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Safety and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be 
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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

September 2003:

Mine Safety:

MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of 
Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could Be Strengthened:

Mine Safety:

GAO-03-945:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-945, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Despite a drop in injury and fatality rates since the formation of the 
Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), 
mining is still a dangerous industry.

Focusing on underground coal mines, GAO assessed how well MSHA 
oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of 
mine plans and the extent to which MSHA’s inspections and accident 
investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of 
underground coal miners.

What GAO Found:

To help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA 
staff review and approve mine plans, conduct inspections, and 
investigate serious accidents. In these three areas, GAO found that 
MSHA has extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, MSHA can 
improve its oversight, guidance, and human capital planning efforts.

MSHA is not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters 
does not ensure that 6-month technical inspections of ventilation and 
roof support plans are being completed in a timely fashion. This may 
lead to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not 
following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials 
do not always ensure that hazards found during inspections are 
corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA uses 
to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and 
agency oversight. Specifically, the agency does not collect 
information on hours worked by independent contractor staff needed to 
compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it 
is difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal 
mines with MSHA’s investigations.

Guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be 
strengthened. Some inspection procedures are unclear and are contained 
in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine 
inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by 
specialists and regular inspectors is also unclear, resulting in some 
duplication of effort.

Finally, although about 44 percent of MSHA’s underground coal mine 
inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years, the agency 
has no plan for replacing them or using other human capital 
flexibilities available to the agency to retain its highly qualified 
and trained inspectors. The potential shortage of inspectors may limit 
MSHA’s ability to ensure the safety and health of underground coal 
miners. 

What GAO Recommends:

In order to provide better oversight over its operations, GAO 
recommends that the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health

* monitor the timeliness of technical inspections conducted as part of 
the 6-month review of certain mine plans,

* ensure that mine operators are correcting hazards identified during 
inspections in a timely manner,

* develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of 
qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, and

* revise the systems used to collect information on accidents and 
investigations.

In its comments on the report, MSHA did not comment on our 
recommendations but disagreed with many of the findings on which the 
recommendations are based. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-945.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Bob Robertson at 
(202) 512-9889, robertsonr@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Does Not 
Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process:

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducts 
Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process 
Could Be Improved:

MSHA Has a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident 
Investigations, but Does Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future 
Accidents:

Conclusions:

Recommendations:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: MSHA's Approval Process for Ventilation and Roof Support 
Plans:

Appendix II: MSHA's Approval Process for Impoundment Plans:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor:

GAO Comments:

Appendix IVGAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Number of Staff Assigned to Each District Office, May 31, 
2003:

Table 2: Quarterly Inspections of Underground Coal Mines, Fiscal Years 
1993 to 2002:

Table 3: Number of Underground Coal Mine Inspectors Assigned to Each 
District Office, Percentage Eligible to Retire in the Next 5 Years, and 
Number of Inspector Trainees in Each District, July 2003:

Figures:

Figure 1: Number of Coal Mines and Mine Workers, 1993 to 2002:

Figure 2: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 
to 2002:

Figure 3: Nonfatal Injury Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 
1993 to 2002:

Figure 4: Miners Working in "Low Coal" (a Mine No More Than 40" High):

Figure 5: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for 
Which Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines:

Figure 6: Contractor Staff as a Percentage of All Workers in 
Underground Coal Mines:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

September 5, 2003:

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 
Ranking Minority Member 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Arlen Specter 
Chairman 
The Honorable Tom Harkin 
Ranking Minority Member 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 
Committee on Appropriations 
United States Senate:

Last year at the Quecreek mine in Pennsylvania, a group of nine coal 
miners accidentally broke through to an abandoned mine not shown on 
their map and were trapped underground for 3 days. Although they were 
eventually rescued, this event and other more tragic mining accidents, 
including the explosion in 2001 at a mine in Alabama in which 13 miners 
were killed, serve as a reminder that the safety and health of the 
thousands of men and women who mine the coal in over 2,000 mines that 
is used to produce over half of the country's electricity must be 
protected. In passing the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 
(the "Mine Act"), Congress gave much of the responsibility for ensuring 
the safety and health of mine workers to the Department of Labor's Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Since that time, the nation's 
mines have become safer--in the past 25 years, both the number and the 
rate of deaths and nonfatal injuries have declined. However, despite 
these trends, mining remains a dangerous industry. Data collected by 
MSHA on serious injuries (those involving days away from work) indicate 
that mining, particularly underground coal mining, is one of the most 
dangerous industries in the United States.

Under the stringent requirements of the Mine Act, MSHA protects the 
health and safety of miners by inspecting each underground coal mine at 
least four times a year, citing mine operators for violations of the 
act or regulations, ensuring that hazards are quickly corrected, 
restricting operations or closing mines for serious violations, and 
investigating serious mine accidents. In addition, MSHA must approve 
the initial plans that mine operators prepare for essential systems 
that protect mine workers--such as ventilation and roof support 
systems--and revisions to the plans. As part of its review of these 
plans, MSHA conducts technical inspections of the mines every 6 months 
to determine whether mine operators are following the plans and whether 
the plans have been updated. These technical inspections are conducted 
in addition to the comprehensive quarterly inspections[Footnote 1] of 
each mine. MSHA's headquarters office is responsible for managing the 
operations of the agency and monitoring the activities of the 11 
district offices responsible for protecting safety and health at coal 
mines nationwide. The district offices have day-to-day responsibility 
for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting inspections, and 
investigating mine accidents. To carry out all of these 
responsibilities, MSHA received an appropriation for fiscal year 2003 
of almost $273 million. This included funding for the approximately 350 
inspectors who are responsible for inspecting underground and surface 
coal mines and investigating mine accidents and the 210 specialists who 
are responsible for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting 
technical inspections of mine plans, and participating in 
investigations of mine accidents.

You asked us to provide you with information on MSHA's efforts by 
assessing (1) how well MSHA oversees its process for reviewing and 
approving three critical types of mine plans, (2) the extent to which 
MSHA's inspection process helps ensure the safety and health of mine 
workers, and (3) the extent to which MSHA uses its accident 
investigations process to improve the future safety and health of mine 
workers.

We reviewed MSHA's policies and procedures, interviewed agency 
officials, and analyzed data obtained from computer files and documents 
at the agency's headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.[Footnote 2] We 
also reviewed documents and interviewed officials at the National Mine 
Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia (Mine Academy); the 
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center in Bruceton, 
Pennsylvania (Technology Center); and 5 of MSHA's 11 district offices. 
In order to include a review of the districts' accident investigations, 
we selected districts in which serious accidents had occurred in the 
past 5 years. We visited several underground coal mines and interviewed 
mine operators and workers at these mines. In addition, we obtained 
documents from and interviewed officials with industry associations, 
including the United Mine Workers of America and the National Mining 
Association. We conducted our work between November 2002 and July 2003 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

Although MSHA devotes substantial effort to reviewing and approving 
mine plans, it does not provide adequate oversight of the plan approval 
process. MSHA has extensive procedures for approving mine plans and, 
for two of the three types of plans we reviewed--ventilation and roof 
support[Footnote 3] plans--has assigned highly qualified staff to the 
review and approval process and approves plans submitted by mine 
operators on a timely basis. However, MSHA headquarters does not 
monitor completion of the 6-month technical inspections that district 
offices conduct in order to verify that mine operators are updating the 
plans as required and following all of the plans' requirements. As a 
result, some mines may be operating without adequate ventilation or 
roof support systems, which could directly affect the safety and health 
of mine workers. For example, data submitted by the district offices to 
MSHA headquarters indicate that 5 of the 11 districts had not completed 
technical inspections of the mines' ventilation plans during most 
quarters of the most recent 5-year period, including several quarters 
in which they had not completed over 50 percent of the inspections. 
MSHA headquarters also has not provided adequate oversight of district 
office operations by providing clear guidance on how to coordinate 
technical inspections with its quarterly inspections of mines. For 
example, in one of the district offices we visited, both the 
specialists who conduct technical inspections and regular inspectors 
spent several days inspecting ventilation systems in the district's 
mines during separate inspections. If they had coordinated these 
inspections, many hours of duplicate work could have been avoided. 
Finally, many of the plans for containing debris produced by mines are 
not approved on a timely basis because MSHA lacks qualified staff for 
reviewing and approving these complex plans. However, MSHA has 
recognized this problem and has developed a plan for hiring additional 
staff in order to eliminate delays.

MSHA has extensive procedures for conducting inspections of mines, 
highly trained and experienced staff, and conducts most annual mine 
inspections as required, but the extent to which the inspection process 
helps ensure the safety and health of mine workers is limited by 
several factors. First, although MSHA's procedures for inspecting 
underground coal mines are quite comprehensive, some of the procedures 
are unclear, resulting in inconsistent interpretations of the 
procedures by inspectors, and the procedures are dispersed throughout 
so many different sources that they are sometimes hard to find. For 
example, the definition of what constitutes a more serious safety and 
health violation--those classified as "significant and substantial"--
is not clear, and inspectors often differ on which violations to 
categorize in this manner. Second, although MSHA conducts most 
quarterly inspections as required, MSHA headquarters does not provide 
adequate oversight to ensure that the district offices follow through 
on unsafe conditions identified during inspections, making sure that 
mine operators correct the conditions by the deadlines set by the 
inspectors. Using MSHA's inspections data, we found that, over the past 
10 years, almost half of the violations for which MSHA inspectors 
issued citations, including almost half of the more serious violations, 
were not corrected by the required deadlines. Third, although MSHA has 
many well trained and experienced staff, it has no plan for addressing 
the fact that about 44 percent of its inspectors will be eligible to 
retire in the next 5 years. This is especially important because it 
takes at least 18 months of classroom and on-the-job training for new 
inspectors to meet the minimum requirements of the job. Finally, MSHA 
does not collect all of the information it needs to compute fatal and 
nonfatal injury rates in order to assess the effectiveness of its 
enforcement activities because the data it collects do not include 
information on contractor staff who work at each mine. Although the 
regulations require independent contractors to report injuries and the 
number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines, MSHA issued 
guidance in 1981 stating that the employment reporting requirement for 
certain independent contractors would be limited so that they need only 
report information in the aggregate for all mines. Since that time, the 
percentage of contractor staff has increased from about 5 percent of 
all underground coal mine workers to about 18 percent, and the 
percentage of mine workers represented by contractor staff who incurred 
nonfatal injuries in underground coal mines increased steadily over the 
most recent 10-year period, 1993 to 2002.

MSHA has a comprehensive process for conducting investigations of mine 
accidents, but it does not use the process to the fullest extent 
possible to improve the future safety and health of mine workers. MSHA 
has extensive procedures for conducting investigations, uses 
experienced and specially trained staff to conduct them, and monitors 
the quality of the investigations and resulting reports. However, 
weaknesses in the databases MSHA uses to track mine accidents and 
accident investigations limit its ability to monitor trends in mine 
hazards and ensure that all serious accidents are investigated. 
Specifically, it is difficult to associate injuries with specific 
accidents or investigations of these accidents, monitor trends in the 
types of hazards that cause injuries, or determine the extent to which 
districts are investigating accidents. For example, although MSHA can 
identify the total number of individuals who were injured by roof falls 
during a specific period, it cannot easily determine how many accidents 
were caused by roof falls during the period or how many of these roof 
falls were investigated, information that could help the agency in its 
efforts to prevent future accidents.

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Labor to improve 
MSHA's ability to protect the safety and health of miners. These 
recommendations should help MSHA provide better oversight over its 
operations and use its resources more effectively by improving its mine 
plan review and approval, inspections, and accident investigation 
processes. In commenting on a draft of this report, MSHA officials did 
not comment on our recommendations but disagreed with the findings on 
which several of our recommendations are predicated. For example, MSHA 
disagreed with our findings regarding district offices' timely 
completion of technical inspections related to mine plans, the agency's 
lack of a plan for addressing the large number of inspectors eligible 
to retire in the next 5 years, and weaknesses in the databases used to 
track mine accidents and accident investigations. MSHA also provided a 
few technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated in the 
report as appropriate. Our summary evaluation of the agency's comments 
is shown on pages 32 and 33. MSHA's comments and our detailed responses 
are provided in full in appendix III.

Background:

As of the end of calendar year 2002, the United States had 
approximately 2,050 coal mines--about 700 underground coal mines and 
1,350 surface mines. Over the past 10 years, the number of underground 
and surface coal mines in the United States has declined: from 
approximately 1,300 underground mines in 1993 to just over 700 mines in 
2002, and from over 2,100 surface mines in 1993 to about 1,300 in 2002. 
Over that same period, the number of mine workers also decreased; from 
over 62,500 underground coal mine workers in 1993 to about 45,500 in 
2002 and from over 74,000 surface coal miners in 1993 to about 62,000 
in 2002. As shown in figure 1, the number of coal mines and mine 
workers declined from 1993 to 2002.

Figure 1: Number of Coal Mines and Mine Workers, 1993 to 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

These mines produced over 1 billion tons of coal in 2002, about one-
third by underground mines. Despite the decrease in the number of mines 
and miners from 1993 to 2002, production has remained constant because 
of the increased use of mechanized mining equipment and more efficient 
mining techniques. In addition, over the past several decades, coal 
production has shifted from primarily underground mines to large 
surface mines, including mines in Wyoming and other areas west of the 
Mississippi that produce millions of tons of coal annually. The 20 
largest coal companies account for 70 percent of all coal that is 
produced in the United States.

Some underground mines do not actively produce coal all year. Some 
mines are only operated seasonally because of local weather conditions, 
and mine operators often suspend operations at smaller, less cost-
effective mines when the price of coal drops below a certain level. 
MSHA is required to inspect inactive mines as long as some miners are 
still working at the mine; however, these inspections generally take 
substantially less time than inspections of active mines.

Both the fatality rates and the nonfatal injury rates--the number of 
fatalities and injuries for every 200,000 hours worked--are higher for 
underground coal mines than surface mines. As shown in figure 2, our 
analysis of MSHA's data on fatalities for the 10-year period from 1993 
to 2002 indicated that the fatality rates for underground coal mines 
were much higher than those for surface mines for this period.

Figure 2: Fatality Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 1993 
to 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Number of fatalities for every 200,000 hours worked.

[End of figure]

For 1993 to 2002, nonfatal injury rates for underground coal mines were 
higher than those for surface mines, as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Nonfatal Injury Rates for Underground and Surface Coal Mines, 
1993 to 2002:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Number of nonfatal injuries for every 200,000 hours worked.

[End of figure]

A variety of factors contribute to underground coal mines being more 
dangerous than surface mines. One factor is that many underground coal 
mines are less than 40 inches high, requiring miners to kneel, crawl, 
or crouch in the mine throughout their work shifts. In some cases, the 
workspace is so small that the large machinery used to mine the coal 
takes up most of the space in the passageway, as shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: Miners Working in "Low Coal" (a Mine No More Than 40" High):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Another critical factor that contributes to the hazardous working 
conditions is methane gas, which is highly explosive. It is often 
produced in large quantities when coal is extracted from underground 
mines. Additional factors are the geological conditions in many areas 
of the country that make the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed 
by fire in an underground mine, coal and silica dust that can cause 
silicosis and pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), and the close 
proximity of unknown areas of abandoned mines, which can lead to 
flooding of the mine, as it did at the Quecreek mine last year.

MSHA's Coal Administration's headquarters is located in Arlington, 
Virginia, and 8 of its 11 district offices are located in the eastern 
United States near coal seams located in or near the Appalachian 
Mountains. As shown in table 1, as of May 2003, MSHA's 11 districts had 
a total of 1,017 staff who were responsible for protecting the safety 
and health of mine workers nationwide, including 283 inspectors and 200 
specialists assigned specifically to underground coal mines. In 
addition to the district office staff, MSHA had 38 headquarters staff 
members assigned to coal mine safety and health, for a total of 1,055 
staff.

Table 1: Number of Staff Assigned to Each District Office, May 31, 
2003:

Managers; District office: One: 7; District office: Two: 16; District 
office: Three: 16; District office: Four: 24; District office: Five: 
18; District office: Six: 18; District office: Seven: 17; District 
office: Eight: 11; District office: Nine: 14; District office: Ten: 12; 
District office: Eleven: 7; District office: Total: 160.

Underground inspectors; District office: One: 5; District office: Two: 
30; District office: Three: 22; District office: Four: 61; District 
office: Five: 23; District office: Six: 44; District office: Seven: 30; 
District office: Eight: 20; District office: Nine: 27; District office: 
Ten: 14; District office: Eleven: 7; District office: Total: 283.

Underground specialists; District office: One: 8; District office: Two: 
21; District office: Three: 19; District office: Four: 31; District 
office: Five: 21; District office: Six: 14; District office: Seven: 33; 
District office: Eight: 14; District office: Nine: 15; District office: 
Ten: 11; District office: Eleven: 13; District office: Total: 200.

Surface inspectors; District office: One: 7; District office: Two: 10; 
District office: Three: 6; District office: Four: 9; District office: 
Five: 7; District office: Six: 11; District office: Seven: 10; District 
office: Eight: 2; District office: Nine: 5; District office: Ten: 2; 
District office: Eleven: 2; District office: Total: 71.

Surface specialists; District office: One: 0; District office: Two: 0; 
District office: Three: 2; District office: Four: 4; District office: 
Five: 0; District office: Six: 2; District office: Seven: 1; District 
office: Eight: 0; District office: Nine: 0; District office: Ten: 1; 
District office: Eleven: 0; District office: Total: 10.

Trainees; District office: One: 0; District office: Two: 0; District 
office: Three: 8; District office: Four: 5; District office: Five: 11; 
District office: Six: 7; District office: Seven: 5; District office: 
Eight: 2; District office: Nine: 1; District office: Ten: 0; District 
office: Eleven: 5; District office: Total: 44.

Subtotal-enforcement staff; District office: One: 20; District office: 
Two: 61; District office: Three: 57; District office: Four: 110; 
District office: Five: 62; District office: Six: 78; District office: 
Seven: 79; District office: Eight: 38; District office: Nine: 48; 
District office: Ten: 28; District office: Eleven: 27; District office: 
Total: 608.

Technical staff; District office: One: 1; District office: Two: 0; 
District office: Three: 2; District office: Four: 6; District office: 
Five: 5; District office: Six: 4; District office: Seven: 6; District 
office: Eight: 1; District office: Nine: 2; District office: Ten: 2; 
District office: Eleven: 2; District office: Total: 31.

Enforcement support; District office: One: 1; District office: Two: 2; 
District office: Three: 3; District office: Four: 9; District office: 
Five: 2; District office: Six: 3; District office: Seven: 2; District 
office: Eight: 2; District office: Nine: 1; District office: Ten: 0; 
District office: Eleven: 0; District office: Total: 25.

Office support; District office: One: 4; District office: Two: 15; 
District office: Three: 13; District office: Four: 24; District office: 
Five: 14; District office: Six: 16; District office: Seven: 17; 
District office: Eight: 10; District office: Nine: 3; District office: 
Ten: 6; District office: Eleven: 3; District office: Total: 125.

Administrative support; District office: One: 3; District office: Two: 
5; District office: Three: 3; District office: Four: 5; District 
office: Five: 5; District office: Six: 6; District office: Seven: 5; 
District office: Eight: 5; District office: Nine: 14; District office: 
Ten: 3; District office: Eleven: 4; District office: Total: 58.

Subtotal-non-enforcement; District office: One: 9; District office: 
Two: 22; District office: Three: 21; District office: Four: 44; 
District office: Five: 26; District office: Six: 29; District office: 
Seven: 30; District office: Eight: 18; District office: Nine: 20; 
District office: Ten: 11; District office: Eleven: 9; District office: 
Total: 239.

Other[A]; District office: One: 0; District office: Two: 0; District 
office: Three: 2; District office: Four: 0; District office: Five: 2; 
District office: Six: 3; District office: Seven: 1; District office: 
Eight: 1; District office: Nine: 0; District office: Ten: 1; District 
office: Eleven: 0; District office: Total: 10.

Total; District office: One: 36; District office: Two: 99; District 
office: Three: 96; District office: Four: 178; District office: Five: 
108; District office: Six: 128; District office: Seven: 127; District 
office: Eight: 68; District office: Nine: 82; District office: Ten: 52; 
District office: Eleven: 43; District office: Total: 1,017.

Source: Monthly staffing report dated May 31, 2003, obtained from MSHA 
headquarters officials.

[A] "Other" includes students and part-time employees.

[End of table]

MSHA Devotes Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Does Not 
Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process:

MSHA has extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving 
two of the three types of plans we reviewed--ventilation and roof 
support plans--and most of these plans are reviewed and approved on a 
timely basis. However, MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor 
completion of 6-month technical inspections conducted as part of the 
districts' review of ventilation and roof support plans; data 
maintained by the district offices indicate that some districts are not 
completing these inspections in a timely manner. In addition, MSHA 
headquarters has not provided clear guidance to the districts on 
coordinating technical inspections related to mine plans with quarterly 
inspections of underground coal mines in order to avoid duplication of 
effort by district staff. Finally, staffing shortages have prevented 
MSHA from reviewing and approving plans for containing debris produced 
by the mines on a timely basis.

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures and Highly Qualified Staff for Approving 
Ventilation and Roof Support Plans:

MSHA has extensive procedures for approving ventilation and roof 
support plans. The Mine Act and its implementing regulations contain 
many of the requirements for approving ventilation and roof support 
plans. Additional procedures are contained in MSHA's Program Policy 
Manual, ventilation and roof support plan approval procedures 
handbooks, and the standard operating procedures for each district 
office. These procedures provide specific steps for approving the 
ventilation and roof support plans submitted by mine operators to MSHA 
for approval. Mine operators are required to submit their initial 
ventilation and roof support plans to the MSHA district in which the 
mine is located for approval prior to operating a mine and are required 
to submit revised plans to the district whenever significant changes 
are made to the plans. The district managers are ultimately responsible 
for approving ventilation and roof support plans submitted to their 
districts. Generally, districts are required to approve ventilation and 
roof support plans within 45 days of receipt unless problems are found 
that must be resolved. In some of the districts we visited, state mine 
agencies were also required to approve the mine plans. See appendix I 
for additional information on MSHA's approval process for ventilation 
and roof support plans.

Specialists assigned to each district office to review and approve mine 
plans are generally highly trained and experienced. MSHA currently has 
200 underground specialists assigned to its 11 district offices who 
review ventilation, roof support, and other types of mine plans. A 
majority of the specialists assigned to underground mines have at least 
5 years of experience in mining and were former inspectors of 
underground coal mines. As such, they receive 25 weeks of underground 
coal mine inspector training at the Mine Academy as well as on-the-job 
training, which qualifies them to conduct inspections and write 
citations for safety and health violations. In addition, most 
specialists have several years of experience as inspectors before 
applying for specialist positions. Each specialist is also required to 
take a minimum of 2 weeks of training in mine safety and health, such 
as specialized training on ventilation or roof support systems, every 2 
years.

Most district offices approve ventilation and roof support plans within 
the required 45-day period. District offices track the review and 
approval of ventilation and roof support plans, noting the date mine 
operators submit the plans to the district, the dates plans are 
assigned to specialists for review, and the dates the plans are 
approved. We reviewed this information for the most recent 5-year 
period, 1998 to 2002, and found that most districts approve these plans 
on a timely basis.

MSHA Does Not Ensure Districts Are Completing Technical Inspections of 
Mine Plans:

MSHA headquarters does not adequately monitor completion of 6-month 
technical inspections of ventilation and roof support plans by the 
district offices. Districts conduct technical inspections of the 
ventilation and roof support plans at least once every 6 months in 
order to ensure that mine operators are updating the plans to reflect 
changes in the ventilation and roof support systems and following the 
requirements of the plans. The specialists who review the mine plans 
during the approval process also conduct many of these technical 
inspections.

Our analysis of the information submitted by the district offices to 
MSHA headquarters on the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections of 
mines' ventilation and roof support plans for the most recent 5-year 
period, 1998 to 2002, indicated that several districts had not 
completed the inspections as required by agency procedures.[Footnote 4] 
The data showed that, although 6 of MSHA's 11 district offices 
completed the 6-month technical inspections of ventilation plans for 
most quarters of the 5-year period, 5 districts did not, and 2 
districts did not complete these inspections during any quarter of the 
5-year period.[Footnote 5] In addition, our analysis of the data 
submitted by the district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical 
inspections related to roof support plans for the same period showed 
that 3 of the 11 districts had not completed these inspections during 
most quarters of the 5-year period.

As a result of districts not completing these 6-month technical 
inspections in a timely manner, some mines may be operating without 
adequate ventilation or roof support systems. Technical inspections of 
the mines' ventilation and roof support plans are essential in ensuring 
adequate airflow and controlling the accumulation of dust particles in 
underground coal mines and that the roofs are adequately supported. 
Inadequate ventilation systems or roof support systems can directly 
affect the safety and health of mine workers. For example, our review 
of MSHA's data on fatalities at underground coal mines from 1998 to 
2002 showed that problems related to ventilation and roof support 
systems accounted for high proportions of fatalities in underground 
coal mines. For this 5-year period, ignitions or explosions from 
excessive gas or coal dust accounted for the third largest percentage 
of all fatalities, 14 percent, and roof falls accounted for the largest 
percentage, 34 percent.

Officials at MSHA headquarters initially were not aware that these 
inspections had not all been completed in a timely manner and contacted 
the district offices to find out why. We also contacted several 
districts and, according to district officials, all technical 
inspections related to the mines' ventilation and roof support plans 
had been conducted, but not all of the inspections were completed 
within the 6-month time frame. In addition, officials in the 5 
districts in which the data indicated that technical inspections had 
not been completed in almost every quarter of the 5-year period we 
reviewed--districts 1, 2, 4, 9, and 10--told us that information in 
their databases was not accurate and that most inspections had been 
completed within the 6-month time frame. However, they were not able to 
explain why they had not corrected the information in their databases 
on completion of the 6-month technical inspections.

Headquarters officials told us that ensuring the timely completion of 
technical inspections would be included in one of the agency's new 
initiatives. As part of this initiative, which was started in June 
2003, individuals from MSHA's Safety Division have been assigned to 
each one of the 11 district offices and given responsibility for 
monitoring the district's performance. These monitoring efforts include 
ensuring that the district is conducting all inspections, tracking 
trends in the number and rates of injuries and fatalities at the 
district's mines, and reviewing the number and types of safety and 
health violations cited. In addition, the Administrator for Coal Mine 
Safety and Health told us that MSHA plans to incorporate the databases 
the districts use to track the completion of 6-month technical 
inspections of ventilation and roof control plans into MSHA's overall 
data systems as part of its agencywide upgrade of MSHA's databases. 
This part of the upgrade is currently planned for 2006.

MSHA Has Not Provided Clear Guidance to Districts on Coordinating 
Inspections:

MSHA headquarters has not provided clear guidance to its district 
offices on coordinating technical inspections of mine plans with 
quarterly inspections of underground coal mines in order to avoid 
duplication of effort by district staff. Specialists who conduct on-
site technical inspections of underground coal mines related to mine 
plans often spend several days inspecting the mines' ventilation and 
roof support systems. For example, a ventilation specialist might spend 
several days walking through the 30 to 50 miles of airways at large 
mines to test whether an adequate amount of air is passing through the 
ventilation system and ensure that the passageways are not blocked. 
Inspectors are required to walk through these same airways during each 
quarterly inspection of the mine. They may, however, rely on the work 
of specialists who conduct the technical inspections, if the 
specialists coordinate their inspections with the inspectors and charge 
their time to the quarterly inspections. However, in 2 of the 5 
districts we visited, we found that, in some instances, specialists and 
inspectors were duplicating each other's work, resulting in an 
inefficient use of MSHA's resources. In one of these districts, because 
district management prohibited specialists from charging their time to 
quarterly inspections, inspectors could not count the time spent by 
specialists examining certain areas of the mines that inspectors are 
required to examine as part of their quarterly inspections, such as 
ventilation systems. Therefore, in this district, inspectors were 
required to examine the same areas of the mines even when a specialist 
had recently examined them. If the district had allowed the specialists 
to coordinate with the inspectors and charge the time they spent 
examining these systems to the quarterly inspections as in other 
districts, the inspectors would not have been required to examine these 
same systems again during the quarterly inspection. District officials 
told us it was their understanding that MSHA's procedures prohibited 
them from charging specialists' time to quarterly inspections, although 
MSHA headquarters officials told us there was no such prohibition.

MSHA headquarters officials told us they have no procedures that 
require specialists to coordinate technical inspections with quarterly 
inspections in order to avoid duplication. They agreed that the 
policies and procedures governing whether specialists may charge their 
time to quarterly inspections are unclear and told us they plan to 
clarify the procedures soon. In the interim, MSHA headquarters issued a 
memorandum to the district offices in June 2003 encouraging them to 
better coordinate inspections by specialists and inspectors.

MSHA Does Not Approve Plans for Containing Mine Debris on a Timely 
Basis:

MSHA is responsible for approving plans for containing mine debris, 
called impoundment plans.[Footnote 6] Many of these plans are extremely 
complex and require highly qualified engineers who are familiar with 
technical areas such as dam building techniques, hydrology, and soil 
conditions. Failure of an impoundment can be devastating to nearby 
communities, which may be flooded with water and sludge, and to the 
environment, affecting streams and water supplies for years afterwards. 
Because of the potential for failure, such as the impoundment dam 
failure in 1972 in Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in which 125 people 
were killed and 500 homes were destroyed,[Footnote 7] MSHA is extremely 
careful about approving impoundment plans. MSHA has responsibility for 
approximately 600 coal impoundments.

All but one of MSHA's district offices send most of their mines' 
impoundment plans to the Mine Waste and Geotechnical Engineering 
Division of MSHA's Safety and Health Technology Center, which the 
agency established in 1973 to provide district offices with the 
technical expertise needed to review impoundment plans. District staff 
review and approve only plans that are less complex or contain only 
minor modifications of existing impoundments. The one district that 
reviews its own impoundment plans has a professional engineer with the 
qualifications and experience needed to review such plans. See appendix 
II for additional information on the process for reviewing and 
approving impoundment plans.

Many impoundment plans sent to the Technology Center are not approved 
on a timely basis because MSHA does not have an adequate number of 
technical staff needed to review these complex plans. The Technology 
Center has historically faced staffing shortages that affect its 
ability to approve impoundment plans on a timely basis. As a result, 
the backlog of impoundment plans has grown--it now takes MSHA 2 to 3 
years to approve most plans and has taken as long as 5 years to approve 
some plans.[Footnote 8] In an effort to address the growing backlog, 
MSHA developed an expedited process for reviewing and approving 
impoundment plans in order to avoid disruption of the mines' 
operations. This system, however, added time to the approval process 
for plans that were not part of the expedited process. In addition, 
because so many plans were expedited, a backlog of expedited plans 
developed. For example, the number of regular (not expedited) 
impoundment plans pending review almost doubled during the 3-year 
period from 1998 to 2001, from 124 plans to 245. In 2000, when the 
expedited system was implemented, there were 69 expedited plans pending 
review. By the following year, there were 148 expedited plans waiting 
to be reviewed. During this period, engineers who left the Technology 
Center were not always replaced because, according to MSHA officials, 
the agency has had difficulty attracting civil engineers and certified 
professional engineers at the salary levels offered.

MSHA conducted two reviews of its procedures for approving impoundment 
plans and has begun to take steps for improving the process. The most 
recent review identified several weaknesses in the procedures, 
including the need for the agency to develop guidance for determining 
which impoundment plans should receive expedited review as well as 
evaluating the staffing levels needed to ensure timely and complete 
review of the plans.[Footnote 9] MSHA officials acknowledged that the 
delays in the review and approval of impoundment plans have been a 
problem for a number of years. However, the officials told us that they 
have recently taken a number of steps to alleviate these delays. First, 
they are in the process of hiring additional engineers for the 
Technology Center to review impoundment plans and provide assistance to 
staff in district offices. Second, to reduce the backlog of plans, the 
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health sent a memorandum to all 
district managers in January 2003 encouraging them to hire specialists 
with experience in civil engineering and have them review less complex 
impoundment plans instead of sending them to the Technology Center for 
review. Finally, MSHA has formed a committee to rewrite the Impoundment 
Inspection Handbook, which the agency plans to issue in March 2004. 
According to MSHA headquarters officials, these new procedures will 
bring more uniformity to the review and inspection process and will 
eliminate a number of outdated and confusing procedures and policies. 
The committee is also tasked with developing a system for rating the 
complexity of impoundment plans. This rating system will establish 
criteria for districts to use in deciding which impoundment plans to 
review in the district and which ones to send to the Technology Center 
for review. Agency officials said they expect to have this rating 
system in place no later than March 2004.

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures, Highly Qualified Staff, and Conducts 
Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Its Inspection Process 
Could Be Improved:

Although MSHA's procedures for conducting inspections of underground 
coal mines are comprehensive, its inspectors are highly qualified, and 
it conducts almost all quarterly inspections as required by MSHA 
policy, the inspection process could be improved in a number of ways. 
Although MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are 
unclear, while others are difficult to locate because they are 
contained in so many different sources. In addition, although MSHA 
conducted over 96 percent of required quarterly inspections each year 
over the past 10 years, MSHA headquarters does not provide adequate 
oversight to ensure that its district offices follow through to make 
sure that unsafe conditions identified during inspections are 
corrected. And, although MSHA has highly qualified inspectors, it has 
no plan for addressing the fact that 44 percent of them will be 
eligible to retire in the next 5 years. Finally, MSHA does not collect 
all of the information it needs to assess the effectiveness of its 
enforcement efforts because it does not collect data on independent 
contractor staff who work at each mine.

MSHA Has Extensive Procedures for Inspecting Mines, but Some Procedures 
Are Unclear:

MSHA has extensive procedures for inspecting mines. The two major 
sources of inspection procedures are the policy manual and the 
inspection handbook. In addition, MSHA issues many ad hoc procedures in 
formats such as bulletins and memorandums. MSHA's procedures require 
inspectors to follow many different steps in conducting quarterly 
inspections of mines. These steps include, among many others, (1) 
walking all of the air passages in the mine which, in a large mine, can 
total over 50 miles in length; (2) taking samples of the mine 
environment, including air, dust, and noise levels; (3) observing 
miners' work habits; and (4) reviewing the mine operators' records of 
their own daily inspections of the mine. Inspectors are also required 
to issue citations for any violations of the law, health or safety 
standards, rules, orders, or regulations they identify during 
inspections.

Although MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are 
unclear and they are located in so many different sources that they can 
be difficult to find. Some procedures do not clearly specify the 
criteria inspectors should use in citing violations. For example, 
several district officials in two of the districts we visited told us 
that the lack of specific criteria for floating coal dust[Footnote 10] 
makes it difficult to determine what is an allowable level. As a 
result, mine inspectors must rely on their own experience and personal 
opinion to determine if the accumulation of floating coal dust is a 
safety hazard that constitutes a violation. According to some of the 
inspectors we interviewed, this has led, in some cases, to 
inconsistencies in inspectors' interpretations of the procedures--some 
inspectors have cited violations for levels of floating coal dust that 
have not brought citations from other inspectors. In addition, the 
inspection procedures are located in so many different handbooks, 
manuals, policy bulletins, policy letters, and memorandums that it can 
be difficult for inspectors to make sure that they are using the most 
recent guidance and procedures.

MSHA headquarters officials told us that they are working to clarify 
the agency's procedures and consolidate the number of sources in which 
they are located. For example, MSHA established a committee in February 
2003 to clarify and consolidate its inspection procedures, including 
developing a checklist for inspections that will be available, along 
with the procedures, to inspectors on their portable computers. These 
online procedures will provide a single source of guidance for all 
types of coal mine inspections. MSHA plans to have these new online 
inspection procedures completed by late 2003.

MSHA Conducts Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but Does Not 
Always Follow Through to Ensure Unsafe Conditions Identified During 
Inspections are Corrected:

MSHA's data on its quarterly inspection completion rates indicates 
that, of the over 2,000 quarterly inspections district offices are 
required to conduct each year, they completed over 96 percent each year 
from fiscal year 1993 to 2002, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Quarterly Inspections of Underground Coal Mines, Fiscal Years 
1993 to 2002:

Number of quarterly inspections required; 1993: 4,216; 1994: 3,927; 
1995: 3,549; 1996: 3,195; 1997: 3,102; 1998: 2,957; 1999: 2,513; 2000: 
2,641; 2001: 2,714; 2002: 2,519.

Number of quarterly inspections completed; 1993: 4,211; 1994: 3,780; 
1995: 3,420; 1996: 3,148; 1997: 3,066; 1998: 2,928; 1999: 2,485; 2000: 
2,613; 2001: 2,638; 2002: 2,495.

Percent completed; 1993: 99.9%; 1994: 96.3%; 1995: 96.4%; 1996: 98.5%; 
1997: 98.8%; 1998: 99.0%; 1999: 98.9%; 2000: 98.9%; 2001: 97.2%; 2002: 
99.0%.

Source: MSHA.

[A] Note: We were not able to independently verify MSHA's completion 
rates.

[End of table]

Although MSHA conducts almost all of the quarterly inspections as 
required, MSHA headquarters does not monitor district office 
performance to ensure that inspectors are following up with mine 
operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified during 
inspections have been corrected. During inspections of mines, MSHA's 
inspectors set deadlines for the mine operators to correct the safety 
and health hazards violations identified. The deadlines vary based on a 
number of factors--including the degree of danger to miners affected by 
the violation--and range from 15 minutes from the time the inspector 
writes the citation to 27 days afterwards. Deadlines can be a short as 
15 minutes because some of the hazards have the potential to quickly 
lead to serious injuries. MSHA's procedures require inspectors to 
follow up with mine operators within the deadline they set or to extend 
the deadline. Inspectors may extend the deadlines under certain 
circumstances, such as when a mine has temporarily shut down its 
operations or when a mine operator is unable to obtain a part needed to 
correct a violation cited for a piece of equipment. MSHA tracks all 
citations, deadlines for correction, and extensions of deadlines in its 
Coal Management Information System.

Our analysis of MSHA's data for the most recent 10-year period, 1993 to 
2002, indicated that, for almost half--48 percent--of the 536,966 
citations for which a deadline was established, inspectors did not 
follow up in a timely manner to make sure mine operators had corrected 
the hazards.[Footnote 11] However, as shown in figure 5, of the 48 
percent of the citations for which the inspectors did not follow up in 
a timely manner, they followed up on many citations within 4 days of 
the deadline and, for all but 11 percent of the citations, they 
followed up in less than two weeks to verify that the mine operators 
had corrected the hazards identified during inspections.

Figure 5: Percentage of All Citations Issued from 1993 to 2002 for 
Which Inspectors Did Not Follow Up by the Specified Deadlines:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Moreover, the more serious type of violations--"significant and 
substantial" (S&S) violations--accounted for a significant proportion 
of the citations for which inspectors did not follow up by the 
deadlines. For the over 235,447 citations written for S&S violations 
from 1993 to 2002 for which a deadline was specified, inspectors did 
not follow up on more than 48 percent of the citations by the deadline. 
However, inspectors followed up on all but about 10 percent of the 
citations for S&S violations within less than 14 days of the deadline.

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that there are many 
different reasons why inspectors may not follow up by the deadlines 
specified in their citations. One of these, according to several 
district officials, is scheduling conflicts that prevent inspectors 
from visiting the mine within the specified deadline. In addition, 
there are circumstances in which inspectors are not able to follow up, 
such as when a mine operator suspends a mine's operations. However, in 
these instances, the inspector should update the information in the 
database to extend the deadline.

District officials we interviewed said that they are tracking the 
number of citations for which inspectors have not followed up by the 
deadlines and are taking steps to reduce this number. For example, 
officials in District 6 told us that they are revising the process of 
scheduling mine visits to improve the timeliness of follow up. In 
addition, MSHA headquarters officials said that tracking the number of 
citations on which inspectors have not followed up in a timely manner 
in each district office is part of their new initiative to better 
monitor district office performance that began in June 2003.

We did not review the quality of MSHA's quarterly inspections. Some 
inspectors and mine operators we interviewed at 2 of the 5 district 
offices we visited, as well as officials from the United Mine Workers 
of America headquarters, told us that staffing shortages sometimes 
cause MSHA to rush its inspections at the end of the quarter. For 
example, inspectors and a mine operator in one district told us that, 
last year, some of the quarterly inspections were not completed until 
the end of the quarter and that, in some cases, MSHA sent a large 
number of inspectors to a few of the district's mines at the end of the 
quarter in order to complete the inspections as required. MSHA 
headquarters officials said they were in the process of balancing the 
workloads of the district offices in order to address some of these 
staffing shortages. They also have begun hiring additional inspectors 
for some districts.

MSHA Has Highly Trained and Experienced Staff, but Lacks a Plan for 
Replacing the Large Number of Inspectors Who May Soon Retire:

MSHA's mine inspectors are highly trained and experienced. Under the 
Mine Act, inspectors are required to have, whenever possible, 5 years 
of practical mining experience before being hired. Newly hired 
inspectors receive a minimum of 18 months of classroom and on-the-job 
training before qualifying to conduct inspections on their own. 
Classroom training for new mine inspectors includes 25 weeks of 
instruction at MSHA's Mine Academy provided in 3-and 4-week segments. 
The classroom training covers a wide range of topics, from inspecting 
mine equipment to conducting tests of air quality. In between attending 
classes at the Mine Academy, new inspectors accompany experienced 
inspectors on mine inspections. Once they have completed their training 
and are certified by the district office to which they are assigned--a 
process that takes, on average, 18 to 24 months according to MSHA 
officials--inspectors receive their Authorized Representative 
credentials indicating that they are certified underground Coal Mine 
Inspectors and are allowed to write citations. In addition to their 
initial training, inspectors are required to take at least 2 weeks of 
refresher training every 2 years. Finally, MSHA's current underground 
coal mine inspectors have been with the agency, on average, for over 18 
years and most had a number of years of mining experience prior to 
joining MSHA. For example, each of the four inspectors we interviewed 
in one of the districts we visited had at least 10 years of mining 
experience prior to joining MSHA and had from 3 to 16 years' experience 
inspecting mines.

Although many of MSHA's highly trained and experienced underground coal 
mine inspectors will be eligible to retire within the next 5 years, and 
the agency's historic attrition rates indicate that many of them will 
actually retire, the agency has not developed a plan for replacing 
these inspectors. As shown in table 3, about 44 percent of MSHA's 
inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years and, in 2 
districts, a much larger proportion will be eligible to retire. The 
table also shows that districts have fewer inspector trainees on board 
than vacancies that will need to be filled when inspectors retire. 
MSHA's historic attrition data show that half of the individuals who 
are eligible for retirement actually retire within 1 year of the date 
they are eligible and 85 percent retire within 4 years.

Table 3: Number of Underground Coal Mine Inspectors Assigned to Each 
District Office, Percentage Eligible to Retire in the Next 5 Years, and 
Number of Inspector Trainees in Each District, July 2003:

Number of underground coal mine inspectors; District office: One: 5; 
District office: Two: 30; District office: Three: 22; District office: 
Four: 61; District office: Five: 23; District office: Six: 43; District 
office: Seven: 30; District office: Eight: 20; District office: Nine: 
27; District office: Ten: 14; District office: Eleven: 7; District 
office: Total: 282.

Number of inspectors eligible to retire in the next 5 years; District 
office: One: 1; District office: Two: 23; District office: Three: 19; 
District office: Four: 18; District office: Five: 11; District office: 
Six: 14; District office: Seven: 13; District office: Eight: 6; 
District office: Nine: 9; District office: Ten: 7; District office: 
Eleven: 2; District office: Total: 123.

Percent eligible to retire within 5 years; District office: One: 20%; 
District office: Two: 77%; District office: Three: 86%; District 
office: Four: 30%; District office: Five: 48%; District office: Six: 
33%; District office: Seven: 43%; District office: Eight: 30%; District 
office: Nine: 33%; District office: Ten: 50%; District office: Eleven: 
29%; District office: Total: 44%.

Number of underground inspector trainees; District office: One: 0; 
District office: Two: 0; District office: Three: 6; District office: 
Four: 3; District office: Five: 7; District office: Six: 5; District 
office: Seven: 5; District office: Eight: 0; District office: Nine: 0; 
District office: Ten: 0; District office: Eleven: 3; District office: 
Total: 29.

Source: MSHA.

[End of table]

MSHA headquarters officials also told us that it will be difficult for 
them to quickly hire and train replacements for the inspectors who 
retire. In addition to the fact that it takes at least 18 months to 
train each new inspector, it takes the agency several months from the 
date an individual retires to advertise and fill each vacant position. 
As a result of losing these inspectors, MSHA may find it difficult to 
maintain its current level of enforcement activity, including 
completing all quarterly inspections of underground coal mines.

MSHA headquarters and district officials told us that they do not have 
a plan that addresses the potential staffing shortages among its 
inspection staff because, although they recognize that the shortages 
may affect their ability to complete all required inspections, they 
cannot fill vacancies until individuals actually retire, so their 
options are limited.

However, MSHA is not making full use of available human capital 
flexibilities to streamline its hiring procedures or retain the 
services of inspectors.[Footnote 12] For example, it is not using the 
direct-hire authority available to federal agencies that would allow 
the agency to choose applicants directly for inspector 
positions.[Footnote 13] Furthermore, use of a category-based rating and 
selection procedure could help MSHA increase the number of qualified 
applicants for its inspector positions. In addition, MSHA is not using 
retention allowances to keep employees with specialized skills, 
including inspectors, who are critical to accomplishing the agency's 
mission. Finally, MSHA has not formally reviewed its hiring process, 
including identifying internal deficiencies, such as problems with its 
process for assessing the quality of applicants that causes delays in 
hiring new inspectors. MSHA headquarters officials told us, however, 
that they are considering conducting a review of their hiring system.

MSHA Does Not Collect Data on Independent Contractor Staff Needed to 
Assess the Effectiveness of Its Enforcement Activities:

MSHA does not collect all of the information on staff employed by 
independent contractors[Footnote 14] who work in underground coal mines 
needed to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement activities. The 
regulations implementing the Mine Act require mine operators, including 
independent contractors, to report the number of hours worked by staff 
at specific mines as well as injuries received during the performance 
of that work. However, MSHA issued a memorandum in 1981 that limited 
the reporting requirements for independent contractors who performed 
all but nine types of services in "high hazard activities," including 
mining coal, and exempted other independent contractors 
completely.[Footnote 15] As a result, MSHA only collects aggregate 
information from independent contractors that engage in these hazardous 
activities. It collects data on the number of hours worked by their 
staff at all mines, but does not collect this information for 
contractor staff at specific mines. MSHA headquarters officials told us 
the agency exempted independent contractors from these reporting 
requirements in order to reduce the regulatory burden on them and 
because, at the time the memorandum was issued, independent contractor 
staff represented a relatively small proportion of all coal miners.

However, because MSHA does not collect information on the hours worked 
by contractor staff who mine coal in each underground coal mine, it 
cannot calculate accurate fatality or nonfatal injury rates for mines 
that use contractor staff to mine coal--rates used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of its enforcement efforts.[Footnote 16] Although MSHA 
can determine whether it is meeting these goals for all underground 
coal mines as a whole, it cannot determine whether it is meeting its 
goals for specific mines. In addition, MSHA cannot track trends in 
fatal or nonfatal injury rates at mines that use contractor staff to 
mine coal. The fact that MSHA is not tracking the number of independent 
contractor staff who work in each mine has become more important in 
recent years, because the proportion of miners who work for independent 
contractors has grown significantly since 1981, when they represented 
only 5 percent of all mine workers. Our analysis of MSHA's data on 
workers in underground coal mines shows that the percentage of 
underground coal miners who work for independent contractors increased 
from 13 percent in 1993 to 18 percent in 2002, as shown in figure 6, 
and the percentage who incurred nonfatal injuries also increased over 
this period.

Figure 6: Contractor Staff as a Percentage of All Workers in 
Underground Coal Mines:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

To address these concerns, MSHA established a task group that was 
directed to work with the members of the mining community[Footnote 17] 
to (l) determine how to best identify and collect data on independent 
contractor staff and (2) develop an enforcement policy for independent 
contractors. MSHA headquarters officials said the task group is in the 
process of drafting an action plan but is having difficulty identifying 
independent contractors because the agency has issued a number of 
duplicate identification numbers to these contractors. In addition, 
MSHA headquarters officials told us that obtaining information on the 
hours worked by contractor staff at specific mines will be difficult 
because these workers often work at more than one mine.

MSHA Has a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Accident 
Investigations, but Does Not Fully Utilize It to Prevent Future 
Accidents:

MSHA's process for conducting accident investigations is comprehensive, 
but the agency does not use its investigations to the fullest extent to 
improve the future safety of mine workers. MSHA has detailed policies 
and rigorous requirements for how investigations must be conducted and 
reported and uses a number of mechanisms to monitor the quality of its 
accident investigations process. However, weaknesses in its databases 
make it difficult for MSHA to track key data on mine hazards and 
potentially useful indicators of its own performance.

MSHA's Polices and Procedures for Conducting Accident Investigations 
Are Extensive:

MSHA has extensive policies and procedures for conducting accident 
investigations. These policies and procedures are contained in the Mine 
Act and its implementing regulations, the Accident Investigations 
Handbook, policy documents, and a training manual. They provide 
guidance for determining when to conduct investigations, who should 
conduct them, how they should be conducted, and how to report the 
results. MSHA is required to investigate all accidents involving 
fatalities and may also investigate nonfatal accidents. While the 
decisions regarding whether to conduct investigations of most accidents 
are made at the district level, investigations of high-profile 
accidents, such as those involving more than two fatalities and mine 
emergencies, are handled by MSHA's headquarters office.[Footnote 18] 
The primary objective of an accident investigation, as stated in the 
investigation handbook, is "to determine the root cause(s) of the mine 
accident and to utilize and share this information with the mining 
community and others for the purpose of preventing similar 
occurrences." Other purposes of investigations are to determine whether 
any violations of the Mine Act or its implementing regulations 
contributed to the accident and to help formulate and assess MSHA's 
health and safety standards.

MSHA's accident investigations are conducted by experienced teams of 
inspectors and specialists, usually consisting of staff from the 
district in which the accident occurred. Additional staff from MSHA 
headquarters and the Technology Center, and, in the case of fatal 
accidents, attorneys from the Department of Labor's Solicitor's Office, 
may also provide assistance. In order to become qualified to conduct 
investigations of mine accidents, inspectors and specialists are 
required to take special training on accident investigations, in 
addition to that received by all inspectors and specialists during 
their initial training. The special accident investigation training 
covers such topics as data and evidence collection, accident 
reconstruction, interviewing techniques, and preparation of 
investigative reports. MSHA investigators are also required to take an 
accident investigation retraining seminar every other year.

Investigators are required to follow specific steps in conducting and 
documenting each accident, including trying to determine the 
underlying, or "root," cause of the accident. Investigators must 
conduct an on-site examination of the accident scene, interview 
witnesses, and analyze relevant mining equipment and material. 
Investigators must also follow detailed reporting requirements, 
including completing standardized forms and, in the case of serious 
accidents such as those involving a fatality, preparing formal written 
reports that cover specific topics. In addition to determining the 
direct causes of an accident, MSHA's investigators must determine the 
underlying causes. For example, for one mine in which frequent 
ignitions were occurring, investigators determined that the direct 
cause of the ignitions was sparks from the metal bit of a cutting 
machine striking rock. These sparks in turn ignited the methane 
released as the coal was cut out of the seam. The investigation team 
also went further and identified the underlying cause as a problem with 
ventilation at the mine. As a result, the mine operator made changes to 
the mine's ventilation plan and, according to MSHA officials, there had 
been no further ignitions in that section of the mine.

MSHA uses several means to monitor the quality of accident 
investigations. The accident investigation program manager in MSHA's 
headquarters office and the accident investigation coordinator at each 
district office monitor the progress of each investigation and provide 
guidance and recommendations to investigators on resources, collection 
of evidence, and conducting interviews. A number of individuals at the 
district and headquarters level review draft investigation reports, 
which the accident investigation program manager then approves. The 
district manager, the Office of the Solicitor, and the accident 
investigation program manager each review proposed citations and orders 
to be issued as a result of accident investigations.

Although we did not conduct a comprehensive review of MSHA's accident 
investigations, we reviewed eight investigations in great depth at 
several of the district offices we visited. For these selected cases, 
we reviewed MSHA files and reports, interviewed investigators, and 
interviewed miners and mine operators at some of the mines involved. We 
found that, for these cases, the MSHA investigators had followed the 
required procedures for conducting accident investigations.

MSHA's Databases Used to Track Accidents and Investigations Have 
Weaknesses:

Because of weaknesses in the databases that MSHA uses to collect data 
on accidents and its investigations, MSHA cannot properly monitor its 
accident investigations activity, including determining whether 
accidents were investigated, or track trends in mine hazards that cause 
accidents.

MSHA cannot use the data it collects on accidents, injuries, and 
investigations to readily determine whether accidents were investigated 
or monitor district performance in regard to their accident 
investigation activity. MSHA has one database that contains information 
on all accidents and injuries reported to MSHA by mine operators and 
contractors.[Footnote 19] It has another database that tracks MSHA's 
accident investigations activity, including time spent by inspectors 
and specialists on each investigation. However, it is very difficult to 
link the information on accidents and investigations contained in these 
two databases. As a result, MSHA headquarters cannot easily use the 
data to monitor whether districts have investigated all fatal accidents 
as required or determine which serious nonfatal accidents have been 
investigated. For example, we analyzed information from both databases 
in an attempt to determine whether MSHA investigated all fatal 
accidents in underground coal mines from 1993 to 2002. Although we were 
able to manually match each fatality to a fatal accident investigation 
using the mine identification number and the date of the investigation, 
and we found that MSHA had investigated all fatalities as required, it 
was a difficult, time-consuming process.

In addition, it is difficult for MSHA to track trends in the most 
frequent causes of mine accidents or to readily determine which types 
of accidents result in multiple injuries or the percentage of accidents 
that result in injuries. This occurs because MSHA does not assign an 
identifier to each accident but rather tracks only the information 
reported by mine operators on individuals injured in 
accidents.[Footnote 20] For example, MSHA cannot easily determine the 
number of roof falls that occurred each year, or the percentage of all 
roof falls that were investigated. It can only show the number of 
individuals who were injured or killed as the result of roof falls and 
the number of noninjury roof falls that occurred.

A few years ago, MSHA established a third database on accident 
investigations in order to record and disseminate information on 
accident investigations, including the results of investigations. The 
database contains detailed information on some accidents as well as 
MSHA's investigations activity. However, because the information in the 
database is not complete (it does not contain information on all 
accidents), it cannot be used to monitor trends in the types of 
accidents or to determine the percentage of accidents investigated. 
Further, MSHA headquarters officials told us that few field or 
headquarters staff use the database to obtain or analyze information on 
accident investigations because the system is not user friendly.

Conclusions:

MSHA plays an important role in protecting the safety and health of 
coal miners. MSHA has extensive policies and procedures and has 
assigned highly qualified staff to its processes for reviewing and 
approving mine plans, conducting inspections of underground coal mines, 
and investigating accidents. However, it is important for MSHA 
headquarters to ensure that the district offices to which it has 
delegated much of the responsibility for protecting the safety and 
health of mine workers have appropriate oversight, guidance, and 
staffing and to collect all of the data needed to evaluate their 
performance.

MSHA headquarters has not always provided the oversight of district 
office operations needed to ensure timely completion of 6-month 
technical inspections in some districts, nor has it ensured that 
hazards identified during inspections are being corrected by mine 
operators on a timely basis. As a result, some mines may be operating 
without accurate or complete ventilation or roof control systems or 
with uncorrected hazards, which may adversely affect the safety and 
health of mine workers.

Headquarters also has not provided inspectors with the guidance they 
need to carry out their work. Some procedures and guidance it has 
provided to district offices for inspections are unclear and, in some 
cases, difficult to locate. In the absence of such guidance, inspectors 
may not be consistently applying the law and regulations designed to 
protect the safety and health of mine workers. Moreover, the lack of 
guidance with regard to coordinating inspections has led to duplication 
of effort, diminishing MSHA's ability to use its staff resources most 
efficiently.

In addition, MSHA is not preparing for a likely shortage of inspectors 
in the future. MSHA officials have said the fact that they are unable 
to hire until someone retires justifies their lack of planning. 
However, this discounts the possibility that they might be able to 
better use their existing resources or plan ways to lessen disruptions 
during the transitions. If MSHA does not develop a plan for addressing 
the large number of retirements of inspectors over the next 5 years, it 
may not be able to continue to ensure the safety and health of 
underground coal miners.

Finally, MSHA is not collecting all of the data needed to evaluate its 
performance and prevent future accidents. It does not collect data on 
the hours worked by staff employed by independent contractors at 
specific mines. MSHA also does not track information on accidents 
needed to identify trends in mining accidents or link accidents and 
injuries to investigations. Given the latitude that district managers 
have in deciding whether to investigate serious accidents, it is 
important for MSHA headquarters to be able to link information on 
accidents and investigations in order to monitor district office 
performance. As a result, MSHA is not able to assess the adequacy of 
its enforcement efforts at mines that employ independent contractor 
staff to mine coal, properly target its efforts to improve mine safety 
at mines with relatively high injury rates, or maximize the likelihood 
of preventing future accidents.

Recommendations:

In order to provide better oversight over its operations, including 
collecting all of the data needed to provide this oversight, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary 
for Mine Safety and Health to:

* monitor the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections conducted as 
part of MSHA's review of ventilation and roof control plans to ensure 
that all inspections are completed by the district offices;

* monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure 
that mine operators are correcting hazards identified during 
inspections on a timely basis;

* update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on 
plan approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated 
instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating technical 
inspections with regular quarterly inspections of mines;

* develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of 
qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including considering 
options such as streamlining the agency's hiring process and offering 
retention allowances;

* amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in 
high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the 
number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA 
can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used 
to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and:

* revise the systems it uses to collect information on accidents and 
investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier 
to link injuries, accidents, and investigations.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided a draft of this report to MSHA for comment. MSHA did not 
comment on our recommendations but expressed concern about many of our 
findings and disagreed with three of the findings on which our 
recommendations are based. In addition, MSHA provided a few technical 
comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. 
MSHA's full comments and our responses are contained in appendix III.

MSHA disagreed with our finding that the agency does not ensure the 
completion of 6-month technical inspections related to mine plans 
conducted by its district offices. While MSHA acknowledged that the 
information provided by the district offices to MSHA headquarters on 
technical inspections is not accurate or complete, the agency said that 
the inspections are actually being conducted by the district offices 
but not recorded by the districts in the database, as evidenced by 
reports on file in the district offices. MSHA also noted that the 
database is being upgraded, which will enhance the agency's ability to 
track and monitor the status of technical inspections. In our view, 
MSHA's current system places all oversight responsibility on the 
district offices because MSHA headquarters does not have the data 
needed to ensure that districts are completing technical inspections as 
required by agency procedures. We maintain that MSHA cannot properly 
monitor the completion of technical inspections by its district offices 
when the information provided by the districts to MSHA headquarters for 
this purpose is inaccurate.

MSHA expressed concern that it would be difficult to develop guidance 
for all district offices on coordinating different types of inspections 
in order to avoid duplication of effort because of the dynamic nature 
of the mining industry. MSHA said that District Managers should be 
responsible for developing standard operating procedures in this area. 
We continue to believe that, while developing such guidance may be 
difficult, it is needed to ensure that MSHA's resources are used most 
effectively. In addition, several district officials told us that more 
coordination of effort in this area by MSHA could lead to better use of 
the agency's resources and eliminate potential duplication of effort.

MSHA took issue with portions of our finding related to the procedures 
provided to inspectors for inspecting underground coal mines, noting 
that the agency provides extensive training to inspectors on the 
procedures and that inspectors must rely on their experience and 
knowledge in determining what constitutes a violation. MSHA also noted 
that it is in the process of providing additional training to its 
inspectors and improving the ease of use of its manuals and other 
procedures. While we commended MSHA on its efforts to provide 
additional training to inspectors and consolidate its procedures, we 
noted that over reliance on inspectors' experience can lead to 
inconsistencies in their interpretations of the procedures.

On following through on its inspections to make sure that unsafe 
conditions are corrected in a timely manner, MSHA agreed that this is 
an important issue and said that it has already taken several actions 
to address inconsistencies in this area. The agency detailed its 
efforts to provide better guidance and additional training, establish a 
new accountability program to ensure the consistency of its enforcement 
actions, and stress the importance of timely follow up by inspectors to 
ensure that hazards are corrected.

MSHA disagreed with our finding that it does not have a plan for 
replacing the large number of inspectors who will be eligible to retire 
in the next 5 years, saying that it does have such a plan. After 
receiving MSHA's comments on our draft report, we asked MSHA officials 
for a copy of the plan referred to in their comments. They told us they 
did not have one plan but, instead, had recently developed plans for 
each of the 11 district offices and provided us with a copy of a plan 
for one district. This plan, however, does not contain all of the 
elements of a high quality human capital plan, such as linking the 
accomplishment of the agency's strategic goals to its future human 
capital needs. We maintain that MSHA needs to develop a comprehensive 
plan that addresses the agency's human capital needs related to 
protecting the safety and health of coal miners.

Finally, MSHA disagreed with our finding that the databases it uses to 
track mine accidents and investigations of these accidents have 
weaknesses that limit its ability to monitor trends in mine hazards and 
determine whether districts are investigating accidents. MSHA said that 
the information it collects on accidents in its databases can be used 
for these purposes. Our finding is accurate. The Accident Investigation 
Database to which MSHA refers in its comments does not track all 
accidents, it only tracks those that were investigated; therefore, the 
database cannot be used to monitor trends in all mine accidents. In 
addition, as noted in our report, the information in the database is 
incomplete, and the database is not widely used throughout the agency 
because it is not user friendly.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from the issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of Labor, the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and 
Health, and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to 
others upon request. This report is also available at no charge on 
GAO's web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-7215 or Revae Moran at (202) 512-3863. Other major 
contributors are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Robert E. Robertson 
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:

Signed by Robert E. Robertson: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: MSHA's Approval Process for Ventilation and Roof Support 
Plans:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix II MSHA's Approval Process for Impoundment Plans:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Modifications to the plan can be made at any point throughout the 
review and approval process.

[B] If the plan is disapproved, MSHA forwards the review comments and 
requests for additional technical information to the mine operator via 
the same process indicated for plan approval.

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor:

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix.

U.S. Department of Labor
Mine Safety and Health Administration 
1100 Wilson Boulevard:
Arlington, Virginia 22209-3939:

August 19, 2003:

Robert E. Robertson Director:

Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues General Accounting 
Office 441 G Street, NW. Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Robertson:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report titled 
"Mine Safety: MSHA Devotes Substantial Efforts to Ensuring the Safety 
and Health of Coal Miners, but Its Programs Could be Strengthened (GAO-
03-945)." We also appreciate the very positive comments about MSHA and 
its operations during the briefing led by your staff on August 5, 2003.

While we agree with certain findings and recommendations in your draft 
report, we also believe that the draft report requires the corrections, 
clarifications, and modifications described below. We also believe that 
the overall tone of the report can be improved to more fully convey to 
the reader what was articulated in the briefing that GAO did not find 
serious deficiencies during its review, and that MSHA is an agency with 
considerable strengths and accomplishments.

Report Title:

We feel the proposed title of the draft report does not accurately 
define the current and on-going programs and initiatives the Agency has 
and will implement to continue to focus resources on improvements. We 
would suggest the following modification to the proposed title: "MSHA 
Devotes Substantial Effort to Ensuring the Safety and Health of Coal 
Miners, and Continues to Focus Resources on Improvements. ":

GAO Finding: "MSHA Does Not Ensure Districts Are Completing Technical 
Inspections of Mine Plans":

This finding is incorrect. Although we acknowledge that the data 
provided by district personnel for the MPA database would give the 
reader the impression that the 6-month plan reviews were not being 
conducted by some districts as required - this data does not accurately 
capture the number of plan reviews that were actually conducted by 
inspection personnel.

Specifically, our MPA database is outdated and will only accept entry 
of the two required 6-month reviews. However, in all cases, whether a 
new plan is submitted or a current plan remains unaltered, MSHA 
conducts timely reviews. Inspectors conduct complete AAA inspections of 
underground mines four times per year. As a part of each AAA 
inspection, the inspector reviews and assesses the adequacy of the plan 
and satisfies the requirements of the 6-month plan reviews. The AAA 
inspection completion rates (98+ %) verify that inspections are 
regularly completed on a quarterly basis. Consequently, the associated 
plan reviews are also completed as required. Procedurally, the 
inspector documents the results on MSHA Form 2000-204. The original 
form is filed with the completed AAA inspection report while a copy is 
maintained by the Technical Division of each District. Additionally, 
each inspector is debriefed by his/her supervisor and the supervisor 
reviews the contents of the inspection report to ensure that all phases 
of the AAA inspection were conducted. As part of this activity, the 
supervisor is required to sign the 2000-204 form, certifying that the 
6-month plan review had been completed. As supporting evidence, we 
provided the GAO team with the completed and certified 2000-204 forms 
from CMS&H District 10 for the time period in question to verify that 
the actual reviews were conducted, documented, and certified even 
though the data did not appear in the MPA database (District 10 was one 
of the CMS&H Districts identified by GAO as having a deficiency in 
conducting the required plan reviews).

Also note that the use of the term "technical inspections" is an 
inaccurate definition of what is correctly termed a `plan review'. A 
Safety and Health Technical Inspection is conducted by a specialist 
considered to be a subject matter expert in the respective mine 
disciplines, such as ventilation, roof control, electrical, health, 
etc. The technical inspection is more comprehensive in that it focuses 
on specific areas of the mine or specific problems that have been 
identified by the inspector and/or operator. In contrast, the required 
6-month plan review consists of a more general evaluation to assure 
that the mine plans are suitable to current conditions at the mine. The 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), in sections 
302(a) and 303(o), requires a review of the plans at least every six 
months. In addition, 30 CFR 75.370(g) requires the ventilation plan for 
each mine be reviewed every 6 months by an authorized representative of 
the Secretary to assure that it is suitable to current conditions at 
the mine. Furthermore, guidance is provided in Chapters 5 and 6 of Coal 
Mine Safety and Health's (CMS&H) Mine Ventilation Plan Approval 
Procedures Handbook (PH92-V-6), stating the review should include a 
physical inspection of the mine ventilation system by either a 
ventilation specialist or regular inspector.

Again, we agree there is room for improvement in CMS&H's MPA database 
for reporting the plan reviews. We currently have a team of Information 
Technology specialists who are rewriting the program for the MPA 
database. We plan on having the upgrade completed in 2004. This will 
provide both Headquarters staff and district personnel an enhanced 
capability to track and monitor the status of required plan reviews.

Finally, please note that the following statement made on page 12 of 
the report is not accurate: "Mine operators ......... are required to 
submit revised plans to the district for approval at least every 6 
months." It is not necessary to routinely require a complete plan 
submittal to satisfy the 6 month review. MSHA conducts reviews of 
current plans at the required intervals - not simply for newly 
submitted plans. Historically, the number of citations/orders issued to 
mine operators for operating a mine with deficient mine plans has been 
extremely small. More often, the mine operator is cited for not 
following an 
approved plan. In those instances, where the physical conditions of the 
mine change and a plan revision is required, the mine operator submits 
the necessary information to the respective district manager for review 
and approval.

GAO Finding: "MSHA Has Not Provided Clear Guidance to Districts on 
Coordinating Inspections":

It is true that there is no formal guidance from Headquarters as to the 
scheduling and coordination of inspection activities between the 
regular inspectors and the district specialists. This is a function of 
district management, relying on their knowledge and familiarity with 
each mine. In addition, there are frequent conversations at formal 
meetings between the district managers and the Administrator concerning 
the scheduling and coordination issue. Headquarters has determined that 
due to the dynamics of the mining industry, it would be difficult to 
develop a formal standard operating procedure that details the manner 
in which scheduling and coordination of inspector/specialist would 
apply to each district. Therefore, to ensure the most efficient and 
effective coordination/scheduling of the districts' resources, the 
respective District Manager should be responsible for developing a 
standard operating procedure that best suits the needs of the district.	
For example, the regular inspector may find conditions during his/her 
normal inspection activities that would necessitate a follow-up visit 
to that area by a specialist to provide a more in depth technical 
evaluation of the environment. Additionally, an operator or a 
representative of the miners may request that the district send a 
specialist to an area of the mine that has previously been inspected by 
the regular inspector. Even though these examples would result in 
duplicate visits to the same area of the mine, this is not a misuse of 
inspection resources.

GAO Finding: MSHA Does Not Approve Plans for Containing Mine Debris on 
a Timely Basis.

MSHA recognizes the fact that, at the present time, the agency does not 
have the sufficient number of qualified technical personnel both at its 
Pittsburgh Technology Center and in its District offices to review and 
approve impoundment plans in a more timely fashion. MSHA, as noted in 
the Report, is taking the necessary steps to remedy this shortfall of 
requisite personnel. We are currently implementing a hiring strategy to 
staff each district with one or more engineers, dependent on the 
workload, having experience in impoundment construction and inspection. 
We also plan to hire additional engineers for the Pittsburgh Technology 
Center, specializing in the highly technical reviews of impoundment 
plans. The District engineers will be responsible for reviewing 
increasingly more complex impoundment construction plans, thus sharing 
a significant amount of the workload. It is important to note that many 
of the impoundment plans are extremely complex and consist of many 
construction phases. The current review process addresses these phases 
in sequential order to avoid unnecessary plan review delays which could 
affect the safe and efficient operations at the mine site. When onsite 
problems do occur, the plan is elevated to an expedited review status 
to ensure timeliness in the 
approval process. This allows the mining operations to continue the 
safe disposal and handling of refuse without compromising the safety of 
miners.

GAO Finding: "MSHA Has Extensive Procedures for Inspecting Mines, but 
Some Procedures are Unclear":

As to the discussion in your report on pages 4, 18, and 19, MSHA makes 
it is a very high priority to have its inspectorate trained in proper 
application of the current legal criteria for taking various 
enforcement actions. Coal and M/NM headquarters staff worked with the 
staff of the Division of Mine Safety (Office of the Solicitor) to 
revise the MSHA Policy Manual text to state the correct and current 
legal criteria for determining if a given violation "could 
significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a 
safety or health hazard" (known as an S & S violation). That policy 
guidance was issued over a year ago. There was a "roll-out" with this 
Manual revision which included new training materials and other 
documents such as the Citation and Order Manual which have been 
similarly revised. In response to the Jim Walter Internal Review MSHA 
arranged to have all inspectors receive additional training on the 
proper application of the S & S test. Thus, MSHA takes issue with the 
implication in the report that MSHA and the Office of the Solicitor 
have not been attentive to making sure the inspectorate receives 
accurate and timely training on the legal tests needed to be applied 
for various enforcement decisions including what criteria to be 
reviewed in making an S & S determination.

While MSHA makes it is a very high priority to have its inspectorate 
trained in proper application of the current legal criteria for taking 
various enforcement actions, we agree that improving the ease of use of 
our manuals and policy letters should be a high priority. We also note 
that no matter how thorough the training including the review of 
"frequent scenarios", these determinations must always be made based on 
the specific on-site facts evaluated by our inspectors. Thus, there may 
always be situations which look superficially the same, but were in 
fact evaluated differently based on all of the factors present at the 
time of the inspection.

Your report refers specifically to several inspectors who expressed 
differences of opinion as to what constitutes an accumulation of float 
coal dust. That is an issue related to whether a condition poses a 
violation. The presence of float coal dust is a condition that must be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. There is no `shopping list' or 
clear-cut formula to indicate when and to what degree the presence of 
float coal dust poses a distinct hazard to the miners. When determining 
whether the condition constitutes a violation, the inspector must rely 
on his/her experience and knowledge. One pertinent issue in this 
decision is the understanding that a minute amount of float coal dust 
poses an explosion hazard to miners. As a rule the decision to cite 
float coal dust accumulations is made on the discoloration of the area, 
not a measurable accumulation. To put this in perspective, the lower 
limit of coal dust flammability is approximately 3.0 ounces of coal 
dust per linear foot of an entry with a cross sectional area of 60 
square feet. This would equate to a layer of float dust the thickness 
of a piece of paper. The Agency continually provides training and 
support for the inspector to enhance his/her ability to make 
effective and accurate judgments. Most recently, during Calendar Year 
2003, a technical expert from Technical Support's Ventilation Division 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania traveled to each of the 11 CMS&H Districts 
and conducted hazard recognition training for all enforcement personnel 
relative to coal dust and float coal dust accumulations.

GAO Finding: "MSHA Conducts Most Quarterly Inspections as Required, but 
Does Not Always Follow Through to Ensure Unsafe Conditions Identified 
During Inspections are Corrected":

Your report indicated that the inspectors do not always follow through 
to ensure timely abatement of violations. This finding was derived as a 
result of the GAO review of violations issued from 1993 to 2002. In 
2002, the Agency also realized some inconsistencies relative to 
inspection procedures and the enforcement of mandatory safety 
standards. In response to the Agency's findings, a joint Consistency 
Plan between Coal and Metal/Nonmetal was developed and implemented on 
April 2, 2002. The Consistency Plan was updated and its importance was 
reemphasized by the Administrator for CMS&H on March 31, 2003. In 
addition, the Administrators for Coal and Metal/Nonmetal jointly issued 
a revised Citation and Order Writing Handbook in June 2002 (Handbook 
Number PH02-I-7). The Handbook sets forth procedures to be followed in 
writing and issuing citations and orders in Coal or Metal/Nonmetal 
mines. The Handbook provides guidance for all enforcement personnel in 
issuing, extending, modifying, vacating, and terminating citations and 
orders. The Handbook was recently updated in August 2003, to provide 
improved guidance and specific examples of proper enforcement 
evaluations.

During Calendar Year 2003, a professional instructor from the Mine 
Health and Safety Academy in Beckley, West Virginia traveled to each of 
the 11 CMS&H Districts and conducted training relative to citation and 
order writing.

On January 6, 2003, the Administrator for CMS&H selected a committee to 
develop a Peer Review Accountability Program to replace our existing 
Accountability Program (Handbook Number AH95-III-1). The new program 
will focus on enforcement consistency throughout the nation. In August 
2003, the committee circulated the draft handbook for comment prior to 
final release and implementation.

Furthermore, the Agency conducts periodic reviews of resource 
allocation to ensure optimum deployment of these resources. This 
strategy ensures that the Agency fulfills its mandated Congressional 
responsibilities in the most effective and efficient manner. This will 
also result in the consistent application of the Agency's rules, 
regulations, policies, and procedures relative to the issuance of 
citations and the establishment of appropriate abatement times.

The Agency has taken the aforementioned measures to improve the 
inspectors' understanding of reasonable citation abatement times and 
the importance of timely follow-up. This has been done, even though we 
recognize that it will not always be possible for an inspector to be in 
the area at the designated time of abatement. As stated 
in the CMS&H General Inspection Procedures Handbook, the inspector 
should make every effort to re-inspect the area as soon as the fixed 
abatement time has expired The most important factors relative to the 
abatement process are the initial consideration of the hazard posed to 
the miners and the 1977 Act's requirement for allowance of "reasonable 
time" for the operator to correct the condition. One only has to look at 
an example where a tail pulley is cited for lack of a guard at 3:00 pm 
on Friday. The inspector must set the abatement time to protect the 
miners and to allow ample time for correction.	The abatement time is 
established as 9:00 pm on the same day. Monday is a holiday and the 
inspector knows he/she will not be back until Wednesday. The citation 
will not be timely abated according to your report, but it is cited and 
abated according to our guidelines and provides the maximum protection 
for the miners. The degree of danger to the miners is and must remain 
the first consideration in determining a 
reasonable time for abatement.	However, due to the inspector's schedule 
and unforeseen assignments, such as 103(8) investigations, Code-A-Phone 
investigations, accident investigations, training assignments, etc., 
the inspector may not be able to re-inspect the area before the 
abatement time has expired. The fact that the inspector does not return 
to the area to evaluate the action taken toward abatement of the 
violation does not relieve the operator of his obligation to correct 
the cited condition.

Footnote to Table 2: Quarterly Inspections of Underground Coal Mines, 
states that MSHA does not keep track of the past status of each mine. 
This is incorrect. The Coal MIS contains a historical record of all 
status changes back to October 1981. GAO did not specifically request 
information relative to historical mine status.

GAO Finding: "MSHA Has Highly Trained and Experienced Staff, but Lacks 
a Plan for Replacing the Large Number of Inspectors Who May Soon 
Retire":

This finding is incorrect. MSHA does have a plan in place to address 
the potential for significant employee attrition in the near future, 
and to the extent possible, will implement this plan. We completed 
analyses of our 11 districts and have allocated human capital, within 
authorized ceilings, to those districts that will experience employee 
retirements. It must be noted that we cannot hire Full Time Equivalents 
(FTE) in excess of what has been authorized by Congress. We can only 
backfill vacancies as retirements occur. This does place us at a 
disadvantage in that it usually requires 1 %2 to 2 years of formal and 
on-the-job training before an inspector can conduct mine inspections. 
Without the authority to double-encumber positions by increasing the 
number of authorized FTEs, the Agency will continue to see its on-board 
inspector levels lower than its authorized hiring levels.

Your report also states that MSHA is not using retention allowances to 
keep inspectors who are critical to the agency's mission. As the report 
indicates, MSHA's coal inspectors have been with the agency for an 
average of 18 years. The majority leave the agency for retirement 
purposes. A retention bonus is an incentive for unusually high or 
uniquely qualified employees who might otherwise leave Federal service. 
The payment of a retention allowance to eligible retirees would not be 
cost effective to MSHA, as these employees will still likely retire 
after the fulfillment of their service commitment.

GAO Finding: "MSHA Does Not Collect Data on Independent Contractor 
Staff Needed to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Enforcement 
Activities":

GAO recommends that MSHA amend guidance provided to independent 
contractors requiring them to report work hours by specific mine. This 
may require a regulatory change, not a guidance change. MSHA's intra-
agency coordination committee is in the process of reviewing 
recommendations from the independent contractor task group. MSHA's goal 
is to find the best method for obtaining the necessary contractor 
information.

GAO Finding: MSHA's Databases Used to Track Accidents and 
Investigations Have Weaknesses.

GAO is incorrect when they say we cannot link certain type accidents to 
the actual accident investigations. Although the Part 50 database and 
the Accident Investigation database are separate, stand-alone systems, 
they are linked using the document control number generated by the Part 
50 database. Each database can be independently queried for relative 
infonnation needed to develop and track accident/injury trends and 
incidence rates. MSHA agrees with the GAO that this method is 
cumbersome and MSHA intends to do remedy this situation as the systems 
are re-written and combined between FY 2004 and FY 2005.

The GAO report states that "MSHA does not assign an identifier to each 
accident." MSHA does assign an identifier to each accident, called the 
Document Number, which is assigned to each 7000-1 Form and becomes a 
part of the database (this field was not requested by GAO as part of 
the data sharing). The Document Number is directly linked to individual 
inspection/investigation events in the accident investigation 
database.

The Report also says that "MSHA cannot easily determine the number of 
roof falls that occurred each year..." Operators are required to 
complete a 7000-1 for accidents as defined in 30 CFR 50.2(h), which 
includes non injury accidents such as unintentional roof falls. These 
are entered into our system and can be identified by using the non 
injury degree code 00. The accidents were included in the data provided 
to GAO. Attached is the number of roof falls reported to MSHA each year 
since 1983.

Additional comments:

Footnote 7 on page 16 mentions that MSHA's predecessor, the Mining 
Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) had responsibility for 
overseeing impoundments at the time of the Buffalo Creek disaster. MESA 
was not created until July of 1973 and Buffalo:

Creek Disaster occurred in 1972. Mine safety responsibilities were with 
the Bureau of Mines at that time.

We would welcome the chance to meet and further explain our concerns 
and reasons for the recommended changes. If you have questions on any 
comments that MSHA has provided, please contact Kenneth Bullock on 
(202) 693-9778 or Kenneth Murray on (202) 693-9505.

Sincerely,

Dave D. Laurlski:

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health:

Signed for Dave D. Laurlski:

Enclosure: Roof falls 1983-2002:

[See PDF for image]

[End of table]

GAO Comments:

1. The briefing to which MSHA refers is the exit conference held on 
August 5, 2003, in which we described the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in this report to MSHA in detail. At this 
conference, as well as briefings held with top MSHA officials in June, 
MSHA generally concurred with our findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. The information presented at the exit conference and 
the other briefings is consistent with the information contained in 
this report.

2. We believe the title of the report presents a fair, balanced, and 
accurate representation of the information in our report. Moreover, 
MSHA's own suggested title acknowledges a need for improvement.

3. Our finding that MSHA does not provide adequate oversight of the 
districts' completion of 6-month technical inspections is accurate. As 
MSHA acknowledges in its comments, the information reported by the 
district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections is not 
accurate or complete. Therefore, MSHA headquarters cannot use this 
information to monitor the completion of inspections by the districts. 
Our draft report noted problems with the accuracy of the data reported 
by district offices to MSHA headquarters on technical inspections. 
However, because of the concerns MSHA expressed in its comments about 
the accuracy of the data, we clarified the discussion of this issue in 
the report and deleted detailed information included in an appendix to 
the draft derived from the data. We commend MSHA on its efforts to 
improve the accuracy of the data collected by its district offices, 
thereby enhancing the agency's ability to monitor the status of these 
inspections.

4. We used the term "technical inspection" in our report in order to 
provide a reader friendly method of referring to the on-site 
inspections conducted by MSHA related to mine plans. The term "plan 
review" used by MSHA does not distinguish the reviews specialists 
conduct at the district offices in order to determine whether written 
plans submitted by mine operators comply with the law, regulations, and 
MSHA's procedures from the on-site inspections conducted at the mines 
in order to compare the plans to actual conditions at the mines.

5. We clarified the language in the report to more accurately reflect 
agency procedures.

6. While MSHA believes the "dynamics" of the mining industry preclude a 
formal plan for coordinating inspections, several district officials we 
interviewed said that more coordination of effort in this area by MSHA 
could lead to better use of agency resources and eliminate potential 
duplication of effort. Furthermore, MSHA headquarters officials issued 
a memorandum in June 2003 encouraging districts to better coordinate 
inspections conducted by specialists and inspectors, suggesting that 
coordination could be important in avoiding duplication.

7. We commend MSHA on its efforts to address this problem. Both of the 
initiatives MSHA mentions are included in our report, and we encourage 
the agency to move forward with these hiring and staffing initiatives.

8. We commend MSHA on its efforts to provide additional training to 
inspectors and to consolidate its procedures. However, our interviews 
with inspectors indicate that they interpret guidance they receive 
differently and are sometimes uncertain as to what constitutes a 
violation. While we acknowledge that an inspector's experience is an 
important component of the decision-making process, an over reliance on 
experience can lead to inconsistencies in inspectors' interpretations 
of the procedures. We also note that MSHA's comment that our report 
implies that MSHA and the Office of the Solicitor have been inattentive 
in ensuring that inspectors receive accurate and timely training on the 
legal tests needed to be applied for various enforcement decisions is 
not accurate. Our report makes no such statement; it refers only to the 
written procedures provided by MSHA to inspectors.

9. We commend MSHA's efforts in this area and again stress the 
importance of using the data it collects in its Coal Management 
Information System to monitor the timeliness of inspectors' actions to 
ensure that mine operators are correcting all mine hazards as required. 
MSHA's own guidance states that a violation cannot be abated until an 
inspector re-inspects the area. As noted in our report, MSHA officials 
told us that they have begun tracking the numbers of citations for 
which inspectors have not followed up in a timely manner as part of a 
new initiative to better monitor district office performance.

10. We made this correction to the report. However, we note that we 
did, in fact, request information from MSHA officials on the historical 
status of each mine but chose not to use the information because the 
officials expressed doubts about its accuracy.

11. In several conversations with senior level MSHA officials, 
including the Assistant Director for Human Resources, they told us 
that, although they were in the process of developing a plan for 
addressing the large number of retirements the agency is facing over 
the next 5 years, they had not yet developed such a plan. After 
receiving MSHA's comments on our draft report, we asked MSHA officials 
for a copy of the plan referred to in the agency's comments. They told 
us they did not have one plan but, instead, had recently developed 
plans for each of the 11 district offices and provided us with a copy 
of a plan for one district dated March 2003. When we visited this 
district office in March 2003, we discussed the issue of how the 
district will address the large number of inspectors who will retire in 
the next 5 years. At that time, the district officials told us they 
were in the process of developing a plan for how to replace these 
inspectors but had not completed the plan. They did not mention having 
such a plan in place, and we were not provided with a copy of the plan 
at that time.

Based on our review of the district plan provided to us by MSHA, we 
commend the agency for beginning to take appropriate actions necessary 
to address anticipated staffing shortages. The plan, however, does not 
integrate accomplishment of MSHA's mission to protect the safety and 
health of coal miners with its human capital approaches, including 
identifying the total number of inspectors needed to accomplishment its 
mission, or address how these numbers will be maintained through hiring 
and training of new inspectors as retirements occur. The plan also does 
not link the accomplishment of MSHA's strategic goals using outcome 
data--such as trends in the incidence rate (fatalities and nonfatal 
injuries) at underground coal mines--to its future human capital needs. 
As noted in our recommendation, MSHA needs to develop a comprehensive 
plan that addresses the human capital needs of the agency as they 
pertain to protecting the safety and health of coal miners rather than 
just developing plans for each of its district offices.

12. We suggested the use of retention allowances as one type of human 
capital flexibility that can benefit an agency facing a potential loss 
of employees in a particular skill area. The use of retention 
allowances, however, is only one of the human capital flexibilities we 
mentioned in the report. In including a list of human capital 
flexibilities, our intent was that MSHA would select those that are 
cost-effective and beneficial to the agency.

13. While we commend MSHA in its continuing efforts to address the 
issue of reporting by independent contractors, our recommendation to 
amend guidance so that all independent contractors are required to 
report the number of hours worked by their staffs at specific mines 
would not require a regulatory change. However, if MSHA believes that a 
regulatory change is necessary, it should take appropriate action. In 
either case, we believe that obtaining input from the mining community 
prior to making such a change and notifying them of the change would be 
beneficial to the entire mining community.

14. Our report does not state that information on certain types of 
accidents and investigations cannot be linked but rather that doing so 
is a difficult process and, in its comments, MSHA agreed that the 
process is cumbersome. The report, however, refers to linking data in 
the Part 50 Database in which injuries resulting from accidents are 
tracked with data in the Coal Management Information System on accident 
investigations. In its comments, MSHA refers to linking data from the 
Part 50 Database to information in the Accident Investigation Database. 
MSHA is correct in stating that injuries and noninjury accidents 
recorded in the Part 50 Database can be linked to accident 
investigations in the Accident Investigation Database. However, the 
Accident Investigations Database only contains information on accidents 
that were investigated, not all mine accidents. In addition, as noted 
in our report, the database is incomplete and is not widely used 
throughout the agency because it is not user friendly.

15. Our finding that MSHA does not assign an identifier to each mine 
accident is accurate. The document number on the Form 7000-1 to which 
MSHA refers in its comments is assigned to each injury, not each 
accident, except for accidents in which no injuries occur. Therefore, 
it is difficult to determine how many accidents of each type occurred 
or to track trends in the types of accidents that account for the most 
injuries.

16. The detailed list MSHA provided to us as an appendix to its 
comments shows the total number of injuries, by degree, that resulted 
from roof falls and the total number of noninjury accidents that 
occurred as a result of roof falls for the past 20 years. The data do 
not, as MSHA implies, show the total number of roof falls that occurred 
during this period. As noted in our report, this makes it difficult for 
MSHA to track trends in the most frequent causes of mine accidents or 
readily determine the percentage of accidents that result in injuries.

17. We made this correction to the report.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Revae E. Moran, (202) 512-3863:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Other major contributors to this report are Patrick J. Dibattista, 
Julian P. Klazkin, Stanley J. Kostyla, Anne Inserra, Lori Rectanus, 
Leslie C. Ross, Jerome T. Sandau, Linda W. Stokes, and Kris Trueblood.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Although the Mine Act does not require MSHA to conduct these 
comprehensive inspections each quarter--it only requires four annual 
inspections--MSHA policy is to inspect each underground coal mine once 
each quarter, and many MSHA staff refer to them as quarterly 
inspections. MSHA also refers to these comprehensive inspections as 
"AAA" inspections because this is the code to which time spent on these 
inspections is charged.

[2] Much of the data we analyzed was provided in a database assembled 
by MSHA at our request. MSHA provided information from several of its 
databases on the types of mines, the number of employees and hours 
worked, the number and types of accidents and injuries, and on the 
number and types of inspections, violations, and fines. Through 
interviews and electronic testing, we concluded that the database 
provided by MSHA was reliable for our work.

[3] MSHA refers to these plans as "roof control" plans.

[4] We analyzed the timeliness of these inspections by reviewing 
reports prepared by the district offices from information in the 
databases they use to track the timeliness of the plan approval process 
and related technical inspections (the Mine Plan Approval System). 
Follow up telephone conversations with district officials indicated 
that, while some of the data showing districts had not completed their 
6-month technical inspections were accurate, other data were not. The 
officials told us that, in some cases, the data in their systems were 
not current and that the technical inspections had been completed. 
Therefore, while we can confidently state that not every district is 
completing its 6-month technical inspections in a timely manner, the 
reports--and the underlying data on which they are based--do not enable 
us to give an exact statement of the degree to which they did not 
complete the inspections as required. 

[5] Although district offices conduct technical inspections of the 
ventilation and roof support systems every 6 months, they conduct 
inspections throughout the year and collect and report data on the 
completion of these inspections for each quarter of the year.

[6] MSHA refers to the large embankment dams built to contain debris 
produced by the mines (debris that consists mainly of water, rock, and 
coal) as "impoundments."

[7] The Bureau of Mines had responsibility for overseeing impoundments 
at the time of the Buffalo Creek disaster.

[8] These delays do not, for the most part, affect mines' operations 
because most plans submitted to MSHA for approval are for modifications 
to existing impoundments at mines that already have an impoundment in 
place.

[9] In October 2000, the floor of an impoundment for a mine in Martin 
County, Kentucky, broke through sealed underground areas of the mine, 
causing a major coal waste spill in the surrounding community. Although 
the impoundment dam did not fail, this event prompted MSHA to review 
its processes for approving all impoundment plans.

[10] MSHA refers to this as "float" coal dust. It is extremely 
combustible and can cause explosions in underground coal mines.


[11] MSHA does not set a deadline for correction of every type of 
violation. For example, inspectors are not required to set a deadline 
for an order in which the mine is closed due to "imminent danger."

[12] Human capital flexibilities represent the policies and practices 
that an agency has the authority to implement, in managing its 
workforce, to accomplish its mission and goals. We recently reported on 
the key practices agencies should use when implementing human capital 
flexibilities. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: 
Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their 
Workforces, GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).

[13] Direct hire authority, which was authorized in the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, provides agencies with the authority to appoint 
candidates directly to jobs for which the Office of Personnel 
Management has determined that there is a severe shortage of candidates 
or a critical hiring need.

[14] The Mine Act defines a mine operator to include independent 
contractors that perform services or construction at a mine. 

[15] MSHA's memorandum exempted all independent contractors from some 
of the reporting requirements of the Mine Act except those whose staff 
provide services in one of the following nine high hazard activities: 
(1) mine development, including shaft and slope sinking; (2) 
construction or reconstruction of mine facilities; (3) demolition of 
mine facilities; (4) construction of dams; (5) excavation or 
earthmoving activities involving mobile equipment; (6) equipment 
installation, such as crushers and mills; (7) equipment service or 
repair of equipment on mine property for a period exceeding 5 
consecutive days at a particular mine; (8) material handling within 
mine property, including haulage of coal, ore, and refuse, unless for 
the sole purpose of direct removal from or delivery to mine property; 
and (9) drilling and blasting. Procedures later issued by MSHA 
clarifying these requirements stated that mining coal was included in 
activity (8).

[16] Two of MSHA's key performance goals are to reduce the fatal injury 
rate and the rate of all injuries in coal mines.

[17] The mining community is a commonly used term for referring to the 
various types of entities and individuals involved in mining. It can 
include MSHA enforcement personnel, state mining agency personnel, mine 
operators, miners and labor organizations, special interest groups, and 
mining equipment manufacturers.

[18] Although the investigation handbook states that MSHA headquarters 
is responsible for investigations of mine emergencies, it does not 
define what constitutes a mine emergency.

[19] Mine operators and independent contractors are required to file 
detailed reports with MSHA on injuries that result from a mine 
accident. These reports include information on the name of the injured 
person, the seriousness of the injury and the body part(s) affected, 
and the number of days of missed work or restricted activity, if any, 
that resulted from the injury.

[20] MSHA does, however, assign an identifier to accidents in which no 
one was injured.

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