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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 

April 2002: 

Military Training: 

Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness 
Reporting: 

GAO-02-525: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Forces Face Increasing Training Limitations: 

Constraints Adversely Affect Training, but the Effects Are Not 
Captured in Readiness Reporting: 

Service and Command Coordination Is Insufficient When Pursuing 
Training Alternatives: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the 
Pacific: 

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries: 

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Army Capability Table: 

Table 2: Marine Corps Capability Table: 

Table 3: Navy Capability Table: 

Table 4: Air Force Capability Table: 

Table 5: Units and Locations Visited on This Assignment: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: A Steel Mill Constructed in the Safety Easement Area of the 
Koon-ni Range: 

Figure 2: A Korean Woman Harvesting Rice on Field Inside the Story 
Range Complex: 

Figure 3: A Machine Gun Firing Point on Range 7 in Okinawa: 

Figure 4: A Tank Tunnel Firing Point on Range 10 in Okinawa: 

Figure 5: Major Combat Units and Bases in Europe: 

Figure 6: Major Combat Units and Bases in Japan and Korea: 

Figure 7: Map of Germany Identifying the Locations of Major Combat 
Units and MAjor Training Facilities: 

Figure 8: Map of Italy Identifying the Locations of Major Combat Units 
and Major Training Facilities: 

Figure 9: Map of United Kingdom Identifying the Location of Major 
Combat Units and Major Training Facilities: 

Figure 10: Map of Korea Identifying the Location of Major Combat Units 
and Major Training Facilities: 

Figure 11: Map of Japan, Including Okinawa, Identifying the Location 
of Major Combat Units and Major Training Facilities: 

Figure 12: Map of Alaska Identifying the Location of Major Combat 
Units and Major Training Facilities: 

Figure 13: Map of Hawaii Identifying the Location of Major Combat 
Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2002: 

The Honorable Daniel Akaka: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Rigorous, realistic training is one of the keys to military readiness. 
All United States military forces, including the approximately 240,000 
military personnel stationed outside the continental United States 
(CONUS), conduct frequent training exercises to hone and maintain 
their war-fighting skills. About 110,000 U.S. military personnel are 
stationed in Europe and 130,000 in the Pacific, including the states 
of Hawaii and Alaska. (See appendix I for maps showing the two 
theaters and what units are stationed there and appendix II for a map 
of each location and its major training areas.) Concerned that growing 
restrictions by host governments are limiting the training 
opportunities available to U.S. military forces, you requested that we 
examine a number of issues related to the ability of non-CONUS-based 
forces to train. Accordingly, our objectives in this report were to 
assess (1) the types of training constraints that non-CONUS forces 
face and whether they are likely to increase in the future, (2) the 
impact these constraints have had on the ability of military units to 
meet their training requirements and on their reported readiness, and 
(3) alternatives that exist to increase training opportunities for 
these forces. As agreed with your office, we included all U.S. forces 
based outside the 48 contiguous states in our examination, which 
includes those based in Hawaii and Alaska. A more detailed description 
of our scope and methodology is included in appendix III. 

This is the first of two assessments we have recently made of training 
limitations facing U.S. forces. We are also nearing completion of a 
study of environmental and commercial development issues affecting 
military training ranges in the continental United States. That report 
is being conducted at the request of the House Committee on Government 
Reform and is expected to be completed shortly. 

Results in Brief: 

Non-CONUS combat units are able to meet many of their training 
requirements but face a variety of training constraints that have 
grown over the past decade and are likely to increase further. Units 
have the most difficulty meeting their training requirements for (1) 
maneuver operations, (2) live ordnance practice, and (3) night and low 
altitude flying. These difficulties arise because both the European 
and Pacific units' home-station training locations are not large 
enough to conduct specific ground maneuvers on a regular basis; are 
limited in the types of munitions or use of live fire or both; and are 
restricted in terms of flight hours, altitudes, and electronic 
frequencies allowed. While some restrictions are long standing, the 
increase in restrictions facing U.S. forces in many cases is the 
result of the growing commercial and residential development on or 
near previously established training areas and ranges. The 
construction itself, including residential and agricultural 
development within training ranges, has forced some ranges to close, 
reduced the training capability at others, and often delayed training 
on those that remain. Continued growth in land use and competing 
demands for air space near training ranges is likely to result in 
further training constraints in the future. 

Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects, including (1) 
requiring workarounds-—or adjustments to the training event—-that 
sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat; 
(2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often; and 
(3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished. One 
potential problem with workarounds is that they lack realism, and the 
procedures used during the workaround could lead to individuals 
practicing tactics that may be contrary to what would be used in 
combat. For example, in actual combat, weapons are armed well before 
pilots make a final approach to a target; however, in Korea, pilots 
are not able to arm their weapons until the final approach on its 
training ranges because of terrain limitations. This causes these 
pilots to learn inappropriate combat tactics. While all units have to 
deploy to major training centers, like the Army's Combat Maneuver 
Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, to obtain some of their higher-
level combined-arms training skills, we found that all non-CONUS units 
had to deploy to complete training that normally is performed at home 
station by CONUS units. These units deploy to other locations within 
the country in which they are stationed (or in the case of Alaska and 
Hawaii to other locations in the state); to other locations within 
their theaters; or back to the United States to complete training. 
While deployments allow the units to complete a great deal more of 
their training, they result in increased costs and more time away from 
home. Even with these actions, there are times when the units are not 
able to accomplish required training or accomplish the training to 
such a limited extent that it just minimally satisfies the requirement. 
However, the adverse effects of training constraints are often not 
being captured in readiness reporting. Our review of unit readiness 
assessments for almost all combat units in Europe and the Pacific for 
the last two fiscal years showed that the impact of limitations and 
restrictions on training were rarely reflected in unit readiness 
reports. 

U.S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to 
address constraints, such as negotiating with host governments to 
lessen restrictions on existing training areas, but such actions are 
often done at an individual-service level and sometimes create 
unforeseen problems for other services and for existing training 
capabilities. For example, Air Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in 
northern Japan are allowed to use a nearby Japanese air base to land 
their F-16s during inclement weather but are not able to practice for 
this maneuver because of an agreement reached by local Japanese 
military officials and a local U.S. Navy official when Misawa was a 
U.S. Navy installation. Under the agreement, Navy P-3 aircraft were 
allowed to practice such landings, but U.S. fighter aircraft could 
not. At the time, the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the 
limitation did not seem significant. The regional military commands do 
not have a strategy for coordinating efforts to improve training that 
could prevent the individual services from pursuing solutions to their 
training shortfalls that are unintentionally detrimental to other 
services or that unintentionally sacrifice some training capabilities 
to improve others. 

GAO is making recommendations to improve the quality of readiness 
reporting to reflect training constraints and to provide for a more 
holistic approach to addressing training constraints. In written 
comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense stated 
that it substantially concurred with the contents of the report and 
its recommendations. A detailed discussion of the department's 
comments is contained in the body of this report. 

Background: 

Armed forces must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter wars, to 
fight and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms 
favorable to the U.S. and allied interest. Historical experiences 
indicate that there is a correlation between realistic training and 
success in combat. Hence, training should be as realistic as possible 
to prepare troops for combat. Service training guidance emphasizes the 
importance of live fire training to create a realistic combat scenario 
and to prepare individuals and units for operating their weapons 
systems. 

U.S. forces are required to train for a variety of missions and 
skills. This training includes basic qualification skills such as 
gunnery and higher-level unit operational combat skills. Service 
training requirements typically require the use of air ranges for air-
to-air and air-to-ground combat, drop zones, and electronic warfare; 
live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small arms, and munitions 
training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic force-on-force 
training at various unit echelons; and sea ranges to conduct ship 
maneuvers for training. To achieve required training, non-CONUS forces 
use a variety of training areas and ranges that are generally owned by 
host governments. 

Ideally, forces conduct the majority of their required training at 
home station using local training areas or operating areas. However, 
non-CONUS forces have historically relied on a combination of 
instrumented training ranges away from home station, major training 
centers, CONUS training exercises, and multilateral training exercises 
with countries within their theater to obtain their required training. 
This includes the Navy and the Marine Corps, which have no permanently 
stationed combat forces in Europe and no fixed access to training 
ranges in the European theater.[Footnote 1] 

We have previously reported that the size of home station training 
areas available to units varies greatly, particularly between units 
stationed overseas and those in the United States.[Footnote 2] For 
example, we reported that local training areas for units stationed in 
Germany have historically varied in size from 3 acres to 8,000 acres, 
with divisional units not always housed at the same location. In the 
United States, we reported that individual installations vary, but far 
more land is available and typical installations may vary in size from 
just under 100,000 acres up to more than one million acres. While this 
report's focus is exclusively on training constraints outside CONUS, 
both we and the Department of Defense (DOD) are examining constraints 
on CONUS training. At the request of the House Committee on Government 
Reform, we are reviewing the effects of environmental and commercial 
development restrictions on key training areas within the 48 
contiguous states and whether DOD is effectively working to address 
these issues. In addition, DOD is in the process of determining the 
extent of the training problems at CONUS facilities. DOD's Senior 
Readiness Oversight Council initiated a sustainable range initiative 
spearheaded by the Defense Test and Training Steering Group. The 
initiative's purpose is to develop and recommend a comprehensive plan 
of action to ensure that the department maintains range and airspace 
capabilities that support DOD's future training needs. In November 
2000, the steering group submitted a sustainable range report to the 
Oversight Council followed by the publication of nine action plans 
that addressed eight training-related issues[Footnote 3] confronting 
CONUS training and an outreach plan. Currently, DOD's efforts have 
focused almost exclusively on CONUS training. There is no consolidated 
DOD-wide listing of non-CONUS training ranges and their associated 
limitations. Some services have started collecting this information, 
but a complete inventory is not yet available. 

Forces Face Increasing Training Limitations: 

Unlike CONUS-based forces, which conduct their company level and below 
training at home-station, none of the permanently stationed non-CONUS 
combat units are able to meet all their company-level and below 
training requirements at home station. According to service doctrine, 
home-station training should support company-level and below training 
requirements. Non-CONUS combat units have the most difficulty meeting 
their training requirements for (1) maneuver operations, (2) live 
ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. These 
difficulties arise because both the European and Pacific units' home-
station training locations are not large enough to conduct specific 
ground maneuvers on a regular basis; are limited in the types of 
munitions or use of live fire or both; and are restricted in terms of 
flight hours, altitudes, and electronic frequencies allowed. Some 
restrictions are long-standing, while others are more recent. In many 
cases, the increase in restrictions facing U.S. forces is the result 
of the growing commercial and residential development on or near 
previously established training areas and ranges. The construction 
itself, including residential and agricultural development within 
training ranges, has forced some ranges to close, reduced the training 
capability at others, and often delayed training on those that remain. 
Continued growth and host nation concerns may result in further 
restrictions in the future. 

Ground Maneuver Restrictions: 

In many instances non-CONUS-based units' home-station local training 
areas are not large enough or are inappropriate for certain 
operations. To make training as realistic as possible, many exercises 
require specific terrain or large maneuver areas. However, in both 
Europe and the Pacific U.S. ground forces lack enough space and/or the 
appropriate terrain to train at their home stations. Following are 
several examples of such limitations. 

* The Army in Germany has historically had limited local training 
areas available for units to engage in home-station training. The Army 
recognizes only 7 of the 61 identified local training areas as having 
all the characteristics of a local training area. Over the past 
decade, as part of the Army's practice of being a good neighbor, there 
has been a shift toward using designated areas as opposed to large 
open areas on private land, which has further lessened the amount of 
land available for training. Although, the Army has limited local 
training areas, it has been able to conduct all its required training 
using a combination of training areas within Germany. Figure 7 in 
appendix II is a map showing the locations of major units and training 
facilities in Germany.

* Army units in Italy also have a limited number of local training 
areas to conduct home-station training, and for some types of mission 
training the terrain there is inappropriate for the desired training. 
Army officials based in Italy said that there were only a few 
instances where training was constrained at some local training areas. 
One local training area does not allow the soldiers to train on their 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. A second local training 
area is coming under pressure from increased recreational use by the 
local population. Specifically, during summer 2001, a portion of this 
training area was completely closed because the area abutting it is 
becoming increasingly popular for hikers. Army officials expressed 
concern that they may lose more of the training area in the future. 
Regarding having the right terrain, while Army units in Italy are 
expected to operate in wooded areas, soldiers told us that during some 
exercises they pretended to be moving through a wooded area hiding 
behind trees when in actuality they were moving through an open field 
at their local training areas. Figure 8 in appendix II is a map 
showing the locations of major units and training facilities in Italy. 

* In Korea, the Army's local maneuver areas are inadequate in size to 
support platoon and company training events, which has been a 
longstanding problem. While the local training areas have always been 
inadequate to support training events to Army standards, the areas 
available for training are shrinking as the population in or around 
the training areas increases. Figure 10 in appendix II is a map 
showing the locations of major units and training facilities in Korea. 

* In Japan, local training areas on Okinawa are too small to support 
the Marine Corps' maneuver-training requirements. Only small-unit 
elements can maneuver together. Large force elements that would 
normally be in close proximity to each other and maneuver together 
must break into small groups, disperse among the island's training 
areas, and maneuver independently. Further, maneuver training that 
ideally would be conducted in a continuous, uninterrupted manner must 
be started and stopped as units move from one non-contiguous training 
area to another. Training constraints have further increased as a 
result of the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
agreement,[Footnote 4] which returned the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield—-
the site previously used to conduct parachute drop training-—to Japan 
and terminated nearly all artillery training on the island. Most 
battalion exercises and parachute drops, which require troops to 
conduct maneuver exercises after being dropped, have been relocated 
off Okinawa. Marine Corps officials told us that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to obtain maneuver training on Okinawa. Figure 
11 in appendix II is a map showing the locations of major units and 
training facilities in Japan. 

Live-Ordnance Restrictions: 

Many local training areas in both Europe and the Pacific prohibit the 
use of live munitions or specific weapon systems. DOD officials have 
repeatedly expressed the need for live-fire to make training realistic 
preparation for combat. Many live-fire restrictions were implemented 
because development and population growth near the training ranges 
reduced the areas available for safety zones and led to noise 
complaints from nearby residents. Following are examples of such 
restrictions. 

* In Germany, for decades Army unit-level personnel have had 
difficulty in conducting live fire training at home station except for 
small arms because of the prohibitions on live fire in those areas. 
Army units have historically gone to the Grafenwoehr Training Area-—
the Army in Europe's principal live-fire training area-—to conduct 
live fire training on their major weapons such as tanks and artillery. 
Regarding Grafenwoehr's sufficiency for future advance munitions, Army 
officials told us that they plan to upgrade the training area to 
accommodate all munitions that will be used by Army in Europe units. 

* Both the Army and the Air Force in Italy have restrictions on live 
fire training. There are such restrictions at nine of the Army's ten 
local training areas and firing ranges. The Air Force's fighter wing 
in Italy does not have a local air-to-ground range for bombing 
training although bombing is one of its primary missions. The lack of 
an air-to-ground range is a longstanding problem and prevents the wing 
from conducting surface attack training in Italy. 

* The two F-15E squadrons in the United Kingdom cannot employ laser-
guided bombs on any of their local ranges. Laser-guided bombs are the 
primary munitions used for air-to-ground attacks by these squadrons. 
Although these squadrons have regular access to air-to-ground ranges 
for non-laser-guided bombing, the ranges are not considered quality 
tactical training ranges that allow pilots to train for identifying 
and engaging targets. Figure 9 in appendix II is a map showing the 
locations of the fighter wing and training facilities in the United 
Kingdom. 

* When in Europe, Navy units have limited access to training for live 
fire combined arms, supporting-arms coordination, and naval gunfire 
support—-all of which are capabilities that the Navy tries to maintain 
at a certain level while deployed in theater. As a result, they rely 
on bilateral exercises, use of other country's ranges or North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercises to attain training. 

* Both the Air Force and the Army in Korea face restrictions on live 
fire training. The capabilities at Koon-ni, the Air Force's only 
exclusive-use range, have steadily diminished over time. Prior to 
1978, live bombs were dropped on the target island, practice bombs 
were dropped on the mainland, and strafing was conducted on a scored 
[Footnote 5] land target. In 1978, live bombing was discontinued. Over 
the years, commercial development has moved within the range's safety 
easement zone. By 1989, practice bombing was restricted to the target 
island and in 2000 the scored strafing pits were closed. Figure 1 is a 
photo of a steel mill constructed within the zone during the time that 
strafing was still allowed. As of April 2002 only training ordnance is 
allowed and can only be used over water. For the Army, its live-fire 
Story Range Complex does not have a safety easement zone sufficient 
for some of its longer-range weapons, such as the Multiple-Launch 
Rocket System and the Palladin. In addition, farming and structures—
such as houses, a greenhouse, and power lines—lie within the range's 
boundaries. Army officials said they frequently find farmers on the 
range, but they are working with the Korean government to fence this 
range to keep farmers out of those areas. Figure 2 shows a picture of 
a local farmer harvesting rice inside the impact area at the Story 
Range. These farmers have to be removed for obvious safety reasons 
before the Army can use the range, which causes delays in training. 

Figure 1: A Steel Mill Constructed in the Safety Easement Area of the 
Koon-ni Range: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: A Korean Woman Harvesting Rice on Field Inside the Story 
Range Complex: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* In Japan, the Navy's ships and aircraft face live-fire restrictions 
at their local training facilities. The Navy is unable to conduct two 
of its surface anti-air warfare exercises due to inadequate target 
support facilities. These exercises are for the Rolling Airframe 
Missile against a subsonic cruise missile target and for the standard 
missile against the Supersonic Sea Skimming Target. The Navy ships 
typically use Farallon de Medinilla, a range about 1,400 miles from 
Tokyo, to train aircraft in their air to ground deliveries and for 
surface ship naval gunfire support. Pacific Command officials said 
that in March 2002, a Federal judge held that the incidental killing 
of migratory birds at this range violated the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act and that a hearing is scheduled for April 30, 2002, to determine 
if operations at this range will be enjoined. Furthermore, the Pacific 
Command said that if the Navy loses use of this range, serious 
degradations in readiness will be expected within six months unless an 
alternative range is found. In addition, the Navy's carrier air wing 
faces constraints on its ability to conduct live fire training. 
Because of the close proximity of the wing's home base at Atsugi (a 
suburb of Tokyo) to the local population, live munitions are not 
allowed to be stored at Atsugi or to be carried by aircraft departing 
the runway. Consequently, the wing's aircraft have to take off from 
Atsugi, land at another base in Japan to load munitions, and then 
continue on to other ranges to conduct their live fire training. 

* In addition to training constraints on mainland Japan, on Okinawa 
the Marines have limited live-fire range capabilities at their local 
training areas. For the Marines, the ranges throughout the island have 
fixed firing points that do not allow tactical firing. Figures 3 and 4 
show examples of the fixed firing points at two of the ranges. As a 
result, Marines can train to fire in only one direction as opposed to 
firing in any direction, which would be the most likely situation in 
combat. While these ranges can help a new Marine become familiar with 
his weapon, they cannot provide realistic or qualification training. 
In addition, since the early 1990s, the Marines' ability to conduct 
artillery firing on Okinawa has steadily diminished and as previously 
noted was discontinued altogether in 1996. The government of Japan now 
pays for the Marines to conduct their artillery firing training on the 
Japanese mainland four times a year. However, Marine Corps officials 
told us that one of the artillery ranges used on the mainland, Camp 
Fuji—a co-use training area in northern Japan—is restricted and that 
artillery is not being trained as robustly as it was on Okinawa. 

Figure 3: A Machine Gun Firing Point on Range 7 in Okinawa: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: A Tank Tunnel Firing Point on Range 10 in Okinawa: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* Land limitations and environmental concerns restrict live fire 
training in Alaska and Hawaii. In Alaska, the artillery, mortar, and 
Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire Command-Link Guided missile 
(TOW) firing area at Fort Richardson is unavailable to units 6 months 
a year (during the warmer months). In addition, the local training 
areas are insufficient to support cavalry gunnery, air-defense 
artillery-platoon "Stinger" missile ground-to-air gunnery, TOW, and 
the MK-19, an automatic grenade launcher. In Hawaii, the Makua live 
fire range complex on Oahu was closed from September 1998 to October 
2001 because of environmental concerns raised by the local population. 
Consequently, during this time the Army and Marines were unable to 
conduct company live fire exercises at home station. According to Army 
in the Pacific officials, the Makua range complex is now open for 
limited use under the terms of a lawsuit settlement. According to 
these officials, it is unlikely that the Marines will be able to use 
this range for the next 3 years because the settlement agreement 
limits the number of annual training events. 

Airspace Restrictions: 

Forces in both Europe and the Pacific are not able to conduct all 
their aviation training events using their local training areas due to 
a variety of airspace restrictions. For aviators in both theaters, air 
space restrictions limit the ability to accomplish required training; 
thus limiting pilots and aircrews' proficiency in some areas. Although 
some restrictions are longstanding, Air Force personnel told us that 
airspace throughout Europe and the Pacific is becoming increasingly 
congested, adding to the difficulty in completing training. Following 
are examples of airspace restrictions. 

* The Air Force units stationed in Germany have limited local air 
space available, and altitude restrictions prohibit flying below 1,000 
feet. Airspace is routinely available between 1,000 and 10,000 feet 
and the Air Force can obtain access to temporary reserved airspace 
above 10,000 feet,[Footnote 6] which is allocated to military training 
flights. The ability to train below 1,000 feet and above 10,000 feet 
is important because pilots are likely to engage in combat at both low 
and high altitudes. In addition, flying is limited to the hours 
between 7 a.m. and 11 p.m.[Footnote 7] Pilots are also prohibited from 
flying at supersonic speeds and employing chaffs and flares. The 
tactical ranges in Germany are limited in that only eight aircraft at 
a time can use them; this does not allow the pilots to train in a 
realistic formation. 

* Air space restrictions in Italy are a major challenge for the Air 
Force wing located in Aviano. The wing does not have permanent air 
space for air-to-air training in Italy. Currently, the wing uses a 
number of small air spaces over the base and airspace over the 
Adriatic Sea; however, there is no binding agreement for continued use 
of this space. Since 1993, the Italian government has limited U.S. 
military aviation forces in Italy, including both the Air Force and 
the Army, to 44 sorties[Footnote 8] per day. According to wing 
personnel, it is impossible for the Air Force to meet all annual 
training events within the 44 sorties per day restriction. In addition 
to sortie limitations, the Air Force is faced with additional 
restrictions, such as restricted flying hours, which make it difficult 
to complete night training requirements; hot pit refueling, that is, 
refueling while the pilot is in the cockpit and the engine is running; 
employing chaffs and flares; and flying at low altitudes. 

* For the Air Force, airspace in the United Kingdom is very congested 
and has restrictions on high altitude and supersonic training, both of 
which are necessary for pilots to accomplish prescribed air-to-air 
attacks. Limited night flying hours restrict pilots' ability to 
accomplish night vision training events. Pilots have limited radio 
frequencies in which they can operate their electronic equipment. The 
only air space dedicated for unrestricted air-to-air training—-
including the ability to fly supersonic, employ chaff/flares, and fly 
at unlimited altitudes—-is at an Air-Combat Maneuvering-
Instrumentation (ACMI) range over the North Sea operated by a private 
contractor. See appendix II figure 9 for the location of the North Sea 
ACMI range. To gain access to this range, the United States must have 
a contract that allows it to buy training slots; however, this 
contract lapsed after fiscal year 2001 because of a lack of funding. 
Electronic warfare training is also a challenge for the Air Force 
wing. It does not have access to electronic warfare ranges where it 
can fly against threat emitters and regularly be exposed to reacting 
to aircraft system alerts. Lastly, the lack of radio frequencies for 
uses such as communicating while training and transmitting training 
telemetry to ground stations is an issue in the United Kingdom and 
throughout Europe. However, the United Kingdom and Italy have now 
approved frequencies for the Air Force in Europe's rangeless training 
technology although there is still a lack of radio frequencies for 
communicating while training 

* In Korea, the ranges used by the Air Force at Koon-ni and Pilsung 
have several restrictions. Both ranges do not allow flying after 10 
p.m. This makes it extremely difficult for pilots to meet night-flying 
requirements during the summer months. In addition, the physical 
locations of the ranges restrict the approaches that aircraft can use 
to enter the ranges and the angles of attack used to engage targets. 
In both these locations, the airspace has become increasingly 
congested over time. The construction of the Inchon commercial airport 
near Seoul and its expected traffic growth will have a negative impact 
on airspace availability for training at Koon-ni Range in the future. 

* In Japan, Air Force and Naval aviators are unable to successfully 
complete training at home station. The size and capabilities of the 
Ripsaw Range in northern Japan do not support training for the Air 
Force wing's mission,[Footnote 9] which is suppression of enemy air 
defenses. The range has only two emitters, and the physical size of 
the range and airspace will not permit additional emitters. Further, 
frequency bands are extremely restricted in Japan and additional 
frequency approval would be very difficult even if the available range 
space would accommodate adding more emitters. Consequently, while the 
size and capability of this range has not changed, the wing's mission 
changed, rendering this range ineffective for current training 
requirements. For the Navy, prior to 1992, night landing practice was 
conducted at Atsugi Naval Air Field. However, due to noise complaints 
generated by the increased population from residential development 
that abuts the Air Field fence, in 1992 routine landing practice was 
discontinued at Atsugi. The interim solution has been to have the 
pilots use Iwo Jima, 674 nautical miles away. The base commander can 
get approval for night landing practice at Atsugi only if weather 
prohibits the use of Iwo Jima or if an emergency arises that requires 
the wing to deploy quickly. Furthermore, because the airspace around 
Atsugi has become extremely congested, landing patterns cannot be 
practiced to standard. 

* In addition to constraints on mainland Japan, airspace on Okinawa is 
restricted, creating difficulties for Air Force and Marine Corps 
pilots. According to Air Force personnel, there is no electronic 
warfare training capability on the island. The closest range with 
electronic emitters is the previously discussed Ripsaw Range in 
northern Japan. Low altitude flying (below 1,000 feet) is prohibited 
over Okinawa. Good neighbor policies limit flying to between 6 am. and 
10 p.m. Restrictions imposed to accommodate civilian air traffic have 
dramatically increased, and Marine Corps officials told us that as a 
result they cannot fly low altitude air defense missions effectively. 

Constraints Adversely Affect Training, but the Effects Are Not 
Captured in Readiness Reporting: 

Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects. These include 
(1) requiring workarounds—-adjustments to the training events-—that 
sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat, 
(2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often, and 
(3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished. 
Sometimes workarounds lack realism, and the procedures used during the 
workaround could lead to individuals practicing tactics that may be 
contrary to what would be used in combat. While all units have to 
deploy to obtain some of their higher-level combined arms training 
skills, we found that all non-CONUS units had to deploy to complete 
training that normally is performed at home station by CONUS units. 
While deployments allow the units to complete a great deal more of 
their training, they result in increased costs and more time away from 
home. Even with these actions, units are not always able to accomplish 
required training or accomplish the training to such a limited extent 
that it just minimally satisfies the requirement. However, the adverse 
effects of training constraints are often not being captured in 
readiness reporting. 

Workarounds May Provide Unrealistic Training: 

Units employ workarounds to mitigate home-station training 
limitations. Although workarounds are preferable to forgoing the 
training, they often result in training that is of lower quality or 
that creates "negative" training. Negative training is practicing 
procedures in a manner inconsistent with how an action would be 
performed in combat, which results in developing bad habits. In 
Europe, in some instances the Army adapts maneuver training to fit the 
land available and the Air Force flies unrealistic air-to-ground 
attack training missions. In the Pacific, the Air Force must perform 
workarounds in Korea and Japan. These workarounds include delaying 
weapons arming when approaching the training ranges and using 
substitute signals to replicate threat emitters. Following are 
examples of such workarounds. 

* In Italy, one of the Army's local training areas is not large enough 
or wooded enough to accomplish its required training. For the unit to 
perform its required flanking maneuver, it does so in pieces so that 
the land will accommodate the event. To train on what to do after 
making contact with the enemy, soldiers told us that a member of the 
unit would hide behind a pile of sandbags in an open field. The other 
members move through the open field and at some point the hidden 
solider playing the role of the enemy initiates contact for the unit 
to react. This workaround does not provide realistic training, because 
there is only one possible place the "enemy" can be. Army officials 
based in Italy said that this local training area is not the preferred 
place for units to conduct the type of training described and that 
other training areas are available and used between 150 and 220 times 
per year. 

* Air Force pilots in the United Kingdom have to both simulate air-to-
ground attacks using training lasers instead of real lasers and train 
at different altitudes than they would likely operate at in combat. 
According to personnel at the fighter wing, training lasers create bad 
habits, especially for younger, less-experienced pilots, because the 
training laser has a shorter range, which does not allow for training 
on the longer range targeting likely in combat. In addition, flying at 
altitudes that are different than the altitudes likely to be used in 
combat affects pilots' timing, habit patterns, situational awareness, 
and engagement times. For example, because air-to-air missiles have 
twice the range at high altitude than at low altitude, the inability 
to train at high altitudes does not allow pilots to practice firing 
missiles in a realistic combat scenario. 

* In Korea, at the Koon-ni range pilots have to delay arming their 
weapons until final approach. According to Air Force personnel this is 
negative training because, in actual combat, weapons are armed well 
before the final approach. 

* In Japan, to get practice against more than the two threat emitters 
at Ripsaw Range, pilots from the fighter wing must employ a "trick 
file" to fool their aircrafts' on board electronic warfare systems to 
make the systems think that weather and other civilian radars are 
threat emitters. While this workaround enables the aircraft's sensors 
to pick up the radar signals as if they were threat systems, the 
training is not realistic. The commercial radars are always turned on, 
making them easy to find. In combat situations, adversaries keep their 
air defense radars off as much as possible, making them much more 
difficult to locate. 

Deployments Allow Units to Meet Some, but Not All, Training Needs: 

When units are unable to mitigate their training constraints with a 
workaround, the next course of action taken is to deploy to complete 
training requirements. While all units have to deploy to major 
training centers like the Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center in 
Hohenfels, Germany to obtain some of their higher-level collective 
training skills, we found that all non-CONUS units had to deploy to 
complete training that CONUS units normally conduct at home station. 
Non-CONUS units deploy to other locations within the country in which 
they are stationed; in Alaska and Hawaii to training facilities 
elsewhere in those states; to other countries within their theaters; 
or back to the United States to complete training. While deployments 
allow the units to complete a great deal more of their training, they 
result in increased costs and more time away from home, although both 
DOD and the Congress are trying to reduce time away from home. 

Data we collected from each of the military services' commands in 
Europe and the Pacific show that in many cases when an entire 
country's training facilities (including both U.S. and host-country-
operated facilities) are considered, or in the case of Alaska and 
Hawaii all facilities in those states, units are able to meet many of 
their training requirements. Since some facilities are not located 
near where units are stationed, Army and Marine Corps ground maneuver 
units and some Navy aviation units and ships must deploy to training 
facilities elsewhere in the country or state in which the unit is 
based and sometimes to other locations in their theater of operations. 
Air Force wings, except those in Korea, must deploy outside the 
country or state in which they are based to complete their training. 

The following is a discussion by service of overall training 
capabilities. Tables 1-4 show each service's training capabilities and 
how well the Commands believe their training facilities in that 
country or state satisfy their training needs. At our request, the 
service commands graded their locations on a high, medium, or low 
scale. High (H) denotes that units can fully satisfy or satisfy a vast 
majority of the capability; moderate (M) denotes that most of the 
capability can be satisfied; and low (L) denotes that very few to none 
of the training requirements can be satisfied in country or within the 
state. Because each service has different training requirements, the 
capabilities being rated vary. 

* As shown in table 1, Army units can meet most training needs in 
country or state. Army units mainly deploy within country or state to 
obtain maneuver, major gunnery, and combined arms live fire training 
at the company level or higher. Army units in Germany deploy to 
Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels training areas on an average of 28 days per 
year to accomplish this training. Army units in Italy deploy to 
Grafenwoehr twice a year for about one month and to Hohenfels once a 
year for about 25 days to accomplish this training. In Korea, Army 
forces do not deploy away from Korea for training because of their 
mission. However, units have always had to deploy to larger training 
areas within country to complete necessary maneuver training. For 
example, each of the five armor and mechanized battalions in Korea 
deploy on average about 7 weeks each calendar year for maneuver 
training and, in total, the division's four aviation battalions deploy 
for training on average about 2-1/2 weeks each calendar year. Army 
units in both Hawaii and Alaska deploy within their respective states 
to accomplish their training requirements. This is particularly true 
for live-fire combined-arms training. There are no Army combat units 
permanently stationed in Japan. 

Table 1: Army Capability Table: 

Capability: Armor qualification gunnery 
Germany: H; 
Italy: [A]; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: [A]; 
Alaska: [A]. 

Capability: Mechanized qualification gunnery; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: [A]; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: [A]; 
Alaska: [A]. 

Capability: Infantry weapons qualification; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Attack helicopter qualification gunnery; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: [A]; 
Korea: M; 
Hawaii: M; 
Alaska: [A]. 

Capability: Lift helicopter qualification gunnery; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: M; 
Korea: M; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Artillery qualification; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: M; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Air defense artillery systems qualification; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: M; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Engineer qualification; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: L; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Military Police Qualification; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: M; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Squad/platoon live-fire exercises; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Platoon Exercise Evaluation/Army Training Evaluation 
Program; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: M; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Company/Battalion Field Training Exercise; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: M; 
Korea: M; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Nonstandard urban operations training; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: L. 

Capability: Mission-Essential Training List training; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: M; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: H; 
Alaska: M. 

Capability: Joint training; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: H; 
Korea: H; 
Hawaii: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Legend: 
H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. 
M = Most of the training needs can be satisfied. 
L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. 
[A] Not applicable. 

Source: U.S. Army Europe and Pacific Commands' Analysis. 

[End of table] 

* As shown in table 2, Marine Corps units' ability to meet training 
requirements are more limited than the Army's. Units must deploy to 
achieve most of their combined-arms live-fire training requirements. 
In Japan, on the island of Okinawa, Marine Corps training is largely 
limited to small arms live-fire and maneuver training at company level 
and below. Units must deploy off Okinawa to maintain basic skill 
training. Since 1996, to conduct artillery live fire training, four 
times a year 150 to 700 Marines stationed on Okinawa deploy to the 
Japanese mainland for 30 days. Live-fire and maneuver training above 
the platoon and squad level and any integrated combined-arms live-fire 
training involving coordinated air and ground assault, also must be 
conducted away from Okinawa. For each of these training exercises, 
about 1,000 sailors and marines deploy for 40 days. In Hawaii, Marine 
Corps forces on Oahu must deploy to the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area 
on the island of Hawaii, about 200 miles from Oahu, to conduct 
combined air and ground task-force training. Each deployment lasts 
between 25 and 30 days and involves a maximum of 2,100 Marines. Prior 
to September 1998, the Marines would have conducted most of this 
training at the Army's Makua military training area on Oahu, lessening 
both deployment days and cost. Principally because of transportation 
costs, the Marines estimate it costs $500,000 more per year to train 
at Pohakuloa than it does to train at Makua. There are no Marine Corps 
combat units permanently stationed in Europe. 

Table 2: Marine Corps Capability Table: 

Marine Corps in the Pacific: 

Marine air: 

Capability: Electronic warfare; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Inert ordnance; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa:M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Live ordnance; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Stand-off weapons; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Air combat maneuvers; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Night operations; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Supporting arms coordination exercise; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Troop lifts; 
Japan: H; 
Okinawa: H; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Reconnaissance; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Command and control; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Chaff and flare expenditure; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Marine ground: 

Capability: Reconnaissance; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Ground maneuver; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Combined arms and supporting arms employment; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Night operations; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Command and control; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special operations capable with 
Naval Special Warfare); 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: M. 

Amphibious warfare: 

Capability: Surface assault; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Helicopter assault; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Amphibious reconnaissance; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: M. 

Capability: Live-fire support; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Live Close Air Support; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Capability: Simulated Close Air Support; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Capability: Live demolitions; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: M. 

Legend: 

H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. 
M = Most of the training needs can be satisfied. 
L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Command's analysis. 

[End of table] 

* As shown in table 3, Navy units have limited ability to meet 
training requirements in Japan, including Okinawa. Deployments are 
often needed to drop live ordnance, obtain proper electronic warfare 
training, fly at low altitudes, or to participate in combined air and 
ground forces training. For example, in Japan the carrier wing 
stationed at Atsugi Naval Air Field in the Tokyo suburbs deploys to 
maintain certification and qualification for aircraft carrier 
landings. Since 1992, aircrews have had to deploy to Iwo Jima, about 
674 nautical miles from Atsugi, 2 to 3 times per year for this 
training. It requires between 350 and 500 personnel for a 10-day 
period to accomplish this training, which must be done prior to each 
carrier deployment. Because of its remote location and lack of an 
alternate emergency airfield, practicing carrier landings at Iwo Jima 
requires a safety waiver. In addition, these aircrews must also deploy 
to complete air-to-ground warfare training by either going to a target 
island near Okinawa, nearly 950 nautical miles away, or to Farallon de 
Medinilla, which is nearly 1,400 miles from Atsugi. For electronic 
warfare training, Navy aircrews stationed in Japan usually deploy to 
Pilsung Range in Korea, nearly 650 miles from Atsugi. During our visit 
to Japan, naval aviators said that it was not uncommon for them to 
deploy in excess of 200 days per year. There are no ships or carrier 
air wings permanently stationed in Europe. 

Table 3: Navy Capability Table: 

Navy in the Pacific: 

Anti-air: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: [A]; 
Okinawa: [A];
Hawaii: [A]. 

Anti-surface: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: M; 
Hawaii: H. 

Undersea: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Mine: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Strike: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: M. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: L. 

Electronic: 

Warfare area capability: Air; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: M. 

Warfare area capability: Surface; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Warfare area capability: Submarine; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Hawaii: H. 

Legend:
H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied. 
M = Most of the training needs can be satisfied. 
L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied.
[A] Not applicable. 

Source: U.S. Navy Pacific Command's analysis. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 4, other than in Korea and Alaska, Air Force units 
have limited ability to train in the locations in which they are 
stationed. Many units must deploy to the United States to fulfill 
their live ordnance, electronic warfare, and low altitude flying 
requirements. For example, they deploy to the United States to 
participate in combined air and ground forces training such as Red 
Flag[Footnote 10] exercises and to participate in weapons testing 
exercises. The Air Force wing in Italy relies on deployments to Red 
Flag and weapons testing and delivery exercises to accomplish required 
training such as air-to-ground attacks, munitions employment, and low 
altitude flying because they do not have access to an air-to-ground 
range. In contrast, for CONUS-based units Red Flag is the culmination 
of training, not an opportunity to obtain training not available at 
home station. The Air Force wing in the United Kingdom also deploys to 
the United States for live fire training using laser-guided bombs and 
to engage in air-to-ground training on tactical ranges. Additionally, 
United Kingdom based units rely on deployments to Red Flag exercises 
or weapons system evaluation programs to complete their electronic 
warfare training. The Air Force in Europe discontinued use of a joint 
British and U.S. electronic warfare training range, Spadeadam, in 
October 2000, and the range is currently available on a pay-as-you-use 
basis. As a result of the cost, the fighter wing did not utilize this 
range during fiscal year 2001. Furthermore, a second option, the 
electronic warfare training range available in Germany, is not 
utilized on a routine basis because the distance from the United 
Kingdom to the range requires tanker support to train there, which 
increases training cost. In Japan, the wing stationed at Okinawa, as 
in the United Kingdom, doesn't have access to an electronic warfare 
range. This wing deploys to Ripsaw Range in northern Japan or to 
Pilsung Range in Korea to perform electronic warfare training. There 
are no active duty Air Force combat units stationed in Hawaii. 

Table 4: Air Force Capability Table: 

Capability: Conventional; 
Germany: M; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: M; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Tactical; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: H; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Laser-guided bomb; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: L; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Chaff; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: H; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Flare; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: H; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Night flying; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: M; 
United Kingdom: M; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: H; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Low & medium altitude; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: H; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: L; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Heavy weight; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: M; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: M; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Strafe; 
Germany: M; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: M; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: H; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Live fire; 
Germany: L; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Scorable; 
Germany: M; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: M; 
Korea: H; 
Japan: H; 
Okinawa: [A]; 
Alaska: H. 

Capability: Electronic warfare; 
Germany: H; 
Italy: L; 
United Kingdom: L; 
Korea: M; 
Japan: L; 
Okinawa: L; 
Alaska: H. 

Legend:
H = All or a vast majority of training needs can be satisfied.
M = Most of the training needs can be satisfied.
L = Very few of the training needs can be satisfied.
[A] Not applicable. 

Source: U.S. Air Force Europe and Pacific Commands' analysis. 

[End of table] 

Notwithstanding Workarounds and Deployments, Some Training Cannot Be 
Completed: 

In some instances certain types of training cannot be completed 
notwithstanding service efforts. Specifically, the Air Force in both 
Europe and the Pacific and the Navy in the Pacific are unable to 
complete all their required training events. Following are examples of 
training that cannot be completed. 

* For the Air Force, individual units report to their command what 
types of training they were unable to accomplish in an internal 
document called their "End of Fiscal Year Training Shortfalls Report." 
The fighter wing in Italy reported that it could not complete its 
basic surface attack or night close-air-support training and the 
fighter wing in the United Kingdom reported that it could not 
accomplish all of its required night flying or electronic combat air-
to-ground deliveries in fiscal year 2001. In Korea, fighter squadrons 
reported that they could not satisfy their night-flying requirements 
because aircraft are not allowed to fly with their wing lights off. 
This lowers combat capability because during training it is impossible 
for pilots to avoid looking at anti-collision or navigation lights, 
which would not be available during combat. In Japan, the wing 
stationed on Okinawa is unable to complete its electronic warfare or 
low altitude training requirements because there is no electronic 
warfare range near Okinawa and because low altitude overland flights 
are not permitted on Okinawa. 

* In Japan, five U.S. surface ships stationed in Japan are unable to 
complete their training requirements because they cannot fire the 
rolling airframe missile. This adversely affects their readiness. The 
targets used to qualify this missile cannot be launched and controlled 
from sites on Okinawa or elsewhere in Japan. According to Pacific 
Fleet officials, they arranged for alternate targets and the ships 
needing to fire the Rolling Airframe Missile did so at Farallon de 
Medinilla and Okinawa in March 2002. Now that this is done, Pacific 
Fleet officials expect these ships' readiness to increase. The ships 
are to maintain their currency through simulation. 

Readiness Reporting: 

Our review of unit readiness assessments for almost all non-CONUS 
combat units in Europe and the Pacific for the last 2 fiscal years 
showed that most units consistently reported high levels of training 
readiness. The impact of limitations and restrictions on training 
readiness were rarely reflected in unit-readiness reports. However, 
individual services may report these limitations in other ways. 

Each month, or whenever a change in readiness occurs, units report 
their readiness status through DOD's primary readiness reporting 
system, the Global Status of Resources and Training System. Units 
report their status in four resource areas, one of which is training. 
A unit's training readiness status is determined by the present level 
of training of assigned personnel as compared to the standards for a 
fully trained unit as defined by joint and service directives. 
[Footnote 11] 

We analyzed monthly Global Status of Resources and Training System 
data for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to see how often non-CONUS combat 
units were reporting training readiness at high levels and lower 
levels. Our analysis included units from the Army divisions and Air 
Force fighter squadrons in Europe and the Pacific, and selected non-
CONUS Navy and Marine Corps units in the Pacific. For the units that 
reported low training readiness, we examined the specific reasons 
cited for the lowered training readiness and also reviewed the 
commanders' comments to ascertain whether they attributed any of their 
training readiness shortfalls to training range or host country 
restrictions. Anytime a unit is not at level one, it must identify the 
reason why, and the readiness reporting instruction provides a list of 
reasons for commanders to choose. There is a reason in the 
instructions for identifying problems caused by inadequate training 
areas. In addition, commanders may submit their own remarks on any 
subject. 

Our analysis of unit-readiness reports of combat forces stationed in 
Europe and for most combat forces stationed in the Pacific showed that 
during fiscal years 2000 and 2001 these forces rarely reported low 
combat readiness. In the Pacific, with the exception of U.S. naval 
forces stationed in Japan, forces rarely reported low training-
readiness. Units from both theaters that did report low training-
readiness rarely attributed the degradation to inadequate training 
areas. Rather, other factors were cited such as personnel shortages or 
operational commitments. Further, in those instances in which Air 
Force units reported low training-readiness, Air Force commanders' 
never cited training area limitations or host country restrictions as 
contributing factors to their low training-readiness. Army and Marine 
Corps commanders did cite training area limitations or host country 
restrictions as contributing factors, but only infrequently. 

Naval forces stationed in Japan reported low training readiness more 
often than other forces, but still only a small proportion of the 
time. Inadequate training areas or ranges were the third most 
frequently cited reason for the degraded training readiness. Further, 
when commenting on their units' low training status, commanders of 
these units often cited the inadequacy of the ranges available to them 
and other restrictions that limited their ability to train. For 
example, one unit commander commented that the inability of his 
fighters to carry live munitions out of Atsugi Naval Air Field was a 
contributing factor to his lowered training readiness. 

The limitations of the Global Status of Resources and Training System 
are well known in DOD. For the most part, military officials in both 
theaters and office of the secretary of defense officials told us that 
the unit readiness report is subjective and is not a vehicle to report 
training shortfalls and the associated limitations or restrictions. 
Officials within the office of the secretary of defense also noted 
that the reporting system does not function as a detailed management 
information system objectively counting all conceivable variables 
regarding personnel, training, and logistics. Rather, we were told 
that it asks commanders to report on whether or not their units are 
combat ready or could be combat ready in a comparatively short period 
of time. However, as noted earlier, the readiness reporting system 
contains what are called reason codes to indicate the cause of lower 
reported readiness. These reason codes include inadequate training 
areas. 

There is no overall training shortfalls report that would inform 
senior DOD leadership of a units' inability to obtain required 
training. However, individual Air Force units report to their command 
what types of training they were unable to accomplish and why they 
were limited in what is called their End of Fiscal Year Training 
Shortfalls Report. The Army has recently revised its training 
readiness reporting instructions to make the reporting more objective 
and the Marine Corps has an initiative underway to improve the 
accuracy, objectivity, and uniformity of its training readiness 
reporting, but there are no DOD-wide initiatives to make such 
improvements. 

Service and Command Coordination Is Insufficient When Pursuing 
Training Alternatives: 

U.S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to 
address constraints, including (1) negotiating with host governments 
to lessen restrictions on existing training areas; (2) seeking to work 
with other countries to create additional training opportunities, such 
as expanding bilateral exercises to include training that can no 
longer be conducted at home station; and (3) using technology to 
create, among other things, transportable training systems designed 
for training outside the usual training areas. The regional military 
commands do not have a unified, coordinated strategy for coordinating 
efforts to improve training that could prevent the individual services 
from pursuing solutions to their training shortfalls that are 
unintentionally detrimental to other services or that unintentionally 
sacrifice some training capabilities to improve others. 

Working with Host Governments: 

In most cases, individual services or unit commanders are working with 
host countries to lessen restrictions. This results in individual 
solutions rather than a set of coordinated actions that sometimes 
adversely affect other services or training capabilities. The 
following are examples of various alternatives and their effects. 

* Both Army and Air Force officials in Italy have a very positive 
working relationship with their Italian counterparts and the U.S. 
Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation. The Air Force is currently 
working with them to relax the restriction on the number of sorties 
allowed per day. The Air Force is restricted to 44 sorties-per-day, 
which makes it very difficult to accomplish training especially after 
aircraft were added to the wing. The Air Force is negotiating to 
increase sorties to 63 per day. U.S. Army helicopters stationed in 
Italy are restricted to 12 sorties per day and on a weekly basis only 
15 of these sorties can be low altitude. The Army needs several 
helicopters to take-off and land multiple times to execute a training 
mission, which it views as a single sortie, while under the agreement 
the Italian government counts each helicopter on the mission as a 
single sortie. This restriction as currently defined by the Italian 
government may limit Army helicopters to no more than 1 day of 
effective training per week. Army personnel said that there was a 
miscommunication between the Air Force and the Army about the 
definition of sortie during the initial negotiations. 

* In other European countries with long-standing training constraints, 
actions have been taken to resolve issues. In these cases, the 
services worked closely with the governments and militaries to address 
new issues as they surfaced, such as the impact of the foot and mouth 
disease in the United Kingdom in 2001. In some instances, certain 
restrictions are the result of political agreements and cannot be 
opposed. An example of this is the low-altitude training restriction 
of 1,000 feet above ground level that Chancellor Kohl of Germany and 
President George H.W. Bush agreed upon. 

* Air Force pilots at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan are allowed to 
use a nearby air base operated by the Japanese Air Self Defense Force 
when they have to divert their F-16s because of inclement weather. 
Ideally, the pilots should practice such landings at the air base 
before they need to use it in an emergency. However, they are unable 
to practice because of an agreement reached prior to 1985 by local 
Japanese military officials and a local U.S. Navy official when Misawa 
was a U.S. Navy installation. Under the agreement, Navy P-3 aircraft 
were allowed to practice such landings at the air base, but U.S. 
fighter aircraft could land there only in an emergency. At the time, 
the Navy had no fighter aircraft at Misawa, and the limitation did not 
seem significant. 

* In Korea, U.S. military officials and American embassy personnel are 
working with their host government counterparts in a coordinated 
effort to, among other things, lessen training restrictions and remove 
residential and commercial development from critical training areas. 
According to U.S. military officials in Korea, the resulting Land 
Partnership Plan[Footnote 12] was designed to consider the needs of 
all the services because previously some local commanders had made 
agreements that met their short-term needs but ultimately sacrificed 
broader, more long-term U.S. military interests. Under the plan, the 
United States is to return about 33,000 acres of land it currently 
uses and reduce its major installations from 41 to 26. In exchange, 
Korean civilian housing, farming, and commercial buildings are to be 
removed from the remaining U.S. installations and training areas. The 
United States is also to receive greater access to Korean-owned-and-
operated training areas and ranges. The plan is to be phased in over a 
10-year period. The plan has been completed and is awaiting final 
United States and Korean government approval. If implementation does 
not begin soon, U.S. Forces Korea estimates that its forces will face 
training-readiness shortfalls by 2003. 

* Army officials in Hawaii recently negotiated with local groups the 
reopening of the Makua training area on the island of Oahu. The 
agreement provides training opportunities that satisfy some of the 
Army's requirements. However, the Army did not include the Marine 
Corps in the negotiation. According to Army officials in the Pacific, 
the Army did attempt to include provisions for Marine Corps training 
requirements in negotiating with the lawsuit plaintiffs, but were 
unable to reach an agreement that would provide specific training 
opportunities for the Marine Corps. These Marine units are heavily 
dependent on Army operated training ranges to meet a sizable portion 
of their training needs, most notably training for company-level and 
higher exercises that involve live-fire and combined-arms. Thus, for 
at least the next three years, Marine units must continue deploying to 
another training area. This increases time away from home and cost. 

Developing New Training Opportunities with Foreign Governments: 

The theater commands and their service components are working with 
countries throughout their theaters to develop additional training 
opportunities. The following are examples of these successful efforts 
and the problems and drawbacks that they sometimes create. 

* The Army in Europe is working with eastern European countries to 
develop training opportunities. For example, in 2000 and 2001, the 
Army conducted a live-fire and combined-arms exercise in Poland called 
Victory Strike. According to Army in Europe officials, the exercise 
allowed them to practice against real world systems and meet training 
standards by taking advantage of the location, opportunity, time, and 
space of the Poland ranges. This exercise also allowed the Army to 
accomplish training that it would not have been able to perform in 
Germany. 

* The Air Force in Europe is working with countries throughout the 
European theater-—including countries in north Africa, such as 
Tunisia, and new NATO nations, such as Slovakia and Bulgaria—-to 
negotiate developing training ranges or opportunities. It is also 
coordinating with the Navy in Europe to develop possible joint-use and 
jointly funded training-range opportunities in Croatia and Slovenia. 
Further, the services are trying to gain access to training ranges in 
countries where U.S. forces do not train now, such as the Czech 
Republic and Croatia. 

* According to personnel in some units we visited, units have little 
input into the design of joint training exercises. While a joint 
exercise may provide great training for one U.S. service, it may 
provide little value for another. For example, Air Force personnel 
stated that the Victory Strike exercise in Poland was not adequately 
coordinated to maximize their involvement. During the first part, they 
were not able to communicate with other participants, and they never 
performed the close air support role that they thought they were there 
to perform. 

* The U.S. Pacific Command supports a number of training exercises 
with allied and friendly countries in the region. The exercises 
include Tandem Thrust, a bi-annual bilateral exercise with Australia; 
Cobra Gold, an annual bilateral exercise with Thailand; and Balikatan, 
a joint exercise with the Philippines. They provide U.S. forces with 
access to training areas that (1) permit integrated and combined-arms 
training that would be difficult to accomplish using only existing 
U.S.-controlled ranges and training areas and (2) are less restricted 
than the areas used at their home station. 

Relying on such exercises does have drawbacks. When foreign ranges are 
used, in deference to host governments and other participants, U.S. 
forces may not be able to conduct the training in a manner that would 
provide the quality of training U.S. forces would conduct on their own 
ranges. According to U.S. Pacific Command and Marine Forces Pacific 
officials, a few of the exercises had little value because they were 
basically having to train their foreign hosts on U.S. tactics and were 
unable to train at a level needed to accomplish their desired goals. 
In addition, if U.S. forces must devote time during exercises for 
training they would typically conduct at home station, they may not 
conduct as much of the higher-level training needed or conduct it as 
effectively. 

Using Technology: 

Eliminating certain training restrictions is impossible; and the 
services are looking to technology, such as simulation training, to 
possibly provide training that non-CONUS units cannot obtain. 
Technologies currently exist in the European theater to provide 
training for individual weapons systems and equipment, such as F-15s, 
tanks, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. In the Pacific theater, the use 
of technology, including simulation, is essential to ensure that U.S. 
military forces are able to maintain their combat readiness. Training 
simulators for Europe-based units are available at major training 
facilities, such as Grafenwoehr, and some home stations. With these 
additional home-station training options, the units do not have to 
deploy as frequently. However, the use of technology for training has 
caused other problems, inadvertent and age-related. Following are 
examples of the non-CONUS use of technology for training and its 
effect. 

* The Air Force in Europe acquired a rangeless training system called 
U.S. Air Force Europe Rangeless Interim Training System to allow 
flexibility in how it uses available airspace for training. Before the 
system was acquired, aircrews had to train on an instrumented range in 
order to receive feedback from their training. With the system, 
aircrews can train in available air space and receive feedback from 
devices installed in their aircraft. In theory, the new system should 
make quality air-to-air training easier to accomplish despite the 
increasing restrictions on available air space. However, this is not 
the case for the F-15C squadron in the United Kingdom. The Air Force 
in Europe acquired the system for the F-15Cs in the United Kingdom and 
terminated the contract for the existing range, which was the best air 
space available for air-to-air training. Now, actual air-to-air 
training is more difficult for that squadron to accomplish because of 
the lack of quality air space. Air Force in Europe officials said that 
they were unaware that quality air space would be more difficult to 
schedule when they terminated the existing range contract. 

* In Germany, many local training areas are not sufficient for tank 
maneuvering. The simulator provides an opportunity for solders to 
become familiar with the procedures while they are at home station. 
However, units we spoke with said that the simulation available at 
home station is old and rarely operating. According to Army in Europe 
officials, they plan on having these replaced. A mobile trainer is to 
be fielded in fiscal year 2005. 

* In Korea, the Army will be highly dependent upon technology in the 
form of simulators, such as for tank gunnery; instrumentation systems; 
and a variety of other systems that are being fielded Army-wide. Using 
such technology, Army officials will be able to improve their training 
capabilities for large-unit maneuvers. Additionally, the Army uses 
portable target systems on Korean ranges to achieve training to U.S. 
standards. The portable systems will become even more important as the 
Army forces in Korea expand their previously discussed use of Korean-
controlled training areas and ranges. 

* In Japan, on Okinawa, an example of technology-based systems 
includes a portable air-combat maneuvering system known as the Kadena 
Interim Training System. The system—a pod fitted to the aircraft's 
wing—is designed to improve the quality of fighter air-to-air training 
and is "rangeless." It does not need ground-based instrumentation to 
function and is not dependent on having a fixed range. The system was 
first deployed at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, but the Air Force has 
started deploying additional systems to Osan Air Base in Korea, and it 
expects to deploy the system to Misawa Air Base in Japan later in 
2002. According to officials from Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet in 
Honolulu, the Navy is also developing a portable air combat 
maneuvering system for its fighter aircraft and plans to fund the 
system in 2004. On Okinawa, the Marine Corps currently use 
marksmanship trainers. The Marines said that they are scheduled to 
receive three additional training simulators: staff trainers to train 
Marines in the use of command and control systems; gunnery and 
tactical trainers for light armored vehicles; and supporting arms call-
for-fire trainers. In Japan, the Navy also wants to fund the use of 
portable antisubmarine warfare ranges and use simulators to maintain 
currency for the Rolling Airframe Missile as was mentioned earlier. 

* In Hawaii, the Pacific Missile Range Facility has developed a 
computer-simulated target "island" to enable surface ships to do naval 
surface fire support training. 

Lack of a Coordinated Strategy: 

With the exception of Korea, the regional commands do not have a 
coordinated strategy for pursuing actions to mitigate training 
limitations. The norm is for individual services to negotiate 
solutions for their individual training constraints. In the case of 
Japan, U.S. Embassy officials in Japan told us that individual service 
efforts were the recommended course of action because local service 
representatives were the most knowledgeable about their issues and 
should be the ones to resolve them. However, as discussed earlier, a 
lack of coordination has at times unintentionally been detrimental to 
another service. For example, we previously described an instance in 
Japan where a local Navy official negotiated practicing landings at a 
Japanese airfield that resolved a Navy constraint but did not consider 
future needs. In the case of Korea, U.S. Forces Korea officials told 
us that the previously described Land Partnership Plan was designed to 
consider the needs of all the services because arrangements made in 
the past by local commanders sometimes sacrificed broader, more long-
term military interests. In addition, when the regional commands or an 
individual service arrange bilateral and multilateral training 
exercises, they do not always allow all the other military service 
participants input into the design of the exercise. This lack of 
coordination has at times not maximized all the services' involvement. 
As we discussed earlier, this was the case for the Air Force in its 
participation in an Army exercise in Poland called Victory Strike. 

Conclusions: 

Even though units we visited told us about numerous constraints on 
their ability to complete required training, units have rarely 
reported degraded training readiness. This practice undermines the 
usefulness of readiness reporting. Also, at present, there is no 
consolidated listing of training constraints for non-CONUS locations. 
Therefore, senior DOD leadership, such as the Senior Readiness 
Oversight Council, which monitors the readiness of U.S. military 
forces, as well as service leadership above the affected commands in 
Europe and the Pacific, cannot be aware of the extent of training 
constraints faced by non-CONUS units. 

Military services and regional commands are taking a variety of steps 
to mitigate constraints and increase training opportunities without a 
coordinated strategy that assures that actions taken by one party do 
not adversely affect another. Our work shows that actions taken by one 
part of DOD can in fact adversely affect other parts of DOD. First, 
individual services, and not regional commands, are pursuing solutions 
to their training shortfalls with host governments—solutions that may 
inadvertently be detrimental to other services. Second, commands do 
not always allow the services much, if any, input into structuring 
bilateral and multilateral training events. Without their input, 
training exercises may not focus on obtaining some required training 
and can unnecessarily favor one service over another. Third, when DOD 
acquires new technology to improve training capabilities, it is not 
considering all factors of the training environment and is thus 
sacrificing some training capabilities to improve others. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the secretary of defense direct the chiefs of the 
military services in conjunction with the undersecretary of defense, 
Personnel and Readiness, to develop a report that will accurately 
capture training shortfalls for senior DOD leadership. This document 
should objectively report a unit's ability to achieve its training 
requirements. It should include: 

* all instances in which training cannot occur as scheduled due to 
constraints imposed by entities outside DOD as well as all instances 
when training substitutes are not sufficient to meet training 
requirements, 

* a discussion of how training constraints affect the ability of units 
to meet training requirements and how the inability to meet those 
requirements is affecting readiness, and, 

* a description of efforts to capture training shortfalls in existing 
as well as developmental readiness reporting systems. 

We further recommend that the secretary of defense direct that the war 
fighting commands, in concert with their service component commands, 
develop an overarching strategy that will detail the initiatives the 
command and each service plan to pursue to improve training, such as 
access to additional host government facilities, participation in 
bilateral and multilateral exercises, and acquisition of new 
technology. This strategy needs to be vetted throughout the services 
to ensure that all factors are taken into consideration and that 
actions taken to improve training opportunities for one service are 
not made to the detriment of another service's ability to train or 
that training capabilities are not lost unintentionally. 

Agency Comments: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it 
concurred with the content of the report and its recommendations. DOD 
suggested and Our Evaluation that our recommendation on reporting 
training shortfalls be expanded (1) to include both active and reserve 
training shortfalls and (2) to specify in greater detail what the 
recommended report should address. Regarding the inclusion of both 
active and reserve training shortfalls in our recommendation, we agree 
that conceptually this has merit, but because we did not examine 
reserve forces' training shortfalls, we are not in a position to 
include them in our recommendation. We have, however, expanded this 
recommendation to identify some topics that reporting on training 
shortfalls should include. These topics are not meant to be all-
inclusive because DOD is in a better position than we to determine 
exactly what to report. In responding to our recommendation that an 
overarching strategy be developed to detail initiatives being pursued 
to improve training, DOD stated that such an effort should help 
generate a variety of options to ameliorate the current training 
deficiencies. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in 
appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense; the 
secretary of the army, the secretary of the air force, the secretary 
of the navy, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the director, 
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 
others upon request. 

If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-8100. Key 
contributors to this report were Steve Sternlieb, Laura Durland, Frank 
Smith, and Lori Adams. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Neal P. Curtin: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Location of Major Units and Bases in Europe and the 
Pacific: 

In Europe, as shown in figure 5, Army and Air Force units are 
primarily stationed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The 
Army in Europe has two divisions, the First Infantry Division 
headquartered at Wuerzburg, Germany, and the First Armored Division 
headquartered at Wiesbaden, Germany. In addition, the Army's Southern 
European Task Force is stationed at Vicenza, Italy. The Air Force has 
three fighter wings in Europe. The 48th Fighter Wing at Lakenheath Air 
Base, United Kingdom is comprised of F-15Cs and F-15Es; the 52nd 
Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany is comprised of A-10s 
and F-16s, and the 31st Fighter Wing located at Aviano, Italy, has F-
16s. 

Figure 5: Major Combat Units and Bases in Europe: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Europe] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Army: 
1st Armored Div. HQ: German: 
1st Infantry Div. HQ: Germany. 
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force: Italy: 

Air Force: 
48th Fighter Wing (Lakenheath Air Base): United Kingdom: 
52nd Fighter Wing (Spangdahlem Air Base): Germany: 
31st Fighter Wing (Aviano Air Base): Italy: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In the Pacific, as shown in figure 6, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps have combat units stationed in Japan and Korea. The 
Army's 2nd Infantry Division is stationed at Uijongbu, Korea. The Air 
Force has the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, whose fighter 
aircraft is the F-15Cs. The 35th Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base in 
Japan has F-16CJs. In Korea, the 51st Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base 
has A-10s and F-16s, and the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base has F-
16s. In Japan, the 7th Fleet is headquartered at Yokosuka Naval Base; 
however, there are ships at both Yokosuka and Sasebo Naval Bases. In 
addition, the Navy has Carrier Air Wing 5 located at Atsugi Naval Air 
Field, Japan. The Marine Corps' BI Marine Expeditionary Force, 
comprised of the Headquarters, 31' Marine Division, 1st Marine 
Aircraft Wing, and 3rd Force Service Support Group is stationed on 
Okinawa. 

Figure 6: Major Combat Units and Bases in Japan and Korea: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Japan and Korea] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Army: 
2nd Infantry Div. HQ: South Korea: 

Air Force: 
35th Fighter Wing KOREA (Misawa Air Base): Japan: 
51st Fighter Wing (Osan Air Base): South Korea: 
8th Fighter Wing (Kunsan Air Base); South Korea: 
18th Wing (Kadena Air Base): Okinawa: 

Navy: 
7th Fleet Headquarters (Yokosuka Naval Base): Japan: 
Atsugi Naval Air Field: Japan: 
Sasebo Naval Base: Japan: 

Marine Corps: 
3rd Marine Division (Camp Courtney): Okinawa: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Maps of Individual Countries: 

Figure 7: Map of Germany Identifying the Locations of Major Combat 
Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Germany] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
52nd Fighter Wing (Spangdahlem Air Base): 

Air Force Training Range: 
Polygone Electronic Warfare Range: 
Siegenburg Range: 

Army Base: 
1st Armored Division Headquarters: 
1st Infantry Division Headquarters: 

Army Training Range: 
Grafenwoehr Training Area: 
Hohenfels Training Area: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 8: Map of Italy Identifying the Locations of Major Combat Units 
and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Italy] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
31st Fighter Wing (Aviano Air Base): 

Army Base: 
U.S. Army European Southern Task Force: 

Army Training Range: 
Foce Del Reno Training Area: 
Monte Carpegna Training Area: 
Monte Romano Training Area: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 9: Map of United Kingdom Identifying the Location of Major 
Combat Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of United Kingdom] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
48th Fighter Wing (Lakenheath Air Base): 

Air Force Training Range: 
Cowden Range: 
Donna Nook Range: 
Garvie Island Range: 
Holbeach Range: 
Lilstock Range: 
Pembrey Range: 
Rosehearty Range: 
Spadeadam Electronic Warfare Range: 
Tain Range: 
Wainfleet Range: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Map of Korea Identifying the Location of Major Combat Units 
and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Korea] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
8th Fighter Wing (Kunsan Air Base): 
51st Fighter Wing (Osan Air Base): 

Air Force Range: 
Koon-ni Range: 
Pilsung Range: 

Army Base: 
2nd Infantry Div. HQ: 

Army Range: 
Casey-Hovey Range Complex: 
Rodriguez Range Complex: 
Western Corridor: Story Range Complex; Dagmar Maneuver Area: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Map of Japan, Including Okinawa, Identifying the Location 
of Major Combat Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Japan and Okinawa] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
18th Wing (Kadena Air Base): 
35th Fighter Wing (Misawa Air Base): 

Air Force Training Range: 
Ripsaw Range: 

Navy Base: 
7th Fleet Headquarters (Yokosuka Naval Base): 
Atsugi Naval Air Field: 
Sasebo Naval Base: 

Marine Corps Base: 
3rd Marine Division (Camp Courtney): 
Camp Schwab: 
Camp Hanse: 

MC Training Area: 
Central Training Area: 
Fuji Maneuver Area: 
le Jima Training Area: 
Northern Training Area: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Map of Alaska Identifying the Location of Major Combat 
Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Alaska] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Air Force Base: 
3rd Wing (Elmendorf Air Base): 
354th Fighter Wing (Eielson Air Base): 

Air Force Training Range: 
Pacific Alaska Range Complex: 

Army Base: 
172nd Separate Infantry Brigade Headquarters: 

Army Training Range: 
Donnelly Training Area: 
Fort Richardson Training Areas: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Map of Hawaii Identifying the Location of Major Combat 
Units and Major Training Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Hawaii] 

The following bases are depicted on the map: 

Navy Training Area: 
Pacific Missile Range Facility: 

Army Base: 
25th Infantry Division (Light): 

Army Training Area: 
Makua Training Area: 
Pohakuloa Training Area: 

Marine Corps Base: 
3rd Marine Regiment: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the types of training constraints faced by non-CONUS-
based units and whether they are likely to increase in the future, we 
interviewed officials at all levels in DOD from the office of 
secretary of defense, Personnel and Readiness, to unit-level service 
representatives from all services in both the European and Pacific 
theaters. We obtained documentation detailing training shortfalls 
where available. We conducted interviews with component command 
representatives from each of the services in both the European and 
Pacific theaters and headquarters personnel within each service 
responsible for training range programs. To aid us in systematically 
collecting country-wide training range capabilities for each service, 
we developed a training-capabilities data collection table that we 
asked each of the services' subordinate commands to fill out on how 
well they were able to meet their training requirements. We included 
these tables on pages 20-25. We conducted our work in the five major 
countries in which U.S. forces are stationed-Germany, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the state of Hawaii. We visited a 
variety of training areas in each location. We did not conduct work 
involving Vieques, Puerto Rico, because our focus was Europe and the 
Pacific and the training constraints involving Vieques are well known. 
Table 5 depicts all the major units and training locations we visited. 

Table 5: Units and Locations Visited on This Assignment: 

Germany: 
U.S. European Command: 
U.S. Army Europe: 
U.S. Air Force Europe: 
Grafenwoehr Training Area: 
Hohenfels Training Area: 
Polygone Electronic Warfare Range: 

Italy: 
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force: 
Aviano Air Base (31st Fighter Wing and Army Helicopter B Company): 
U.S. Navy 6th Fleet: 

United Kingdom: 
Lakenheath Air Base (48th Fighter Wing): 
Holbeach Training Range: 
U.S. Navy Europe: 

Hawaii: 
U.S. Pacific Command: 
U.S. Army Pacific: 
U.S. Air Force Pacific: 
U.S. Marine Corp Pacific: 
U.S. Navy Pacific: 
25th Infantry Division (Light) Army: 
Scofield Barracks Training Area: 
3rd Regiment of 3rd Marine Division at Kaneohe: 
The Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai: 
The Makua Military Reservation Training Area on Oahu: 
Pohakuloa Training Area on Hawaii: 

South Korea: 
U.S. Forces Korea: 
8th Army Korea: 
2nd Infantry Division Army: 
Osan Air Base: 
Story Training Range Complex: 
Dagmar Maneuver Area: 
Koon-ni Training Range: 

Japan: 
U.S. Forces Japan — Yokota Air Base: 
Misawa Air Base (35th Fighter Wing): 
Atsugi Naval Air Field: 
Mt. Fugi Training Center: 
Ripsaw Training Range: 

Okinawa: 
Kadena Air Base (18th Wing): 
3rd Marine Division - Camp Schwab: 
3rd Marine Division - Camp Hansen: 
The Marine Corps Central Training Area: 
le Jima Training Area: 

[End of table] 

To determine the impact that training constraints are having on the 
units' ability to meet their requirements, we obtained information on 
such impacts from unit level service representatives from all services 
in both the European and Pacific theaters. In doing so, where training 
was not accomplished, we discussed if these shortfalls translated into 
readiness reporting. To independently assess the impact of training 
constraints on reported readiness, we obtained and analyzed reported 
readiness data for the European and Pacific theaters for fiscal years 
2000 and 2001 to determine if units had reported any diminished 
readiness as a result of training limitations. 

To determine what alternatives were being pursued by the services to 
overcome their training shortfalls, we interviewed unit-level and 
component-command representatives from all services in both the 
European and Pacific theaters. They provided us data and documentation 
on what initiatives they are pursuing to alleviate training 
limitations. We also interviewed embassy representatives from the 
defense attaches' offices in each of the previously mentioned 
countries that we visited except Korea to determine what role they 
play in addressing training limitations. We conducted our review from 
June 2001 through February 2002 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

The Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-4000: 

April 22, 2002: 

Mr. Neal P. Curtin: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Curtin: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 
Accounting Office Draft Report GAO-02-525, "Military Training: 
Limitations Exist Overseas But Are Not Reflected in Readiness 
Reporting," March 19, 2002 (GAO Code 350081). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft, 
and substantially concurs with the contents of the report and the 
recommendations offered within. The Department offers adjustments to 
the GAO draft recommendations in the enclosure and has provided 
technical comments separately to GAO for inclusion. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul W. Mayberry: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Code 350081/GA0-02-525: 

"Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas But Are Not Reflected 
In Readiness Reporting" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chiefs of the Military Services in conjunction with the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to develop a 
report that will accurately capture Now on p. 35. training shortfalls 
for senior DoD leadership. This document should objectively report a 
unit's ability to achieve its training requirements. (Page 32/Draft 
Report). [Now on p. 35] 

DoD Response: Since this report addresses encroachment issues 
affecting Hawaii and Alaska as well as other ranges overseas, both 
Active and Reserve training issues should be considered. Recommend 
that the end of the first sentence in Recommendation 1 be revised to 
read "...to develop a report that will accurately capture Active and 
Reserve training shortfalls for senior DoD leadership." 

Otherwise, Concur, with the following comment. The recommendation 
should go further and specify in greater detail what the recommended 
report should address, For instance, what constitutes a "training 
shortfall?" As the GAO report already indicates, a "training 
shortfall" could be when training does not occur as scheduled, or its 
substitute (or work-around) is not sufficient. The recommended report 
should also address more of the concerns raised by the GAO. One such 
concern is developing a way to accurately reflect the training 
shortfalls in readiness reporting systems. Therefore, the recommended 
study should not only ask DoD to "objectively report on inability to 
meet training requirements," but DoD should also be asked to examine 
how to capture training shortfalls in existing as well as 
developmental readiness reporting systems. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct that the war fighting commands, in concert with their Service 
component commands, develop an overarching strategy that will detail 
the initiatives the command and each Service plans to pursue to 
improve training, such as access to additional host government 
facilities, participation in bilateral and multilateral exercise, and 
acquisition of new technology. This strategy needs to be vetted 
throughout the Services to ensure that all factors are taken into 
consideration and that actions taken to improve training Now on p. 35. 
opportunities for one Service are not made to the detriment of another 
Service's ability to train or that training capabilities are not lost 
unintentionally. (Page 33/Draft Report). [Now on p. 35] 

DoD Response: Concur. This strategy will assist the war fighting 
commands and the Service component commands to develop an approach 
that resolves the shortfalls in overseas training. A coordinated 
effort as such should help generate a variety of options to ameliorate 
the current training deficiencies. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Navy and Marine Corps deploy forces into the European theater 
fully trained at their highest state of readiness. Therefore, their 
objective is to provide "maintenance" or "proficiency" training during 
their six-month deployment in theater. 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: War Offers 
Important Insights Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-92-240], Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 25, 1992. 

[3] The report addressed endangered species, unexploded ordnance, 
frequency encroachment, maritime sustainability, national airspace 
redesign, air quality, airborne noise, and urban-growth encroachment. 

[4] The United States and Japan launched the Special Action Committee 
process to reduce the training burden on the people of Okinawa and 
thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. The committee was to 
develop recommendations to realign, consolidate, and reduce U.S. 
facilities and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces on Okinawa. 

[5] Scoring is the process of quantitatively measuring training 
performance. 

[6] Generally, temporary reserved airspace is capped at 24,000 feet; 
however, on rare occasions it can be extended up to 31,000 feet. 

[7] Although the flying hours are usually 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., they may 
be adjusted for NATO exercises or other events when requests are made 
to appropriate German authorities. 

[8] A sortie is an individual flight by one aircraft. 

[9] In 1995, the wing's primary mission changed from attacking general 
targets to suppression of enemy air defenses. The new mission requires 
extensive training against electronic warfare emitters. 

[10] Red Flag is one of the Air Force's premier training events. It 
provides realistic combat training in an air, ground, and electronic 
threat environment. It also allows participating units to operate with 
multiple weapon systems and U.S. allies. 

[11] Commanders can assign a training status rating ranging from T-1, 
meaning most ready, to T-4, meaning least ready. Specifically, a T-1 
rating assessment means the unit requires 0 to 14 days to train to 
proficiency in its wartime mission; a T-2 unit requires 15 to 28 days; 
a T-3 unit requires 29 to 42 days; and a T-4 unit requires 43 or more 
days to train to proficiency in its wartime mission. A T-5 rating 
assessment means that a unit's training proficiency cannot be 
determined due to special circumstances, such as an inactivation. 

[12] The Land Partnership Plan is a cooperative U.S.-Korean effort to 
improve combat readiness, consolidate U.S. installations and training 
areas, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean 
alliance. 

[End of section] 

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