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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2009: 

NASA: 

Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects: 

GAO-09-306SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-306, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to 
invest billions in the coming years in science and exploration space 
flight initiatives. The scientific and technical challenges inherent in 
NASA’s mission create great challenges in managing its projects and 
controlling costs. In the past, NASA has had difficulty meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives for some of its projects. The need 
to effectively manage projects will gain even more importance as NASA 
seeks to manage its wide-ranging portfolio in an increasingly 
constrained fiscal environment. 

In response to the explanatory statement of the House Committee on 
Appropriations accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2008, this report provides an independent assessment of selected NASA 
projects. In conducting this work, GAO compared projects against best 
practice criteria for system development including attainment of 
knowledge on technologies and design as well as various aspects of 
program management. The projects assessed are considered major 
acquisitions by NASA—each with a lifecycle cost of over $250 million. 
No recommendations are provided. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 18 NASA projects in various phases of project development 
and found that 10 out of 13 projects that had entered the 
implementation phase experienced significant cost and/or schedule 
growth. For those projects, development costs increased by an average 
of 13 percent from baseline cost estimates that were established just 2 
or 3 years ago and they had an average launch delay of 11-months. In 
some cases, cost growth was considerably higher than what is reported 
because it had occurred prior to the most recent baseline. Many of the 
projects we reviewed indicated that they had experienced challenges in 
developing new technologies or retrofitting older technologies as well 
as in managing their contractors, and more generally, understanding the 
risks and challenges they were up against when they started their 
efforts. 

GAO’s previous work has consistently shown that reducing the kinds of 
problems this assessment identifies in acquisition programs hinges on 
developing a sound business case for a project. In essence, this means 
establishing firm requirements, maturing technologies, and assuring 
other vital resources, such as time and funding are sufficient before 
making long-term commitments to acquisitions. NASA has acted to adopt 
practices that would ensure programs proceed based on a sound business 
case and undertaken an array of initiatives aimed at improving program 
management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight. Continued 
attention to these efforts should help maximize NASA’s acquisition 
investments. 

Figure: Photographs: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

Photographs of: 
Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope; James Webb Space Telescope; 
Dawn; 
Mars Science Laboratory. 

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral. JWST Project Office; 
NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: William K. Hartmann, UCLA: Mars Science 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-306]. For more 
information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 
ChaplainC@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 
A Sound Business Case Underpins Successful Acquisition Outcomes: 

NASA Has Made Efforts To Improve Its Acquisitions: 

Project Assessments: 

Our Observations: 

Assessments of Individual Projects: 

Aquarius: 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV): 

Dawn: 

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST): 

Glory: 

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission: 

Herschel: 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 

Kepler: 

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM): 

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO): 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL): 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO): 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV): 

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO): 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA): 

Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE): 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix II: NASA Life-Cycle For Flight Systems Compared To A Knowledge-
Based Approach: 

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Assessment of Challenges for NASA Projects in the 
Implementation Phase: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Flight Systems Compared to a Knowledge-
Based Approach: 

Abbreviations: 

AFB: Air Force Base: 

AFS: Air Force Station: 

AIA: Atmospheric Imaging Assembly: 

APS: aerosol polarimetry sensor: 

ASI: Argenzia Spaciale Italiana (Italian Space Agency): 

CCD: charged-coupled device: 

CDR: critical design review: 

CERES: Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System: 

CEV: Crew Exploration Vehicle: 

CONAE: Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (Space Agency of 
Argentina): 

CrIS: Cross-track Infrared Sounder: 

CSA: Canadian Space Agency: 

DCI: data collection instrument: 

DLR: German Aerospace Center: 

DPR: dual-frequency precipitation radar: 

EO-1: Earth Observatory Satellite: 

ESA: European Space Agency: 

EVE: Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment: 

GBM: gamma-ray burst monitor: 

GLAST: Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope: 

GMI: GPM microwave imager: 

GPM: Global Precipitation Measurement (mission): 

HIFI: Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared: 

HMI: Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager: 

IPO: Integrated Program Office: 

JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency: 

JPL: Jet Propulsion Laboratory: 

KDP: key decision point: 

LAT: large area telescope: 

LCROSS: Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite: 

LDCM: Landsat Data Continuity Mission: 

LRO: Lunar Reconnaisance Orbiter: 

MEP: Mars Exploration Program: 

MSL: Mars Science Laboratory: 

NAR: nonadvocate review: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NIR: near infrared (bands): 

NPR: NASA Procedural Requirements: 

NPOESS: National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System: 

NPP: NPOESS Preparatory Project: 

OCO: Orbiting Carbon Observatory: 

OLI: Operational Land Imager: 

PA&E: Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (NASA): 

PDR: preliminary design review: 

PICA: phenolic impregnated carbon ablator: 

SDO: Solar Dynamics Observatory: 

SDR: system definition review: 

SOFIA: Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy: 

SSS: sea surface salinity: 

TIM: total irradiance monitor: 

TIRS: Thermal Infrared Sensor: 

TRL: technology readiness level: 

TSIS: Total Solar Irradiance Sensor: 

USGS: U.S. Geological Service: 

VIIRS: Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 2, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

In response to the explanatory statement of the House Committee on 
Appropriations accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2008, this report provides our assessment of large-scale NASA projects. 
NASA is at a critical juncture. The agency is in the midst of phasing 
out the Space Shuttle program and beginning another major undertaking, 
the Constellation program--which will create the next generation of 
spacecraft for human spaceflight and is expected to cost upward of $230 
billion. This massive effort, unparalleled since the transition from 
the Apollo program to the Shuttle program, presents the agency with 
myriad complex and interdependent challenges. 

NASA is taking on this endeavor against a backdrop of growing national 
government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that continue to strain 
all our federal agencies' resources. While NASA's budget represents 
less than 2 percent of the nation's fiscal discretionary budget, the 
agency is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support 
important scientific missions including the study of climate change. 
Therefore, it is exceedingly important that these resources be managed 
as effectively and efficiently as possible. 

In the past, this has not always been the case. NASA has had difficulty 
meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives for some of its 
projects, and in fact, it had to cancel prior attempts to replace the 
space shuttle, after billions had already been spent, in the face of 
cost overruns and program management problems. However, to its credit, 
NASA has developed a comprehensive plan to address systemic acquisition 
management weaknesses and it is in the initial stages of implementing 
the plan. Moreover, as we have urged it to do, NASA recently 
incorporated best practice criteria for system development in its 
acquisition policy, though our review shows more needs to be done to 
ensure the policy is followed. To maximize NASA's ability to invest in 
science and space exploration, senior leaders should focus attention to 
adopting best practices and demonstrate a willingness to fix and/or 
terminate projects that are not performing well. This assessment should 
support such efforts. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

[End of letter] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 2, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) extensive 
portfolio of missions ranges from sending robotic vehicles to Mars, to 
scientific study of Earth from space, to assembling and supplying the 
International Space Station. Some of these missions, such as the Hubble 
Space Telescope and NASA's earth science efforts, have literally 
changed the way we view our planet and the universe. The technology 
that NASA developed has resulted in numerous spin-off products that are 
used across a wide range of technical and commercial fields. 

However, NASA has also had its share of challenges. For example, the X- 
33 and X-34 programs, which were meant to demonstrate technology for 
future reusable launch vehicles, were canceled due to technical 
difficulties and cost overruns after NASA spent more than $1 billion on 
them. More recently, the Mars Science Laboratory, which was already 
over budget, announced a two-year launch delay. Current estimates 
suggest the price of this delay may be $400 million--which drives the 
current project life-cycle cost estimate to $2.3 billion; up from its 
initial confirmation estimate of $1.6 billion. GAO and others have also 
reported on overruns on many other NASA programs over the past decade. 
What is common among these and other programs is that whether they 
succeed or fail, they cost more to build and take longer to launch than 
planned. As a result, NASA is able to accomplish less than its plans 
with the money it is allocated, and it is forced to make unplanned 
trade-offs among its projects--shorting one to pay for the mistakes of 
another. 

Congress has expressed concern about NASA's performance and has 
identified the need to standardize the reporting of cost, schedule, and 
content for NASA research and development projects. In 2005, Congress 
required NASA to report cost and schedule baselines--benchmarks against 
which changes can be measured--for all NASA programs and projects with 
estimated life-cycle costs of at least $250 million that have been 
approved to proceed to implementation.[Footnote 1] It also required 
that NASA report to Congress when development cost is likely to exceed 
the baseline estimate by 15 percent or more, or when a milestone is 
likely to be delayed by six months or more.[Footnote 2] In response, 
NASA began establishing cost and schedule baselines in 2006 and has 
been using them as the basis for annual project performance reports for 
Congress provided in its annual budget submission each year. 

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 
accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 directed GAO 
to prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA 
programs, projects, or activities. This report responds to that mandate 
by assessing 18 NASA projects, each with a life-cycle cost over $250 
million. The combined life-cycle cost for these 18 projects exceeds $50 
billion. Each assessment is presented in a two-page summary that 
analyzes the project's cost and schedule status and project challenges. 
We also provide general observations about the performance of NASA's 
major projects and the agency's management of those projects during 
development. 

NASA provided updated cost and schedule data as of December 2008 for 13 
of the 18 projects.[Footnote 3] We reviewed and compared that data to 
previously established baselines for each of those 13 projects. We took 
appropriate steps to address data reliability. 

Our approach included an examination of the phase of a project's 
development and how each project was advancing within this framework. 
Each project we reviewed was in either the formulation phase or the 
implementation phase of the project life cycle. In the formulation 
phase, the project develops and defines the project requirements--what 
the project should be able to do--establishes a schedule, estimates 
costs and produces a plan for implementation. In the implementation 
phase, the project carries out these plans, performing final design and 
fabrication as well as testing components and system assembly, 
integrating these components and testing how they work together, and 
launching the project. This phase also includes the period from project 
launch through mission completion. We assessed each project's cost and 
schedule and characterized growth in either as significant if it was 
greater than the thresholds established for Congressional reporting. 

Based on discussion with project officials and drawing on GAO's 
established criteria for knowledge-based acquisitions[Footnote 4] and 
on other GAO work on space and weapon system acquisitions, we 
identified five challenges that can contribute to cost and schedule 
growth in these projects: technology maturity, design stability, 
complexity of heritage technology, contractor performance and 
development partner performance. To assess technology maturity, we 
examined the project's reported critical technology readiness levels-- 
a measure that NASA devised and that is now used at other agencies as 
well. We looked at the technology readiness level at the time of the 
project's preliminary design review, which occurs just before it enters 
the implementation phase, and compared that against the level of 
maturity that best practices call for at that stage to minimize risks. 
To assess design stability, we examined the percentage of engineering 
drawings completed or projected to be completed by the critical design 
review--which is usually held about mid-way through the project's 
development. We asked project officials to provide this information and 
we compared it against GAO's best practices' metric of 90 percent of 
drawings released by the critical design review. Finally, based in part 
on our discussions with officials for the individual projects, we 
identified the extent to which project cost and schedule were 
negatively impacted by challenges integrating heritage--or pre- 
existing--technology into their projects. We also discussed the extent 
to which contractors' and development partners' challenges in 
developing and delivering project hardware impacted overall project 
cost and schedule. 

In this review, these challenges were largely apparent in the projects 
that had entered the implementation phase. 

This list of challenges is not exhaustive; nor do we believe these 
challenges will not change or evolve as we continue this work into the 
future. Our objectives are to expand on the importance of developing a 
knowledge-based acquisition strategy and to provide decision-makers 
with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of individual systems 
that identifies potential risks and allows them to take actions to put 
projects that are early in the development cycle in a better position 
to succeed. This report and the challenges we discuss in it are a 
starting point for our future work in this area. The individual project 
offices were given an opportunity to comment on and provide technical 
clarifications on our assessments prior to their inclusion in the final 
product. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II contains 
detailed information on our scope and methodology. We do not provide 
recommendations in this report. 

A Sound Business Case Underpins Successful Acquisition Outcomes: 

The major projects that NASA undertakes range from highly complex and 
sophisticated space transportation vehicles, to robotic probes, to 
satellites equipped with advanced sensors to study the earth. In many 
cases, NASA's projects are expected to incorporate new and 
sophisticated technologies while operating in harsh, distant 
environments. Many of its projects are also one time articles, meaning 
that there is little opportunity to apply knowledge gained to the 
production of a second, third, or future increments of space craft. 
Moreover, NASA often partners with other space-faring countries, 
including several European nations, Japan, and Argentina. These 
partnerships go a long way to foster international cooperation in 
space, but they also put NASA projects in a vulnerable position when 
partners do not meet their obligations or run into technical obstacles 
they cannot easily overcome. While space development programs are 
complex and difficult by nature, and most are one-time efforts, we are 
convinced that NASA would benefit from a more disciplined approach to 
its acquisitions. The nature of its work should not preclude NASA from 
achieving what it promises when requesting and receiving funds. 

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for 
these projects can provide early recognition of challenges, allow 
managers to take corrective action, and place needed and justifiable 
projects in a better position to succeed. Our studies of best practice 
organizations shows the risks inherent in NASA's work can be mitigated 
by developing a solid, executable business case before committing 
resources to a new product development.[Footnote 4] In its simplest 
form, this is evidence that (1) the customer's needs are valid and can 
best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the chosen concept can be 
developed and produced within existing resources--that is, proven 
technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to 
deliver the product when needed. A program should not go forward into 
product development unless a sound business case can be made. If the 
business case measures up, the organization commits to the development 
of the product, including making the financial investment. Our best 
practice work has shown that developing business cases based on 
matching requirements to resources before program start leads to more 
predictable program outcomes--that is, programs are more likely to be 
successfully completed within cost and schedule estimates and deliver 
anticipated system performance.[Footnote 5] 

At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach to 
product development that is a best practice among leading commercial 
firms. Those firms have created an environment and adopted practices 
that put their program managers in a good position to succeed in 
meeting these expectations. For a program to deliver a successful 
product within available resources, managers should demonstrate high 
levels of knowledge before significant commitments are made. In 
essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge 
can be described over the course of a program, as follows: 

* When a project begins development, the customer's needs should match 
the developer's available resources--mature technologies, time, and 
funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated maturity of 
the technologies needed to meet customer needs--referred to as critical 
technologies. If the project is relying on heritage--or pre-existing-- 
technology, that technology must be in appropriate form, fit, and 
function to address the customer's needs within available resources. 

* Then, about midway through the product's development, it should be 
stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting performance 
requirements. The critical design review takes place at that point of 
time because it generally signifies when the program is ready to start 
building production-representative prototypes. If design stability is 
not achieved, but a product development continues, costly re-designs to 
address changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges can 
occur. 

* Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 
shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 
have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate that 
it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack of 
testing increases the possibility that project managers will not have 
information that could help avoid costly system failures in late stages 
of development or during system operations. 

Our best practice work has identified numerous other actions that can 
be taken to increase the likelihood that a program can be successfully 
executed once that business case is established. These include ensuring 
cost estimates are complete, accurate and updated regularly; holding 
suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their product 
through such activities as regular supplier audits and performance 
evaluations of quality and delivery; and holding program managers 
accountable for their choices. Moreover, we have recommended using 
metrics and controls throughout the life-cycle to gauge when the 
requisite level of knowledge has been attained and direct decision 
makers to consider criteria before advancing a program to the next 
level and making additional investments. 

The consequence of proceeding with system development without 
establishing and adhering to a sound business case is substantial. GAO 
and others have reported that NASA has experienced cost and schedule 
growth in several of its projects over the past decade, resulting from 
problems that include failing to adequately identify requirements and 
underestimating complexity and technology maturity. For example, the X- 
33 and X-34 programs both were terminated because of significant cost 
increases caused by problems developing the necessary technologies and 
flight demonstration vehicles. Neither program fully assessed the costs 
associated with developing new, unproven technologies. Additionally, in 
2005, GAO reported on the lack of an established sound business case 
for NASA's Prometheus I--a project that faced challenges in identifying 
preliminary requirements, establishing firm cost estimates and maturing 
critical technologies. After concurring with GAO's recommendation that 
NASA establish a firm business case for the project, NASA identified 
more realistic requirements for Prometheus I and reduced the project's 
requested funding by nearly $2.4 billion through 2010. 

NASA Has Made Efforts To Improve Its Acquisitions: 

In 2005, we reported that NASA's acquisition policies did not conform 
to best practices for product development because they lacked major 
decision reviews at several key points in the project life-cycle, which 
would allow decision makers to make informed decisions about whether a 
project should be authorized to proceed in the development life-cycle. 
Based, in part, on our recommendations, NASA issued a revised policy in 
March 2007[Footnote 6] that institutes several key decision points 
(KDP) in the development life-cycle for space flight programs and 
projects. At each KDP, a decision authority is responsible for 
authorizing the transition to the next life-cycle phase for the 
project.[Footnote 7] In addition, NASA acquisition policies also 
require that technologies be sufficiently mature at the preliminary 
design review, the design is stable at critical design review, and the 
system can be fabricated within cost, schedule and performance 
specifications. These changes brought the policy more in line with best 
practices for product development. A more detailed discussion of NASA's 
acquisition policy and how it relates to best practices is provided in 
appendix I of this report. 

Further, in response to GAO's designation of NASA acquisition 
management as a "high risk" area,[Footnote 8] NASA developed a 
corrective action plan to improve the effectiveness of NASA program/ 
project management.[Footnote 9] The approach focuses on how best to 
ensure the mitigation of potential issues in acquisition decisions and 
better monitor contractor performance. The plan identifies five areas 
for improvement--program/project management, cost reporting process, 
cost estimating and analysis, standard business processes, and 
management of financial management systems--each of which contain 
targets and goals to measure improvement. As part of this initiative, 
NASA has taken a positive step in improving management oversight of 
project cost, schedule, and technical performance with the 
establishment of a baseline performance review reporting to NASA's 
senior management. Through monthly reviews, NASA intends to highlight 
projects that are predicted to exceed internal NASA cost and/or 
schedule baselines, which are set lower than cost and schedule 
baselines submitted to Congress, so the agency can take preemptive 
actions to minimize the projects' potential cost overruns or schedule 
delays. 

While these efforts are positive steps towards achieving successful 
project outcomes and ensuring that decision makers are appropriately 
investing the agency's resources, they will be limited if project 
officials are not held accountable for demonstrating that elements of a 
knowledge-based business case are demonstrated at key junctures in 
development. It is critical that project officials not only have a high 
level of knowledge about a project at key junctures, but also that this 
information is used by decision makers to make decisions on whether to 
invest additional resources and allow a project to proceed through the 
development life cycle. 

Project Assessments: 

We found several factors that occurred throughout the various projects 
we reviewed that can contribute to project cost and schedule growth. 
These factors--characterized as project challenges--were mostly present 
in the projects that had reached the implementation phase of the 
project life cycle. They, along with a profile of each project we 
reviewed, are described in a two-page assessment for each project. The 
project profile presents a general description of the mission 
objectives for each of the projects; a picture of the spacecraft or 
aircraft; a schedule timeline identifying key dates for the project; a 
table identifying programmatic and launch information; and the baseline 
year cost and schedule estimates and December 2008 cost and schedule 
data. 

The remainder of the assessment analyzes the project challenges and the 
extent to which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance risk 
due to these challenges. They are based on past GAO work on elements of 
a successful acquisition business case--technology maturity, heritage 
technology complexity, and design stability. Additionally, through our 
review, we identified two more challenges--contractor performance and 
development partner performance--that had an impact on cost and 
schedule performance of the NASA projects. Contractor performance 
impacts NASA's ability to deliver a project within cost and schedule 
baselines because the agency depends on the expertise of the contractor 
to deliver what it promises. Similarly, NASA sometimes relies on other 
domestic and international organizations to provide key instruments, 
the spacecraft, and/or launch services for collaborative projects; the 
performance of these partners can impact NASA's performance for a 
project. When a development partner cannot deliver an instrument or 
integrate it on schedule, the impact is felt by NASA. Specifically, 
since often there is no exchange of money between partners, the cost of 
any delays to the project must be assumed by each partner. 

For each individual project assessment, we provide a table showing the 
challenges relevant to the project and a project status narrative. This 
is followed by a narrative of the project challenges we identified 
relevant to each project. 

NASA project offices were provided an opportunity to review drafts of 
the individual two-page assessments prior to their inclusion in the 
final product. The projects provided both technical corrections and 
more general comments. We integrated the technical corrections as 
appropriate and characterized the general comments on the second page 
of each two-page assessment. 

Our Observations: 

NASA provided cost and schedule data for 13 projects in the 
implementation phase of the project life cycle.[Footnote 10] Ten of 
those 13 projects experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth 
from their project baselines.[Footnote 11] Based on our analysis, 
development costs for projects in our review increased by an average of 
almost 13 percent from their baseline cost estimates--all in just two 
or three years--including one project's cost that increased by over 50 
percent. It should be noted that a number of these projects had 
experienced considerably more cost growth before they were baselined in 
response to the statutory reporting requirement.[Footnote 12] Our 
analysis also shows that projects in our review had an average delay of 
over 11 months to their launch dates. The lack of knowledge at key 
junctures during project development, as well as the complexity of 
using heritage hardware--systems with characteristics similar to the 
one being developed--and working relationships with contractors and 
development partners contributed to the cost and schedule growth. Table 
1 depicts the 13 projects we reviewed that had entered the 
implementation phase, the challenges they faced or are currently 
facing, and the cost and schedule changes they experienced. 

Table 1: Assessment of Challenges for NASA Projects in the 
Implementation Phase: 

NASA Projects: Aquarius; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Empty]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Check]; 
Development Cost Change: 6%; 
Launch Delay (months): 10. 

NASA Projects: Dawn; 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Empty]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: -2%; 
Launch Delay (months): 0. 

NASA Projects: Gamma-ray Large Space Area Telescope; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Check]; 
Development Cost Change: 5%; 
Launch Delay (months): 9. 

NASA Projects: Glory; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Check]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 54%; 
Launch Delay (months): 6. 

NASA Projects: Herschel; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Check]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Empty]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Check]; 
Development Cost Change: 13%; 
Launch Delay (months): 20. 

NASA Projects: Kepler; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Empty]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 25%; 
Launch Delay (months): 9. 

NASA Projects: Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter; 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Empty]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 0%; 
Launch Delay (months): 6[A]. 

NASA Projects: Mars Science Laboratory; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Check]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 26%; 
Launch Delay (months): 25. 

NASA Projects: NPOESS Preparatory Project; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Check]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Check]; 
Development Cost Change: 19%; 
Launch Delay (months): 26. 

NASA Projects: Orbiting Carbon Observatory; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Empty]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 18%; 
Launch Delay (months): 5. 

NASA Projects: Solar Dynamics Observatory; [Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Empty]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Check]; 
Development Cost Change: 1%; 
Launch Delay (months): 17. 

NASA Projects: Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy; 
[Shaded] 
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Empty]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Check]; 
Contractor Performance: [Check]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: 3%; 
Launch Delay (months): 9. 

NASA Projects: Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer; • -1% 0
Technology Maturity: [Empty]; 
Design Stability: [Check]; 
Complexity of Heritage Technology: [Empty]; 
Contractor Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Partner Performance: [Empty]; 
Development Cost Change: -1%; 
Launch Delay (months): 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA project data. 

Note: Shading indicates project exceeded cost and/or schedule baseline. 
A blank cell indicates the challenge does not apply to that particular 
project or the project did not supply data or make a projection of the 
data. 

[A] The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter exceeded its schedule threshold by 
5 months and 25 days, but the table shows 6 months due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

We did not specifically correlate individual project challenges with 
specific cost and/or schedule changes in each project. The degree to 
which specific challenges contributed to cost and schedule growth 
varied across the projects in this review. Nonetheless, since previous 
GAO work has demonstrated the impact of these challenges on cost and 
schedule growth and our discussions with NASA project officials 
identified the additional challenges we discuss as contributing to cost 
and schedule growth, we are confident in our characterization of them 
for the purpose of this specific review. 

Technology Maturity: 

Four of the thirteen projects in our assessment for which we received 
data and that had entered the implementation phase did so without first 
maturing all critical technologies.[Footnote 13] Further, three of 
those four projects had also not matured their critical technologies 
before continuing to assembly, integration, and testing. This means 
that needed knowledge about these technologies remained unknown well 
into development thereby adding potential cost and schedule risk to the 
projects. For example, five of the eight critical technologies for one 
instrument and three of the five critical technologies for another 
instrument identified by the Herschel project office were immature when 
the project moved into implementation. Almost two years later at the 
critical design reviews, four of the thirteen critical technologies for 
these two instruments were still immature, yet the project proceeded. 
When complex development programs proceed without understanding whether 
technologies can work as intended, they end up facing unanticipated 
technical problems that have costly, reverberating effects on other 
aspects of the program. 

Design Stability: 

The majority of the projects in our assessment that held a critical 
design review did so without first achieving a stable design. GAO best 
practices recommend completion of at least 90 percent of engineering 
drawings at the critical design review to provide evidence that the 
design is stable. Though NASA's acquisition policy does not specify how 
the project should achieve design stability by the critical design 
review, NASA's system engineering handbook adheres to GAO's metric. Of 
the projects we were able to assess that had reached that point in 
their life-cycle, none had achieved design stability by the time they 
proceeded into assembly, integration, and testing. 

All of the projects in our assessment that had reached their critical 
design review and that provided data on engineering drawings 
experienced some growth in the total number of design drawings after 
their critical design review. Growth ranged from 8 percent to, in the 
case of two projects, well over 100 percent. Some of this increase can 
be attributed to change in system design after critical design review. 
For some projects, design changes after critical design review were 
necessary due to problems in maturing technologies or issues found 
during testing. For example, the Mars Science Laboratory required 
several design changes to address various issues, including redesign of 
the plumbing for the propulsion system, which increased the drawing 
count by 67 percent from critical design review to the time of our 
review. 

Complexity of Heritage Technology: 

More than half the projects in the implementation phase--8 of them-- 
encountered challenges in integrating or modifying heritage 
technologies. Additionally, two projects in formulation--Ares I and 
Orion--also encountered this challenge. We found that the projects that 
relied on heritage technologies underestimated the effort required to 
modify them to the necessary form, fit, or function. According to NASA 
officials, heritage technologies are not the same as critical 
technologies because, in their opinion, critical technologies are not 
based on existing--or heritage--technology. Generally, the project 
officials said that the technology they were using was not considered 
"new" if it had been demonstrated in a test environment or used on a 
prior mission, even if there needed to be a change or customization in 
configuration or design. Yet, these projects all failed to build in the 
necessary resources for technology modification. For example, the 
Kepler project office did not identify any critical technologies since 
all had flown on earlier missions, but viewed their modification as a 
design challenge for the Kepler mission. However, the project 
underestimated the effort required to modify the photometry array and, 
as a result, this challenge contributed to a 25 percent--or $78 
million--cost overrun and Kepler's launch schedule being delayed by 
nine months. 

Contractor Performance: 

Six of the seven projects that cited contractor performance as a 
challenge also experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth. 
Through our discussions with the project offices, we were informed that 
contractors encountered technical and design problems with hardware 
which disrupted development progress. Additionally, contractors lacked 
the experience in space systems that was required for the projects, 
which may be the underlying reason for these development challenges. 
For example, the Dawn contractor had no experience in deep space 
missions. Officials from the company acknowledged they had difficulty 
developing the spacecraft wiring. They also encountered problems 
developing the ion propulsion system for the spacecraft. 

Contractors also faced workforce or corporate issues, such as closing 
facilities, lack of resources, and management inefficiencies. For 
example, the Glory project manager cited management inefficiencies and 
execution problems with the instrument contractor. According to Glory 
project officials at NASA, among the drivers of these management 
inefficiencies were senior leadership changes, a loss of core 
competencies due to plant closure, and a lack of proper decision 
authority. The contractor agreed that the plant closure and the need to 
re-staff were major project challenges. In this case, as with others in 
our review, the contractors forfeited their contract fees or spent the 
fee they had received from NASA to cover project costs. 

Development Partner Performance: 

Five of the thirteen projects we reviewed encountered challenges with a 
development partner. In these cases, the development partner could not 
meet their commitments to the project within planned timeframes. This 
may have been a result of issues within the specific development 
partner organization or as a result of issues faced by a contractor to 
that development partner. For example, NASA is collaborating with the 
European Space Agency (ESA) on the Herschel space observatory. While 
NASA has delivered its two instruments to ESA, ESA has encountered 
difficulties developing its instruments and has delayed Herschel's 
launch by 14 months. Because of this delay, NASA has incurred about $39 
million in cost growth due to the need to fund component developers for 
a longer period of time than originally planned. 

Assessment Of Individual Projects: 

Our assessments of all 18 individual projects follow. 

Aquarius: 

Aquarius is a satellite mission developed by NASA and the Space Agency 
of Argentina (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, CONAE) to 
investigate the links between the global water cycle, ocean 
circulation, and the climate. It will measure global sea surface 
salinity. The Aquarius science goals are to observe and model the 
processes that relate salinity variations to climatic changes in the 
global cycling of water and to understand how these variations 
influence the general ocean circulation. By measuring salinity globally 
for 3 years, Aquarius will provide an unprecedented new view of the 
ocean's role in climate. 

Figure: Artist depiction of Aquarius Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation start (12/03); 
Preliminary Design Review (6/05); 
Critical Design Review (9/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness Date (5/10). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
International Partner: Argentina's National Committee of Space 
Activities (CONAE); 
Major Contractors: in-house development; 
Projected Launch Date: May 23, 2010; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif. 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 3 years for Aquarius mission; 5 years for SAC-D 
(CONAE) mission. 

Project Challenges: 
* Design Stability; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $241.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $253.1; 
Change: 4.7%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $35.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $35.6; 
Change: 0.3%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $192.7; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $204.5; 
Change: 6.1%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $13.6; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $13.0; 
Change: -4.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 7/2009; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 5/2010; 
Change: 10 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

The launch for Aquarius has been delayed 10 months, from July 2009 to 
May 2010 because of delays in CONAE’s spacecraft development 
activities. The launch delay prompted NASA to report to the Congress 
that the Aquarius project exceeded its development schedule threshold 
and caused NASA to experience a $10.7 million cost increase. Based on 
the cost-sharing arrangements with CONAE, NASA will also bear its own 
costs associated with future delays. NASA has continued its development 
of the Aquarius instrument, which is currently scheduled for completion
in March 2009 and shipment to CONAE in June 2009 for integration with 
the Argentine-developed spacecraft. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The only critical technology the project office identified was the 
Aquarius instrument itself, which includes the scatterometer and the 
radiometer components. The project deemed the instrument mature at the 
preliminary design review because the instrument uses heritage 
technologies, even though those technologies were brought together in a 
different form, fit, and function for use on Aquarius. The instrument
design, however, was not stable at the critical design review (CDR) as 
the Aquarius project had released only 16 percent of the engineering 
drawings. Project officials told us that some detailed parts were either
not accounted for or not very mature at CDR, and they needed a follow-
on review to clear up the issue. For example, details in the design of 
a connector arm of a reflector to the instrument were lagging. In 
addition, project officials said that the Aquarius instrument design 
was far ahead of development of CONAE’s spacecraft, so the project 
could not finalize and release all the instrument drawings until CONAE 
finished the spacecraft design. To help minimize project risk in the 
interim, project officials said NASA provided CONAE with an engineering 
model to work with as the Argentines developed the spacecraft. All 
engineering drawings have now been released. 

Aquarius’ schedule slipped 10 months, prompting NASA to report to the 
Congress that the Aquarius program has exceeded its development 
schedule threshold. According to project officials and budget 
documents, a delay in development of the spacecraft bus by CONAE is the 
primary reason for the schedule slip. Project officials said that CONAE 
is using some newer and unfamiliar technologies on the spacecraft, such 
as lithium-ion batteries for power storage. NASA’s review of CONAE’s 
proposed schedule indicated that CONAE had made several high-risk 
decisions in order to meet a planned launch date of September 2009.
For example, CONAE decided to begin flight model fabrication before 
completing adequate testing of the engineering models. Subsequent 
discussions between NASA and CONAE led to a decision to set a new 
launch date of May 2010. The spacecraft will also house several 
instruments for CONAE science missions. According to project officials, 
those instruments all appear to be on schedule, but officials added 
that none of those instruments are needed for NASA’s Aquarius mission 
and that the mission would launch without the CONAE instruments if any 
were delayed. 

NASA expects the Aquarius instrument to be completed in March 2009 and 
held until June 2009 when it will ship to Argentina to be integrated 
with the spacecraft. Since no funds are exchanged between the U.S. and
Argentina for this project, NASA bears its own costs associated with 
any further delays for its portion that could occur. Project officials 
indicated that the schedule slip increased NASA’s cost by $10.7 
million. They also noted that this cost increase does not include 
increased launch vehicle costs because of the delay or Delta-II launch 
site maintenance costs at Vandenberg Air Force Base. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Aquarius project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that Aquarius had changes to its baseline due to slips by
its development partner, the CONAE, and that they believe the NASA 
contribution to this mission is on schedule for completion in March 
2009. They added that the benefit of the international partnership, plus
the groundbreaking information about the Earth’s climate, out weigh the 
additional costs, which NASA has chosen to absorb within its budget. 
Project officials said that NASA will continue to closely monitor 
progress and work with its development partner to minimize impacts. 

[End of Aquarius section] 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV): 

Figure: Artist depiction of Ares Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, as part of the Constellation 
Program, is the next generation human spacecraft that will carry the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle into low Earth orbit. The mission of the 
Ares I project is to deliver a safe, reliable, and affordable launch 
system for space exploration. Ares I will feature a 24.5-metric ton 
lift capability to carry crew to the Moon or deliver crew and cargo to 
the International Space Station. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation start (9/05); 
Preliminary Design Review (9/08); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Critical Design Review (3/10); 
Launch Readiness (3/15). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Alliant Techsystems, Pratt and Whitney, Rocketdyne, 
Boeing; 
Projected Launch Date: March 2015; 
Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla. 
Launch Vehicle: Ares I; 
Mission Duration: N/A. 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost*: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): $17,000 to $20,000. 

*This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are explored. 
NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. This estimate is for 
the Ares I vehicle only. 

Launch Schedule: 3/2015 

Project Status: 

Contract costs for the development the Ares I increased by $304 million 
since initial award and the first manned launch has slipped from fiscal 
year 2014 to fiscal year 2015. The Ares I had planned to begin 
developmental flight testing in April 2009. However, delays to the 
planned Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission have impacted the 
project’s ability to modify the launch pad needed to support planned 
testing, resulting in at least a 3-month delay to the first Ares I 
developmental flight test. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

Because of the use of heritage systems and technology in system 
designs, Ares I project officials said they did not identify any 
critical technologies. However, we found that all three major elements 
of the Ares I system—the first stage, upper stage, and upper stage 
engine—face significant development challenges. The first stage draws 
heavily from existing Space Shuttle systems, but requires modifications 
such as incorporating a fifth segment that is likely to affect flight 
characteristics. In addition, modeling indicates that thrust 
oscillation within the first stage could cause unacceptable structural 
vibrations throughout the Ares I and Orion vehicles which could 
adversely affect crew safety if left unmitigated. NASA is considering
solutions including incorporating tuned vibration absorbers into the 
Ares I first stage or adding a composite structure between the first 
and second stages. Thrust oscillation was again identified as a risk 
during the September 2008 preliminary design review, and the project 
has scheduled another review in the fall of 2009 to fully incorporate 
design solutions. The upper stage design includes a shared bulkhead 
between the hydrogen and oxygen fuel tanks, even though experience from 
the Apollo program shows that common bulkheads are complex and 
difficult to manufacture. The J-2X upper stage engine represents a new 
engine development effort that is likely to encounter problems during 
development; NASA estimates that J-2X will require 29 rework cycles to 
address problems, which they state is less than the number experienced 
during the development of other rocket engines. 

NASA has not released official cost and schedule estimates to complete 
the Ares I program. NASA officials stated that these estimates will be 
made available when the project moves into implementation, or at the
conclusion of the Constellation Program’s non-advocate review. However, 
the value of various development contracts for the Ares I have 
increased by $304 million since initial award, and the first manned 
launch has slipped from 2014 to 2015. 

The project has already experienced schedule delays that they attribute 
to funding instability in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and launch pad 
availability. Constellation’s integrated risk management system also 
indicates there is a high risk that funding shortfalls could occur in 
fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being 
completed to support schedules and milestones. Further, the delayed 
Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission has caused the first planned 
Ares I developmental flight test—Ares I-X—to slip at least 3 months 
from April 2009 to July 2009. Since the Hubble mission will have a back 
up Shuttle for crew rescue purposes, thus utilizing both launch pads, 
the Ares I project cannot modify launch pad 39B for its use until the 
Hubble servicing mission is complete. NASA continues to develop an 
integrated schedule based on how the Hubble mission will impact pad 
modifications for the Ares I-X mission, as well as joint scheduling of 
a mobile launch platform and space in the Vertical Assembly Building. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Ares I project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that they believe the project has made 
progress in maturing the Ares I design and associated elements, and 
that all planned reviews have been executed on a schedule that supports 
the initial operating capability commitment. They added that the 
project is responding to technical and programmatic challenges, and 
they feel that all major element contracts are in place and are 
performing to plan. 

[End of Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) section] 

Dawn: 

Figure: Artist depiction: NASA/JPL/McREL; Background: William K. 
Hartmann, UCLA (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The Dawn mission is on a journey to the two largest asteroids in our 
solar system, Vesta and Ceres. Launched from Cape Canaveral in 
September 2007, the Dawn spacecraft will encounter and orbit Vesta 4 
years later, then travel an additional three years to reach and orbit 
Ceres. The Dawn spacecraft will use solar-electric (ion) propulsion to 
reach and orbit Vesta for 7 months and Ceres for 5 months while 
performing scientific investigations at various altitudes and lighting 
conditions. Dawn will use imaging, spectroscopy, and gravity 
measurements to characterize the two asteroids---measuring their mass, 
gravity fields, principal axes, rotational axes, and moments of 
inertia. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (4/01); 
Implementation Preliminary Design Review (10/03); 
Critical Design Review (6/04); 
Launch Readiness (9/07); 
GAO Review (12/08). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
Partners: Los Alamos National Laboratories, German Aerospace Center 
(DLR) with the Max Planck Institute for Aeronomy, Agenzia Spaziale 
Italiana (ASI); 
Major Contractors: Orbital Sciences Corporation; 
Launch Date: September 27, 2007; 
Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla. 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 8 Years. 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $460.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $465.0; 
Change: 1.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $99.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $106.6; 
Change: 7.4%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $273.7; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $269.4; 
Change: -1.6%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $87.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $89.0; 
Change: 1.9%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 9/2007; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 9/2007; 
Change: none. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

Dawn launched on September 27, 2007. The spacecraft is scheduled to 
begin the survey of Vesta on August 18, 2011 and then survey Ceres 
beginning February 18, 2015. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The Dawn project has been beset with funding issues. The project was 
approved for early formulation in January 2001, but was delayed nine 
months as NASA did not have the funds to proceed. Budget issues also 
caused a delay in the project as it moved through the formulation 
phase. The mission objectives were then modified to a baseline mission 
to Vesta with travel to Ceres as an extended mission. During the 
project’s second confirmation review, NASA added the travel to Ceres as 
a primary mission objective. The project was also told to increase 
reserves to 25 percent to comply with JPL design principles which, 
according to project officials, were not written when the Dawn project 
was first proposed, causing the project to be descoped and under-funded 
at the beginning of implementation. Project management expended $25 
million in project reserves in the first year of implementation 
attempting to meet a June 2006 launch date, but the use of reserves was 
not conveyed to the mission directorate. In the subsequent year, the 
project experienced significant cost overruns. The project stopped 
development activities between October 2005 and January 2006 during a 
review by an Independent Assessment Team (IAT). The IAT reported 
technical issues with the project, recommended management changes, and 
stated a need for an additional $57 million and a 12 to 18 month 
extension to complete implementation. According to project officials, 
NASA’s Science Mission Directorate terminated the project in February 
2006, but it was reinstated on appeal and resulted in a launch 
readiness date slip to June 2007. Ultimately, this one year launch 
delay cost the project an additional $54 million. 

JPL indicated that contractor performance led to several problems 
during Dawn’s development, generally stemming from a lack of technical 
and corporate experience on the part of the prime contractor with regard
to complex space systems, such as the ion propulsion system which 
contractor officials agreed was new to them. The IAT noted that JPL did 
not provide enough oversight of its contractor, which had no system-
level planetary project implementation experience, to assure hardware 
delivery schedules would be met and software development activities 
could be accomplished on time and within budget. Project officials told 
us that other sub-contractors on the project also experienced 
development and testing issues. For example, a sub-contractor working 
on development of the ion propulsion system encountered problems that 
led to deficient workmanship and component failures, while another 
subcontractor had issues with development of the xenon tank for the ion 
propulsion system; both the flight tank and spare failed testing. As a 
result of these issues and other system level implementation issues, 
the project experienced cost overruns and the overall launch readiness 
date for the system slipped 15 months. Subsequently, the prime 
contractor suggested forfeiting part of their contract award fees to 
keep the project on cost and its mission intact, and NASA agreed. 

The initial project proposal for Dawn assumed a high level of heritage 
technology for the ion propulsion system from the Deep Space One 
mission. According to project officials, inheritance reviews were 
conducted early in the life cycle for Dawn and the design was generally 
correct. A study performed during formulation should have derived that 
the cost and schedule assumptions of using heritage technology were
not valid, but officials told us the study was not accurate. Problems 
with the heritage technology, however, were discovered in 
implementation, resulting in significant cost growth. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Dawn project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
said that NASA agrees that there were funding issues but points out 
that they were initially externally driven, which necessitated changes 
to project scope during the project life cycle and resulted in the 
prime contractor giving up their fee prior to confirmation. Project
officials also agreed that there were technical challenges faced by 
both prime and by some sub-contractors, some of which were due to a 
higher expectation of heritage hardware than was actually the case. 

[End of Dawn section] 

Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST): 

Figure: Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST): 

Source: Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FI IMG RSC-08PD-1637. 

[End of figure] 

The Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) seeks to improve 
understanding of the structure of the universe. By measuring the 
direction, energy, and arrival time of celestial high-energy gamma 
rays, GLAST will map the sky with 50 times the sensitivity of previous 
missions. GLAST’s scientific payload includes two instruments: the
Large Area Telescope (LAT) and the Gammaray Burst Monitor (GBM). The 
mission has four objectives: (1) understanding the mechanisms of 
particle acceleration in astrophysical environments; (2) determining 
the high-energy behavior of gammaray bursts; (3) resolving and 
identifying point sources with known objects; and (4) probing dark 
matter and the extra galactic background light in the early universe. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (7/99): 
Preliminary Design Review (6/03); 
Critical Design Review (9/04); 
Launch Readiness (5/08); 
GAO Review (12/08). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
Partners: U.S. Department of Energy, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and 
Sweden; 
Major Contractors: Stanford University, General Dynamics; 
Launch Date: June 11, 2008; 
Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla. 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal). 

Project Challenges: 
* Design Stability; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Contractor Performance; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $723.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $774.5; 
Change: 7.1%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $97.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $98.7; 
Change: 1.3%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $403.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $423.0; 
Change: 4.9%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $222.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $252.8; 
Change: 13.6%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 9/2007; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 6/2008; 
Change: 9 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

GLAST successfully launched into low Earth orbit on June 11, 2008. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

Prior to launch in June 2008, the GLAST project experienced several 
schedule delays because of conflicts over test facilities, launch pad 
time, and engineering issues. These delays resulted in NASA’s reporting 
to the Congress that the GLAST project exceeded its schedule baseline 
by 8 months. Project officials told us that the spacecraft vendor gave 
priority to Department of Defense projects for thermal vacuum testing at
its test facility. This action forced GLAST to be moved to the Naval 
Research Labs for testing. In order to accommodate GLAST, the alternate 
test facility required some minor modification. According to NASA 
officials, this resulted in a 3-month delay. A busy launch schedule at 
Cape Canaveral then made it difficult for GLAST to re-schedule its 
launch date, contributing to the remainder of the project’s overall 
schedule slip. 

Project officials said schedule slippage can also be attributed to 
heritage technology engineering problems. At the project’s preliminary 
design review, GLAST had matured its one critical technology, while the 
rest were considered heritage technologies. The project considers the 
Large Area Telescope (LAT) a new instrument, though it is made up of 
several heritage technologies. According to a project official, the LAT
has experienced both engineering design and electrical parts problems 
that resulted in schedule delays and the need for additional funding. 
Likewise, officials told us that a component of GLAST’s command and 
data handling system also features a new combination of heritage 
technology. Because of software and hardware problems, project 
officials said that the prime contractor had to bring this work, which 
had been outsourced to a sub-contractor, back in-house. 

The project also identified partner issues that contributed to an 
increase in project cost. According to project officials, France 
initially was responsible for significant instrument integration work; 
however, the French were unable to complete that work and, as a result, 
the project office transferred it to the Naval Research Laboratory. 
This transfer increased costs by about $5 million. In addition, 
officials said that Italy originally was supposed to supply the GLAST 
ground station with X-band communications. However, in 2003, Italian 
officials informed the project they could not keep this commitment. The 
antenna on the GLAST spacecraft now uses Ku-band communications 
instead. Italy also used an inexperienced contractor to produce GLAST’s 
tracking towers, a situation that resulted in contamination problems. 
Project officials stated that these partner issues combined to increase 
the cost of the GLAST project and contributed to the $45 million 
increase. 

The GLAST project’s design was not stable at critical design review as 
the project had released only 76 percent of its drawings and 
experienced a 31 percent growth in the number of drawings after the 
critical design review. Project officials attributed the growth to the 
withdrawal of the French partners, the change to a Ku-band transmitter 
and ground system, and the change in facility for producing the solar 
arrays. 

Project Office Comments: 

The GLAST project office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that they believe the principal project challenge was 
the loss of development partners, and that the eight month launch slip 
was caused by contractor performance and launch vehicle development 
issues. They did not consider design stability or the complexity of 
heritage technology as issues for this project. 

[End of Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) section] 

Glory: 

Figure: Glory Project Office (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The Glory project is a low-Earth orbit satellite that will contribute 
to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program. The satellite has two 
principal science objectives: (1) collect data on the properties of 
aerosols and black carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere and climate systems 
and (2) collect data on solar irradiance. The satellite has two main 
instruments---the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS) and the Total 
Irradiance Monitor (TIM)---as well as two cloud cameras. The TIM will 
allow NASA to have uninterrupted solar irradiance data by bridging the
gap between NASA’s Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment and the 
National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
missions. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (9/05); 
Preliminary Design Review (9/05); 
Critical Design Review (7/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness Date (06/09). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, University of 
Colorado Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, Orbital Sciences 
Corporation; 
Projected Launch Date: June 2009; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif. 
Launch Vehicle: Taurus XL; 
Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal). 

Project Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Design Stability; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $266.1; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $347.9; 
Change: 30.7%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $70.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $70.5; 
Change: -0.4%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $168.9; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $259.1; 
Change: 53.4%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $26.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $18.3; 
Change: -30.7%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 12/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 6/2009; 
Change: 6 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

The Glory project reported to the Congress that it exceeded its 
development cost threshold by 31 percent from its baseline, requiring 
the Congress to reauthorize Glory. The project is waiting for delivery 
of the APS, which is now projected for February 2009. The delivery of 
this instrument is over one year behind schedule. The launch date for 
Glory, originally scheduled for June 2008, is now scheduled for June 
2009. The launch delay may require the project to report to the 
Congress that it will also exceed its development schedule baseline. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The Glory project has experienced significant delays because of late 
delivery of the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), which is based on 
heritage technology. At its preliminary design review in September 2005,
the Glory project had one immature technology: the APS. At that review, 
the project estimated that the APS would be delivered by September 
2007. According to the APS contractor, the instrument is now forecasted 
for delivery in February 2009---over one year behind schedule. The 
project identified contractor performance as the top risk facing the 
mission. Despite the contractor’s performance, NASA has kept work on 
the APS with the company because the project believes it is more cost 
effective than starting a new inhouse development project of this 
instrument. NASA estimated that an in-house development effort would 
cost an additional $78 million and delay launch until February 2010. 
Glory project officials stated that the APS development problems do not 
stem from technical issues, but from the contractor’s inability to plan
and execute the work. The officials outlined several causes for the 
project’s issues with the contractor, including the company 
consolidating its workforce and a resulting loss of APS corporate 
design knowledge. Contractor officials told us that along with moving 
the APS development effort from one facility to another, they made the 
decision to finish building the instrument with the new team rather 
than doing a complete design analysis. They said this led directly to 
cost and schedule increases as they had to perform more testing 
concurrent with the development of the instrument. 

At the critical design review, the project’s design was not stable as 
it had released only 70 percent of its drawings. As of GAO’s review, 99 
percent of total drawings have been released. However, Glory’s drawing
count increased by 27 percent after the critical design review. This 
increase is attributed to the modification of drawings for heritage 
parts for Glory’s unique configuration. 

Since Glory was baselined in fiscal year 2008, the project’s 
development costs have increased by 31 percent. As a result, NASA has 
reported to the Congress that Glory has exceeded its development cost 
threshold, requiring the Congress to reauthorize the project. 
Uncertainty in the project prior to its mission confirmation in 2005 
delayed the launch readiness date from June 2008 to December 2008. More 
recently, the project’s scheduled launch date has slipped from December 
2008 to June 2009, which could cause the project to also have to report 
the slip to the Congress. According to project officials, Glory’s 
recent cost and schedule issues are driven solely by the late delivery 
of the APS. The project has taken several steps to mitigate the cost 
increases caused by the delayed delivery of the APS and to improve the 
contractor’s performance. The project has eliminated requirements, 
simplified the instrument design, provided NASA engineering and 
management resources to the contractor, and involved both NASA and 
contractor executives in addressing the problems. According to 
contractor officials, the company has used its award fee to cover the 
costs on this project. The company has also provided its own funding to 
help off-set cost overruns. 

Project Office Comments: 

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that since filing the threshold report, NASA has 
continued to pursue the baseline plan for the Glory implementation. 
They added that performance at the APS instrument supplier continues to 
be slow, but the instrument technical performance evaluated at each 
major developmental gate has been excellent. In addition, they believe 
the engineering design and the technical performance of the APS 
instrument have never been issues, and the programmatic issues have all 
been connected with the supplier’s manufacturing and management. 

[End of Glory section] 

Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission: 

Figure: GPM Project Office (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission, a joint NASA and 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) project, seeks to improve the 
scientific understanding of the global water cycle and the accuracy of 
precipitation forecasts. The GPM is composed of a core spacecraft 
carrying two main instruments: a Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar 
(DPR) and a GPM Microwave Imager (GMI). In addition, the GPM project 
includes a second Low-Inclination spacecraft with a second GMI 
instrument. The GPM builds on the work of the Tropical Rainfall 
Measuring Mission, and will provide the first opportunity to calibrate 
measurements of global precipitation. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (7/02); 
Preliminary Design Review (11/08); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Critical Design Review (11/09); 
Launch Core Spacecraft (7/13); 
Launch constellation Spacecraft (11/14); 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA); 
Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace; 
Projected Launch Date: July 2013; 
Launch Location: Tanegashima Island, Japan; 
Launch Vehicle: H-IIA (Japan); 
Mission Duration: 3 years (5 years consumables). 

Project Challenges: 
* None Currently Identified. 

Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost*: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): not provided; 

* NASA suggested it will provide baseline estimates for
this project when it proceeds from formulation into
implementation. 

Launch Schedule: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): 7/2013. 

Project Status: 

GPM is in the formulation phase and is expected to enter implementation 
after its mission confirmation review in the spring of 2009. Recent 
project budget changes show reductions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. 
These reductions caused a project re-plan and delayed the scheduled 
development of the second GMI instrument by 1 year and delayed the 
launch of the Low-Inclination observatory by 5 months. The re-plan 
schedules a July 2013 launch of the core spacecraft at the latest as
requested by JAXA. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The GPM spacecraft and its components are being designed to be 
demiseable---they will burn up during re-entry into the Earth’s 
atmosphere to limit orbital debris---which poses a challenge for the 
project in the integration of the propellant management device with the 
craft’s aluminum composite propulsion tanks. Neither the propellant 
management device nor the aluminum composite tanks are new 
technologies, but the integration of the two is the challenge. 
Currently, the integration of the propellant management device and the 
aluminum composite tank is not expected to be mature until after the 
preliminary design review. If the project is unable to sufficiently 
mature this technology, it will use a titanium propellant management 
device and/or tank that is less demiseable. 

The GPM project has not reached a design review where we could assess 
design stability based on our metric. The project currently has 
released 17 percent of its engineering drawings, but expects to have
released only 70 percent of drawings at the critical design review. 
According to project officials, the two main instruments—the JAXA-
supplied Dual-frequency Precipitation Radar (DPR) and the NASA-supplied
GPM Microwave Imager (GMI)—are based on heritage technology and 
therefore are not considered critical technologies. However, the DPR 
and GMI will have to be adapted to the GPM spacecraft design for this
mission. In addition, the DPR instrument includes a Ka-band radar that 
the project identified as a new design. 

Project officials told us that JAXA has been frustrated by NASA’s 
uncertainty over funding the GPM project and questioned NASA’s 
commitment to the project. According to a March 2008 report from NASA’s 
Inspector General, budget reductions to the GPM project in fiscal years 
2005 through 2007 led to a 2-year delay in the contract for the 
development and delivery of the GMI. These reductions caused the launch 
of the core spacecraft to be delayed from 2007 to 2013 and the cost 
estimate to rise from $600 million to over $1 billion. In early 2008, 
NASA signed a launch vehicle agreement with JAXA. Subsequently, the 
preliminary design and critical design reviews were scheduled for the 
project. 

The project’s budget was recently reduced for fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. Following these cuts, NASA directed the project to re-plan with 
two constraints: 1) maintain the core spacecraft launch date of June
2013 but let the Low-Inclination spacecraft slip as necessary and, 2) 
accept increased programmatic risk from low contingency funds in fiscal 
year 2009. The re-plan presented maintains the core spacecraft to a July
2013 launch date requested by JAXA, but the start of work on the second 
GMI instrument is delayed by one year and the launch of the 
Constellation observatory is delayed by 5 months. As a result of the 
reduction in funding levels, NASA considers fiscal year 2009 as a high-
risk year for the project since it now has low contingency reserves of 
approximately 5 percent. 

Project Office Comments: 

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
said that following the numerous mission delays that drove the launch 
date from 2008 to the current July 2013, the sustained funding 
increases the GPM project has received since the fiscal year 2008 
budget has enabled steady progress towards mission confirmation and 
implementation in fiscal year 2009. They added that JAXA has been 
satisfied with this progress, including the formal agreement
concluded in early 2008 between NASA and JAXA on the use of the H-IIA 
launch vehicle to launch the Core Observatory. Project officials 
believe they will have a stable design since they plan to have necessary
hardware manufacturing drawings released by the critical design review. 

[End of Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission section] 

Herschel: 

Figure: ESA/AOES Medialab (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The Herschel Space observatory, a collaborative project between NASA 
and the European Space Agency (ESA), will seek to discover how the first
galaxies formed and how they evolved to give rise to present day 
galaxies like our own. Herschel has the largest mirror ever built for a 
space telescope. At 3.5 meters in diameter, the mirror will collect 
long-wavelength radiation from some of the coldest and most distant 
objects in the Universe. It will be able to observe dust-obscured and 
cold objects that are invisible to other telescopes. Additional targets 
for Herschel will include clouds of gas and dust where new stars are 
being born, disks out of which planets may form, and cometary 
atmospheres packed with complex organic molecules. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (1998); 
Preliminary Design Review (7/00); 
Critical Design Review (7/01); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (04/09); 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory: 
International Partner: European Space Agency (ESA); 
Major Contractors: in-house development; 
Projected Launch Date: April 2009; 
Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana; 
Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied); 
Mission Duration: 3 years (5 year goal). 

Project Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Design Stability; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $325.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $276.8; 
Change: -14.9%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $10.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $10.4; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $117.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $131.7; 
Change: 12.6%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $198.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $134.7; 
Change: -32.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 8/2007; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 4/2009; 
Change: 20 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

Since Herschel’s baseline was established in 2007, ESA slipped the 
Herschel launch schedule three times because of scope changes and 
challenges with integration of the instruments onto the spacecraft. A
recent slip resulted in a project cost increase of $43 million and 
required NASA to report to the Congress that it exceeded its schedule 
baseline. The project is currently behind schedule by about 50 days, a 
delay that has caused a fourth launch date slip from its current October
2008 date to April 2009. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

NASA has completed the development of components for two Herschel 
Instruments---the Heterodyne Instrument for the Far Infrared (HIFI) and 
the Spectral and Photometric Imaging Receiver (SPIRE) instrument---and 
delivered them to ESA. However, during both the preliminary and 
critical design reviews, some of the critical technologies for these 
elements were considered immature. At the preliminary design review 
(PDR) for HIFI, five of the eight critical technologies were immature. 
Later, at critical design review (CDR), two of the eight HIFI critical 
technologies were still assessed as immature. SPIRE had a similar 
record. At SPIRE’s PDR, three of the five critical technologies were 
assessed as being immature. Two years later at CDR, two of five SPIRE 
critical technologies were still assessed as immature. Regardless of
this, the project proceeded. After delivery of NASA’s components, 
problems were found during testing of the equipment in Europe. 
According to the project office, the HIFI failed in thermal cycling 
during testing and SPIRE had problems with the wiring that connects its 
detectors. The technical issues with the two instruments cost $3.9 
million to resolve. 

In addition to technology maturity issues, NASA committed to developing 
components for the HIFI and SPIRE instruments before achieving design 
stability for the instruments. At the CDR for both the HIFI and SPIRE 
instruments, NASA had released less than 10 percent of the engineering 
design drawings. According to the project office, this was primarily 
due to the fact that ESA’s interface drawings were in preliminary 
format. The office also said that the lack of timeliness in the 
submission of design drawings is a challenge when the project has to 
depend on multiple partners for input. 

Herschel’s $43 million growth in life cycle costs can be largely 
attributed to technical integration problems, which resulted in launch 
delays. Those delays are also the primary cause of overall schedule 
slippage. ESA’s contractor could not complete development of its 
instruments or integrate Herschel instruments in a timely manner, 
prompting ESA to pull the integration work in-house. While NASA faced 
some technical problems with development of components for the HIFI and 
SPIRE instruments, resulting in about $3.9 million of cost growth, 
project officials said the remaining increase of about $39 million is 
due to the three slips in Herschel’s launch date since the project’s 
baseline was established in February 2007 since the project must 
maintain a workforce to support testing and integration activities. 
Based on the 14-month delay in launch date, NASA reported to the 
Congress in February 2008 that the Herschel project has exceeded its 
schedule baseline. Herschel’s launch schedule has now slipped even 
further. The project office stated that Herschel is currently behind 
schedule by about 50 days, which caused the launch date to slip from 
its current October 2008 date to early in calendar year 2009. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Herschel project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that although NASA did have some technical
issues with their hardware contributions which did cause an increase to 
the NASA cost in order to correct the problems, the majority of the 
cost increase to NASA has been due to technical problems on the 
European side which have caused the launch to slip several times in the 
last several years. 

[End of Herschel section] 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 

Figure: JWST Project Office (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large, infrared-optimized 
space telescope that is designed to find the first galaxies that formed 
in the early universe. The focus of scientific study will include first 
light, assembly of galaxies, origins of stars and planetary systems, 
and origins of the elements necessary for life. JWST's instruments will 
be designed to work primarily in the infrared range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, with some capability in the visible range. 
JWST will have a large mirror, 6.5 meters (21.3 feet) in diameter and a 
sunshield the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and sunshade will 
not fit onto the rocket fully open, so both will fold up and open once 
JWST is in outer space. JWST will reside in an orbit about 1.5 million 
kilometers (1 million miles) from the Earth. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (3/99); 
Preliminary Design Review (3/08); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Critical Design Review (7/09); 
Launch Readiness Date (6/13); 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: European Space Agency (ESA), Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA); 
Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman; 
Projected Launch Date: June 2013; 
Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana; 
Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 (ESA Supplied); 
Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal). 

Project Challenges: 
* None Currently Identified. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): Not provided. 

Formulation Cost: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): Not provided. 

Development Cost: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): Not provided. 

Operations Cost: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): Not provided. 

Launch Schedule: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): 6/2013. 

* NASA suggested it will supply the baseline estimates for this project 
when it provides them to Congress in the FY10 Budget Request. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion 
cost increase—$3.5 billion to $4.5 billion—and a 2-year schedule delay 
on the project. A major risk that continued to affect the project 
following this replan was the low level and late phasing of contingency
funding budgeted, despite 12 percent of the $1 billion cost growth 
being used to increase such funding. Although JWST passed its 
preliminary design review, the project still has to address several 
issues related to testing. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The JWST project was re-planned in fiscal year 2006 after a $1 billion 
cost increase and a 2-year schedule delay on the project. About half of 
the cost growth was because of a 1-year schedule slip, resulting from a
delayed decision to use an ESA-supplied Ariane 5 launch vehicle and an 
additional 10-month slip caused by budget profile limitations in fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007. Changes in requirements and a 12 percent increase 
in the program’s contingency funding accounted for the remainder of the 
growth. Despite this increase in contingency funding (i.e., reserves), 
the level and phasing of contingency funding budgeted for the project 
continues to be a major risk. An independent review team expressed 
concern over the contingency funding, stating that it is too low and 
phased in too late. Further, it stated that a contingency fund of 25 
percent to 30 percent would be appropriate for a project through 
implementation. Goddard Space Flight Center policies also require 
reserves of 25 percent through Phase D, Implementation. NASA directed 
its Science Mission Directorate to address the JWST reserves issue at 
the project’s confirmation reviews in the summer of 2008. The project 
budgeted for 5 years of operation for JWST, instead of 10 years of 
mission operations, which, according to the JWST Deputy Associate 
Director, saved the project approximately $300 million. 

Prior to the re-plan in fiscal year 2006, the JWST project was set to 
proceed into development with immature technologies. Because of 
substantial cost growth on the project and as part of the 2006 re-plan,
NASA decided to invest additional time and resources in maturing JWST’s 
critical technologies prior to the preliminary design review. JWST held 
a technology non advocate review in January 2007 to assess the maturity 
of its ten critical technologies. At that time, all but one of the 
critical technologies was assessed as mature, the remaining critical 
technology—the cryocooler—has since been matured. Maturing critical
technologies on the project prior to entering implementation was a 
significant step to reducing risk. The JWST project office also had 53 
percent of its design drawings released at its preliminary design 
review in March 2008 and anticipates that it will have 94 percent of 
its design drawings released by the critical design review in June 
2009. 

Although JWST passed its preliminary design review, the project still 
has to address several issues related to testing. One concern is that 
the project plans to do only one test at the highest level of assembly 
possible in the cryogenic vacuum chamber at the Johnson Space Center. 
The review panel advised JWST to add another test cycle to its 
schedule. Further, the board recommended the addition of a center of 
curvature test on the Optical Telescope Element and was also concerned 
that the project was not planning to test the sunshield at the highest 
level of assembly in the cryogenic vacuum chamber. The project is still 
working through how to address such testing issues. 

Project Office Comments: 

The JWST project provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
said they generally agree with the assessment as presented. Project 
officials commented that the specific concern expressed by the review 
team was that the project's baseline plan only included one cryogenic 
thermal vacuum test opportunity at the integrated level of assembly, 
but the officials added that the specific tests that will be conducted 
during that one cryogenic thermal vacuum test opportunity are numerous 
and comprehensive. Project officials said to address the review team’s 
concern in this regard, the project has accounted for the cost of the 
additional cryogenic testing, should it eventually be required. 

[End of James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) section] 

Kepler: 

Figure: Photograph of Kepler craft. 

Source: Ball Aerospace. 

[End of figure] 

The Kepler mission has been designed to discover Earth-like planets in 
orbit around stars in our galaxy. The goal is to detect tens or even 
hundreds of Earthsize planets in the habitable zones of stars similar
to our own sun. The habitable zone is the region around a star where 
the temperature of a terrestrial-type planet can be expected to allow 
water to exist in liquid form on the planet's surface, thereby 
increasing the probability of life. Kepler will explore the structure 
and diversity of planetary systems by conducting a census of extra-
solar terrestrial planets using a photometer in heliocentric orbit to 
observe the dimming of starlight caused by planetary transits. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (12/01); 
Preliminary Design Review (10/04); 
Critical Design Review (10/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (2/09); 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp.
Projected Launch Date: March 2009; 
Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 3.5 years. 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $497.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $594.8; 
Change: 19.6%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $138.1; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $141.2; 
Change: 2.2%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $312.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $390.3; 
Change: 24.8%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $46.6; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $63.3; 
Change: 35.8%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 6/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 3/2009; 
Change: 9 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, NASA has reported to the 
Congress that both Kepler’s development costs and schedule have 
exceeded the baseline. During that time, Kepler’s development costs 
have increased by about $78 million---or 25 percent---and its schedule 
has increased by 9 months, despite a reliance on heritage technologies. 
Kepler project officials attribute the cost and schedule growth to 
contractor performance problems, cost overruns, and the disruption 
caused by a $35-million budget reduction in fiscal year 2005. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

None of Kepler’s technologies were identified as critical by the 
project management office because all of Kepler’s technologies have 
flown on other missions and are therefore considered heritage. However, 
the project office acknowledged that the customization of some of 
Kepler’s instruments, and the reliance on heritage technology has 
proven to be a challenge to Kepler’s development. Project officials 
told us that Kepler’s large photometry array added to the complexity of 
the project because photometers of Kepler’s sensitivity have not flown 
before and proved more difficult to adapt than anticipated; an 
adaptation that contributed to cost growth. Officials added that the 
Kepler photometer requires a low noise level in its signal chain in 
order to detect changes in the brightness of stars. This made 
developing the electronics for the focal plane array a challenge. The 
focal plane array is the largest ever flown in space and has stringent
requirements. Coupled with the high density of elements and electrical 
and thermal attachments, this makes the assembly and tests of this 
element a key challenge for the project. 

We were unable to determine if Kepler’s design was stable at its 
critical design review. According to the project office, the prime 
contractor, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, implemented a 
new drawing management system called Agile, and the project did not 
have any way to recover the forecast drawings count at the critical 
design phase in October 2006. However, the project reports that 96 
percent of its engineering design drawings have been released to the 
manufacturer. 

Kepler’s total cost and overall schedule have increased significantly. 
Since being baselined in fiscal year 2007, Kepler’s development costs 
have increased by about $78 million—or 25 percent—and its schedule has 
increased by nine months. NASA has reported to the Congress that both 
Kepler’s development costs and schedule have exceeded the baseline. The 
project office attributes the cost and schedule growth to contractor 
performance problems, which occurred because the prime contractor was 
unable to execute the project planned activities within the cost and 
schedule they proposed, despite a reliance on heritage technology. 
Contractor officials agreed that they underestimated the complexity and 
the effort required to modify the existing these technologies. Both the 
Kepler project manager and contractor officials also believe that a $35 
million funding cut in the program because of funding constraints in 
fiscal year 2005 was a significant contributor of the project’s delays. 
This funding instability, according to a NASA project official, 
contributed to an overall 20-month delay in the project’s schedule and 
about $169 million in cost growth. 

Both the project office and the prime contractor made changes to ensure 
that the project remained executable with sufficient reserves. The 
project office shortened the operations period by 6 months and accepted 
additional project risk when it canceled or de-scoped several tests. 
For example, the flight segment vibration test was reduced to an 
acoustic test, and the vibration tests of the solar panel were removed. 
Additionally, the prime contractor put new management personnel in 
place and according to contractor officials, agreed to commit $7 
million of its projected award fee to a cost performance incentive
that may allow the contractor to earn the fee later in the project’s 
life cycle. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Kepler project office provided technical comments to a draft of 
this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project 
officials also commented that Kepler instrument uses existing 
technology components in a new and complex instrument design, and that 
the contractor underestimated the complexity and effort required to 
develop the instrument system and subsystems. They added that after the 
2006 re-baselining of the project, the contractor continued to have 
problems with the instrument development resulting in additional cost 
and schedule overruns. They said the project was able to absorb this 
cost increase by de-scoping elements of the program, delaying the guest 
observer science program and reducing the mission duration by 6 months. 

[End of Kepler section] 

Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM): 

Figure: Artist depiction of Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). 

Source: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems. 

[End of figure] 

The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), a partnership between NASA 
and the U.S. Geological Service (USGS), seeks to extend the ability to 
detect and quantitatively characterize changes on the global land 
surface at a scale where natural and man-made causes of change can be 
detected and differentiated. It is the successor mission to Landsat 7. 
The Landsat data series, begun in 1972, is the longest continuous 
record of changes in the Earth’s surface as seen from space. Landsat 
data is a unique resource for people who work in agriculture, geology, 
forestry, regional planning, education, mapping, and global change 
research. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (10/03); 
Preliminary Design Review (11/08); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Critical Design Review (8/09); 
Launch Readiness Date (12/12). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
Partner: U.S. Geological Service (USGS); 
Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corp., General 
Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, The Hammers Company; 
Projected Launch Date: December 2012; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V; 
Mission Duration: 5 years (10 years propellant). 

Project Challenges: 
* None Currently Identified. 

Project Performance (then year dollars in millions); 

Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost*: 
Latest* (Jan. 2009): $730 to $800. 

* This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options, are 
explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. 

Launch Schedule: 
Latest* (Jan. 2009): 12/2012. 

Project Status: 

The LDCM project shifted its estimated launch date from July 2011 to 
December 2012 after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation 
Review in September 2008. The LDCM project is on an aggressive 39-month
development schedule for the main instrument. The LDCM instrument 
payload consists of a single science instrument, the Operational Land 
Imager (OLI); however, NASA is considering the addition of another 
science instrument—a decision that could exacerbate the already 
aggressive schedule and add cost. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The LDCM instrument payload consists of a single science instrument—the 
Operational Land Imager (OLI). The project considered the addition of 
two other science instruments—the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS)
and the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS). The project has decided 
not to add TSIS, but will continue studying whether TIRS will be 
included. The project hopes to receive funding for completion of the 
TIRS instrument in spring 2009. The spacecraft is being designed to 
accommodate TIRS and both the spacecraft and OLI developers are 
studying the impacts of adding TIRS. According to a project official, 
Goddard Space Flight Center would develop and build TIRS in-house, a 
process that would take approximately 48 months. If TIRS is added to 
the LDCM mission, however, it could delay launch by over a year and, 
according to a project official, cost about $5 million for the redesign 
of the spacecraft to accommodate the instrument. This design cost does 
not include the cost of integrating the instrument onto the spacecraft. 
Project officials have indicated that LDCM has already undertaken an 
aggressive 39-month OLI development schedule. According to the 
contractor for the OLI instrument, this aggressive schedule was 
necessary because of delays in the procurement process. The LDCM 
project delayed its estimated launch date from July 2011 to December 
2012 after it completed its Initial Mission Confirmation Review in 
September 2008. While a launch after January 2012 could jeopardize the 
continuity of Landsat data, project officials said recent reliability 
analyses show that the Landsat 7 satellite may be operational until 
2017, lessening the likelihood of a data gap. 

The project office has identified four critical technologies for the 
OLI instrument. Three of the four critical technologies—the wide field 
of view optics, linear arrays, and modular sensor chip assemblies—are
considered fully mature as they have been fully validated by the Earth 
Observing Satellite (EO-1) mission through scene comparisons with 
Landsat 7. The sensor assembly chips for the OLI are considered mature
since prototypes were included on the Advanced Land Imager that flew on 
EO-1. The project does not anticipate that there will be any additional 
critical technologies for the spacecraft because most of the technology 
used to build the spacecraft will be commercial off-the-shelf items 
that have flown on other missions. 

Because LDCM has not yet reached its critical design review, we were 
unable to assess design stability of the project at this time. The 
project office anticipates having over 95 percent of the flight design 
and manufacturing drawings complete by the critical design review 
currently scheduled for August 2009. The spacecraft contract was 
awarded in April 2008, and the project office anticipates releasing the 
spacecraft drawings after design maturation. Formal cost and schedule 
baselines will be established for the project at the Mission 
Confirmation Review in 2009. 

Project Office Comments: 

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office 
also commented that NASA and the OLI instrument vendor are making 
steady progress on the OLI instrument on the planned schedule. The 
project is developing detailed schedules now to ensure sufficient 
schedule reserve is applied to the critical hardware developments. 

[End of Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) section] 

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO): 

Refer to PDF for Figure: Photograph of Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
(LRO): 

Source: LRO Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) is NASA’s first mission in the 
implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration, the plan to return 
to the moon and beyond. LRO’s mission is to orbit the moon for one year 
measuring lunar topography, resources, and thermal and radiation 
environments. This data will be used to select a landing site for 
future manned missions to the moon and to ensure astronaut safety. The 
LRO has a scientific payload of six main instruments and one technology 
demonstration instrument. LRO’s launch vehicle contains a secondary 
payload, the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS), 
which will investigate lunar surface volatiles such as water. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (5/04); 
Preliminary Design Review (2/06); 
Critical Design Review (11/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (4/09). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
Partner: Boston University, University of California Los Angeles, 
Southwest Research Institute, Russian Institute for Space Research, 
Arizona State University, Naval Air Warfare Center; 
Prime Contractors: in-house development; 
Projected Launch Date: April 24, 2009; 
Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V; 
Mission Duration: 1 year (then science mission). 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $540.1; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $540.1; 
Change: 0.0. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $93.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $94.8; 
Change: 1.6%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $420.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $422.4; 
Change: 0.4%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $25.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $22.9; 
Change: -11.2%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 10/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 4/2009; 
Change: 6 months*. 

* Actual launch delay is currently 5 months and 25 days. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

LRO’s original schedule with a launch date by the end of 2008 placed 
the project on a challenging and aggressive development schedule. This 
schedule is driven by the need to provide data for the Orion and Ares
I hardware designs and mission planning efforts for a human lunar 
mission by 2020. The project experienced challenges modifying 
instruments for the moon’s thermal environment. These challenges, along 
with a decision by the launch authority to re-prioritize the LRO launch 
on its manifest, contributed to a launch slip to April 2009. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The project did not identify any critical technologies. Each of the 
project’s major instruments is based significantly on heritage 
technology. However, the project manager said the project had 
underestimated the difficulty of the modifications needed. For example, 
the project manager said the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Cameras 
needed some technical work to adapt their designs for the lunar thermal 
environment as well as some redesign when areas needing reinforcement 
were found during testing. The Lunar Orbiter Laser Altimeter, while 
similar to laser altimeters that have flown on previous Mars and 
Mercury missions, had issues with the electronics that time the laser 
pulses of the altimeter, which, according to the project manager, took 
more time to resolve than originally expected. The Diviner Lunar 
Radiometer Experiment instrument is almost a copy of an instrument on 
Mars now, but experienced motor failures, which the project manager 
said took extra time and money to recover from. Finally, the Lyman-
Alpha Mapping Project instrument, a copy of the Pluto Alice instrument, 
was slightly delayed because of a detector failure during thermal 
vacuum testing. According to the project manager, most instruments 
required additional design and analysis of their thermal control 
designs to operate reliably on the mission. Redesign was necessary 
because the lunar environment presents a harsher thermal environment 
than the environment faced by earth-orbiting missions. 

The project did not measure design stability by percentage of drawings 
completed at the critical design review (CDR), and therefore was not 
assessed according to this metric. 

Project officials said NASA gave LRO more reserve funding because of 
the aggressive schedule on the project to compensate for schedule 
slippages. Most challenges faced by the project occurred prior to the 
confirmation review, so officials stated that the project will probably 
finish at about only 3 percent above the confirmation cost estimate. 
However, late delivery of instruments from project partners and a 
decision by the launch authority to slip the LRO launch date both 
contributed to the project’s launch date being delayed 6 months from 
October 2008 to April 2009. 

Project Office Comments: 

The LRO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that the change in launch date from December 2008 to 
April 2009 was made to accommodate other launch priorities and as well 
as technical problems with the launch vehicle. Project officials noted 
that, while LRO’s schedule was aggressive, schedule reserve had been 
built in to accommodate late instrument deliveries and the project was 
on track for a December 2008 launch. They added that the additional 
time afforded by the new April 2009 launch date is being used by the 
project to perform additional testing and mission simulations. 

[End of Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) section] 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL): 

Figure: Mars Science Laboratory (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) is part of the Mars Exploration 
Program (MEP). The MEP seeks to understand whether Mars was, is, or can
be a habitable world. To answer this question the MSL project will 
investigate how geologic, climatic, and other processes have worked to 
shape Mars and its environment over time, as well as how they interact 
today. The MSL will continue this systematic exploration by placing a 
mobile science laboratory on the Mars surface to quantitatively assess 
a local site as a potential habitat for life, past or present. The MSL 
is considered one of NASA’s flagship projects and will be the most 
advanced rover ever sent to explore the surface of Mars. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (11/03); 
Preliminary Design Review (6/06); 
Critical Design Review (6/07); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (10/11). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
Partners: U.S. Department of Energy, Centre Nationale d'Etude Spatiale 
(France), Russian Federal Space Agency, Centro de Astrobiologia 
(Spain), Canadian Space Agency; 
Major Contractors: none — in-house development; 
Projected Launch Date: October, 2011; 
Launch Location: Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla.; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V; 
Mission Duration: 1 year - travel, 2 years - operations. 

Project Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Design Stability; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $1642.2; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $1899.6; 
Change: 15.7%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $515.1; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $515.5; 
Change: 0.1%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $968.6; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $1225.0; 
Change: 26.5%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $158.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $159.1; 
Change: 0.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 9/2009; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 10/2011; 
Change: 25 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

Since the project was baselined, MSL has experienced significant cost 
growth—over $200 million thus far, or more than a 26 percent increase 
in development costs—because of technological and engineering problems. 
While the project has overcome design and weight growth issues, it 
continues to face other technical challenges that contributed to MSL’s 
launch delay from October 2009 to October 2011. This launch delay will
result in about $400 million in cost growth as the project works to 
resolve its remaining technical risks. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

At the project’s preliminary design review, the project assessed all 
seven of critical technologies as immature resulting from late 
development challenges encountered. At the critical design review a 
year later, three of the seven critical technologies had been replaced 
by backup technologies with two of the seven still assessed as 
immature, including one of the replacement technologies. In addition, 
MSL’s design was never stabilized at the critical design review. 
Several design changes were required to address various issues. For 
example, the plumbing for the propulsion system was redesigned because 
it was determined that MSL needed larger, rigid lines for the system 
than were previously used on smaller Mars rovers. These thicker lines 
inadvertently became load-bearing components, which caused the project 
to redesign part of the structure to account for the loads and shift 
them to MSL’s primary structure. 

MSL has relied on several heritage technologies that have had to be re-
designed, re-engineered, or replaced for use on the lab. For example, 
the heatshield made of a super light-weight ablator that had flown on
previous missions was considered nearly ready at the critical design 
review, but it suffered a significant setback in testing and could not 
be proved for use on MSL. The project had to select a new and less 
mature technology—phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA). According 
to the MSL project office, the impact of this change was approximately 
$30 million in cost growth and a nine-month delay in delivery of the 
heat shield. 

Significant weight growth has occurred during MSL’s development brining 
the spacecraft to 90 percent of its mass threshold according to MSL 
project officials. For example, MSL’s project manager said that the 
project wanted to implement a dry lubrication scheme with lightweight 
titanium gears for the actuators, or motors that allow the lab to 
function autonomously. During fabrication, however, it was discovered 
that the lightweight titanium gears did not provide the durability 
needed for MSL, causing the project to revert to the heavier stainless 
steel gear system with wet lubricant used by prior projects. To keep 
the lubricant from freezing in Martian temperatures, the project also 
had to add heaters to the actuators, adding even more mass to the 
rover. 

The project cost has grown by over $200 million in the last year—more 
than a 26 percent increase in development costs—and will increase even 
more due to the launch delay from October 2009 to 2011. The project 
could not meet its original schedule due to difficulty in meeting 
delivery milestones for actuators, key avionics, and flight software 
while maintaining its full testing program. Since Mars launch windows 
are optimally aligned every 26 months, the project has to delay its 
planned launch to October 2011. As a result of the launch delay, 
project officials state that costs will likely grow by an estimated 
$400 million bringing the project’s life-cycle cost to $2.2 to $2.3 
billion. 

Project Office Comments: 

The MSL project office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also 
commented that while most of the system development is on track, MSL 
cannot meet its October 2009 launch date due to a few critical elements 
that are lagging. Project officials said the MSL launch is now 
scheduled for the fall of 2011, which is the next opportunity for an 
optimally aligned Earth-Mars transit. 

[End of Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) section] 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

Figure: Photograph of NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP): 

Source: Ball Aerospace. 

[End of figure] 

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. Air Force. 
The satellite will measure ozone, atmospheric and sea surface 
temperatures, land and ocean biological productivity, and cloud and 
aerosol properties. The NPP mission has two objectives. First, NPP will 
provide a continuation of global observations following the Earth 
Observing System missions Terra and Aqua. Second, NPP will provide the 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) with risk-reduction demonstration and validation for the 
critical NPOESS sensors, algorithms, and ground data processing. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (11/98); 
Preliminary Design Review (1/03); 
Critical Design Review (8/03); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (6/10). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
Partner: National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration and U.S. Air 
Force; 
Major Contractors: Northrop Grumman Electrical Systems and Ball 
Aerospace and Technologies Corp.; 
Projected Launch Date: June 2, 2010; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 5 years. 

Project Challenges: 
* Technology Maturity; 
* Design Stability; 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $672.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $794.6; 
Change: 18.1%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $47.3; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $47.0; 
Change: -0.6%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $593.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $703.7; 
Change: 18.7%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $32.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $43.9; 
Change: 35.1%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 4/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 6/2010; 
Change: 26 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

Due primarily to the late delivery of a key instrument being developed 
by project partners, the NPP project has experienced nearly $111 
million in development cost growth and a 26-month delay in its launch 
readiness date since being baselined in fiscal year 2007. As a result,
NASA has reported to the Congress that the NPP project has exceeded 
both its cost and schedule thresholds. The NPP project office is 
monitoring the risk of further instrument delivery delays. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The NPP project office identified six critical technologies for the 
project—the spacecraft and all five instruments. Five of the six 
critical technologies were assessed as immature at the preliminary and 
critical design reviews. The Clouds’ and the Earth’s Radiant Energy 
System (CERES) instrument was the only mature technology, and according 
to project officials this instrument was only added back to the mission
when it was determined that development of other instruments would 
cause a significant launch delay. Many of the spacecraft’s components 
and subsystems have flown on previous missions and are therefore mature.
The NPP project office now considers all critical technologies to be 
mature. 

The project’s design was unstable at the critical design review (CDR). 
Two instruments being developed by the Integrated Program Office (IPO), 
which is composed of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and Department of Defense officials, are the Cross-track Infrared 
Sounder (CrIS) and the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite 
(VIIRS). Both had to be redesigned because of failures that were 
detected during testing after the CDR. The project office said a 31 
percent increase in new engineering drawings was largely attributed to 
the redesign of the VIIRS and CrIS stemming from testing failures. 
According to a project official, the CrIS structure development 
multiple fractures during testing and needed to be stripped to its 
components and rebuilt. The project official also said the VIIRS could 
not meet its science requirement of detecting ocean color because of 
the poor quality of its filters. The official indicated a problem 
exists with the system’s requirements and not the ability of the 
contractor to produce the correct filters. An official for the 
contractor building the VIIRS instrument said the original requirement 
was unachievable and the filters will be improved for the second VIIRS 
instrument, which will be a part of the NPOESS mission. 

Since NPP was baselined in fiscal year 2007, the project’s development 
costs increased by about $111 million, or almost 19 percent, and its 
schedule has increased by 26 months. As a result, NASA has reported to 
the Congress that the NPP project has exceeded both its cost and 
schedule thresholds. The project office attributes almost all of the 
cost and schedule changes to the late delivery of the VIIRS instrument 
by the project partners. The instrument is now scheduled to be 
delivered in April 2009. An official for the VIIRS instrument 
contractor cites the presence of multiple government customers and 
ongoing requirements changes as the reasons for the delay and increase 
in cost. Neither the IPO nor the NPOESS prime contractor, according to 
NASA’s NPP project manager, provided adequate oversight of the VIIRS 
contractor during the development of VIIRS. While there is no 
contractual relationship between NASA and the VIIRS contractor, project 
officials told us NASA now has two engineers at the prime contractor’s 
facility to oversee the design and development of the instrument. 
Additional delay in instrument delivery could result in observatory
integration delays, cost increases, schedule slips, and possible gaps 
in data continuity. 

Project Office Comments: 

The NPP project office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project also 
commented that the NASA-developed instruments did not experience 
challenges with design stability, rather it was NASA’s partners’ 
instruments. They added that the VIIRS performance requirements have 
remained stable since the critical design review and the primary drivers
of the schedule delay are issues found during fabrication and testing 
of the engineering and flight models. Project officials said the VIIRS 
instrument continues to incur delays during environmental testing which
will likely result in a delay in NPP launch readiness beyond June 2010. 
NASA has provided the NPOESS IPO additional expertise to help provide 
more oversight to attempt to minimize additional delays and increase 
the likelihood of VIIRS meeting performance goals. 

[End of NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) section] 

Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO): 

Figure: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction). 

[End of figure] 

NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) seeks to enable more reliable 
forecasts of climate change. It will make the first global measurements
of atmospheric carbon dioxide with the precision and resolution needed 
to characterize production and loss rates. These measurements will 
improve mankind’s understanding of the processes that regulate 
atmospheric carbon dioxide. The OCO payload consists of a single unit 
instrument with three high resolution grating spectrometers. Each of 
these spectrometers records the intensity of radiation over one of 
three very narrow Near Infrared bands that are sensitive to the 
presence of carbon dioxide and oxygen. The observatory will fly in loose
formation with other satellites to enable synergy and to complement the 
science return. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (12/03); 
Preliminary Design Review (7/04); 
Critical Design Review (8/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (2/09). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. and Orbital Sciences Corp. 
Projected Launch Date: February 23, 2009; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.; 
Launch Vehicle: Taurus XL; 
Mission Duration: 2 years. 

Project Challenges: 
* Design Stability; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $235.2; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $273.1; 
Change: 16.1%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $31.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $32.5; 
Change: 4.8%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $186.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $219.7; 
Change: 17.9%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $17.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $20.9; 
Change: 17.4%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 9/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 2/2009; 
Change: 5 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

OCO’s launch date slipped from September 2008 to February 2009, and 
NASA reported to the Congress that the project’s development cost 
increased 18 percent from the baseline established in fiscal year 2008. 
On February 24, 2009, OCO launched but failed to reach orbit. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The only critical technology for OCO, its three-channel grating 
spectrometer, was considered mature at the mission’s preliminary design 
review. However, technical problems arose for the instrument after its 
critical design review (CDR) in August 2006. Testing results showed 
that the detectors used in the instrument suffer from a residual image 
problem when they transition from a bright-to-dark image. This is an 
inherent characteristic of the detectors and the error in data will be 
corrected by ground-based software. In addition, OCO’s design was not 
stable at CDR as the project reported that it had only released 66 
percent of its engineering drawings. Following CDR, the project also 
experienced a 15 percent increase in the total number of drawings 
expected. According to project officials, the increase was attributed 
to the changes made in the system design to address structural issues. 
The project has since released all of its engineering drawings. 

According to project officials, the contractor developing the three-
channel spectrometer underestimated the cost to develop the instrument. 
In December 2005, OCO project management began providing its own 
personnel to augment the contractor’s workforce in order to mitigate 
schedule slippage. Reviews of the instrument design identified areas 
that would not withstand launch and/or flight forces—a finding that 
necessitated a redesign of the instrument structure. According to the 
deputy project manager, the contract was modified to bring 
responsibility for the instrument’s integration and testing activity in 
house. Project management stated that the contractor did not receive 
its award fee because of its poor performance, but will still be 
eligible for on-orbit award fees. 

OCO has experienced cost increases and schedule delays, and NASA has 
reported to the Congress that OCO has exceeded its development cost 
baseline. According to project officials, the project did not receive
funding to begin its preliminary design phase in 2003, resulting in a 
one year schedule delay and an increase to the estimated mission cost 
of approximately $60 million. In addition, the movement of the 
instrument work in-house in October 2006 led to an increase in 
development costs and an inability to maintain the planned September 
2008 launch date. NASA recently reported to the Congress an 18 percent 
increase in development cost from the baseline established in fiscal 
year 2008 and a schedule slip to December 2008. OCO was ready to launch 
in December but a delay at Vandenberg Air Force Base pushed the launch 
into 2009. 

Project Office Comments: 

The OCO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. In addition, 
project officials commented that they believe the instrument and 
mission design were stable at the critical design review and neither 
have experienced significant changes to the CDR-approved design. They 
added that the project did experience problems during instrument 
development, assembly, and testing which prompted the project to be 
rebaselined. Since then, they stated that the project has stayed within 
its planned cost and schedule and was prepared to launch in December 
2008, but was delayed because of unavailability of the launch range and 
launch vehicle certification issues. 

[End of Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) section] 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV): 

Figure: Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) (artist depiction). 

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems. 

[End of figure] 

NASA’s Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), as part of the 
Constellation Program, is the next generation spacecraft to carry crew 
and cargo to the International Space Station and to the Moon. The 
Constellation Program includes the CEV and a launch system that will 
replace the Space Shuttle, which is slated to retire in 2010. The five-
meter diameter Orion capsule is to be launched by the Ares I Crew 
Launch Vehicle. Orion will carry up to six astronauts to the 
International Space Station or four astronauts to the Moon after 
linking up with a lunar lander. The capsule will return to Earth and 
descend on parachutes to the surface. Orion has three main elements—the 
crew module (capsule), service module/spacecraft adapter, and launch 
abort system. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation Start (7/06); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Preliminary Design Review (3rd Qtr 2009); 
Critical Design Review (4th Qtr 2010); 
Initial Operational Capability (3/15). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Johnson Space Center; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Lockheed Martin; 
Projected Launch Date: March 2015; 
Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.; 
Launch Vehicle: Ares I; 
Mission Duration: Varied based on destination. 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology. 

Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Preliminary Estimate of Project Life Cycle Cost*: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): $20,000 TO $29,000. 

* This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formation and 
there is still uncertainty in the value as design options are explored, 
NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. This estimate is for 
the Orion vehicle only. 

Launch Schedule: 
Latest (Jan. 2009): 3/2015. 

Project Status: 

NASA is currently working toward a preliminary design review (PDR) for 
the Orion vehicle. As a result of several issues including unexpected 
weight growth, the PDR has been delayed by at least 9 months into 
fiscal year 2009. Additional schedule movement is under consideration 
to allow more time for integration of preliminary design products 
across the Orion organization to assure acceptable risk for completing 
the PDR with the right vehicle design. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The Orion project identified three critical technologies for the 
spacecraft: the phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA) heat shield, 
which was used on Stardust, NASA’s comet sample return mission, landing
airbags, and landing parachutes. The project identified a backup heat 
shield technology for PICA. Project officials said that both heat 
shield technologies have some heritage to earlier NASA missions, but 
both technologies have distinct risks. According to officials, PICA 
must be built and applied to Orion in sections creating gaps between 
the sections that need to be filled, similar to Space Shuttle tiles. 
The backup is lighter than PICA, but more difficult to manufacture. The 
PICA material is the chosen technology for the thermal protection 
system, but project officials said that they will select a single 
technology at PDR based on performance, how difficult it is to produce, 
weight, and cost. The project expects that all technologies will be 
mature by the preliminary design review. We found, however, that the 
heat shield development and manufacturing schedule is at risk and may 
impact Orion’s test schedule. In addition, Orion faces challenges in 
the development of the attitude control motor for the launch abort 
system. While similar attitude control motors have been demonstrated 
before, Orion’s motor design is complex, and any failures during
developmental testing may cause unexpected delays. 

Although the Orion project has not reached a design review where we 
could assess design stability based on our metric, NASA recognizes that 
continued weight growth and requirements changes are contributing to 
instability in the Orion design. For example, according to agency 
officials, continuing Orion weight growth led NASA to redesign the 
Orion vehicle in fall 2007. As a result of engineering trade-offs that 
were made during this process, NASA modified the requirement for 
landing on land to landing in water, which would reduce vehicle mass. 
The Orion project is still working on these issues and has not yet 
finalized requirements or design. 

At the time of our review, NASA had not released cost and schedule 
estimates for completing the Orion project. NASA officials stated that 
these estimates will be made available at the conclusion of the 
Constellation Program non-advocate review, which takes places after 
PDR, when all NASA projects establish an integrated cost and schedule 
baseline. According to the Constellation program’s risk database, there 
is a high risk that Orion could face funding shortfalls in fiscal years 
2009 through 2012, resulting in planned testing not being completed in 
time to support schedule and milestones. Furthermore, schedule delays 
have already occurred as a result of unexpected efforts to resolve 
mass, power, and other architecture issues and because the project 
needed sufficient time to attain an acceptable level of design risk. 

Project Office Comments: 

The Orion project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office 
also commented that they believe steady progress has been made in all 
technology areas and appropriate technology readiness will be achieved 
prior to PDR in late summer 2009. They also believe that the Orion 
project has achieved stability in requirements growth and that NASA 
will continue to narrow design options as the project moves toward a 
confirmed baseline design. Project officials added the project is on 
schedule to finalize the choice of material for the heat shield by 
March 2009. 

[End of Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) section] 

Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO): 

Figure: Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) (artist depiction). 

Source: SDO Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) will investigate how the Sun's 
magnetic field is structured and how its energy is converted and 
released into the heliosphere in the forms of solar wind, energetic
particles, and variations in solar irradiance. The primary goal of the 
SDO mission is to understand the solar variations that influence life 
on Earth and humanity’s technological systems. It seeks to do this by 
determining how the Sun’s magnetic field is generated and structured, 
and how this stored magnetic energy is released. Analysis of data from
SDO’s three instruments—Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA), Extreme 
Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE), and Helioseismic and Magnetic
Imager (HMI)—will improve the science needed to enable space weather 
predictions. 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Stanford University, Lockheed Martin Solar 
Astrophysics Laboratory, University of Colorado; 
Projected Launch Date: January 2010; 
Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, Fla.; 
Launch Vehicle: Atlas V; 
Mission Duration: 5 years (10 year goal). 

Project Challenges: 
* Design Stability; 
* Contractor Performance; 
* Development Partner Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $785.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $817.0; 
Change: 4.0%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $78.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $85.8; 
Change: 10.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $623.7; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $629.6; 
Change: 0.9%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $83.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $101.6; 
Change: 21.2%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 8/2008; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 1/2010; 
Change: 17 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

SDO has experienced significant launch schedule delays. Funding cuts in 
fiscal year 2005 caused the project to slip SDO’s launch date from 
April to August 2008. Subsequent test scheduling issues and spacecraft 
parts problems caused a further delay until December 2008. A crowded 
launch manifest has now forced a 13-month delay to January 2010. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

The SDO project reported that its only critical technology—a 4K x 4K 
array of charge-coupled devices (CCD) to be used in both the HMI and 
AIA instruments—was mature at the project’s preliminary design review. 
The United Kingdom originally led development of the CCD camera 
systems, but dropped out of the project before the preliminary design 
review. Project officials also stated that SDO was purposefully 
designed to use existing technology components, but recognized that 
some technologies—such as the Kaband transmitter, high-speed bus, and 
high-gain antenna system—required modifications to be used on SDO. For 
example, the existing technology for the Ka-band transmitter required a 
new design for integration with SDO. Project officials told us that 
originally Northrop Grumman was to build the Ka-band transmitter, but 
its development was brought in house after contractor performance 
issues arose. 

SDO’s design was not stable at the critical design review (CDR). 
Following this review, the project experienced nearly a 1,200 percent 
increase in the number of releasable drawings expected. Project 
officials said only drawings for in-house structures such as propulsion 
systems, electronics, instrument ports, the high-gain antenna system, 
and the spacecraft were considered at CDR. Drawings for the instruments 
were not included and flight drawings were only in draft form at CDR. 
Project officials indicated that flight drawings did not need to be 
ready so far in advance of the project’s launch readiness date since 
there was enough time to build these components. 

SDO also experienced several problems during testing of flight 
hardware. The project suffered a technical setback in 2007 when the 
thermal vacuum chamber being used to test the high gain antenna 
overheated, resulting in the need to completely rebuild the antenna. 
Several other risks to the project were identified during testing. For 
example, testing identified a part on the spacecraft’s high-speed bus 
that, under certain circumstances, could cause the spacecraft to reset 
itself, which could mean failure to meet science data quality and 
completeness requirements. 

At the time of its critical design review in April 2005, the SDO 
project budget was reduced by one third for fiscal year 2005 because of 
other funding priorities. As a result, the project underwent a replan 
that delayed the project’s launch readiness date from April 2008 to 
August 2008. Subsequent scheduling issues for testing of the AIA 
instrument and other spacecraft parts problems caused further delays 
and cost increases: the launch date slipped to December 2008 resulting 
in a cost increase of $18.1 million. Because of launch manifest issues, 
SDO’s launch date has since slipped to January 2010. 

Project Office Comments: 

The SDO project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office 
commented that all of the problems they found during testing have been
corrected, and that they believe the SDO design has been relatively 
stable and drawing releases occurred as planned. Project officials also 
said the project combined technology components in new ways in a new 
type of design, but the technologies themselves were not modified. They 
reported that SDO has been integrated and tested and is awaiting 
launch. Officials said the current delay and resulting cost increase is 
due to a crowded launch manifest. 

[End of Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) section] 

Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA): 

Figure: Photograph of Boeing 747SP aircraft. 

Source: SOFIA Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

SOFIA is a joint project between NASA and the German Space Agency (DLR) 
to install a 2.5 meter telescope in a specially modified Boeing 747SP 
aircraft. This airborne observatory is designed to provide routine 
access to the visual, infrared, farinfrared, and sub-millimeter parts 
of the spectrum. Its mission objectives include studying many different
kinds of astronomical objects and phenomena, including star birth and 
death; the formation of new solar systems; planets, comets, and 
asteroids in our solar system; and black holes at the center of 
galaxies. Interchangeable instruments for the observatory are being 
developed to allow a range of scientific measurement to be taken by 
SOFIA. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation start (10/91); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Initial Operational Capability (8/09); 
Full Operational Capability (9/14). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Dryden Flight Research Center; 
International Partner: German Space Agency (DLR); 
Major Contractors: L3 Communications, MPC Products Corporation, 
University Space Research Association; 
Projected Operational Capability: August 2009; 
Aircraft: Modified 747SP; 
Sortie Location: Dryden Flight Research Center, Calif. 
Mission Duration: 20 years of science mission flights. 

Project Challenges: 
* Complexity of Heritage Technology; 
* Contractor Performance. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $2954.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $2580.8; 
Change: -12.6%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $35.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $35.0; 
Change: 0.0%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $919.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $946.4; 
Change: 2.9%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): $2000.0; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $1599.4; 
Change: -20.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2007): 12/2013; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 9/2014; 
Change: 9 months. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

SOFIA plans to have its first science flight in 2009. The SOFIA project 
was rebaselined in fiscal year 2007; its development costs have grown 
to almost four times its original estimate. The rebaseline sought to 
achieve science objectives earlier than previously planned, but 
resulted in a 9 month delay in full operational capability. Cost growth 
is in part because of challenges with the modification of the aircraft 
used as the platform for SOFIA. Project officials said the aircraft 
modification proved to be more complex job than anticipated. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

We could not assess the technology maturity or the design stability of 
the overall project as NASA did not provide information related to the 
aircraft modification. Data provided for development of the instruments
that will fly on SOFIA generally indicates a high level of technology 
maturity. Many of these technologies have already been used on ground-
based telescopes, and the early instruments are essentially finished and
have been waiting for the observatory to be completed. Similarly, we 
could not assess design stability of the instruments since the drawings 
were still preliminary at the critical design review. 

NASA experienced challenges with the modification of the aircraft used 
as the platform for the SOFIA project, which led to significant cost 
overruns. Contributing to this challenge, according to project 
officials, was the aircraft manufacturer’s refusal to provide the 
blueprints for the 747SP. The plane had to be reverse engineered, 
making the modifications more difficult. Project officials also said 
that the contractor responsible for the aircraft’s modification and 
integration had limited experience with this type of work and did not 
fully understand the statement of work, further contributing to cost 
overruns. 

The SOFIA project also experienced problems related to the original 
prime contractor’s performance earlier in development. The SOFIA 
program manager said the original prime contractor was tasked to lead
the project and NASA would purchase the raw data collected by SOFIA 
from the contractor. According to another NASA official, that 
contractor had neither the project management experience nor the design-
build expertise necessary for the project—a situation that contributed 
to some of the SOFIA project’s problems. Consequently, NASA brought 
overall management of both development and operations of SOFIA in-house
to achieve stronger technical, cost, and schedule controls. Project 
management was restructured and operational responsibility now resides 
with NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center, while NASA’s Ames Research 
Center manages the project’s science. The original contractor is still 
under contract for some science operations and instrument development. 

As a result of ongoing cost growth early in development, the SOFIA 
project underwent a review in 2006. The project was slated for 
cancellation in 2006, and no funds were allocated to it in that fiscal 
year. However, later that year, SOFIA was reinstated. In 2007, it was 
redesigned and, in July of that year, rebaselined. This new plan sought 
to be more responsive to the science community and achieve science 
objectives earlier than previously planned by performing science 
flights while still maturing the aircraft and telescope, but resulted 
in a 9-month delay in full operational capability. SOFIA’s current 
development costs are estimated to be about $950 million, almost four 
times the estimated development costs in 1997. 

Project Office Comments: 

The project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. The project office 
also commented that since its rebaselining in July 2007, the SOFIA 
project has not experienced cost or schedule growth. 

[End of Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 
section] 

Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE): 

Figure: Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) (artist depiction). 

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech. 

[End of figure] 

The WISE mission is designed to map the sky in infrared light and 
search for the nearest and coolest stars, the origins of stellar and 
planetary systems, the most luminous galaxies in the universe, and most
main-belt asteroids larger than 3 kilometers. It is also intended to 
create a catalog of over 300 million sources that will be of interest 
to future infrared studies, including the upcoming James Webb Space 
Telescope mission. During its 6-month mission, WISE will use a four-
channel imager to take overlapping snapshots of the sky. The WISE 
telescope optics will be cooled below 20 degrees Kelvin to keep it 
colder than the objects in space it will observe so that WISE can see 
the dim infrared emission from them rather than from the telescope 
itself. 

Formulation to Implementation: 
Formulation start (3/03); 
Preliminary Design Review (7/05); 
Critical Design Review (6/07); 
GAO Review (12/08); 
Launch Readiness (11/09). 

Project Essentials: 
NASA Center Lead: Jet Propulsion Laboratory; 
International Partner: None; 
Major Contractors: Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, Space 
Dynamics Laboratory; 
Projected Launch Date: November 1, 2009; 
Launch Location: Vandenberg AFB, Calif.; 
Launch Vehicle: Delta II; 
Mission Duration: 6 months. 

Project Challenges: 
* Design Stability. 

Table: Project Performance (then year dollars in millions): 

Total Project Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $311.4; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $310.5; 
Change: -0.3%. 

Formulation Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $99.5; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $99.6; 
Change: 0.1%. 

Development Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $192.1; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $190.9; 
Change: -0.6%. 

Operations Cost: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): $19.8; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): $20.0; 
Change: 1.0%. 

Launch Schedule: 
Baseline Est. (FY 2008): 11/2009; 
Latest (Dec. 2008): 1/2009; 
Change: none. 

[End of table] 

Project Status: 

The WISE project is currently on schedule to meet its November 2009 
launch date. However, the failure of a structural model of the flight 
cryostat during vibration testing prompted a design change to add a 
soft-ride system to the launch vehicle, a solution that cost about $2.6 
million. This failure has caused the project to descope some testing in 
order to regain lost cost and schedule margin. 

Detailed Project Discussion: 

Though the project is currently on track to meet its launch readiness 
date, the WISE project encountered schedule delays early in its life 
cycle. According to a project official, the project was not initially 
confirmed to proceed because of cost and technical concerns. As a 
result, the official said the project designed a smaller telescope and 
matured the technology that had concerned the review board. The 
preliminary design review for WISE was held in July 2005, and the 
project had its initial confirmation review in November 2005; however, 
there was a lack of funding in the NASA budget for the WISE project at 
that time so the formulation phase was extended. At this point in the 
project, the launch readiness date had slipped from 2008 to June 2009. 
A second confirmation review was held in October 2006, at which time 
the launch readiness date was set for October 2009. Although the second 
confirmation review happened one year later, the launch readiness date 
set at the original confirmation review only slipped 4 months since, 
according to a project official, the project was able to make progress 
during that year. 

WISE project officials identified two mission critical technologies---
the solid hydrogen cryostat and the long wavelength infrared detector 
multiplexer---both of which were assessed as mature at the project’s
preliminary design review. The solid hydrogen cryostat is a 
modification of a heritage technology. It is of similar design and 
construction and manufactured by the same contractor that produced 
cryostats for previous NASA missions. A project official said the 
project did not encounter any challenges with the development of the 
cryostat. WISE’s design, however, was not stable at the project’s 
critical design review. At the time of that review, the project had 
released only 70 percent of its engineering drawings. A project 
official stated that the drawing count and additional analyses, 
prototypes, and engineering models were used at the critical design 
review to evaluate the project’s design stability. The project has 
since released the remainder of the engineering drawings. 

The project did encounter some challenges during testing, which 
impacted the spacecraft’s design. The thermal-mass-dynamics-simulator, 
a structural model of the flight cryostat, failed during structural 
testing. According to a NASA official, analyses done by NASA and the 
cryostat’s contractor did not predict this problem. To mitigate this 
problem, the project added a soft-ride system to the launch vehicle to 
reduce loads on the cryostat. The failure also caused the project to 
accept more project risk by de-scoping two test events in order to 
regain reserve margin. According to the project office, the remedy cost 
$2.6 million, but the overall project schedule was not affected. 

Project Office Comments: 

The WISE project office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Project officials 
also commented that they believe that development of a complex 
cryogenic instrument from heritage technology was more challenging to 
the project than its design stability. 

[End of Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) section] 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for review and comment. In
written comments, NASA recognizes that its goal is to improve its cost
estimating and schedule and indicates that it will work hard to improve 
its performance. 

The actions NASA has taken to address our past recommendations are 
positive steps toward achieving successful project outcomes and ensuring
that decision makers are appropriately investing the agency’s resources.
However, NASA asserts that its projects are typically high risk, one-of-
a-kind missions that do not readily fit into the knowledge-based 
framework associated with best practices in system acquisition. NASA’s 
own studies and those of others have shown that the challenges 
discussed in this report, as well as other project management 
challenges, have plagued the agency for decades. Given the fact that 
most of the projects we reviewed in this study breached congressional 
thresholds within a 2- to 3-year period, we remain convinced that NASA 
would benefit from a more disciplined, knowledge-based approach to its 
acquisitions. 

NASA sought to provide clarification and additional context to the
information we provided in our observations. The agency indicated that 
the growth we reported for the 10 projects in implementation was a 
forward-looking estimate, rather than actual growth. For this review, 
NASA provided us baseline cost and schedule estimates for most projects 
and then provided us updated estimates for those same projects. We 
assume that the estimates NASA provided are projections based on costs 
incurred and schedule completed to date, as well as realistic 
assumptions about future costs and schedule plans. 

NASA also stated that cost and schedule growth for some projects was due
to factors outside of the agency’s control. Specifically: 

1. Two NASA missions—the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and Solar 
Dynamics Observatory—experienced delays to their launch dates due
to U.S. launch manifest prioritization. While NASA maintains that the
launch slips for LRO and SDO were beyond its control, we believe
that greater discipline in these and other acquisitions can still 
alleviate the impact of these factors. Specifically, given the launch 
manifest constraints that the agency is and has been experiencing, it 
would be prudent to adequately plan for such launch delays when 
determining cost and schedule reserves. 

2. NASA believes that Aquarius, NPP, and Herschel projects experienced 
cost growth and schedule delays due to partner performance beyond its 
control. We believe that having the sufficient amount of insight into 
the partner’s activities and schedules may have allowed NASA to become
aware of the issues earlier and to actively manage the issues throughout
the development process. 

3. NASA stated in its comments that not all cost growth is reported 
from the time of the NASA commitment to Congress for the performance,
cost and schedule of its projects, as is the case with the James Webb
Space Telescope. This project was just confirmed in the fall of 2008.
Nonetheless, NASA provided GAO data for projects as late as December
2008. Since NASA develops baseline estimates for its projects at the
confirmation review that are formal commitments, we would have expected 
NASA to report that data to us in December 2008. 

4. NASA stated that it underestimates the complexity of developing 
first-of-a-kind missions. While we recognize the nature of NASA 
projects, as stated in our report, we remain convinced that a knowledge-
based approach will allow the agency to better plan for and address 
these complexities. 

We are pleased that NASA recognizes our desire to assist the agency in
improving its cost and schedule estimating and look forward to 
continuing to work with it to improve performance in these areas. 
NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. NASA also provided 
technical comments, which we addressed throughout the report as 
appropriate and where sufficient evidence was provided to support 
significant changes. 

We will send copies of the report to NASA's Administrator and 
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Pete Olson: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Office of the Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

February 24, 2009: 

Ms. Christina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO-09-306, entitled "Assessments 
of Selected Large-Scale Projects." We are pleased that GAO recognizes 
NASA's efforts and the hard work of many people at NASA to mitigate 
acquisition management risk and lay a foundation to reduce project cost 
and schedule growth. NASA values the open and constructive 
communications between the NASA and GAO teams on this effort. NASA is 
dedicated to continuous improvement of its acquisition management 
processes and performance. 

NASA has implemented improvement initiatives enumerated in the NASA 
response to the 2007 GAO High Risk Area of Contract Management. 
Specifically NASA has adopted a new acquisition strategy policy which 
improves its ability to manage performance risks (including adoption of 
probabilistic cost and schedule estimation methods); and has 
established a rigorous monthly internal Baseline Performance Review 
(BPR) to track program and institutional performance and identify 
corrective actions to allow performance to plan. These actions have 
allowed us to more clearly identify the causes of deviations from plan 
that can also be used by the GAO in future reporting. 

While NASA practices many of the elements of GAO's stated business case 
approach, where applicable to the Agency's investment model, the 
essential attributes of NASA's project development differ from those of 
a commercial or production entity. NASA projects are typically high 
risk one-of-a-kind missions that require a knowledge-based approach 
where experience from previous missions are modified and adapted to the 
new mission. NASA's intent is to advance selected technologies and 
techniques to a level of maturity that would provide an acceptable 
balance of investment risk and return. This approach requires projects 
to develop a plan that meets system requirements within cost and 
schedule constraints and with acceptable risk by the confirmation 
review, called Key Decision Point C. Senior management reviews and 
assesses each project at this key decision point to determine readiness 
for the project to proceed into the implementation phase and detailed 
design. As mentioned above, NASA management reviews projects monthly at 
the BPR to assess progress against cost, schedule, and technical 
commitments. This approach is outlined in NASA's policy directive and 
procedural requirements related to program/project management. 

In its draft report, GAO asserts that NASA has had significant cost 
and/or schedule growth from the baseline estimate in 10 of the 13 
projects on which NASA provided data, using GAO's definition of 
significant as "greater than the thresholds established for 
Congressional reporting." Among significant points of clarification 
that were not provided in the report is that the growth reported was a 
forward-looking estimate that included anticipated growth through 
launch, as well as actual growth to date. Based on this assumption, the 
projected growth indicated in the report is possible, but not yet the 
actual increase as GAO states. 

Other GAO-quoted figures also require some additional context to 
provide the reader with an accurate view of the cost and schedule 
growth. NASA notes that the GAO report does not distinguish between 
factors that result in this growth and whether they are internal or 
external to NASA. Recognition of the factors that NASA controls, as 
well as those that are outside the control of the Agency, would best 
allow us to focus on those factors which NASA can address in order to 
improve the Agency's acquisition performance. Out of the 10 projects 
that exceeded Congressional growth thresholds, approximately half did 
so as a result of external factors. Further, it is also important to 
link specific instances of cost or schedule growth to factors that 
contributed to that growth. Some examples from the draft would include: 

1. Slips in the launch dates for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) 
and the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) are a result of delays in the 
U.S. launch manifest prioritization that rightly puts national security 
missions first. The launch manifest, while actively managed, is beyond 
the control of NASA. 

2. Cost increases and delays to missions such as NPOESS Preparatory 
Project (NPP), Aquarius and Herschel are due to partner performance 
beyond the control of NASA. 

3. Not all cost growth is reported from the time of the NASA commitment 
to Congress for the performance, cost, and schedule. This is the case 
for JWST which was just confirmed in the fall of 2008. 

4. One of the most prevalent internal issues is underestimating the 
complexity of the development of first-of-a-kind missions, such as with 
MSL. In response to past history of these issues, NASA has adopted 
formal program reviews at key milestones and now includes probabilistic 
cost-estimating techniques to help address these uncertainties.
To ensure that NASA and GAO share a common data set for presentation to 
the Congress and the public, we have provided separate technical 
comments addressing the accuracy and representation of data included in 
several of the Project Summary pages of the report. 

NASA recognizes that the goal is to improve our performance in 
estimating cost and schedule so as to enhance our ability to explore 
and utilize space for the benefit of the Nation and the world. We are 
committed to continuous improvement and will work hard to continuously 
measure and improve our performance. To this end we welcome the 
comments from GAO regarding our performance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. If you 
have any questions or require additional information, please contact 
Julie Pollitt at (202) 358-1580. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Charles H. Scales: 
Associate Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: NASA Life-Cycle For Flight Systems Compared To A Knowledge-
Based Approach: 

GAO has previously conducted work on NASA's acquisition policy for 
space-flight systems, and in particular, on its alignment with a 
knowledge-based approach to system acquisitions. The figure below 
depicts this alignment. 

Figure 1: NASA's life-cycle for flight systems compared to a knowledge- 
based approach: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

NASA’s life cycle for flight systems and ground support projects: 

Formulation: 

Pre-phase A: Concept studies; 
KDP A; 
Phase A: Concept development (Pre-NAR; SDR); 
KDP B; 
Phase B: Preliminary design and technology completion (NAR; PDR); 
KDP C; 

Program start: 

Implementation: 

Phase C: Final design and fabrication (CDR); 
KDP D; 
Phase D: System assembly, integration and test, launch; 
KDP E; 
Phase E: Operations and sustainment; 
KDP F; 
Phase F: Closeout. 

Knowledge-based approach: 

Formulation: 

Concept and technology development; 
Knowledge point 1 (KP1): Technologies, time, funding, and other 
resources match customer needs; 

Program start: 

Implementation: 

Product development: 
- Integration; 
Knowledge point 2 (KP2): Design performs as expected; 
- Demonstration; 
Knowledge point 3 (KP3): Production meets cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. 

Production: 

Key: 

Management decision reviews: 

Pre-NAR = preliminary non-advocate review; 
NAR = non-advocate review; 
KDP = key decision point. 

Technical reviews: 
SDR = system definition review; 
PDR = preliminary design review; 
CDR = critical design review. 

Source: NASA data and GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

As the figure shows, NASA's policy defines a project life-cycle in two 
phases--the formulation[Footnote 14] and implementation[Footnote 15] 
phases, which are further divided into incremental pieces: Phase A 
through Phase F. Project formulation consists of Phases A and B, during 
which time the projects develop and define the project requirements and 
cost/schedule basis and design for implementation, including an 
acquisition strategy. During the end of the formulation phase, leading 
up to the preliminary design review (PDR)[Footnote 16] and Non-advocate 
review (NAR)[Footnote 17], the project team completes its preliminary 
design and technology development. NASA Procedural Requirements 
7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements, 
specify that the project complete development of mission-critical or 
enabling technology, as needed, with demonstrated evidence of required 
technology qualification (i.e., component and/or breadboard validation 
in the relevant environment) documented in a technology readiness 
assessment report. The project must also develop, document, and 
maintain a project integrated baseline which includes the integrated 
master schedule and baseline life-cycle cost estimate. Implementing 
these requirements brings the project closer to ensuring that resources 
and needs match, but it is not fully consistent with Knowledge point 1 
of the knowledge-based acquisition life-cycle. Our best practices show 
that demonstrating technology maturity at this point in the system life-
cycle should include a system or subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment, not only component validation. 
As written, NASA's policy does not require full technology maturity 
before a project enters the implementation phase. 

After project confirmation, the project begins implementation, 
consisting of Phases C, D, E, and F. During phases C and D, the project 
performs final design and fabrication as well as testing of components 
and system assembly, integration, test, and launch. Phases E and F 
consist of operations and sustainment and project closeout. A second 
design review, the critical design review (CDR),[Footnote 18] is held 
during the implementation phase toward the end of Phase C. The purpose 
of the CDR is to demonstrate that the maturity of the design is 
appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, 
assembly, integration, and test. Though this review is not a formal 
decision review, its requirements for a mature design and ability to 
meet mission performance requirements within the identified cost and 
schedule constraints are similar to knowledge expected at Knowledge 
point 2 of the knowledge-based acquisition life-cycle. Furthermore, 
after CDR, the project must be approved at KDP D before continuing into 
the next phase. 

The NASA acquisition life-cycle lacks a major decision review at 
Knowledge Point 3 to demonstrate that production processes are mature. 
According to NASA officials, the agency rarely enters a formal 
production phase due to the small quantities of space systems that they 
build. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope And Methodology: 

Our objectives were to report on the status and challenges faced by 
several NASA systems with life-cycle costs greater than $250 million 
and to discuss broader trends faced by the agency in its management of 
system acquisitions. 

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and identified 
challenges for each of 18 major projects[Footnote 19] included in this 
report. We summarized our assessments of each individual project in two 
components--a project profile and a detailed discussion of project 
challenges. We did not validate the data provided by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). However, we took 
appropriate steps to address data reliability. Specifically, we 
confirmed the accuracy of NASA-generated data with multiple sources 
within NASA and, in some cases, with external sources. Additionally, we 
corroborated data provided to us with published documentation. We 
determined that the data provided by NASA project offices were 
sufficiently reliable for our engagement purposes. 

We developed a standardized data collection instrument (DCI) that was 
completed by each project office and returned by December 2008. Through 
the DCI, we gathered basic information about projects as well as 
current and projected development activities for those projects. The 
cost, schedule and performance data estimates that NASA inputted were 
the most recent updates as of December 2008. At the time we collected 
the data, 4 of the 18 projects were in formulation and 14 were in 
implementation. However, NASA only provided cost and schedule data for 
13 of the projects. To further understand performance issues, we talked 
with officials from each project office and NASA's Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). 

The results collected from each project office and PA&E were summarized 
in a two-page report format providing a project overview; key cost, 
contract, and schedule data; and a discussion of the challenges 
associated with the deviation from relevant indicators from best 
practice standards. The aggregate measures and averages calculated were 
analyzed for meaningful relationships, e.g. relationship between cost 
growth and schedule slippage and knowledge maturity attained both at 
critical milestones and through the various stages of the project life- 
cycle. We identified cost and/or schedule growth as significant where, 
in either case, a project's cost and/or its schedule exceeded the 
thresholds for the Congressional reporting requirement. 

To supplement our analysis, we relied on GAO's body of work over the 
past years that has examined acquisition issues across multiple 
agencies. These reports cover such issues as contracting, program 
management, acquisition policy, and cost estimating. GAO also has an 
extensive body of work related to challenges NASA has faced with regard 
to specific system acquisitions, financial management, and cost 
estimating. This work provided the context and basis for much of the 
general observations we made with regard to the projects we reviewed. 
Additionally, the discussions with the individual NASA projects helped 
us identify further challenges faced by the projects. Together, this 
contributed to our development of a short list of challenges discussed 
for each project. The challenges we identified and discussed do not 
represent an exhaustive or exclusive list. They are subject to change 
and evolution as GAO continues this annual assessment in future years. 

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 
D.C. In addition, we visited NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 
Huntsville, Alabama, Dryden Flight Research Center at Edwards Air Force 
Base in California, and Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 
Maryland to discuss individual projects. We also met with 
representatives from NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, California 
and three NASA suppliers. 

Data Limitations: 

NASA only provided specific cost and schedule estimates for 13 of the 
18 projects in our review. Agency officials believe that because one 
project, the James Webb Space Telescope, will not formally release its 
baseline cost and schedule estimates until the fiscal year 2010 budget 
submission to Congress, they are not required to provide those 
estimates to GAO. For those projects that had not yet entered 
implementation, NASA provided internal preliminary estimated total 
(life cycle) cost ranges and associated schedules, from key decision 
point B (KDP-B), solely for informational purposes.[Footnote 20] NASA 
formally baselines and commits itself to cost and schedule targets for 
a project with a specific and aligned set of planned mission objectives 
at key decision point C (KDP-C), which follows a Non-Advocate Review 
(NAR) and Preliminary Design Review (PDR). KDP-C reflects the life 
cycle point where NASA approves a project to leave the formulation 
phase and enter into the implementation phase. NASA explained that 
preliminary estimates are generated for internal planning and fiscal 
year budgeting purposes at KDP-B, which occurs mid-stream in the 
formulation phase, and hence, are not considered a formal commitment by 
the Agency on cost and schedule for the mission deliverables. NASA 
officials contend that because of changes that occur to a project's 
scope and technologies between KDP-B and KDP-C, estimates of project 
cost and schedule can change significantly heading toward KDP-C. 
Finally, NASA did not provide data for the Global Precipitation 
Measurement Mission because NASA officials said that the agency waived 
the requirement for a KDP-B review for that project until it reaches 
KDP-C. 

Project Profile Information on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

This section of the two-page assessment outlines the essentials of the 
project, its cost and schedule performance and its status. Project 
essentials reflect pertinent information about each project, including, 
where applicable, the major contractors and partners involved in the 
project. These organizations have primary responsibility over a major 
segment of the project, or in some cases, the entire project. 

Project performance is depicted according to cost and schedule changes 
in the various stages of the project life-cycle. To assess the cost and 
schedule changes of each project we obtained data directly from NASA 
PA&E and from NASA's Integrated Budget and Performance documents. For 
systems in implementation, we compared the latest available information 
with baseline cost and schedule estimates set for each project in the 
fiscal year 2007 or 2008 budget request. 

All cost information is presented in nominal "then year" dollars for 
consistency with budget data.[Footnote 21] Baseline costs are adjusted 
to reflect the cost accounting structure in NASA's fiscal year 2009 
budget estimates. For the fiscal year 2009 budget request, NASA changed 
its accounting practices from full-cost accounting to reporting only 
direct costs at the project level. Projects in implementation at the 
time of the initial baseline requirement for the fiscal year 2007 
budget request were grandfathered in using the cost estimate at the 
time of the fiscal year 2007 budget request. Any project that did not 
have a life-cycle cost of $250 million in fiscal year 2007, but later 
increased beyond that threshold, was baselined at the next budget 
request. All major projects entering implementation after the fiscal 
year 2007 budget request have a baseline that reflects the project's 
life-cycle cost estimate upon entering implementation. For projects in 
implementation, the budget table provides a life-cycle cost estimate 
broken out by phases. 

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, which is 
defined as the number of months between the project start, or 
formulation start, and projected or actual launch date.[Footnote 22] 
Formulation start generally refers to the initiation of a project; NASA 
refers to project start as Key Decision Point A, or the beginning of 
the formulation phase. The preliminary design review typically occurs 
during the end of the formulation phase, followed by a confirmation 
review which allows the project to move into the implementation phase. 
The critical design review is held during the final design of 
implementation and demonstrates that the maturity of the design is 
appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication, 
assembly, integration, and test. Launch readiness is determined through 
a launch readiness review which verifies that the launch system and 
spacecraft/payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase 
includes the operations of the mission and concludes with project 
disposal. 

We assessed the extent to which NASA projects exceeded their cost and 
schedule baselines. To do this, we compared the project baseline cost 
and schedule estimates with the current cost and schedule data reported 
by the project office in December 2008. 

Project Challenges Discussion on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

To assess the project challenges for each project, we submitted a data 
collection instrument to each project office. We also held interviews 
with each of the project offices to discuss the information on the data 
collection instrument. These discussions led to identification of 
further challenges faced by NASA projects. These challenges were 
largely apparent in the projects that had entered the implementation 
phase. We then reviewed pertinent project documentation, such as the 
project plan, schedule, risk assessments, and major project reviews. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked project officials to assess the 
technology readiness levels (TRL) of each of the project's critical 
technologies at various stages of project development. Originally 
developed by NASA, TRLs are measured on a scale of one to nine, 
beginning with paper studies of a technology's feasibility and 
culminating with a technology fully integrated into a completed 
product. (See appendix IV for the definitions of technology readiness 
levels.) In most cases, we did not validate the project offices' 
selection of critical technologies or the determination of the 
demonstrated level of maturity. However, we sought to clarify the 
technology readiness levels in those cases where the information 
provided raised concerns, such as where a critical technology was 
reported as immature late in the project development cycle. 
Additionally, we asked project officials to explain the environments in 
which technologies were tested. 

Our best practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 
6--demonstrating a technology as a fully integrated prototype in a 
realistic environment--is the level of maturity needed to minimize 
risks for space systems entering product development. In our 
assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness 
level 6 are referred to as fully mature due to the difficulty of 
achieving technology readiness level 7, which is demonstrating maturity 
in an operational environment--space. Projects with critical 
technologies that did not achieve maturity by the preliminary design 
review were assessed as having a technology maturity project challenge. 
We did not assess technology maturity for those projects which had not 
yet reached the preliminary design review at the time of this 
assessment.[Footnote 23] 

To assess design stability, we asked project officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our 
current assessment.[Footnote 24] In most cases, we did not verify or 
validate the percentage of engineering drawings provide by the project 
office. However, we collected the project offices' rationale for cases 
where it appeared that only a small number of drawings were completed 
by the time of the design reviews or where the project office reported 
significant growth in the number of drawings released after CDR. In 
accordance with GAO best practices, projects were assessed as having 
achieved design stability if they had released at least 90 percent of 
all projected drawings by the critical design review. Projects which 
had not met this metric were determined to have a design stability 
project challenge. Though some projects used other methods to assess 
design stability, such as computer and engineering models and analyses, 
we did not analyze the use of these other methods and therefore could 
not assess the design stability of those projects. We could not assess 
design stability for those projects which had not yet reached the 
critical design review at the time of this assessment. 

To assess the complexity of heritage technology, we interviewed project 
officials about the use of heritage technologies in their projects. 
[Footnote 25] We asked them what heritage technologies were being used, 
what effort was needed to modify the form, fit, and function of the 
technology for use in the new system, and whether the project 
encountered any problems in modifying the technology. Heritage 
technologies were not considered critical technologies by several of 
the projects we reviewed. Based on our interviews, and review of cost 
and schedule data from the data collection instruments, and previous 
GAO work on space systems, we determined whether complexity of heritage 
technology was a challenge for a particular project. 

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with contractor 
performance, we interviewed project officials about their interaction 
and experience with contractors. We also interviewed contractor 
officials from Orbital Sciences Corporation, Ball Aerospace and 
Technologies Corporation, and Raytheon Space Systems about their 
experiences contracting with NASA. We were informed about contractor 
performance problems pertaining to their workforce, the supplier base, 
and technical and corporate experience. We also discussed contract fees 
and situations in which NASA and a contractor agreed that the 
contractor would use their award fee to cover project cost overruns. We 
assessed a project as having this challenge if these contractor 
performance problems, as confirmed by NASA and, where possible, the 
project contractor, caused the project to experience a cost overrun, 
schedule delay, or decrease in mission capability. For projects which 
did not have a major contractor, we considered this challenge not 
applicable to the project. 

To assess whether projects encountered challenges with development 
partner performance, we interviewed NASA project officials about their 
interaction with international or domestic partners during project 
development. Development partner performance was considered a challenge 
for the project if project officials indicated that domestic or foreign 
partners were experiencing problems with project development that 
impacted the cost, schedule, or performance of the project for NASA. 
These challenges were specific to the partner organization or caused by 
a contractor to that partner organization. For projects which did not 
have an international or domestic development partner, we considered 
this challenge not applicable to the project. 

The individual project offices were given an opportunity to comment on 
and provide technical clarifications to the two-page assessments prior 
to their inclusion in the final product. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to March 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale individual 
components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard; Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware: Low fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale components 
to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or form or fit 
but representative of technically feasible approach suitable for flight 
articles; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components; 
Hardware: High fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent but not 
necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). Should be 
approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of several 
components with reasonably realistic support elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware: Prototype; Should be very close to form, fit and function. 
Probably includes the integration of many new components and realistic 
supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a 
test bed aircraft; 
Hardware: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function integrated with 
other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate full 
functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft; 
Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications; 
Hardware: Flight qualified hardware; 
Demonstration Environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration Environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant 
Director; Greg Campbell; Richard A. Cederholm; Brendan S. Culley; Neil 
D. Feldman; Leon S. Gill; Rachel L. Girshick; Kristine R. Heuwinkel; 
Deanna R. Laufer; Shelby S. Oakley; Kenneth E. Patton; Sylvia Schatz; 
and Letisha T. Watson made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-161, §103; 42 U.S.C. §16613(b), (f) (4). 

[2] 42 U.S.C. §16613(d) 

[3] NASA also provided preliminary estimates in the form of cost ranges 
for three projects in the formulation phase. Since the values provided 
were ranges, rather than specific values, we did not include these 
projects in our analysis. Further, the agency did not provide schedule 
baselines for these projects so we could not determine any schedule 
changes they experienced. 

[4] GAO. Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future 
Combat System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-376] 
(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007); GAO. Defense Acquisitions: Improved 
Business Case Key for Future Combat System's Success, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-564T] (Washington, D.C.: April 4, 
2006); GAO. NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.: 
December 21, 2005); GAO. NASA's Space Vision: Business Case for 
Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242] (Washington, D.C.: 
February 28, 2005). 

[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-242]. 

[6] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procedural 
Requirements 7120.5D, NASA Spaceflight Program and Project Management 
Requirements (Mar. 6, 2007). (Hereinafter cited as NPR 7120.5D (Mar. 6, 
2007). 

[7] NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 2.4.5 (Mar. 6, 2007). 

[8] GAO. High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2007). 

[9] NASA. Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract 
Management (October 31, 2007). 

[10] We also reviewed the James Webb Space Telescope, but NASA did not 
provide cost or schedule data for that project even though it is in 
implementation. 

[11] For purposes of our analysis, significant cost and schedule growth 
occurs when a project's cost and/or its schedule growth exceeds the 
thresholds established for Congressional reporting. 

[12] 42 U.S.C. § 16613(b). 

[13] Appendix IV provides a description of the metrics used to assess 
technology maturity in this review. 

[14] NASA defines formulation as the identification of how the program 
or project supports the Agency's strategic needs, goals, and 
objectives; the assessment of feasibility, technology and concepts; 
risk assessment, team building, development of operations concepts and 
acquisition strategies; establishment of high-level requirements and 
success criteria; the preparation of plans, budgets, and schedules 
essential to the success of a program or project; and the establishment 
of control systems to ensure performance to those plans and alignment 
with current Agency strategies. 

[15] The implementation phase is defined as the execution of approved 
plans for the development and operation of the program/project, and the 
use of control systems to ensure performance to approved plans and 
continued alignment with the Agency's strategic needs, goals, and 
objectives. NPR 7120.5D, paragraph 1.2.1 c. (Mar. 6, 2007). 

[16] According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR 
demonstrates that the preliminary design meets all system requirements 
with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule constraints and 
establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It shows 
that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been 
identified, and verification methods have been described. Full baseline 
cost and schedules, as well as risk assessments, management systems, 
and metrics are presented. 

[17] According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the PDR 
demonstrates that the preliminary design meets all system requirements 
with acceptable risk and within the cost and schedule constraints and 
establishes the basis for proceeding with detailed design. It shows 
that the correct design option has been selected, interfaces have been 
identified, and verification methods have been described. Full baseline 
cost and schedules, as well as risk assessments, management systems, 
and metrics are presented. 

[18] According to NPR 7120.5D, Appendix A (Mar. 6, 2007), a Non- 
Advocate Review (NAR) is comprised of the analysis of a proposed 
program or project by a (non-advocate) team composed of management, 
technical, and resources experts (personnel) from outside the advocacy 
chain of the proposed program or project. It provides Agency management 
with an independent assessment of the readiness of the program/project 
to proceed into implementation. 

[19] According to NPR 7120.5D, Table 2-6 (Mar. 6, 2007), the CDR 
demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support 
proceeding with full scale fabrication, assembly, integration, and 
test, and that the technical effort is on track to complete the flight 
and ground system development and mission operations in order to meet 
mission performance requirements within the identified cost and 
schedule constraints. Progress against management plans, budget, and 
schedule, as well as risk assessments are presented. 

[20] These missions include: Ares I, Landsat Data Continuity Mission, 
Orion, and the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission. 

[21] Due to changes in NASA's accounting structure, its historical cost 
data is relatively inconsistent. As such, we used "then-year" dollars 
to report data consistent with the data that NASA reported to us. 

[22] Some projects reported that their spacecraft would be ready for 
launch sooner than the date that the launch authority could provide 
actual launch services. In these cases, we used the actual launch date 
for our analysis rather than the date that the project reported 
readiness. 

[23] According to NASA officials, projects that were in formulation at 
the time of the agency's 2007 revision of its project management policy 
are required to comply with that policy. Projects that had already 
entered implementation at the time of the revision were directed to 
implement those requirements which would not adversely affect the 
project's cost and schedule baselines. 

[24] In our calculation for the percentage of total number of drawings 
projected for release, we used the number of drawings released at the 
critical design review as a fraction of the total number of drawings 
projected, including where drawing growth occurred. So, the denominator 
in the calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the 
critical design review. We felt that this more accurately reflected the 
design stability of the project. 

[25] NASA distinguishes critical technologies from heritage 
technologies. NASA officials do not believe that heritage technologies 
are the same as critical technologies because they believe critical 
technology does not rely on existing technology. GAO best practices 
describe critical technologies as those that are required for the 
project to successfully meet customer requirements, regardless of 
whether or not they are based on existing or heritage technology. For 
the purposes of this review, we distinguish between the two types 
because NASA did not report heritage technologies as critical 
technologies in our data collection instrument. 

[End of section] 

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