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entitled 'DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military 
Personnel and Sourcing Decisions' which was released on March 28, 2003.



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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



March 2003:



DOD PERSONNEL:



DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital Strategic 

Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing 

Decisions:



GAO-03-475:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-475, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services



Why GAO Did This Study:



The Department of Defense’s (DOD) civilian employees play key roles in 

such areas as defense policy, intelligence, finance, acquisitions, and 

weapon systems maintenance. Although downsized 38 percent between 

fiscal years 1989 and 2002, this workforce has taken on greater roles 

as a result of DOD’s restructuring and transformation. Responding to 

congressional concerns about the quality and quantity of, and the 

strategic planning for the civilian workforce, GAO determined the 

following for DOD, the military services, and selected defense 

agencies: (1) the extent of top-level leadership involvement in 

civilian strategic planning; (2) whether elements in civilian 

strategic plans are aligned to the overall mission, focused on 

results, and based on current and future civilian workforce data; and 

(3) whether civilian and military personnel strategic plans or 

sourcing initiatives were integrated.



What GAO Found:



Generally, civilian personnel issues appear to be an emerging priority 

among top leaders in DOD and the defense components. Although DOD 

began downsizing its civilian workforce more than a decade ago, it did 

not take action to strategically address challenges affecting the 

civilian workforce until it issued its civilian human capital 

strategic plan in April 2002. Top-level leaders in the Air Force, the 

Marine Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Defense 

Finance Accounting Service have initiated planning efforts and are 

working in partnership with their civilian human capital professionals 

to develop and implement civilian strategic plans; such leadership, 

however, was increasing in the Army and not as evident in the Navy. 

Also, DOD has not provided guidance on how to integrate the 

components’ plans with the department-level plan. High-level 

leadership is critical to directing reforms and obtaining resources 

for successful implementation.



The human capital strategic plans GAO reviewed for the most part 

lacked key elements found in fully developed plans. Most of the 

civilian human capital goals, objectives, and initiatives were not 

explicitly aligned with the overarching missions of the organizations. 

Consequently, DOD and the components cannot be sure that strategic 

goals are properly focused on mission achievement. Also, none of the 

plans contained results-oriented performance measures to assess the 

impact of their civilian human capital initiatives (i.e., programs, 

policies, and processes). Thus, DOD and the components cannot gauge 

the extent to which their human capital initiatives contribute to 

achieving their organizations’ mission. Finally, the plans did not 

contain data on the skills and competencies needed to successfully 

accomplish future missions; therefore, DOD and the components risk not 

being able to put the right people, in the right place, and at the 

right time, which can result in diminished accomplishment of the 

overall defense mission.



Moreover, the civilian strategic plans did not address how the 

civilian workforce will be integrated with their military counterparts 

or sourcing initiatives. DOD’s three human capital strategic plans-- 

two military and one civilian--were prepared separately and were not 

integrated to form a seamless and comprehensive strategy and did not 

address how DOD plans to link its human capital initiatives with its 

sourcing plans, such as efforts to outsource non-core responsibilities.

The components’ civilian plans acknowledge a need to integrate 

planning for civilian and military personnel—taking into consideration 

contractors—but have not yet done so. Without an integrated strategy, 

DOD may not effectively and efficiently allocate its scarce resources 

for optimal readiness. 



What GAO Recommends:



GAO recommends DOD improve the departmentwide plan to be mission 

aligned and results-oriented; provide guidance to integrate component- 

and department- level human capital strategic plans; develop data on 

future civilian workforce needs; and set milestones for integrating 

military and civilian workforce plans, taking contractors into 

consideration. DOD comments were too late to include in the final 

report.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-475.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 

the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at 

(202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov.



[End of section]



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for Civilian Personnel Not 

Extensive in the Past, but Is Increasing:



Key Elements of Strategic Plans for DOD Civilian Personnel Not in 

Place:



Strategic Plans for Civilian Personnel Not Yet Integrated with Plans 

for Military Personnel or Sourcing Initiatives:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix II: Key Events Related to Strategic Planning for DOD Civilian 

Personnel:



Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



Figures:



Figure 1: Civilian Employment by DOD Component as of September 30, 2002 

(670,166 Direct Hires):



Figure 2: Relationships among Several Key Elements of a Human Capital 

Strategic Plan:



Figure 3. Key Events Related to Strategic Planning for DOD Civilian 

Personnel:



Abbreviations:



DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency:



DFAS: Defense Finance and Accounting Service:



DOD: Department of Defense:



GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:



OMB: Office of Management and Budget:



OPM: Office of Personnel Management:



QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review:



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United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



March 28, 2003:



The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives:



Dear Mr. Ortiz:



With almost 700,000 civilian employees on its payroll, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) is the second largest federal employer of civilians in 

the nation. Defense civilian personnel, among other things, develop 

policy, provide intelligence, manage finances, and acquire and maintain 

weapon systems. Given the global war on terrorism, the role of DOD’s 

civilian workforce is expanding, such as participation in combat 

support functions that free military personnel to focus on warfighting 

duties for which they are uniquely qualified. Civilian personnel are 

also key to maintaining DOD’s institutional knowledge because of 

frequent military personnel rotations. However, since the end of the 

cold war, the civilian workforce has undergone substantial change, due 

primarily to downsizing, base realignments and closures, competitive 

sourcing initiatives, and changing missions. For example, between 

fiscal years 1989 and 2002, DOD reduced its civilian workforce by about 

38 percent, with an additional reduction of about 55,000 personnel 

proposed through fiscal year 2007. Some DOD officials have expressed 

concern about a possible shortfall of critical skills because 

downsizing has resulted in a significant imbalance in the shape, 

skills, and experience of its civilian workforce and more than 50 

percent of the civilian workforce becoming eligible to retire in the 

next 5 years. As a result, the orderly transfer of DOD’s institutional 

knowledge is at risk.



These factors, coupled with the Secretary of Defense’s significant 

transformation initiatives, make it imperative for DOD to strategically 

manage its civilian workforce within a total force perspective, which 

includes civilian personnel as well as active duty and reserve military 

personnel and contractor personnel. This strategic management approach 

will enable DOD to accomplish its mission by putting the right people, 

in the right place, at the right time and at a reasonable cost.



In April 2002, DOD published a strategic plan for civilian 

personnel.[Footnote 1] In response to your request, we reviewed 

strategic planning efforts for civilian personnel at DOD and selected 

defense components, including the four military services and two 

defense agencies (the Defense Contract Management Agency and the 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service).[Footnote 2] Specifically, we 

determined (1) the extent to which top-level leadership is involved in 

strategic planning for civilian personnel and (2) whether strategic 

plans for civilian personnel are aligned with the overall mission, 

results oriented, and based on data about the future civilian 

workforce. In addition, we determined whether the strategic plans for 

civilian personnel are integrated with plans for military personnel or 

sourcing initiatives.[Footnote 3] (See app. I for a description of our 

scope and methodology.):



Results in Brief:



Until recently, top-level leadership[Footnote 4] at the department and 

the component levels has not been extensively involved in strategic 

planning for civilian personnel; however, civilian personnel issues 

appear to be a higher priority for top-level leaders today than in the 

past. Although DOD began downsizing its civilian workforce more than a 

decade ago, top-level leadership has not, until recently, developed and 

directed reforms to improve planning for civilian personnel. With the 

exception of the Army and the Air Force, neither the department nor the 

components in our review had developed strategic plans to address 

challenges affecting the civilian workforce until 2001or 2002, which is 

indicative of civilian personnel issues being an emerging priority. In 

addition, top-level leaders in the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the 

Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service have been or are working in partnership with their 

civilian human capital professionals to develop and implement civilian 

strategic plans; such partnership is increasing in the Army and not as 

evident in the Navy. Moreover, DOD’s issuance of its departmentwide 

civilian human capital plan[Footnote 5] begins to lay a foundation for 

strategically addressing civilian human capital issues; however, DOD 

has not provided guidance on aligning the component-level plans with 

the department-level plan to obtain a coordinated focus to carry out 

the Secretary of Defense’s transformation initiatives in an effective 

manner. High-level leadership attention is critical to developing and 

directing reforms because, without the overarching perspective of such 

leaders, reforms may not be sufficiently focused on mission 

accomplishment, and without their support, reforms may not receive the 

resources needed for successful implementation.



The human capital strategic plans we reviewed for the most part were 

not fully aligned with the overall mission of the department or 

respective components, results oriented, or based on data about the 

future civilian workforce. For example, the goals and objectives 

contained in strategic plans for civilian personnel were not explicitly 

aligned with the overarching missions of the organizations. 

Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether DOD’s and the 

components’ strategic goals are properly focused on mission 

achievement. In addition, none of the plans contained results-oriented 

performance measures that could provide meaningful data critical to 

measuring the results of their civilian human capital initiatives 

(i.e., programs, policies, and processes). Thus, DOD and the components 

cannot gauge the extent to which their human capital initiatives 

contribute to achieving their organizations’ mission. Also, for the 

most part, the civilian human capital plans in our review did not 

contain detailed information on the skills and competencies needed to 

successfully accomplish future missions. Without information about what 

is needed in the future workforce, it is unclear if DOD and its 

components are designing and funding initiatives that are efficient and 

effective in accomplishing the mission, and ultimately contributing to 

force readiness.



Lastly, the civilian strategic plans we reviewed did not address how 

the civilian workforce will be integrated with their military 

counterparts or with sourcing initiatives. At the department level, the 

strategic plan for civilian personnel was prepared separately from 

corresponding plans for military personnel and not integrated to form a 

seamless and comprehensive strategy and did not address how DOD plans 

to link its human capital initiatives with its sourcing plans, such as 

efforts to outsource non-core responsibilities. For the most part, at 

the component level, plans set goals to integrate planning for the 

total workforce, to include civilian, military, and contractor 

personnel. The Air Force and the Army, in particular, have begun to 

integrate their strategic planning efforts for civilian and military 

personnel, taking contractor responsibilities into consideration. 

Without integrated planning, goals for shaping and deploying civilian, 

military, and contractor personnel may not be consistent with and 

support each other. Consequently, DOD and its components may not have 

the workforce with the skills and competencies needed to accomplish 

tasks critical to readiness and mission success.



We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to strengthen 

civilian human capital planning, including integration with military 

personnel and sourcing initiatives. We received comments from the 

Department of Defense too late to include them in the final report.



Background:



DOD’s civilian workforce has undergone a sizeable reduction but remains 

critical to DOD’s mission success. Strategic human capital management 

provides a framework for maximizing the value added by the civilian 

workforce through aligning its civilian human capital initiatives to 

support DOD’s overarching mission.



Current Size, Distribution, and Changing Roles of DOD’s Civilian 

Workforce:



Since the end of the cold war, DOD has undergone sizable reductions in 

its civilian workforce. Between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, DOD’s 

civilian workforce shrank from 1,075,437 to 670,166-about a 38 percent 

reduction.[Footnote 6] DOD accomplished this downsizing without 

proactively shaping the civilian workforce to have the skills and 

competencies needed to accomplish future DOD missions. As a result, 

today’s workforce is older and more experienced, but 58 percent will be 

eligible for early or regular retirement in the next 3 years. Moreover, 

the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request projects that DOD’s 

civilian workforce will be further reduced by about 55,000 through 

fiscal year 2007. As shown in figure 1, at the end of fiscal year 2002, 

the military departments employed 85 percent of DOD’s civilians; 15 

percent were employed by the other defense organizations.



Figure 1: Civilian Employment by DOD Component as of September 30, 2002 

(670,166 Direct Hires):



[See PDF for image]



Note: GAO’s analysis of DOD data.



[A] Other defense organizations include defense agencies, DOD field 

activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Inspector General, 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense.



[B] Department of the Navy includes Navy and Marine Corps personnel.



[End of figure]



Furthermore, the 2000 Defense Science Board Task Force report[Footnote 

7] observed that the rapid downsizing during the 1990s led to major 

changes in the roles of and balance between DOD’s civilian and military 

personnel and contractor personnel. The roles of the civilians and 

private-sector workforce are expanding, including participation in 

combat functions--as a virtual presence on the battlefield--and in 

support duties on both the domestic and international scenes. These 

changing roles call for greater attention to shaping an effective 

civilian workforce to meet future demands within a total force 

perspective. This perspective includes a clear understanding of the 

roles and characteristics of DOD’s civilian and military personnel and 

the most appropriate source of 

capabilities--military, civilian, or contractor.



The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the 

principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense for total force management as it relates to 

readiness, personnel requirements and management, and other matters. 

The Under Secretary’s office develops policies, plans, and programs for 

recruitment, training, equal opportunity, compensation, recognition, 

discipline, and separation of all DOD personnel, including active, 

reserve, and retired military and civilian personnel. This office also 

analyzes the total force structure as it relates to quantitative and 

qualitative military and civilian personnel requirements. Within this 

office is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Civilian Personnel Policy, which formulates plans, policies, and 

programs to manage the DOD civilian workforce. Policy leadership and 

human resource programs and systems are provided through the Civilian 

Personnel Management Service.



Strategic Human Capital Management:



Strategic human capital management involves long-term planning that is 

fact based, focused on program results and mission accomplishment, and 

incorporates merit principles. Studies by several organizations, 

including GAO, have shown that highly successful performance 

organizations in both the public and private sectors employ effective 

strategic management approaches as a means to prepare their workforce 

to meet present and future mission requirements as well as achieve 

organizational success. In our 2001 High-Risk Series and Performance 

and Accountability Series and again in 2003, we designated strategic 

human capital as a high-risk area and stated that serious human capital 

shortfalls are threatening the ability of many federal agencies to 

economically, efficiently, and effectively perform their 

missions.[Footnote 8] We noted that federal agencies, including DOD and 

its components, needed to continue to improve the development of 

integrated human capital strategies that support the organization’s 

strategic and programmatic goals.



In March 2002, we issued an exposure draft of our model of strategic 

human capital management to help federal agency leaders effectively 

lead and manage their people.[Footnote 9] The model is designed to help 

agency leaders effectively use their people and determine how well they 

integrate human capital considerations into daily decision making and 

planning for the program results they seek to achieve. Similarly, the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) have developed tools that are being used to assess 

human capital management efforts. In October 2001, OMB developed 

standards for success for strategic human capital management--one of 

five governmentwide reform initiatives in the President’s Management 

Agenda. In December 2001, OPM released a human capital scorecard to 

assist agencies in responding to the OMB standards for success; later, 

in October 2002, OMB and OPM developed--in collaboration with GAO--

revised standards for success. To assist agencies in responding to the 

revised standards, OPM released the Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework. In April 2002, the final report of the 

Commercial Activities Panel,[Footnote 10] mandated by Congress and 

chaired by the Comptroller General, sought to elevate attention to 

human capital considerations in making sourcing decisions. Federal 

organizations are increasingly concerned with sourcing issues because 

they are being held accountable for addressing another President’s 

Management Agenda initiative that calls for determining their core 

competencies and deciding how to build internal capacity or contract 

out for services.



Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for Civilian Personnel Not 

Extensive in the Past, but Is Increasing:



Until recently, top-level leadership at the department and component 

levels has not been extensively involved in strategic planning for 

civilian personnel; however, it is of higher priority to top-level 

leadership today than it has been in the past. With the exception of 

the Air Force, leadership at the component level has not been 

proactive, but is becoming more involved in responding to the need for 

strategic planning, providing guidance, or supporting and working in 

partnership with civilian human capital professionals.



We have previously emphasized that high-performing organizations need 

senior leaders who are drivers of continuous improvement and also 

stimulate and support efforts to integrate human capital approaches 

with organizational goals. There is no substitute for the committed 

involvement of top leadership.[Footnote 11]



Department-level Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for 

Civilian Personnel Has Increased in Recent Years:



Strategic planning for the Department of Defense civilian workforce is 

becoming a higher priority among DOD’s senior leadership, as evidenced 

by direction given in 2001 in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and 

the Defense Planning Guidance and by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness to develop a civilian and military human 

resources strategic plan. We previously reported that a demonstrated 

commitment to change by agency leaders is perhaps the most important 

element of successful management reform and that leaders demonstrate 

this commitment by developing and directing reform.[Footnote 12] OMB 

and OPM have similarly advocated the need for top leadership to fully 

commit to strategic human capital planning. The Defense Science Board 

reported in 2000 that senior DOD civilian and military leaders have 

devoted “far less” attention to civilian personnel challenges than the 

challenges of maintaining an effective military force.[Footnote 13]



In 1992, during the initial stages of downsizing, DOD officials voiced 

concerns about what they perceived to be a lack of attention to 

identifying and maintaining a balanced basic level of skills needed to 

maintain 

in-house capabilities as part of the defense industrial base. In our 

2000 testimony, Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian Workforce 

Management,[Footnote 14] we testified that DOD’s approach to civilian 

force reductions was less oriented toward shaping the makeup of the 

workforce than was the approach it used to manage its military 

downsizing. In its approach to civilian workforce downsizing, the 

department focused on mitigating adverse effects (such as nonvoluntary 

reductions-in-force) through retirements, attrition, hiring freezes, 

and base closures. (See 

app. II for a time line of key events related to DOD’s civilian 

workforce downsizing.):



DOD initiated a more strategic approach when it published its first 

strategic plan for civilian personnel (Civilian Human Resources 

Strategic Plan, 2002-2008) in April 2002. In developing the 

departmentwide plan, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness made efforts to work in conjunction with 

defense components’ civilian human capital communities by inviting 

their leaders to contribute to working groups and special meetings and 

reviewing the services’ civilian human capital strategic plans. 

However, DOD has yet to provide guidance on how to integrate component-

level civilian human capital strategic plans with its departmentwide 

civilian strategic plan. DOD officials said that full integration would 

be difficult because of the wide array of human capital services and 

mission support provided at the component level. However, one of the 

lessons learned in our previous work on strategic planning in the 

defense acquisition workforce was the need for leadership to provide 

guidance for planning efforts.[Footnote 15] Without guidance, defense 

components may not be able to effectively function together in support 

of the departmentwide plan. For example, DOD’s goal to provide 

management systems and departmentwide force planning tools may not be 

fully or efficiently achieved without a coordinated effort among all 

defense components. The component-level plans we reviewed included 

goals, objectives, or initiatives to improve analysis or forecasting of 

workforce requirements, but they did not indicate coordination with the 

departmentwide effort or with one another.



Civilian human capital planning has emerged as an issue in another 

DOD-related forum for top leaders. In November 2002, the Human 

Resources Subcommittee of the Defense Business Practice Implementation 

Board released its report to DOD’s Senior Executive Council 

recommending, among other things, the establishment of a “Human Capital 

Transformation Team” to help implement agreed upon changes to transform 

human capital management in DOD’s civilian workforce.[Footnote 16]



Component-level Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for 

Civilian Personnel Varies:



Leadership participation in strategic planning varies among the defense 

components we reviewed. High-level leaders in the Air Force, the Marine 

Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and the Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) have provided the impetus for 

strategic planning and are partnering with civilian human capital 

professionals to develop and implement their strategic plans. Such 

partnership is increasing in the Army and not as evident in the 

Department of the Navy.



Air Force Leadership Increasingly Proactive on Strategic Planning for 

Civilian Personnel:



Since the mid-1990s, Air Force leadership has been relatively active in 

strategic planning for civilian human capital. In 1999, high-level Air 

Force leadership recognized the need for strategic human capital 

planning to deal with the significant downsizing that had occurred over 

the last several years. For the civilian workforce, this recognition 

culminated in the publication in 2000 of the Civilian Personnel 

Management Improvement Strategy White Paper; the Air Force produced an 

update of this document in 2002.[Footnote 17] Air Force leadership also 

has recognized that it must further enhance its efforts with greater 

attention to integrated, total force planning. Air Force leadership has 

demonstrated this commitment by incorporating civilian human capital 

leaders into broader Air Force strategic planning and resource 

allocation processes. Air Force leaders created a human resources board 

(the Air Force Personnel Board of Directors) composed of 24 senior 

civilian and military leaders. The board convenes semi-annually to 

address military and civilian human capital issues in an integrated, 

total force context. It is fostering integrated planning with the 

intent of developing an overarching strategy--holistic, total force 

strategy--designed to meet Air Force workforce demands for the present 

and the future and intended to encompass the needs of active, reserve, 

civilian, and contractor personnel by 2004. Furthermore, the Air Force 

began to allocate resources for civilian human capital initiatives in 

fiscal year 2002 due to the strong support from Air Force leaders.



Strategic Planning for Civilian Personnel Is an Emerging Priority in 

the Marine Corps, DCMA, DFAS, and the Army:



In recent years, strategic human capital planning has generally 

received increasing top-level leadership support in the Marine Corps, 

DCMA, DFAS, and the Army. A Marine Corps official told us that the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and other top Marine Corps leaders 

became involved with civilian human capital strategic planning in 2001. 

The Commandant, in October 2002, endorsed the civilian human capital 

strategic plan, which outlines the Corps’ vision, intent, core values, 

expected outcomes, and strategic goals for civilian human capital. 

Officials are currently developing an implementation plan, which is 

expected to contain specific objectives, milestones, points of 

accountability, resource requirements, and performance measures. DCMA 

began strategic human capital planning in 2000 in response to guidance 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, and issued its first human capital strategic 

plan in 2002. DCMA officials told us that their human resources 

director is a member of DCMA’s broader executive management board and 

that human capital--civilian and military--is a standing agenda issue 

at the board’s monthly meetings. DFAS officials told us their director 

includes human capital professionals in DFAS’s management decision-

making processes. Further, human capital is a key element in the DFAS 

agencywide strategic plan. DFAS initiated its human capital strategic 

planning efforts in 2002, but it has not yet published its plan.



Within the Army, top-level leadership involvement in strategic planning 

efforts for civilian human capital has been limited but increasing. The 

bulk of such efforts has instead originated in the Army’s civilian 

human capital community. The Army’s civilian human capital community 

recognized the need for strategic civilian human capital planning in 

the mid-1990s and developed strategic plans. The Army’s civilian human 

capital community also initiated, in 2000, an assessment of the 

civilian workforce situation and developed new concepts for human 

resource systems and workforce planning.[Footnote 18] Since 2002, Army 

top-level leadership has become more explicitly involved in their 

civilian human capital community’s initiatives. For example, in January 

2003, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army formally endorsed the Army’s 

human capital strategic plan. Also, in January 2003, Army top leaders 

endorsed the recommendations of a study to improve the development and 

training of the Army’s civilian workforce, which followed three 

companion studies with similar objectives for military personnel. 

Additionally, as of March 2003, Army top leaders accepted the rationale 

and validated the requirement for another initiative to centrally 

manage senior civilian leaders by basing selection and retention 

decisions on long-term Army needs rather than on the short-term needs 

of local commanders. The Army plans to establish a management office to 

begin this effort in fiscal year 2004. Army officials told us that all 

of these efforts have not yet been fully funded. Without the commitment 

and support of Army top leaders, the Army’s civilian human capital 

community has limited authority to carry out reforms on its own and 

limited ability to ensure that its reforms are appropriately focused on 

mission accomplishment.



In addition, Army civilian human capital officials’ contributions to 

broader strategic planning efforts have been increasing. Specifically, 

officials told us that while the Army’s civilian human capital 

community has a voice in the Army’s resource allocation deliberations, 

getting civilian personnel issues included in top-level Army planning 

and budgeting documents is sometimes challenging. Within the past year, 

however, civilian human resource issues have been included in the Army-

wide strategic readiness system (a balanced scorecard) and an Army 

well-being initiative (balancing the demands and expectations of the 

Army and its people).



Navy Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for Civilian 

Personnel Is Limited:



Within the Department of the Navy, top-level leadership involvement in 

strategic planning efforts for civilian human capital has been limited. 

Department of the Navy leadership invested in studies related to 

strategic planning for its civilian workforce, but it has been slow to 

develop a strategic plan for its civilian human capital. Two documents 

published in August 2000 and May 2001 reported the results of work 

sponsored by a personnel task force established by the Secretary of the 

Navy to examine facets of the Department of the Navy’s human resources 

management. One, a study conducted and published by the National 

Academy of Public Administration’s Center for Human Resources 

Management, focused on Department of the Navy civilian personnel 

issues; the other reported on the rest of the findings of the task 

force.[Footnote 19] Department of the Navy human capital officials told 

us that they have not implemented the recommendations of those studies 

because (1) many require new legislation and (2) the studies were 

future oriented, looking as far ahead as 2020, and it will take time to 

implement the recommendations. These officials said that although the 

Department of the Navy had not yet developed a strategic plan for its 

civilian human capital, the Navy major commands (referred to as 

claimants) did their own human capital strategic planning as necessary, 

adding that they believed these efforts were sufficient. More recently, 

however, these officials told us that they are developing (on their own 

initiative) a strategic plan for the Department of the Navy’s civilian 

workforce.



In addition, the Navy has very recently undertaken other strategic 

planning efforts. In July 2002, the Navy established a new organization 

to develop a consolidated approach to civilian workforce management 

that centers on 21 core competency functional areas. Navy officials 

view this recent initiative, which involves senior military and 

civilian leaders, as the first step in developing a total force concept 

(civilian, active and reserve military, and contract employees). In 

March 2003, the Department of the Navy established (1) a new position 

that will provide a liaison for the Navy and Marine Corps strategic 

planning processes and (2) a Force Management Oversight Counsel, co-

chaired by top Navy and Marine Corps officials, which will develop an 

overarching framework for Navy and Marine Corps strategic planning.



With the looming uncertainty of continued downsizing, anticipated 

retirements, and increased competitive sourcing of non-core functions, 

strategic planning for the civilian workforce will grow in importance. 

If high-level leaders do not provide the committed and inspired 

attention to address civilian human capital issues (that is, establish 

it as an organizational priority and empower and partner with their 

human capital professionals in developing strategic plans for civilian 

human capital), then future decisions about the civilian workforce may 

not have a sound basis.



Key Elements of Strategic Plans for DOD Civilian Personnel Not in 

Place:



For the most part, the strategic plans we reviewed lacked such key 

elements as mission alignment, results-oriented performance measures, 

and data-driven workforce planning.[Footnote 20] Mission alignment is 

demonstrated by clearly showing how the civilian workforce contributes 

to accomplishing an organization’s overarching mission. It is also 

evident in descriptions of how the achievement of human capital 

initiatives will improve an organization’s performance in meeting its 

overarching mission, goals, and objectives. Results-oriented 

performance measures enable an organization to determine the effect of 

human capital programs and policies on mission accomplishment. Finally, 

data on the needed knowledge, skills, competencies, size, and 

deployment of the workforce to pursue an organization’s missions allow 

it to put the right people, in the right place, at the right time. The 

interrelationships of these three key elements are shown in figure 2. 

Without adequate alignment, performance measures, and workforce data, 

DOD and its components cannot be certain their human capital efforts 

are properly focused on mission accomplishment.



Figure 2: Relationships among Several Key Elements of a Human Capital 

Strategic Plan:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





Previously, we emphasized that high-performing organizations align 

their human capital initiatives with mission and goal accomplishment. 

Organizations’ strategic human capital planning must also be results 

oriented and data driven, including, for example, information on the 

appropriate number and location of personnel needed and their key 

competencies and skills. High-performing organizations also stay alert 

to emerging mission demands and human capital challenges and reevaluate 

their human capital initiatives through the use of valid, reliable, and 

current data.[Footnote 21]



Strategic Plans for Civilian Personnel Are Not 

Mission Aligned and Results Oriented:



The human capital goals and objectives contained in strategic plans for 

civilian personnel were not, for the most part, explicitly aligned with 

the overarching missions of the organizations we reviewed. Moreover, 

none of the plans fully reflected a results-oriented approach to 

assessing progress toward mission achievement. Human capital strategic 

plans should be aligned with (i.e., consistent with and supportive of) 

an organization’s overarching mission. Alignment between “published and 

approved human capital planning documents” and an organization’s 

overarching mission is advised in OPM’s Human Capital Assessment and 

Accountability Framework. With regard to assessing progress, programs 

can be more effectively measured if their goals and objectives are 

outcome-oriented (i.e., focused on results or impact) rather than 

output-oriented (i.e., focused on activities and processes), in keeping 

with the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act 

(GPRA). Congress anticipated that GPRA would be institutionalized and 

practiced throughout the federal government; federal agencies are 

expected to develop performance plans that are consistent with the 

act’s approach.



Based on the above criteria, we analyzed the human capital strategic 

plans that five of the seven organizations in our review have 

published[Footnote 22] for the following:



* Human capital goals and objectives that explicitly describe how the 

civilian workforce helps achieve the overarching mission, goals, and 

objectives.



* Results-oriented measures that track the success of the human capital 

initiatives in contributing to mission achievement.



All of the civilian human capital plans we reviewed referred to their 

respective organizations’ mission; however, the human capital goals, 

objectives, and initiatives did not explicitly link or describe how the 

civilian workforce efforts would contribute to the organizations’ 

overarching mission achievement, and more importantly how the extent of 

contribution to mission achievement would be measured. Aspects of 

DCMA’s plan, however, demonstrate alignment by including a general 

explanation of the overarching mission inclusive of human capital 

goals, objectives, and initiatives that further define how its civilian 

workforce contributes to achieving the overarching mission. For 

example:



* DCMA’s overarching mission is to “Provide customer-focused 

acquisition support and contract management services to ensure 

warfighter readiness, 24/7, worldwide.” DCMA’s human capital plan 

demonstrates the alignment of the agency’s workforce by stating that 

the agency will accomplish its overarching mission by “Partner[ing], or 

strategically team[ing] with customers to develop better solutions, and 

ensur[ing] warfighter success on all missions” and “Providing expertise 

and knowledge throughout the acquisition life cycle, from cradle to 

grave; from factory to foxhole and beyond”.[Footnote 23]



* DCMA’s plan contains one human capital goal, among other agency-wide 

goals, directed at aligning workforce efforts with mission 

accomplishment. The goal is to enable DCMA people to excel by building 

and maintaining a work environment that (1) attracts, 

(2) develops, and (3) sustains a quality workforce.



* Several objectives and initiatives in DCMA’s plan demonstrate a link 

to this human capital goal and to the overarching mission. Examples of 

these initiatives include determining ways to (1) making DCMA 

employment attractive, (2) establishing a professional development 

framework that is integrated and competency-based as well as developing 

an advanced leadership program, and (3) sustaining a quality workforce 

by ensuring recognition and awards to 

high-performing personnel. This alignment of DCMA’s workforce, 

initiatives, and goals to the overarching mission helps DCMA ensure 

that its civilian workforce has the necessary expertise and knowledge 

to provide customer-focused acquisition support and contract management 

services.



The other plans in our review generally did not demonstrate this degree 

of alignment. For example, in the Army civilian human capital strategic 

plan, four of the six human resource goals are more narrowly directed 

toward the role played by the human resource community and only 

indirectly tie the civilian workforce to the achievement of the Army’s 

overall mission. However, two goals--”systematic planning that 

forecasts and achieves the civilian work force necessary to support the 

Army’s mission” and “diversity through opportunity”[Footnote 24] --link 

more explicitly to the Army’s overarching mission. Also, DOD’s 

departmentwide civilian human capital plan refers to the overarching 

mission by including broad references to DOD’s overarching strategic 

plan. However, the plan is silent about what role DOD’s civilian 

workforce is expected to play in achievement of the mission. The plan 

recognizes the need for aligning the civilian workforce with the 

overarching mission by proposing to develop a human resource management 

accountability system to guarantee the effective use of human resources 

in achieving DOD’s overarching mission.



Moreover, none of the plans in our review contained results-oriented 

goals and measures. For example, DOD’s strategic goal to “promote 

focused, well-funded recruiting to hire the best talent available” is 

not expressed in measurable terms (i.e., it does not define “focused, 

well-funded, and best talent available”), and the measures for this 

goal are process oriented 

(i.e., developing or publishing a policy or strategy; reviewing 

programs) rather than results oriented. DOD’s plan, however, indicates 

that mission achievement measures are being developed. At the component 

level, the Army, in particular, has developed metrics related to its 

personnel transaction processes; although these measures are important, 

they are not focused on measuring outcomes related to mission 

accomplishment. Army officials recognize the importance of relating 

outcomes to mission accomplishment and are presently working to develop 

such measures. Without results-oriented measures, it is difficult for 

an organization to assess the effectiveness of its human capital 

initiatives in supporting its overarching mission, goals, and 

objectives.



Officials at DOD and the defense components in our review told us they 

recognize the importance of alignment and results-oriented measures in 

strategic human capital planning. In fact, the Air Force has recently 

undertaken an initiative to develop a planning framework aligning 

strategy, vision, execution, measurement, and process transformation. 

Many human capital officials we spoke with noted they have only 

recently begun to transition from their past role of functional 

experts--focused primarily on personnel transactions--to partners with 

top leadership in strategically planning for their civilian workforce. 

In their new role, they expect to make improvements in strategically 

managing civilian personnel, including identifying results-oriented 

performance measures in future iterations of their plans. Until such 

elements are in place, it is difficult to determine if the human 

capital programs DOD and its components are funding are consistent with 

overarching missions or if they are effectively leading to mission 

accomplishment.



Strategic Plans for Civilian Personnel Generally Lack Data on Workforce 

Needs:



The civilian human capital strategic plans for DOD and its components 

include goals focused on improving their human capital initiatives, but 

only two components include workforce data that supported the need for 

those particular initiatives. GAO and others[Footnote 25] have reported 

that it is important to analyze future workforce needs to (1) assist 

organizations in tailoring initiatives for recruiting, developing, and 

retaining personnel to meet its future needs and (2) provide the 

rationale and justification for obtaining resources and, if necessary, 

additional authority to carry out those initiatives. We also stated 

that to build the right workforce to achieve strategic goals, it is 

essential that organizations determine the critical skills and 

competencies needed to successfully implement the programs and 

processes associated with those goals. To do so, three types of data 

are needed: (1) what is available--both the current workforce 

characteristics[Footnote 26] and future availability, (2) what is 

needed--the critical workforce characteristics needed in the future, 

and (3) what is the difference between what will be available and what 

will be needed--the gap. Without this information, DOD cannot structure 

its future workforce to support the Secretary of Defense’s initiatives 

or mitigate the risk of shortfalls in critical personnel when pending 

civilian retirements occur.



Of the five organizations in our review that had civilian human capital 

strategic plans,[Footnote 27] two--the Air Force and DCMA--included 

some information about the future workforce and indicated the gaps to 

be addressed by its civilian human capital initiatives. The Air Force’s 

plan includes a chart that illustrates, in terms of years of federal 

service, the current workforce compared to a 1989 baseline (prior to 

the downsizing of its civilian workforce) and a target workforce for 

fiscal year 2005. This information was generally based on data that 

were readily available but considered to be a less-than-adequate 

indicator for level of experience, and it is not clear how the target 

workforce data were derived. According to the Air Force, its analysis 

illustrated the shortfall in the number of civilians with less than 10 

years of service when compared to the Air Force’s long-term 

requirements. Using this and other analyses, the Air Force initially 

developed workforce-shaping activities in four 

areas--accession planning, force development, retention/separation 

management, and enabling activities, which included 27 separate 

initiatives.



DCMA’s plan describes the agency’s workforce planning methodology, 

which focuses on identifying gaps between its current and future 

workforce. DCMA’s strategic workforce planning team analyzes 

quantitative data on the current workforce and employs an interview 

protocol to gather and analyze information from DCMA managers and 

subject matter experts pertaining to future work and workforce 

requirements.[Footnote 28] According to DCMA, this methodology allows 

it to link the desired distribution of positions, occupational series, 

and skills to organizational outcomes, processes, and customer 

requirements and to DOD’s transformation guidance, goals, and 

initiatives. Although DCMA has not completely identified or quantified 

its future workforce requirements, it identified the following: 

requirements for new technical skills, especially software acquisition 

and integration; upgrading general skills and maintaining the existing 

skill base; correcting imbalances in geographic locations; requirements 

for hiring about 990 employees per year through 2009; and obtaining 

additional positions to support anticipated increasing procurements.



In contrast to the Air Force and DCMA plans, the DOD, Army, and Marine 

Corps plans lack information about future workforce needs. For example, 

DOD’s civilian human capital plan contains data on those civilians 

eligible for retirement by grade level and by job category. However, 

the plan does not address key characteristics such as skills and 

competencies that will be needed in the future workforce to support 

changes being undertaken by DOD.[Footnote 29] Without this information 

and a methodology to analyze and identify the gaps that exist between 

what will be available and what will be needed, it is not clear that 

the human capital initiatives in DOD’s plan will result in the desired 

future workforce.



All of the plans we reviewed acknowledge strategic workforce planning 

shortfalls by setting goals or initiatives to improve in this area. For 

example, DOD’s plan includes a goal to obtain management systems and 

tools that support total force planning and informed decision making. 

DOD has begun adopting the Army’s Civilian Forecasting System and the 

Workforce Analysis Support System for departmentwide use, which will 

enable it to project the future workforce by occupational series and 

grade structure. However, the systems (which are based on a regression 

analysis of historical data) are not capable of determining the size 

and skill competencies of the civilian workforce needed in the future. 

Also, DOD has not yet determined specifically how this new analytic 

capability will be integrated into programmatic decision-making 

processes. DOD officials stated that its first step was to purchase the 

equipment and software, which was accomplished in 2002. DOD is now 

analyzing users’ needs. As of December 2002, DOD officials were testing 

the systems, but they expressed concerns that the Army systems may not 

serve the needs of a complex and diverse organization such as DOD.



Strategic Plans for Civilian Personnel Not Yet Integrated with Plans 

for Military Personnel or Sourcing Initiatives:



The civilian human capital strategic plans we reviewed did not address 

how the civilian workforce would be integrated with their military 

counterparts or sourcing initiatives to accomplish DOD’s mission. The 

2001 QDR states that future operations will not only be joint but also 

depend upon the total force--including civilian personnel as well as 

active duty and reserve personnel. The QDR also emphasizes that DOD 

will focus its “owned” resources in areas that contribute directly to 

warfighting and that it would continue to take steps to outsource and 

shed its non-core responsibilities. The 2000 Defense Science Board Task 

Force report states that DOD needs to undertake deliberate and 

integrated force shaping of the civilian and military forces, address 

human capital challenges from a total force perspective, and base 

decisions to convert functions from military to civilian or to 

outsource functions to contractors on an integrated human resource 

plan.[Footnote 30] In addition, the National Academy of Public 

Administration, in its report on the Navy civilian workforce 2020, 

notes that as more work is privatized and more traditionally military 

tasks require support of civilian or contractor personnel, a more 

unified approach to force planning and management will be necessary; 

serious shortfalls in any one of the force elements will damage mission 

accomplishment.[Footnote 31] The Academy’s report also states that the 

trend towards greater reliance on contractors necessitates a critical 

mass of civilian personnel expertise to protect the government’s 

interest and ensure effective oversight of contractors’ work. Further, 

the 2002 Commercial Activities Panel final report indicates that 

sourcing and human capital policies should be inextricably linked 

together, and it calls for federal sourcing policies to be “consistent 

with human capital practices designed to attract motivate, retain, and 

reward a high performing workforce.”[Footnote 32]



DOD’s overall human capital strategy, however, consists of three 

separate plans: one for civilians, one for military personnel, and one 

for quality of life issues for servicemembers and their families. DOD 

has not integrated the contractor workforce into these plans. Although 

DOD officials maintain that these plans are intended to complement each 

other, the plans are not integrated to form a seamless and 

comprehensive strategy. The civilian plan was prepared separately from 

the other two military plans with little direct involvement of key 

stakeholders, such as representatives from military personnel and 

manpower requirements communities.



Although not reflected in its departmentwide civilian human capital 

strategic plan, DOD acknowledged--in its response to the President’s 

Management Agenda to accomplish workforce restructuring, 

reorganizations, delayering, outsourcing, and reengineered and 

streamlined processes--that these efforts could only be accomplished 

through coordinating and integrating civilian and military components. 

The departmentwide civilian plan includes a longer-term objective to 

assess the need for and the capabilities of automated information 

management tools to primarily integrate civilian and military personnel 

and transaction data. We believe these tools can also provide 

information for planning and analysis, but they may not provide DOD 

with the information needed to proactively shape the total DOD 

workforce in response to current changes (i.e., the Secretary’s 

transformation of the department, increasing joint operations, and 

competitive sourcing initiatives) because (1) contractor data are not 

included and (2) the projected date for accomplishing this objective, 

September 2008, may be too late to effect near-term decisions. In 

addition, officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness recognize that integration of the military and 

civilian plans is important and are developing an umbrella document 

that will encompass all three components of the human capital strategy, 

but it has not established a time frame for completion.



Furthermore, DOD’s civilian human capital strategic plan does not 

address the role of civilian vis-à-vis contractor personnel or how DOD 

plans to link its human capital initiatives with its sourcing plans, 

such as efforts to outsource non-core responsibilities. The plan notes 

that contractors are part of the unique mix of DOD resources, but none 

of the goals and objectives discusses how DOD will shape its future 

workforce in a total force (civilian, military, and contractor) 

context.[Footnote 33] We believe that effective civilian workforce 

planning cannot be accomplished in isolation from planning for military 

personnel or sourcing initiatives. As the Commercial Activities Panel 

report notes, it is particularly important that sourcing strategies 

support, not inhibit, the government organization’s efforts to recruit 

and retain a high-performing in-house workforce.[Footnote 34] We also 

noted in our High Risk report that careful and thoughtful workforce 

planning efforts are critical to making intelligent competitive 

sourcing decisions.[Footnote 35]



At the service level, the Air Force’s strategic plans for civilian 

personnel were not initially developed in a total force context, but 

the current plans acknowledge the need to integrate strategic planning 

for civilians with their military counterparts, as well as taking into 

account contractors. For example, the Air Force has set a goal and 

taken steps to integrate planning for active, reserve, civilian, and 

contractor personnel by 2004.[Footnote 36] Air Force officials stated 

concerns about the significant budgetary consequences when planning 

does not take place in a total force context. For example, when 

civilian or contractor personnel perform functions previously conducted 

by military personnel, the defense component involved must obtain 

additional funds because payment for civilians and contractors cannot 

come from military personnel funds.[Footnote 37] The Air Force 

estimates that these costs could be $10 billion to $15 billion over the 

next 5 years.



Although a proposed time frame is not provided, the Marine Corps’ 

civilian plan states the need to forecast military and civilian levels 

and workforce requirements based on strategic mission drivers, 

stratified workload demand, and business process changes; the 

requirements for its civilian marines will take into account the 

appropriate redistribution of work among the military, civilian, and 

contractor communities.[Footnote 38] The Army’s civilian human capital 

plan states that it will have to acquire, train, and retain its total 

force in an operational environment that will place different demands 

on human capital management. The Army’s human capital community has an 

objective to support the Army-wide “Third Wave” initiative, which 

focuses on privatization of non-core functions to better allocate 

scarce resources to core functions.[Footnote 39] (The Department of the 

Navy does not yet have a civilian human capital strategic plan.):



The defense agencies we reviewed, which have relatively few military 

personnel compared to the military services, are taking or plan to take 

an integrated approach to strategic planning for their civilian and 

military workforces, but they do not indicate how they will integrate 

these efforts with their sourcing initiatives. DCMA’s human capital 

strategic plan includes both civilian and military personnel. For 

example, the plan includes a goal to address the underassignment of 

military personnel,[Footnote 40] because their absence further 

compounds the difficulties caused by the downsizing of civilian 

positions and the increasing workload. DFAS is planning to include both 

civilian and military personnel in the human capital strategic plan 

that it is developing. Like DCMA, military personnel are a small but 

important part of the overall DFAS workforce, but they are projected to 

be less available in the future. For example, the Air Force has 

announced that it is reducing its military personnel presence at DFAS 

over the next several years.



Without integrated planning, goals for shaping and deploying military, 

civilian, and contractor personnel may not be consistent with and 

support each other. Consequently, DOD may not have the workforce it 

needs to accomplish tasks critical to readiness and mission success.



Conclusions:



DOD has made progress in establishing a foundation for strategically 

addressing civilian human capital issues by developing its 

departmentwide civilian human capital strategic plan. However, the 

alignment of human capital goals with the overarching mission is 

unclear in DOD’s and the components’ strategic plans for civilian human 

capital, and results-oriented performance measures linked to mission 

accomplishment are lacking. Without these key elements, DOD and its 

components may miss opportunities to more effectively and efficiently 

increase workforce productivity. Also, without greater commitment from 

and the support of top leaders, civilian human capital professionals in 

DOD and the defense components may design strategic planning efforts 

that are not appropriately focused on mission accomplishment and that 

do not have adequate support to carry out.



Moreover, DOD top leadership has not provided its components with 

guidance on how to align component-level strategic plans with the 

departmentwide plan. Without this alignment, DOD’s and its components’ 

planning may lack the focus and coordination needed (1) to carry out 

the Secretary of Defense’s transformation initiatives in an effective 

manner and (2) to mitigate risks of not having human capital ready to 

respond to national security events at home and abroad.



Although DOD and component officials recognize the critical need for 

ensuring that the future workforce be efficiently deployed across their 

organizations and have the right skills and competencies needed to 

accomplish their missions, their strategic plans lack the information 

needed to identify gaps in skills and competencies. As a result, DOD 

and its components may not have a sound basis for funding decisions 

related to human capital initiatives and may not be able to put the 

right people in the right place at the right time to achieve the 

mission.



Furthermore, as personnel reductions continue and DOD carries out its 

transformation initiatives, integrating planning in a total force 

context--as mentioned in the QDR--becomes imperative to ensure that 

scarce resources are most effectively used. However, military and 

civilian human capital strategic plans--both DOD’s and the components’-

-have yet to be integrated with each other. Furthermore, the civilian 

plans do not address how human capital policies will complement, not 

conflict with, the department-level or component-level sourcing plans, 

such as competitive sourcing efforts.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To improve human capital strategic planning for the DOD civilian 

workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to undertake the 

following:



* Improve future revisions and updates to the DOD departmentwide 

strategic human capital plan by more explicitly aligning with DOD’s 

overarching mission, including results-oriented performance measures, 

and focusing on future workforce needs. To accomplish this, the 

revisions and updates should be developed in collaboration with top DOD 

and component officials and civilian and military human capital 

leaders.



* Direct the military services and the defense agencies to align their 

strategic human capital plans with the mission, goals, objectives, and 

measures included in the departmentwide strategic human capital plan 

and provide guidance to these components on this alignment.



* Define the future civilian workforce, identifying the characteristics 

(i.e., the skills and competencies, number, deployment, etc.) of 

personnel needed in the context of the total force and determine the 

workforce gaps that need to be addressed through human capital 

initiatives.



* Assign a high priority to and set a target date for developing a 

departmentwide human capital strategic plan that integrates both 

military and civilian workforces and takes into account contractor 

roles and sourcing initiatives.



Agency Comments:



We requested comments from the Department of Defense, but none were 

provided.



We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Directors 

of DCMA and DFAS. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



Please contact me at (202) 512-5559 if you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Key contributors are listed in 

appendix III.



Sincerely yours,



Derek B. Stewart

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management:



Signed by Derek B. Stewart:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



As requested by the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on 

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, we reviewed civilian human 

capital strategic planning in the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Specifically, the objectives of this report were to assess (1) the 

extent to which top-level leadership is involved in strategic planning 

for civilian personnel and (2) whether strategic plans for civilian 

personnel are aligned with the overall mission, results oriented, and 

based on data about the future civilian workforce. We also determined 

whether the strategic plans for civilian personnel are integrated with 

plans for military personnel or sourcing initiatives. We focused 

primarily on civilian human capital strategic planning undertaken since 

1988, when DOD began downsizing its civilian workforce. Our analyses 

were based on the documents that each organization identified as its 

civilian human capital strategic planning documents. Several documents 

had been published or updated either just prior to or during the time 

of our review (May 2002 to March 2003). Also, DOD and component 

strategic planning for civilian personnel is a continuous process and 

involves ongoing efforts. We did not review the implementation of the 

human capital strategic plans because most plans were too recent for 

this action to be completed.



The scope of our review included examining the civilian human capital 

strategic planning efforts undertaken by DOD, its four military 

services, and two of its other defense organizations--the Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA). We selected the military services since they 

account for about 85 percent of the civilian personnel in DOD. To 

understand how civilian human capital strategic planning is being 

undertaken by other defense organizations, which account for the other 

15 percent of the DOD civilian workforce, we determined the status of 

the human capital strategic planning efforts of 21 other defense 

organizations through a telephone survey. We judgmentally selected two 

defense agencies, DFAS and DCMA, because of their large size and 

because they perform different functions; therefore, they could offer 

different perspectives on strategic planning for civilians. DFAS and 

DCMA account for about 26 percent of the civilian personnel in other 

defense organizations. DFAS has about 15,274 civilian employees and 

more than 1,000 military personnel, performs finance and accounting 

activities, and does not have a civilian human capital strategic plan, 

although it does have an overall agency strategic plan that includes 

human capital as a key element. DCMA has about 11,770 civilian 

employees and about 480 military personnel, performs acquisition 

functions, and has a civilian human capital strategic plan.



To assess the extent to which top-level leadership is involved in 

strategic planning for civilian personnel, we reviewed the civilian 

human capital strategic plans for discussions of the methodology used 

in developing them that indicated leadership involvement. Further, we 

compared the civilian human capital strategic plans publication dates 

to key events, such as the issuance of the President’s Management 

Agenda, which advocates strategic human capital planning. We discussed 

top leadership involvement in the development of human capital 

strategic plans with the applicable civilian human capital planning 

officials. These officials included representatives from the following 

offices:



* Department of Defense: Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, including Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian 

Personnel Policy and Director, Civilian Personnel Management Service.



* Department of Air Force: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Personnel Headquarters; Director of Strategic Plans and Future Systems, 

and Director, Air Force Personnel Operations Agency, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel; and Directorate of Personnel, Air Force Materiel 

Command.



* Department of the Army: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1.



* Department of the Navy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Civilian Personnel Policy and Equal Employment Opportunity; Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel; and Deputy 

Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.



* Defense Contract Management Agency: Executive Director, Human 

Resources; and Director, Strategic Planning, Programming, and Analysis.



* Defense Finance and Accounting Service: Human Resources Directorate 

and Resource Management Directorate.



To assess whether strategic plans for civilian personnel are aligned 

with the overall mission, results oriented, and contained data about 

the future civilian workforce, we compared each plan with the concepts 

articulated in our model for strategically managing human capital and 

similar guidance provided by the Office of Budget and Management and 

the Office of Personnel Management (which are discussed in greater 

detail in the Background section of this report). Among the numerous 

sources we reviewed, we used the criteria described in our reports on 

Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management; Human 

Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders; High-Risk 

Series: An Update; and Performance and Accountability Series - Major 

Management Challenges and Program Risks.[Footnote 41] Specifically, we 

looked for (1) the alignment of human capital approaches to meet 

organizational goals, (2) the presence of results-oriented performance 

measures, and 

(3) the references to use of workforce planning data to justify human 

capital initiatives (i.e., policies and programs). To ensure 

consistency with our application of the criteria in other GAO 

engagements, we also reviewed approximately 100 of our reports that 

addressed their application within DOD and other federal agencies. 

Also, to better understand the existing human capital framework and its 

relationship to the strategic planning efforts, we gathered information 

about policies, programs, and procedures. Finally, we validated the 

results of our analyses of the plans with appropriate agency officials.



To assess whether the strategic plans for civilian personnel are 

integrated with plans for military personnel or sourcing initiatives, 

we analyzed the civilian human capital strategic plans for (1) 

references to military personnel or a total force perspective and (2) 

discussions about competitive and strategic sourcing efforts being 

undertaken in a total force context. We also collaborated with other 

GAO staff who reviewed 

(1) DOD’s strategic plans for military personnel and quality of life 

issues for servicemembers and their families,[Footnote 42] (2) sourcing 

initiatives,[Footnote 43] and 

(3) DOD’s acquisition workforce.[Footnote 44] In addition, we discussed 

integration between civilian and military personnel plans with the 

applicable civilian human capital planning officials previously 

mentioned.



We conducted our review from May 2002 to March 2003 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Key Events Related to Strategic Planning for DOD Civilian 

Personnel:



Figure 3 provides a time line of several key events and dates that 

affected DOD’s civilian workforce between 1988 and 2002. It also shows 

when DOD and its components published their human capital strategic 

plans.



Figure 3: Figure 3. Key Events Related to Strategic Planning for DOD 

Civilian Personnel:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC); Government Performance and 

Results Act (GPRA); National Defense Panel (NDP); Defense Science Board 

(DSB); Department of Defense (DOD); President’s Management Agenda 

(PMA); Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Office and Personnel 

Management (OPM); Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA); and 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).



[End of figure]



[End of section]



Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Derek B. Stewart (202) 512-5559

Christine Fossett (202) 512-2956:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to the name above, Daniel Chen, Joel Christenson, Barbara 

Joyce, Janet Keller, Shvetal Khanna, Dan Omahen, Gerald Winterlin, Dale 

Wineholt, and Susan Woodward made key contributions to this report.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008. At this time, 

DOD also published two strategic plans for military personnel (one 

addressing military personnel priorities and one addressing quality of 

life issues for servicemembers and their families). In a December 2002 

report (Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain 

Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237), we 

addressed aspects of the two plans concerning benefits for active duty 

military personnel, noting that the plans were incomplete and that DOD 

needed a process to oversee the plans’ implementation. 



[2] Throughout this report, the term “component” refers to all services 

and agencies in DOD. The term “service” refers to the Air Force, the 

Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy. The term “agency” refers to the 

Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service.



[3] Sourcing initiatives, which are undertaken to achieve greater 

operating efficiencies, include such efforts as public-private 

competitions under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 

for commercial activities and functions; direct conversions (converting 

positions from one sector to another without public-private 

competition); public-private partnerships; and privatization, 

divestiture, and reengineering.



[4] Top-level leaders include the Secretary of Defense, under or deputy 

secretaries, service secretaries, chiefs of staff of the services, and 

other DOD senior executive service personnel.



[5] DOD and its components use the term human resources whereas we use 

the term human capital.



[6] These numbers do not include indirect hire employees, for example, 

persons rendering service to the federal government under agreements or 

contracts with a foreign government.



[7] The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy, 

February 2000. The Defense Science Board is a federal advisory 

committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of 

Defense.



[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, 

GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001); Performance and 

Accountability Series--Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A 

Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 2001); and Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A 

Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).



[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Exposure Draft: A Model of 

Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 15, 2002).



[10] Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of 

the Government: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2002).



[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: Strategic Human 

Capital Management, GAO-03-120 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).



[12] GAO-02-373SP.



[13] The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy. 

The report also stated that DOD must give greater priority to the 

management of its civilian workforce in order to create the proper 

civilian force structure for the future. 



[14] GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2000).



[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Acquisition Workforce: Status of 

Agency Efforts to Address Future Needs, GAO-03-55 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 18, 2002).



[16] Defense Business Practice Implementation Board, Report to the 

Senior Executive Council, Department of Defense: Human Resources Task 

Group Report FY02-1, November 15, 2002. 



[17] Air Force officials told us that this document and the Vision 

Implementation Plan together represent the Air Force’s civilian human 

capital strategic plan.



[18] The Army refers to this effort as the Civilian Personnel 

Management System XXI (CPMS XXI). See The Wexford Group International, 

Army CPMS XXI Transforming Civilian Workforce Management White Paper 

(Vienna, Va., revised May 11, 2001).



[19] The 2000 National Academy of Public Administration, Civilian 

Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources Management 

in the Department of the Navy (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 18, 2000), and 

the 2001 Department of the Navy: A Strategic Human Resource Management 

System for the 21st Century, Vols. I and II (Washington, D.C.: May 

2001).



[20] This review primarily focused on aspects of leadership and 

strategic human capital planning--two of four cornerstones in our model 

for strategically managing human capital (GAO-02-373SP). We did not 

focus on aspects of the other two important cornerstones--

(1) acquire, develop, retain, and deploy the best talent and elicit the 

best performance for mission accomplishment and (2) results-oriented 

organizational cultures that promote high performance and 

accountability (such as individual performance management that is fully 

integrated with the organization’s mission and is used as the basis for 

managing the organization) and empower and include employees in setting 

and accomplishing programmatic goals.



[21] GAO-03-120.



[22] DOD, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and DCMA have published 

civilian human capital strategic plans. DFAS and Department of the Navy 

are in the process of developing such plans.



[23] DCMA Human Capital Strategic Plan.



[24] The Army’s goal for diversity through opportunity states: “A 

civilian force that is as richly diverse as America itself, and a work 

environment that promotes individual respect and encourages 

collaboration through sharing of different views and perspectives to 

improve effectiveness and quality.”



[25] GAO-02-373 SP; National Academy of Public Administration, Building 

Successful Organizations: A Guide to Strategic Workforce Planning 

(Washington, D.C.: May 2000); International Personnel Management 

Association, Workforce Planning Resource Guide for Public Sector Human 

Resource Professionals (Summer 2002); and RAND, An Operational Process 

for Workforce Planning (Forthcoming).



[26] Workforce characteristics are concrete and measurable aspects of a 

group of workers that are critical for organizational success and can 

be influenced by policy decisions. Examples include occupation; grade 

level; experience; academic degree or discipline; certification; 

leadership; multifunctional skills; deployment; or military, civilian, 

and contractor mix.



[27] The Department of the Navy and DFAS do not yet have plans.



[28] DCMA developed this qualitative approach because it does not have 

(1) workforce modeling or projection tools that can be used as a basis 

to establish the number of future positions and types of future 

competencies required and (2) data on current workforce competencies to 

establish the baseline needed to assess future competency gaps.



[29] Changes include such initiatives as DOD’s transformation to a 

capabilities-based organization and competitive sourcing under OMB 

Circular A-76.



[30] The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy.



[31] Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human 

Resources Management in the Department of the Navy.



[32] Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government: Final Report.



[33] Officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness described a parallel effort to define civilian 

and contractor roles as part of identifying activities that are not 

inherently governmental as required by the Federal Activities Inventory 

Reform Act (P.L. 105-270).



[34] Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government: Final Report. 



[35] GAO-03-120.



[36] Air Force Personnel Vision Implementation Plan 2002.



[37] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing: Some 

Progress, but Continuing Challenges Remain in Meeting Program Goals, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-106 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).



[38] U.S. Marine Corps Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan 2003.



[39] The Department of the Army’s Fiscal Year 02-07 Civilian Human 

Resources Strategic Plan and FY03 Army Civilian Human Resources 

Operational Plan.



[40] In 2002, DCMA was authorized 630 military positions, but it filled 

480. This chronic problem occurs because the services lack military 

personnel trained in the acquisition career fields and, therefore, do 

not have enough qualified military personnel to fill the DCMA 

positions. Currently, this shortage affects the Administrative 

Contracting and Acquisition Manager functions. 



[41] U.S. General Accounting Office, Exposure Draft: A Model of 

Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 2002); Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency 

Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2000, Version 1); 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001); 

and Performance and Accountability Series--Major Management Challenges 

and Program Risks: Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan 2003).



[42] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel Oversight 

Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human 

Capital Planning, GAO-03-237 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002).



[43] Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of 

the Government: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2002).



[44] U.S. General Accounting Office, Acquisition Workforce: Department 

of Defense’s Plans to Address Workforce Size and Structure Challenges, 

GAO-02-630 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 30, 2002).



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