This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-144 
entitled 'General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is 
Needed, but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical 
to Long-Term Success' which was released on December 10, 2004.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

November 2004:

General Aviation Security:

Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with 
the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success:

GAO-05-144:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-144, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives.

Why GAO Did This Study:

Federal intelligence agencies have reported that in the past, 
terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft (all 
aviation other than commercial and military) for terrorist acts, and 
that the September 11th terrorists learned to fly at general aviation 
flight schools. The questions GAO answered regarding the status of 
general aviation security included (1) What actions has the federal 
government taken to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities 
of, general aviation; and communicate that information to stakeholders? 
(2) What steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general 
aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government 
face; and (3) What steps have non-federal stakeholders taken to enhance 
the security of general aviation?

What GAO Found:

The federal and state governments and general aviation industry all 
play a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal 
government provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and 
provides some funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and 
enhancing security falls on airport operators. Although TSA has issued 
a limited threat assessment of general aviation, and the FBI identified 
that terrorists have considered using general aviation to conduct 
attacks, a systematic assessment of threats has not been conducted. In 
addition, to assess airport vulnerabilities, TSA plans to issue a self-
assessment tool for airport operators’ use, but it does not plan to 
conduct on-site vulnerability assessments at all general aviation 
airports due to the cost and vastness of the general aviation network. 
Instead, TSA intends to use a systematic and analytical risk management 
process, which is considered a best practice, to assess the threats and 
vulnerabilities of general aviation. However, TSA has not yet developed 
an implementation plan for its risk management efforts. 

TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to 
address security risks to general aviation through regulation and 
guidance, but still face challenges in their efforts to further enhance 
security. For example, TSA has promulgated regulations requiring 
background checks of foreign candidates for U.S. flight training 
schools and has issued security guidelines for general aviation 
airports. However, we found limitations in the process used to conduct 
compliance inspections of flight training programs. In addition, FAA, 
in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has implemented 
airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special events. 
However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for 
reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit 
access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively 
affect the general aviation industry. 

Non-federal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the 
federal government and have individually taken steps to enhance general 
aviation security. For example, industry associations developed best 
practices and recommendations for securing general aviation, and have 
partnered with TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport 
Watch Program, similar to a neighborhood watch program. Some state 
governments have also provided funding for enhancing security at 
general aviation airports, and many airport operators GAO surveyed took 
steps to enhance security such as installing fencing and increasing 
police patrols. 

Examples of General Aviation Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends, among other things, that the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) develop a plan for implementing a risk management 
approach to strengthen general aviation security, and that the Federal 
Aviation Administration establish a documented process to review and 
revalidate flight restrictions.

TSA and FAA generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-144.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick, 
202-512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge TSA's 
Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities and 
Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders:

TSA and FAA Have Taken Actions to Reduce Security Risks Associated with 
General Aviation but Face Regulatory and Funding Challenges:

Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General Aviation 
Security:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration:

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General 
Aviation:

Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening and 
Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities:

Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation Departments of 
55 Fortune 500 Corporations:

Figures:

Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation:

Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002:

Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States:

Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation Airport (top) 
and a More Complex Urban General Aviation Airport (bottom):

Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA:

Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal Security 
Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to Include Some Private and 
Public Charter Aircraft:

Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in Texas 
when the President Is Present:

Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone Surrounding 
the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight Restriction Zone:

Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military 
Installations:

Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have Increased:

Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, Warning 
General Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted Airspace:

Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General Aviation 
Airports Around the Country:

Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized Aircraft 
Use:

Abbreviations:

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

TFR: temporary flight restrictions:

TSA: Transportation Security Administration:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

November 11, 2004:

The Honorable Harold Rogers: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

General aviation accounts for three-quarters of all aircraft that take 
off and land in the United States. These aircraft encompass a wide 
range of flight operations at nearly 19,000 general aviation airports 
nationwide.[Footnote 1] According to the National Air Transportation 
Association, the general aviation industry contributes about $100 
billion to the U.S. economy each year and accounts for about 1.3 
million jobs. Federal intelligence agencies have reported in the past 
that terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft for 
terrorist acts and that the September 11 terrorists learned to fly at 
flight schools in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota. In addition, the 9/
11 Commission identified concerns that vulnerabilities continue to 
exist in general aviation.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with other 
federal agencies, state governments, and the general aviation industry, 
plays a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal 
government provides guidance on threats and vulnerabilities, enforces 
regulatory requirements, and provides some funding assistance, because 
of competing needs of commercial aviation security funding and the 
vastness and diversity of the general aviation network, the bulk of the 
responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport 
operators. This public/private partnership has been strengthened 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, in part, through the 
teaming of TSA and general aviation industry associations by means of 
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which, among other things, 
helped develop security guidelines for general aviation airports based 
on industry best practices.[Footnote 2]

To assess the status of general aviation security, we answered the 
following questions: (1) What actions has the federal government taken 
to identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities of, general 
aviation, and communicate that information to stakeholders? (2) What 
additional steps has the federal government taken to strengthen general 
aviation security, and what, if any, challenges does the government 
face in further enhancing security? (3) What steps have non-federal 
stakeholders taken to enhance the security of general aviation? Due to 
TSA's concerns that the public release of our detailed findings could 
compromise aviation security, we issued a separate restricted report to 
you detailing the results of our review. This report is intended to 
summarize, in a publicly releasable form, our overall findings and 
confirm TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) agreement 
to take action to better assess the potential for terrorist misuse of 
general aviation aircraft, improve the communication of terrorist 
threat information to the general aviation community, help manage 
security risks associated with access to general aviation aircraft and 
airspace, and help ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for 
indefinite periods of time are reviewed, revalidated, and consistently 
applied. Information determined to be sensitive has been removed from 
this report.

To determine the actions taken by the federal government to assess and 
communicate threats and vulnerabilities associated with general 
aviation, we reviewed federal agency reports and studies sponsored by 
industry associations, and interviewed federal officials and general 
aviation industry representatives, including those who provided input 
to TSA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group on General 
Aviation. To identify what additional steps the federal government has 
taken to address national security risks from general aviation, we 
obtained and analyzed data from the FAA, including the number of flight 
restrictions that affect general aviation and information from TSA on 
efforts to ensure compliance with general aviation regulations and 
provide security guidelines for airport operators. We sought to 
determine the reliability of these data by, among other things, 
discussing methods of inputting and maintaining data with agency 
officials. On the basis of these discussions, we determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. To 
identify what steps nonfederal aviation stakeholders have taken to 
enhance the security of general aviation, we judgmentally selected 31 
general aviation airports to observe security measures implemented 
since September 11, 2001, and discuss security-related issues.[Footnote 
3] We selected these airports based on characteristics including size, 
location, and aviation activity.[Footnote 4] Because of the limited 
number of airports in our sample, and because the selected airports did 
not constitute a representative sample, the results of our case study 
analysis cannot be projected to the universe of general aviation 
airports. We also discussed security issues with selected state 
aviation officials. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of 
publicly accessible general aviation airports that are eligible for 
federal funding to obtain airport managers' views on changes in the 
security environment in general aviation since September 11.[Footnote 
5]

We performed our work between October 2003 and August 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix I provides more details about our scope and methodology of our 
work.

Results in Brief:

TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall systematic 
assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to 
determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. Although TSA 
issued a limited assessment of threats associated with general aviation 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that terrorists 
have considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic 
assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, TSA has 
conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation 
airports, but agency officials stated that conducting these assessments 
is costly and, therefore, impractical to do for the 19,000 general 
aviation airports nationwide. TSA intends to implement a risk 
management approach to better assess threats and vulnerabilities of 
general aviation aircraft and airports and, as part of this approach, 
is developing an online vulnerability self-assessment tool to be 
completed by individual airport managers. However, we found limitations 
in the use of the self-assessment tool. Further, TSA has not yet 
developed a plan with specific milestones for implementing these tools 
and assessments. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA to 
(1) monitor the progress of its efforts, (2) hold responsible officials 
accountable for achieving desired results, and (3) ensure that 
alternative approaches are considered should the tool not provide 
sufficient data to provide a desired security baseline of 
vulnerabilities.

TSA has also partnered with industry associations to develop security 
guidelines that enable general aviation airport managers to assess 
their own vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, and works through 
industry associations to communicate threat information. However, 
industry and state aviation officials we spoke with stated that 
security advisories distributed by TSA were general in nature and were 
not consistently received. In part this is understandable because, 
among other things, the agency relies on other federal agencies for 
threat information. However, we have found that applying these 
principles to the extent possible provides organizations like TSA with 
the best opportunity to achieve desired results.

TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks to general 
aviation through regulation and guidance, but still face challenges in 
their efforts to further enhance security. For example, TSA has 
developed regulations governing background checks of foreign candidates 
for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security guidelines for 
general aviation airports. However, we found limitations in the process 
used to conduct compliance inspections of flight training programs. 
Further, should TSA establish new security requirements for general 
aviation airports, competing funding needs could challenge the ability 
of general aviation airport operators to meet these requirements. In 
addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has 
implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special 
events to guard against potential terrorist threats. However, FAA has 
not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and 
revalidating the continuing need for extended flight restrictions that 
limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could 
negatively affect the general aviation industry. In addition, we found 
limitations in the process used to allow pilots to fly through 
security-related flight restrictions.

Nonfederal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the 
federal government and one another to enhance general aviation security 
and have individually taken a number of steps to address the threat of 
misuse of general aviation aircraft. For example, in addition to 
developing their own sets of best practices and recommendations for 
securing general aviation aircraft and operations, industry 
associations have worked with TSA to develop security initiatives such 
as the Airport Watch program,[Footnote 6] launched jointly by the 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and TSA, and the TSA Access 
Certificate program,[Footnote 7] developed by the National Business 
Aviation Association and currently being evaluated at selected airports 
by TSA. Some state governments have also provided funding for enhancing 
security at general aviation airports and established security 
regulations. For example, New Jersey requires that all aircraft stored 
at general aviation airports be secured with at least two locks to 
prevent unlawful access to the aircraft. In addition, many of the 
general aviation airports we visited and surveyed had taken steps to 
enhance security such as installing fencing and lighting, and 
requesting increased local police patrols.

Because of the importance of securing general aviation operations and 
to help address associated challenges, we are making recommendations to 
the Department of Homeland Security to take four actions to better 
assess the possibility of terrorists' misuse of general aviation 
aircraft, better communicate terrorist threat information, and help 
mitigate security risks to general aviation operations. We are also 
making a recommendation to the Department of Transportation to take 
action to ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for 
indefinite periods are reviewed and, if appropriate, revalidated and 
consistently applied.

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the Assistant 
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security 
Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration who generally concurred with our findings and 
recommendations. TSA's written comments are presented in appendix II.

Background:

General aviation encompasses a wide variety of activities, aircraft 
types, and airports. About 85 percent of all general aviation hours 
flown falls into one of five categories of flying activity, as defined 
by FAA and described in figure 1. The largest of these categories is 
recreational flying, which is defined as flying for pleasure or 
personal transportation and not for business purposes. In 2002, 
recreational flying accounted for about 41 percent of all general 
aviation hours flown. The remaining categories include activities such 
as medical services, aerial advertising, aerial mapping and 
photography, and aerial application of seeds or chemicals.[Footnote 8]

Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Various types of aircraft can be used in general aviation operations, 
including single-engine and multi-engine piston aircraft, turboprops, 
turbojets, helicopters, gliders, and experimental aircraft. The general 
aviation fleet in the United States consists of about 211,000 active 
aircraft. While this fleet is diverse, certain activities are generally 
associated with specific types of general aviation aircraft. For 
example, corporate flying generally involves the use of turboprop and 
turbojet aircraft, while personal and instructional flying generally 
involves the use of single-engine propeller-driven aircraft. The 
largest category of general aviation aircraft is single-engine 
propeller, which in 2002 made up 68 percent of the general aviation 
fleet. Types of general aviation aircraft and their uses are described 
in figure 2.[Footnote 9]

Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

There are approximately 14,000 private-use and 4,800 public-use general 
aviation airports in the United States, and about 550,000 active 
general aviation pilots and instructors. [Footnote 10] Non-U.S. 
citizens can also possess active student pilot certificates in the 
United States, according to FAA. Although general aviation aircraft can 
take off and land at almost any airport, including most of the nation's 
commercial service airports,[Footnote 11] there is an extensive system 
of general aviation airports nationwide. Figure 3 identifies the 
categories of airports in the United States.

Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States:

[See PDF for image]

[A] According to FAA, commercial service airports are those airports 
that handle regularly scheduled commercial airline traffic and have at 
least 2,500 annual passenger enplanements. TSA considers commercial 
service airports to be those subject to security requirements under 
49.C.F.R. part 1542 and by that definition, there are approximately 450 
commercial service airports.

[End of figure]

Public-use general aviation airports can range in size and complexity 
from the short, grass landing strip in rural areas to the very busy 
urban airports with multiple paved runways of differing lengths that 
can accommodate large jet aircraft. Figure 4 illustrates examples of a 
rural general aviation airport with a grass landing strip and a more 
complex urban general aviation airport.

Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation Airport (top) 
and a More Complex Urban General Aviation Airport (bottom):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

General aviation industry interests are represented by a variety of 
national organizations. One of the functions of these organizations is 
disseminating information from federal agencies to their members. These 
associations also provide their members with security best practices 
and recommendations tailored to their members' specific needs. Table 1 
provides an overview of some of the largest industry associations and 
their role in general aviation.

Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General 
Aviation:

Association: American Association of Airport Executives; 
Who they represent: Airport executives at public use airports.

Association: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; 
Who they represent: Pilots and aircraft owners.

Association: Experimental Aircraft Association; 
Who they represent: Recreational aviation enthusiasts and builders.

Association: General Aviation Manufacturers Association; 
Who they represent: Companies manufacturing general aviation aircraft, 
engines, and component parts.

Association: Helicopter Association International; 
Who they represent: Helicopter operators and manufacturers.

Association: National Business Aviation Association, Inc; 
Who they represent: Companies that own or operate general aviation 
aircraft as an aid to the conduct of their business or are involved 
with some other aspect of business aviation.

Association: National Agricultural Aviation Association; 
Who they represent: Licensed commercial applicator-operators that use 
aircraft to enhance food and fiber production, protect forestry, and 
control health-threatening pests.

Association: National Air Transportation Association; 
Who they represent: Companies that provide general aviation service 
including on-demand air charter, fuel and ground services, aircraft 
maintenance, and pilot training.

Association: National Association of State Aviation Officials; 
Who they represent: Officials in state government aviation agencies. 

Source: Industry associations.

[End of table]

Prior to the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in 
November 2001, FAA had primary responsibility for securing all civil 
aviation, including general aviation. Although the act transferred much 
of that responsibility from FAA to TSA,[Footnote 12] FAA maintains a 
security role because of its regulatory authority over the imposition 
of temporary flight restrictions (TFR)[Footnote 13] and its 
disbursement of grants to fund safety and security enhancements at 
commercial and general aviation airports.

Most of the civil aviation security regulations TSA assumed from FAA 
did not apply to general aviation, but rather to commercial passenger 
air carriers and commercial airports.[Footnote 14] Although the 
security of general aviation airports remains largely unregulated, the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and subsequent laws required 
TSA to develop additional regulations that affect specific segments of 
general aviation--flight training schools and certain charter flight 
operations.[Footnote 15]

Among other things, with regard to all modes of transportation, the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act also required TSA to:

* receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to 
transportation security;

* assess threats to transportation security and develop policies, 
strategies, and plans for dealing with those threats, including 
coordinating countermeasures with other federal organizations;

* enforce security-related regulations and requirements; and:

* oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security 
measures at airports and other transportation facilities.[Footnote 16]

Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge TSA's 
Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities and 
Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders:

TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall, 
systematic assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general 
aviation to determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. 
However, in July 2003, TSA issued a limited assessment of threats 
associated with general aviation activities. In addition, the FBI 
stated that intelligence indicates that terrorists have considered 
using general aviation aircraft in the past to conduct attacks. To 
determine vulnerabilities, TSA conducted vulnerability assessments at 
some general aviation airports based on specific security concerns or 
requests by airport officials, and have conducted less intensive 
security surveys at selected general aviation airports. To better focus 
its efforts and resources, TSA intends to implement a risk management 
approach to assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation 
aircraft and airports, and conduct on-site vulnerability assessments 
only at those airports the agency determines to be nationally critical. 
However, TSA has not yet developed a plan with specific milestones for 
implementing these tools and assessments.

While TSA has partnered with industry associations to develop security 
guidelines for general aviation airports and communicate threat 
information to airport operators, we found limitations in the 
communication of threat information. Industry and state aviation 
officials we spoke with stated that security advisories distributed by 
TSA were general in nature and were not consistently received. Risk 
communication principles provide that specific information on potential 
threats include--to the extent possible--the nature of the threat, when 
and where it is likely to occur, over what time period it is likely to 
occur, and guidance on actions to be taken. Applying these principles 
presents problems for TSA because, among other things, the agency 
receives threat information from other federal agencies and that 
information is often classified.

Theft of General Aviation Aircraft Has Been a Concern, but Intelligence 
on Threats to General Aviation Is Infrequent and Non-specific:

Neither TSA nor FBI has conducted an overall systematic assessment of 
threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to 
better prepare against terrorist threats. In July 2003, TSA issued a 
brief summary assessment of the threats associated with general 
aviation. However, the assessment was not widely distributed or made 
available to general aviation airports or other stakeholders. In 2004, 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that 
the department, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, 
and other agencies, lacked precise knowledge about the time, place, and 
methods of potential terrorist attacks related to general aviation. 
Additionally, industry and TSA officials stated that the small size, 
lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general 
aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists and, thereby, 
reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.

Historical intelligence indicates that terrorists have expressed 
interest in using general aviation aircraft to conduct attacks. The 
following are examples of intelligence information indicating terrorist 
interest in general aviation:

* CIA reported that terrorists associated with the September 11 attacks 
expressed interest in the use of crop-dusting aircraft (a type of 
general aviation aircraft) for large area dissemination of biological 
warfare agents such as anthrax.

* CIA reported that one of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks 
originally proposed using small aircraft filled with explosives to 
carry out the attacks.

* In May 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued a security 
advisory indicating that al Qaeda was in the late stages of planning an 
attack, using general aviation aircraft, on the U.S. Consulate in 
Karachi, Pakistan, and had also planned to use general aviation 
aircraft to attack warships in the Persian Gulf.

The Extent of General Aviation's Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack Is 
Difficult to Determine:

TSA and industry stakeholders we spoke with stated that general 
aviation airports are vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA officials 
stated also that it would be difficult for the agency to systematically 
conduct on-site assessments of the vulnerabilities of individual 
general aviation airports to terrorist activities because of the 
diversity and large number of airports. Officials cited the nearly 
19,000 general aviation airports nationwide, noting that each has 
distinct characteristics that may make it more or less attractive to 
potential terrorists.

TSA's efforts to assess vulnerabilities at specific general aviation 
airports have been limited. At the time of our review, TSA had 
conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation 
airports based on specific security concerns or requests by airport 
officials. TSA officials stated that the resources associated with 
conducting vulnerability assessments, and the diverse nature of general 
aviation airports, makes it impractical to conduct assessments at the 
approximately 19,000 general aviation airports nationwide, or even the 
approximately 4,800 public-use general aviation airports. TSA officials 
said, however, that they had conducted a less intensive security survey 
at additional general aviation airports. TSA selected these airports, 
among other things, in preparation for special security events such as 
the G-8 summit and national Republican and Democratic political 
conventions.

In response to industry requests for federally endorsed security 
protocols, TSA issued security guidelines in May 2004 meant to enable 
individual general aviation airport managers to assess their own 
facility's vulnerability to terrorist attack and suggest security 
enhancements.[Footnote 17] Although these guidelines were issued after 
we conducted our survey of general aviation airport managers, we found 
that the majority of airport managers surveyed stated that they would 
use a security review/vulnerability assessment tool if it were 
provided. To produce these security guidelines, TSA partnered with 
industry associations participating in the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee's Working Group on General Aviation Airports Security. The 
guidelines include an airport characteristic measurement tool that 
allows airport operators to assess the level of risk associated with 
their airport to determine which security enhancements are most 
appropriate for their facility. The guidelines also contain security 
guidance based on industry best practices. TSA officials emphasized 
that, because security at general aviation airports is not currently 
regulated by TSA, the security enhancements suggested by the guidelines 
are voluntary and are to be implemented at the discretion of the 
airport manager. While TSA's and general aviation airport managers' 
assessments at specific general aviation airports have been limited, 
TSA has identified a number of factors that could make general aviation 
aircraft and airports vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists.

Implementing a Risk Management Approach Could Improve the Assessment of 
Threats and Vulnerabilities, but TSA Lacks an Implementation Plan:

In order to address challenges in assessing threats and vulnerabilities 
to all modes of transportation--including general aviation--and 
focusing scarce resources, TSA plans to implement a risk management 
approach based on assessments of criticality, threat, and 
vulnerability.[Footnote 18] TSA's risk management approach, as it 
relates to general aviation security, is summarized below.

* TSA plans to use a criticality tool to provide the basis for 
prioritizing which transportation assets and facilities require 
additional or special protection. On the basis of a criticality 
assessment, TSA intends to provide greater security scrutiny to general 
aviation airports that require special protection.

* TSA plans to apply threat scenarios of how terrorists might conduct 
attacks in specific situations in airport environments to assess 
threats faced by individual general aviation airports.

* TSA is developing an online self-assessment toolintended to help 
general aviation airport managers develop a comprehensive security 
baseline for their facility.

* TSA is developing a Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability 
Evaluation tool for conducting on-site assessments of general aviation 
airports that are deemed to be nationally critical.

TSA intends to compile baseline data on security vulnerabilities from 
these tools and use the data to conduct a systematic analysis of 
security vulnerabilities at general aviation airports nationwide. TSA 
officials stated that such an analysis will allow the agency to 
establish the need, if any, for minimum security standards; determine 
the adequacy of current security regulations; and help the agency and 
airports better direct limited resources. They noted that because 
airports will not be required to use the tool, the usefulness of the 
data gathered will be dependent on the number of airports voluntarily 
submitting assessment results to TSA.

Despite these plans, however, TSA has not developed an implementation 
plan with specific milestones for conducting its risk management 
efforts. These efforts have been under development for over a year and 
were originally scheduled to have been completed between June and 
August of 2004. Without a plan that establishes specific time frames 
for implementation of the tools and assessments, it will be difficult 
for TSA to monitor the progress of its efforts and hold responsible 
officials accountable for achieving desired results. Similarly, without 
a plan that includes estimates of the resources needed to effectively 
implement the agency's risk management approach, TSA's ability to 
allocate its resources to areas of greatest need could be impaired. A 
plan could also address alternative approaches that could be 
implemented if the extent of voluntary participation of general 
aviation airport managers does not provide sufficient data needed to 
establish the desired security baseline of vulnerabilities.

TSA Faces Challenges in Applying Risk Communication Principles to 
Improve the Quality of Threat Information Disseminated to General 
Aviation Stakeholders:

TSA faces challenges in ensuring that threat information is effectively 
communicated to the general aviation community due to the generality of 
intelligence information given, and the lack of a current, reliable, 
and complete list of airport contacts. In addition, intelligence 
information may be classified or sensitive, thus limiting with whom it 
can be shared.[Footnote 19] TSA partners with industry associations 
that are part of a General Aviation Coalition as a primary means for 
communicating threat information and developing security guidelines for 
general aviation airport managers.[Footnote 20] Specifically, rather 
than notifying general aviation airport operators directly, TSA 
communicates threat advisories to these industry associations, which in 
turn are to provide it to their members. A majority of general aviation 
airport managers we surveyed reported that they had at least some 
contact with nonfederal entities such as state aviation officials or 
industry associations such as the American Association of Airport 
Executives or the National Business Aviation Association.[Footnote 21] 
Additionally, a majority indicated that they had established procedures 
for disseminating security-related information to airport employees and 
tenants.

TSA issued threat advisories for dissemination by general aviation 
associations to general aviation airports. However, industry 
association representatives and state aviation officials we spoke with 
stated that these security advisories were general in nature and were 
not consistently received. An example of one of TSA's threat advisories 
is shown in figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Timely, specific, and actionable information are three key principles 
of effective risk communication. However, TSA faces inherent challenges 
in applying risk communication principles because of: (1) the 
generality of intelligence information received from the intelligence 
community, (2) a limited capability to identify appropriate officials 
and airports to receive threat information, and (3) potential 
restrictions placed on communicating classified or sensitive security 
information to general aviation stakeholders. Providing threat 
information to the public or those with a need to know in accordance 
with these principles is challenging and extends beyond threat 
communications related to general aviation.

The first challenge TSA, along with other federal agencies, faces in 
applying risk communication principles is the generality of 
intelligence information and the difficulties the government faces in 
developing such information. According to TSA, gathering specific 
threat information is difficult because the threat posed by a 
particular person or group varies over time with changes in the 
terrorist organization's structure, objectives, methodologies, and 
capabilities. Targets also change depending on the security of the 
target in question; likelihood of success; mission complexity; and 
potential psychological, emotional, and financial impact of the attack. 
These variations in groups and targets make predicting how and when a 
terrorist event could occur difficult. Nonetheless, we have reported 
that public warning systems should, to the extent possible, include 
specific, consistent, accurate, and clear information on the threat at 
hand, including the nature of the threat, location, and threat time 
frames along with guidance on actions to be taken in response to the 
threat.[Footnote 22] According to risk communication principles, 
without adequate threat information, the public may ignore the threat 
or engage in inappropriate actions, some of which may compromise rather 
than promote the public's safety.

A second challenge faced by TSA in communicating threat information to 
general aviation airports is the lack of current, reliable, and 
complete information about who to contact to facilitate communication. 
General aviation airport operators are widely spread among a diverse 
range of airports that have historically been subject to little or no 
federal regulation or contact. As a result, contact information about 
who the owners or operators of individual airports are may not be 
complete, current, or readily available. Neither FAA nor TSA maintains 
a current database with contact information for all general aviation 
airports. Thus, identifying who should receive threat information at 
the nearly 19,000 airports poses a significant challenge. While general 
aviation industry associations typically maintain contact information 
on their members, association officials stated that when they need 
contact information on general aviation airports they generally use 
data from the FAA.

A third challenge TSA faces in providing classified threat information 
to general aviation airport operators is determining which airport 
officials have a need and clearance to receive classified or sensitive 
intelligence information. In general, the more detailed and specific 
the threat information, the more likely the information is classified 
and, therefore, not available to those without appropriate security 
clearances. TSA officials said they had sanitized threat information in 
order to issue the five security advisories to general aviation 
industry associations in an unclassified format. TSA officials said 
they had also granted security clearances to individuals at certain 
industry associations who were willing to undergo the required 
background check process. However, although TSA has developed the 
ability to communicate classified threat information to some general 
aviation industry representatives, the agency still faces limitations 
on its ability to ensure that airport operators with a need to know 
have access to classified threat information, and have the appropriate 
clearances.

According to TSA officials, the agency's approach to risk management 
should improve its ability to communicate threat information to the 
general aviation community by addressing the three challenges mentioned 
above. Specifically, once TSA completes threat and criticality 
assessments and--in coordination with general aviation airport 
managers--vulnerability assessments, the agency will have a greater 
sense of the threats that individual general aviation airport managers 
should be aware of and therefore be able to communicate more useful and 
specific threat information. Conducting vulnerability and criticality 
assessments should also help TSA identify airports for which current 
and reliable contact information is needed, and identify airport 
officials with a need to know classified threat information.

TSA and FAA Have Taken Actions to Reduce Security Risks Associated with 
General Aviation but Face Regulatory and Funding Challenges:

TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks associated with 
general aviation through regulation, guidance, and funding. However, in 
response to the September 11 attacks, TSA has primarily focused on 
strengthening the security of commercial aviation and meeting 
associated congressional mandates. As a result, TSA has dedicated fewer 
resources to strengthening general aviation security, and both TSA and 
FAA continue to face challenges in their efforts to further enhance 
security. For example, TSA has developed a regulation governing 
background checks of foreign candidates for flight training at U.S. 
flight schools and issued security guidelines for general aviation 
airports.[Footnote 23] However, TSA has not yet developed a schedule 
for conducting inspections or determined the resources needed for 
monitoring compliance with new regulations. In addition, should TSA 
establish security requirements for general aviation airports, it may 
be difficult for airport operators to finance security enhancements 
independently and federal funding will also be a challenge since 
general aviation airports' needs must compete with the needs of 
commercial airports for security funding. FAA, in coordination with TSA 
and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over 
certain landmarks and events, among other things, to guard against 
potential terrorist threats. FAA officials said that they 
intermittently reviewed the continuing need for flight restrictions 
limiting access to airspace for indefinite periods of time--those 
established at the request of the Department of Defense and for the 
defense of the national capital region. However, they had not 
established written procedures or criteria for revalidating the need 
for restrictions to ensure such reviews were consistently conducted. In 
addition, we found limitations in the process used by TSA to review and 
make recommendations regarding waivers to allow general aviation pilots 
to fly through security related flight restrictions.

DOJ, FAA, and TSA Have Issued Requirements for Student Pilots, but 
Limitations Exist:

Recognizing the threat posed by larger aircraft, whether carrying 
passengers or cargo, the Department of Justice, in February 2003, 
issued a requirement that all non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training 
in aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more must undergo a comprehensive 
background check.[Footnote 24] Both TSA and FAA subsequently issued 
regulations intended to limit access to aircraft for certain segments 
of the general aviation community by increasing requirements for 
background checks of pilots. As table 2 shows, TSA and FAA promulgated 
new regulations governing the screening and validation of pilot and 
student pilot identities.

Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening and 
Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities:

Date: Feb. 2002; 
Agency: TSA[A]; 
New requirement: Individuals must successfully complete a fingerprint-
based criminal history records check before serving as a flight crew 
member.

Date: Feb. 2002; 
Agency: FAA[B]; 
New requirement: Flight crew operating aircraft to or from College Park 
Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington Executive/Hyde Field must 
successfully complete a background check by a law enforcement agency 
and that may include a fingerprint- based criminal history records 
check. (All three airports are within 15 nautical miles of key 
landmarks such as the Washington Monument.)

Date: Oct. 2002; 
Agency: FAA[C]; 
New requirement: All pilots must carry and present picture 
identification along with their pilot certificates.

Date: Jan. 2003; 
Agency: FAA and TSA[D]; 
New requirement: FAA may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue an airman 
certificate to anyone (any citizen or noncitizen) when notified by TSA 
after TSA's determination that such a person is a threat to 
transportation security.

Date: July 2003; 
Agency: FAA; 
New requirement: FAA began issuing the new certificates made of plastic 
and incorporating security features such as a hologram of the FAA seal 
to replace the old paper certificates.

Date: Dec. 2003; 
Agency: TSA[E]; 
New requirement: All non-U.S. citizens or nationals seeking flight 
training at a U.S. flight school must undergo a comprehensive 
background check by TSA, regardless of aircraft weight. 

Source: GAO's analysis of regulations.

[A] 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.229 & 1544.230.

[B] 14 C.F.R. Part 91, SFAR 94.

[C] 14 C.F.R. § 61.3.

[D] 14 C.F.R. § 61.18 and 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.115 & 1540.117.

[E] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. @ 2572-74 (TSA has yet to 
finalize its implementing regulation).

[End of table]

Prior to September 11, FAA did not require background checks of anyone 
seeking a pilot license, also referred to as a pilot certificate. In 
November 2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act required 
that foreign student pilots seeking training in aircraft weighing 
12,500 pounds or more undergo a background check by the Department of 
Justice. Under regulations issued by the Department of Justice, flight 
training providers are responsible for ensuring that aliens applying 
for flight training in aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more fill out 
and submit a Department of Justice Flight Training Candidate Checks 
Program form and are fingerprinted.[Footnote 25] The Foreign Terrorist 
Tracking Task Force is to perform a criminal history background check 
of the foreign candidate and notify the flight training provider 
whether or not the foreign candidate is cleared to receive flight 
training.[Footnote 26] According to officials from the Foreign 
Terrorist Tracking Task Force, a number of foreign student pilot 
candidates have been denied from enrolling in a flight training program 
between March 17, 2003 and August 18, 2004.[Footnote 27] FAA officials 
said that in February 2002 they took additional steps to make sure that 
foreign student pilots who already had student pilot certificates when 
the new requirements went into effect were checked.

In December 2003, the Vision 100--The Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)[Footnote 28] transferred 
responsibility for conducting background checks from the Department of 
Justice to TSA and expanded the background check requirement to include 
all foreign student pilots regardless of the aircraft's size in which 
they train.[Footnote 29] TSA has developed a regulation implementing 
the mandates of Vision 100 and, at the time of our review, planned to 
publish the final regulation and assume the background check 
responsibilities from the Department of Justice by September 30, 2004. 
According to TSA officials, TSA's Alien Flight Student program will be 
similar to the Department of Justice's Flight Training Candidate Checks 
Program.[Footnote 30] A key challenge for TSA is fulfilling its 
responsibility to enforce security related regulations will be 
monitoring the compliance of flight training programs in the United 
Sates and Puerto Rico with this new requirement. We found limitations 
in the monitoring of these flight-training programs.

In addition to the Department of Justice regulations governing foreign 
student pilots, FAA, in July 2002, implemented changes to the process 
of issuing a U.S. pilot certificate to foreign nationals already 
holding a pilot certificate from a foreign country.[Footnote 31] 
Historically, FAA issued pilot certificates to pilots who held licenses 
issued by nations that are members of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization based on their foreign license. Members of the 
organization, including the United States and 187 other nations, 
(including nations known to sponsor terrorism) agreed to issue private 
pilot certificates to those holding pilot licenses from other 
organization member nations without requiring them to undergo skills 
testing.

Because of the destructive potential of larger aircraft, the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act directed TSA to promulgate new rules 
governing security requirements for certain public and private charter 
operations. Generally, the "twelve-five rule" requires nonscheduled or 
on-demand charter services (for passengers or cargo) using aircraft 
weighing 12,500 pounds or more to implement a specific program of 
security procedures similar to those required of scheduled commercial 
airlines and public charters.[Footnote 32] Similarly, the "private 
charter rule" requires private charter services using aircraft weighing 
100,309.3 pounds (45,500 kilograms) or more, or that have 61 or more 
passenger seats, to implement many of the same security procedures 
required of the major airlines. However, we found that TSA faces 
challenges in monitoring compliance with these new security 
regulations. Figure 6 shows that selected existing security 
requirements have been expanded from commercial air carriers to public 
and private charter aircraft.

Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal Security 
Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to Include Some Private and 
Public Charter Aircraft:

[See PDF for image]

[A] The sterile area is the portion of an airport defined in the 
airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding 
aircraft through the screening of persons and property.

[End of figure]

Procedures for Determining Continued Need for Temporary Flight 
Restrictions Have Not Been Developed:

Since September 11, 2001, FAA has issued temporary flight restrictions 
(TFR) for some Department of Defense facilities and for the protection 
of the national capital region for indefinite periods without a 
documented process to justify their continuance. FAA imposes TFRs to 
temporarily restrict aircraft operations within designated areas. Prior 
to September 11, FAA issued TFRs primarily to safely manage airspace 
operations during events of limited duration. Since then, however, FAA, 
in coordination with TSA, the Department of Defense, and the Secret 
Service, among others, has increasingly used TFRs for the purposes of 
national security over specific events and critical 
infrastructure.[Footnote 33]

FAA has authority over the U.S. National Airspace System and is the 
agency responsible for implementing TFRs via the Notice to Airmen 
system.[Footnote 34] For security-related TFRs, FAA generally requests 
that TSA's Office of Operations Policy evaluate requests received from 
federal and nonfederal entities--such as the FBI, the Department of the 
Interior, and state or local government entities--associated with 
National Special Security Events and selected sporting events.[Footnote 
35] TSA evaluates such requests using security related criteria.

Based on their evaluation of requests for selected security-related 
TFRs, TSA officials will make recommendations to FAA regarding whether 
the TFR should be issued. On the basis of this information, FAA will 
make a determination whether to issue the TFR through the Notice to 
Airmen system.

The Number, Size, and in Some Cases Duration of TFRs Has Increased 
since September 11, 2001:

According to FAA officials, prior to September 11, 2001, TFRs were 
rarely issued for security purposes. Since then, however, FAA has 
issued numerous TFRs for the purpose of national security as a result 
of increased focus on aviation security. FAA officials stated that 
Notices to Airmen and other records of TFRs were historically not kept 
after the restrictions were removed, thus they were unable to provide 
accurate information on the number of TFRs issued for national security 
purposes prior to September 11, 2001. Since that time, however, FAA 
officials said the agency had issued approximately 220 Notices to 
Airmen and associated TFRs.

The size--that is, the amount of airspace restricted both vertically 
and laterally--of some TFRs has increased. For example, prior to 
September 11, TFRs for presidential visits had a radius of 3 nautical 
miles with a ceiling of 3,000 feet.[Footnote 36] Since then, 
presidential TFRs have had a radius of 30 nautical miles, with a 
ceiling of 18,000 feet.[Footnote 37] The rationale for increasing the 
size of presidential TFRs, according to FAA, was based on the 
difficulty the military might have in preventing an airborne attack on 
the President once an aircraft was within the 3-nautical mile zone. 
Figure 7 illustrates the area now covered by a presidential TFR over 
the Crawford Ranch in Texas when the President is in residence.

Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in Texas 
when the President Is Present:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In the case of the national capital region and selected military 
installations, the duration of TFRs implemented for national security 
reasons has been put in place and subsequently extended for indefinite 
periods of time. For example, temporary flight restrictions in and 
around the national capital region were established shortly after 
September 11 and according to FAA officials, no set date has been 
established for their removal. These restrictions in and around 
Washington, D.C., are the flight-restricted zone and the Washington, 
D.C. Metropolitan Air Defense Identification Zone, as shown in figure 
8.[Footnote 38]

Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone Surrounding 
the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight Restriction Zone:

[See PDF for image]

Note: The Air Defense Identification Zone consists of three overlapping 
zones centered on the regions three major airports--Baltimore-
Washington International, Dulles International, and Reagan National 
Airport--and extends approximately 30-nautical miles in all directions.

[End of figure]

In addition, FAA issued 21 TFRs around various military facilities 
throughout the country because of security concerns at these facilities 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11. While 8 of these TFRs have 
since been canceled, 13 were still in effect as of July 27, 2004, with 
no scheduled date for removal or documented analysis to justify their 
continued need. According to FAA officials, the agency plans to convert 
11 of these areas to national security areas.[Footnote 39] Once FAA 
publishes revised aeronautical charts reflecting the new, permanent 
advisories recommending that pilots avoid the airspace, FAA officials 
said they plan to cancel the TFRs. In January 2004, FAA issued 
proposals for converting the remaining two TFRs to permanently 
prohibited airspace (where no flights are permitted). At the time of 
our review, FAA was still reviewing comments on the proposal to 
permanently restrict the surrounding airspaces. Figure 9 shows the 
status of security-related TFRs FAA established over military 
installations since September 11.

Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military 
Installations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

TFRs May Negatively Affect the General Aviation Industry:

TSA, FAA, and general aviation industry stakeholders we spoke with 
stated that TFRs negatively affect primarily general aviation operators 
and airports. According to aviation industry representatives we 
contacted and FAA, the increase in the number, size, and duration of 
TFRs and, at times, limited notice given prior to their establishment 
since September 11 has resulted in numerous inadvertent violations of 
restricted airspace. For example, the Washington, D.C. Air Defense 
Identification Zone has been violated over 1,000 times, constituting 
over 40 percent of all TFR violations since September 11, 2001. As 
figure 10 shows, since September 2001, the number of violations of all 
TFRs has increased dramatically. General aviation has accounted for 
most TFR violations committed within U.S. airspace. Further, about 95 
percent of all TFR violations occurred in airspace secured for either 
presidential security or other national security purposes.

Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have Increased:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Although no TFR violations have been shown to be terrorist related, 
violators are subject to disciplinary action. According to FAA 
officials, violations of a TFR typically result in a suspension of the 
pilot's certificate ranging anywhere from 15 days to 90 days. They said 
that the most common reason for TFR violations is pilots not reading 
the Notices to Airmen for the flight area, a required preflight 
procedure. Other reasons for violations included weather problems, 
mechanical failures, and pilot in-flight disorientation (i.e., getting 
lost). FAA officials stated that the number and severity of 
disciplinary actions imposed on pilots violating TFRs have increased 
since September 11. However, FAA officials were unable to provide 
statistical information on the number and severity of disciplinary 
actions for pilots violating TFRs before or since September 11.

The imposition of TFRs can also have an economic impact on general 
aviation operations.[Footnote 40] TSA, FAA, and industry associations 
we spoke with stated that the costs associated with restricting 
airspace can be significant. The National Business Aviation Association 
commissioned a study to estimate the economic impact TFRs have had on 
general aviation since September 11.[Footnote 41] While we did not 
independently assess the validity of the association's assumptions or 
calculations, the study estimated that general aviation passengers and 
firms lost over $1 billion because of increased costs to passengers and 
lost revenues and additional operating costs for general aviation 
firms.[Footnote 42]

We visited St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, to discuss the 
economic impact of TFRs with an affected general aviation airport 
operator.[Footnote 43] St. Mary's is located approximately 3 miles 
south of the Kings Bay Naval Base, where FAA issued a security-related 
TFR shortly after September 11. The airport operator stated that the 
loss of much of the general aviation traffic through his airport 
resulting from the TFR had significantly reduced his ability to 
generate revenue to sustain operations. According to the operator, the 
airport's proximity to the TFR around the base significantly deters 
pilots from using the airport. Other airport operators we visited that 
were affected by TFRs also cited their negative economic impacts. A 
sign warning pilots to avoid restricted airspace near the St. Mary's 
Airport is pictured in figure 11.

Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary's Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, Warning 
General Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted Airspace:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Although TFRs may have economic and other negative impacts on the 
general aviation industry, FAA did not establish a systematic process 
for periodically reviewing the continuing need for TFRs over the 
national capital region and the 13 TFRs over military installation, or 
determine the long-term economic or other impacts on general aviation 
operations of these restrictions. While FAA officials said they 
frequently reviewed TFRs on an informal basis, they did not conduct 
routine assessments of the continuing need for indefinite TFRs based on 
a consistent, documented set of criteria or determine the impact of 
these restrictions on general aviation. In June 2004, FAA officials, in 
reporting to Congress on the Air Defense Identification Zone, did not 
cite specific criteria or the process used to determine the continuing 
need for the restrictions. Instead, FAA based its report primarily on 
unspecified security reasons submitted by TSA. TSA officials cited the 
continuing threat posed to the national capital region by organizations 
such as al Qaeda. While the air defense identification zone around the 
national capital region is unique, it is possible that future 
circumstances may warrant the issuance of other temporary flight 
restrictions of indefinite duration. Without documented procedures and 
criteria, FAA cannot ensure that future reviews of flight restrictions 
issued for indefinite periods are properly conducted, or consistently 
ensure that restrictions on airspace are still needed.

We also found that TSA and FAA were limited in their ability to 
mitigate the threat of airborne attack. This is a result of limitations 
in airspace restrictions, and the practice of granting pilots waivers 
to enter temporarily restricted airspace.

Enhancing Security at General Aviation Airports Is Difficult because of 
Funding Challenges:

Enhancing general aviation security is difficult because of funding 
challenges faced by the federal government and general aviation airport 
operators. General aviation airports have received some federal funding 
for implementing security upgrades since September 11, but have funded 
most security enhancements on their own. General aviation stakeholders 
we contacted expressed concern that they may not be able to pay for any 
future security requirements that TSA may establish. In addition, TSA 
and FAA are unlikely to be able to allocate significant levels of 
funding for general aviation security enhancements, given competing 
priorities of commercial aviation and other modes of transportation.

About 3,000 general aviation airports are eligible to receive FAA 
Airport Improvement Program grants.[Footnote 44] General aviation 
airports can use Airport Improvement Program grant funds for projects 
that provide safety and security benefits. For example, 6 of the 31 
airport managers we interviewed, including one of the largest general 
aviation airports in the country, said they used Airport Improvement 
Program grants to pay for some of their security enhancements after 
September 11, 2001. In fiscal year 2002, general aviation airports 
received $561 million in Airport Improvement Program grants, of which 
$3.2 million (or about 0.6 percent) was awarded for security projects, 
and in fiscal year 2003, $680 million, of which $1.3 million (or about 
0.2 percent) was awarded for security projects.[Footnote 45] Because 
general aviation airports are generally not subject to any federal 
regulations for security,[Footnote 46] in order to meet eligibility 
requirements for their grants, general aviation airport projects are 
generally limited to those related to safety but have security 
benefits, such as lighting and fencing, as well as the acquisition and 
use of cameras, additional lighting, and motion sensors.[Footnote 47] 
FAA officials stated that if new security requirements were established 
for general aviation airports, security-related enhancement projects 
related to these requirements would be eligible and receive priority 
for Airport Improvement Program funding. However, given the competing 
demands of commercial airports, the large number of general aviation 
airports eligible for such funding, and the limitations of the Airport 
Improvement Program,[Footnote 48] funding could be uncertain for 
general aviation airport operators to meet any new security-related 
requirements.

The Office for Domestic Preparedness within the Department of Homeland 
Security administers two grant programs that could benefit general 
aviation airports--the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the 
Urban Areas Security Initiative.[Footnote 49] Under these programs, 
states may purchase equipment to protect critical infrastructure, 
including equipment for general aviation airports, if the state 
declares general aviation airports critical infrastructures. During the 
course of our review, we learned of one state that plans to spend a 
small amount of Department of Homeland Security grants to improve the 
security of general aviation airports. According to officials in 
Wisconsin, the state plans to use at least $1.5 million of its $41 
million Homeland Security Grant in 2004 to enhance security at general 
aviation airports located along the Great Lakes.

Vision 100 also authorized the Department of Homeland Security to 
establish a $250 million Aviation Security Capital Fund administered by 
TSA to alleviate some of the demand on the Airport Improvement Program 
for security enhancement grants. Of this amount, $125 million is 
discretionary, with priority given to the installation of baggage-
screening equipment at commercial airports while the balance is 
allocated by formula based on airport size and other security 
considerations. TSA officials noted that Congress did not provide an 
appropriation for fiscal year 2004 for the fund. If Congress decides to 
make appropriations in the future for these purposes, general aviation 
airports will still have to compete with commercial airports for this 
discretionary funding. Given the extent of unmet security funding needs 
at commercial airports, it seems unlikely that a significant proportion 
of funding would be available for general aviation. For example, 
estimates to install explosive detection system machinery with 
commercial airport baggage systems range from $3 billion to $5 billion. 
At the time of our review, $1.2 billion had been appropriated for this 
effort, and according to the House Committee on Appropriations, 
airports will be funded, at best, for about half of their installation 
needs. Even if funds were available, TSA would face a challenge in 
establishing and prioritizing security projects eligible for Aviation 
Security Capital Fund grants across a wide spectrum of general aviation 
airports with diverse characteristics. Although funding is limited for 
airport improvement, someairport managers we spoke with said they had 
expended thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars for security in 
order to attract more tenants to their facility or to retain their 
existing tenants.

Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General Aviation 
Security:

Nonfederal stakeholders with an interest in general aviation security-
-including industry associations, state governments, general aviation 
airport operators (owners and managers), and users of general aviation 
airports and aircraft--have taken steps to strengthen the security of 
general aviation airports and operations. Industry associations have 
developed and provided recommendations on best practices for enhancing 
security around general aviation airports, have partnered with the 
federal government to develop federally endorsed security guidelines, 
and have sponsored and provided training for their own voluntary 
security programs. Some states also have suggested best practices, 
established regulations, and provided funding to general aviation 
airports to reduce security vulnerabilities. General aviation airport 
operators and tenants, such as air charter services, have also 
implemented policy and procedural measures to restrict access to 
airport property and aircraft. Many airports we visited and surveyed 
had installed physical security enhancements, such as fencing, 
lighting, surveillance cameras, and electronic access control gates, 
and had hired additional security guards. General aviation aircraft 
owners have also taken steps to protect their aircraft from misuse.

Industry Associations Have Provided General Aviation Airport Operators 
Guidance on Security Practices and Made Recommendations to TSA:

Many of the general aviation industry associations we contacted had 
developed guidance to help enhance the security of general aviation 
operations and airports. For example, the following are some of the 
recommendations or best practices designed to strengthen security at 
general aviation airports made by some of the members of the Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation 
Airports Security:[Footnote 50]

* Posting signs at general aviation airports warning against 
unauthorized use of aircraft.

* Securing aircraft when unattended using existing mechanisms such as 
door locks, keyed ignitions, and locked hangars to protect aircraft 
from unauthorized use or tampering.

* Controlling vehicle access to areas where aircraft operate by using 
signs, fences, or gates.

* Installing effective outdoor lighting to help improve the security of 
aircraft parking, hangar, and fuel storage areas, as well as airport 
access points.

* Allowing local law enforcement operational space at the airport to 
provide a security presence that serves as a natural deterrent to 
terrorism.

Several general aviation industry associations, in partnership with 
TSA, have also initiated their own voluntary security programs to 
address the security of general aviation operations and airports. For 
example:

* The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, working with TSA, 
established and operates the Airport Watch program. The program was 
formed in March 2002--similar in concept to a neighborhood watch 
program--to improve general aviation airport community awareness. 
Through the program, the association provides warning signs for 
airports, informational literature, and training videotapes to educate 
pilots and airport employees on how the security of their airports and 
aircraft can be enhanced. TSA operates a toll-free hotline (866-GA-
SECURE) where airport operators, managers, and pilots can report 
suspicious activity to TSA. In May 2004 the hotline began receiving 
calls regarding a variety of airport users' concerns of suspicious 
activities or individuals in and around general aviation airports. 
Figure 12 shows an example of the posters identifying the hotline TSA 
provides to general aviation airports.

Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General Aviation 
Airports Around the Country:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

* The National Business Aviation Association developed a set of 
security procedures that corporate aircraft operators can put into 
place to increase the security of their operations. In January 2003, 
the association, in partnership with TSA, initiated a pilot project, 
called the TSA Access Certificate program, at Teterboro Airport in New 
Jersey for operators who had established these procedures in a security 
program and had their security program reviewed and approved by TSA. 
TSA approval allows operators to operate internationally without the 
need of a waiver each time they enter the country.[Footnote 51] (In 
August 2003, TSA expanded the program to include corporate aircraft 
operators based at Morristown, New Jersey, and White Plains, New York.) 
According to association officials, the concept of a TSA-approved 
security program could be applied to other types of general aviation 
operations. Officials also stated that one operator of a single general 
aviation aircraft applied for and received a TSA access certificate to 
operate internationally.[Footnote 52]

* The National Agricultural Aircraft Association created a program to 
educate aerial application pilots on safety and security issues (the 
Professional Aerial Applicators Support System).[Footnote 53] 
According to association officials, the training program qualifies 
operators in most states to meet continuing education requirements 
needed to maintain state agricultural aviation licenses.

In addition to providing security guidance and developing security 
programs, 10 general aviation industry associations worked together to 
make security recommendations to TSA to help prevent the unauthorized 
use of general aviation aircraft in a terrorist attack. The group met 
throughout the summer of 2003 to review and discuss numerous general 
aviation airport security recommendations and evaluated each 
recommendation for its appropriateness and effect on enhancing security 
at general aviation airports. On the basis of this review, the group 
issued a report to TSA on suggested security guidelines.[Footnote 54]

States We Visited Varied in Their Efforts to Address General Aviation 
Vulnerabilities:

We visited 10 states and found that their efforts to enhance general 
aviation security reflected a range of activities. Some states had 
implemented new requirements for security, funded security 
enhancements, or provided guidance on best practices. Specifically, 2 
of the 10 states we visited had imposed requirements for general 
aviation airports and aircraft owners and operators since September 11, 
2001.[Footnote 55]

* In July 2002, the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission issued a 
requirement that all airport employees--including general aviation 
airport employees--wear special photo identification badges. According 
to state officials, the badges enable airport personnel to distinguish 
between those who are, and are not, authorized to be on airport 
property.

* In March 2003, the Governor of New Jersey issued an executive order 
that directed aircraft owners and operators who use the state's 486 
licensed general aviation facilities to take steps to limit access to 
aircraft. Called the "two-lock rule," the executive order requires that 
all aircraft parked or stored at a general aviation facility in New 
Jersey for more than 24 hours be protected by a minimum of two locks 
that secure or disable the aircraft to prevent illegal or unlawful 
operations.

Four of the 10 states we contacted provided funding for security 
enhancements at general aviation airports. This funding, however, was 
generally limited to matching funds for federal grants used to install 
measures that had both a safety and a security benefit, such as airport 
perimeter fencing and lighting projects. Some states had grant programs 
that could be used strictly for security enhancements:

* For fiscal years 2002 through 2004, Georgia's Department of 
Transportation Aviation Programs provided a total of $1,174,000 in 
grants to general aviation airports for fencing, lighting, and 
electronic card-reader gates.

* In February 2002, Tennessee's Aeronautics Commission issued a policy 
that the state would provide 90 percent of the cost (not to exceed a 
total of $50 million annually) on security-related projects at general 
aviation airports. Eligible projects include security fencing and 
gates, signage, security lighting and motion sensors, and surveillance 
cameras and monitors.

* In 2003, the State of Washington established a $2 million annual 
matching grant program for general aviation airport security 
enhancements funded by proceeds from the state's aviation fuel tax.

* In 2004, Virginia appropriated $1.5 million to the state's Department 
of Aviation specifically for security upgrades at general aviation 
airports.

* California's Aviation Division established a grant program for 
research and development projects that could fund security enhancements 
at general aviation airports. However, the Aviation Division's budget 
has not been sufficient to provide any grants from the program over the 
past 3 years.

One of the 10 states we contacted provided guidance on security best 
practices, while 2 others provided guidance on preparing airport-
specific security plans and self-assessments of vulnerabilities. In 3 
of the 10 states, the incentive for airports to develop security plans 
is tied to funding eligibility.

* In March 2003, Virginia's Aviation Department Director issued a set 
of best practices and later established a voluntary security 
certification program, encouraging airports to assess their 
vulnerabilities and develop airport-specific security plans.

* In May 2002, Tennessee's Aeronautics Division issued guidance on 
developing an airport emergency and security plan.

* In April 2003, Washington's Aviation Division issued security 
guidelines for general aviation airports based on recommendations from 
a task force of pilots, general aviation associations, airports, law 
enforcement, and government agencies.

General Aviation Airport Managers and Aircraft Owners Are Primarily 
Responsible for Security Enhancements:

Unlike commercial service airports, general aviation airports are not 
subject to current federal security regulations,[Footnote 56] and, 
therefore, general aviation managers and aircraft owners determine what 
security measures they will use to protect their assets. To determine 
security measures undertaken since September 11, we judgmentally 
selected and visited 31 general aviation airports in 10 states open to 
the public and part of FAA's National Plan of Integrated 
Airports.[Footnote 57] Airport managers we contacted reported spending 
as little as $10 for providing forgery-proof identification badges for 
airport employees to as much as $3 million on, among other voluntary 
measures at one airport, fencing and around-the-clock security guards. 
In our survey, about a third (36 percent) of managers reported that 
funds to pay for security improvements had come from airport revenues, 
while about a fifth reported receiving federal grants (21 percent) and 
a fifth reported receiving state grants (22 percent) to finance 
security improvements.[Footnote 58]

According to 18 of the 31 airport managers and 3 of 5 tenants (e.g., 
fixed base operators)[Footnote 59] we visited, the security measures 
and practices they implemented following the September 11 attacks were 
self-initiated, common sense kinds of measures that were expected by 
the public and their clients to help protect property from vandalism or 
theft. Many of these measures were no-cost or low-cost security 
enhancements based primarily on procedural changes. For example, for 
those airports that did not have formal written security plans, airport 
managers said they generally discussed security issues with their 
tenants on a regular basis through meetings and e-mails. Other airports 
that had formal written security plans or procedures updated those 
security plans and procedures based on recommendations from industry 
associations. Some of the 31 airport managers we visited said they had 
arranged for more frequent patrols by local law enforcement officers 
since September 11, some for no cost to the airports.

Many of the airports we visited had implemented an "airport watch" 
program--similar to neighborhood watch programs--and displayed signs 
designed and provided by the Airline Owners and Pilots Association, as 
discussed above. Other airports absorbed the cost of installing new 
signs warning against trespassing. Our survey of airport managers 
identified an increase in the use of security awareness training since 
September 11. For those aircraft owners who do not store their aircraft 
in a hangar, forms of securing their aircraft from unauthorized use 
include attaching devices to propellers, known as "prop locks," to 
prevent them from rotating; and devices to cover throttle levers, known 
as "throttle locks," to prevent someone from being able to start the 
aircraft. Figure 13 shows two kinds of prop locks aircraft owners use. 
According to airport and state aviation officials, prop locks range in 
cost from about $150 to about $300.

Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized Aircraft 
Use:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Several of the airport managers we visited had invested in high-cost 
security measures to minimize access by potential criminals and 
terrorists to airport property and, thus, tenants' aircraft. 
Specifically, airport officials we visited had obtained federal or 
state grant assistance for purchasing additional fencing and lighting 
or purchasing high-tech surveillance cameras. However, several airport 
managers and tenants considered additional security a cost of 
conducting business in the post-September 11 environment. Airports 
officials generally said that they spent between $25,000 and $500,000 
on security enhancements such as fencing, lighting, and electronic 
access gates. While airport officials said they would like to add more 
security enhancements, they were reluctant to spend much more on 
enhancing security until TSA issued guidance on what security measures, 
or combination of security measures, TSA considers appropriate. (As 
noted previously, TSA issued security guidelines with recommended 
enhancements in May 2004, after the majority of our site visits.)

Officials from the National Business Aviation Association said that 
corporate aviation departments are more likely to take high-cost 
measures to protect their aircraft. For example, some of the large 
member corporations had provided information on the types of security 
measures they used before September 11, to protect their aircraft from 
tampering, theft, or hijacking. According to the association, these 
included the types of security initiatives shown in table 3.

Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation Departments of 
55 Fortune 500 Corporations:

All aircraft are stored in hangars: All hangars are closed and 
monitored with security systems when the area is unattended.

All aircraft are stored in hangars: Mechanics are all company employees 
or vetted contractors.

All aircraft are stored in hangars: Visitors are personally escorted.

All aircraft are stored in hangars: Aviation facilities are restricted 
by an access control system.

All aircraft are stored in hangars: Aircraft doors are kept closed and 
locked when the aircraft is in a secure hangar.

All aircraft are stored in hangars: Comprehensive background 
investigations are conducted for flight crew personnel.

Source: National Business Aviation Association.

[End of table]

Conclusions:

From its inception, TSA has primarily focused its efforts on enhancing 
commercial aviation security to prevent aircraft from again being used 
as weapons. The amount of TSA's resources and the vastness and 
diversity of the general aviation airport system mean the bulk of the 
responsibility for determining vulnerabilities and instituting 
security enhancements has fallen and will likely continue to fall on 
airport operators. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, homeland security 
and national preparedness often begins with the private sector. While 
the federal government can provide guidance and some amount of funding 
for security enhancements, long-term success in securing general 
aviation depends on a partnership among the federal government, state 
governments, and the general aviation industry.

Even with such a partnership, enhancing security at general aviation 
airports presents TSA and the general aviation community with 
challenges that will not be easily or quickly resolved. For example, 
TSA's planned risk management approach for general aviation could 
assist the agency in providing guidance and prioritizing funding for 
security enhancements by assessing vulnerabilities and threats to 
better target its efforts. However, without a documented implementation 
plan for assessing threats and vulnerabilities that sets forth time 
frames and goals and the resources needed to achieve these goals, there 
is limited assurance that TSA will focus its resources and efforts on 
areas of greatest need, monitor the progress of its efforts, and hold 
responsible officials accountable for achieving desired results. In 
addition, completing vulnerability and threat assessments in 
partnership with general aviation airports should help TSA better 
communicate threat information. However, because TSA must rely on other 
federal agencies to provide threat information and follow federal 
requirements governing disclosure of classified information, it is 
difficult for TSA to adhere to risk communication principles, 
particularly in providing specific and actionable information. 
Nevertheless, effective communication of threat information is 
important because misallocation of limited resources and disruption of 
operations are possible effects of communicating nonspecific or 
incorrect threat information.

While TSA and FAA have promulgated regulations to help reduce security 
risks associated with access to aircraft and airspace, the intended 
security benefit of these regulations may be limited for a variety of 
reasons. For example, we found limitations in TSA's process for 
monitoring flight training providers and operators of private charter 
aircraft, and in granting waivers to pilots to fly through security 
related flight restrictions. In addition, FAA has not documented its 
process for reviewing and revalidating the need for continuing 
security-related flight restrictions on airspace that are established 
for indefinite periods. Without plans for monitoring compliance or 
procedures to document agency processes, TSA and FAA cannot ensure that 
these regulations achieve their intended effect or minimize the 
negative impacts of the regulations on affected general aviation 
industry stakeholders.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To better assess the threat of terrorists' misuse of general aviation 
aircraft and to improve the quality of communicating terrorist threat 
information to the general aviation community, we recommend that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant 
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security 
Administration to take the following two actions:

* Develop an implementation plan for executing a risk management 
approach that will help identify threats and vulnerabilities. Such a 
plan should include milestones, specific time frames, and estimates of 
funding and staffing needed to focus its resources and efforts on 
identified airports.

* After identifying the most critical threats and vulnerabilities, 
apply risk communication principles, including to the extent possible 
the nature of the threat, when and where it is likely to occur, over 
what time period, and guidance on actions to be taken--in developing 
and transmitting security advisories and threat notifications.

To help ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for indefinite 
periods are reviewed and, if appropriate, revalidated and consistently 
applied, we recommend that the Secretary of the Transportation direct 
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to establish a 
documented process to justify the initiation and continuance of flight 
restrictions for extended periods.

In our restricted report, we also made two recommendations to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security regarding monitoring 
compliance with regulations governing the identification of student 
pilots, their training, and the operation of certain general aviation 
aircraft; and the process for granting pilots waivers to enter 
restricted airspace.

Agency Comments:

We provided draft copies of this report to the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security 
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration for their 
review and comment. TSA generally concurred with the findings and 
recommendations in the report and provided formal written comments that 
are presented in appendix II. TSA provided technical comments that we 
incorporated as appropriate. FAA also generally concurred with the 
findings and recommendations in the report and provided technical 
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the Assistant Secretary 
of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration, 
and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and 
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to 
discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at 
berrickc@gao.gov, or Chris Keisling, Assistant Director, at (404) 679-
1917 or at keislingc@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

To determine what steps the federal government has taken to identify 
and assess threats to and vulnerabilities of general aviation, and 
communicate that information to stakeholders, we interviewed 
individuals in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) 
Office of Transportation Security Policy, Office of Operations Policy, 
and General Aviation Operations and Inspections Office on TSA's role in 
enhancing general aviation security. Individuals from these offices 
provided documentation on TSA's threat assessment efforts as well as 
its past vulnerability assessment activities and future vulnerability 
assessment plans. We examined documentation on TSA's means of obtaining 
intelligence information and disseminating that information to general 
aviation stakeholders. We also interviewed individuals from FAA's 
Special Operations Division and Airspace and Rules Division on their 
roles in securing general aviation. We examined documentation from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) on intelligence regarding potential terrorist misuse of 
general aviation. In addition, we examined documentation from TSA and 
FBI on the reasons general aviation may be vulnerable to terrorist 
misuse. We also spoke to staff in and examined documentation from TSA's 
Office of Threat Assessment and Risk Management to obtain information 
on plans to implement a risk management approach to further assess 
threats and vulnerabilities and to enable the agency to implement risk 
communication principles to communicate threat information.

To determine what steps the federal government has taken to strengthen 
general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges the government 
faces in further enhancing security, we obtained and analyzed 
information from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including data 
on the number of flight restrictions that affect general aviation and 
the amount of federal funding that has been spent on enhancing general 
aviation security. We sought to determine the reliability of these data 
by, among other things, discussing methods of inputting and maintaining 
data with FAA officials. We spoke to TSA officials about, and examined 
related documentation on, security guidelines published by TSA, 
including documentation on TSA's activities with the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation Airports 
Security. We interviewed general aviation industry representatives, 
including those who provided input to the TSA-sponsored Aviation 
Security Advisory Committee's Working Group on General Aviation 
Airports Security, to obtain their views on federal efforts to enhance 
general aviation security. We also interviewed individuals from TSA's 
Office of Compliance on the promulgation of regulations as a result of 
the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as well as 
TSA's plans for ensuring operator compliance with these regulations. We 
interviewed personnel from FAA's Special Operations Division regarding 
FAA's issuance of temporary flight restrictions, including the criteria 
and internal controls FAA uses to examine requests for these 
restrictions from federal and nonfederal entities. As part of this 
analysis, we took steps to verify the reliability of data from FAA on 
the number of violations of temporary flight restrictions. We 
interviewed FAA and TSA officials on potential limitations of the 
effectiveness of these flight restrictions. We also contacted the 
Director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force on efforts to 
screen foreign students applying for flight training in the United 
States. We examined potential sources of funding for additional 
security measures at general aviation airports, including challenges 
associated with limited funding.

To determine the actions individual general aviation airport managers 
have taken to enhance security at their airports, we visited 31 general 
aviation airports in 10 states. We judgmentally selected these 31 
airports to observe a cross section of general aviation airports. 
However, we limited our selection of general aviation airports to the 
2,829 listed in FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems, 
because these airports are eligible for FAA funding and are open to use 
by the general public. The remaining 16,000 general aviation airports 
are generally privately owned and not open to use by the public, and/or 
are small landing strips with fewer than 10 based aircraft, and are not 
eligible for federal funding. To ensure we selected a cross section of 
general aviation airports listed in the National Plan, we based our 
selection on:

1. Size, using the number of based aircraft as an indicator--100 or 
more aircraft we considered large, 25 to 99 medium, and 24 or fewer 
small.

2. Regional location--northeast, northwest, southeast, and southwest 
areas of the country.

3. Proximity to potential terrorist targets such as large population 
centers versus sparse population areas, as well as near to and far from 
other critical infrastructures and symbolic landmarks.

4. Airport characteristics, including number, length, and type (turf or 
paved) of runways, and primary types of general aviation operations 
such as recreational aviation, business and corporate aviation, charter 
services, and flight training.

Because we judgmentally selected these general aviation airports, we 
cannot draw generalized conclusions based on airport managers' 
interview responses. However, the anecdotal information provided is 
intended to complement the findings of our random survey of 500 general 
aviation airports.

To obtain examples of what some states have done to enhance general 
aviation security, we judgmentally selected 10 states with efforts to 
enhance general aviation security ranging from issuing new security 
requirements to those in the early stages of determining how they would 
address general aviation security. To select this range of states, we 
conducted a literature search to determine which states had proposed or 
enacted new security laws, regulations, or requirements. We also 
requested recommendations from the National Association of State 
Aviation Officials and other industry associations such as the Aircraft 
Owners and Pilots Association, and noted which state aviation directors 
had participated in the National Association of State Aviation 
Officials' Task Group on General Aviation Security. We also considered 
whether a state participated in FAA's block grant program in which FAA 
provides airport improvement program grant money to a state in a lump 
sum and the state determines which airport projects to fund, rather 
than each airport applying directly to FAA for grant funds on a 
project-by-project basis. Finally, on the basis of our resources, we 
considered those states in which we also planned to visit general 
aviation airports. Because we did not randomly select the states in 
which we obtained information, we cannot draw generalized conclusions 
about all states. However, the information obtained from these 10 
states serves to provide examples of what some states have done to 
enhance general aviation security.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration:

Office of the Assistant Secretary:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
601 South 12th Street:
Arlington, VA 22202-4220:

Transportation Security Administration:

OCT 26 2004:

Ms. Cathleen Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) would like to thank 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the report entitled, " 
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY. Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, But 
Continued Partnership with Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term 
Success," GAO-05-144 (Job Code 440352). The report offers a welcome 
review of the General Aviation community and contributes to the broad 
understanding of the security environment for the 19,000 General 
Aviation airports, 211,000 active aircraft, and 550,000 active pilots 
and instructors.

TSA generally concurs with the GAO findings. TSA would like to 
emphasize the vastness of the General Aviation community when 
contemplating proposed security initiatives. For example, there are 
approximately 300 sea and river ports and 453 commercial airports in 
contrast to the 19,000 General Aviation airports. The size and 
diversity of this community warrants careful consideration in any 
proposed Federal oversight, initiatives, and/or guidelines.

TSA and General Aviation community partnerships are vital to developing 
appropriate security initiatives.

TSA carefully considers security initiatives using a threat based, risk 
management approach. TSA agrees with GAO that a continued partnership 
with the General Aviation community is critical for mutual long-term 
success. Here are some highlights of our results in partnering with 
private stakeholders:

* General Aviation Security Guidelines: The Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee (ASAC) partnered with TSA to develop General Aviation 
security recommendations. These recommendations were included in TSA's 
Information Publication A-001: "Security Guidelines for General 
Aviation Airports."

* AOPA Airport Watch and GA Hotline: Development of the Airport Watch 
program, which includes a general aviation "hotline" in coordination 
with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). This program 
seeks to improve local awareness through public communications and 
promotes the hotline for reporting suspicious behavior in the General 
Aviation community.

* NBAA Security Protocol: Partnering with National Business Aviation 
Association (NBAA), TSA developed guidelines based on industry best 
practices to standardize security procedures for corporate flight 
departments. These guidelines, endorsed by the International Business 
Aviation Council (IBAC), have applicability to corporate general 
aviation aircraft operating internationally.

In addition to the above, TSA also works cooperatively with the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) on requests for Temporary Flight 
Restrictions (TFRs) and looks forward to collaborating in the future. 
TSA has and will continue to coordinate and answer requests for the 
implementation and removal of TFRs with the FAA.

These examples of voluntary, public-private partnership programs 
demonstrate how TSA, in a short amount of time, has enhanced the 
security of General Aviation by leveraging community networks and the 
existing communication infrastructure.

Comments on the Public GAO Recommendations:

GAO recommendation to TSA (1): Develop an implementation plan for 
executing a risk management approach that will help identify threats 
and vulnerabilities. Such a plan should include milestones, specific 
time frames, and estimates of funding and staffing needed to focus its 
resources and efforts on identified airports.

TSA concurs. The agency is committed to a threat based, risk management 
approach and will continue to apply that approach to General Aviation. 
TSA has conducted a General Aviation threat assessment and, through 
TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS), 
continuously monitors all-source intelligence and law enforcement 
reporting for information relative to General Aviation. TSA 
intelligence reporting practices and protocols are consistent 
throughout all modes of transportation. TSA also maintains the General 
Aviation hotline at the TSA Transportation Security Operations Center 
(TSOC) where General Aviation related suspicious activity and threats 
may be reported. In addition, TSA has piloted a General Aviation Self 
Assessment Risk Module (TSARM). TSARM is a free web-based tool designed 
to assist transportation asset owners/operators in developing security 
plans and identifying potential vulnerabilities along with security 
system upgrades. In addition to providing direct feedback to local 
operators, it concurrently provides TSA timely infrastructure data to 
consider in criticality assessments.

GAO recommendation to TSA (2): After identifying the most critical 
threats and vulnerabilities, apply risk communication principles, 
including to the extent possible the nature of the threat, when and 
where it is likely to occur, over what time period, and guidance on 
action to be taken-in developing and transmitting security advisories 
and threat notifications.

TSA concurs. TSA supports the communication protocol as directed by the 
Department of Homeland Security based on the methodology of risk 
communication principles (see DHS statement GAO-04-682). Currently, TSA 
sends out advisories to the General Aviation community that are 
disseminated by both national and local General Aviation stakeholders.

In the few instances when there has been a specific threat, TSA has 
provided the General Aviation community with information that is 
timely, specific, and actionable. In addition, TSA has the ability to 
provide SSI and classified information to General Aviation industry 
stakeholders as appropriate. TSA does maintain extensive contact lists 
of key General Aviation stakeholders, including home contact 
information, and with its stakeholder network, TSA is able to respond 
to specific threats in a timely manner.

In conclusion, thank you again for the GAO review to assist Congress to 
better understand the dynamics of providing security in conjunction 
with the General Aviation community. We appreciate your efforts to help 
define the efforts and challenges ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

David M. Stone: 
Assistant Secretary: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404 
Chris Keisling (404) 679-1917:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, Leo Barbour, Grace Coleman, Chris 
Ferencik, Kara Finnegan-Irving, Dave Hooper, Stan Kostyla, Thomas 
Lombardi, Mark Ramage, Robert Rivas, Jerry Seigler, and Richard Swayze 
were key contributors to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The range of general aviation flight operations encompasses 
personal/family transportation, power line inspection and repair, 
pipeline patrol, training, transporting medical supplies, emergency 
services, rescue operations, wildlife and land surveys, traffic 
reporting, agricultural aviation, firefighting, and law enforcement.

[2] The Aviation Security Advisory Committee was formed following the 
1988 Pan American World Airways Flight 103 tragedy (Lockerbie, 
Scotland) to allow all segments of the population to have input into 
future aviation security considerations. The committee was originally 
sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. However, when the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act was signed into law, primary 
responsibility for civil aviation security were transferred from the 
Federal Aviation Administration to TSA, and accordingly, sponsorship of 
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee also was transferred to TSA.

[3] We visited general aviation airports in Alabama, California, 
Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.

[4] General aviation activities also take place at some commercial 
airports, but we did not include commercial airports in the scope of 
this review.

[5] Because this is a probability sample, population estimates based on 
this sample data are subject to sampling error. All percentage 
estimates based on this sample have 95 percent confidence intervals 
that are within +/-6 percentage points of the estimate itself, unless 
otherwise noted.

[6] Airport Watch is a program initiated by the Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association working with TSA. The program is supported by a TSA-
sponsored toll free hotline (866-GA-SECURE) and warning signs for 
airports, informational literature, and training videotapes provided by 
the association.

[7] The TSA Access Certificate program is based on a set of security 
protocols developed by the National Business Aviation Association. TSA 
is testing this program at three airports in the Northeast for possible 
use as a national security standard for corporate and business 
operators.

[8] TSA considers general aviation aircraft to include all U.S. 
registered civil aircraft not (1) operated under 14 C.F.R. Part 121 
(scheduled commercial airlines), (2) military operations, and (3) on-
demand air carriers that operate nonscheduled commercial service under 
14 C.F.R. Part 135 

[9] For a more detailed discussion on the general aviation industry, 
see GAO, General Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related 
Infrastructure, and Safety Issues, GAO-01-916, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
31, 2001).

[10] According to FAA's Airmen's Registry as of July 3, 2004. 

[11] Airports that handle regularly scheduled commercial airline 
traffic and have at least 2,500 annual passenger enplanements.

[12] Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-
71, § 101(a), (g), 115 Stat. 597, 603 (2001).

[13] FAA has sole authority to issue TFRs and other rules to restrict 
aircraft from operating within defined areas, on a temporary or 
permanent basis, in order to protect persons or property in the air or 
on the ground. When time permits, FAA issues security-based TFRs after 
consultation with TSA and other federal agencies, as appropriate.

[14] 49 C.F.R. parts 1540, 1542 & 1544 (formerly codified, in part, at 
14 C.F.R. parts 107 & 108).

[15] Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 113(a) & 132, 115 Stat. at 622 & 635.

[16] Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. at 598. 

[17] Transportation Security Administration, Security Guidelines for 
General Aviation Airports, Information Publication A-001, (May 2004).

[18] See GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management 
Approach,. GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).

[19] For example, 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 limits TSA's ability to 
distribute sensitive security information to persons with a need to 
know, and Executive Order 13292--Further Amendment to Executive Order 
12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Information, March 25, 
2003, limits the distribution of classified information. 

[20] The General Aviation Coalition consists of the major general 
aviation organizations and focuses on addressing aviation issues of 
common interest and concern. The coalition meets every 6 months with 
the FAA Administrator and senior FAA managers to present and update 
issues. The industry associations that make up the coalition consists 
of the Aircraft Electronics Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the General 
Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Helicopter Association 
International, the International Council of Air Shows, the National 
Aeronautics Association, the National Agricultural Aviation 
Association, the National Air Transportation Association, the National 
Aircraft Resale Association, the National Association of State Aviation 
Officials, the National Business Aviation Association, the Professional 
Aviation Maintenance Association, the Small Aircraft Manufacturers 
Association, the Soaring Society of America, the U.S. Parachute 
Association, and the University Aviation Association.

[21] TSA officials said they also conducted outreach programs before 
national events requiring special aviation security to educate the 
general aviation community on flight restrictions and other planned 
security measures and that TSA planned to assign a lead federal 
security director in each state as a point of contact for states' 
general aviation communities. 

[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Risk Communication Principles May Assist 
in Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, GAO-04-538T 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2004).

[23] TSA has proposed a regulation pursuant to section 612 of the 
Vision 100ćCentury of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2572-74 (2003), to codify TSA's authority in light 
of the transfer of responsibilities from the Department of Justice. The 
Department of Justice issued and enforced regulations that require 
background checks of foreign candidates for flight training pursuant to 
section 113 of ATSA, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. at 622-23.

[24] 28 C.F.R. Part 105. Vision 100 subsequently amended this 
requirement, transferring responsibility for conducting the background 
checks to TSA and applying this requirement to all non-U.S. citizens 
seeking flight training in aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds. 
TSA has developed, but not yet implemented, regulations to this effect.

[25] 28 C.F.R.Part 105.

[26] The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force was created in response 
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, Oct. 29, 2001. The 
purpose of the task force is to (1) deny entry into the United States 
of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting 
terrorist activity; and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any 
such aliens already present in the United States. The directive 
required that the task force be staffed by personnel from the 
Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Customs 
Service, the intelligence community, military support components, and 
other federal agencies as appropriate. The Department of Justice 
delegated authority for establishing and administering the Flight 
Training Candidate Checks Program to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking 
Task Force.

[27] The regulations establishing the Flight Training Candidate Checks 
Program became effective on March 17, 2003. 68 Fed. Reg. 7,313 (Feb. 
13, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 105).

[28] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. at 2572-74.

[29] As of July 2004, FAA reported that 3,742 foreign student pilots 
had active student certificates and TSA officials estimated that over 
200,000 pilots currently licensed by FAA are non-U.S. citizens. 

[30] According to TSA officials, most foreign candidates must receive a 
U.S. student or work visa to receive flight training in the 
United.States. Under the Department of Justice's Flight Training 
Candidate Checks Program, the Department of State would not issue such 
visas to foreign candidates unless they had received preliminary 
approval from the Department of Justice. TSA officials said that TSA 
intends to work with the Department of State to continue this process 
when the TSA regulation is finalized. 

[31] According to TSA officials, responsibility for conducting these 
checks will transfer from Department of Justice to TSA in October 2004.

[32] Prior to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, certain 
aviation charter services were already subject to security 
requirements. For example, charter services using aircraft with 31 
seats or more were required to meet security requirements similar to 
those in place for scheduled commercial air carriers.

[33] FAA may issue TFRs related to security including TFRs issued for 
sporting events and significant national landmarks (14 C.F.R. § 99.7.) 
In addition, FAA may issue security-related TFRs by working directly 
with the Secret Service for the security of the President and other 
dignitaries (14 C.F.R. § 91.141) and the Department of Defense for 
protection of certain military facilities (14 C.F.R. § 99.7). 

[34] Notices to Airmen are a method by which FAA communicates to pilots 
information that is time-critical and is either of a temporary nature 
or is not known far enough in advance to permit publication on 
aeronautical charts or other operation publications. This can include 
the establishment, condition, or change in any facility, service, 
procedure, or hazard in the national airspace system. They may be 
regulatory (restrictive) or advisory in nature, or both.

[35] The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the 
Homeland Security Council, is responsible for designating events as 
National Special Security Events. A recent example was the 2004 G-8 
Summit in Sea Island, Georgia.

[36] Presidential TFRs are issued to address security with respect to 
airspace over presidential and other parties. No person may operate an 
aircraft in the vicinity of an area to be visited or traveled by the 
President, Vice President, or other public figures for which this type 
of restriction is issued. According to TSA officials, the size of TFRs 
issued for dignitaries other than the President did not increase after 
September 11, 2001. 

[37] The first 10 nautical miles from the center of the TFR constitute 
a no-fly zone. The area from 10 to 30 nautical miles of the TFR 
constitute an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) where operators 
must obtain a unique beacon code to identify themselves and maintain 
constant radio contact with air traffic controllers.

[38] 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 defines an air defense identification zone as an 
area of airspace over land or water in which the ready identification, 
location, and control of civil aircraft is required in the interest of 
national security. General aviation aircraft must meet certain 
operational requirements; that is, pilots must have an approved flight 
plan by FAA, maintain two-way radio communications with air traffic 
control, and have a transponder that transmits a unique code. According 
to TSA officials, smaller general aviation aircraft are limited in 
their ability to access the flight restricted zone because of limited 
operational capabilities needed to operate in the air defense 
identification zone. FAA officials noted that additional airspace, 
extending in places as much as 45 nautical miles from the Washington 
Monument, is also included in the zone.

[39] In commenting on the draft report, FAA officials noted that one of 
the 11 remaining military TFRs--Anniston, Alabama--was canceled and 
established as a national security area after completed we completed 
our review. National security areas are established at locations where 
there is a requirement for increased security and safety of ground 
facilities. For example, FAA designated a national security area over 
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, located in Colorado. Pilots 
are advised to avoid flying over these designated areas. During times 
of heightened alert levels, FAA may increase the national security area 
advisories to TFRs. 

[40] These costs may be expected to increase with the number of TFRs, 
and with their size and duration. A TFR that encompasses a large area 
and is in effect for a long period of time is more likely to cause 
flights to be cancelled, delayed, or diverted than is a TFR that covers 
a smaller area or is in effect for only a short while. 

[41] Key assumptions underlying the study's estimates were that the 
typical TFR lasts about 4 hours and affects approximately 15 flights 
per hour. Of the affected flights, about 40 percent were assumed to be 
delayed, with about 50 percent assumed to be diverted, imposing costs 
on passengers and aircraft operators. 

[42] HLB Decision Economics INC (HLB Reference 6795) March 2004, "The 
Economic Costs of Restricting General Aviation Access to Ronald Reagan 
Washington National Airport and TFRs (Temporary Flight Restrictions) 
Since September 11, 2001." The study estimated that, from September 11, 
2001, through March 2004, 2,898 TFRs affected general aviation in the 
following ways: approximately 11,101 general aviation flight 
cancelations, 74,334 general aviation flight postponements, and 103,162 
general aviation flight diversions to more circuitous routes. 

[43] St. Mary's would be directly affected by FAA proposals to 
permanently prohibit flight operations within airspace under temporary 
flight restrictions at the time of our review. 

[44] These airports are eligible to receive Airport Improvement grants 
because they have submitted applications to be included in and have 
been accepted in FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems. 
These grant funds are usually limited to planning, designing, and 
constructing projects such as runways, taxiways, aprons, and land 
purchases. However, they may also be used for security and safety 
purposes. Eligible safety and security projects include improvements or 
equipment that is required by federal regulation or, according to FAA 
officials, if TSA makes an airport-specific determination that security 
enhancements are needed.

[45] The amounts of 2002 and 2003 Airport Improvement Program funds do 
not include grants provided to general aviation airports in states that 
receive FAA block grants since detailed information about the total 
amounts given to general aviation airports or the amounts of those 
funds that went for general aviation security are not readily 
available, according to FAA officials. Airport Improvement Program 
block grant states are Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee Texas, and Wisconsin.

[46] The Potomac, Washington Executive/Hyde Park, and Montgomery County 
general aviation airports in Maryland are subject to federal security 
regulations.

[47] The Aviation and Transportation Security Act had extended 
eligibility for Airport Improvement Program funding to any additional 
security-related facilities and equipment required by law or the 
Secretary of Transportation after September 11, 2001, and before 
October 1, 2002.

[48] GAO, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to 
Meet Airports' Planned Developments, GAO-03-497T (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 25, 2003).

[49] The Office of Domestic Preparedness allocated nearly $1.7 billion 
in State Homeland Security grants among the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and five territories for fiscal year 2004, and an additional 
$671 million in Urban Area Security Initiative grants among 50 
metropolitan areas. 

[50] The members of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working 
Group on General Aviation Airports Security are the Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association, the Airports Consultants Council, the American 
Association of Airport Executives, the Experimental Aircraft 
Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the 
Helicopter Association International, the National Air Transportation 
Association, the National Association of State Aviation Officials, the 
National Business Aviation Association, and the U.S. Parachute 
Association.

[51] According to general aviation industry association officials, 
general aviation aircraft operators wishing to fly to the United States 
from other countries must stop in one of seven portal countries before 
entering the country.

[52] TSA officials noted that all certificate holders are corporations.

[53] According to the association, the majority of its members are 
licensed as commercial applicator-operators who use aircraft to enhance 
food and fiber production, protect forestry, and control health-
threatening pests. 

[54] Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group 
on General Aviation Airports Security, October 1, 2003, Transportation 
Security Administration, Washington, D.C.

[55] In addition, TSA officials said that New York had mandated that 
all general aviation airports in the state apply TSA's security 
guidelines. 

[56] 49 C.F.R. Part 1542.

[57] A primary purpose of the National Plan of Integrated Airports 
(NPIAS) is to identify the airports that are important to national 
transportation and, therefore, eligible to receive grants under the 
Airport Improvement Program. The NPIAS is composed of all commercial 
service airports, all reliever airports, and selected general aviation 
airports. The word "airport" includes landing areas developed 
specifically for helicopters and seaplanes as well as conventional 
fixed wing aircraft landing areas.

[58] We conducted a probability sample consisting of 499 or the 2,829 
general aviation airports that are open to the public and part of FAA's 
National Plan of Integrated Airports (NPIAS). We conducted this survey 
between March and May 2004, and obtained 344 eligible responses. From 
this sample, estimates are produced for a target population defined as 
managers of service level general aviation airports that were included 
in the FAA National Plan of Integrated Airports database as of January 
2004. Because we used a probability sample, the estimates could be 
different for a different random sample. For estimated percentages in 
this report, we are 95 percent confident that the actual value is 
within +/-6 percentage points of the survey estimate.

[59] Fixed-base operators provide a variety of services to pilots, such 
as flight training, aircraft rental, fueling, maintenance, parking, and 
the sale of pilot supplies.

GAO's Mission:

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading.

Order by Mail or Phone:

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548:

To order by Phone:

	

Voice: (202) 512-6000:

TDD: (202) 512-2537:

Fax: (202) 512-6061:

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

Public Affairs:

Jeff Nelligan, managing director,

NelliganJ@gao.gov

(202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office,

441 G Street NW, Room 7149

Washington, D.C. 20548: