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Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Friday, March 23, 2007: 

Defense Trade: 

National Security Reviews of Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Companies 
Could Be Improved: 

Statement of Ann M. Calvaresi-Barr, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

GAO-07-661T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-661T, a testimony before the House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and 
Infrastructure Protection 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, 
enacted in 1988, authorized the President to suspend or prohibit 
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that pose a threat to national 
security. 

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States—chaired by the 
Department of Treasury with 11 other members, including the Departments 
of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security—implements Exon-Florio 
through a four-step review process: (1) voluntary notice by the 
companies of pending or completed acquisitions; (2) a 30-day review to 
determine whether the acquisition could pose a threat to national 
security; (3) a 45-day investigation period to determine whether 
concerns require possible action by the President; and (4) a 
presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition. 

Over the past decade, GAO has conducted several reviews of the 
Committee’s process and has found areas where improvements were needed. 
GAO’s most recent work, conducted in 2005, indicated concerns remained. 

What GAO Found: 

Exon-Florio reviews are meant to serve as a safety net when other laws 
may be inadequate to protect national security. GAO found that several 
aspects of the review process may have weakened the law’s 
effectiveness. First, member disagreement about what defines a threat 
to national security may have limited the Committee’s analyses. Some 
argued that reviews should be limited to concerns about export-
controlled technologies or items, classified contracts, or specific 
derogatory intelligence concerning the company. Others argued for a 
broader scope, one that considers potential threats to U.S. critical 
infrastructure, defense supply, and technology superiority. 

Committee members also differed on the criteria that should be used to 
determine when an investigation is warranted. Some applied essentially 
the criteria in the law for a presidential decision—that is, there is 
credible evidence that the foreign controlling interest may take action 
that threatens national security and that no other laws other than the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act are adequate to protect 
national security. Others argued that these criteria are inappropriate 
because the purpose of an investigation is to determine if credible 
evidence of a threat exists. 

While most cases can be completed within the 30-day review period, 
complex acquisitions may require more time. Concerned that an 
investigation could discourage foreign investment, the Committee 
allowed companies to withdraw notifications rather than proceed to 
investigation. While this practice can provide additional review time 
without chilling foreign investment, it may also heighten the risk to 
national security in transactions where there are concerns and the 
acquisition has been completed or is likely to be completed during the 
withdrawal period. Finally, because few cases are investigated, few 
require a presidential decision, giving Congress little insight into 
the Committee’s process. 

Figure: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States' 
Review Process: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO analysis based on 50 U.S.C app. 2170 and 31 C.F.R. Part 800 
and case file reviews. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

In 2005, GAO offered several matters for Congressional consideration 
aimed at improving the Committee’s process. The Committee has taken 
some actions to reform the process, but GAO has not examined these 
actions. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-661T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Ann Calvaresi-Barr (202) 
512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to take part in this hearing on issues 
related to foreign ownership of U.S. assets and potential effects on 
national security. As you know, U.S. export control laws, national 
disclosure policy, the National Industrial Security Program, and other 
processes and programs have been established to protect defense 
technologies and other critical assets from falling into the wrong 
hands, and for other reasons. Similarly, the Exon-Florio amendment to 
the Defense Production Act of 1950,[Footnote 1] enacted in 1988, 
authorized the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions, 
mergers, or takeovers[Footnote 2] of U.S. companies that pose a threat 
to national security. Exon-Florio is meant to serve as a safety net 
when laws other than the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act[Footnote 3] may be ineffective in protecting national security. 

Exon-Florio is administered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States, currently made up of 12 members: the Department of 
the Treasury, which serves as Chair; the Departments of Commerce, 
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and six offices in the 
Executive Office of the President. On the surface, the Exon-Florio 
review process is fairly straightforward. According to regulations, 
after a company voluntarily files a notice of a pending or completed 
acquisition by a foreign concern, the Committee conducts a 30-day 
review to determine whether there are any national security concerns. 
If the Committee is unable to complete its review within 30 days, the 
Committee may either allow the companies to withdraw the notification 
and refile or initiate a 45-day investigation. If a case undergoes an 
investigation, the Committee submits a report to the President, 
including a recommendation for action. Cases that result in a 
presidential decision are reported to the Congress. 

As requested, my comments today will summarize our reports on 
weaknesses in the Exon-Florio process that GAO has identified over the 
past decade. Before I begin, however, it is important to provide some 
context to Exon-Florio. Specifically, implementing Exon-Florio can pose 
a significant challenge for the federal government because of the 
potential for conflict with U.S. open investment policy--a policy that, 
in recognizing the economic benefits associated with foreign 
investments, calls for foreign investors to be treated no differently 
than domestic investors. This challenge has increased significantly 
since September 2001, when threats facing the nation were fundamentally 
redefined to include threats against the homeland, including those to 
our critical infrastructure. At the same time, the economy has become 
increasingly globalized, as countries open their markets and 
communicate regularly through the Internet. Government programs 
established decades ago are often ill-equipped to grapple with these 
emerging complexities. GAO, therefore, designated the effective 
identification and protection of critical technologies as a 
governmentwide high-risk area, which warrants a strategic reexamination 
to identify needed changes.[Footnote 4] In terms of Exon-Florio, 
legislation has been introduced to reform the Exon-Florio process. 

Our understanding of the Committee's process is based on our 2005 work 
but built on our review of the process and our discussions with agency 
officials for our 2002 report. For our 2005 review, and to expand our 
understanding of the Committee's process for reviewing foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. companies, we met with officials from the 
Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the 
Treasury--the agencies that are most active in the review of 
acquisitions--and discussed their involvement in the process. Further, 
we conducted case studies of nine acquisitions that were filed with the 
Committee between June 28, 1995, and December 31, 2004. We conducted 
our review from April 2004 through July 2005 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

To summarize our work in this area, we have found that several aspects 
of the Committee's process for implementing Exon-Florio may have 
weakened the law's effectiveness. First, we found a lack of agreement 
among Committee members about the scope of Exon-Florio--specifically, 
what defines a threat to national security. Neither the statute nor the 
implementing regulation defines "national security." However, the 
statute provides factors that may be considered in determining threats 
to national security. Despite these factors, some Committee members 
argued to apply a more traditional definition--one limited to concerns 
about export-controlled technologies or items, classified contracts, 
and the existence of specific derogatory intelligence on a foreign 
company. Other Committee members have argued that a broader view is 
warranted, and in analyzing the effects of an acquisition, considered 
the potential vulnerabilities that an acquisition can create with 
regard to U.S. critical infrastructure, defense supply, and defense 
technology superiority. These disagreements may have limited the 
Committee's analyses of proposed or completed acquisitions. 

Second, Committee members also had differing opinions on the criteria 
that should be used to determine whether an investigation was 
warranted. The criteria used by Treasury as the Committee Chair and 
others were essentially the same criteria established in the current 
law for the President to suspend or prohibit a transaction, or order 
divestiture--that is, there is credible evidence that the foreign 
controlling interest may take action that threatens national security 
and that no laws other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act are adequate to protect national security. Some 
Committee members have argued that applying these criteria is 
inappropriate because the purpose of an investigation is to determine 
whether or not credible evidence of a threat exists. 

Third, while most acquisitions are not problematic and the Committee's 
review can be completed within the 30-day period allowed by Exon- 
Florio, some more complex acquisitions required more analysis or 
consideration than the 30-day review period could accommodate. However, 
the Committee has been reluctant to use the additional 45 days allowed 
by the legislation because it would require initiating an 
investigation. The Committee's concern was that the negative 
perceptions surrounding an investigation could discourage foreign 
investment in the United States, thereby conflicting with U.S. open 
investment policy. To avoid investigations, the Committee has in the 
past encouraged companies to withdraw their notifications of proposed 
or completed acquisitions and refile them at a later date. Between 1997 
and 2004, companies involved in 18 acquisitions were allowed to 
withdraw their notification and refile at a later time. The new filing 
is considered a new case and restarts the 30-day clock. While 
withdrawing and refiling provides additional time for Committee members 
to review a foreign acquisition while minimizing the risk of chilling 
foreign investment, it may also heighten the risk to national security 
in transactions where there are concerns and the acquisition has been 
completed or is likely to be completed during the withdrawal period. 
This was the situation in 4 of the 18 acquisitions cited above. One 
company did not refile for 9 months, another did not refile for 1 year, 
and 2 had yet to refile at the time of our review.[Footnote 5] 

Finally, because very few cases required a presidential decision--the 
criterion for reporting to the Congress on specific cases--the Congress 
had little insight into the Committee's process. Further, a 1992 
amendment to the legislation requires a report to the Congress every 4 
years on certain trends in foreign acquisitions. However, at the time 
of our work only one report had been submitted, in 1994. I understand 
that another report, in response to that requirement, has been issued. 

Since our 2005 report, the Committee has taken some actions to reform 
the process, such as increasing communication to interested 
congressional committees. However, we have not examined how these 
changes are working. It should be noted that because the law provides 
for confidentiality of information filed under Exon-Florio, our ability 
to discuss details of cases we examined is limited. 

Background: 

Enacted in 1988, the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production 
Act authorized the President to investigate the effects of foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. companies on national security and to suspend or 
prohibit acquisitions that might threaten national security. The 
President delegated investigative authority to the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, an interagency group responsible for 
monitoring and coordinating U.S. policy on foreign investment in the 
United States.[Footnote 6] Since the Committee's establishment in 1975, 
membership has doubled, with the Department of Homeland Security being 
the most recently added member. In addition to the Committee's 12 
standing members, other agencies may be called on when their particular 
expertise is needed. 

In 1991, the Treasury Department, as Chair of the Committee, issued 
regulations to implement Exon-Florio. The law and regulations establish 
a four-step process for reviewing foreign acquisitions of U.S. 
companies: (1) voluntary notice by the companies;[Footnote 7] (2) a 30- 
day review to identify whether there are any national security 
concerns; (3) a 45-day investigation period to determine whether those 
concerns require a recommendation to the President for possible action; 
and (4) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the 
acquisition (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Process Used by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States to Implement the Exon-Florio Amendment: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis based on 50 U.S.C. app. 2170 and 31 C.F.R. Part 
800 and case file reviews. 

[A] At any point prior to a presidential decision, companies can 
request to withdraw a notification. 

[End of figure] 

In most cases, the Committee completes its review within the initial 30 
days because there are no national security concerns or concerns have 
been addressed, or the companies and the government agree on measures 
to mitigate identified security concerns. In cases where the Committee 
is unable to complete its review within 30 days, it may initiate a 45-
day investigation or allow companies to withdraw their notifications. 
The Committee generally grants requests to withdraw. When the Committee 
concludes a 45-day investigation, it is required to submit a report 
with recommendations to the President. If Committee members cannot 
agree on a recommendation, the regulations require that the report to 
the President include the differing views of all Committee 
members.[Footnote 8] The President has 15 days after the investigation 
is completed to decide whether to prohibit or suspend the proposed 
acquisition, order divestiture of a completed acquisition, or take no 
action.[Footnote 9] Table 1 provides a breakdown of notifications and 
committee actions taken from 1997 through 2004 (the latest date for 
which data were available at the time of our 2005 review). 

Table 1: Notifications to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States and Actions Taken, 1997 through 2004: 

Year: 1997; 
Notifications: 62; 
Acquisitions[A]: 60; 
Investigations[B]: 0; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 0; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: 1998; 
Notifications: 65; 
Acquisitions[A]: 62; 
Investigations[B]: 2; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 2; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: 1999; 
Notifications: 79; 
Acquisitions[A]: 76; 
Investigations[B]: 0; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 0; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: 2000; 
Notifications: 72; 
Acquisitions[A]: 71; 
Investigations[B]: 1; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 0; 
Presidential decisions: 1. 

Year: 2001; 
Notifications: 55; 
Acquisitions[A]: 51; 
Investigations[B]: 1; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 1; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: 2002; 
Notifications: 43; 
Acquisitions[A]: 42; 
Investigations[B]: 0; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 0; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: 2003; 
Notifications: 41; 
Acquisitions[A]: 39; 
Investigations[B]: 2; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 1; 
Presidential decisions: 1. 

Year: 2004; 
Notifications: 53; 
Acquisitions[A]: 50; 
Investigations[B]: 2; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 2; 
Presidential decisions: 0. 

Year: Total; 
Notifications: 470; 
Acquisitions[A]: 451; 
Investigations[B]: 8; 
Notices withdrawn after investigation begun: 6; 
Presidential decisions: 2[C]. 

Source: Department of the Treasury. 

[A] Acquisitions that were withdrawn and refiled are shown in the year 
of initial notification. 

[B] Investigations are shown in the year of their notification. 

[C] In both cases the President took no action, thereby allowing the 
transaction, and sent a report to Congress. 

[End of table] 

Over the past decade, GAO has conducted several reviews of the 
Committee's process and actions and has found areas where improvements 
were needed. In 2000, we found that gaps in the notification process 
raised concerns about the Committee's ability to ensure transactions 
are notified.[Footnote 10] Our 2002 review, prompted by a lack of 
congressional insight into the process, again found weaknesses in the 
process. Specifically, we reported that member agencies could improve 
the agreements they negotiated with companies under Exon-Florio to 
mitigate national security concerns. We also questioned the use of 
withdrawals to provide additional time for reviews.[Footnote 11] While 
our most recent work indicated that member agencies had begun to take 
action to respond to some of our recommendations, concerns remained 
about the extent to which the Committee's implementation of Exon-Florio 
had provided the safety net envisioned by the law.[Footnote 12] 

Views Differed over What Constitutes a National Security Threat and 
When an Investigation Is Warranted: 

In 2005, we reported that a lack of agreement among Committee members 
on what defines a threat to national security and what criteria should 
be used to initiate an investigation may have limited the Committee's 
analyses of proposed and completed foreign acquisitions. From 1997 
through 2004, the Committee received a total of 470 notices of proposed 
or completed acquisitions,[Footnote 13] yet it initiated only 8 
investigations. 

While neither the statute nor the implementing regulation defines 
"national security," the statute provides a number of factors that may 
be considered in determining a threat to national security (see fig. 
2). 

Figure 2: Exon-Florio Factors That May Be Considered When Determining a 
Threat to National Security: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: 50 U.S.C. app 2170(f). 

[End of figure] 

Some Committee member agencies argued for a more traditional and narrow 
definition of what constitutes a threat to national security--that is, 
(1) the U.S. company possesses export-controlled technologies or items; 
(2) the company has classified contracts and critical technologies; or 
(3) there is specific derogatory intelligence on the foreign company. 
Other members, including the Departments of Defense and Justice, argued 
that acquisitions should be analyzed in broader terms. According to 
officials from these departments, vulnerabilities could result from 
foreign control of critical infrastructure, such as control of or 
access to information traveling on networks. Vulnerabilities can also 
result from foreign control of critical inputs to defense systems, such 
as weapons system software development[Footnote 14] or a decrease in 
the number of innovative small businesses researching and developing 
new defense-related technologies. 

While these vulnerabilities may not pose an immediate threat to 
national security, they may create the potential for longer term harm 
to U.S. national security interests by reducing U.S. technological 
leadership in defense systems. For example, in reviewing a 2001 
acquisition of a U.S. company, the Departments of Defense and Commerce 
raised several concerns about foreign ownership of sensitive but 
unclassified technology, including the possibility of this sensitive 
technology being transferred to countries of concern or losing U.S. 
government access to the technology. However, Treasury argued that 
these concerns were not national security concerns because they did not 
involve classified contracts, the foreign company's country of origin 
was a U.S. ally, or there was no specific negative intelligence about 
the company's actions in the United States. 

In one proposed acquisition, disagreement over the definition of 
national security resulted in an enforcement provision being removed 
from a mitigation agreement between the foreign company and the 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Defense had raised 
concerns about the security of its supply of specialized integrated 
circuits, which are used in a variety of defense technologies that the 
Defense Science Board had identified as essential to our national 
defense--technologies found in unmanned aerial vehicles, the Joint 
Tactical Radio System, and cryptography and other communications 
protection devices. However, Treasury and other Committee members 
argued that the security of supply issue was an industrial policy 
concern and, therefore, was outside the scope of Exon-Florio's 
authority. As a result of removing the provision, the President's 
authority to require divestiture under Exon-Florio was eliminated as a 
remedy in the event of non-compliance.[Footnote 15] 

Committee members also disagreed on the criteria that should be applied 
to determine whether a proposed or completed acquisition should be 
investigated. While Exon-Florio provides that the "President or the 
President's designee may make an investigation to determine the effects 
on national security" of acquisitions that could result in foreign 
control of a U.S. company, it does not provide specific guidance for 
the appropriate criteria for initiating an investigation of an 
acquisition.[Footnote 16] At the time of our work, Treasury, as 
Committee Chair, applied essentially the same criteria established in 
the law for the President to suspend or prohibit a transaction, or 
order divestiture: (1) there is credible evidence that the foreign 
controlling interest may take action to threaten national security and 
(2) no laws other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act are adequate and appropriate to protect national 
security.[Footnote 17] However, the Defense, Justice, and Homeland 
Security Departments argued that applying these criteria at this point 
in the process is inappropriate because the purpose of an investigation 
is to determine whether or not credible evidence of a threat exists. 
Notes from a policy-level discussion of one particular case further 
corroborated these differing views. 

Committee Allowed Withdrawal of Notifications to Avoid Investigations: 

Committee guidelines required member agencies to inform the Committee 
of national security concerns by the 23rd day of a 30-day review-- 
further compressing the limited time allowed by legislation to 
determine whether a proposed or completed foreign acquisition posed a 
threat to national security. According to one Treasury official, the 
information is needed a week early to meet the legislated 30-day 
requirement. While most reviews are completed in the required 30 days, 
some Committee members have found that completing a review within such 
short time frames can be difficult--particularly in complex cases. One 
Defense official said that without advance notice of the acquisition, 
time frames are too short to complete analyses and provide input for 
the Defense Department's position. Another official said that to meet 
the 23-day deadline, analysts have only 3 to 10 days to analyze the 
acquisition. In one instance, Homeland Security was unable to provide 
input within the 23-day time frame. 

If a review cannot be completed within 30 days and more time is needed 
to determine whether a problem exists or identify actions that would 
mitigate concerns, the Committee can initiate a 45-day investigation of 
the acquisition or allow companies to withdraw their notifications and 
refile at a later date.[Footnote 18] According to Treasury officials, 
the Committee's interest is to ensure that the implementation of Exon- 
Florio does not undermine U.S. open investment policy. Concerned that 
public knowledge of investigations could devalue companies' stock, 
erode confidence of foreign investors, and ultimately chill foreign 
investment in the United States, the Committee has generally allowed 
and often encouraged companies to withdraw their notifications rather 
than initiate an investigation. 

While an acquisition is pending, companies that have withdrawn their 
notification have an incentive to resolve any outstanding issues and 
refile as soon as possible. However, if an acquisition has been 
concluded, there is less incentive to resolve issues and refile, 
extending the time during which any concerns remain unresolved. Between 
1997 and 2004, companies involved in 18 acquisitions withdrew their 
notification and refiled 19 times. In four cases, the companies had 
already concluded the acquisition before filing a notification. One did 
not refile until 9 months later and another did not refile for 1 year. 
Consequently, concerns raised by Defense and Commerce about potential 
export control issues in these two cases remained unresolved for as 
much as a year--further increasing the risk that a foreign acquisition 
of a U.S. company would pose a threat to national security. 

For the other two cases, neither company had refiled at the time we 
completed our work. In one case, the company had previously withdrawn 
and refiled more than a year after completing the acquisition. The 
Committee allowed it to withdraw the notification to provide more time 
to answer the Committee's questions and provide assurances concerning 
export control matters. The company refiled, and was permitted to 
withdraw a second time because there were still unresolved issues. When 
we issued our report in 2005, 4 years had passed since the second 
withdrawal without a refiling. In the second case, the company--which 
filed with the Committee more than 6 months after completing its 
acquisition--was also allowed to withdraw its notification. At the time 
we issued our report, 2 years had passed without a refiling. 

Lack of Reporting Contributed to the Opaqueness of the Committee's 
Process and Diminished Oversight: 

In response to concerns about the lack of transparency in the 
Committee's process, the Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to Exon- 
Florio in 1992, requiring a report to the Congress if the President 
made any decision regarding a proposed foreign acquisition. In 1992, 
another amendment also directed the President to report every 4 years 
on whether there was credible evidence of a coordinated strategy by one 
or more countries to acquire U.S. companies involved in research, 
development, or production of critical technologies for which the 
United States is a leading producer, and whether there were industrial 
espionage activities directed or assisted by foreign governments 
against private U.S. companies aimed at obtaining commercial secrets 
related to critical technologies. 

While the Byrd Amendment expanded required reporting on Committee 
actions, few reports have been submitted to the Congress because 
withdrawing and refiling notices to restart the clock has limited the 
number of cases that result in a presidential decision. Between 1997 
and 2004, only two cases--both involving telecommunications systems-- 
resulted in a presidential decision and a subsequent report to the 
Congress. Infrequent reporting of Committee deliberations on specific 
cases provides little insight into the Committee's process to identify 
concerns raised during investigations and determine the extent to which 
the Committee has reached consensus on a case. Further, despite the 
1992 requirement for a report on foreign acquisition strategies every 4 
years, at the time of our work there had been only one report--in 1994. 
However, another report, in response to this requirement, was recently 
delivered to the Congress. 

In conclusion, the effectiveness of Exon-Florio as a safety net depends 
on how the broad scope of its authority is implemented in today's 
globalized world--where identifying threats to national security has 
become increasingly complex. While Exon-Florio provides the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States the latitude to define what 
constitutes a threat to national security, the more traditional 
interpretation fails to fully consider factors currently embodied in 
the law. Further, the Committee guidance requiring reviews to be 
completed within 23 days to meet the 30-day legislative requirement, 
along with the reluctance to proceed to an investigation, limits 
agencies' ability to complete in-depth analyses. However, the 
alternative--allowing companies to withdraw and refile their 
notifications--increases the risk that the Committee, and the Congress, 
could lose visibility over foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies. The 
criterion for reporting specific cases to the Congress only after a 
presidential decision contributes to the opaque nature of the 
Committee's process. 

Our 2005 report laid out several matters for congressional 
consideration to (1) help resolve the differing views as to the extent 
of coverage of Exon-Florio, (2) address the need for additional time, 
and (3) increase insight and oversight of the process. Further, we 
suggested that, when withdrawal is allowed for a transaction that has 
been completed, the Committee establish interim protections where 
specific concerns have been raised, specific time frames for refiling, 
and a process for tracking any actions being taken during a withdrawal 
period. We have been told that some of these steps are now being taken. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy 
to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may 
have. 

For information about this testimony, please contact Ann M. Calvaresi- 
Barr, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, at (202) 512-4841 
or calvaresibarra@gao.gov. Other individuals making key contributions 
to this product include Thomas J. Denomme, Gregory K. Harmon, Paula J. 
Haurilesko, John J. Marzullo, Russell Reiter, Karen Sloan, and Marie 
Ahearn. 

Scope and Methodology: 

Our understanding of the Committee's process is based on our 2005 work 
but built on our review of the process and our discussions with agency 
officials for our 2002 report. For our 2005 review, and to expand our 
understanding of the Committee's process for reviewing foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. companies, we met with officials from the 
Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the 
Treasury--the agencies that are most active in the review of 
acquisitions--and discussed their involvement in the process. Further, 
we conducted case studies of nine acquisitions that were filed with the 
Committee between June 28, 1995, and December 31, 2004. We selected 
acquisitions based on recommendations by Committee member agencies and 
the following criteria: (1) the Committee permitted the companies to 
withdraw the notification; (2) the Committee or member agencies 
concluded agreements to mitigate national security concerns; (3) the 
foreign company had been involved in a prior acquisition notified to 
the Committee; or (4) GAO had reviewed the acquisition for its 2002 
report. We did not attempt to validate the conclusions reached by the 
Committee on any of the cases we reviewed. To determine whether the 
weaknesses in provisions to assist agencies in monitoring agreements 
that GAO had identified in its 2002 report had been addressed, we 
analyzed agreements concluded under the Committee's authority between 
2003 and 2005. We conducted our review from April 2004 through July 
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. 

[2] In the remainder of this statement, acquisitions, mergers, and 
takeovers are referred to as acquisitions. 

[3] The International Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the President 
broad powers to deal with any "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States (50 
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706). To exercise this authority, however, the 
President must declare a national emergency to deal with any such 
threat. Under this legislation, the President has the authority to 
investigate, regulate, and, if necessary, block any foreign interest's 
acquisition of U.S. companies (50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)). 

[4] High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington D.C.: Jan. 
2007). 

[5] Given the immediacy of this hearing, we were unable to gather and 
verify data on the disposition of these cases. However, even if the 
companies refiled subsequent to our 2005 reporting, the refilings were 
not timely. 

[6] Executive Order 11858 (May 7, 1975), as amended by Executive Order 
12188 (Jan. 2, 1980), Executive Order 12661 (Dec. 27, 1988), Executive 
Order 12860 (Sept. 3, 1993), and Executive Order 13286 (Feb. 28, 2003). 

[7] Notification is not mandatory. However, any member agency is 
authorized to submit a notification of an acquisition if the companies 
have not done so. As of our 2005 report, no agency has submitted a 
notification of an acquisition. Instead, member agencies have informed 
Treasury of acquisitions that may be subject to Exon-Florio, and 
Treasury has contacted the company to encourage them to officially 
notify the Committee of the acquisition to begin a review. 

[8] 31 C.F.R. § 800.504(b). 

[9] In 1990, the President ordered a Chinese aerospace company to 
divest its ownership of a U.S. aircraft parts manufacturer. To date, 
this is the only divestiture the President has ordered. 

[10] Defense Trade: Identifying Foreign Acquisitions Affecting National 
Security Can Be Improved, GAO/NSIAD-00-144 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2000). 

[11] Defense Trade: Mitigating National Security Concerns under Exon- 
Florio Could Be Improved, GAO-02-736 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 
2002). 

[12] Defense Trade: Enhancements to the Implementation of Exon-Florio 
Could Strengthen the Law's Effectiveness, GAO-05-686 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 28, 2005). 

[13] Nineteen of these notices were refilings. 

[14] Defense Acquisitions: Knowledge of Software Suppliers Needed to 
Manage Risks, GAO-04-678 (Washington D.C.: May 25, 2004). 

[15] The regulations provide that the Committee may reopen its review 
or investigation and revise its recommendation to the President if it 
determines that the companies omitted or provided false or misleading 
material information to the Committee (31 C.F.R. § 800.601(e)). 

[16] 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a). Under the statute, investigations are 
mandatory in those cases in which the acquiring company is "controlled 
by or acting on behalf of a foreign government" and the acquisition 
could result in control of the U.S. company and could affect the 
national security of the United States (50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)). 

[17] 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e). 

[18] Exon-Florio's implementing regulations permit companies to request 
to withdraw notifications at any time up to a presidential decision. 
After the Committee approves a withdrawal, any subsequent refiling is 
considered a new, voluntary notice. 

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