This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-259 
entitled 'September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance 
Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters' which was 
released on December 26, 2002.



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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. 

Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



December 2002:



september 11:



More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’ 

Contributions in Disasters:



GAO-03-259:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-259, a report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Committee on Finance, United States Senate 



Why GAO Did This Study: 



Surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households

have donated money to charitable organizations to aid in the response 
to 

the September 11 disasters.  To provide the public with information on 

the role of charitable aid in assisting those affected by the attacks, 

GAO was asked to report on the amount of donations charities raised and 

distributed, the accountability measures in place to prevent fraud by 

organizations and individuals, and lessons learned about how to best 

distribute charitable aid in similar situations



What GAO Found:



Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the total amount of 

funds raised in response to the September 11 attacks, 35 of the larger 

charities have reported raising an estimated $2.7 billion since 

September 11, 2001. About 70 percent of the money that has been 
collected 

by these 35 charities has been reported distributed to survivors or 

spent on disaster relief since September 11, 2001. Charities used the 

money they collected to provide direct cash assistance and a wide range 

of services to families of those killed, those more indirectly affected 

through loss of their job or residence, and to disaster relief workers. 

Some of the charities plan to use funds to provide services over the 

longer term, such as for scholarships, mental health counseling, and 

employment assistance. 



Charities and government oversight agencies have taken a number of 

steps to prevent fraud by individuals or organizations, and relatively 

few cases have been uncovered so far. However, the total extent of 
fraud 

is not known and will be difficult to assess particularly in situations 

when organizations solicit funds on behalf of September 11 but use the 

funds for other purposes.  



Overall, charitable aid made a major contribution in the nation’s 
response 

to the September 11 attacks, despite very difficult circumstances. 

Through the work of charities, millions of people contributed to the 

recovery effort. At the same time, lessons have been learned that could 

improve future charitable responses in disasters, including easing 
access 

to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities 
and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increasing attention to 

public education, and planning for future events. FEMA and some 
charitable 

organizations have taken some steps to address these issues.  However, 

the independence of charitable organizations, while one of their key 

strengths, will make the implementation of these lessons dependent on 

close collaboration and agreement among charities involved in aiding 

in disasters.



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



What GAO Recommends:



To help facilitate collaboration among charitable organizations 
involved 

in disasters, GAO is recommending that FEMA convene a working group of 

involved parties to take steps to implement strategies for future 

disasters, building upon lessons learned in the aftermath of September 
11. 



The working group should address issues such as the development and 
adoption 

of a common application form and confidentiality agreement for use in 

disasters and strategies for enhancing public education regarding 
charitable 

giving.



This group could include representatives of key charitable and 
voluntary 

organizations and foundations; public and private philanthropic 
oversight 

groups and agencies; and federal, state, and local emergency 
preparedness 

officials.



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Charities Have Played an Unprecedented Role in the Amount of Money 

Collected and Types of Assistance Provided to September 11 Survivors:



Charities and Oversight Agencies Have Several Accountability Measures 

in Place; Relatively Few Cases of Fraud Identified So Far:



Little Coordination of Charitable Aid Occurred Early on, although a 

More Integrated Approach Emerged Months Later:



Lessons Learned after September 11 Could Improve Future Responses but 

Pose Implementation Challenges:



Conclusions:



Recommendation for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Appendix I: September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:



Appendix II: September 11 Fund Data for 35 Large Charities:



Appendix III: Contact Information for State Charity Officials:



Appendix IV: Members of National Voluntary Organizations 

Active in Disaster:



Appendix V: Organizations Participating in 9/11 United Services Group 

Service Coordination:



Appendix VI: Comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency:



Tables:



Table 1: September 11 Fund Data for 35 Charities:



Table 2: Examples of the Range of Services Provided by the Two Largest 

September 11 Charities:



Table 3: Types of Fraud and Related Accountability Measures:



Figure:



Figure 1: Amount of Aid Raised and Distributed by Selected Charities:



Abbreviations:



FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:



IRS: Internal Revenue Service:



NYC: New York City:



USG: United Services Group:



United States General Accounting Office:



Washington, DC 20548:



December 19, 2002:



The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Finance

United States Senate:



Dear Senator Grassley:



On September 11, 2001, America suffered terrorist attacks that resulted 

in the deaths of more than 3,000 people in New York City (NYC), at the 

Pentagon in Virginia, and in Pennsylvania. In addition, economists 

suggest that in NYC alone, about 100,000 people may have lost their 

income as a result of these events.[Footnote 1] Federal, state, and 

local governments responded to this disaster in a variety of ways, and 

private charities provided aid beyond that of government.[Footnote 2] 

Some surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households 

have donated money to charitable organizations to aid in the response 

to the disaster.



To provide you with information on the role of charitable aid in 

assisting those affected by the attacks, you asked us to determine the 

following: 

(1) How much in donations have charities raised to assist September 

11 survivors, and what assistance has been made available to them? 

(2) What accountability measures are in place to ensure that only 

eligible individuals receive aid, and what is known about fraud 

committed by organizations and individuals? (3) What coordination 

efforts have been pursued, if any, in response to the disaster? (4) 

What lessons can be learned about how to best distribute charitable aid 

in similar situations?



To answer these questions, we contacted September 11-related charities 

identified by the Chronicle of Philanthropy, a key trade publication of 

the nonprofit sector, and gathered information on the funds they raised 

and distributed. We supplemented the Chronicle’s list with information 

we gathered from additional charities during our review. We interviewed 

officials from 12 of the larger September 11-related funds in NYC and 

Washington, D.C; representatives from three September 11 victims 

groups; officials from various philanthropic oversight organizations; 

and representatives from the major charities providing assistance after 

the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. We also spoke with officials from 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the federal agency 

charged with responding to disasters; the NYC Office of Emergency 

Management; and the Office of Family Policy of the Department of 

Defense. Finally, we interviewed officials from government oversight 

agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), officials from 

state charity offices or attorneys general offices in seven states, and 

the New York County (Manhattan) District Attorney’s Office. We 

conducted our review from January through November 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. We did not 

independently verify data provided by the charitable organizations or 

oversight officials, and it was not within the scope of our work to 

review the charities’ systems of internal control or to trace their use 

of funds. On September 3, 2002, we issued an interim report on the 

results of our review.[Footnote 3]



Results in Brief:



Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the total amount of 

funds raised, 35 of the larger charities have reported raising almost 

$2.7 billion since September 11, 2001. About 70 percent of the money 

that has been collected by these 35 charities has been distributed to 

survivors or spent on disaster relief as of October 31, 2002. Fund 

distribution rates vary widely among this group of charities, in part 

because of differences in their operating purpose. For example, some 

charities were established to provide immediate assistance, while 

others, such as scholarship funds, were established to provide services 

over a longer period of time. Charities reported distributing these 

funds for cash grants and a wide range of services to families of those 

killed, those more indirectly affected through loss of their job or 

residence, and to disaster relief workers. Questions about how best to 

use the funds as well as service delivery difficulties complicated 

charities’ responses. For example, to distribute aid, charities had to 

make extensive efforts to identify victims and survivors as there were 

no uniform contact lists for families of victims. In addition, 

charities faced challenges in providing aid to non-English speaking 

people in need of assistance. Some charities have focused their efforts 

on these individuals.



Charities and government oversight agencies have taken a number of 

steps to prevent fraud by individuals or organizations, and relatively 

few cases have been uncovered so far. Most charities we spoke with 

required applicants to provide documentation certifying identity, 

injury, death of a family member, or loss of job or home, and may have 

asked for proof of financial need. State attorneys general and local 

district attorneys also told us that although they had limited 

resources available to address September 11-related fraud, they are 

actively responding to public concerns about charities. While 

information is available on identified fraud cases, the total extent of 

fraud is not known, and it will be difficult for charities and 

oversight agencies to assess.



Despite some early efforts, little coordination of charitable aid 

occurred early on, although a more integrated approach emerged some 

months later. Even with these efforts, September 11 survivors generally 

believed they had to navigate a maze of service providers, and both 

charities and those individuals who were more indirectly affected by 

the disaster were confused about what aid might be available. Although 

steps were taken to address some of these issues in previous disasters, 

the scope and complexity of the September 11 attacks presented a number 

of challenges to charities in their attempts to provide seamless social 

services for surviving family members and others in need of aid. Some 

months after the disaster, however, oversight agencies and large 

funders established a more coordinated approach. This included the 

formation of coordinating entities, the implementation of case 

management systems, and attempts to implement key coordination tools, 

such as client databases.



Charities, government agencies, watchdog groups, and survivors’ 

organizations shared with us lessons that could improve the charitable 

aid process in disasters in the future. These lessons include easing 

access to aid for those who are eligible, enhancing coordination among 

charities and between charities and FEMA, increasing attention to 

public education on charitable giving, and planning for future events. 

Some efforts are under way to address these issues. However, the 

independence of charitable organizations, while one of their key 

strengths, will make implementation of these lessons learned dependent 

on close collaboration and agreement among these independent 

organizations. To help facilitate collaboration among charitable 

organizations involved in disasters, we are recommending that FEMA 

convene a working group of involved parties to take steps to implement 

strategies for future disasters, building upon lessons learned in the 

aftermath of September 11. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

FEMA agreed with our recommendation and said that such a working group 

would likely foster enhanced coordination and collaboration and 

potentially lead to improvements in service to those affected by 

disasters.



Background:



Charities are organizations established to address the needs of the 

poor or distressed and other social welfare issues. Federal, state, and 

private agencies and the American public monitor how well charities are 

meeting these needs. Although not all charities have a disaster relief 

focus, historically charities have adapted their work as needed to the 

immediate or longer-term needs of disaster survivors. In these disaster 

aid efforts, charities may cooperate with FEMA. Though charities and 

FEMA have a substantial role in providing disaster aid, people affected 

by disasters may also pursue other government or private sources of 

relief.



Purpose and Scope of the Charitable Sector:



Charities represent a substantial presence in American society. 

Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) establishes 27 categories of tax-

exempt organizations; the largest number of such organizations falls 

under Section 501(c)(3), which recognizes charitable organizations, 

among others. The term charitable, as defined in the regulations that 

implement Section 501(c)(3), includes:



* assisting the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged;



* advancing religion, education, or science;



* erecting or maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works;



* lessening neighborhood tensions;



* eliminating prejudice and discrimination;



* defending human and civil rights; or



* combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.



An organization must apply for IRS recognition as a tax-exempt charity 

that strives to meet one or more of these purposes. In general, a 

charity serves these broad public purposes, rather than specific 

private interests. By 2000, IRS had recognized 1.35 million tax-exempt 

organizations under Section 501(c), of which 820,000 (60 percent) were 

charities. At the end of 1999, the assets of Section 501(c)(3) 

organizations approached $1.2 trillion and their annual revenues 

approached $720 billion. Charities pay no income taxes on contributions 

received, but they can be taxed on income generated from unrelated 

business activities.



Oversight of Charities:



Federal agencies, state charity officials, other nonprofit 

organizations, and the general public may all participate in overseeing 

charitable operations to protect the public interest. At the federal 

level, IRS has primary responsibility for recognizing tax-exempt status 

and determining compliance with tax laws, such as those governing the 

use of charitable funds.[Footnote 4] Notwithstanding these powers, IRS 

is not generally responsible for overseeing how well a charity spends 

its funds or meets its charitable purpose.



Despite the federal government’s significant indirect subsidy of 

charities through their tax-exempt status and the allowance of 

charitable deductions by individuals, the federal government has a 

fairly limited role in monitoring charities, with states providing the 

primary oversight of charities through their attorneys general and/or 

charity offices. These officials maintain registries of charities and 

professional fundraisers, including financial reports of registrants. 

They also monitor the solicitation and administration of charitable 

assets. Attorneys general and state charity officials have extensive 

power to investigate charities’ compliance with state law and can 

correct noncompliance through the courts. Although local law 

enforcement agents, such as district attorneys, may assist the state 

with investigations of charities, they tend to focus on the prosecution 

of the criminal cases of individuals who defraud charities.



Further oversight of charities’ efficiency and effectiveness is likely 

to be carried out by the private sector, including “charity watchdogs,” 

and the American public. Watchdogs such as the Better Business Bureau’s 

Wise Giving Alliance and publications such as The Chronicle of 

Philanthropy are the public’s primary sources for information on 

charitable organizations and fund-raising. The questions and concerns 

people bring to the attention of watchdogs and government officials are 

often the key motivators for initiating investigations.



Charities’ Roles in Disasters:



Charities have historically played a role in the nation’s response to 

disasters. First, some charities, for example, the American Red Cross 

or the Salvation Army, are equipped to arrive at a disaster scene and 

provide mass care, including food, shelter, and clothing, and in some 

circumstances, emergency financial assistance to affected persons. 

Next, depending on the extent and nature of devastation to a community 

and charities’ typical services and capacities, some charities are best 

structured to provide longer-term assistance, such as job training or 

mental health counseling. Finally, new charities may form post-disaster 

to address the needs of all survivors or specific population groups. 

For example, after the September 11 attacks, charities were established 

to serve survivors of restaurant workers and firefighters.



FEMA is the lead federal agency for responding to disasters and may 

link with charitable organizations to provide assistance. According to 

FEMA regulations, in the event of a presidentially declared disaster or 

emergency, such as September 11, FEMA is required to coordinate relief 

and assistance activities of federal, state, and local governments; the 

American Red Cross; the Salvation Army; and the Mennonite Disaster 

Service; as well as other voluntary relief organizations that agree to 

operate under FEMA’s direction. Although charities are expected to be 

among the first agencies to provide assistance to those affected, in 

the event of some natural disasters, FEMA may anticipate need and be 

the first to respond. FEMA can provide a range of assistance to 

individual disaster survivors. In a natural disaster, such as a 

hurricane or flood, the bulk of FEMA’s individual assistance program 

money tends to be given to individuals whose residences have been 

damaged. September 11 presented a different challenge for the agency: 

few people had damage to their homes, but many needed unemployment 

assistance and help paying their mortgage or rent.



Other Sources of Disaster Relief Assistance:



Though FEMA and charities provide key resources to survivors of 

disasters, a range of additional aid may be available for those 

affected by the September 11 attacks.[Footnote 5] Federal sources of 

aid to individuals include Social Security, Medicaid, Disaster 

Unemployment, and Department of Justice benefits for fallen police 

officers and firefighters.[Footnote 6] In addition, the Congress has 

set up a Federal Victim Compensation Fund for individuals injured and 

families of those who died in these attacks. See appendix I for more 

information about this fund. From states, survivors may obtain State 

Crime Victim Compensation Board funds, unemployment insurance, or 

workers’ compensation. Some families may also be able to access private 

insurance or employer pensions.[Footnote 7]



Charities Have Played an Unprecedented Role in the Amount 

of Money Collected and Types of Assistance Provided to September 11 

Survivors:



While it may be difficult to tally precisely the total amount of funds 

collected, 35 of the larger charities have raised almost $2.7 billion 

and distributed about 70 percent of the money. Distribution rates vary 

widely among the charities, in part, because some were established to 

provide immediate assistance while others were established to provide 

assistance over the longer term. Charities used the money they 

collected to provide cash and a broad range of services to people 

directly and indirectly affected, although questions about how best to 

use the funds as well as service delivery difficulties complicated 

charities’ responses.



Of the Larger Charities, 

35 Have Raised Almost $2.7 Billion; Most Aid Collected Has Already Been 

Distributed:



Thirty-five of the larger charities have raised almost $2.7 billion as 

of October 31, 2002, to aid the survivors of the terrorist attacks. 

(See table 1.) These include a range of organizations, including large, 

well-established organizations such as the American Red Cross and the 

Salvation Army and other organizations created specifically in response 

to September 11, such as the Twin Towers Fund. While the total amount 

raised may increase over time, many organizations are no longer 

actively collecting funds. For example, The September 11th Fund stopped 

soliciting donations in November 2001 and in January 2002 asked the 

public to stop sending contributions to the fund.



Table 1: September 11 Fund Data for 35 Charities:



Relief charities: American Red Cross Liberty Fund; Amount raised: 

$1,011,000,000.



Relief charities: The September 11th Fund; Amount raised: 512,000,000.



Relief charities: Twin Towers Fund; Amount raised: 205,000,000.



Relief charities: International Association of Fire Fighters; Amount 

raised: 161,000,000.



Relief charities: New York Police and Fire Widows’ & Children’s Benefit 

Fund; Amount raised: 117,000,000.



Relief charities: Citizens’ Scholarship Foundation; Amount raised: 

113,167,336.



Relief charities: Salvation Army; Amount raised: 87,722,612.



Relief charities: Uniformed Firefighters Association; Amount raised: 

71,000,000.



Relief charities: New York State World Trade Center Relief Fund[A]; 

Amount raised: 68,730,000.



Relief charities: New York Times 9/11 Neediest Fund; Amount raised: 

61,147,017.



Relief charities: Robin Hood Foundation; Amount raised: 60,300,000.



Relief charities: Catholic Charities USA; Amount raised: 31,847,514.



Relief charities: Catholic Charities of NY; Amount raised: 25,400,000.



Relief charities: Survivors Fund; Amount raised: 20,000,000.



Relief charities: Windows of Hope; Amount raised: 19,000,000.



Relief charities: World Vision; Amount raised: 12,428,378.



Relief charities: New York State Fraternal Order of Police Foundation; 

Amount raised: 12,028,314.



Relief charities: Port Authority Police Benevolent Association; Amount 

raised: 11,642,025.



Relief charities: NYC Police Foundation; Amount raised: 11,000,000.



Relief charities: Americares Foundation; Amount raised: 9,261,073.



Relief charities: Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society; Amount raised: 

6,800,000.



Relief charities: Army Emergency Relief; Amount raised: 5,792,588.



Relief charities: Federal Employee Education & Assistance Fund; Amount 

raised: 5,500,000.



Relief charities: United Jewish Communities; Amount raised: 4,800,000.



Relief charities: United Way National Capital; Amount raised: 

3,956,512.



Relief charities: Union Community Fund; Amount raised: 3,092,105.



Relief charities: Lions Clubs International Foundation; Amount raised: 

3,023,000.



Relief charities: Rotary International; Amount raised: 1,800,000.



Relief charities: American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 

Animals; Amount raised: 1,744,000.



Relief charities: Kiwanis International Foundation; Amount raised: 

1,591,916.



Relief charities: Tides Foundation; Amount raised: 597,207.



Relief charities: Jewish Federation of Greater Washington; Amount 

raised: 450,000.



Relief charities: National Italian American Foundation; Amount raised: 

334,000.



Relief charities: Farmers’ Market Federation of NY; Amount raised: 

162,000.



Relief charities: American Lung Association; Amount raised: 139,000.



Relief charities: Total; Amount raised: $2,660,456,597.



Source: Data provided by charities. Most data are as of October 31, 

2002, unless otherwise noted in appendix II.



Note: We asked the charities to exclude funds they had received from 

other September 11 funds to avoid overstatement of the funds involved.



[A] This is not a charity; the New York State Department of Taxation 

and Finance established and administers this fund of donations.



[End of table]



The large number of charities collecting funds for September 11 

complicates the efforts to determine a precise count of the total funds 

raised. The Metro New York Better Business Bureau Foundation has 

identified 470 September 11-related charities, and the IRS estimates 

that about 600 charities are involved in September 11-related 

fundraising. The IRS took steps to quickly grant tax-exempt status to 

about half of these 600 charities after September 11.[Footnote 8] While 

some of these new charities appear to be smaller, specific fundraising 

events such as the Hike of Hope, others like the Twin Towers Fund, 

which raised $205 million, became major charities. While any one 

charity will have information on its funding and services, the 

charitable sector as a whole generally does not have reporting 

mechanisms in place to track funds across entities or for any one 

event. Some tracking efforts are under way, however. For example, the 

Metro New York Better Business Bureau Foundation recently surveyed the 

470 September 11-related charities they identified and 270 responded to 

its request for fund information.



Further complicating a precise tally of funds is the interfund 

transfers that occurred among charities. For example, the Americares 

Foundation raised $5.3 million in its Heroes Fund and transferred it to 

the Twin Towers Fund to be distributed. Likewise, the United Jewish 

Federation of New York distributed $5.4 million in grants it received 

from the New York Times 

9/11 Neediest Fund and the United Jewish Communities of North America. 

The Metro New York Better Business Bureau Foundation estimates that 

more than $400 million of the charitable aid it is tracking represents 

duplicate listings of money raised by grant-making organizations and 

the direct service providers they are funding. Moreover, an unknown 

number of corporations have sold and are still selling products for 

which some portions of the proceeds are to be donated to September 11 

charities, a practice known as “cause-related marketing.” Some reports 

cite hundreds of products being sold in the name of September 11 

charities; the extent to which these funds have already been forwarded 

to charities is not known.



A more complete accounting of the number of September 11 charities and 

the amounts they raised might be possible when all charitable 

organizations have filed with IRS the required annual information form, 

called the IRS 990. Among other items, these tax-exempt 

501(c)(3) organizations must report on their total revenues (including 

donations), expenses, grants and allocations, and the total dollars of 

specific assistance they provided to individuals.[Footnote 9] This form 

is due in the fifth month after the close of the organization’s taxable 

year. As IRS 

990 forms for these charities become available, examination of them may 

yield more information; however, the way these data are reported may 

not necessarily allow a precise accounting of dollars raised for 

September 

11. For example, pre-existing charities that served other purposes as 

well as September 11, may not report funding data at the level of 

detail that would link spending to September 11 purposes.



Fund Distribution Rates Varied, Reflecting Different Charitable Goals 

and Purposes:



Of the almost $2.7 billion estimated collected by the larger 35 

charities, about $1.8 billion, or 70 percent, has been reported 

distributed as of October 31, 2002. Fund distribution rates, however, 

vary widely from less than 1 percent to 100 percent, in part because of 

the differing goals and purposes of the charities. For example, some 

charities with high distribution rates like the New York Times 9/11 

Neediest Fund or the United Way of the National Capital Area are 

primarily fundraisers that make grants to direct service providers such 

as the Children’s Aid Society and the Salvation Army, which provide 

immediate assistance to survivors. Other charities, particularly those 

that will be providing scholarship assistance to survivors like the 

Citizens’ Scholarship Foundation, the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society, 

the Army Emergency Relief, and Windows of Hope, have much lower 

distribution rates that reflect the longer-term missions of their 

charities. Figure 1 shows the amount of aid raised and distributed by 

charities. See appendix II for the amount of funds raised, distributed, 

and distribution rates for each of the 35 charities.



Figure 1: Amount of Aid Raised and Distributed by Selected Charities



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Charities Provided Cash and a Broad Range of Services to People 

Directly and Indirectly Affected:



Charities provided a wide range of assistance to the different 

categories of individuals affected, including the families of those 

killed, those indirectly affected through the loss of a job or 

displacement from their home, and services provided to the rescue 

workers and volunteers, as shown in table 2. A full accounting of the 

range of services provided is difficult to ascertain, as many large 

funders have provided grants to multiple service providers. For 

example, The September 11th Fund has provided grants to over 100 

organizations, including direct service providers like Safe Horizon, 

which provide assistance to families and communities and to rescue and 

recovery efforts.



Table 2: Examples of the Range of Services Provided by the Two Largest 

September 11 Charities:



Charity: American Red Cross - Liberty Fund; Directly affected: 3,396 

survivor families received 12 months’ living expenses, averaging 

$58,900 per family ($200 million total), and each estate will receive 

$45,000; Indirectly affected: 55,000 families who lost jobs or income 

or had damaged homes received 3 months’ living expenses ($276 

million); Immediate disaster relief: 14 million meals for disaster 

workers and survivors; Other: 236,000 mental health counseling visits 

and; 131,000 health service visits.



Charity: The September 11th Fund; Directly affected: 3,500 survivors 

received $20,000 each; Indirectly affected: 35,000 displaced workers 

and 3,000 displaced residents received $4,000 - $10,000 each; 

Immediate disaster relief: 343,000 meals served to rescue workers; ; 

4.3 million pounds of food were delivered to ground zero; Other: 

20,000 people received mental health counseling and referrals, and 

10,000 people received legal advice; ; 15,000 people who lost jobs 

received training, career counseling, or placement services; ; Nearly 

1,000 small businesses and nonprofits received grants or loans to help 

rebuild the community.



Source: Data provided by charities as of October 31, 2002, does not 

include future or planned distributions.



[End of table]



Families of those killed on September 11 have received cash gifts from 

various charities to help them through the first year of the recovery 

process. McKinsey’s survey of nonuniformed World Trade Center families 

showed that 98 percent of families reported receiving cash assistance 

averaging $90,000 per family.[Footnote 10] Because of the charities 

specifically established to assist the survivors of the firefighters 

and police killed in the attacks, their survivors will receive more 

cash assistance than survivors of the nonuniformed people killed. A 

Ford Foundation study reports that uniformed rescue workers funds have 

provided families of the Port Authority Police and NYC Police and 

Firefighters with cash benefits of $715,000, $905,000, and $938,000, 

respectively.[Footnote 11]



It was a change in IRS rules and subsequent legislation that enhanced 

the abilities of charities to distribute aid on a per capita basis--as 

did some of the charities focused on those firefighters and police 

killed--rather than on the basis of more in-depth needs assessment. IRS 

rules governing the uses of charitable aid were changed for September 

11 survivors. Recognizing the unique circumstances caused by this 

tragedy and in anticipation of congressional legislation that was 

subsequently passed, IRS relaxed the burden on charities--in the case 

of this disaster only--to show that the assistance provided was based 

on need.[Footnote 12] In November 2001, IRS issued guidance that 

authorized charities to make payments to September 11 victims and their 

families without a specific needs test, if made in good faith and using 

objective standards. Some charities and oversight agencies we spoke 

with said that this placed some charities under pressure to more 

quickly distribute their funds. It allowed others, such as the 

International Association of Fire Fighters, to distribute funds on a 

per capita basis, regardless of need, to the surviving families of 

those who perished, a practice that had not been permitted prior to the 

September 11 disasters.



Charities’ Responses Complicated by Questions about Use of Funds and 

Difficulties Reaching Those in Need:



Questions about how aid should be distributed as well as problems 

identifying and serving thousands of people directly and indirectly 

affected complicated charities’ tasks as they moved to aid those 

affected by the attacks.



Different Perspectives on Appropriate Use of Funds Complicates 

Distribution:



Charities faced considerable debate on how their funds should be 

distributed--to whom, for what, and when? Some victims’ groups and 

charities believe the money should be in the form of cash grants, 

distributed as quickly as possible, and typically focused on families 

of those killed, believing that the survivors are in the best position 

to understand and deal with their individual needs. Other charities and 

oversight organizations believe that needs are best met when the 

charitable funds take into account a broad range of needs, including 

those in the long term, and focus on services rather than cash 

grants.[Footnote 13] For example, Oklahoma City charities emphasized 

needed services rather than cash grants.



While most of the September 11 funds have been distributed in the first 

year, some charities are planning to provide services over the longer 

term. The American Red Cross announced that it is setting aside $133 

million to be spent over the next 3 to 5 years primarily in the areas 

of mental health and uncovered health care costs. The September 11th 

Fund announced that it will use its remaining $170 million over the 

next 5 years to also fund services such as mental health counseling, 

employment assistance, health care, and legal and financial advice. In 

addition, the Survivors’ Fund, the largest fund set up exclusively to 

support the needs of survivors of the Pentagon attack, is focusing its 

services on the long-term needs of the survivors.



Since the attacks, decisions made by the American Red Cross--by far the 

largest holder of funds for September 11 purposes--were the focus of 

much media and congressional scrutiny, raising concerns about its plans 

for funds raised. By the middle of November 2001, contributions to the 

American Red Cross’s Liberty Fund reached nearly $543 million. The 

American Red Cross had established the Liberty Fund to help people 

affected by the September 11 attacks, its aftermath, and other 

terrorist events that could occur in the near future. While American 

Red Cross officials said that from early on it used its traditional 

language in its fund appeals saying that funds raised would be used for 

“this and other disasters,” it was widely perceived as a violation of 

the donors’ intent in this case. In response to concerns about the 

organization’s use of funds, on November 14, 2001, the American Red 

Cross pledged that the entire Liberty Fund would be spent to care for 

those directly and indirectly affected by the September 11 attacks, 

their families, and the rescue workers. Fulfillment of donor intent is 

an important issue, and many charities we spoke with said that they 

were keeping their spending within the framework of what they believed 

donors wanted: to quickly meet the needs of those for whom aid is 

intended.



Representatives from philanthropic oversight organizations said 

charities in general could have minimized some of the problems they 

faced by paying more attention to the public relations aspects of their 

work.[Footnote 14] This might have reduced adverse publicity when 

people expected one thing and charities did another. Problems these 

representatives cited include the following:



* Some charities made vague appeals for money, and the public didn’t 

understand what programs these funds might support.



* Victims and the needs of the survivors were too narrowly defined. 

Some charities communicated a simplistic definition of those needing 

help as only the survivors of those people who were killed or those who 

were injured in the terrorist attacks. However, in the September 11 

disasters, thousands of others were displaced from their homes, lost 

their jobs, and needed counseling to cope with post-traumatic stress 

disorder.



* Some charities implied that all of the funds collected would go to 

direct assistance without any management and administrative cost. This 

created a misperception that services could be delivered without 

trained professionals, administrative back offices, support staff, or 

personnel to help ensure accountability in the use of the donated 

funds.



Identifying and Reaching Those in Need Posed Significant Difficulties:



Charities told us that they had to make extensive efforts to identify 

the people who were killed and locate their survivors, as there were no 

uniform lists, and privacy issues affected the sharing of information. 

For example, when the Robin Hood Foundation wanted to provide $10,000 

cash gifts to the surviving families, it found it had to develop its 

own list of the people who were killed and contact information for 

their survivors. The foundation recruited volunteers to contact World 

Trade Center employers and reported having to sign 55 different 

confidentiality agreements with companies, airlines, and individuals, 

to ensure that Robin Hood Foundation would not share its list with 

other agencies. In the case of those killed and injured at the 

Pentagon, confidentiality was a concern as well. The Pentagon provided 

the Foundation with a list of beneficiary names for the checks but sent 

a representative to New York to put the checks in the envelopes and 

apply the address labels.



Charities made many efforts to reach out to hard-to-serve clients, non-

English speakers, and immigrants. For example, the New York Immigration 

Coalition received $800,000 from The September 11th Fund and money in 

other grants to provide legal assistance, establish immigrant help 

desks at each disaster center, and train charity workers on how to 

better reach immigrants. The NYC Department of Health reported that 

20 percent of those killed in NYC were foreign-born, coming from 

167 different countries. Charity officials said the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service facilitated their efforts to reach immigrants by 

announcing it would not pursue information on the immigration status of 

individuals. Also, some charities such as Windows of Hope were created 

to specifically serve low-income restaurant workers with language 

barriers.



In spite of outreach efforts, representatives from the victims groups 

we spoke with said that survivors were not aware of all charitable 

services and assistance available. A recent study of dislocated 

hospitality-industry workers in the Washington, D.C., region also 

reported that despite the efforts to meet the needs of these workers, 

many still struggled to connect with services.[Footnote 15] Workers 

interviewed for the study said a single source of information and 

referrals for emergency assistance, job placement assistance, or job 

training would have been helpful.



In addition, some people we spoke with in NYC expressed concern that 

many indirectly affected survivors did not qualify for assistance 

because they lived outside the geographic area below Canal Street in 

Manhattan, which was initially targeted for aid by FEMA and many 

charities. After much public concern about the limited geographic range 

of FEMA’s eligibility regulations, in August 2002, the Congress 

mandated FEMA to expand its mortgage and rental assistance to employees 

working anywhere in Manhattan and to those who could track job loss or 

loss of income to September 11.[Footnote 16] FEMA also provides this 

assistance to those workers whose employers are not located in 

Manhattan, but who are economically dependent on a Manhattan firm, and 

anyone living in Manhattan, who commuted in and out of the island and 

who suffered financially because of post-September 11 disruptions.



Charities and Oversight Agencies Have Several Accountability Measures 

in Place; Relatively Few Cases of Fraud Identified So Far:



Charities and government oversight agencies have taken a number of 

steps to prevent fraud, and relatively few cases have been uncovered so 

far. For example, to minimize fraud by individuals, some charities 

required applicants to provide documentation certifying their needs and 

the relationship of their need to the disaster. Also, some charities 

conducted independent reviews of their applications and eligibility 

processes. State attorneys general and local district attorneys told us 

that although they had limited resources to dedicate to such efforts, 

they are actively responding to public concerns about charities. 

Officials from these government oversight agencies pursued 

investigation of fraud by individuals and charities; most of the few 

cases of fraud being prosecuted or investigated in New York relate to 

individuals who are charged with or have been convicted of falsely 

obtaining assistance.



A Range of Accountability Measures Are in Place to Address Different 

Types of Fraud:



Different types of fraud can occur in the solicitation and delivery of 

charitable funds: fraud by individuals, charities, and businesses, as 

shown in table 3. Charity and oversight agency officials told us that 

they employed a number of methods to prevent this fraud, as also shown 

in table 3. Most charities we spoke with required applicants to provide 

documentation certifying identity, injury, death of a family member, or 

loss of job or home, and may have asked for proof of financial need, 

for example, paycheck stubs. To verify that they were adequately 

screening for fraud, some charities conducted independent reviews of 

their eligibility processes. State charity officials and local district 

attorneys typically relied heavily on complaints from the public and on 

the charities themselves to identify ineligible individuals or 

fraudulent charitable groups or solicitations.[Footnote 17] These 

officials also reached out to a number of professional groups, 

including presentations to fund-raising associations and charity boards 

about state guidelines on charitable solicitation. Finally, they also 

issued educational press releases, suggesting that people should 

examine charities before they write checks. See appendix III for 

contact information for each state’s charity oversight agency.



Table 3: Types of Fraud and Related Accountability Measures:



Different types of fraud possible: By individual - Fraudulent claims of 

eligibility for a charity’s funds or services can include; * claiming 

survivor benefits using a false death certificate, a forged identity, 

or by falsely overstating connections to a victim or; * falsely 

representing need for job-related or housing benefits; Accountability 

measures in place to prevent or detect fraud: * Charities’ eligibility 

screening, including document checking; * Charities’ internal audits 

of the screening process; * Police or district attorney investigations 

(either initiated by charities or by law enforcement).



Different types of fraud possible: By group or organization (“charity”) 

-; * Solicitation of funds by those pretending to represent a 

charitable cause or; * using September 11 to solicit funds but using 

the funds raised for an unrelated purpose; Accountability measures in 

place to prevent or detect fraud: * Complaints by the general public or 

charity watchdogs; * Attorneys general investigations; * External 

audits by accounting firms; * IRS review; * Police or district 

attorney investigations.



Different types of fraud possible: By business - Cause-related 

marketing, or any arrangement that results in a charity receiving a 

percentage of sales, can result in a charity receiving few or no 

benefits; Accountability measures in place to prevent or detect fraud: 

* Charities monitor media and attend to questions from the public; * 

State attorneys general may require submission of a contract between 

the charity and the business; * Police or district attorney 

investigations.



Source: Public and private philanthropic oversight officials and 

charities.



[End of table]



Charities and Oversight Agencies Reported Relatively Few Cases of 

Fraud:



Charities, state attorneys generals, and local district attorneys we 

spoke with said that they have found relatively few cases of fraud by 

charities or individuals. Charities like Safe Horizon told us that they 

were developing relationships with local law enforcement and had 

referred a number of suspicious cases to the police department. 

Furthermore, charities’ internal audits identified additional 

potential cases of fraud. For example, the American Red Cross’s review 

identified 350 suspected cases of fraudulent claims on its Liberty 

Fund, representing less than 1 percent of distributed funds. State and 

local oversight officials told us that although they did not have 

additional resources available to address September 11-related fraud, 

they are actively pursuing any fraud identified. They reported that 

since September 11, they had found relatively few cases of fraud, 

either by charities or individuals.[Footnote 18] These attorneys 

general and state charity officials from the seven states that suffered 

high numbers of casualties from September 11 told us they are 

investigating a combined total of 

17 suspected cases of fraudulent solicitation of funds. Local officials 

indicate that they have more reports of individual fraud than charity 

fraud. For example, the New York County District Attorney’s Office 

reported that as of October 15, 2002, it had arrested 84 people for 

individual fraud and 

2 people for fraudulent solicitation of funds. Representatives of this 

district attorney estimated that about $1 million in aid has been 

fraudulently obtained. The following are examples of suspected 

individual fraud uncovered to date by the New York County District 

Attorney’s Office.[Footnote 19]



* One man staged his own death in the Trade Center, then, posing as his 

next of kin (a recently deceased brother), applied for and received 

over $272,000 from two charities.



* Another NYC man reported that his 13th child had accompanied him to a 

job interview at the World Trade Center and had perished in the attack. 

The investigation revealed that the child never existed, a fact 

confirmed by other family members. The man received $190,867 from two 

charities.



* A group of cafeteria employees in a building near the Trade Center 

were paid for 4 days of work when their building was closed post-

disaster. One employee applied for disaster-related income replacement 

for those 4 days (even though he had been paid) and received funds. 

This employee told his co-workers about his success in obtaining 

charitable aid under pretense, and 23 of his colleagues attempted to do 

the same.



* A man hired 13 homeless people to help him defraud charities. He 

supplied the homeless people with fraudulent documentation of job loss 

and financial need, then drove them around to relief sites around the 

city, where they applied for and received a total of $108,905 from 

charities.



In addition, the New York State Attorney General’s Office reported 

investigating approximately 20 additional cases of individual fraud, 

many of which are related to individuals who allegedly attempted to 

obtain false death certificates.



While information is available on identified fraud cases, the total 

extent of fraud is not known and will be difficult for oversight 

agencies and charities to assess. First, detection of fraud by 

individuals could be challenging, despite checks being in place, as 

charities said they were overwhelmed by the volume of applications for 

assistance and had to hire new staff or volunteers to help them manage 

their relief efforts. The potential for fraud by individuals may have 

increased, as the new personnel may have been unfamiliar with the 

charities’ eligibility regulations and may have inappropriately 

distributed or denied funds. Second, fraud detection may be 

particularly problematic in areas such as cause-related marketing by 

businesses. For example, the executive director of the Twin Towers Fund 

told us he was unaware of a record company’s marketing campaign on the 

fund’s behalf, until he read about it in the newspaper. The charity had 

to contact the record company, then set up a contract to formalize the 

terms of the fundraising. Third, it may also be difficult to track 

fund-raising by groups using September 11 to solicit for other 

purposes. In one state, oversight officials told us that an 

organization conducted a telemarketing drive promising that funds would 

be given to “firefighters, like those who died September 11,” but no 

funds went to the survivors of firefighters who died in the attacks. 

Oversight agencies said that these types of organizations tended to 

move very quickly in and out of geographic areas, making it difficult 

to find and prosecute them.



Little Coordination

of Charitable Aid Occurred Early on, although a More Integrated 

Approach Emerged Months Later:



Despite some early cooperation attempts, survivors had difficulty 

accessing charitable aid. The unprecedented scope and complexity of the 

September 11 disasters presented a number of challenges to charities in 

their attempts to provide seamless social services for those in need of 

assistance. Some months after the disaster, however, oversight agencies 

and large funders worked to establish a more coordinated approach at 

the September 11 attack sites. This included the formation of 

coordinating entities, the implementation of case management systems, 

and attempts to implement key coordination tools, such as client 

databases.



Despite Early Charity Response Efforts, Survivors Experienced 

Difficulty Accessing Aid:



Following the disasters, charitable organizations and FEMA took some 

immediate steps to help survivors get assistance, including checking in 

with other agencies. Charities moved quickly to collect funds, give 

grants to service providers, and establish 800 numbers and Web sites 

with aid information. FEMA headquarters contacted charities likely to 

be active in disaster relief to discuss how FEMA contacts would be of 

assistance. Some efforts at formal coordination include Family 

Assistance Centers and Disaster Assistance Service Centers, where some 

of the larger charities and government agencies set up booths to 

provide assistance to survivors and those economically affected by the 

disaster.[Footnote 20] The United Way of the National Capital Area held 

information-sharing meetings for Washington and Virginia service 

providers and the New York Community Trust did so as well.



Despite these efforts, September 11 survivors generally believed that 

they had to navigate a maze of service providers in the early months, 

and both charities and those individuals who were more indirectly 

affected by the disaster (e.g., by job loss) were confused about what 

aid might be available. Survivors and charities told us that aid 

distribution was hindered by a number of factors. First, those seeking 

aid had to fill out a separate application and provide a unique set of 

documentation for each charity to which they applied. Second, in the 

early stages post-disaster, all survivors had to apply in person for 

charitable assistance, even if they had previously obtained aid from 

the organization. This became troublesome for the many survivors who 

did not live in metropolitan New York or Washington. Charities like 

Pennsylvania September 11th Assistance ended up paying for survivors’ 

travel to the Liberty Park Family Assistance Center in New Jersey. 

Third, over the course of the first few weeks after the disaster, many 

dimensions of coordination were limited by little information sharing 

between organizations helping survivors. For example, some charities 

said that they were not familiar with other organization’s rules, 

especially FEMA’s. Furthermore, because of privacy laws, charities and 

FEMA did not share information about clients with each other; as a 

result, in early stages of service delivery, charities might have 

duplicated services to clients.



Although ways to address some of these issues have been used in the 

past, the scope and complexity of the September 11 disasters presented 

a number of challenges to charities in their attempts to provide 

seamless social services for survivors of the disaster. In the 

aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, charities and service providers 

worked together to create a database of aid recipients, provide each 

recipient a case manager, and to participate in a long-term recovery 

committee to better coordinate aid, fostering a more integrated service 

delivery approach. The September 11 events differed in key ways that 

hindered a similar approach:



* A much larger and more diverse number of actual and potential aid 

recipients. The 168 Oklahoma City victims who were killed were a more 

homogeneous population of federal government workers, while the World 

Trade Center disaster alone had 2,795 victims from a number of 

businesses and 167 countries. In addition, thousands more than in 

Oklahoma City were indirectly affected through loss of their jobs and 

homes.



* Numerous governmental jurisdictions. The September 11 attacks 

occurred in three states, which involved multiple government entities 

at each site.



* Larger numbers and multiple layers of funders and grantees. In 

addition to existing charities that were already involved in disaster 

relief services, the hundreds of new charities that emerged to provide 

aid to families of those killed were involved.



A More Integrated Approach Emerged Later:



Some months after the disaster, oversight agencies and large funders 

worked to establish a more coordinated approach at the September 

11 attack sites. This approach included the formation of coordinating 

entities, the implementation of case management systems, and attempts 

to implement key coordination tools.



Several coordination efforts emerged at the disaster sites. In NYC, the 

State Attorney General had encouraged charities to work together to 

ease access to aid, including use of a common application form and 

database. The 9/11 United Services Group (USG), a consortium of human 

service organizations and their affiliated service coordinators, was 

formed in December 2001 to foster a more coordinated approach to aid 

delivery. (See appendix V for a list of USG organizations participating 

in USG service coordination.) Furthermore, in the spring of 2002, FEMA 

successfully established long-term recovery committees in New York and 

New Jersey for charities that had smaller September 11 funds than those 

of USG. In Virginia, the Survivors’ Fund set up a board to assess the 

unmet needs of survivors and persons who were economically displaced by 

the disasters. Members of this board include key area agencies, such as 

the United Way and FEMA, which have historically facilitated 

coordination in areas affected by disasters.



As coordination efforts progressed, some charities continued to follow 

Oklahoma’s model by establishing case managers for individuals who lost 

family members in the attacks. Although all the charities were familiar 

with a case management model, cross-agency case management presented 

challenges, as agencies’ mission statements or regulations specified 

different qualifications and specializations of their social workers 

(e.g., Master’s degree required). Despite these challenges, USG’s 

service coordinator program involves the efforts of a number of 

charities across the city. If families need help, they can call the 

Safe Horizon hotline, and an operator there assesses whether the 

clients have short-or long-term needs, his or her geographic area, and 

the clients denominational or ethnic preferences for service providers, 

and then connects them with a 9/11 USG service coordinator. 

Coordinators are current staff of local charities and have been trained 

by USG to help survivors identify and access a broad range of 

services.[Footnote 21] They have access to a number of technology 

tools, including an automated centralized directory of benefits and 

services available to families and a community website that allows 

service coordinators to communicate with the entire service coordinator 

community. Service coordinators, key charity managers, and the New York 

FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaison also meet weekly to discuss service 

provision issues. The Survivors’ Fund in Virginia also set up case 

managers but contracted with another agency to hire new social workers 

to provide case management services to the injured and families of 

those killed in the Pentagon attacks.



Agencies began to develop client databases and a common application 

form for disaster relief aid. One key advantage of client databases is 

that the services clients had already received could be tracked by the 

charities, and as such, would prevent duplication of services. Although 

many charities expressed concern that their clients would lose their 

anonymity by signing a confidentiality waiver, the 9/11 USG has 

established a database of September 11 services for its service 

coordinators, and a number of their member organizations are creating 

and using a confidential client information database. The Survivors’ 

Fund and United Way of the National Capital Area have also created a 

client database, which is primarily being used by these two agencies. A 

common application form would improve the aid delivery process by 

reducing the amount of documentation and forms clients have to provide 

to each agency. The common application form is in progress in New York. 

The form has not been established yet, as charities that have trained 

volunteers nationwide indicated that at this time, they are not 

interested in retraining all their volunteers to a new application.



Lessons Learned 

after September 11 Could Improve 

Future Responses but Pose Implementation Challenges:



Charities, government agencies, watchdog groups, and survivors’ 

organizations shared with us lessons that could improve the charitable 

aid process in disasters in the future. These lessons include easing 

access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between 

charities and FEMA, increasing attention to public education, and 

planning for future events. Some efforts are under way to address these 

issues. However, the independence of charitable organizations, while 

one of their key strengths, will make implementation of these lessons 

learned dependent on close collaboration and agreement among these 

independent organizations.



Lessons Learned Could Prove Valuable in the Future:



Charities, government agencies, watchdog groups, and survivors’ 

organizations shared with us the lessons they learned from the 

September 11 charitable aid process that could be incorporated into the 

nation’s strategies for responding to large-scale disasters in the 

future.



Easing access to aid for those eligible--Helping individuals in need 

find out what assistance is available, and easing their access to that 

assistance could be facilitated if a central, accessible source of 

public and private assistance is made available to survivors. Access to 

assistance could be further facilitated if charities adopted a 

simplified, one-stop application process and a standard waiver of 

confidentiality that would allow survivors to get access to multiple 

charities and allow charities to share information on individuals 

served and avoid duplicative services. While the focus of such an 

effort would be to facilitate services to those in need, a one-step 

application process could include a set of basic interview questions or 

steps designed to prevent fraud. Another way to facilitate eligible 

survivors receiving assistance is by offering each survivor a case 

manager, as was done in NYC and in Washington. Case managers can help 

to identify gaps in service and provide assistance over the long term.



Enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and FEMA-

-Private and public agencies could better assist those in need of aid 

by coordinating, collaborating, sharing information with each other, 

and understanding each other’s roles and responsibilities. This 

requires effective working relationships with frequent contacts. 

Collaborative working relationships are essential building blocks of 

strategies that ease access to aid, such as a streamlined application 

process or the establishment of a database of families of those killed 

and injured to help charities identify service gaps and further 

collaboration.



Increasing attention to public education--Charities’ increased 

attention to public education could better inform the donor public on 

how their money will be spent and the role of charities in disasters. 

Controversies over donor intent could be minimized if charities took 

steps when collecting funds to more clearly specify the purposes of the 

funds raised, the different categories of people they plan to assist, 

the services they plan to provide, and how long that assistance will be 

provided, as that information becomes known.



Charities can further ensure accountability by more fully informing the 

public about how their contributions are being used and providing 

comprehensive information on facets of their operation to the public. 

The September 11th Fund’s and the Robin Hood Foundation’s Web sites, 

for example, list updated information on grants, recipients, amounts, 

and purposes. Moreover, efforts such as those of the Metro New York 

Better Business Bureau to compile information across multiple 

organizations can help provide accountability for how funds are used. 

For future events, the Ford Foundation report on the philanthropic 

response to September 11 suggested that “the major philanthropies 

should consider designating a well-respected public figure who would 

provide daily media briefings on their responses.”:



Planning for future events--Planning for the role of charities in 

future disasters could aid the recovery process for individuals and 

communities. While disasters, victims, and survivors can vary widely, 

it could be useful for charities to develop an assistance plan to 

inform the public and guide the charities’ fundraising efforts. In 

addition, state and local efforts related to emergency preparedness 

could explicitly address the role of charities and charitable aid in 

future events. Future plans could also address accountability issues, 

including training for charitable aid workers and law enforcement 

officials about identifying potential fraud and handling referrals for 

investigations.



Some Charitable Organizations and FEMA Are Taking Steps to Incorporate 

Lessons Learned but Face Significant Challenges:



While some of the lessons learned can be implemented at the individual 

charity level, most require a more collaborative response among 

charities, and some steps are under way to build collaborative 

responses. Key efforts include the following:



* The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster--This 

organization has 34 national member organizations, such as the American 

Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and Catholic Charities USA, 52 state and 

territorial organizations, and some local organizations. Established in 

1970, its goal is to promote collaboration, while encouraging agencies 

to respond independently but cooperatively in disasters. Since 

September 11, 2001, this organization has initiated information sharing 

meetings in NYC and Washington, D.C., and has discussed lessons learned 

at its annual meeting in March 2002. See appendix IV for a list of its 

members.



* As part of its mission, the 9/11 United Services Group is planning to 

develop a blueprint for the coordinated delivery of social services and 

financial aid in future emergencies.



* Later this year, FEMA is facilitating a meeting between a committee 

of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster and the 

9/11 United Services Group.



While some charitable organizations are taking steps to incorporate 

lessons learned, they face significant challenges. By its inherent 

nature, the charitable sector is comprised of independent entities 

responsive to clients and donors; it is not under the direction of a 

unifying authority. While in situations such as September 11 FEMA is 

required to coordinate activities of certain charitable organizations, 

as well as others that agree to such an arrangement, FEMA officials 

said that in exercising this authority for September 11 and other 

events, they work closely with charities as a facilitator, not as a 

leader or director. FEMA officials noted it is important to build and 

maintain trust with the charitable organizations and to be careful to 

give local leadership the opportunity to lead in disasters. An 

externally imposed effort to direct or manage charities, whether by 

FEMA or another entity, could have deleterious effects; a key strength 

of charities is their ability to react flexibly and independently in 

the event of disasters.



Conclusions:



Overall, charitable aid made a major contribution in the nation’s 

response to the September 11 attacks. Given the massive scale and 

unprecedented nature of the attacks, the charities responded under very 

difficult circumstances. Through the work of these charities, millions 

of people have been able to contribute to the recovery effort and 

provide assistance to those directly and indirectly affected by the 

attacks. While much has been accomplished by charities in this 

disaster, lessons or strategies have also been identified related to 

improving access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and 

between charities and FEMA, increasing attention to public education, 

and planning for future events that could improve future responses in 

disasters.



There are no easy answers as to how to incorporate strategies that may 

result in a more accessible and transparent service delivery system 

into any future disasters. Coordination and collaboration among 

charitable organizations are clearly essential elements of these 

strategies, and some organizations have taken steps in this direction. 

At this point in time, an appropriate role for the federal government 

is to facilitate these efforts through FEMA, the federal agency that 

already has relationships with many of the key organizations involved 

in disaster response. This will help to ensure that lessons learned 

from the September 11 attacks and their aftermath can be incorporated 

into the nation’s strategies for dealing with large-scale disasters 

like this in the future. At the same time, it will help to ensure that 

charities may remain independent and vital in their programs and 

priorities.



Recommendation for Executive Action:



We are recommending that the director of FEMA convene a working group 

of involved parties to take steps to implement strategies for future 

disasters, building upon the lessons identified in this report and by 

others to help create sustained efforts to address these issues. The 

working group should address these and other issues as deemed relevant: 

(1) the development and adoption of a common application form and 

confidentiality agreement; (2) the establishment of databases for those 

receiving aid in particular disasters; and (3) strategies for enhancing 

public education regarding charitable giving in general and for large-

scale disasters in particular, including ways to enhance reporting on 

funds collected and expended. This working group could include FEMA, 

representatives of key charitable and voluntary organizations and 

foundations; public and private philanthropic oversight groups and 

agencies; and federal, state, and local emergency preparedness 

officials.



Agency Comments:



In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA said that the 

recommendation is a practical one that is likely to foster enhanced 

communication and coordination among charitable organizations, 

foundation leaders, and government emergency managers. While FEMA 

acknowledged the challenges of working with a number of independent 

entities, it added that a working group of involved parties, along with 

skillful leadership and active participation among members, is likely 

to lead to important improvements in coordination and ultimately better 

service to those affected by disasters. In addition, FEMA noted that a 

component of the existing National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster may serve as the basis upon which to build. FEMA’s full 

comments are presented in appendix VI.



We also shared a draft of the report with the American Red Cross, the 

Salvation Army, The September 11th Fund, the 9/11 United Services 

Group, an official of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster, and officials in the New York State Attorney General’s Office 

in New York City and obtained their oral comments. They said the report 

was fair and balanced and provided technical comments which we included 

where appropriate. Regarding the recommendation, the American Red Cross 

expressed some concern over whether FEMA was the right party to convene 

the working group, stating that the group’s goals would be outside of 

FEMA’s mission and that it would, therefore, be inappropriate to ask 

that FEMA be responsible for ensuring the success of the work group. 

The American Red Cross also said that the goals of the work group would 

more properly fall under the purview of the nonprofit sector and that 

work has already started on some of these areas.



In responding to this concern, we emphasize that our recommendation 

charges FEMA with convening a working group of involved parties but 

does not specify that FEMA play the leadership role or be charged with 

management or oversight of the group’s progress. We agree that the key 

to the success of a working group in this area will depend on the 

actions of the charitable and voluntary organizations involved. We also 

acknowledge that some efforts are under way, including among the 

American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and the United Way, to address some 

of these issues. However, we continue to think that it is appropriate 

for FEMA to play a role in initiating meetings that will bring together 

involved parties. This will help to ensure that sustained attention is 

paid to these important issues and potentially result in improving the 

nation’s response to those in need in any future disasters.



As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 

after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of the report 

to other interested parties. We will also make copies available upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-7215 or Gale C. Harris, Assistant Director, at 

(202) 512-7235. Kevin Kumanga and Emily Leventhal also made key 

contributions to this report.



Sincerely yours,



Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director

Education, Workforce, and

 Income Security Issues:



Signed by Cynthia M. Fagnoni



[End of section]



Appendix I: September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:



Who is eligible: Any individual who was physically injured or the 

families and beneficiaries of any individual who was killed as a result 

of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.



Payments: The average award under the September 11th Victim 

Compensation Fund of 2001--before the statutorily required collateral 

offsets--is projected to be more than $1.8 million per claimant. 

Although it is difficult to determine the amount of collateral sources 

(e.g., life insurance) each claimant will have, the Special Master who 

oversees the fund believes the average payout after collateral sources 

will be approximately $1.5 million per claimant. Charitable aid 

received by families is not taken into account in determining award 

amounts.



Total estimated expenditures: Over $5 billion.



Applications: Filing deadline is December 2003.



[End of section]



Appendix II: September 11 Fund Data for 35 Large Charities:



Relief charities: American Lung Association[A]; Amount

raised: $139,000; Amount

distributed: $63,000; Percent

distributed: 45.



Relief charities: American Red Cross Liberty Fund; Amount

raised: 1,011,000,000; Amount

distributed: 696,000,000; Percent

distributed: 69.



Relief charities: Americares Foundation; Amount

raised: 9,261,073; Amount

distributed: 9,261,073; Percent

distributed: 100.



Relief charities: Army Emergency Relief[B]; Amount

raised: 5,792,588; Amount

distributed: 477,100; Percent

distributed: 8.



Relief charities: American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 

Animals; Amount

raised: 1,744,000; Amount

distributed: 1,179,000; Percent

distributed: 68.



Relief charities: Catholic Charities of NY[C]; Amount

raised: 25,400,000; Amount

distributed: 17,300,000; Percent

distributed: 68.



Relief charities: Catholic Charities USA; Amount

raised: 31,847,514; Amount

distributed: 30,590,054; Percent

distributed: 96.



Relief charities: Citizens’ Scholarship Foundation; Amount

raised: 113,167,336; Amount

distributed: 1,054,174; Percent

distributed: 1.



Relief charities: Farmers’ Market Federation of NY[D]; Amount

raised: 162,000; Amount

distributed: 162,000; Percent

distributed: 100.



Relief charities: Federal Employee Education & Assistance Fund; Amount

raised: 5,500,000; Amount

distributed: 650,000; Percent

distributed: 12.



Relief charities: International Association of Fire Fighters; Amount

raised: 161,000,000; Amount

distributed: 159,898,000; Percent

distributed: 99.



Relief charities: Jewish Federation of Greater Washington[C]; Amount

raised: 450,000; Amount

distributed: 400,000; Percent

distributed: 89.



Relief charities: Kiwanis International Foundation; Amount

raised: 1,591,916; Amount

distributed: 1,558,373; Percent

distributed: 98.



Relief charities: Lions Clubs International Foundation; Amount

raised: 3,023,000; Amount

distributed: 1,200,000; Percent

distributed: 40.



Relief charities: National Italian American Foundation; Amount

raised: 334,000; Amount

distributed: 71,500; Percent

distributed: 21.



Relief charities: Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society; Amount

raised: 6,800,000; Amount

distributed: 67,300; Percent

distributed: 1.



Relief charities: New York Police and Fire Widows’ and Children’s 

Benefit Fund; Amount

raised: 117,000,000; Amount

distributed: 53,000,000; Percent

distributed: 45.



Relief charities: New York Times 9/11 Neediest Fund; Amount

raised: 61,147,017; Amount

distributed: 60,583,789; Percent

distributed: 99.



Relief charities: NYC Police Foundation; Amount

raised: 11,000,000; Amount

distributed: 6,400,000; Percent

distributed: 58.



Relief charities: New York State Fraternal Order of Police Foundation; 

Amount

raised: 12,028,314; Amount

distributed: 7,200,972; Percent

distributed: 60.



Relief charities: New York State World Trade Center Relief Fund[E]; 

Amount

raised: 68,730,000; Amount

distributed: 60,355,500; Percent

distributed: 88.



Relief charities: Port Authority Police Benevolent Association[C]; 

Amount

raised: 11,642,025; Amount

distributed: 9,988,001; Percent

distributed: 86.



Relief charities: Robin Hood Foundation; Amount

raised: 60,300,000; Amount

distributed: 38,500,000; Percent

distributed: 64.



Relief charities: Rotary International; Amount

raised: 1,800,000; Amount

distributed: 1,450,000; Percent

distributed: 81.



Relief charities: Salvation Army[C]; Amount

raised: 87,722,612; Amount

distributed: 64,629,024; Percent

distributed: 74.



Relief charities: The September 11th Fund; Amount

raised: 512,000,000; Amount

distributed: 376,000,000; Percent

distributed: 73.



Relief charities: Survivors Fund[B]; Amount

raised: 20,000,000; Amount

distributed: 4,300,000; Percent

distributed: 22.



Relief charities: Tides Foundation; Amount

raised: 597,207; Amount

distributed: 594,934; Percent

distributed: 99.



Relief charities: Twin Towers Fund; Amount

raised: 205,000,000; Amount

distributed: 156,000,000; Percent

distributed: 76.



Relief charities: Uniformed Firefighters Association[C]; Amount

raised: 71,000,000; Amount

distributed: 60,000,000; Percent

distributed: 85.



Relief charities: Union Community Fund; Amount

raised: 3,092,105; Amount

distributed: 2,938,000; Percent

distributed: 95.



Relief charities: United Jewish Communities; Amount

raised: 4,800,000; Amount

distributed: 4,400,000; Percent

distributed: 92.



Relief charities: United Way National Capital; Amount

raised: 3,956,512; Amount

distributed: 3,034,461; Percent

distributed: 77.



Relief charities: Windows of Hope; Amount

raised: 19,000,000; Amount

distributed: 8,000,000; Percent

distributed: 42.



Relief charities: World Vision; Amount

raised: 12,428,378; Amount

distributed: 11,908,215; Percent

distributed: 96.



Relief charities: Total; Amount

raised: $2,660,456,597; Amount

distributed: $1,849,194,470; Percent

distributed: 70.



Source: Data provided by charities, as of October 31, 2002, does not 

include distributions planned for the future.



Notes: We asked the charities to exclude funds they had received from 

other September 11 funds to avoid overstatement of the funds involved. 

In addition, the amount of funds distributed includes funds used for 

administrative purposes in some cases. Because of differences in how 

charities defined and reported administrative funds, we did not break 

out administrative funds.



All information as of October 31, 2002, unless noted in one of the 

table notes.



[A] As of June 25, 2002.



[B] As of September 30, 2002.



[C] As of July 31, 2002.



[D] Fund closed September 11, 2002.



[E] This is not a charity; the New York State Department of Taxation 

and Finance established and administers this fund of donations.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Appendix III: Contact Information for State Charity Officials:



State: Alabama; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: [Empty]; In-state toll

free number: 800-392-5658.



State: Alaska; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 907-465-2133; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Arizona; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 602-542-5763; In-state toll

free number: 800-352-8431.



State: Arkansas; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 501-682-2341; In-state toll

free number: 800-482-8982.



State: California; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 916-322-3360; In-state toll

free number: 800-952-5225.



State: Colorado; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 303-866-5189; In-state toll

free number: 800-222-4444.



State: Connecticut; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 860-808-5318; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Delaware; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 302 -577-8600; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: District of Columbia; Charity office: Department of Consumer and 

Regulatory Affairs; Main telephone

number: 202-442-4400; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Florida; Charity office: Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services; Main telephone

number: 850-488-2221; In-state toll

free number: 800-435-7352.



State: Georgia; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: 404-656-2817; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Hawaii; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 808-586-2727; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Idaho; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main telephone

number: 208-334-2424; In-state toll

free number: 800-432-3545.



State: Illinois; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 312-814-2595; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Indiana; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 317-232-6330; In-state toll

free number: 800-382-5516.



State: Iowa; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main telephone

number: 515-281-5926; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Kansas; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 785-296-2215; In-state toll

free number: 800-432-2310.



State: Kentucky; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 502-696-5389; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Lousiana; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 504-342-7013; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Maine; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main telephone

number: 207-626-8800; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Maryland; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: 410-974-5534; In-state toll

free number: 800-825-4510.



State: Massachusetts; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 617-727-2200; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Michigan; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 517-373-1152; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Minnesota; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 651-296-3353; In-state toll

free number: 800-657-3787.



State: Mississippi; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: [Empty]; In-state toll

free number: 888-236-6167.



State: Missouri; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 573-751-3321; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Montana; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 406-444-2026; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Nebraska; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 402-471-2682; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Nevada; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 702-486-3777; In-state toll

free number: 800-992-0900.



State: New Hampshire; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 603-271-3591; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: New Jersey; Charity office: Department of Law; Main telephone

number: 973-504-6215; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: New Mexico; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 505-827-6060; In-state toll

free number: 800-300-2020.



State: New York; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 212-416-8000; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: North Carolina; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main 

telephone

number: 919-807-2214; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: North Dakota; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 701-328-3404; In-state toll

free number: 800-472-2600.



State: Ohio; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main telephone

number: 614-466-4320; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Oklahoma; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: 405-521-3912; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Oregon; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 503-229-5725; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Pennsylvania; Charity office: Department of State; Main 

telephone

number: 717-783-1720; In-state toll

free number: 800-732-0999.



State: Rhode Island; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 401-222-3048; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: South Carolina; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main 

telephone

number: 803-734-1790; In-state toll

free number: 888 -242-7484.



State: South Dakota; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 605-773-4400; In-state toll

free number: 800-300-1986.



State: Tennessee; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: 615-741-2555; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Texas; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main telephone

number: 512-463-2070; In-state toll

free number: 800-621-0508.



State: Utah; Charity office: Department of Commerce; Main telephone

number: 801-530-6601; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Vermont; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 802-828 3171; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Virginia; Charity office: Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services; Main telephone

number: 804-786-2042; In-state toll

free number: 800-552-9963.



State: Washington; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main telephone

number: 360-753-0863; In-state toll

free number: 800-332-4483.



State: West Virginia; Charity office: Secretary of State; Main 

telephone

number: 304-558-6000; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Wisconsin; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 608-266-1221; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



State: Wyoming; Charity office: Attorney General’s Office; Main 

telephone

number: 307-777-7841; In-state toll

free number: [Empty].



Source: National Association of State Charity Officials Web page: 

http://www.nasconet.org.



Note: The offices listed in this table may be contacted if you have 

questions or information related to charitable aid.



[End of table]



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Members of National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster:



The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster has 34 national 

member organizations as well as 52 state and territorial Voluntary 

Organizations Active in Disaster.



American Baptist Men’s Ministries

Adventist Community Services

American Radio Relay League

American Red Cross

America’s Second Harvest

Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team

Catholic Charities USA

Christian Disaster Response

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee

Church of the Brethren

Church World Service

Episcopal Relief and Development

Friends Disaster Service

Humane Society of the United States

International Relief Friendship Foundation

International Aid

Lutheran Disaster Response

Mennonite Disaster Service

National Emergency Response Team

National Organization for Victim Assistance

Nazarene Disaster Response

Northwest Medical Teams International

The Phoenix Society For Burn Survivors

Points of Light Foundation

Presbyterian Disaster Assistance

REACT International

The Salvation Army

Society of St. Vincent de Paul

Southern Baptist Disaster Relief

United Jewish Communities

United Methodist Committee On Relief

United States Service Command

Volunteers of America

World Vision:



[End of section]



Appendix V: Organizations Participating in 9/11 United Services Group 

Service Coordination:



American Red Cross in Greater New York:



Asian American Federation of New York:



Chinese-American Planning Council:



Chinatown YMCA:



Filipino American Human Services:



New York Asian Women’s Center:



Japanese American Social Services:



Asociacion Tepeyac:



Black Agency Executives:



Community Service Society of New York:



Brooklyn Bureau of Community Service:



Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York:



Catholic Charities of Brooklyn and Queens:



Center for Independence of the Disabled in New York:



Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies:



Lutheran Social Services of Metropolitan New York:



Hispanic Federation:



Committee for Hispanic Children and Families:



Puerto Rican Family Institute:



Unitas Therapeutic Community:



Urban Health Plan:



Human Services Council:



Children’s Aid Society:



Latin American Workers Project:



The Legal Aid Society of New York:



Mental Health Association of New York City:



Safe Horizon:



The Salvation Army:



United Jewish Appeal - Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York:



F.E.G.S. NY:



F.E.G.S. Long Island:



Jewish Board of Family and Children’s Services:



Westchester Jewish Community Services:



Shorefront Y:



United Neighborhood Houses of New York:



Forest Hills Community House:



Supportive Children’s Advocacy Network New York:



WTC Permanency Project:



Council on Adoptable Children:



Jewish Child Care Association:



[End of section]



Appendix VI Comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency:



Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472:



DEC 02 2002:



Ms. Gale Harris:



Assistant Director. Education, Workforce, And Income Security Issues:



United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:



Dear Ms. Harris:



The enclosure contains The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

response to the GAO Draft Report entitled: “September 11 --More 

Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’ 

Contributions in Disaster.”:



If you have the need for any further information, please have a member 

of your staff contact Larry Zensinger, Director, Recovery Division at 

(202) 646-3642.



Sincerely,



Gary E. Crowell:



Chairman, Audit Coordinating Committee:



Signed by Gary E. Crowell



Enclosure:



cc: Inspector General:



Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472:



NOV 21, 2002:



MEMORANDUM FOR: Nancy L. Hendricks Assistant Inspector General 

for Audit:



FROM:



John R. D’Araujo, Jr. Assistant Director Response and Recovery 

Directorate:



SUBJECT:General Accounting Office (GAO) Draft Report:



We have reviewed the GAO Draft Report entitled: “ September 11 --More 

Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’ 

Contributions in Disaster” and would like to submit the following 

comment, as invited by GAO to do so:



The recommendation as stated on page 27 is a practical one that is 

likely to foster important interagency communications and an enhanced 

level of coordination and collaboration among charitable organizations, 

foundation leaders, and government emergency managers. Though some 

discussion of lessons-learned has certainly begun already, such a broad 

based working group does not currently exist. As indicated in the GAO 

report there are very real challenges when working with a number of 

independent agencies, however, with skillful leadership and active 

participation among members, this working group is likely to lead to 

important improvements in coordination and ultimately better service to 

those affected by disasters. The already existing National VOAD 

Recovery Committee may serve as the basis upon which to build.



Please contact Larry Zensinger, Director, Recovery Division at (202) 

646-3642 if you have any questions on this matter.



FOOTNOTES



[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Review of Studies of the 

Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on the 

World Trade Center, GAO-02-700R (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2002).



[2] The 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery 

from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, P.L. 107-

38, mandates that not less than one-half of the $40 million 

appropriated shall be for disaster recovery activities and assistance 

activities in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. 



[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, September 11: Interim Report on 

the Response of Charities, GAO-02-1037 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 

2002).



[4] IRS evaluates compliance by reviewing the informational Form 990, 

Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax.



[5] Businesses, as well as individuals, may also access federal aid, 

for example, Small Business Administration loans.



[6] The Department of Justice’s Public Safety Officers Benefit Fund 

provides a one-time sum of $250,000 to the next-of-kin of a fallen 

public safety officer, such as a firefighter. This amount was 

retroactively adjusted after September 11, as the 2001 amount had been 

$152,000. 



[7] State Crime Victim Compensation Board Funds are available post-

disaster if, like the September 11 attacks or the Oklahoma City 

bombing, the disaster site is also a crime scene.



[8] IRS told us that in December 2002, it would begin a “limited 

operational review” of 88 of the newly approved charities. This review 

will examine whether the money raised by these charities was expended 

for charitable purposes, whether these charities met their IRS filing 

requirements, and whether or not the charitable funds raised provided 

personal or private benefit to the charity or individuals involved.



[9] For more information see U.S. General Accounting Office, Tax-Exempt 

Organizations: Improvements Possible in Public, IRS, and State 

Oversight of Charities, GAO-02-526 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2002).



[10] See A Study of the Ongoing Needs of People Affected by the World 

Trade Center Disaster prepared by McKinsey & Co. for 9/11 United 

Services Group (New York, NY: June 2002). The 9/11 United Services 

group is a consortium of 13 organizations formed in December 2001 to 

foster a more coordinated approach to aid delivery. This survey 

conducted for them is based on data collected in April and May 2002. 

The figure cited does not include any additional cash assistance 

families may receive from the September 11TH Victim Compensation Fund.



[11] Seessel, Tom, The Philanthropic Response to 9/11. Prepared by The 

John S. Watson Institute for Public Policy, Thomas Edison State College 

for the Ford Foundation (Trenton, N.J.: Aug. 2002).



[12] The Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, P.L. 107-134, was 

enacted January 23, 2002. Among other provisions, the act states that 

tax-exempt charities making payments “by reason of the death, injury, 

wounding, or illness of an individual incurred as the result of the 

terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, or 

an attack involving anthrax occurring on or after September 11, 2001 

and before January 1, 2002,” are not required to make specific 

assessment of need before giving out aid. The act also forgives for 

certain tax years the tax liability of those killed in the April 19, 

1995, Oklahoma City bombing, those killed in the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, and those killed in the terrorist attacks involving 

anthrax occurring after September 10, 2001, and before January 1, 2002. 





[13] A recent study conducted by McKinsey & Co. for the 9/11 United 

Services Group estimates that the cost of meeting the needs of all 

those affected by September 11 in NYC will be $373 million in 2003 and 

$44 million in 2004. See A Study of the Ongoing Needs of People 

Affected by the World Trade Center Disaster prepared by McKinsey & Co. 

for 9/11 United Services Group (New York, NY: June 2002).



[14] These organizations include the Better Business Bureau’s Wise 

Giving Alliance, the American Institute of Philanthropy, the Urban 

Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, the National 

Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, the Brookings Institution, and 

the Ford Foundation.



[15] Martha Ross, Brookings Greater Washington Research Program and 

Sandra Padilla, Diane Levy, and Elizabeth Cove, The Urban Institute, 

Calling 211: Enhancing the Washington Region’s Safety Net After 9/11 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002).



[16] 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and 

Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, P.L. 107-206, 

enacted August 2, 2002.



[17] We spoke with state charity officials, from state attorneys 

general offices or secretary of state offices, in seven states: 

California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 

Pennsylvania, and Virginia.



[18] As of October 31, 2002.



[19] Although the cases mentioned here all involve the successful 

receipt of money from charities, not everyone who was charged with 

fraud received aid.



[20] Family Assistance Centers were primarily designed to meet the 

needs of the families of those killed. These centers were set up by key 

government entities at each attack site, specifically, the city of New 

York and the Department of Defense Office of Family Policy. 

Pennsylvania did not have a Family Assistance Center, but Pennsylvania 

September 11th Assistance coordinated services for families of victims 

of the Pennsylvania crash. Disaster Assistance Service Centers were set 

up by FEMA in New York to serve the needs of those recently displaced 

from their jobs as a result of the September 11 attacks. 



[21] By July 2002, USG reported training 300 coordinators, 90 percent 

of which are from USG charities.



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