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Report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

May 2003:

RADIOACTIVE WASTE:

DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility at Livermore Laboratory, 
but Challenges Remain:

Radioactive Waste:

GAO-03-558:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-558, a report to the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, 
House of Representatives 


Why GAO Did This Study:

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory in Livermore, California, generates radioactive and 
hazardous wastes in the course of its research dealing with nuclear 
weapons. The laboratory’s new Decontamination and Waste Treatment 
Facility is a $62 million complex that includes buildings designed for 
both temporarily storing waste and treating it for off-site disposal. 
Although construction was completed in 2001, the storage building did 
not begin operating until September 2002, and the treatment buildings 
remain unused to this day. GAO was asked to identify the cause of the 
delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the facility, 
the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, and the 
steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date for initiating 
treatment operations at the facility can be met.

What GAO Found:

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new 
facility occurred because DOE managers did not ensure timely 
resolution of disagreements with the laboratory over technical issues 
affecting safety at the facility’s waste storage building. Safety 
documents must be approved by DOE to ensure the safe operation of 
nuclear facilities before operations can begin. The review of the 
storage building safety document lasted a year and resulted in 
postponement of the review of the safety document for the treatment 
buildings, which in turn delayed operation of the treatment buildings. 

The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two main effects. 
First, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment 
activities at an older facility, which has fewer environmental and 
worker protections. Second, the delay in initiating treatment 
operations has postponed off-site disposal of some of the waste. 

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take steps to 
address the delay in an effort to begin treatment operations at the 
new facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials 
believe that meeting the deadline will be challenging. One step that 
DOE is taking to prevent further delay is to improve its oversight so 
that any future disagreements are resolved in a timely manner. 
However, to meet the deadline, the laboratory has compressed the time 
allowed for other tasks. In this regard, the laboratory has altered 
the time to prepare for an operational readiness review—a process 
needed to ensure that the facility will be operated safely—from the 
normal 6 weeks to 2 weeks. Officials describe the scheduled start date 
as challenging but achievable.

DOE generally agreed with the accuracy of the report. GAO incorporated 
DOE’s comments as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-558.

To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841 or 
nazzaror@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a 
Timely Manner:

Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations Postponed Use of Safety 
Improvements and Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:

DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents, 
but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003 
Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations:

Agency Comments and Our Response:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

Figures:

Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage:

Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent:

Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site 
Plan:

Figure 4: New Facility's Treatment Area for Liquid Waste:

Abbreviations:

DOE: Department of Energy:

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration:

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 15, 2003:

The Honorable Ellen Tauscher
House of Representatives:

Dear Ms. Tauscher:

The Department of Energy (DOE) has a complex of sites and facilities 
for designing nuclear weapons and producing the nuclear components for 
these weapons. One part of that complex is DOE's weapons laboratories, 
including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Located in 
Livermore, California, the laboratory conducts research on nuclear 
weapons and other areas in the interest of national security. In 
carrying out these activities, the laboratory creates radioactive waste 
(such as rags and tools contaminated with uranium or plutonium), 
hazardous waste (such as acids and solvents), and mixed waste (waste 
with both radioactive and hazardous material). Before this waste can be 
permanently disposed of, its contents must be analyzed to determine the 
specific physical, chemical, and radiological components, and some of 
the waste must be treated so that it meets the acceptance criteria of 
off-site disposal facilities. While the Livermore laboratory has been 
able to analyze and treat some of its wastes for off-site disposal, it 
has not been able to analyze and treat all of the various kinds of 
wastes it generates. As a result, some of the waste has remained on-
site since the mid-1980s. The California Environmental Protection 
Agency, which regulates the storage and treatment of hazardous and 
mixed waste in the state, has given the laboratory permission to store 
hazardous and mixed waste in containers outdoors on pads or in tent 
structures. In addition, DOE has authorized the laboratory to store 
radioactive waste in a similar manner. However, for a number of years 
DOE has planned to improve the laboratory's ability to process its 
wastes for off-site shipment and thereby reduce the need for on-site 
storage.

In the mid-1990s, DOE and the Livermore laboratory began building a new 
facility to treat the laboratory's wastes. Called the Decontamination 
and Waste Treatment Facility, this $62 million project includes a 
building of more than 11,000 square feet for temporarily storing waste 
and two larger buildings totaling more than 37,000 square feet for 
treating waste for off-site disposal. The new facility is intended not 
only to enhance the laboratory's capability to treat waste, but also to 
better protect workers and the environment while doing so. Although 
construction of the project was completed in June 2001, the storage 
building did not begin operating until September 2002, and the 
treatment buildings remain unused to this day. In response to your 
request, this report (1) identifies the cause of the delay in 
initiating storage and treatment operations at the new facility, (2) 
identifies the effects of the delay in initiating treatment operations, 
and (3) discusses the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated 
date for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met.

Results in Brief:

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new 
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely way 
two technical issues concerning the plan to ensure the safe operation 
of the new building for temporarily storing wastes. The first issue 
concerned how to categorize the potential severity of hazards faced by 
workers, the public, and the environment if wastes stored in the new 
storage building were released. This categorization provides the basis 
for determining what safety controls are needed to ensure adequate 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment from such a 
release. The second issue involved whether to include an analysis of 
the effect of a potential aircraft crash into the building. Nearly a 
year after the safety document was submitted for review and approval, 
DOE directed the Livermore laboratory to base its document on a higher-
level category that assumed that if a release of wastes occurred, the 
consequences for workers, the public, and the environment could extend 
beyond the building to other laboratory areas. Laboratory officials had 
preferred a lower-level designation that assumed that the consequences 
of an accident would not extend beyond the building. Laboratory 
officials had contended that this lower-level designation would cost 
less to implement and reduce the amount of nuclear safety oversight the 
laboratory would receive. In addition, officials from DOE and the 
laboratory agreed that the laboratory would analyze the potential 
effect an aircraft crash would have on the building. The laboratory's 
position on conducting such an analysis had been that it was 
unnecessary because a potential aircraft crash was not a credible 
event. The lengthy time frame for approving the laboratory's storage 
building safety planning document delayed the start of treatment 
operations.

The delay in initiating treatment operations at the new facility has 
had two main effects. First, it postponed the use of the new facility's 
safety improvements. Because of the delay, the laboratory has had to 
continue treatment operations for longer than planned in the older 
facility, which lacks some of the new facility's protections for worker 
safety and the environment. For example, some waste is treated at the 
older facility in uncovered outdoor tanks, while at the new facility 
the treatment operations will be conducted indoors using a ventilation 
system that will prevent waste particles from being released into the 
environment. Second, the delay in initiating treatment operations has 
postponed off-site disposal of some of the waste. Within 6 months of 
the facility's becoming operational, laboratory officials had planned 
to start treating some of the waste that could not be treated in the 
older facility and shipping this waste off-site for disposal. With a 
later start-up date, these shipments will be delayed.

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take three steps 
to address the cause of the delay and begin treatment operations at the 
new facility by the current deadline of August 2003, but officials 
believe that meeting the deadline will be challenging. First, DOE and 
the laboratory implemented a formal process to resolve issues during 
the development of the treatment buildings' safety document. Second, 
the two issues that led to the delay in approving the storage building 
safety document have been resolved in the treatment buildings' safety 
document. Third, DOE management said it will improve oversight so that 
any future disagreements are resolved in a timely manner. Even with 
these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the August 2003 
date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings can be met. 
To achieve this deadline, the laboratory has compressed the time 
allowed for other interim steps. In this regard, the laboratory has 
allowed less time than it typically allows to prepare for an 
operational readiness review--2 weeks, rather than the normal 6 weeks. 
This process is important because it tests the facility's procedures, 
equipment, and personnel to ensure that the laboratory will operate the 
facility in accordance with parameters set out in the safety document. 
DOE and laboratory officials describe the scheduled start date as 
challenging but achievable.

In commenting on a draft of this report DOE generally agreed with GAO's 
findings.

Background:

DOE has several research laboratories, including the Livermore 
laboratory, devoted primarily to DOE's nuclear weapons program. 
Organizations or universities under contract to DOE manage and operate 
these laboratories. For example, the University of California has 
operated the Livermore laboratory for DOE and its predecessor agencies 
since laboratory operations began in 1952.[Footnote 1] The Livermore 
laboratory has an infrastructure of research, testing, engineering, and 
waste management facilities located on the laboratory site in 
Livermore, California, a city of about 75,000 people located about 50 
miles east of San Francisco. An additional area located about 15 miles 
east of the laboratory is used for experimental testing. The laboratory 
site's groundwater is contaminated with hazardous substances from past 
operations,[Footnote 2] and in 1987, the Environmental Protection 
Agency added the site to the National Priorities List of the nation's 
most serious hazardous waste sites.

Treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous and mixed wastes are 
governed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as 
amended (RCRA). Under RCRA, owners and operators of new hazardous waste 
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, including federal 
facilities, are required to obtain a permit before beginning 
construction of the facility. The state of California is authorized to 
administer the RCRA program for facilities in California and is 
responsible for issuing the permit.

DOE is responsible for ensuring that the nuclear activities at its 
facilities are carried out safely and in accordance with law and 
regulation. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within DOE, carries out oversight of 
nuclear research, nuclear safety, and related activities. DOE's Office 
of Environmental Management provides oversight of environmental 
restoration and waste management activities, such as the construction 
of the new waste treatment facility at the Livermore site. NNSA and 
Office of Environmental Management staff from NNSA's Livermore Site 
Office are responsible for carrying out these oversight 
responsibilities. NNSA staff also administer the contract between DOE 
and the University of California, which sets out the parameters and 
performance requirements for operating the laboratory.

Radioactive and hazardous wastes at the Livermore laboratory amounted 
to about 2,700 cubic meters as of January 16, 2003. The wastes include 
low-level radioactive waste,[Footnote 3] transuranic waste,[Footnote 
4] hazardous waste, and mixed waste. About one-fourth of the 
radioactive waste also contains hazardous substances. The waste is 
packaged in containers and is stored outdoors or under tents on asphalt 
pads, or inside enclosed or partially enclosed buildings (see figs. 1 
and 2). The waste is stored within fenced areas of the laboratory site 
where access is controlled. The California Environmental Protection 
Agency and DOE have approved storage of the waste in this manner. 
Before the waste can be disposed of off-site, much of it must be 
treated and repackaged so that it will meet the requirements of 
disposal facilities. Because the waste inventory is expected to 
eventually decline, the new facility's storage building is designed to 
provide less waste storage capacity than the older storage facilities 
provide. Most of the older storage facilities will be closed in future 
years after the backlog of waste has been disposed of off-site.

Figure 1: Current Outdoor Waste Storage:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 2: Current Waste Storage under Tent:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility 
project was placed on hold for a time after its authorization. The 
Congress had provided authorization and funding for the project for 
fiscal year 1986, but complaints from the public about an incinerator 
included in the facility design contributed to DOE's decision to place 
the project on hold. Ultimately, the laboratory redesigned the facility 
without the incinerator and planned to complete construction of the 
facility by the end of 1999.

Construction of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility was 
completed in June 2001, approximately 1½ years behind schedule. 
Construction was delayed because California regulators took longer than 
expected to issue a RCRA permit for the facility. Although laboratory 
officials had planned to receive the permit in 1997, an accident 
occurred at one of the laboratory's existing waste management 
facilities, which exposed workers to higher-than-allowable levels of 
radioactivity. According to a California regulator, that accident is 
likely to have led the California Environmental Protection Agency to 
postpone issuing the permit until an investigation of the accident was 
completed. Issuance of the permit was also delayed by a large number of 
public comments, which took longer than expected to address. To 
mitigate the impact of the delay in receiving the permit, the 
laboratory built the facility in two stages. In the first stage, the 
laboratory built portions of the facility that did not require the 
permit, such as the lobby and offices, which would not handle hazardous 
and mixed waste. The laboratory built the rest of the facility in the 
second stage after receiving the permit in 1999. The delay in obtaining 
the RCRA permit increased project costs by $2.1 million. The increase 
was covered by available contingency funds, allowing the project to 
remain within budget. Figure 3 shows the site plan of the facility; 
figure 4 shows a portion of the interior.

Figure 3: Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Site 
Plan:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 4: New Facility's Treatment Area for Liquid Waste:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Delay Occurred because DOE Managers Did Not Resolve Disagreements in a 
Timely Manner:

The delay in initiating storage and treatment operations at the new 
facility occurred because DOE managers did not resolve in a timely 
manner lingering disagreements about two technical issues. First, DOE 
and the laboratory disagreed about how to categorize the potential 
severity of hazards faced by workers, the public, and the environment 
if wastes stored in the new storage building were released. Proper 
categorization is important because it provides the basis for 
determining what kinds of safety controls must be in place to protect 
workers, the public, and the environment if such an event were to 
occur. Second, DOE and the laboratory also disagreed about whether to 
include an aircraft crash analysis in the safety document, with the 
laboratory maintaining that such an analysis was unnecessary, and DOE 
officials taking the opposite viewpoint. DOE managers did not fully 
resolve these disagreements for nearly a year. The lengthy time frame 
for approving the laboratory's storage building safety document delayed 
the start of treatment operations.

DOE and Laboratory Officials Disagreed about Hazard Categorization:

Federal regulations require contractors operating a DOE nuclear 
facility to establish controls upon which they will rely to adequately 
protect workers, the public, and the environment against the dangerous 
materials on-site.[Footnote 5] Before a nuclear facility can operate, 
contractors must prepare and DOE must approve a safety document that 
identifies and assesses the hazards, risks, and controls needed to 
safely operate the facility. Contractors must determine the potential 
risk to workers, the public, and the environment of hazards associated 
with the facility. They must categorize the level of the facility's 
hazards in accordance with DOE requirements. There are three hazard 
categories: potential for significant off-site consequences (category 
1), potential for significant on-site consequences (category 2), and 
potential for only significant localized consequences in the facility 
(category 3).

Using the same methodology that the laboratory had used to determine 
categorization for existing storage facilities, the laboratory 
determined that the new storage building should be given a category 3 
classification. The laboratory believed the methodology was adequate 
because it had received DOE approval when it had been used before. 
Laboratory officials were also concerned that a higher category 2 
classification would require them to conduct a rigorous quantitative 
accident analysis, which is more costly and might result in more safety 
controls and external oversight of storage building operations that 
could increase operating costs.

Although the methodology had been approved when used for the 
laboratory's existing facilities, some officials within DOE had 
questioned its appropriateness, and these concerns surfaced again as 
the document was being reviewed for the new storage building. Some DOE 
officials believed that the new storage building warranted a category 2 
hazard classification, because they saw potential for significant on-
site consequences in the event of a release of the stored materials. In 
addition, a May 2001 report by the laboratory's safety document review 
group indicated that the laboratory's methodology for determining the 
hazard category for some of its existing facilities was inappropriate. 
The report concluded that the hazard category for the facilities needed 
further evaluation.[Footnote 6]

DOE and the Laboratory Also Disagreed about the Need for Aircraft Crash 
Analysis:

DOE and the laboratory also disagreed over whether to include an 
aircraft crash analysis as part of the storage building safety 
document. DOE had issued a standard in October 1996 that provides 
facilities an approach for performing an analysis of the health and 
safety risks to workers on-site and the public in the event of a 
release of material resulting from an aircraft crash. This standard 
applies to facilities that contain significant quantities of 
radioactive and hazardous material.[Footnote 7] The standard also 
applies if special circumstances exist, such as a facility's being 
located near significant numbers of people. The laboratory is located 
next to residential areas in the city of Livermore.

Both DOE and laboratory officials believed they had a logical basis for 
their positions on the aircraft crash analysis. DOE officials believed 
that an aircraft crash analysis should be included in the storage 
building safety document because of the laboratory's proximity to 
residential areas and the Livermore airport; an increase in airplane 
traffic in the area; and the potential for a release of radioactive 
material in the event of an aircraft crash into the storage building, 
which would pose potential health and safety risks to workers and the 
public. Laboratory officials, on the other hand, said their previous 
calculations for an existing storage facility determined that such a 
crash was not a credible event, and therefore an analysis was not 
required. They contended that the same finding was valid for the new 
storage building, as well.

Review of the Safety Document Lasted a Year:

In June 2001 the laboratory submitted the storage building safety 
document to DOE for review and approval. Review of the safety document 
was scheduled to last approximately 4 months. However, the safety 
document was not approved until June 2002, a year later. During the 1-
year period, the laboratory submitted the safety document to DOE three 
times, and each time DOE rejected it. Although the project was falling 
behind schedule, DOE field managers responsible for the timely approval 
of the safety document did not take steps early on to resolve the 
situation. This occurred in part because some DOE officials supported 
the laboratory's efforts to justify a lower category 3 hazard 
classification. They concurred with the laboratory that a category 2 
hazard classification would require a more detailed quantitative 
accident analysis, which would be more costly and would result in more 
safety controls that could increase operating costs and oversight of 
its storage building operations. In addition, the laboratory believed 
that a category 3 hazard classification would provide an appropriate 
level of safety.[Footnote 8]

In May 2002, the DOE manager responsible for overseeing laboratory 
operations took steps to resolve the disagreement over hazard 
classification. In a May 10, 2002, letter, the DOE manager directed 
laboratory officials to use a category 2 classification for the storage 
building. The same letter also stated that DOE and the laboratory 
agreed to expedite the review and approval process to accelerate the 
initiation of operations at the storage building. DOE and the 
laboratory implemented an intensive review process that consisted of a 
series of meetings in which the DOE review team and laboratory 
officials jointly conducted a line-by-line review and edit of the 
storage building safety document. In addition, DOE had determined that 
the storage building safety document did not have to include an 
aircraft crash analysis provided that the laboratory include the 
analysis in the June 2003 update of the document. In the interim, DOE 
required the laboratory to include compensatory measures in the 
document, such as procedures for public notification and fire 
department response time in the event of an airplane crash. DOE 
approved the safety document on June 28, 2002.

Because of the longer-than-expected time frame for approving the 
storage building safety document, the cost for completing the 
facility's safety documents exceeded laboratory estimates by $400,000, 
according to a project budget document. However, the laboratory's 
project manager stated that the additional cost was covered by the 
project's contingency fund reserved for unforeseen circumstances, 
allowing the project to remain within budget. The delay in approving 
the storage building safety document postponed the review of the safety 
document for the other portion of the facility--the treatment 
buildings. This delay, in turn, prevented the start of operations at 
the treatment buildings.

Delay in Initiating Treatment Operations Postponed Use of Safety 
Improvements and Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:

The delay in initiating treatment operations has had two related 
consequences. First, because the treatment buildings are not yet 
operational, the laboratory has had to continue conducting its waste 
treatment activities at the older facility, which lacks some of the new 
facility's environmental and worker protections. In addition, the older 
facility has fewer capabilities to treat waste and prepare it for off-
site disposal, requiring the laboratory to postpone disposing of some 
waste off-site.

Safety Improvements Not Realized with Continued Use of Older Treatment 
Facility:

Until DOE approves the treatment buildings' safety document and DOE and 
the laboratory conduct an operational readiness review, the treatment 
buildings cannot begin operations. These tasks were postponed until DOE 
resolved disagreements about the storage buildings' safety document. As 
a result, the laboratory has had to continue its waste treatment 
operations at the older facility and has not been able to utilize the 
safety features of the new facility. Examples of the differences in 
safety features between the two facilities follow.

* The new facility has a ventilation system that filters waste 
particles from the air in the buildings to prevent the release of 
contaminants into the environment; the older facility does not.

* The buildings of the new facility were designed so that all waste 
treatment operations are conducted indoors. At the older facility, some 
operations are conducted in treatment tanks that do not have covers and 
are located outdoors, enabling vapors and waste particles to escape 
into the environment.

* Compared with the older facility, the new facility has more areas in 
which ventilation systems take in air at a high rate near treatment 
equipment to protect workers from exposure to fumes and waste 
particles.

Delay Postponed Off-Site Disposal of Some Waste:

Because the treatment buildings are not yet operational, the laboratory 
has not been able to use the new treatment facility's enhanced 
capabilities to prepare waste for off-site disposal. For example, the 
new facility has a debris washer that washes mixed waste to remove the 
hazardous portion of the waste from the radioactive portion, allowing 
each portion to be sent to disposal sites at a lower total cost than 
disposing of the mixed waste as a whole. In addition, the new facility 
is equipped with a glovebox that enables special handling of the waste 
in an enclosed, controlled, and highly ventilated area to treat 
"reactive" waste[Footnote 9] that is not acceptable at disposal sites. 
Treatment of such waste enables it to meet the acceptance criteria of 
disposal sites. The older facility does not have these features.

Since the laboratory cannot yet utilize the new buildings' treatment 
capabilities, some wastes have remained at the laboratory rather than 
being disposed of off-site. For example, a laboratory official 
responsible for waste management activities stated that the laboratory 
had planned to begin treating reactive waste within 6 months of the 
start of operations at the treatment buildings to prepare it for 
disposal. Because of the delay in initiating operations, the laboratory 
has postponed treating and disposing of this waste.

DOE Has Improved Review and Oversight of Laboratory Safety Documents, 
but Time Remaining Will Make It Challenging to Meet the August 2003 
Deadline for Starting Treatment Operations:

DOE and the laboratory have taken or are planning to take the following 
three steps to address the cause of the delay in approving the storage 
building safety document in an effort to meet the August 2003 deadline 
for starting treatment operations:

* DOE and the laboratory agreed to hold a series of joint working 
meetings to identify and resolve issues during the development of the 
treatment buildings' safety document. This action was taken to identify 
and address issues or concerns during the development stages of the 
document rather than during the document review process. By enhancing 
communication, DOE and the laboratory hoped to minimize the possibility 
that disagreements would delay the approval of the document and further 
postpone the initiation of treatment operations.

* In the treatment buildings' safety document, DOE and the laboratory 
resolved the two main issues that led to the delay in approving the 
storage building safety document. The laboratory has agreed to limit 
the amount of radioactive material it processes during treatment 
operations to meet the requirements for a lower category 3 hazard 
classification for the treatment buildings. The laboratory also agreed 
to include an aircraft crash analysis in the treatment buildings' 
safety document.

* DOE's management resolved to strengthen oversight by not allowing any 
future disagreements to languish unresolved for long periods of time. 
For example, DOE's Livermore Laboratory Site Manager said that it took 
too long to resolve the disagreement over the storage building safety 
document and that in a similar situation she would take action to 
ensure that any disagreement was resolved within 60 to 90 days.

Even with these steps, DOE and laboratory officials are unsure if the 
August 2003 date for initiating operations at the treatment buildings 
can be met. The laboratory now has less time available to prepare for 
the remaining tasks than it typically allows. Once the laboratory has 
submitted and received approval of safety documents from DOE, it must 
prepare documents and train staff for the facility's operational 
readiness review. An operational readiness review examines the 
facility's procedures, equipment, and personnel to ensure that the 
contractor will operate the facility safely in accordance with 
parameters set out in the safety document. Laboratory officials said 
that, typically, the laboratory allows 6 weeks of preparation for the 
operational readiness review. However, for the treatment buildings, the 
laboratory has compressed the amount of time to prepare for the 
operational readiness review to 2 weeks in order to meet the August 
2003 deadline. DOE and laboratory officials said that the August 2003 
deadline is challenging but achievable.

Agency Comments and Our Response:

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory for their review and comment. The laboratory 
provided its comments through DOE. In written comments, DOE generally 
agreed with the accuracy of our report. However, we made changes in 
response to two points raised by DOE's Assistant Secretary for 
Environmental Management. First, concerning the delays in resolving 
safety issues, DOE said our draft report omits the fact that the 
laboratory had developed a safety document for the treatment and 
storage facility as early as 1996 and some of the safety issues had 
been unresolved since that time. We recognize that the laboratory had 
developed preliminary safety documents in 1996 and 1997 and some of the 
safety issues identified at that time remained unresolved until after 
they resurfaced in 2001. However, this information does not help 
explain why those issues remained unresolved, and it does not address 
the cause of the delay in initiating operations at the new facility. We 
did clarify in the report that some of the safety issues surfaced in 
1996 and 1997.

DOE's second point concerned a statement in the draft report that 
shipment of some waste to off-site disposal facilities had been 
delayed. The Assistant Secretary said that the treatment and off-site 
disposal of legacy waste--the backlog of stored waste from nuclear 
weapons research activities--have not been directly postponed by the 
delay in obtaining approval of the facility safety documents. However, 
we found that the delay in approving the storage building safety 
document contributed to the delay in approving the treatment buildings' 
safety document. Furthermore, the treatment building cannot operate 
until after approval of the safety documents and completion of an 
operational readiness review. Certain waste at the laboratory, such as 
reactive waste, cannot be treated in the laboratory's older facilities 
and has been stored at the site. The laboratory's plan was to begin 
treating this waste for off-site disposal within 6 months of initiating 
operations at the new treatment facility. Therefore, the delay in 
initiating operations at the treatment facility has postponed the off-
site disposal of some waste.

DOE also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as 
appropriate. DOE's written comments on our draft report are included in 
appendix II.

We conducted our review from September 2002 through April 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix I provides details on our scope and methodology.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day 
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of Energy and the Director of Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Robin M. Nazzaro
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

Signed by Robin M. Nazzaro:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

To identify the cause of the delay in initiating storage and treatment 
operations at the new facility, we reviewed DOE orders and standards 
and federal regulations pertaining to safety documents. We also 
reviewed safety documents, DOE comments on safety documents, and 
internal DOE correspondence discussing disagreements over safety 
documents. In addition, we reviewed a DOE memorandum addressing 
delegations of authority and also analyzed project schedules to 
determine the extent of delays for the Decontamination and Waste 
Treatment Facility project. We also analyzed project cost documents to 
determine any increases in costs from the delay. Finally, we 
interviewed DOE and Livermore laboratory officials about the 
preparation and review of safety documents.

To identify the effects of the delay in initiating treatment 
operations, we analyzed documents describing waste treatment operations 
obtained from the laboratory, and we interviewed Livermore laboratory 
officials.

To identify the steps taken to ensure that the latest estimated date 
for initiating treatment operations at the facility can be met, we 
interviewed DOE and laboratory officials and analyzed a DOE and 
laboratory written agreement addressing the development of safety 
documents. We also reviewed laboratory presentations on safety issues 
made to DOE. Finally, we analyzed the project schedule pertaining to 
the operational readiness review.

We also toured laboratory and waste storage and treatment facilities 
and obtained data on the types, amounts, and locations of waste at the 
laboratory. We conducted our review from September 2002 through April 
2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy:

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585:

APR 25 2003:

Mr. Robin Nazzaro Director, Natural Resources and Environment:

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Nazzaro:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-03-
558, Radioactive Waste: DOE Has Acted to Address Delay in New Facility 
at Livermore Laboratory, but Challenges Remain.

The Department of Energy (DOE) would like to emphasize that though the 
new facilities have features that provide additional environmental and 
worker protections, the existing facilities meet all Federal and State 
regulations and are both safe for the worker and protection of the 
environment. At no time has legacy waste been stored improperly or 
workers exposed to undue hazards. Likewise, the new Decontamination and 
Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) will not operate until the DOE is 
assured that it can be operated safely and in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. It should also be recognized that some 
of the existing facilities would remain in operation, following startup 
of the new facility, as defined by the Legacy Waste Disposal Plan.

1 agree that some of the safety issues (e.g., hazard categorization, 
aircraft crash accident) have taken longer to resolve, but the report 
omits the fact that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
developed a safety analysis report for this facility and the 
Radioactive Waste Storage Facility as early as 1996. Some of the safety 
issues laid dormant since that time, remaining unresolved until 
resurfaced in 2001. The report makes mention that the cost for 
completing facility safety documents exceeded estimates by $400,000. It 
is unclear what estimates where used to draw this conclusion given the 
fact that safety document preparation has occurred over a multi-year 
time frame.

With the recent involvement from my staff, the DWTF Safety Analysis 
Report (SAR) review and approval process for the DOE site office has 
improved significantly. As a result, I was able to approve the DWTF 
Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety Requirements on April 16, 
2003.

The DOE is still relying upon the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory to achieve startup of operations at the DWTF as they have 
committed to in August 2003. We are approaching these commitments with 
the recognition that the first priority is ensuring the new facility is 
ready to function in a safe and environmentally sound manner, 
protecting the worker, the public, and the environment. It is my 
expectation, and certainly achievable, that both the Laboratory's 
internal and DOE's independent operational readiness reviews be 
conducted in the most disciplined and rigorous manner to support this 
priority.

One statement, often made in the report, that we take issue with is 
that delays in the safety documentation approval resulted in a 
postponement of off-site disposal of some waste. I am not aware of any 
instance in which the treatment and off-site disposal of legacy waste 
has been directly delayed by safety documentation approval. Existing 
treatment capabilities have been maintained at the existing facilities 
while the new facility was being made ready. Though the new facility 
construction has been completed, the equipment needed to provide 
expanded treatment capabilities has not yet been installed, tested, and 
operating procedures implemented. These activities do not rely upon 
safety documentation approval to be completed. Further, it is unclear 
what measures where used to determine that off-site disposal delays 
occurred given that the first Legacy Waste Disposal Plan was 
established in 2002.

I would like to acknowledge the abilities and professionalism of your 
staff. They have made every effort to understand a very complicated 
management and technical issue and produce a fair and balanced report. 
If you have any further questions, please call me at (202) 586-7709.

Sincerely,

Jessie Hill Roberson,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:

Signed for Jessie Hill Roberson:

cc:	Robert G. Card, Under Secretary Everet H. Beckner, 
NA-10 Beverly A. Cook, EH-1:

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Robin M. Nazzaro (202) 512-3841:

William R. Swick (206) 287-4800:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, Leo G. Acosta, Gary R. Boss, Allen T. 
Chan, Nancy L. Crothers, Gary L. Jones, James L. Ohl, Stanley G. 
Stenersen, and Yunsian Tai made key contributions to this report.


FOOTNOTES

[1] DOE has continued to extend its contract with the University since 
that time under a provision in federal statute that allows contracts 
with federally funded research and development centers to be extended 
without competition in order to maintain essential research and 
development capability. See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (c)(3)(B). The University 
of California also operates another DOE weapons laboratory, the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

[2] The site is a former U.S. Navy flight training base and aircraft 
rework facility.

[3] The Livermore laboratory's low-level waste has a wide range of 
characteristics; it often contains small amounts of radioactivity in 
large volumes of material.

[4] Transuranic waste is radioactive waste contaminated with 
transuranic elements (i.e., elements heavier than uranium, such as 
plutonium) with half-lives greater than 20 years, in concentrations 
above 100 nanocuries per gram of waste.

[5] 10 CFR part 830, promulgated in 2001, establishes these safety 
requirements.

[6] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Baseline Review of LLNL 
Nuclear Facilities Authorization Basis Documents, Final Summary Report 
on Issues and Recommendations on LLNL-Authorization Basis Documents, 
May 2001. 

[7] Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities, 
DOE-STD-3014-96, October 1996.

[8] Concerns over safety issues surfaced in 1996 and 1997 when the 
laboratory prepared the preliminary safety documents for the new 
facility. DOE required the laboratory to resolve these issues prior to 
DOE authorizing facility operations. 

[9] An example of reactive waste is material containing sodium metal, 
which reacts strongly with water, including water in the air. Such a 
reaction could create a large amount of heat, which could cause the 
material to ignite.

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