responsive infrastructure. However, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy officials told us that while 
a draft plan was prepared, they decided not to circulate the draft for 
comments because they believed the results of the first strategic 
capability assessment would result in too many changes to the plan. 
Instead, the officials told us that the strategic capability assessment 
process would develop the strategy, plans, and guidance that were to be 
provided by the plan. 

DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach 
Until Concepts Mature: 

In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need 
for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to 
the plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing 
an integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities, 
defensive capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and 
missile defense concepts are mature. Policy and Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics officials in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense told us that there are several concepts related to New Triad 
capabilities being developed, including the Strategic Deterrence Joint 
Operating Concept and concept and operational plans for global strike 
and integrated ballistic missile defense. The officials told us that 
once nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are developed, 
specific programs could be better identified to implement these 
concepts, including new programs to develop capabilities that do not 
currently exist. These officials told us that they recognize the 
importance of a long-term investment approach for the New Triad to 
provide a basis for decisions on resources for future capabilities 
initiatives. However, they do not believe the development of the 
nonnuclear strike and missile defense concepts are far enough along to 
begin the study leading to development of a long-term investment 
strategy. These officials did not provide us with an estimate for when 
these concepts would be considered sufficiently mature to begin the 
study. 

While we agree that some concepts are continuing to evolve, and that 
new systems are still under development, we do not believe that these 
circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for the future of the 
New Triad. For example, although DOD is still developing concepts for 
missile defense, it is planning to spend billions of dollars over the 
next several years to develop a range of missile defense capabilities. 
As new information becomes available, we would expect to see 
adjustments in DOD's plans-that is the nature of long-term planning. 
Further, without the context of a long-term investment approach for 
acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its aging 
systems that provide New Triad capabilities, DOD will continue to 
invest billions of dollars on capabilities that will affect the long-
term composition of the New Triad. DOD is likely to face significant 
affordability challenges in the long term as some existing nuclear 
weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected service 
lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are 
expanding. Given the length of time to develop and acquire capabilities 
for the New Triad and the need to consider long-term affordability 
issues, DOD is also at risk of not considering the best approaches to 
developing and sustaining capabilities needed to provide the broad 
range of military options for the President and Secretary of Defense 
that are envisioned for the New Triad. DOD is further at risk of not 
effectively integrating the wide range of diverse New Triad 
capabilities as they are developed and being able to effectively 
determine future investment costs and the priorities and trade-offs 
needed to sustain New Triad implementation. In our February 2005 report 
addressing the challenges that the nation faces by its growing fiscal 
imbalance in the 21st century, we stated that DOD's current approach to 
planning and budgeting often results in a mismatch between programs and 
budgets and that DOD does not always fully consider long-term resource 
implications and the opportunity cost of selecting one alternative over 
another.[Footnote 20]

JCIDS Process Could Complement Any Long-term Investment Approach: 

The new JCIDS process could play a role in any long-term investment 
approach that is eventually prepared for the New Triad by providing a 
forum for additional analyses and assessments to support New Triad 
investment decisions and ensure that those decisions are in concert 
with DOD's overall investment priorities. The JCIDS process is intended 
to provide a means to ensure that new capabilities are conceived and 
developed in a joint warfighting context. The process intends to (1) 
focus on achieving joint operational capabilities rather than on 
individual weapon systems and (2) provide a systematic means to 
identify capability gaps, propose solutions, and establish roadmaps for 
future investments to acquire needed capabilities. Capability 
assessments, developed through the process, are designed to have a long-
term focus, consider a wide range of potential materiel and nonmateriel 
solutions across the military services, analyze trade-offs among 
different solutions, and identify areas where existing capabilities are 
redundant or excessive. The process offers proposed solutions that are 
intended to be integrated and prioritized and would eventually be 
incorporated into resource roadmaps that show the investment strategies 
to develop and acquire the needed capabilities. 

JCIDS also intends to involve the combatant commanders early in the 
decision-making process to provide a strong warfighter perspective in 
identifying capabilities and resource priorities. The U.S. Strategic 
Command has created mission capabilities teams within its Capability 
and Resource Integration Directorate that closely align its missions 
with the JCIDS process to strengthen its ability to more effectively 
advocate for the capabilities needed to perform its missions. The 
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command told us that his intent is for 
these teams to play an active role in identifying and developing New 
Triad capabilities. 

New Triad capabilities span most of the functional areas established in 
the JCIDS process, including command and control and force application. 
Officials in the Joint Staff's Office of Requirements Assessment told 
us that the JCIDS process does not currently identify and track joint 
warfighting capabilities as capabilities for the New Triad and Office 
of the Secretary of Defense officials told us that there are no efforts 
at this time to crosswalk the JCIDS' joint warfighting capabilities 
with the New Triad. However, Joint Staff officials said that 
organizations with New Triad responsibilities, such as the U.S. 
Strategic Command, do participate in the working groups and other 
activities throughout the JCIDS process to ensure that their equities 
are addressed. The JCIDS process could provide benefits to defense 
planning, but because the process is still very early in its 
development it is unclear whether or how DOD plans to use JCIDS to 
address its New Triad investments. 

Conclusions: 

It is important for DOD and congressional decision makers to have the 
most complete accounting possible of the projected spending planned for 
the New Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the 
budget. Until DOD reaches agreement on the program elements that 
comprise New Triad spending in its FYDP, and creates a way to aggregate 
spending, neither defense officials nor Congress will have visibility 
over all of the projected spending planned in the near-term for the New 
Triad. Importantly, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, who 
has been assigned significant responsibilities for coordinating and 
integrating New Triad capabilities from a warfighter perspective, will 
not have the resource visibility needed to effectively carry out this 
new role. This information is needed to accurately assess the 
affordability of the various activities and weapon systems that make up 
the New Triad, and to make timely and informed decisions on the funding 
required to develop, acquire, and integrate the wide range of diverse 
New Triad capabilities. 

Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment 
approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges, 
future funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is 
not fully known. While DOD believes it is still too early to develop a 
long-term investment approach, further delaying the start of this 
effort puts the department at risk of not developing and acquiring 
capabilities for the New Triad when needed. As a result, the President 
and Secretary of Defense can not be assured that DOD has the broad 
range of military options envisioned in the New Triad. Although New 
Triad concepts are continuing to evolve and mature, laying the 
foundation now for a long-term investment approach would provide DOD 
with an additional planning tool for future development of the New 
Triad concept-a tool that could be continuously improved and updated as 
better information becomes available and as changing security and 
fiscal circumstances warranted. The need for such an approach becomes 
increasingly important as existing nuclear platforms begin approaching 
the end of their useful lives and decisions to replace one or more of 
the platforms are required. Additionally, without such an approach, 
decision makers lack information on projected costs, spending 
priorities and trade-offs, resource requirements, and funding timelines 
in making decisions on the spending commitments needed to sustain New 
Triad implementation. Further, without a long-term investment approach, 
the large number of New Triad stakeholders, such as the military 
services, defense agencies, and combatant commands, will lack the 
direction and focus they need to effectively prepare future funding 
plans to develop, acquire, and integrate the capabilities. Lastly, 
while the new JCIDS process is intended to provide a better approach to 
identifying solutions to capability shortcomings and strengthen the 
role of combatant commanders in making decisions on capability 
investments, it is yet unclear how the process will be used to 
specifically support investment decisions for the New Triad. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen DOD's implementation of the New Triad and provide greater 
transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, 
acquiring, and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: 

* Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in 
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1) 
develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements 
in the FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and 
sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a 
virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating new data 
fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New Triad-
related program elements to provide increased visibility of the 
resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year 
the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the 
department's summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct that these three actions be completed at or about the 
time when the President's budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to 
Congress. 

* Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated long-
term investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision 
makers with information about future joint requirements, projected 
resources, spending priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding 
timelines. As part of developing and implementing this approach, DOD 
should leverage the analyses, assessments, and other information 
prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System process. The Secretary of Defense should direct that development 
of a long-term investment approach be completed in time for it to be 
considered in the department's preparation of its submission for the 
President's budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be updated, as 
needed, to adapt to changing circumstances. 

Agency Comments: 

On April 28, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to DOD for review 
and comment. As of the time this report went to final printing, DOD had 
not provided comments as requested. However, DOD did provide technical 
changes, which have been incorporated in this report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will 
make copies available to others upon request. In addition the report 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 
4402. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff 
members who made key contributions to this report are listed in 
appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: U.S. Strategic Command Missions: 

U.S. Strategic Command has a significant role in implementing the New 
Triad, advocating for the development of New Triad capabilities, and 
supporting its missions. It derives these responsibilities from 
missions assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Table 
3 describes U.S. Strategic Command's current missions. 

Table 3: U.S. Strategic Command Missions: 

Mission: Strategic deterrence; 
Description: 
* Plan, target, and employ during wartime intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers; 
Basis of authority: Assumed the mission in June 1992 from the 
disestablished Strategic Air Command and Joint Strategic Target 
Planning Staff. 

Mission: Military space operations; 
Description: 
* Develop desired characteristics and capabilities; 
* Plan, advocate, and conduct military space operations; and; 
* Serve as the single point of contact for military space operational 
matters; 
Basis of authority: Change 1 of the Unified Command Plan,[A] effective 
July 2002. 

Mission: Global strike; 
Description: 
* Provide integrated global strike planning and command and control 
support to deliver rapid, extended- range, precision kinetic and 
nonkinetic (e.g., elements of space and information operations) effects 
in support of theater and national objectives; 
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective 
January 2003. 

Mission: Integrated missile defense; 
Description: 
* Advocate desired global missile defense and missile-warning 
characteristics and capabilities for active and passive ballistic 
missile defenses for all combatant commands; and; 
* Provide centralized planning, coordination, and integration of global 
ballistic missile defenses, missile warning systems, and battle 
management, command control, communications, and intelligence system 
and architecture; 
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective 
January 2003. 

Mission: DOD information operations; 
Description: 
* Integrate and coordinate DOD information operations (including 
computer network attack, computer network defense, electronic warfare, 
operations security, military psychological operations, and military 
deception) across geographic areas of responsibility; 
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective 
January 2003. 

Mission: Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; 
Description: 
* Plan, integrate, and coordinate intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as 
directed; and; 
* Task and coordinate command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in support 
of strategic force employment, including global strike, missile 
defense, and associated planning; 
Basis of authority: Change 2 of the Unified Command Plan, effective 
January 2003. 

Mission: Combating weapons of mass destruction; 
Description: 
* Plan, integrate, and synchronize DOD efforts with the efforts of 
other agencies; 
* Integrate other U.S. Strategic Command capabilities (e.g., global 
strike) and provide operational support to other combatant commands and 
organizations conducting combating weapons of mass destruction 
missions; 
* Synchronize DOD operations for combating weapons of mass destruction 
with the intelligence community; 
* Advocate desired capabilities for combating weapons of mass 
destruction; 
* Sponsor relevant joint doctrine; and; 
* Provide military representation to U.S. national and international 
agencies; 
Basis of authority: Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, effective 
January 2005. 

Source: Unified Command Plan: 

Note: Change 1 and Change 2 incorporated), April 20, 2002, and 
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, January 6, 2005, designating 
responsibilities for combating weapons of mass destruction to 
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. 

[A] The Unified Command Plan is a classified document approved by the 
President, published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
addressed to the commanders of combatant commands. It establishes the 
combatant commands, identifies geographic areas of responsibility, 
assigns primary missions, defines authority of the commanders, 
establishes command relationships, and gives guidance on the exercise 
of combatant command. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
fully identified projected spending for the New Triad in its Future 
Years Defense Program (FDYP), we reviewed key DOD documentation to 
identify and define the New Triad's capabilities and determine whether 
DOD had identified specific, related programs in the FYDP. 

Specifically, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents on the New 
Triad, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Nuclear Posture 
Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2002 
Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board's February 2004 
report, Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings by DOD officials, and 
relevant programming guidance. We also obtained the results of an 
analysis performed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
that identified New Triad spending in the FYDP, and discussed the 
purpose, scope, methodology, and limitations of the analysis with 
officials from this office. In addition, we interviewed officials from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including officials from the 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, 
the Office of Strategic and Space Programs in the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of the Deputy Assistant of the 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We 
also interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force 
headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, and the Department of 
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to gain an 
understanding of their role in implementing the New Triad. We met with 
officials of the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss 
the command's missions that are relevant to the New Triad. 

As part of our effort to determine the extent to which DOD has 
identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its FYDP, we 
performed our own notional analysis of the FYDP to identify resources 
associated with the New Triad. In doing so, we examined the FYDP's 
structure and related documentation to determine whether the FYDP was 
designed to capture information that would identify specific program 
elements as being related to the New Triad. We met with relevant DOD 
officials to discuss our approach, and reviewed the analysis performed 
by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. We also reviewed 
prior GAO work to gain a better understanding of whether the FYDP has 
been modified to allow for new program element aggregations. In 
performing our analysis, we assessed the reliability of the FYDP data 
by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) 
reviewing existing information about the data and the system that 
produced them, (3) interviewing a knowledgeable DOD official about the 
data, and (4) reviewing data reliability tests on these data previously 
performed by GAO. We determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional details about how 
we performed our notional analysis are presented in appendix III. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a long-term 
investment approach to identify and manage future investments needed to 
achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New Triad, we 
interviewed officials and reviewed key documentation to determine 
whether DOD has taken steps to develop and follow such an approach. 
Specifically, to identify best practices for a long-term investment 
approach, we reviewed relevant GAO reports, and identified and reviewed 
investment approaches of other organizations. We then compared DOD's 
approach for the New Triad against these elements that we had 
identified in other organizations to determine the extent to which DOD 
had these elements in place. In addition, we obtained and reviewed 
relevant documents, including the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the 
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary of Defense's 
fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report, the Defense Science Board's 
February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces, briefings 
provided by DOD officials, and relevant programming guidance to 
identify investments and investment priorities in building New Triad 
capabilities. We also met with officials from the Joint Staff's 
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments to discuss 
the development and implementation of the department's new Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System, and to determine 
whether the New Triad's plans for achieving desired capabilities were 
aligned to this new system. 

Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, including officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, the Office of Strategic and 
Space Programs in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the 
Office of the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 
Matters, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We also interviewed officials 
from the Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 
headquarters, and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security 
Administration to gain their perspectives. In addition, we visited the 
headquarters of the: 

U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, and met with command 
officials to discuss investments needed to acquire capabilities and 
implement the command's missions. 

Our review was conducted between December 2003 and April 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO's Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected 
Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program: 

To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend on 
the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending 
associated with New Triad capabilities. This analysis identifies 737 
program elements that are either "fully dedicated" or "not fully 
dedicated" to the New Triad. "Fully dedicated" program elements provide 
capabilities that primarily execute or support New Triad missions, 
whereas "not fully dedicated" program elements provide capabilities 
that have wider military application than just the New Triad. 

Our notional analysis is based on certain assumptions, which we 
considered to be relevant and reasonable, about how to align New Triad 
capabilities to FYDP program elements. For example, we assume that: 

* All program elements in the FYDP that are not defined as "historical" 
are currently active and valid for analysis, even though there may not 
be any spending currently associated with the program elements over the 
fiscal years 2004 through 2009 time frame. 

* Certain FYDP field values, or combinations of values, can be used to 
identify groups of program elements as being related to the New Triad. 
For example, certain combinations of Force and Infrastructure Codes and 
Defense Mission Codes can be used to identify particular New Triad 
capabilities. 

To ensure that our assumptions were reasonable, we discussed our 
overall approach with budget experts at GAO and the Congressional 
Budget Office and with DOD officials. Generally, these officials agreed 
with our approach to identify the projected spending associated with 
the New Triad included in the FYDP. However, DOD officials cautioned 
that identifying program elements that are not fully dedicated to the 
New Triad can be difficult because of the subjectivity required in 
deciding on the extent to which a program element provides capabilities 
for the New Triad. Therefore, our notional analysis suggests a 
methodology that can be used to conduct a comprehensive accounting of 
the spending plans for the New Triad, and is not meant to provide a 
definitive accounting of projected New Triad spending. We recognize 
that the assumptions we made are subjective, and that other analyses to 
identify projected spending on New Triad capabilities in the FYDP may 
use different assumptions and obtain somewhat different results. 

Our Methodology for Identifying FYDP Program Elements Related to the 
New Triad: 

To identify DOD's definitions of the four New Triad capabilities-- 
offensive strike; active and passive defenses; responsive 
infrastructure; and command and control, intelligence, and planning--we 
used relevant DOD documentation, such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review, the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, the Secretary 
of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Annual Defense Report, and the Defense 
Science Board's February 2004 report, Future Strategic Strike Forces. 
We compared these capability definitions with information about each of 
the 4,725 FYDP program elements[Footnote 21] we reviewed. When we 
determined that a program element was related to one or more of the New 
Triad's capabilities, we categorized it according to the particular 
capability that it supported. 

We then determined whether the program elements that we identified were 
either fully dedicated or not fully dedicated to the New Triad. In 
making this determination, we assumed that all of the program elements 
identified in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation analysis 
were fully dedicated to the New Triad. Table 4 summarizes the criteria 
we used to identify and categorize program elements that are linked to 
the New Triad. 

Table 4: GAO's Categorization of New Triad-Related FYDP Program 
Elements: 

Offensive strike: 

Description: Kinetic (e.g., advanced conventional and nuclear) and 
nonkinetic (e.g., information operations) systems that provide the 
ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration and extended-range 
attacks to achieve precision effects against highly valued adversary 
assets. Includes special operations capabilities; 
Fully dedicated program elements: 
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation analysis; 
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that provide or 
support conventional, nuclear, and information operations strike 
capabilities; 
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements 
that mainly support special operations, cryptology, and certain 
counterintelligence capabilities. 

Active and passive defenses: 

Description: Programs designed to defend the U.S. homeland, allies, and 
forces abroad. Active defenses include (1) ballistic and cruise missile 
defense capabilities and (2) air defenses. Passive defenses include 
measures that reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, 
redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening; warn of imminent 
attack; and support consequence management activities; 
Fully dedicated program elements: 
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation analysis; 
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that provide or 
support missile defenses, defense of U.S. airspace, and passive 
defenses, particularly consequence management activities; 
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements 
that mainly provide headquarters support and certain counterdrug 
activities. 

Responsive infrastructure: 

Description: Programs that address the ability of the U.S. technology 
base to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and 
timing of potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology 
and industrial base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and 
responsiveness of science and technology programs related to possible 
future strategic capabilities; 
Fully dedicated program elements: 
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation analysis; 
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that support the 
upkeep of important test ranges and facilities; 
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements 
that support activities at key facilities that support or execute New 
Triad- related missions. 

Command and control, intelligence, and planning: 

Description: Programs that (1) provide or support nuclear, national, 
and global military command and control systems, including key 
communications infrastructure and platforms; (2) provide "exquisite" 
intelligence of an adversary's capabilities; and (3) support adaptive 
planning; 
Fully dedicated program elements: 
* All relevant program elements identified in the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation analysis; 
* Additional program elements, identified by GAO, that historically 
provided nuclear command and control capabilities; 
Not fully dedicated program elements: GAO-identified program elements 
supporting a broad range of command and control, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the national level, 
including space-, air-and ground-based surveillance and reconnaissance 
platforms. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. 

[End of table]

We then used the FYDP data to identify the projected spending 
associated with these program elements for fiscal years 2004 through 
2009, and expressed our results in then-year dollars. The data for the 
projected spending are current as of the President's budget submission 
to Congress for fiscal year 2005. 

Projected New Triad Spending by FYDP Major Force Program: 

The FYDP's strategic forces major force program, one of 11 major force 
programs in the FYDP, includes $55.6 billion in then-year dollars for 
the New Triad for fiscal years 2004 through 2009, or 15 percent of the 
$360.1 billion of total spending that we identified. The offensive 
forces and weapons systems in this program are primarily nuclear- 
focused. As indicated in table 5, the remaining $304.6 billion, or 85 
percent of the projected spending that we identified, is dispersed 
among 7 of the remaining 10 major force programs in the FYDP. The 
command, control, communications, and intelligence program accounted 
for the largest share of New Triad-related spending--$133.5 billion, or 
37 percent of the projected spending that we identified. We did not 
identify any projected spending on the New Triad in major force 
programs for central supply and maintenance; training, medical, and 
other general personnel activities; and support of other nations. 

Table 5: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Major Force Program 
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars. 

Strategic Forces; 
* B-52 Squadrons; 
* Minuteman Squadrons; 
* Service Support to U.S. Strategic Command; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $55.6; 
Percent: 15%. 

General Purpose Forces; 
* Tomahawk Cruise Missile; 
* Tomahawk and Tomahawk Mission Planning Center; 
* Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $29.7; 
Percent: 8%. 

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; 
* E-4B National Airborne Operations Center; 
* U.S. Army Space Activities; 
* Defense Reconnaissance Support Activities; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $133.5; 
Percent: 37%. 

Mobility Forces; 
* Special Operations Forces; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $3.5; 
Percent: 1%. 

Guard and Reserve Forces; 
* B-52 Squadrons, Air Force Reserve; 
* F-16 Air Defense Squadrons, Air National Guard; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $4.8; 
Percent: 1%. 

Research and Development; 
* Army Missile Defense Systems Integration; 
* Space-based Radar; 
* Next Generation Bomber; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $98.2; 
Percent: 27%. 

Central Supply and Maintenance; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: n/a; 
Percent: n/a. 

Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: n/a; 
Percent: n/a. 

Administration and Associated Activities; 
* Management Headquarters, Missile Defense Agency; Total obligation 
authority in billions of then-year dollars: Total projected spending 
for New Triad program elements: $0.9; 
Percent: <1%. 

Support of Other Nations; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: n/a; 
Percent: n/a. 

Special Operations Forces; 
* Psychological Operations Activities, Active Army; 
* Joint Special Operations Forces Intelligence Activities; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $33.8; 
Percent: 9%. 

Total; 
Total projected spending for New Triad program elements: $360.1; 
Percent: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total projected spending does not add to $360.1 billion and total 
percent does not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of table]

Projected New Triad Spending by Primary Appropriation Category: 

We analyzed the $360.1 billion of projected spending associated with 
the New Triad based on primary appropriation category, as illustrated 
in figure 3. We determined that the largest amount of projected 
spending is for research, development, test, and evaluation funding, 
which accounts for $141.8 billion or 39 percent of the $360.1 billion 
in projected spending that we identified. We identified $111.0 billion 
in projected spending for operation and maintenance appropriations, or 
31 percent of the total spending that we identified. 

Figure 3: Projected Spending for the New Triad by Primary Appropriation 
Category, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars. 

[End of figure]

Projected New Triad Spending by DOD Organizations: 

Defensewide programs, including programs managed by the Missile Defense 
Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and intelligence- 
related defense agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
account for 50 percent of the $360.1 billion of projected spending that 
we identified as being associated with the New Triad. Spending for 
Missile Defense Agency-related program elements totals $53.1 billion 
during fiscal years 2004 through 2009 and is greater than the spending 
we identified for either the departments of the Army or Navy. As shown 
in figure 4, among the military departments the Air Force accounts for 
the largest share of New Triad spending--$112.9 billion, or 31 percent 
of the $360.1 billion that we identified for fiscal years 2004 through 
2009. Spending by the Air Force, Army, and Navy includes service 
support for defense agencies and combatant commands, such as the U.S. 
Strategic Command. 

Figure 4: Projected Spending for the New Triad by DOD Organizations, 
Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Total obligation authority in billions of then-year dollars. 

[A] Includes Marine Corps. 

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Mark J. 
Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. O'Neill, Julie M. Tremper, 
and Renee S. McElveen made key contributions to this report. 

(350475): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-398), Congress directed the Secretary 
of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to "conduct a 
comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the United States for 
the next 5 to 10 years". The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was the second 
post-Cold War review of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The first one 
was conducted in 1994. 

[2] Strategic capabilities are those required to conduct strategic 
missions, which are operations directed against one or more of a 
selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive 
destruction and disintegration of the enemy's capacity and will to make 
war. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are 
designed to have a long-range rather than an immediate effect on the 
enemy and its military forces. There may be times, however, when 
strategic capabilities need to produce timely effects. 

[3] Program elements are the primary data elements in the FYDP that 
generally represent organizational entities and their related 
resources. They represent descriptions of the various missions of DOD 
and are the building blocks of the FYDP, and they may be aggregated in 
different ways, including to show total resources assigned to a 
specific program, and to identify selected functional groupings of 
resources. 

[4] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). This report 
presents illustrative questions for policymakers to consider across 
major areas of the budget and federal operations as they carry out 
their responsibilities. 

[5] In conducting our analysis we relied on DOD's definitions of New 
Triad capabilities to determine the relevant program elements in the 
FYDP that were aligned with those capabilities. However, we made 
certain assumptions about how to make these linkages, such as the 
extent to which capabilities provided by program elements were 
dedicated to New Triad missions. 

[6] The Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States plans to 
reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range 
between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012. This warhead range and the 
year the goal is to be reached are also set forth in the May 2002 
Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia. An operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear warhead is one that is fully ready for use 
and is either mated on or allocated to an operational delivery system, 
such as a ballistic missile or strategic bomber. 

[7] The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan is intended to 
provide general guidance for developing several key New Triad 
capabilities, including advanced nonnuclear strike and ballistic 
missile defenses, and for modernizing and extending the service lives 
of existing strategic nuclear platforms. 

[8] DOD plans to extend the service life of the Minuteman III 
intercontinental ballistic missile system until 2020. 

[9] The FYDP submitted with DOD's fiscal year 2005 budget includes data 
through fiscal year 2009. 

[10] Hard and deeply buried targets are structures ranging from 
hardened surface bunker complexes to deep, underground tunnel 
facilities, which are used to conceal and protect critical leadership, 
military, and industrial personnel; weapons; equipment; and activities 
that constitute serious threats to U.S. security. These structures are 
typically large, complex, and well concealed, incorporating strong 
physical security, modern air defenses, protective siting, multifaceted 
communications, and other important features that make many of them 
survivable against existing conventional methods of attack. 

[11] All projected spending associated with the New Triad is expressed 
as total obligation authority in then-year dollars and is current as of 
the budget submitted to Congress for fiscal year 2005. 

[12] These programs and activities include special access programs, 
weapons systems, and other activities that are not identifiable with 
discrete program elements. 

[13] Of the 737 program elements we identified, 271 did not have any 
resources assigned to them for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 at the 
time the President's 2005 budget was released. However, these program 
elements remain active in the FYDP, and therefore may have spending 
associated with them in the future. 

[14] For not fully dedicated program elements, we included all 
projected spending for the elements in our analysis and we did not 
attempt to assign any specific portion of the spending to the New 
Triad. 

[15] GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2004). This report also discusses a number of other 
limitations in the FYDP. For example, the FYDP's current usefulness is 
limited in providing Congress visibility over the implementation of the 
capabilities-based defense strategy and associated risk management 
framework, important 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review initiatives. We 
made recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the FYDP, 
including: (1) aligning the program elements in the FYDP to defense 
capabilities needed to meet the defense strategy and the dimensions of 
the risk management framework and (2) reporting funding levels in its 
summary FYDP report to Congress. 

[16] The FYDP defines strategic forces as those organizations and 
associated weapon systems whose force missions encompass 
intercontinental or transoceanic intertheater responsibilities. Program 
elements in the strategic forces major force program include strategic 
offensive forces, such as those related to intercontinental and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic defensive forces, 
such as ballistic missile early-warning systems. 

[17] We have issued several reports addressing DOD's progress in 
creating its virtual major force program for space. See: GAO, 
Technology Development: New DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy 
Provides Basis for Optimizing Investments, but Future Versions Need to 
Be More Robust, GAO-05-155 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005); Defense 
Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further 
Management Actions Needed, GAO-03-379 (Washington, D.C.: April 2003); 
and Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition 
Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control, GAO-02-738 
(Washington, D.C.: September 2002). 

[18] GAO, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision- 
Making, GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.: December 1998). 

[19] DOD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: December 2002). Also see GAO, 
Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). For 
information on the "Bomber Roadmap", see GAO, Operation Desert Storm: 
Limits on the Role and Performance of B-52 Bombers in Conventional 
Conflicts, GAO/NSIAD-93-138 (Washington, D.C.: May 1993) and Strategic 
Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time- 
Consuming, and Costly, GAO/NSIAD-93-45 (Washington, D.C.: February 
1993). 

[20] GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

[21] FYDP resources fall into three broad categories--total obligation 
authority, manpower, or forces--that are identifiable by resource 
identification codes. In our review of the FYDP's structure, we 
identified 4,725 unique, active program elements associated with total 
obligation authority resource identification codes. 

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