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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2007: 

Securing, Stabilizing, And Reconstructing Afghanistan: 

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight: 

GAO-07-801SP: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures: 

Demographics and Development Indicators: 

Natural Resources: 

Economy: 

Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National 
Security Forces Face Several Challenges: 

Prior Recommendations: 

Oversight Questions: 

Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several 
Factors: 

Oversight Questions: 

Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S. 
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan: 

Prior Recommendation: 

Oversight Questions: 

Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags 
behind the Other Security Pillars: 

Prior Recommendation: 

Oversight Questions: 

Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and 
Are Constrained by Security Concerns: 

Prior Recommendations: 

Oversight Questions: 

Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan: 

Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005: 

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal 
Years 2002-2008: 

Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years 
2002-2008, by Program Category: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan: 

Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army: 

Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan: 

Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy: 

Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project: 

Abbreviations: 

AEF: Afghan Eradication Force: 

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces: 

CERP: Commanders' Emergency Response Program: 

Defense: Department of Defense: 

GDP: gross domestic product: 

IG: Inspectors General: 

IMF: International Monetary Fund: 

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

ODA: official development assistance: 

PEP: Poppy Elimination Program: 

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team: 

State: Department of State: 

UN: United Nations: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 24, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

As the United States reviews plans to accelerate its efforts to secure, 
stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan, I have enclosed a series of issue 
papers for your consideration. These papers are based on the continuing 
and prior work of GAO on Afghanistan, which we have provided to the 
Congress since June 2003. 

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help 
secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] In February 
2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding 
to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden 
nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from 
devolving into a narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the 
United States, and several multilateral organizations are engaged in 
securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has 
been made in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, 
and training of the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years 
of U.S. and international efforts, the overall security situation in 
this poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and, 
moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The lack of 
security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and rebuild 
Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a resurgence of 
the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, 
inadequate infrastructure, limited government capacity, corruption, a 
largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a dramatic increase in 
drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic opportunities. 
Furthermore, these efforts are complicated by regional influences, and 
the recent transfer of the security mission to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 

Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan-
-one on food and agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction 
assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national security 
forces, and one on drug control programs.[Footnote 2] We identified 
programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles 
that limited success and should be taken into consideration in program 
design and implementation (see table 1). A key improvement we 
identified in most of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved 
planning, including the development of strategic plans with elements 
such as measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and 
identification of external factors that could significantly affect 
efforts. Some additional needed improvements we identified include 
better coordination among the United States and other donor nations, 
more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project 
implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles, especially 
deteriorating security and the limited institutional capacity of the 
Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. 

Table 1: Summary of Prior GAO Findings on Afghanistan: 

Areas of focus: Emergency food assistance; 
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop joint U.S.-Afghan 
Interagency strategic focus and plan; (2) Consider more flexible 
procurement and distribution options; (3) Improve coordination; 
Obstacles: (1) Unstable security situation; (2) Control by warlords of 
much of the country; (3) Growth of opium production; (4) Inadequate 
international resources. 

Areas of focus: Afghanistan reconstruction; 
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop comprehensive 
operational strategy/ strategic plan; (2) Improve financial data; (3) 
Improve coordination; (4) Develop performance management plan for USAID 
in Afghanistan; (5) Require performance management plans from 
contractors; (6) Communicate performance information; 
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Growth of opium production; 
(3) Inadequate resources; (4) Delayed funding; (5) Poor contractor 
performance and limited capacity. 

Areas of focus: Afghan army and police; 
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Develop detailed plans for 
completing the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police; 
(2) Help ensure congruent progress in all security pillars; 
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Limited Afghan capacity; (3) 
Lack of an effective judiciary; (4) Growth of opium production; (5) 
Continued presence of armed militias. 

Areas of focus: Drug control; 
Key programmatic improvements needed: (1) Minimize project delays; 
Obstacles: (1) Deteriorating security; (2) Limited Afghan capacity; (3) 
Lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental 
institutions. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements 
varied. For example, officials from the Departments of Defense 
(Defense) and State (State) generally concurred with the recommendation 
in our 2005 report on efforts to establish an Afghan army and police 
that detailed plans would facilitate more effective management of 
resources and promote better long-term planning. As of May 2007, 
however, the departments had not provided us with such plans. On the 
other hand, in response to recommendations in our 2004 and 2005 
Afghanistan reconstruction reports, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) developed a strategic plan and performance 
management plans and the agency's planning and performance management 
for Afghanistan are now more thorough. 

Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on, 
including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that 
progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security 
reform agenda established by the United States and several coalition 
partners. These pillars included: creating a national army, 
reconstituting the police, establishing a working judiciary, combating 
illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. The United 
States has been involved to some degree with each of the five pillars 
and initially was charged with taking the lead in establishing the 
Afghan army, but has since allocated significant resources to 
reconstituting the police and countering the illicit drug trade. While 
some progress has been made in each pillar, the United States and its 
coalition partners continue to face challenges. Although some army and 
police units have been trained and equipped, Defense reports that none 
are capable of independent operations, Afghanistan still has no formal 
national judicial system for the police to rely upon, opium poppy 
cultivation is at record levels, and the Afghan police often find 
themselves facing better armed drug traffickers and militias. 

In the absence of national security forces capable of independently 
providing security for the country, ISAF is helping to provide security 
for Afghanistan. However, ISAF's ability to do so is limited by a 
number of factors, such as national restrictions on its component 
forces and shortages in troops and equipment. Lastly, though 
reconstruction assistance helped Afghanistan elect its first president, 
return millions of children to school, and repatriate millions of 
refugees, Afghanistan continues to face reconstruction challenges, 
which are exacerbated by the security-related concerns described above. 

Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing, 
stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade 
and require continuing international assistance. If the recent 
administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the 
United States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier 
estimates. Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping 
the Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan 
would decline and the overall security situation would improve. 
However, Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating 
security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to 
operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a 
total of $7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold 
increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of 
the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 
combined. The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult 
trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing 
demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in 
the years ahead. 

Significant oversight will be needed to help ensure the Congress has 
visibility over the cost and progress of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 
The enclosures that follow provide background information on 
Afghanistan and discuss suggested areas for additional oversight on the 
following topics: 

* efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces, 

* international security forces, 

* counternarcotics, 

* Afghanistan's judicial system, and: 

* reconstruction. 

These enclosures are based on our completed Afghanistan related work 
and incorporate updated information from current budget and program 
documents. We also discussed these topics with cognizant Defense, 
State, and USAID officials involved in securing, stabilizing, and 
reconstructing Afghanistan. Additionally, we met with U.S. Central 
Command officials, who provided the current status of (1) their efforts 
to train and equip the ANSF and (2) the recent transition of the 
security mission from U.S. to ISAF control. Moreover, we met with 
experts from various academic and research institutions and reviewed 
their reports related to Afghanistan. Finally, we provided a draft of 
this report to the relevant agencies for advanced review. Each agency 
informed us that they were not providing formal comments. However, each 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. We 
conducted our review from January through May 2007 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to Members of Congress and 
cognizant congressional committees. We will also make copies available 
to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director, 
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-3031 or 
willliamsbridgersj@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson at (202) 512- 
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 
enclosure VII. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

Enclosures: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard D. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey: 
Chairwoman: 
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: Afghanistan Facts and Figures: 

Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited 
natural resources. It is bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran 
to the west (see fig. 1). Afghanistan's land area is about 647,500 
square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than the state of Texas. 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Map Resources. 

[End of figure] 

Conflict has ravaged Afghanistan for nearly three decades. The Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a 
prolonged war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a protracted 
civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of the 
fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a 
haven for terrorists. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the 
United States, several allies, and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance 
forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a 
safe haven to al Qaeda terrorists. In late 2001, a conference in Bonn, 
Germany established a process for political reconstruction that 
included the adoption of a new constitution and called for democratic 
elections. On December 7, 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first 
democratically elected president of Afghanistan. The National Assembly 
was inaugurated on December 19, 2005. 

Demographics and Development Indicators: 

Afghanistan's population, estimated at over 31 million, is ethnically 
and linguistically diverse. Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups include 
the Pashtun (42 percent), Tajik (27), Hazara (9), Uzbek (8), Aimak (4), 
and Turkmen (3). Although some ethnic groups are predominant in 
specific regions, such as the Pashtun along much of the border with 
Pakistan, many regions are populated by multiple ethnic groups. Over 30 
languages are spoken in Afghanistan, but most of the population speaks 
either Dari/Persian (46 percent) or Pashtu (42). The population is 
largely rural and mostly uneducated. Almost half of the population is 
under the age of 15. Islam is the predominant religion--80 percent of 
the population is Sunni and 19 percent is Shi'a. 

Development indicators published by the World Bank and the United 
Nations (UN) rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every 
category. Life expectancy at birth is 43 years of age. More than 20 
percent of all Afghan children die before the age of 5, of which a 
third die soon after birth. The per capita income for Afghanistan is 
estimated to be about $200 per year, excluding income from illicit drug 
production and trafficking, and over 70 percent of Afghan adults are 
illiterate. According to the World Bank, limited available data suggest 
that more than a third of rural households face chronic or temporary 
shortages of food. 

Natural Resources: 

Resource limitations pose constraints on development in Afghanistan. 
Only 12 percent of the land in Afghanistan is arable, the country has 
limited access to fresh water, and potable water supplies are 
inadequate. Unlike some other countries in the region, Afghanistan does 
not produce oil or have substantial oil reserves. Instead, much of the 
population relies on wood for fuel, which has led to rapid 
deforestation and soil degradation. In addition, much of the country is 
prone to damaging natural hazards, including earthquakes in the Hindu 
Kush mountains, flooding, and droughts. 

Economy: 

After the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, the Afghan 
economy grew rapidly as a new government was established and 
international aid flowed into the country. While limited economic 
statistics are available, the World Bank estimates that the Afghan 
economy grew approximately 16 percent in 2003, 8 percent in 2004, and 
14 percent in 2005 (see table 2). Inflation has fluctuated, from around 
10 percent in 2004 and 2005 to as low as 4 percent in December 2006 due 
to a decline in international energy prices, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).[Footnote 3] According to IMF and 
private economic consulting firms, while the economy is expected to 
grow rapidly over the next few years, Afghanistan is still a very poor 
country attempting to recover from decades of warfare and economic 
neglect. 

Table 2: Growth of Afghanistan's Economy, 2000-2005: 

Indicator: Gross domestic product (GDP) (billions of constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars); 
2000: N/A; 
2001: 2.7; 
2002: 4.4; 
2003: 4.9; 
2004: 6.1; 
2005: 7.3. 

Indicator: GDP growth (annual percent); 
2000: N/A; 
2001: N/A; 
2002: 29; 
2003: 16; 
2004: 8; 
2005: 14. 

Indicator: Official development assistance (ODA) (billions of constant 
2000 U.S. dollars); 
2000: 0.2; 
2001: 0.4; 
2002: 1.4; 
2003: 1.7; 
2004: 2.3; 
2005: 2.8. 

Indicator: Ratio of ODA to GDP (percent); 
2000: N/A; 
2001: 17; 
2002: 32; 
2003: 35;
2004: 37; 
2005: 38. 

N/A = data unavailable: 

Source: GAO analysis of World Development Indicators data from the 
World Bank. 

Note: GDP is based on nondrug output. GDP growth is calculated based on 
constant (inflation-adjusted) local currency (Afghani) values, not U.S. 
dollars. ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants. 

[End of table] 

Since 2001, the Afghan economy has received large amounts of foreign 
assistance. In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, 
official development assistance (foreign grants and concessional loans) 
from international donors was $2.8 billion, or over a third the size of 
the national economy. In addition, about 60 countries attended a 
January 2006 conference in London on the Afghanistan Compact, which 
maps out how the international community will contribute to 
Afghanistan's future development. Afghanistan has also received 
substantial reduction in its external debt, which had totaled over $11 
billion. However, according to IMF, Afghanistan's ability to assume 
additional debt for development purposes is limited due to 
Afghanistan's remaining debt and limited export revenues. 

In terms of international trade, Afghanistan's exports are dominated by 
illicit narcotics (opium and its products, morphine and heroin), which 
have an estimated total value of $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion per year, 
according to the World Bank.[Footnote 4] By contrast, officially 
recorded exports are estimated at several hundred million dollars. The 
country is highly import dependent for basic goods like petroleum 
products; construction materials; machinery and equipment; medicines; 
textiles; and, in bad harvest years, food, with imports financed 
largely by aid and (to a considerable extent) illicit drug proceeds. 
According to the World Bank, growth and diversification of legal 
exports will be critical for the country's longer-term development 
success. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip the Afghan National 
Security Forces Face Several Challenges: 

In the wake of decades of war that left Afghanistan without an army or 
a functioning police force, the United States, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and other coalition nations have been 
working to develop the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National 
Police--referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)--to 
provide security for Afghanistan. After several years of relative calm 
since the ousting of the Taliban, security deteriorated significantly 
in 2006. The use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings 
increased fourfold, with approximately 130 suicide attacks launched by 
militants. This deterioration in security has been blamed in part on 
the weakness of the ANSF. 

The United States has provided over $6 billion through fiscal year 2006 
to train and equip the Afghan army and police. Citing deteriorating 
security in Afghanistan and the need to rapidly establish independent 
security forces, the administration has requested $7.6 billion and $2.9 
billion for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, respectively, to accelerate 
efforts to train and equip the ANSF (see table 3). 

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal 
Years 2002-2008: 

Dollars in millions. 

Assistance program: Afghan army[B]; 
Fiscal years: 2002: $76.9; 
Fiscal years: 2003: $372.6; 
Fiscal years: 2004: $723.7; 
Fiscal years: 2005: $1,736.6; 
Fiscal years: 2006: $768.0; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: $4,883.2; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $1,903.7; 
Total: $10,464.7. 

Assistance program: Afghan police; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 25.5; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 5.0; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 223.9; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 813.9; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 1,293.7; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: 2,730.6; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 948.9; 
Total: 6,041.5. 

Total; 
Fiscal years: 2002: $102.4; 
Fiscal years: 2003: $377.6; 
Fiscal years: 2004: $947.6; 
Fiscal years: 2005: $2,550.5; 
Fiscal years: 2006: $2,061.7; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request[A]: $7,613.8; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $2,852.6; 
Total: $16,506.2. 

Sources: Departments of Defense and State. 

[A] Fiscal year 2007 includes approximately $1.6 billion that has been 
appropriated and approximately $6 billion as requested by Defense in 
the 2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request. 

[B] Afghan army includes detainee operations. 

[End of table] 

According to Defense documents and discussions with Defense officials, 
the 2007 and 2008 budget requests, as well as the provision of 
sufficient mentors and trainers, would allow Defense and State[Footnote 
5] to complete the training and equipping of the ANSF by December 2008-
-almost a year ahead of previous plans--at which time the United States 
would transition its efforts to sustaining the ANSF. According to 
Defense progress reports from March 2007, 21,600 combat troops[Footnote 
6] and 62,500[Footnote 7] police officers and patrolmen and women have 
been trained, equipped, and assigned. Therefore, over the next 2 years, 

* Defense plans to complete the training and equipping of 70,000 army 
personnel, including an additional 29,045 new combat troops (for a 
total of 50,645), and complete the establishment of an Afghan Ministry 
of Defense and military sustaining institutions;[Footnote 8] and: 

* Defense and State plan to complete the training and equipping of 
82,000 police personnel--an increase of 20,000 over previous plans-- 
including at least 19,500 new recruits, and complete the reform of 
Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior, which oversees the police. 

These plans are ambitious and require both the rapid expansion of 
efforts to train and equip new recruits and substantial improvements in 
the current forces' capabilities to operate independently. According to 
Defense progress reports from March 2007, no army combat units are 
fully capable of operating independently and less than 20 percent are 
fully capable of leading operations with coalition support. Defense 
reports that no Afghan police units are fully capable of operating 
independently and that only 1 of 72 police units is fully capable to 
lead operations with coalition support.[Footnote 9] Moreover, according 
to Defense officials, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of 
forces on hand is less than those trained. For example, although 20,400 
combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007, 
Defense officials stated that approximately 15,000 were actually 
present for duty.[Footnote 10] 

Furthermore, efforts to equip the Afghan security forces have faced 
problems since their inception. In 2004 and 2005, Defense planned to 
equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged Soviet weapons and 
armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn 
out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, Defense 
began providing the forces with U.S. equipment--an effort that faces 
challenges.[Footnote 11] As security has deteriorated, equipment needs 
have changed, and their associated costs have increased. For example, 
the Afghan army was initially provided with pickup trucks, such as 
those in figure 2, and 9-millimeter pistols; more recently, Defense has 
begun providing more protective equipment, such as Humvees, and more 
lethal weapons, such as rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. 

Moreover, procedures to ensure that the intended recipients receive, 
retain, and use their equipment as intended have lagged. For example, 
the Defense and State Inspectors General (IG) reported that when the 
United States first began training the police, State's contractor 
provided trainees with a one-time issue of uniforms and nonlethal 
equipment upon graduation. However, many students sold their equipment 
before they reached their duty stations, and the program was 
terminated. The IGs reported that most equipment is now distributed 
from Kabul to police units' provincial headquarters, but hoarding 
equipment is reportedly a large problem, maintenance is insufficient, 
and end-user accountability of distributed equipment is 
limited.[Footnote 12] 

Figure 2: Trucks Purchased for the Afghan National Army: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for 
managing the country's national police force, faces a number of 
problems that have required reform or restructuring. According to 
officials from State and its police training contractor, these problems 
include pervasive corruption; an outdated rank structure overburdened 
with senior-level officers; lack of communication and control between 
central command and the regions, provinces, and districts; pay 
disparity between the army and police; and a lack of professional 
standards and internal discipline. According to State, the Ministry of 
Interior is in the process of implementing pay and rank reforms. 
Reforms to date include removal of over 2,000 high-ranking officers 
(colonel and above) and steps to make pay for rank-and-file police 
officers more equitable. Additional planned reforms include 
establishing parity between the salaries of police and military and 
selecting police officers based on merit rather than loyalty and local 
influence. 

Prior Recommendations: 

In our 2005 report on the Afghan security forces, we recommended that, 
because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial 
resources, the Secretaries of Defense and State develop detailed plans 
for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. We 
proposed the plans include clearly defined objectives and performance 
measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future funding 
requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, 
including transitioning program responsibility to Afghanistan. We 
suggested that the Secretaries provide this information to the Congress 
when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan army or 
police forces. 

In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security 
sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and 
trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating 
militia fighters--is critical to the success of the army and police 
programs, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State work 
with the other nations to help ensure that progress in the other 
pillars is congruent with the progress made in the army and police 
programs. We suggested that the Secretaries regularly report to the 
Congress--no less than annually--on the progress made in addressing 
these other security pillars. 

Though Defense and State generally concurred with our recommendations, 
both suggested that existing reporting requirements addressed the need 
to report their plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and 
police forces. Our analysis of Defense and State reporting to the 
Congress, however, indicated that the departments did not have the 
detailed plans as we recommended. In recent months, we again asked 
Defense and State for plans that are responsive to the recommendation. 
Though both Defense and State officials asserted that detailed plans 
for fielding fully functioning Afghan army and police forces by a 
stated end date have been done, they have not provided them to us. We 
continue to believe that developing and following such plans and 
ensuring concurrent progress in the other security pillars is essential 
to the overall future success of the Afghan security effort. 

Oversight Questions: 

* What is the overall strategic plan for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan? 
What is the operational concept for the ANSF? How are U.S. plans to 
train and equip the ANSF incorporated into the strategic plan for 
Afghanistan? 

* How much funding has the United States provided to train and equip 
the ANSF? How do Defense and State track funding for the ANSF, 
including obligations and expenditures? What equipment, training, and 
services has the United States provided through drawdowns and as excess 
defense articles? 

* How much funding, training, equipment, or other services have the 
other coalition partners provided to train and equip the ANSF? 

* What is the anticipated total cost to fully train and equip the ANSF? 
What is the estimated annual cost to sustain these forces, and who will 
pay for it? What are the plans for Afghanistan to take program and 
financial responsibility for its army and police? 

* What have been the results to date of efforts to train and equip the 
ANSF? What and how much equipment has been provided? How does the 
United States track where it is and how it is used? How many troops 
have been trained and equipped? Of those, how many are available for 
duty? What are the capabilities of these troops to operate 
independently of coalition troops? 

* What performance measures are used to assess progress in developing 
Afghan army sustaining institutions? What progress has been made? What 
is the desired end state, and what is the anticipated time frame for 
completion? 

* What performance measures are used to assess progress in reforming 
the Afghan Ministry of Interior? What progress has been made? What is 
the desired end state, and what is the anticipated time frame for 
completion? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure III: International Security Forces Limited by Several 
Factors: 

Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), with approximately 35,000 troops from 37 
nations,[Footnote 13] was formed to assist the government of 
Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment to enable 
reconstruction. ISAF was formed in December 2001 under a United Nations 
(UN) mandate to provide security in Kabul and its surrounding area, and 
to assist Afghanistan in creating a safe and secure environment. In 
2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to (1) 
assume command and control for the ISAF mission and (2) assume 
responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in northern 
and western Afghanistan. Although NATO had difficulty persuading 
nations to provide the resources needed for these teams, as of November 
2006, it oversees 25 PRTs throughout Afghanistan, which are structured 
around five regional commands, as shown in figure 3. Twelve PRTs are 
led by the United States. The PRTs' mission is to assist the government 
of Afghanistan to extend its authority; to facilitate the development 
of a stable and secure environment; and, through military presence, 
enable security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Each PRT has 
a lead country assigned, but PRTs are joint military-civilian 
organizations and often include representatives from other ISAF member 
states. For example, the United States has officials from the 
Departments of State and Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) at many of the PRTs to observe and 
assist in reconstruction efforts. 

Figure 3: PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: ISAF and Defense (data); Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

ISAF's responsibilities and efforts in Afghanistan are increasing. 
However, its ability to provide security for the country is limited by 
a number of factors. Although NATO has command over ISAF troops, 
control is ultimately exercised by each nation. ISAF's rules of 
engagement are heavily influenced by limitations imposed by national 
governments (referred to as national caveats) that, for example, 
prevent troops from some countries from performing certain tasks or 
missions, or moving between geographic areas of operation. As a result, 
the burden of combat, when it arises, falls disproportionately on the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Australia, and Estonia, which have forces in or lead PRTs in the more 
hostile regions of Afghanistan. Furthermore, some ISAF troops are 
limited by shortages of certain types of critical equipment, and most 
do not have strategic capacity, such as airlift. 

Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated into the ISAF chain 
of command. Therefore, each lead nation can have its own concept, 
priorities, and, in some cases, national caveats that guide specific 
PRT operations. For some PRTs, particularly in the more volatile south 
and east, providing security is the priority, but for others in more 
secure areas, reconstruction is the highest priority. Overall, PRTs aim 
to contribute to stability and facilitate reconstruction via activities 
such as patrolling, monitoring, influence, and mediation. Many have 
also participated to some extent in specific reconstruction projects by 
providing funding or other assistance, particularly in areas where 
nongovernmental organizations have been unable to operate. 

The U.S.-led PRTs facilitate reconstruction by providing security but 
also devote substantial resources to reconstruction projects that are 
designed to advance U.S. security objectives. U.S. commanders, 
including those leading PRTs, have access to funds provided under 
Defense's Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP). According to 
Defense officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, CERP funds for 
Afghanistan totaled $391 million, and the requests for fiscal years 
2007 and 2008 are $231 million and $210 million, respectively. 
According to the U.S. Central Command, CERP-funded projects are 
intended to gain the confidence of local residents and leaders and 
discourage them from cooperating with insurgents. U.S. CERP funds have 
been used by PRT commanders for rapid implementation of small-scale 
projects, such as providing latrines for a school or a generator for a 
hospital, and do not require prior approval or coordination at the 
federal level. 

Oversight Questions: 

* How do the national caveats placed on the various ISAF forces affect 
ISAF's ability to provide security for Afghanistan and the operations 
of the PRTs? What equipment shortages and capability limitations exist 
among the ISAF-member nations and how are they being addressed? 

* What reconstruction programs and projects do the various PRTs engage 
in? How do PRT lead nations manage their programs to ensure 
accountability? 

* How much funding has Defense provided for CERP-funded projects in 
Afghanistan? How are CERP funds being used in Afghanistan? How does 
Defense track CERP projects and ensure accountability for the use of 
these funds? 

* How does the United States coordinate its PRTs with those run by 
other coalition partners? How does the United States coordinate its 
CERP-funded PRT reconstruction projects with USAID and other donors 
(including nongovernmental organizations) who may be providing 
reconstruction assistance in the area? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure IV: Worsening Security and Other Factors Hinder U.S. 
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan: 

Combating illicit narcotics in Afghanistan is one of the five security 
pillars. Since 2002, the United States has provided over $1.5 billion 
to stem the production and trafficking of illicit drugs--primarily 
opiates--in Afghanistan. Despite U.S. and international efforts in 
these areas, the UN estimated that the number of hectares of opium 
poppy under cultivation grew by 50 percent in 2006, and a record 6,100 
metric tons of opium was produced. The UN estimated that the export 
value of opium and its derivatives--morphine and heroin--equaled about 
a third of Afghanistan's licit economy, with drug profits reportedly 
funding terrorists and other antigovernment entities. Initial estimates 
for 2007 indicate that the amount of opium poppy under cultivation will 
remain the same or possibly increase. The continued prevalence of opium 
poppy cultivation and drug trafficking throughout Afghanistan imperils 
efforts to secure and stabilize the country. 

To combat opium poppy cultivation, drug trafficking, and their negative 
effects on Afghan institutions and society, the United States, working 
with allied governments, in 2005 developed a five-pillared 
counternarcotics strategy addressing (1) alternative livelihoods, (2) 
elimination and eradication, (3) interdiction, (4) law enforcement and 
justice reform, and (5) public information. USAID and State initiated a 
number of projects under each of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy's 
five pillars, but delays in implementation--due to the security 
situation, poor infrastructure, and other factors--limited progress. 
Many projects have not been in place long enough to fully assess 
progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy 
cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. 

Alternative livelihoods. USAID implemented projects to provide economic 
alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the amount of 
Afghanistan's economic activity attributable to the drug industry. 
Results varied in the three principal alternative livelihoods regions, 
in part because of the differing security risks and access to 
infrastructure. 

Elimination and eradication. State supported the Afghan government's 
efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops if 
prevention failed. State provided support for central and provincial 
eradication efforts (see fig. 4). Central government eradication 
efforts improved with the reorganization of the Afghan Eradication 
Force (AEF) into smaller, more mobile units and the addition of 
purchased and leased transport and logistical-support aircraft. 
However, in 2006, AEF's fielding was delayed because of coordination 
problems, reducing the amount of eradication possible. In addition, not 
all Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams, which were designed to help 
governors discourage farmers from growing poppy, were fully fielded. 

Figure 4: AEF Using a U.S.-Provided Tractor to Eradicate Opium Poppy: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department. 

[End of figure] 

Interdiction. State and Defense assisted Drug Enforcement 
Administration-led efforts to help build Afghan capacity to destroy 
drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major 
traffickers. State and Defense also provided support for border 
security enhancements in neighboring countries and the counternarcotics 
police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan, State began border security projects. 

Law enforcement and justice reform. State supported the Afghan 
government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and 
punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State provided support for 
Department of Justice prosecutors, who helped develop and implement a 
new counternarcotics law; corrections reform, including training guards 
and refurbishing courthouses; and a planned justice center. 

Public information. State led a public information campaign intended to 
convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy cultivation and trade. 
However, because of delays with the PEP team implementation, the 
campaign was not able to rely on planned support from the teams. 

Prior Recommendation: 

In our 2005 report on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police, 
we concluded that progress in the other security pillars was critical 
to eventually sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the army 
and police.[Footnote 14] As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State 
have not specifically reported on progress in the counternarcotics or 
other security pillars, as we recommended. 

Oversight Questions: 

* What is the current status of U.S. funding provided for 
counternarcotics in Afghanistan, and how much has been expended? What 
has this funding supported? 

* What is the status of the State-and USAID-funded counternarcotics 
programs? What has been accomplished in each of the five 
counternarcotics pillars? 

* What counternarcotics assistance have the Departments of Defense and 
Justice, including the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, provided? 

* How will the Afghan counternarcotics strategy be adjusted if, as is 
expected, the 2007 poppy cultivation figures show no decrease? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure V: Progress Establishing a Working Judicial System Lags 
behind the Other Security Pillars: 

Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of 
law is a prerequisite for effective policing. It is one of the five 
security pillars. However, according to donor officials, few linkages 
exist in Afghanistan between the Afghan judiciary and police, and the 
police have little ability to enforce judicial rulings. In addition, 
judges and prosecutors are not being exposed to police training and 
practices. 

Supported by the United States, other donors, and international 
organizations, Italy--initially the lead nation for reforming the 
judiciary--followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and 
drafting legal codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3) 
renovating the country's physical legal infrastructure. However, 
according to Italian and U.S. government officials, the reform program 
was underfunded and understaffed. 

Nevertheless, Italy and the other donors made some progress in 
promoting reform. This included drafting a new criminal procedure code, 
training several hundred judges, and renovating courthouses. USAID 
officials indicated that they continue to have projects to develop a 
judicial code of conduct and to train both sitting and new judges. They 
also have projects to develop and implement uniform procedures and 
rules for courts and to establish a common curriculum for law courses. 
Also, as noted in enclosure IV, the United States has supported the 
Afghan government's efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, 
prosecute, and punish illicit drug traffickers and corrupt officials. 

However, these accomplishments and current efforts address only a 
portion of Afghanistan's overall need for judicial reform. 
Afghanistan's judicial sector is characterized by a conflicting mix of 
civil, religious, and customary laws, with too few trained judges, 
prosecutors, or other justice personnel. Furthermore, its penal system 
is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, official records, and essential 
office equipment and furniture have been damaged extensively. U.S. and 
other donor officials informed us that progress in rebuilding the 
judicial sector lags behind the other security pillars and that the 
reform effort is being undermined by systemic corruption at key 
national and provincial justice institutions. 

Prior Recommendation: 

Although we did not specifically examine U.S. assistance efforts to 
help establish a working judiciary in Afghanistan, in our 2005 report 
on U.S. assistance for the Afghan army and police, we concluded that 
progress in the other security pillars is critical to eventually 
sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the army and 
police.[Footnote 15] As we note in enclosure II, Defense and State have 
not specifically reported on progress in the judicial or other security 
pillars, as we recommended. 

Oversight Questions: 

* What is the status of efforts to develop a working judicial system in 
Afghanistan? 

* How much funding has the United States provided for Afghanistan's 
judicial system, and how much of that has been expended? What has this 
funding been used for? 

* What are the key obstacles to judicial reform, and how will they be 
addressed? 

* To what extent have the United States, its coalition partners, and 
the government of Afghanistan developed a strategy, clear objectives, 
and an estimate of the time and resources needed to complete justice 
sector reforms? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure VI: Reconstruction Efforts Have Lacked Strategic Focus and 
Are Constrained by Security Concerns: 

To date, the United States has provided about $4.4 billion for 
reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the administration has requested an 
additional $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Reconstruction 
assistance to Afghanistan, largely led by USAID with support from 
international donors and other U.S. government entities, helped 
Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions of children to 
school, and repatriate millions of refugees. However, the 
reconstruction needs of Afghanistan are immense, and reconstruction 
efforts face a number of challenges. Afghanistan is one of the world's 
poorest countries and ranks near the bottom of virtually every 
development indicator category, such as life expectancy; literacy; 
nutrition; and infant, child, and maternal mortality (see encl. I). 
Nearly three decades of war and extended drought have destroyed 
Afghanistan's infrastructure, economy, and government. 

U.S. reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan has taken place in three 
stages since the ouster of the Taliban. In 2002 and 2003, USAID 
initially focused on humanitarian and short-term assistance, such as 
assistance to displaced persons and food assistance, which helped avert 
widespread famine. Although USAID continues to provide some 
humanitarian assistance, this assistance is now a much smaller part of 
its program. 

In 2004, USAID expanded assistance to include quick impact projects, 
such as infrastructure projects. At that time, due to a variety of 
obstacles, especially security and limited Afghan capacity, USAID had 
not met all of its reconstruction targets in areas such as health, 
education, and infrastructure. The largest component of these 
reconstruction efforts was the construction of roads, which, after 
decades of neglect, were in disrepair or lacking altogether. The United 
States, Afghanistan, and international donors deemed road construction 
critical to economic growth and security. 

In recent years, USAID expanded Afghan reconstruction assistance to a 
comprehensive development package that focuses more on increasing 
Afghan capacity and aims to address a wide range of needs, such as 
agriculture, education, health, road construction, power generation, 
and others. As shown in table 4, USAID has allocated reconstruction 
assistance to 12 primary program categories, with more than $1.8 
billion, or about 27 percent of U.S. reconstruction assistance, to 
roads. 

Table 4: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Fiscal Years 
2002-2008, by Program Category: 

Dollars in millions. 

Program category: Roads; 
Fiscal years: 2002: $51; 
Fiscal years: 2003: $142; 
Fiscal years: 2004: $354; 
Fiscal years: 2005: $276; 
Fiscal years: 2006: $255; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: $446; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $338; 
Total[A]: $1,862; 
Percent of total[A]: 27. 

Program category: Power generation; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 3; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 0; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 77; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 286; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 61; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 135; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 203; 
Total[A]: 765; 
Percent of total[A]: 11. 

Program category: Alternative livelihoods; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 3; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 1; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 5; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 185; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 121; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 211; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 121; 
Total[A]: 647; 
Percent of total[A]: 9. 

Program category: Elections, governance, rule of law, Office of 
Transition Initiatives; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 25; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 42; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 153; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 103; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 23; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 124; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 56; 
Total[A]: 526; 
Percent of total[A]: 8. 

Program category: Support to government of Afghanistan; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 41; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 40; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 103; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 117; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 60; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 47; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 62; 
Total[A]: 470; 
Percent of total[A]: 7. 

Program category: Health and clinics; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 8; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 56; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 83; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 111; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 51; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 72; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 66; 
Total[A]: 447; 
Percent of total[A]: 7. 

Program category: Education and schools; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 19; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 21; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 104; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 86; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 49; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 62; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 54; 
Total[A]: 395; 
Percent of total[A]: 6. 

Program category: Food assistance; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 159; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 51; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 49; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 57; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 60; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 22; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 10; 
Total[A]: 408; 
Percent of total[A]: 6. 

Program category: Economic growth; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 21; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 12; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 84; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 91; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 46; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 68; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 61; 
Total[A]: 382; 
Percent of total[A]: 6. 

Program category: Agriculture; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 27; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 56; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 50; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 77; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 27; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 55; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 31; 
Total[A]: 324; 
Percent of total[A]: 5. 

Program category: Provincial Reconstruction Teams; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 0; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 11; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 56; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 85; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 20; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 117; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 30; 
Total[A]: 319; 
Percent of total[A]: 5. 

Program category: Internally displaced persons; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 108; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 23; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 10; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 0; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 0; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 0; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 0 ; 
Total[A]: 141; 
Percent of total[A]: 2. 

Program category: Other[B]; 
Fiscal years: 2002: 7; 
Fiscal years: 2003: 7; 
Fiscal years: 2004: 45; 
Fiscal years: 2005: 37; 
Fiscal years: 2006: 5; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: 15; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: 16; 
Total[A]: 131; 
Percent of total[A]: 2. 

Total; 
Fiscal years: 2002: $471; 
Fiscal years: 2003: $462; 
Fiscal years: 2004: $1,173; 
Fiscal years: 2005: $1,511; 
Fiscal years: 2006: $778; 
Fiscal years: 2007 request: $1,374; 
Fiscal years: 2008 request: $1,048; 
Total[A]: $6,817; 
Percent of total[A]: 100. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[A] Totals may not add due to rounding. 

[B] Includes water, information technology, and program support. 

[End of table] 

USAID's road construction efforts include primary roads, including 
parts of Afghanistan's ring road, and secondary and urban roads, some 
of which connect to the ring road, as depicted in figure 5. 

Figure 5: Cash-for-Work Cobblestone Road Project: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Road reconstruction and construction has attracted considerable donor 
assistance. As of January 2007, about $5.2 billion for transportation 
infrastructure projects had been provided or promised by the United 
States and more than 10 other donors. Nearly $4 billion of this was for 
366 completed projects, including most of the ring road. The ring road 
connects Kabul to Kandahar in the south, Herat in the east, and Mazar-e-
Sharif in the north, completing a circle or ring. The portion of the 
ring road from Kabul to Kandahar was a signature project for USAID--
opening in December 2003 to much fanfare. The Kabul-Kandahar road 
reduced travel time between the two cities from several days to 6 
hours. However, the U.S. Embassy has restricted official U.S. travel on 
the road because of heightened security risks. 

Because most reconstruction project evaluation has not yet taken place, 
it is not clear whether the broad range of USAID's reconstruction 
programs in Afghanistan has led to improved results in many sectors or 
whether, given the obstacles USAID faces, the breadth of its efforts 
limits USAID's ability to achieve significant results in a smaller set 
of priority areas. 

In addition, many of USAID's reconstruction programs target specific 
geographic areas. In 2005, we reported that two-thirds of obligated 
fiscal year 2004 funds supported local projects in Afghanistan's 34 
provinces, but Kabul and Kandahar provinces received approximately 70 
percent of these funds, mainly for roads. More recently, alternative 
livelihood programs have focused on providing economic alternatives in 
opium poppy-growing areas. Further, the administration's proposed 
budget for fiscal year 2008 specifies that some of the funding be 
provided for roads in areas targeted by insurgents and for rural 
development in poppy-producing regions. Focusing assistance on such 
targeted geographic regions has resulted in some complaints that 
regions only receive assistance if they have problems such as opium 
poppy cultivation or heightened security concerns. 

Prior Recommendations: 

In 2004, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID revise USAID's 
strategy for its assistance program to Afghanistan.[Footnote 16] 
Specifically, we suggested that, among other things, the strategy 
should contain measurable goals, specific time frames, and resource 
levels. We also recommended that the Secretary of State produce an 
annual consolidated budget report and semiannual obligation and 
expenditure reports. In response, USAID agreed and has revised its 
operational strategy for Afghanistan much as we suggested. State, on 
the other hand, disagreed and noted that it already keeps the Congress 
informed through briefings, hearings, and mandated reports. We 
disagreed at the time and continue to believe that regular reporting of 
both obligations and expenditures for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan 
would provide the Congress with a more complete picture of what funds 
actually have been spent. 

In 2005, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) establish a 
performance management plan that complies with USAID directives, (2) 
clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that 
contractors are to develop performance management plans specific to the 
work they are conducting, and (3) more completely communicate the 
performance information from the plans to executive decision makers in 
Kabul and Washington, D.C.[Footnote 17] Overall, USAID concurred and 
has developed the performance management plans we suggested. However, 
USAID's plans are ambitious and assume that security in Afghanistan 
will improve, which has not happened. 

Oversight Questions: 

* How much funding has the United States provided for Afghanistan's 
reconstruction, and how much of that has been expended? What has been 
achieved to date? What obstacles have been encountered? How has USAID 
taken these obstacles, such as the worsening security situation, into 
account in planning for future reconstruction efforts? 

* What are USAID's reconstruction priorities? How have USAID funds been 
allocated? How are USAID's programs prioritized and sequenced? What is 
the current geographic distribution of obligated funds for local 
programs? How do USAID's reconstruction priorities align with the 
overall U.S. strategy for securing and stabilizing Afghanistan? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, (202) 512-3031 or 
willliamsbridgersj@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson at (202) 512- 
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report include Al Huntington (Assistant 
Director), David Bruno, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, 
Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, David Gootnick, 
Elizabeth Guran, Laura Holliday, John Hutton, Ernie Jackson, Hynek 
Kalkus, Reid Lowe, Elizabeth Repko, George Taylor, Phil Thomas, Pierre 
Toureille, Adam Vodraska, Tim Wedding, Eve Weisberg, Christina Werth, 
and Loren Yager. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] This does not include the cost of U.S. military operations. 

[2] GAO, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, GAO-03-607 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003); Afghanistan Reconstruction: 
Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; 
Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 2, 2004); Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, 
Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten 
Achievement of U.S. Goals, GAO-05-742 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2005); Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have 
Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005); Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite 
Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. 
Goals, GAO-07-78 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2006). 

[3] In July 2006, IMF reported that substantial shortcomings continue 
to affect Afghanistan's national accounts, balance of payments, 
monetary, and social sector data. Given the security environment in 
Afghanistan and the ongoing development of the statistical system's 
capacity, statistics presented here for context and background should 
not be considered completely reliable. 

[4] The World Bank reports that data are limited on the extent of 
production and export of opium, given its illicit nature. 

[5] Defense is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan army. 
Defense and State share responsibility for police training. 

[6] We note that in early 2005, Defense reported that it had provided 
basic training for 18,300 combat troops and projected that it could 
train an additional 27,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007, for a 
total of 46,000 combat troops (see GAO-05-575). 

[7] Defense officials indicated that Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior 
reports the number of police assigned and that these numbers may not be 
reliable. The Ministry of Interior Forces include, among others: 
uniformed police, border police, counternarcotics police, and personnel 
for sustaining purposes, such as training, education, and procurement. 

[8] Sustaining institutions include medical, logistics, intelligence, 
and recruiting units. 

[9] Although Defense reports that no army or police units are fully 
capable of operating independently of coalition forces, Defense 
officials stated that some units of the Afghan army have conducted 
successful operations and State officials provided examples of 
successful police operations. 

[10] Defense officials state that approximately 40 percent of the 
absences were authorized and 60 percent were unauthorized. 

[11] These efforts began in 2005; however, the equipment did not arrive 
until 2006. 

[12] U.S. Departments of Defense and State Inspectors General, 
Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness 
(Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2006). 

[13] These include about 14,000 U.S. troops and 21,000 troops from the 
36 other coalition member countries. In January 2007, several NATO 
countries pledged to send additional troops. 

[14] GAO-05-575. 

[15] GAO-05-575. 

[16] GAO-04-403. 

[17] GAO-05-742. 

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Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202) 
512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, D.C. 20548: