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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, March 4, 2010: 

Recovery Act: 

Factors Affecting the Department of Energy's Program Implementation: 

Statement of Patricia A. Dalton, Managing Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-10-497T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-497T, a testimony before the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, United States Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act)-—
initially estimated to cost $787 billion in spending and tax 
provisions-—aims to promote economic recovery, make investments, and 
minimize or avoid reductions in state and local government services. 
The Recovery Act provided the Department of Energy (DOE) more than 
$43.2 billion, including $36.7 billion for projects and activities and 
$6.5 billion in borrowing authority, in areas such as energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, nuclear waste clean-up, and electric 
grid modernization. 

This testimony discusses (1) the extent to which DOE has obligated and 
spent its Recovery Act funds, and (2) the factors that have affected DOE
’s ability to select and start Recovery Act projects. In addition, GAO 
includes information on ongoing work related to DOE Recovery Act 
programs. This testimony is based on prior work and updated with data 
from DOE. 

What GAO Found: 

As of February 28, 2010, DOE reported it had obligated $25.7 billion 
(70 percent) and reported expenditures of $2.5 billion (7 percent) of 
the $36.7 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and 
activities. For context, as of December 31, 2009, DOE reported that it 
had obligated $23.2 billion (54 percent) and reported expenditures of 
$1.8 billion (4 percent). The percentage of Recovery Act funds 
obligated varied widely across DOE program offices and ranged from a 
high of 98 percent in the Energy Information Administration to a low 
of 1 percent for the Loan Guarantee Program Office. None of DOE’s 
program offices reported expenditures of more than a third of their 
Recovery Act funds as of February 28, 2010. 

Table: Recovery Act Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures 
(Cumulative) Reported by Department of Energy as of February 28, 2010: 

Recovery Act: DOE; 
Funding: $36,710 million; 
Obligations: $25,652 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 70%
Expenditures: $2,514 million; 
Percentage Expended: 7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

[End of table] 

Officials from DOE and states that received Recovery Act funding from 
DOE cited certain federal requirements that had affected their ability 
to implement some Recovery Act projects. For example: 

* Davis Bacon Requirements. Officials reported that Davis-Bacon 
requirements had affected the start of projects in the Weatherization 
Assistance Program because the program had previously been exempt from 
these requirements. 

* National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). DOE officials told us that 
NEPA may affect certain projects that are likely to significantly 
impact the environment, thereby requiring environmental assessments or 
environmental impact statements. 

* National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). Officials from the 
Michigan Department of Human Services told us that about 90 percent of 
the homes scheduled to be weatherized under the Weatherization 
Assistance Program would need a historic review. 

Additionally, DOE and state officials told us that other factors also 
affected the timing of project selection or starts. For example: 

* Newness of programs. In some cases, because some Recovery Act 
programs were newly created, officials needed time to establish 
procedures and provide guidance before implementing projects. 

* Staff capacity. DOE officials also told us that they experienced 
challenges in hiring new staff to carry out Recovery Act work. Also, 
District of Columbia officials told us they needed to hire 6 new staff 
members to oversee and manage the weatherization program. 

* State, local, or tribal issues. The economic recession affected some 
states’ budgets, which also affected states’ ability to use some 
Recovery Act funds, such as difficulty providing matching funds. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-497T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Patricia A. Dalton at (202) 
512-3841 or daltonp@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the Department 
of Energy's (DOE) implementation of programs funded under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Congress and the 
administration have fashioned a significant response to what is 
generally considered to be the nation's most serious economic crisis 
since the Great Depression. The Recovery Act is intended to promote 
economic recovery, make investments, and minimize or avoid reductions 
in state and local government services. Enacted on February 17, 2009, 
the act was a response to the economic recession at a time when the 
jobless rate was approaching 8 percent. In early 2009, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Recovery Act's combined 
spending and tax provisions would cost approximately $787 billion. On 
January 26, 2010, CBO updated its estimate of the cost of the Recovery 
Act. It now estimates that the Recovery Act will cost $75 billion more 
than originally estimated--or a total of $862 billion from 2009 
through 2019. That amount includes more than $43.2 billion for DOE 
efforts in areas such as energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
nuclear waste cleanup, and electric grid modernization. 

The Recovery Act specifies several roles for GAO, including conducting 
ongoing reviews of selected states' and localities' use of funds made 
available under the act. We recently completed our fifth review, 
issued yesterday, which examined a core group of 16 states, the 
District of Columbia, and selected localities.[Footnote 1] We also 
recently completed a review on the impact of certain federal 
requirements and other factors on Recovery Act project selection and 
starts.[Footnote 2] 

My statement today is based largely on these two prior reviews and 
updated with data from DOE and focuses on (1) the extent to which DOE 
has obligated and spent its Recovery Act funds, and (2) the factors 
that have affected DOE's ability to select and start Recovery Act 
projects. In addition, we include information on ongoing GAO work on 
DOE Recovery Act programs. We obtained financial data from DOE on its 
obligations and expenditures for Recovery Act projects and also asked 
DOE--and 26 other federal agencies--which federal requirements, if 
any, affected the timing of project selection and start dates, as well 
as whether any requirements at the state and local levels, or any 
other factors, affected project selection and start dates. To 
supplement the federal agencies' responses, we spoke with officials in 
16 states and the District of Columbia who are responsible for 
implementing Recovery Act projects. We are reviewing these 16 states 
and the District of Columbia for our bi-monthly reviews on Recovery 
Act implementation. The states selected contain about 65 percent of 
the U.S. population and are estimated to receive collectively about 
two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance funds available 
through the Recovery Act. We selected these states and the District of 
Columbia on the basis of federal outlay projections; percentage of the 
U.S. population represented; unemployment rates and changes; and a mix 
of states' poverty levels, geographic coverage, and representation of 
both urban and rural areas. We also spoke with representatives from 
the National Governors Association; the National Association of State 
Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers; and the National Association 
of Counties. 

Our prior work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Background: 

The Recovery Act provided DOE more than $43.2 billion, including $36.7 
billion for projects and activities and $6.5 billion in borrowing 
authority.[Footnote 3] Of the $36.7 billion for projects and 
activities, almost half--$16.8 billion--was provided to the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy for projects intended to 
improve energy efficiency, build the domestic renewable energy 
industry, and restructure the transportation industry to increase 
global competitiveness. The Recovery Act also provided $6 billion to 
the Office of Environmental Management for nuclear waste cleanup 
projects, $4.5 billion to the Office of Electricity Delivery and 
Energy Reliability for electric grid modernization, $4 billion to the 
Loan Guarantee Program Office to support loan guarantees for renewable 
energy and electric power transmission projects, $3.4 billion to the 
Office of Fossil Energy for carbon capture and sequestration efforts, 
and $2 billion to the Office of Science and the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency-Energy for advanced energy technology research. 

DOE Obligated 70 Percent and Reported Expenditures of 7 Percent of its 
Recovery Act Funds as of February 28, 2010: 

As of February 28, 2010, DOE reported that it had obligated $25.7 
billion (70 percent) and reported expenditures of $2.5 billion (7 
percent) of the $36.7 billion it received under the Recovery Act for 
projects and activities (see table 1). By comparison, as of December 
31, 2009, the department reported it had obligated $23.2 billion (54 
percent) and reported expenditures of $1.8 billion (4 percent). 

Table 1: Recovery Act Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures 
(Cumulative) Reported by Department of Energy as of February 28, 2010: 

Program Office: Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy; 
Funding: $389 million; 
Obligations: $156 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 40%; 
Expenditures: $2 million; 
Percentage Expended: 1%. 

Program Office: Departmental Administration; 
Funding: $42 million; 
Obligations: $26 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 61%; 
Expenditures: $13 million; 
Percentage Expended: 31%. 

Program Office: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy; 
Funding: $16,764 million; 
Obligations: $14,559 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 87%; 
Expenditures: $823 million; 
Percentage Expended: 5%. 

Program Office: Energy Information Administration; 
Funding: $8 million; 
Obligations: $8 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 98%; 
Expenditures: 0; 
Percentage Expended: 0. 

Program Office: Environmental Management; 
Funding: $6,000 million; 
Obligations: $5,525 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 92%; 
Expenditures: $1,378 million; 
Percentage Expended: 23%. 

Program Office: Fossil Energy; 
Funding: $3,396 million; 
Obligations: $961 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 28%; 
Expenditures: $9 million; 
Percentage Expended: 0. 

Program Office: Loan Guarantee Program Office; 
Funding: $3,970 million; 
Obligations: $56 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 1%; 
Expenditures: $25 million; 
Percentage Expended: 1%. 

Program Office: Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; 
Funding: $4,495 million; 
Obligations: $2,924 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 65%; 
Expenditures: $20 million; 
Percentage Expended: 0. 

Program Office: Office of Science; 
Funding: $1,636 million; 
Obligations: $1,435 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 88%; 
Expenditures: $241 million; 
Percentage Expended: 15%. 

Program Office: Western Area Power Administration; 
Funding: $10 million; 
Obligations: $3 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 32%; 
Expenditures: $3 million; 
Percentage Expended: 26%. 

Program Office: Total; 
Funding: $36,710 million[A]; 
Obligations: $25,652 million; 
Percentage Obligated: 70%; 
Expenditures: $2,514 million; 
Percentage Expended: 7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

Note: The numbers in this table are rounded to the nearest million. 

[A] The Recovery Act also provided DOE with $6.5 billion in borrowing 
authority ($3.25 billion for the Bonneville Power Administration and 
$3.25 billion for the Western Area Power Administration), which is not 
included in this table. DOE was also appropriated $15 million in the 
Recovery Act for the Office of Inspector General, which is also not 
included in this table. 

[End of table] 

The percentage of Recovery Act funds obligated varied widely across 
DOE program offices. Several program offices--Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, the Energy Information Administration, Environmental 
Management, and Science--had obligated more than 85 percent of their 
Recovery Act funds by February 28, 2010, while other program offices-- 
Fossil Energy, the Loan Guarantee Program, and the Western Area Power 
Administration--had obligated less than a third of their Recovery Act 
funds by that time. 

The percentage of Recovery Act funds spent also varied across DOE 
program offices, though to a lesser degree than the percentage 
obligated. None of the program offices reported expenditures of more 
than a third of their Recovery Act funds as of February 28, 2010. The 
percentage of funds spent ranged from a high of 31 percent for 
Departmental Administration to a low of zero percent for the 
Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Energy Information 
Administration, and Fossil Energy offices. 

Federal Requirements and Other Factors Affected the Timing of Project 
Selection and Starts: 

Officials from DOE and states that received Recovery Act funding from 
DOE cited certain federal requirements and other factors that had 
affected their ability to implement some Recovery Act projects. In 
particular, DOE officials reported that Davis-Bacon requirements and 
the National Environmental Policy Act affected the timing of some 
project selection and starts, while state officials reported that the 
National Historic Preservation Act affected their ability to select 
and start Recovery Act projects. Other factors unrelated to federal 
requirements--including the newness of programs, staff capacity, and 
state and local issues--also affected the timing of some projects, 
according to federal and state officials. 

DOE and State Officials Reported that Certain Federal Requirements 
Affected Project Selection and Starts: 

Officials from DOE and states that received DOE funding cited certain 
federal requirements that had affected their ability to select or 
start some Recovery Act projects. For example: 

* Davis-Bacon requirements.[Footnote 4] DOE's Weatherization 
Assistance Program became subject to the Davis-Bacon requirements for 
the first time under the Recovery Act after having been previously 
exempt from those requirements.[Footnote 5] Thus, the Department of 
Labor (Labor) had to determine the prevailing wage rates for 
weatherization workers in each county in the United States. In July 
2009, DOE and Labor issued a joint memorandum to Weatherization 
Assistance Program grantees authorizing them to begin weatherizing 
homes using Recovery Act funds, provided they paid construction 
workers at least Labor's wage rates for residential construction, or 
an appropriate alternative category, and compensated workers for any 
differences if Labor established a higher local prevailing wage rate 
for weatherization activities. On September 3, 2009, Labor completed 
its determinations; later that month, we reported that Davis-Bacon 
requirements were a reason why some states had not started 
weatherizing homes.[Footnote 6] Specifically, we reported that 7 out 
of 16 states and the District of Columbia decided to wait to begin 
weatherizing homes until Labor had determined county-by-county 
prevailing wage rates for their state. Officials in these states 
explained that they wanted to avoid having to pay back wages to 
weatherization workers who started working before the prevailing wage 
rates were known. In general, the states we reviewed used only a small 
percentage of their available funds in 2009, mostly because state and 
local agencies needed time to develop the infrastructures required for 
managing the significant increase in weatherization funding and for 
ensuring compliance with Recovery Act requirements, including Davis-
Bacon requirements. According to available DOE data, as of December 
31, 2009, 30,252 homes had been weatherized with Recovery Act funds, 
or about 5 percent of the approximately 593,000 total homes that DOE 
originally planned to weatherize using Recovery Act funds.[Footnote 7] 

* National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).[Footnote 8] DOE officials 
told us that while NEPA is unlikely to impose a greater burden on 
Recovery Act projects than on similar projects receiving federal 
funds, the timing of certain projects may be slowed by these 
requirements. However, DOE officials reported that the agency had 
taken steps to expedite the NEPA review process and said that the 
agency's funding opportunity announcements specified that projects 
must be sufficiently developed to meet the Recovery Act's timetable 
for commitment of funds. Nevertheless, DOE officials also told us that 
several program offices--including Loan Guarantee, Fossil Energy, 
Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and the Power Marketing 
Administrations--will likely have projects that significantly impact 
the environment and will therefore require environmental assessments 
or environmental impact statements. DOE officials told us that they 
plan to concurrently complete NEPA reviews with other aspects of the 
project selection and start process. State officials in California and 
Mississippi also told us that NEPA had caused delays in DOE Recovery 
Act projects. For example, California officials said that the State 
Energy Commission must submit some of its Recovery Act projects to DOE 
for NEPA review because they are not covered by DOE's existing 
categorical exclusions.[Footnote 9] State officials said that such 
reviews can take up to six or more weeks. Both California and 
Mississippi officials told us that activities that are categorically 
excluded under NEPA (e.g., road repaving or energy-efficient upgrades 
to existing buildings) still require clearance before the state can 
award funds. Staff must spend time filling out forms and supplying 
information to DOE on projects that may qualify for a categorical 
exclusion. 

* National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).[Footnote 10] State 
officials told us that NHPA had also affected DOE Recovery Act project 
selection and starts.[Footnote 11] Mississippi officials, in 
particular, cited NHPA's clearance requirements as one of the biggest 
potential delays to project selection in energy programs. Many of the 
city-and county-owned facilities that could benefit from the Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program could be subject to 
historic preservation requirements, which mandate that projects must 
be identified within 180 days of award.[Footnote 12] In part because 
of this requirement, the state had to adjust program plans and limit 
the scope of eligible recipients and projects to avoid historic 
preservation issues. Likewise, officials from the Michigan Department 
of Human Services told us that NHPA requires that weatherization 
projects receiving federal funds undergo a state historic preservation 
review. According to Michigan officials, this requirement means that 
the State Historic Preservation Office may review every home over 50 
years of age if any work is to be conducted, regardless of whether the 
home is in a historic district or on a national registry. These 
officials estimated that 90 percent of the homes scheduled to be 
weatherized would need a historic review. These reviews are a 
departure from Michigan's previous experience; the State Historic 
Preservation Office had never considered weatherization work to 
trigger a review. Furthermore, Michigan officials told us that their 
State Historic Preservation Office's policy is to review 
weatherization applications for these homes within 30 days after 
receiving the application and advise the Michigan Department of Human 
Services on whether the work can proceed. However, as of October 29, 
2009, the State Historic Preservation Office had only two employees, 
so state officials were concerned that this process could cause a 
significant delay. To avoid further delays, Michigan officials told us 
that in November 2009, they signed an agreement with the State 
Historic Preservation Office that is designed to expedite the review 
process. They also told us that with the agreement in place, they 
expect to meet their weatherization goals. 

* Buy American provisions.[Footnote 13] DOE officials told us that Buy 
American provisions could cause delays in implementing Recovery Act 
projects. Officials from other federal agencies said those provisions 
have affected or may affect their ability to select or start some 
Recovery Act projects. In some cases, those agencies had to develop 
guidance for compliance with Buy American provisions, including 
guidance on issuing waivers to recipients that were unable to comply. 
For example, according to Environmental Protection Agency officials, 
developing Buy American guidance was particularly challenging because 
of the need to establish a waiver process for Recovery Act projects. 
At the local level, officials from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) 
reported that the only security cameras that are compatible with the 
existing CHA system and City of Chicago police systems are not made in 
the United States. CHA worked with the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to determine how to seek a waiver for this particular 
project. Moreover, an industry representative told us that the Buy 
American provisions could interrupt contractors' supply chains, 
requiring them to find alternate suppliers and sometimes change the 
design of their projects, which could delay project starts. 

DOE and State Officials Reported that Other Factors Have Also Affected 
the Timing of Project Selection and Starts: 

Officials from DOE and states also told us that factors other than 
federal requirements have affected the timing of project selection or 
starts. For example: 

* Newness of programs. Because some Recovery Act programs were newly 
created, in some cases, officials needed time to establish procedures 
and provide guidance before implementing projects. In particular, the 
DOE Inspector General noted that the awards process for the Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, newly funded under 
the Recovery Act, was challenging to implement because there was no 
existing infrastructure. Hence, Recovery Act funds were not awarded 
and distributed to recipients in a timely manner. 

* Staff capacity. Officials from DOE stated that they would need to 
hire a total of 550 staff--both permanent and temporary--to carry out 
Recovery Act-related work. However, several issues affected DOE's 
ability to staff these federal positions, including the temporary 
nature and funding of the Recovery Act and limited resources for 
financial management and oversight. To address those issues, DOE was 
granted a special direct hire authority as part of the Recovery Act 
for certain areas and program offices. The authority allowed DOE to 
expedite the hiring process for various energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, electricity delivery, and energy reliability programs and 
helped DOE fill longer term temporary (more than 1 year, but not more 
than 4 years) and permanent positions. However, according to DOE 
officials, government-wide temporary appointment authority does not 
qualify an employee for health benefits, and thus few candidates have 
been attracted to these temporary positions. According to DOE 
officials, the Office of Management and Budget recently approved 
direct-hire authority for DOE, which officials believe will alleviate 
issues related to health care benefits. 

Some state officials told us that they experienced heavy workloads as 
a result of the Recovery Act, which impaired their ability to 
implement programs. As we reported in December 2009, smaller 
localities, which are often rural, told us that they faced challenges 
because of a lack of staff to understand, apply for, and comply with 
requirements for federal Recovery Act grants.[Footnote 14] For 
example, some local government officials reported that they did not 
employ a staff person to handle grants and therefore did not have the 
capacity to understand which grants they were eligible for and how to 
apply for them. In the District of Columbia, Department of the 
Environment officials explained that weatherization funds had not been 
spent as quickly as anticipated because officials needed to develop 
the infrastructure to administer the program. For example, the 
department needed to hire six new staff members to oversee and manage 
the program. Officials reported that, as of late January 2010, the 
department had still not hired any of the six new staff required. 
Officials from the National Association of Counties said that some 
localities had turned down Recovery Act funding to avoid the 
administrative burdens associated with the act's numerous reporting 
requirements. 

* State, Local, or Tribal Issues. In our recently issued report on 
factors affecting the implementation of Recovery Act projects, we 
noted that the economic recession affected some states' budgets, 
which, in turn, affected states' ability to use some Recovery Act 
funds.[Footnote 15] For example, according to a recent report by DOE's 
Office of Inspector General, implementation of the Weatherization 
Assistance Program's Recovery Act efforts was delayed in part by state 
hiring freezes, problems resolving local budget shortfalls, and state-
wide furloughs.[Footnote 16] State-level budget challenges have 
affected the implementation of other Recovery Act projects. For 
example, officials from the Department of Defense told us that because 
states were experiencing difficulties in passing their current-year 
budgets, some were unable to provide matching funds for certain Army 
National Guard programs. As a result, the Department of Defense had to 
revise its Recovery Act project plan to cancel or reduce the number of 
Army National Guard projects with state matching funds and replace 
them with other projects that did not require matching funds. 
Officials from the Department of Housing and Urban Development also 
told us that project starts in some instances were affected by the 
need for state and local governments to furlough employees as a result 
of the economic downturn. 

GAO Has Ongoing Work on DOE Recovery Act Programs: 

In a report issued yesterday, we discussed recipient reporting in 
DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program.[Footnote 17] Specifically, we 
noted that reporting about impacts to energy savings and jobs created 
and retained at both the state and local agency level is still 
somewhat limited. Although many local officials that we interviewed 
for that review have collected data about new hires, none could 
provide us with data on energy savings. Some states told us they plan 
to use performance measures developed by DOE, while others have 
developed their own measures. For example, Florida officials told us 
they plan to measure energy savings by tracking kilowatts used before 
and after weatherization, primarily with information from utility 
companies. In addition, local agencies in some states either collect 
or plan to collect information about other aspects of program 
operations. For example, local agencies in both California and 
Michigan collect data about customer satisfaction. In addition, a 
local agency in California plans to report about obstacles, while an 
agency in New York will track and report the number of units on the 
waiting list. 

As we reported, DOE made several outreach efforts to their program 
recipients to ensure timely reporting. These efforts included e-mail 
reminders for registration and Webinars that provided guidance on 
reporting requirements. For the first round of reporting, DOE 
developed a quality assurance plan to ensure all prime recipients 
filed quarterly reports, while assisting in identifying errors in 
reports. The methodology for the quality assurance review included 
several phases and provided details on the role and responsibilities 
for DOE officials. According to DOE officials, the data quality 
assurance plan was also designed to emphasize the avoidance of 
material omissions and significant reporting errors. 

In addition to our reviews of states' and localities' use of Recovery 
Act funds, GAO is also conducting ongoing work on several DOE efforts 
that received Recovery Act funding, including the Loan Guarantee 
Program and the Office of Environmental Management's activities. 

As I noted earlier, Congress made nearly $4 billion in Recovery Act 
funding available to DOE to support what the agency has estimated will 
be about $32 billion in new loan guarantees under its innovative 
technology loan guarantee program. However, we reported in July 2008 
that DOE was not well positioned to manage the loan guarantee program 
effectively and maintain accountability because it had not completed a 
number of key management and internal control activities.[Footnote 18] 
To improve the implementation of the loan guarantee program and to 
help mitigate risk to the federal government and American taxpayers, 
we recommended that, among other things, DOE complete internal loan 
selection policies and procedures that lay out roles and 
responsibilities and criteria and requirements for conducting and 
documenting analyses and decision making, and develop and define 
performance measures and metrics to monitor and evaluate program 
efficiency, effectiveness, and outcomes. We are currently engaged in 
ongoing work to determine the current state of the Loan Guarantee 
Program and what progress DOE has made since our last report, and we 
expect to report on that work this summer. 

Ongoing work also focuses on DOE's Office of Environmental Management, 
which also received Recovery Act funding. The Office of Environmental 
Management oversees cleanup efforts related to decades of nuclear 
weapons production.[Footnote 19] The Recovery Act provided DOE with $6 
billion--in addition to annual appropriations of $6 billion--for 
cleanup activities including packaging and disposing of wastes, 
decontaminating and decommissioning facilities, and removing 
contamination from soil. DOE has begun work on the majority of its 
more than 85 Recovery Act projects at 17 sites in 12 states and has 
spent nearly $1.4 billion (about 23 percent of its total Recovery Act 
funding) on these projects. We are currently conducting work to 
evaluate the implementation of these projects, including the number of 
jobs that have been created and retained, performance metrics being 
used to measure progress, DOE's oversight of the work, and any 
challenges that DOE may be facing. We expect to report on that work 
this summer. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will continue 
to monitor DOE's use of Recovery Act funds and implementation of 
programs. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other 
Members of the Committee may have at this time. 

Contact and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me or 
Mark Gaffigan, Director, at (202) 512-3841. Kim Gianopoulos (Assistant 
Director), Amanda Krause, Jonathan Kucskar, David Marroni, Alise 
Nacson, and Alison O'Neill made key contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Recovery Act: One Year Later, States' and Localities' Uses of 
Funds and Opportunities to Strengthen Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-437] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 
2010). 

[2] GAO, Recovery Act: Project Selection and Starts Are Influenced by 
Certain Federal Requirements and Other Factors, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-383] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 
2010). 

[3] DOE was initially appropriated $45.2 billion in the Recovery Act; 
however, $2 billion for the Loan Guarantee Program was transferred 
from DOE's Recovery Act appropriation. As a result, DOE's 
appropriations under the Recovery Act now total $43.2 billion. 

[4] The Davis-Bacon Act requires that contractors and subcontractors 
pay workers the locally prevailing wages on most federally funded 
construction projects, and it imposes several administrative 
requirements relating to the payment of workers on qualifying 
projects. The Recovery Act generally applies Davis-Bacon requirements 
to Recovery Act-funded projects, requiring contractors and 
subcontractors to pay all laborers and mechanics at least the 
prevailing wage rates in the local area where they are employed, as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor. In addition, contractors are 
required to pay these workers weekly and submit weekly certified 
payroll records, generally to the contracting federal agency. 

[5] The Recovery Act appropriated $5 billion for the Weatherization 
Assistance Program, which DOE is distributing to each of the states, 
the District of Columbia, and seven territories and Indian tribes. The 
program seeks to assist low-income families by making such long-term 
energy efficiency improvements to their homes as installing 
insulation; sealing leaks; and modernizing heating equipment, air 
circulation fans, and air conditioning equipment. 

[6] GAO, Recovery Act: Funds Continue to Provide Fiscal Relief to 
States and Localities, While Accountability and Reporting Challenges 
Need to Be Fully Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1016] (Washington, D.C., Sept. 23, 
2009). 

[7] DOE collects data reported by states and territories on the number 
of homes weatherized and on state and territory expenditures of funds 
on a quarterly basis. The data reported by states as of a certain date 
(such as for the quarter ending December 31, 2009) can change as 
states finalize figures for homes weatherized and funds spent. DOE 
originally planned to weatherize 593,000 homes with Recovery Act 
funding by March 31, 2012. A DOE report issued on February 24, 2010, 
indicated that 30,252 homes had been weatherized nationwide as of 
December 31, 2009, though numbers are not yet finalized. 

[8] NEPA established national environmental policies and goals to 
ensure that federal agencies properly consider environmental factors 
before deciding on a project. Under NEPA, federal agencies evaluate 
the potential environmental effects of projects they are proposing 
using an environmental assessment or, if projects may significantly 
affect the environment, a more detailed environmental impact statement. 

[9] If an agency determines that activities of a proposed project fall 
within a category of activities the agency has already determined has 
no significant environmental impact--called a categorical exclusion-- 
then the agency generally does not need to prepare an environmental 
assessment or environmental impact statement. 

[10] NHPA declares that the federal government has a responsibility to 
expand and accelerate historic preservation programs and activities in 
order to preserve the nation's historical and cultural foundations. 
The act requires that for all projects receiving federal funding or a 
federal permit, federal agencies must take into account the project's 
effect on any historic site, building, structure, or other object that 
is or can be listed on the National Historic Register. Under the act 
and its implementing regulations, the agency must consult with 
relevant federal, state, and tribal officials with regard to such a 
project. 

[11] DOE officials told us in January 2010 that they were in the 
process of developing an agreement with the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation and the National Conference of State Historic 
Preservation Officers to create a manageable framework for 
streamlining DOE's compliance with NHPA requirements. 

[12] The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants program, 
administered by DOE, provides funds through competitive and formula 
grants to units of local and state government and Indian tribes to 
develop and implement projects to improve energy efficiency and reduce 
energy use and fossil fuel emissions in their communities. The 
Recovery Act includes $3.2 billion for the program. 

[13] The Buy American Act generally requires that raw materials and 
manufactured goods acquired for public use be made or produced in the 
United States, subject to limited exceptions. Federal agencies may 
issue waivers for certain projects under specified conditions, for 
example, if using American-made goods is inconsistent with the public 
interest or the cost of those goods is unreasonable. Agencies also 
need not use American-made goods if they are not sufficiently 
available or of satisfactory quality. The Recovery Act has similar 
provisions, including one limiting the "unreasonable cost" exception 
to those instances when inclusion of American-made iron, steel, or 
other manufactured goods would increase the overall project cost by 
more than 25 percent. 

[14] GAO, Recovery Act: Status of States' and Localities' Use of Funds 
and Efforts to Ensure Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-231] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 
2009). 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-383]. 

[16] DOE Office of Inspector General, OAS-RA-10-04, Special Report: 
Progress in Implementing the Department of Energy's Weatherization 
Assistance Program Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(Feb. 19, 2010). 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-437]. 

[18] GAO, Department of Energy: New Loan Guarantee Program Should 
Complete Activities Necessary for Effective and Accountable Program 
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-750] 
(Washington, D.C., July 7, 2008). 

[19] DOE estimates that the total cost to complete this work will come 
to about $300 billion and that it will take several more decades. 

[End of section] 

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