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Statement before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST: 
Wednesday, December 2, 2009: 

Homeland Security: 

DHS's Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Maritime, Aviation, and 

Statement for the Record:
Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director:
Homeland Security and Justice: 


GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-106, Statement Before the Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Securing the nation’s transportation and information systems is a 
primary responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Within DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
responsible for securing all transportation modes; U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for cargo container security; 
the U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for protecting the maritime 
environment; and the National Protection and Programs Directorate is 
responsible for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. This 
statement focuses on the progress and challenges DHS faces in key areas 
of maritime, aviation, and cybersecurity. It is based on GAO products 
issued from June 2004 through November 2009, as well as ongoing work on 
air cargo security. GAO reviewed relevant documents; interviewed 
cognizant agency officials; and observed operations at 12 airports, 
chosen by size and other factors. The results are not generalizable to 
all airports. 

What GAO Found: 

DHS has made progress in enhancing security in the maritime sector, but 
key challenges remain. For example, as part of a statutory requirement 
to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo by July 2012, CBP has 
implemented the Secure Freight Initiative at select foreign ports. 
However, CBP does not have a plan for fully implementing the 100 
percent scanning requirement by July 2012 because it questions the 
feasibility, although it has not performed a feasibility analysis of 
the requirement. Rather, CBP has planned two new initiatives to further 
strengthen the security of container cargo, but these initiatives will 
not achieve 100 percent scanning. Further, TSA, the Coast Guard, and 
the maritime industry took a number of steps to enroll over 93 percent 
of the estimated 1.2 million users in the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) program (designed to help control 
access to maritime vessels and facilities) by the April 15, 2009 
compliance deadline, but they experienced challenges resulting in 
delays and in ensuring the successful execution of the TWIC pilot. 
While DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to 
reduce the risks posed by small vessels, they face ongoing resource and 
technology challenges in tracking small vessels and preventing attacks 
by such vessels. 

In the aviation sector, TSA has made progress in meeting the statutory 
mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger 
aircraft by August 2010 and in taking steps to strengthen airport 
security, but TSA continues to face challenges. TSA’s efforts include 
developing a system to allow screening responsibilities to be shared 
across the domestic air cargo supply chain, among other steps. Despite 
these efforts, TSA and the industry face a number of challenges 
including the voluntary nature of the program, and ensuring that 
approved technologies are effective with air cargo. TSA also does not 
expect to meet the mandated 100 percent screening deadline as it 
applies to air cargo transported into the U.S., in part due to existing 
screening exemptions for this type of cargo and challenges in 
harmonizing security standards with other nations. GAO is reviewing 
these issues as part of its ongoing work and will issue a final report 
next year. In addition, TSA has taken a variety of actions to 
strengthen airport security by, among other things, implementing a 
worker screening program; however, TSA still faces challenges in this 

DHS has made progress in strengthening cybersecurity, such as 
addressing some lessons learned from a cyber attack exercise, but 
further actions are warranted. Since 2005, GAO has reported that DHS 
has not fully satisfied its key responsibilities for protecting the 
nation’s computer-reliant critical infrastructures and has made related 
recommendations to DHS, such as bolstering cyber analysis and warning 
capabilities and strengthening its capabilities to recover from 
Internet disruptions. DHS has since developed and implemented certain 
capabilities to satisfy aspects of its responsibilities, but it has not 
fully implemented GAO’s recommendations and, thus, more action is 
needed to address the risk to critical cybersecurity infrastructure. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making recommendations in this statement; however, GAO has 
made prior recommendations to DHS to, among other things, analyze the 
feasibility of scanning U.S.-bound cargo containers and more fully 
protect computer-reliant critical infrastructures. DHS generally agreed 
with these recommendations. DHS provided technical comments on this 
statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. 

View [hyperlink,] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-
8777 or 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to submit this statement on the progress that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made and the challenges it 
faces in key areas of maritime and aviation security, as well as in 
securing the nation against computer-based, or cyber attacks. The 
economic well being of the United States is dependent on the 
expeditious flow of people and goods through the U.S. transportation 
system, which moves millions of passengers and tons of freight each 
day. The extensiveness of the transportation system, as well as the 
sheer volume of passengers and freight moved, makes it both an 
attractive target and challenging to secure. Ports, waterways, and 
vessels are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion 
in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a 
widespread impact on global shipping, international trade, and the 
global economy. Likewise, successful terrorist attacks and plots 
against the commercial aviation system in the past 8 years highlight 
the threats and vulnerabilities this system faces. Balancing security 
concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and 
commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private 
sectors alike. Likewise, pervasive and sustained cyber attacks against 
the United States and others continue to pose a potentially devastating 
impact to systems and operations and the critical infrastructures that 
they support. 

Within DHS, numerous component agencies have responsibility for 
securing areas of transportation security and computer-reliant critical 
infrastructures, such as communications and electricity. The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal agency with 
primary responsibility for securing all modes of transportation and has 
developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to 
secure commercial aviation and surface modes of transportation. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has a priority mission of keeping 
terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S., is responsible for 
securing and facilitating trade, and has primary responsibility for 
cargo container security. The Coast Guard has responsibility for 
protecting the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and security 
interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at 
risk, including America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways. The 
National Protection and Programs Directorate is responsible for, among 
other things, assuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the 
nation's computer-reliant critical infrastructures--a practice known as 
cyber critical infrastructure protection, or cyber CIP. 

A number of laws have been enacted in recent years to strengthen 
maritime and aviation security, as well as cybersecurity. In response 
to provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 
TSA established the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
(TWIC) program in December 2001.[Footnote 1] The Security and 
Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 directed the Secretary 
of Homeland Security to, among other things, implement the TWIC pilot 
project in the maritime sector.[Footnote 2] To increase the security of 
container cargo bound for the United States, the SAFE Port Act further 
required CBP to establish a pilot program to test the feasibility of 
scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers at foreign ports. 
[Footnote 3] Further, in August 2007 the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) was enacted and provides, among 
other things, that by July 2012, a container loaded on a vessel in a 
foreign port shall not enter the United States unless that container is 
scanned before it is loaded onto the vessel.[Footnote 4] The Act 
further requires that by August 2010, 100 percent of cargo--domestic 
and inbound--transported on passenger aircraft be physically screened. 
[Footnote 5] To address the threats posed by cyber attacks, President 
Bush issued a 2003 national strategy and related policy directives 
aimed at improving cybersecurity nationwide, including both government 
systems and those that support cyber critical infrastructures[Footnote 
6] owned and operated by the private sector.[Footnote 7] 

My statement today focuses on the progress that DHS and its component 
agencies have made to strengthen maritime, aviation, and cybersecurity, 
and the challenges that remain. In particular, my statement addresses 
(1) cargo container scanning, (2) efforts to enroll maritime workers in 
the TWIC program, (3) small vessel security,[Footnote 8] (4) air cargo 
screening, (5) airport perimeter and access control security, and (6) 
cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. 

My comments are based on related GAO reports and testimonies issued 
from June 2004 through November 2009,[Footnote 9] as well as ongoing 
work that will be completed in early 2010 assessing the progress that 
DHS and its component agencies have made in addressing challenges 
related to air cargo screening. To conduct this work, we reviewed 
relevant documents related to the programs reviewed; interviewed 
cognizant DHS, TSA, Coast Guard, and CBP officials; and observed 
operations at a non-probability sample of 19 seaports--13 domestic and 
6 foreign--and 12 airports, chosen by size, program participation, and 
other factors. Although the results of our site visits are not 
generalizable to all seaports, airports, or officials, we gained a 
critical understanding of the progress and challenges associated with 
implementing efforts to secure the transportation system and improve 
cyber CIP. We have conducted our ongoing work--covering the period 
October 2008 to date--as well as the prior audit work that serves as 
the basis for this statement, in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

In summary, DHS has made progress in enhancing security in the maritime 
sector, but key challenges remain. Among other things, CBP has begun 
working with foreign ports to scan U.S.-bound container cargo; TSA, 
Coast Guard, and the maritime industry enrolled over 93 percent of the 
estimated 1.2 million users in the TWIC program by the April 15, 2009 
compliance deadline; and DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a 
strategy and programs to reduce the risks associated with small 
vessels. However, DHS and its component agencies face a number of 
management, technological, and resource challenges associated with 
these efforts. In our previous work, we made recommendations to help 
address these challenges. Specifically, in our October 2009 report on 
scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers, we made recommendations to DHS 
and CBP to complete a feasibility analysis, cost estimates, and a cost- 
benefit analysis and provide the results to Congress to help strengthen 
container security. In our November 2009 report on TWIC, we made 
recommendations to TSA to, among other things, expedite the development 
of contingency and disaster recovery plans and system(s), and 
recommended to TSA and the Coast Guard that they develop a detailed 
evaluation plan to help ensure that needed information on biometrics 
readers will result from the pilot. DHS generally concurred and 
discussed actions to implement recommendations from both of these 
reports, but we believe that these actions will not fully address the 
intent of all of the recommendations. In the aviation sector, TSA has 
made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate of the 9/11 
Act--including developing a program to share screening responsibilities 
across the supply chain, but the agency continues to face challenges 
related to planning and technology, among other things. In our 
September 2009 report on airport security, we made recommendations to 
TSA to, among other things, develop a national strategy to guide 
stakeholder efforts to strengthen airport perimeter and access control 
security, to which DHS concurred. Finally, regarding cyber CIP issues, 
DHS has developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy 
aspects of its cybersecurity responsibilities, such as addressing 
certain lessons learned from cyber attack exercises, but it has not 
fully satisfied our recommendations to, among other things, bolster 
cyber analysis and warning capabilities and strengthen its capabilities 
to recover from Internet disruptions. As a result, DHS needs to take 
further action to address these areas. 


Secure Freight Initiative (SFI): 

In December 2006, in response to SAFE Port Act requirements, DHS, and 
the Department of Energy (DOE) jointly announced the formation of the 
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program to test the feasibility 
of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo at three foreign 
ports (Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Qasim, Pakistan; and Southampton, 
United Kingdom). According to CBP officials, while initiating the SFI 
program at these ports satisfied the SAFE Port Act requirement, CBP 
also selected the ports of Busan, South Korea; Hong Kong; Salalah, 
Oman; and Singapore to more fully demonstrate the capability of the 
integrated scanning system at larger, more complex ports. As of October 
2009, SFI has been operational at five of these initial seven seaports. 
According to CBP and DOE officials, the SFI program builds upon 
existing container security measures by enhancing the U.S. government's 
ability to have containers scanned for nuclear and radiological 
material overseas and, thus, better assess the risk of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in inbound cargo containers. 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC): 

Managed by TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, the TWIC program aims to 
protect the nation's maritime transportation facilities and vessels by 
requiring maritime workers to complete background checks and obtain a 
biometric identification card in order to gain unescorted access to the 
secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels.[Footnote 10] A 
federal regulation in January 2007 set a compliance deadline, 
subsequently extended to April 15, 2009, whereby each maritime worker 
was required to hold a TWIC in order to obtain unescorted access to 
secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels.[Footnote 11] In 
addition, TSA has initiated a pilot to test the use of TWIC with 
related access control technologies. 

Small Vessel Security: 

Concerns have grown about the security risks of small vessels and DHS 
has identified the four gravest risk scenarios involving the use of 
such vessels for terrorist attacks. Some of these risks have been shown 
to be real through attacks conducted outside U.S. waters, but to date, 
no small boat attacks have happened in the United States. These four 
scenarios include the use of a small vessel as (1) a waterborne 
improvised explosive device, (2) a means of smuggling weapons into the 
United States, (3) a means of smuggling humans into the United States, 
and (4) a platform for conducting a stand-off attack. 

Air Cargo Security: 

Air cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons, and can be 
shipped in various forms, including unit load devices (ULD) that allow 
many packages to be consolidated into one container or pallet, wooden 
crates, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as loose or bulk 
cargo. Participants in the air cargo shipping process include shippers, 
such as manufacturers; freight forwarders, who consolidate cargo from 
shippers and take it to air carriers for transport; air cargo handling 
agents, who process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air 
carriers; and air carriers that load and transport cargo.[Footnote 12] 
TSA's responsibilities include, among other things, establishing 
security requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air 
carriers that transport cargo, and domestic freight forwarders. 

Perimeter and Access Control Security: 

Airport perimeter and access control security is intended to prevent 
unauthorized access into secured airport areas, either from outside the 
airport complex or from within. Airport operators generally have direct 
day-to-day responsibility for maintaining and improving perimeter and 
access control security, as well as implementing measures to reduce 
worker risk. However, TSA has primary responsibility for establishing 
and implementing measures to improve security operations at U.S. 
commercial airports--that is, TSA-regulated airports--including 
overseeing airport operator efforts to maintain perimeter and access 
control security.[Footnote 13] Airport workers may access sterile 
areas--areas of airports where passengers wait after screening to board 
departing aircraft--through TSA security checkpoints or through other 
access points that are secured by the airport operator. The airport 
operator is also responsible, in accordance with its security program, 
for securing access to secured airport areas where passengers are not 
permitted. Airport methods used to control access vary, but all access 
controls must meet minimum performance standards in accordance with TSA 


The federal government has developed a strategy to address cyber 
threats. Specifically, President Bush issued the 2003 National Strategy 
to Secure Cyberspace and related policy directives, such as Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7, that specify key elements of how the 
nation is to secure key computer-based systems, including both 
government systems and those that support critical infrastructures 
owned and operated by the private sector. The strategy and related 
policies also establish DHS as the focal point for cyber critical 
infrastructure protection and assigns DHS multiple leadership roles and 
responsibilities in this area, to include (1) developing a 
comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure protection, 
including cybersecurity; (2) developing and enhancing national cyber 
analysis and warning capabilities; (3) providing and coordinating 
incident response and recovery planning, including conducting incident 
response exercises; (4) identifying, assessing, and supporting efforts 
to reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities, including those associated 
with infrastructure control systems; and (5) strengthening 
international cyberspace security. More recently, in February 2009, 
President Obama directed the National Security Council and Homeland 
Security Council to conduct a comprehensive review to assess the United 
States' cybersecurity-related policies and structures. The resulting 
May 2009 report made a number of recommendations to improve the 
nation's approach.[Footnote 14] 

Maritime Security: 

CBP Has Made Some Progress in Working with Foreign Ports to Scan U.S.- 
Bound Containers, but Challenges Remain in Expanding the Program to 
Larger Ports and Meeting the Statutory Target Date: 

In October 2009, we reported that CBP has made some progress in working 
with the initial SFI ports to scan U.S.-bound cargo containers; but 
because of challenges to expanding scanning operations, especially to 
larger ports, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound 
cargo containers at over 600 foreign seaports remains largely unproven. 
[Footnote 15] CBP and DOE have been successful in integrating images of 
scanned containers onto a single computer screen that can be reviewed 
remotely from the United States and have also been able to use these 
initial ports as a test bed for new applications of existing 
technology, such as mobile radiation scanners. However, the SFI ports' 
level of participation, in some cases, has been limited in terms of 
duration or scope. While 54 to 86 percent of the U.S.-bound cargo 
containers, on average, were scanned at 3 comparatively low volume 
ports that are responsible for less than 3 percent of container 
shipments to the United States, CBP has not been able to achieve 
sustained scanning rates above 5 percent at 2 comparatively larger 
ports--the type of ports that ship most containers to the United 
States.[Footnote 16] Scanning operations at the initial SFI ports have 
encountered a number of challenges, such as logistical problems with 
containers transferred from rail or other vessels, and CBP officials 
are concerned that they and the participating ports cannot overcome 

CBP has developed two initiatives related to SFI for improving 
container security; however, challenges remain as neither initiative 
will enable CBP to fully achieve the 9/11 Act requirement to scan 100 
percent of all U.S.-bound cargo by July 2012. The first initiative, the 
"strategic trade corridor strategy," involves scanning 100 percent of 
U.S.-bound containers at selected foreign ports where CBP believes it 
will mitigate the greatest risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
entering the United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security approved 
this strategy and, according to CBP, is in negotiations with foreign 
governments to expand SFI to ports in those countries. The second 
initiative, known as "10+2", requires importers to provide 10 data 
elements and vessel carriers to provide 2 data elements on containers 
and their cargo to CBP, which provides further information to CBP, 
thus, improving its ability to identify containers that may pose a risk 
of containing WMD for additional scrutiny--such as scanning or physical 
inspection. Based on discussions with DHS and CBP officials, it is 
unclear whether DHS intends for the strategic trade corridor strategy 
and 10+2 to be implemented in lieu of the 100 percent scanning 
requirement or whether it is the first phase of implementation. While 
these initiatives may collectively improve container security, they 
will not enable CBP to fully achieve the 9/11 Act requirement to scan 
100 percent of U.S.-bound containers by July 2012. According to CBP, it 
does not have a plan for fully implementing the scanning requirement by 
this date because it questions the feasibility; however, it has not 
performed a feasibility analysis of expanding 100 percent scanning, as 
required by the SAFE Port Act. To address this, in October 2009, we 
recommended that CBP conduct a feasibility analysis of implementing 100 
percent scanning and provide the results, as well as alternatives to 
Congress, in order to determine the best path forward to strengthen 
container security.[Footnote 17] CBP concurred with our recommendation. 
Further, senior DHS and CBP officials acknowledge that most, if not all 
foreign ports, will not be able to meet the July 2012 target date for 
scanning all U.S.-bound cargo. As a result, DHS has recently decided to 
grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports, thus extending the 
target date for compliance with this requirement by 2 years, to July 

TSA and the Coast Guard Took Steps to Enroll Transportation Workers 
into the TWIC Program by the Mandated Deadline, but Challenges in 
Program Scheduling and Evaluation May Hinder the TWIC Reader Pilot's 

In November 2009 we reported that, based on lessons learned from its 
early experiences with enrollment and activation, TSA and its 
contractor took steps to prepare for a surge in TWIC enrollments and 
activations as local compliance dates approached.[Footnote 18] For 
example, according to TSA and port facility representatives, TSA and 
its contractor increased enrollment center resources, such as 
increasing the number of enrollment and activation stations to meet 
projected TWIC user demands. Likewise, the Coast Guard employed 
strategies to help the maritime industry meet the TWIC national 
compliance date while not disrupting the flow of commerce. As a result 
of these efforts, TSA reported enrolling 1,121,461 workers in the TWIC 
program, or over 93 percent of the estimated 1.2 million users, by the 
April 15, 2009 deadline. 

Although most workers received their TWICs, TSA data show that some 
workers experienced delays in receiving TWICs. Among the reasons for 
the delays was that a power failure occurred in October 2008 at the 
government facility that processes TWIC data that caused a hardware 
component failure in the TWIC enrollment and activation system for 
which no replacement component was on hand. In our November 2009 report 
on TWIC, we made recommendations to TSA to expedite the development of 
contingency and disaster recovery plans and system(s). DHS stated it is 
taking steps to address this recommendation and future potential TWIC 
system failures by developing a system to support disaster recovery by 
2012. While DHS's efforts are a positive step, until they are complete, 
TWIC systems remain vulnerable to similar disasters. 

In response to our 2006 recommendation and a SAFE Port Act requirement, 
TSA initiated a pilot in August 2008[Footnote 19] known as the TWIC 
reader pilot, to test TWIC-related access control technologies. 
[Footnote 20] The pilot is expected to test the viability of selected 
biometric card readers for use in reading TWICs within the maritime 
environment and test the technical aspects of connecting TWIC readers 
to access control systems. The results of the pilot are expected to 
inform the development of the card reader rule requiring TWIC readers 
for use in controlling access at MTSA regulated vessels/facilities. 
Based on the August 2008 pilot initiation date, the card reader rule is 
to be issued no later than 24 months from the initiation of the pilot, 
or by August 2010. 

Although TSA has made significant progress to incorporate best 
practices into TWIC's schedule for implementing the reader pilot 
program, weaknesses continue to exist that limit TSA's ability to use 
the schedule as a management tool to guide the pilot and accurately 
identify the pilot's completion date. In response to limitations that 
we identified, the program office developed a new TWIC pilot master 
schedule in March 2009, and updated it in April 2009, and again in May 
2009. The pilot schedule went from not meeting any of the nine 
scheduling best practices in September 2008 to fully addressing one of 
the practices, addressing seven practices to varying degrees, and not 
addressing one practice.[Footnote 21] While TSA has improved its 
technical application of program scheduling practices on the TWIC 
reader pilot program, as of May 2009, weaknesses remain that may 
adversely impact its usefulness as a management tool. For example, the 
schedule does not accurately reflect all key pilot activities or assign 
resources to those activities. To address these weaknesses, in our 
November 2009 report we recommended that TSA, in concert with pilot 
participants, fully incorporate best practices for program scheduling 
in the pilot. TSA concurred in part with our recommendation. In 
addition, shortfalls in TWIC pilot planning have presented a challenge 
for TSA and the Coast Guard in ensuring that the pilot is broadly 
representative of deployment conditions. This is in part because an 
evaluation plan that fully identifies the scope of the pilot and the 
methodology for collecting and analyzing the information resulting from 
the pilot has not been developed. Agency officials told us that no such 
evaluation plan was developed because they believe that the existing 
pilot documentation coupled with subject matter expertise would be 
sufficient to guide the pilot. However, our review of the TWIC pilot 
highlights weaknesses that could be rectified by the development and 
use of an evaluation plan. To address this, in November 2009, we 
recommended that TSA and the Coast Guard develop an evaluation plan to 
help ensure that needed information on the use of biometrics readers 
will result from the pilot. DHS concurred and discussed actions to 
implement the recommendation, but it is too early to determine if the 
intended actions will fully address the intent of the recommendation. 

DHS and Coast Guard Have a Strategy and Programs in Place, but 
Identifying and Preventing Small Vessel Attacks Remains a Challenge: 

While DHS and the Coast Guard have developed a strategy and programs to 
reduce the risks associated with small vessels, they face ongoing 
challenges in tracking small vessels and preventing attacks by such 
vessels.[Footnote 22] In April 2008, DHS issued its Small Vessel 
Security Strategy and is now in the process of developing and reviewing 
a more detailed implementation plan. After review by the Coast Guard 
and CBP, the draft plan was forwarded to DHS on September 18, 2009 with 
a recommendation for approval, but DHS has not yet issued a final 
decision. As part of its effort to improve security in the maritime 
domain, the Coast Guard is also implementing two major unclassified 
systems to track a broad spectrum of vessels. While these systems use 
proven technologies, they depend on the compliance of vessel operators 
to carry equipment needed to interact with these systems and to make 
sure the systems are turned on and functioning properly. These systems, 
however, generally cannot track small vessels. The Coast Guard and 
other agencies have other systems, though--which can include cameras 
and radars--that can track small vessels within ports, but these 
systems are not installed at all ports, and do not always work in bad 
weather or at night. In addition, the Coast Guard and other agencies, 
such as the New Jersey State Police, have several programs in place to 
address risks from small vessels, such as outreach efforts to the 
boating community to share threat information. However, the Coast Guard 
program faces resource limitations. For example, the Coast Guard's 
program to reach out to the boating community for their help in 
detecting suspicious activity, America's Waterway Watch, lost the 
funding it received through a Department of Defense readiness training 
program for military reservists in fiscal year 2008. Now it must depend 
on the activities of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, a voluntary 
organization, for most of its outreach efforts. Even with systems in 
place to track small vessels, there is widespread agreement among 
maritime stakeholders that it is very difficult to detect threatening 
activity by small vessels without prior knowledge of a planned attack. 

Aviation Security: 

TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, but 
Still Faces Participation, Technology, Oversight, and Inbound Cargo 

As we previously reported in March 2009, TSA has taken several key 
steps to meet the air cargo screening mandate of the 9/11 Act as it 
applies to domestic cargo.[Footnote 23] TSA's approach involves 
multiple air cargo industry stakeholders sharing screening 
responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. According to TSA 
officials, this decentralized approach is expected to minimize carrier 
delays, cargo backlogs, and potential increases in cargo transit time, 
which would likely result if screening were conducted primarily by air 
carriers at the airport. The specific steps that TSA has taken to 
address domestic air cargo screening include the following: 

* Revised air carrier security programs: Effective October 1, 2008, TSA 
established a requirement for 100 percent screening of nonexempt cargo 
transported on narrow-body passenger aircraft.[Footnote 24] Effective 
February 1, 2009, TSA also required air carriers to ensure the 
screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all 
passenger aircraft. Furthermore, effective February 2009, TSA revised 
or eliminated most of its screening exemptions for domestic cargo. 
[Footnote 25] 

* Created the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP): TSA created a 
voluntary program to allow screening to take place earlier in the 
shipping process and at various points in the air cargo supply chain-- 
including before the cargo is consolidated. In this program, air cargo 
industry stakeholders--such as freight forwarders and shippers-- 
voluntarily apply to become certified cargo screening facilities 
(CCSF). CCSFs in the program were required to begin screening cargo as 
of February 1, 2009. 

* Issued an interim final rule: On September 16, 2009, TSA issued an 
interim final rule, effective November 16, 2009, that among other 
things, codifies the statutory air cargo screening requirements of the 
9/11 Act and establishes requirements for entities participating in the 

* Established the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot: To 
operationally test explosives trace detection (ETD) and X-ray 
technology among CCSFs, TSA created the Air Cargo Screening Technology 
Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of the largest freight 
forwarders to use the technologies and report on their 
experiences.[Footnote 26] This pilot is ongoing, with an anticipated 
end date of August 2010, and the results have not yet been finalized. 

* Expanded its explosives detection canine program: To assist air 
carriers in screening cargo, TSA has taken steps to expand the use of 
TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams. TSA now has 120 
allocated canine teams dedicated to air cargo screening at 20 major 

While these steps are encouraging, TSA faces several challenges in 
meeting the air cargo screening mandate. First, although industry 
participation in the CCSP is vital to TSA's approach to move screening 
responsibilities across the supply chain, the voluntary nature of the 
program may make it difficult to attract program participants needed to 
screen the required levels of domestic cargo. Attracting certified 
cargo screening facilities (CCSF) is important because much cargo is 
currently delivered to air carriers in a consolidated form and the 
requirement to screen individual pieces of cargo will necessitate 
screening earlier in the air cargo supply chain. However, there are 
concerns about potential program costs, including acquiring expensive 
technology, hiring additional personnel, conducting additional 
training, and making facility improvements. 

Second, while TSA has taken steps to test technologies for screening 
and securing air cargo, it has not yet completed assessments of the 
technologies it plans to allow air carriers and program participants to 
use in meeting the August 2010 screening mandate. According to TSA 
officials, the agency has conducted laboratory assessments and plans to 
complete operational testing of X-ray technologies by late 2009, and 
laboratory and operational testing of explosives trace detection 
technology by August 2010. However, these technologies, which have not 
yet been fully tested for effectiveness, are currently being used by 
industry participants to meet air cargo screening requirements. 

Third, TSA faces challenges overseeing compliance with the CCSP due to 
the size of its current Transportation Security Inspector (TSI) 
workforce. Under the CCSP, in addition to performing inspections of air 
carrier and freight forwarders, TSIs are to also perform compliance 
inspections of new regulated entities that voluntarily become CCSFs, as 
well as conduct additional CCSF inspections of existing freight 
forwarders. TSA officials have stated that there may not be enough TSIs 
to conduct compliance inspections of all the potential CCSFs once the 
program is fully implemented by August 2010. Until TSA completes its 
staffing study, TSA may not be able to determine whether it has the 
necessary staffing resources to ensure that entities involved in the 
CCSP are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure air cargo. 
[Footnote 27] 

Finally, TSA has taken some steps to meet the screening mandate as it 
applies to inbound cargo but does not expect to achieve 100 percent 
screening of inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline. TSA revised its 
requirements to, in general, require carriers to screen 50 percent of 
nonexempt inbound cargo. TSA also began harmonization of security 
standards with other nations through bilateral and quadrilateral 
discussions.[Footnote 28] In addition, TSA continues to work with CBP 
to leverage an existing CBP system to identify and target high-risk air 
cargo. However, TSA does not expect to meet the mandated 100 percent 
screening level by August 2010. This is due, in part, to existing 
inbound screening exemptions, which TSA has not reviewed or revised, 
and to challenges TSA faces in harmonizing the agency's air cargo 
security standards with those of other nations. Moreover, TSA's 
international inspection resources are limited. We will continue to 
explore these issues as part of our ongoing review of TSA's air cargo 
security efforts, to be issued next year. 

TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces 
Challenges in Assessing Risk, Evaluating Worker Screening Methods, 
Addressing Airport Technology Needs, and Developing a National Strategy 
for Airport Security: 

In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that TSA 
has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to 
strengthen the security of commercial airports.[Footnote 29] For 
example, in March 2007, TSA implemented a random worker screening 
program--the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP)-- 
nationwide to enforce access procedures, such as ensuring that workers 
do not possess unauthorized items when entering secured areas. In 
addition, TSA has expanded requirements for background checks and the 
population of individuals who are subject to these checks, and has 
established a statutorily directed pilot program to assess airport 
security technology.[Footnote 30] In 2004 TSA initiated the Airport 
Access Control Pilot Program to test, assess, and provide information 
on new and emerging technologies, including biometrics. TSA issued a 
final report on the pilots in December 2006. 

As we reported in September 2009, while TSA has taken numerous steps to 
enhance airport security, it continues to face challenges in several 
areas, such as assessing risk, evaluating worker screening methods, 
addressing airport technology needs, and developing a unified national 
strategy for airport security.[Footnote 31] For example, while TSA has 
taken steps to assess risk related to airport security, it has not 
conducted a comprehensive risk assessment based on assessments of 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as required by DHS's 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan . To address these issues, we 
recommended, among other things, that TSA develop a comprehensive risk 
assessment of airport security and milestones for its completion, and 
evaluate whether the current approach to conducting vulnerability 
assessments appropriately assesses vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with 
these recommendations. 

Further, to respond to the threat posed by airport workers, the 
Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, 
directed TSA to use $15 million of its appropriation to conduct a pilot 
program at seven airports to help identify the potential costs and 
benefits of 100 percent worker screening and other worker screening 
methods.[Footnote 32] In July 2009 TSA issued a final report on the 
results and concluded that random screening is a more cost-effective 
approach because it appears "roughly" as effective in identifying 
contraband items at less cost than 100 percent worker screening. 
[Footnote 33] However, the report also identified limitations in the 
design and evaluation of the program and in the estimation of costs. 
Given the significance of these limitations, we reported in September 
2009 that it is unclear whether random worker screening is more or less 
cost-effective than 100 percent worker screening.[Footnote 34] In 
addition, TSA did not document key aspects of the pilot's design, 
methodology, and evaluation, such as a data analysis plan, limiting the 
usefulness of these efforts. To address this, we recommended that TSA 
ensure that future airport security pilot program evaluation efforts 
include a well-developed and well-documented evaluation plan, to which 
DHS concurred. 

Moreover, although TSA has taken steps to develop biometric worker 
credentialing, it is unclear to what extent TSA plans to address 
statutory requirements regarding biometric technology, such as 
developing or requiring biometric access controls at airports, 
establishing comprehensive standards, and determining the best way to 
incorporate these decisions into airports' existing systems.[Footnote 
35] To address this issue, we have recommended that TSA develop 
milestones for meeting statutory requirements for, among other things, 
performance standards for biometric airport access control systems. DHS 
concurred with this recommendation. 

Finally, TSA's efforts to enhance the security of the nation's airports 
have not been guided by a national strategy that identifies key 
elements, such as goals, priorities, performance measures, and required 
resources. To better ensure that airport stakeholders take a unified 
approach to airport security, we recommended that TSA develop a 
national strategy that incorporates key characteristics of effective 
security strategies, such as measurable goals and priorities, to which 
DHS concurred. 


DHS Has Made Progress in Strengthening Cybersecurity, but Further 
Actions are Warranted: 

Federal law and policy[Footnote 36] establish DHS as the focal point 
for efforts to protect our nation's computer-reliant critical 
infrastructures. Since 2005, we have reported that DHS has not yet 
fully satisfied its key responsibilities for protecting these critical 
infrastructures and have made recommendations for DHS to address in key 
cyberscurity areas, to include the five key areas shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Key Cybersecurity Areas Identified by GAO: 

1. Bolstering cyber analysis and warning capabilities. 

2. Completing actions identified during cyber exercises. 

3. Improving cybersecurity of infrastructure control systems. 

4. Strengthening DHS's ability to help recover from Internet 

5. Addressing cyber crime. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy 
aspects of its responsibilities, but the department has not fully 
implemented our recommendations and, thus, further action needs to be 
taken to address these areas. For example, in July 2008, we reported 
[Footnote 37] that DHS's United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team did not fully address 15 key attributes of cyber analysis and 
warning capabilities related to four key areas.[Footnote 38] As a 
result, we recommended that the department address shortfalls in order 
to fully establish a national cyber analysis and warning capability. 
DHS agreed in large part with our recommendation. Similarly, in 
September 2008, we reported that since conducting a major cyber attack 
exercise, called Cyber Storm, DHS had demonstrated progress in 
addressing eight lessons it had learned from these efforts, but its 
actions to address the lessons had not been fully implemented. 
[Footnote 39] Consequently, we recommended that DHS complete corrective 
activities to strengthen coordination between public and private sector 
participants in response to significant cyber incidents. DHS concurred 
with our recommendation and has made progress in completing some 
identified activities. 

We also testified in March 2009 on needed improvements to the nation's 
cybersecurity strategy.[Footnote 40] In preparing for that testimony, 
we obtained the views of experts (by means of panel discussions) on 
critical aspects of the strategy, including areas for improvement. 

The experts, who included former federal officials, academics, and 
private sector executives, highlighted 12 key improvements that are, in 
their view, essential to improving the strategy and our national 
cybersecurity posture. The key strategy improvements identified by 
these experts are listed in table 2. 

Table 2: Key Strategy Improvements Identified by Cybersecurity Experts: 

1. Develop a national strategy that clearly articulates strategic 
objectives, goals, and priorities. 

2. Establish White House responsibility and accountability for leading 
and overseeing national cybersecurity policy. 

3. Establish a governance structure for strategy implementation. 

4. Publicize and raise awareness about the seriousness of the 
cybersecurity problem. 

5. Create an accountable, operational cybersecurity organization. 

6. Focus more actions on prioritizing assets, assessing 
vulnerabilities, and reducing vulnerabilities than on developing 
additional plans. 

7. Bolster public-private partnerships through an improved value 
proposition and use of incentives. 

8. Focus greater attention on addressing the global aspects of 

9. Improve law enforcement efforts to address malicious activities in 

10. Place greater emphasis on cybersecurity research and development, 
including consideration of how to better coordinate government and 
private sector efforts. 

11. Increase the cadre of cybersecurity professionals. 

12. Make the federal government a model for cybersecurity, including 
using its acquisition function to enhance cybersecurity aspects of 
products and services. 

Source: GAO analysis of opinions solicited during expert panels. 

[End of table] 

These recommended improvements to the national strategy are in large 
part consistent with our previous reports and extensive research in 
this area. Until they are addressed, our nation's most critical federal 
and private sector cyber infrastructure remain at unnecessary risk to 
attack from our adversaries. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement for the record. 

[End of section] 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For questions about this statement, please contact Cathleen A. Berrick 
at 202-512-8777, or For further information regarding 
maritime security issues, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell at 202- 
512-9610, or For further information regarding 
aviation security issues, please contact Stephen M. Lord at 202-512- 
4379, or For further information regarding cybersecurity 
issues, contact David A. Powner at 202-512-9286, or 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. 


In addition to the contacts named above, Christopher Conrad, Assistant 
Director, managed this review. Jonathan Bachman, Dave Bruno, Lisa 
Canini, Joseph Cruz, Michael Gilmore, Barbara Guffy, Lemuel Jackson, 
Steve Morris, Robert Rivas, Yanina Golburt Samuels, and Rebecca 
Kuhlmann Taylor made significant contributions to the work. Frances 
Cook, Geoffrey Hamilton, Tom Lombardi, and Jan Montgomery provided 
legal support. Linda Miller provided assistance in testimony 

[End of section] 


[1] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). TSA was transferred 
from the Department of Transportation to DHS pursuant to requirements 
in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 
403(2), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178. 

[2] See Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884. 

[3] See id. § 231, 120 Stat. at 1915 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 981). 

[4] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489-90 (2007) 
(amending 6 U.S.C. § 982(b)). Both the SAFE Port Act and 9/11 Act 
define scanning to be an examination with both non-intrusive imaging 
equipment and radiation detection equipment. In addition, while the law 
states that cargo containers are not to enter the United States unless 
they were scanned at a foreign port, actual participation in the 
program by sovereign foreign governments and ports is voluntary. 

[5] The 9/11 Act establishes minimum standards for screening air cargo 
and defines screening for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate 
as a physical examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether 
cargo poses a threat to transportation security. See Pub. L. No. 110- 
53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. at 477-79 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)). 
Solely performing a review of information about the contents of cargo 
or verifying the identity of the cargo's shipper does not constitute 
screening for purposes of satisfying the mandate. For the purposes of 
this statement, domestic air cargo refers to cargo transported by air 
within the United States and from the United States to a foreign 
location by both U.S. and foreign-based air carriers; and inbound cargo 
refers to cargo transported by U.S. and foreign-based air carriers from 
a foreign location to the United States. 

[6] Critical infrastructures are systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to nations that their incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on national security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
of those matters. 

[7] The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003); Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); and National Security 
Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2008). 

[8] According to DHS's Small Vessel Security Strategy, "small vessels" 
are characterized as any watercraft--regardless of method of 
propulsion--less than 300 gross tons, and used for recreational or 
commercial purposes. 

[9] See for example, GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and 
Other Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial 
Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2009) and Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key 
Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 17, 2009). 

[10] Biometrics refers to technologies that measure and analyze human 
body characteristics--such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, 
voice patterns, facial patterns and hand measurements--for 
authentication purposes. According to Coast Guard guidance, a secure 
area is an area that has security measures in place for access control. 
For most maritime facilities, the secure area is generally any place 
inside the outer-most access control point. For a vessel or outer 
continental shelf facility, such as off-shore petroleum or gas 
production facilities, the secure area is generally the whole vessel or 

[11] To implement the requirement for using a biometric credential for 
accessing select maritime facilities and vessels--as called for in the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), as amended by the 
Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006--the 
credential rule (72 Fed. Reg. 3492 (2007)) established that all 
maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA- 
regulated facilities and vessels were expected to hold TWICs by 
September 25, 2008, but the final compliance date was extended to April 
15, 2009, pursuant to 73 Fed. Reg. 25562 (2008). 

[12] For purposes of this statement, the term freight forwarders only 
includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also 
referred to as indirect air carriers. 

[13] See generally Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[14] The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, 
D.C.: May 29, 2009). 

[15] GAO, Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the 
Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 

[16] Scanning percentages at Port Qasim, Puerto Cortes, and the Port of 
Southampton reflect operations conducted from November 2007 through May 
2009.Scanning percentages at the Port of Hong Kong reflect operations 
conducted from February 2008 through April 2009. Scanning percentages 
at the Port of Busan reflect operations conducted from April 2009 
through May 2009. 

[17] [hyperlink,]. 

[18] GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Progress 
Made in Enrolling Workers and Activating Credentials but Evaluation 
Plan Needed to Help Inform the Implementation of Card Readers, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 18, 2009). 

[19] The pilot initiation date is based on the first date of testing 
identified in the TWIC pilot schedule. The SAFE Port Act required the 
pilot to commence no later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
the SAFE Port Act (October 13, 2006). 

[20] GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges 
before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
Program, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

[21] These best practices include (1) capturing all activities-- 
defining in detail the work to be completed, including activities to be 
performed; (2) sequencing all activities--listing activities in the 
order in which they are to be carried out; (3) assigning resources to 
all activities--identifying the resources needed to complete the 
activities; (4) establishing the duration of all activities-- 
determining how long each activity will take to execute; (5) 
integrating all activities horizontally and vertically--achieving 
aggregated products or outcomes by ensuring that products and outcomes 
associated with other sequenced activities are arranged in the right 
order, and dates for supporting tasks and subtasks are aligned; (6) 
establishing the critical path for all activities--identifying the path 
in the schedule with the longest duration through the sequenced list of 
key activities; (7) identifying float between activities--using 
information on the amount of time that a predecessor activity can slip 
before the delay affects successor activities; (8) conducting a 
schedule risk analysis--using statistical techniques to predict the 
level of confidence in meeting a project's completion date; and (9) 
updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine the dates 
for all activities--continuously updating the schedule to determine 
realistic start and completion dates for program activities based on 
current information. 

[22] For further information on the risks associated with small 
vessels, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide 
Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 17, 2009). 

[23] GAO, Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress 
and Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo 
on Passenger Aircraft, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.18, 

[24] Narrow-body flights transport about 26 percent of all cargo on 
domestic passenger flights. According to TSA officials, narrow-body 
aircraft make up most domestic passenger flights, and transport most 
passengers traveling on domestic passenger flights. 

[25] Effective September 2009, TSA revised or eliminated additional 
exemptions for domestic cargo. 

[26] ETD requires human operators to collect samples of items to be 
screened with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any 
traces of explosives material. 

[27] For additional information on TSA's staffing study, see GAO, 
Aviation Security: Status of Transportation Security Inspector 
Workforce, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington D.C.: Feb. 6, 2009). 

[28] The term harmonization is used to describe countries' efforts to 
coordinate their security practices to enhance security and increase 
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. 

[29] [hyperlink,]. 

[30] According to TSA officials, the agency established this program in 
response to a provision enacted through the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act. See Pub. L. No.107-71 § 106(d), 115 Stat. at 610 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)(3)). 

[31] [hyperlink,]. 

[32] Explanatory Statement accompanying Division E of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 
2042 (2007), at 1048. While the Statement refers to these pilot 
programs as airport employee screening pilots, for the purposes of this 
statement, we use "worker screening" to refer to the screening of all 
individuals who work at the airport. 

[33] Transportation Security Administration, Airport Employee Screening 
Pilot Program Study: Fiscal Year 2008 Report to Congress (Washington, 
D.C., July 7, 2009). 

[34] The contractor TSA hired to assist with the pilot program 
identified design and evaluation limitations, such as the limited 
number of participating airports. The contractor also identified 
limitations regarding estimates of the costs and operational effects of 
implementing various worker screening methods nationwide. For example, 
the contractor noted that its cost estimates did not include costs 
associated with operational effects, such as longer wait times for 
workers, and potentially costly infrastructure modifications, such as 
construction of roads and shelters to accommodate vehicle screening. 

[35] Among other things, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 directed TSA, in consultation with industry 
representatives, to establish comprehensive technical and operational 
system requirements and performance standards for the use of biometric 
identifier technology in airport access control systems. See Pub. L. 
No. 108-458, § 4011, 118 Stat. 3638, 3712-14 (2004) (codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 44903(h)(5)). 

[36] These include The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure 

[37] GAO, Cyber Analysis and Warning: DHS Faces Challenges in 
Establishing a Comprehensive National Capability, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

[38] The four key areas are: (1) monitoring network activity to detect 
anomalies, (2) analyzing information and investigating anomalies to 
determine whether they are threats, (3) warning appropriate officials 
with timely and actionable threat and mitigation information, and (4) 
responding to the threat. 

[39] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs To Fully 
Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2008). 

[40] GAO, National Cybersecurity Strategy: Key Improvements Are Needed 
to Strengthen the Nation's Posture, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.10, 

[End of section] 

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