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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

December 2014: 

Emergency Preparedness: 

Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency Assessments and 
Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps: 

GAO-15-20: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-15-20, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

No-notice catastrophic disasters pose one of the greatest challenges 
to national emergency preparedness. ESFs are federal interagency 
coordinating structures that group capabilities into functional areas 
most frequently needed in a national response. GAO was asked to review 
federal preparedness to respond to no-notice catastrophic disasters, 
such as IND attacks and major earthquakes. This report assesses the 
extent to which opportunities exist to enhance (1) assessment of ESF 
preparedness and (2) management oversight of the closure of federal 
capability gaps identified in selected exercises, real-world 
incidents, and other assessments. GAO reviewed relevant laws, 
directives, strategies, and plans; analyzed recommended corrective 
actions from national-level exercises and other interagency 
assessments; reviewed documents and interviewed officials from five 
federal departments key to disaster response (Defense, Energy, Health 
and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Justice); and compared 
current processes against internal control standards and leading 
program management practices. 

What GAO Found: 

The departments that coordinate federal emergency support functions 
(ESF), in preparation for national disaster response, carry out their 
responsibilities in various ways, but the Secretary of Homeland 
Security's ability to assess ESF preparedness could be enhanced. ESF 
coordinators conduct a range of coordination, planning, and capability 
assessment activities. All 10 ESF coordinators across the five 
departments in GAO's review reported coordinating with stakeholders 
and developing at least one ESF planning document. However, the ESF 
Leadership Group and the group's chair, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)—-a component of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)-—have not worked with other federal departments to 
issue supplemental guidance detailing expectations for the minimum 
standards for activities and product deliverables necessary to 
demonstrate ESF preparedness. In the absence of such guidance, GAO 
found that ESF coordinators are inconsistently carrying out their 
emergency response preparedness activities. DHS and FEMA have 
responsibility for assessing federal emergency preparedness. Issuing 
supplemental guidance detailing expectations for ESF coordinators 
would better enable DHS and FEMA to assess the status of ESF response 
preparedness. 

Federal departments have identified emergency response capability gaps 
through national-level exercises, real-world incidents, and other 
assessments, but opportunities exist to help close the gaps by 
enhancing management oversight in two areas: 

* First, federal departments are responsible for implementing their 
own recommended corrective actions from national-level exercises and 
real-world disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, but the status of 
federal interagency implementation of these actions is not 
comprehensively collected by or reported to DHS or FEMA. As a result, 
DHS's and FEMA's ability to assess and report on the nation's overall 
preparedness is hampered. 

* Second, FEMA leads interagency efforts to identify and propose 
actions to address capability gaps in the nation's preparedness to 
respond to improvised nuclear device (IND) attacks, but its 
implementation plan lacks key program management details. 
Specifically, FEMA's March 2012 IND Implementation Plan proposed over 
300 recommended actions to help close gaps identified in the April 
2010 DHS IND Strategy. The September 2013 annual revision to the plan 
contained summary information on the status of some of the recommended 
actions, but did not contain detailed program management information—
such as specific timeframes, milestones, and estimated resources 
required to close any given capability gap—which is needed to better 
enable ongoing management oversight of gap closure efforts. 

Regular reporting on the status of corrective actions identified in 
national-level exercises and real-world major disasters, as well as 
detailed program management information for management oversight of 
the status of recommended actions in the IND Implementation Plan, 
would enhance interagency accountability for closing identified 
capability gaps and better enable DHS and FEMA to assess the status of 
federal interagency preparedness efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FEMA-—in collaboration with other federal 
agencies—-(1) issue supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators 
detailing minimum standards for activities and product deliverables 
necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness, (2) regularly report on the 
status of corrective actions identified through prior national-level 
exercises and real-world disasters, and (3) develop and issue detailed 
program management information to better enable management oversight 
of the DHS IND Strategy's recommended actions. DHS concurred with the 
recommendations and identified related actions the department is 
taking to address them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-20]. For more 
information, contact Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or 
curriec@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

ESF Coordinators Conduct Their Oversight Responsibilities in Various 
Ways, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen the Assessment of ESF 
Preparedness: 

Federal Departments Identified Corrective Actions to Address 
Capability Gaps, but Management Oversight of Implementation Status 
Could Be Improved: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Examples of Coordination Activities, Planning Documents, 
and Capability Assessments Identified by National Response Framework 
(NRF) Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinators: 

Appendix III: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed for National Level 
Exercises 2010 and 2011, as of November 2014: 

Appendix IV: Corrective Actions Developed after Hurricane Sandy Not 
Yet Closed, as of November 2014: 

Appendix V: Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Program Interagency 
Working Groups' Activities and Projects: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: List of Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and their Assigned 
Coordinators: 

Table 2: Status of Corrective Actions from National-Level Exercises 
(NLE) 2010 and 2011 for the Five Departments, as of November 2014: 

Table 3: Status of Corrective Actions from Hurricane Sandy for Five 
Departments, as of November 2014: 

Table 4: Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Interagency Working Group 
Focus Areas and Assigned Capability Gaps as Described in the IND 
Implementation Plan: 

Table 5: Departments and Key Components in GAO's Review: 

Table 6: List of Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and their Assigned 
Coordinators: 

Table 7: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed from National Level 
Exercise 2010, as of November 2014: 

Table 8: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed from National Level 
Exercise 2011, as of November 2014: 

Table 9: Corrective Actions Developed after Hurricane Sandy Not Yet 
Closed, as of November 2014: 

Table 10: Summary of Capability Gaps and Recommended Actions Pursued 
as identified in the September 2013 IND Implementation Plan: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Number of Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinators 
Conducting Selected Activities to Oversee ESF Preparedness: 

Abbreviations: 

CAPS: Corrective Action Program System: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

ESF: emergency support function: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 

IND: improvised nuclear device: 

NLE: national level exercise: 

NRF: National Response Framework: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 4, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

No-notice catastrophic disasters pose one of the greatest challenges 
to national emergency preparedness, whether caused by manmade attacks 
or natural events. For example, nuclear detonation from a successful 
improvised nuclear device (IND) attack in a U.S. city would cause 
enormous loss of life and property and severe damage to an affected 
area's economic viability.[Footnote 1] Similarly, natural disasters 
such as a major earthquake can occur with little to no advanced 
warning and also potentially cause massive loss of life and property. 
For example, federal emergency response planning estimates on the 
consequences of a catastrophic earthquake along known fault lines in 
the central United States include impacts to multiple states and more 
specifically project over 75,000 casualties (injured and fatalities), 
more than 380,000 displaced from their homes and communities, at least 
330,000 buildings moderately or severely damaged, and direct economic 
losses surpassing $200 billion.[Footnote 2]

The National Response Framework (NRF) states that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security is to ensure that overall federal preparedness 
actions are unified, complete, and synchronized to prevent unfilled 
gaps or seams in the federal government's efforts to respond to all 
hazards. Such hazards include IND attacks and catastrophic 
earthquakes.[Footnote 3] Further, the NRF identifies 14 emergency 
support functions (ESF) that serve as the federal government's primary 
coordinating structure for building, sustaining, and delivering 
response capabilities. The ESFs are organized by specific functional 
areas for the most frequently needed capabilities during an emergency--
including communications, medical services, and search and rescue--and 
are designed to coordinate the provision of related assets and 
services by federal departments and agencies.

To assess preparedness to respond to no-notice catastrophic disasters, 
the National Preparedness System calls for federal departments and 
agencies to identify potential capability gaps, such as through 
exercises and real-world incidents, and to develop corrective actions 
to help close these gaps.[Footnote 4] The National Exercise Program--
an interagency program managed by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), a component of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)--serves as a means of assessing interagency preparedness and 
identifying corrective actions through national-level exercises (NLE). 
[Footnote 5] Similarly, federal departments and agencies also identify 
corrective actions following responses to real-world incidents, such 
as the federal response to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. Finally, 
federal departments and agencies may identify capability gaps by 
conducting capability gap analyses, which compare the capabilities 
needed for an effective response (i.e., capability requirements) 
against those available.

Congressional requesters asked us to review federal preparedness to 
respond to no-notice catastrophic disasters. This report assesses the 
extent to which opportunities exist to strengthen: 

1. the assessment of ESF preparedness, and: 

2. management oversight of the status of implementation of federal 
capability gaps identified in national-level exercises, real-world 
incidents, and other gap assessments.

For the purposes of this report, we selected two no-notice 
catastrophic scenarios and five federal departments for our review. 
IND attacks and major earthquakes represent one man-made scenario and 
one naturally occurring scenario, respectively, and are among the 
scenarios the federal government uses to plan for no-notice 
catastrophic incidents. We selected the five federal departments--the 
Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services 
(HHS), DHS, and Justice (DOJ)--because, among other things, they 
represent federal entities with significant responsibilities for 
responding to IND attacks and major earthquakes and each department 
coordinates 1 or more of the 14 ESFs. To address our report 
objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and presidential directives, all-
hazards and incident-specific interagency strategies and plans, as 
well as relevant assessments of federal preparedness. We also 
interviewed department and agency officials on their roles and 
responsibilities for emergency response, coordination of ESF 
preparedness, and management oversight of the status of implementation 
of corrective actions to close capability gaps identified in national-
level exercises, real-world incidents, and other gap assessments.

In addition, to identify the extent to which opportunities, if any, 
exist to enhance the assessment of ESF preparedness, we gathered and 
analyzed information on the 10 ESFs that were coordinated by one of 
the five departments in our review.[Footnote 6] We compared current 
federal efforts to monitor ESF preparedness against, among others, 
requirements in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006 (Post-Katrina Act) and Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, as well as best practices we have previously 
identified for interagency coordination.[Footnote 7] To identify 
potential opportunities to enhance the management oversight of the 
status of implementation of corrective actions to close federal 
response capability gaps, we gathered and analyzed after-action 
reports from two relevant national-level exercises, one real-world 
incident, and other relevant assessments.[Footnote 8] To determine the 
status of corrective actions from NLE 2010, NLE 2011, and Hurricane 
Sandy, we reviewed interagency and departmental documents that 
identified and provided status updates on corrective actions for these 
events. To assess the reliability of this information, we gathered 
information from agency officials knowledgeable about how corrective 
actions from NLEs and real-world incidents are tracked within their 
respective departments or agencies.[Footnote 9] To identify other 
scenario-specific capability gap assessments conducted on federal 
emergency response to IND attacks and major earthquakes, we 
interviewed agency officials to determine the extent to which such 
assessments had been conducted. We identified one relevant interagency 
assessment--the April 2010 DHS Strategy for Improving the National 
Response and Recovery from an IND Attack (DHS IND Strategy).[Footnote 
10] We reviewed the March 2012 and September 2013 iterations of the 
IND Response and Recovery Capability-Based Implementation Plan (IND 
Implementation Plan), which describe recommended actions to address 
IND response capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy, as 
well as the status of efforts to close those gaps.[Footnote 11] We 
compared current federal management oversight of efforts to monitor 
and track the closure of capability gaps identified through NLE 2010, 
NLE 2011, the response to Hurricane Sandy, and the DHS IND Strategy 
against, among others, requirements in the Post-Katrina Act and 
leading practices for internal control and program management, 
specifically Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 
and The Standard for Program Management.[Footnote 12]

Additional detail on the scope and methodology of our review is 
contained in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to December 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background: 

Roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security and Administrator of FEMA: 

Side bar: 

National Preparedness Goal and System: 

Presidential Policy Directive 8 directed the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to develop a national preparedness goal and design a national 
preparedness system to address the greatest risks to the nation. The 
National Preparedness Goal, issued in September 2011, defines the core 
capabilities necessary for emergency response to specific types of 
incidents, including acts of terrorism and natural disasters. The 
National Preparedness System was issued in November 2011 and is 
intended to guide activities to achieve the national preparedness 
goal. Specifically, it provides guidance on the planning, 
organization, equipment, training, and exercises needed to develop and 
maintain domestic emergency response capabilities. The figure below 
shows the system's feedback cycle.

[Figure: illustration] 

Identifying and assessing risk; 
Estimating capability requirements; 
Building and sustaining capabilities; 
Planning to deliver capabilities; 
Validating capabilities; 
Reviewing and updating. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security documents 
(text and graphic). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar]

DHS and FEMA, in coordination with other federal departments and 
agencies, are responsible for assessing federal emergency 
preparedness. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on Management 
of Domestic Incidents identifies the Secretary of Homeland Security as 
the principal federal official for domestic incident management. 
[Footnote 13] Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness 
assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility for 
coordinating preparedness efforts among federal executive branch 
departments and agencies.[Footnote 14] According to the NRF, the 
Secretary is to ensure that overall federal preparedness actions are 
unified, complete, and synchronized to prevent unfilled gaps or seams 
in the federal government's efforts.[Footnote 15] Following the 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress passed the 
Post-Katrina Act in October 2006.[Footnote 16] The act enhanced FEMA's 
responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS, required FEMA to 
establish a national preparedness system, and assigned FEMA 
responsibility for assessing the nation's overall preparedness. The 
Post-Katrina Act also identifies the Administrator of FEMA as the 
principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security regarding emergency management.[Footnote 17] The FEMA 
Administrator's duties include preparation for, protection against, 
response to, and recovery from all hazards, including IND attacks and 
major earthquakes.

National Response Framework and Emergency Support Functions: 

The NRF is a guide to how the nation responds to disasters and 
emergencies of all types and describes the principles, roles and 
responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core 
capabilities required to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs 
following an incident. The NRF includes various annexes, including 
those on ESFs, the federal government's primary coordinating structure 
for building, sustaining, and delivering response core 
capabilities.[Footnote 18] The ESF annexes are organized by specific 
functional areas most frequently needed in a national response and 
designed to bring together the capabilities of various federal 
departments and agencies. Each ESF comprises a federal department or 
agency that has been designated as the ESF coordinator, along with a 
number of primary and support agencies.[Footnote 19] Table 1 lists the 
14 ESFs and their assigned coordinators.[Footnote 20]

Table 1: List of Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and their Assigned 
Coordinators: 

ESF: Transportation (ESF #1); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Transportation.

ESF: Communications (ESF #2); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National 
Communications System.

ESF: Public Works and Engineering (ESF #3); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

ESF: Firefighting (ESF #4); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Agriculture/U.S. Forest Service and 
DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/U.S. Fire Administration.

ESF: Information and Planning (ESF #5); 
ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA.

ESF: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human 
Services (ESF #6)[A]; 
ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA.

ESF: Logistics (ESF #7); 
ESF coordinator: General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA.

ESF: Public Health and Medical Services (ESF #8); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services.

ESF: Search and Rescue (ESF #9); 
ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA.

ESF: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF #10); 
ESF coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency.

ESF: Agriculture and Natural Resources (ESF #11); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Agriculture.

ESF: Energy (ESF #12); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Energy.

ESF: Public Safety and Security (ESF #13); 
ESF coordinator: Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives.

ESF: Long-Term Community Recovery (ESF #14); 
ESF coordinator: Not applicable--superseded by the National Disaster 
Recovery Framework.

Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Framework. GAO-15-20. 

[A] In this report, we refer to ESF #6 as the Mass Care ESF. 

[End of table] 

ESF coordinators are responsible, per the NRF, for overseeing the 
preparedness activities of their ESF and coordinating with the ESFs' 
primary and support agencies. The NRF describes four broad 
responsibilities for ESF coordinators: 

* maintaining contact with ESF primary and support agencies through 
conference calls, meetings, training activities, and exercises;

* coordinating efforts with corresponding private sector, 
nongovernmental organization, and federal partners;

* ensuring the ESF is engaged in appropriate planning and preparedness 
activities; and: 

* monitoring the ESF's progress in meeting the targets of the core 
capabilities it supports.

For example, DHS and its agencies--such as FEMA--have responsibility 
for coordinating 7 of the 14 ESFs. FEMA also chairs the ESF Leadership 
Group, which is composed of the federal departments and agencies that 
are designated as ESF coordinators. The ESF Leadership Group exists to 
coordinate responsibilities, resolve interagency operational and 
preparedness issues, and provide planning guidance and oversight for 
developing interagency response plans and activities.[Footnote 21]

Capability Assessment through National-Level Exercises, Real-World 
Incidents, and Other Gap Analyses: 

Side bar: 

National-Level Exercise (NLE) 2010: 

NLE 2010 was a 2-day exercise conducted in May 2010 that concentrated 
on response and recovery from an improvised nuclear device attack in 
the United States. In the exercise's scenario, a terrorist group 
developed and detonated a 4.5-kiloton device in a midwestern U.S. 
city. In the exercise, the detonation resulted in the destruction of 
hundreds of heavy structures and homes, 65,000 people killed, 21,000 
injured, and highly radioactive fallout. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documents 
(text and photo). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar] 

The National Exercise Program serves to assess interagency 
preparedness and identify corrective actions needed to close gaps in 
required emergency response capabilities.[Footnote 22] FEMA's National 
Exercise Division manages the design and execution of NLEs, including 
the development of interagency after-action reports and the related 
improvement plans that identify specific corrective actions. 
Participating federal departments and agencies are to track the status 
of implementation of their assigned corrective actions following NLEs. 
[Footnote 23] Starting in calendar year 2013, the National Exercise 
Program established a biennial exercise cycle for NLEs.[Footnote 24] 
The first NLE under this new cycle occurred in March 2014 and FEMA 
officials stated that they are beginning to plan for the next NLE, 
which is to occur in calendar 2016.[Footnote 25]

Side bar: 

National Level Exercise (NLE) 2011: 

NLE 2011 was a 4-day exercise conducted in May 2011 that concentrated 
on response to a catastrophic earthquake. The NLE 2011 scenario 
involved a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone, 
which is a major fault line impacting eight states in the southern and 
midwestern United States. In the exercise, the earthquake and 
aftershocks resulted in thousands of casualties and major damage and 
destruction throughout the central United States. 

[Figure: map] 

Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale: 
VI; 
VII; 
VIII; 
IX; 
X+. 

Note: The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale measures the effect of an 
earthquake on the earth's surface, and is measured from I to XII, with 
XII being the most intense. For example, for an earthquake with a 
Modified Mercalli Intensity of IX (orange in the figure above), some 
buildings may have shifted off of their foundations and others would 
have considerable damage, including partial collapses, fallen 
chimneys, broken windows, and overturned furniture. 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. 
Geological Survey documents (text and graphic). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar]

In addition, interagency and intradepartmental after-action reports 
developed in the wake of major disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy in 
October 2012, also provide a means of assessing federal preparedness 
and identifying corrective actions needed to close capability gaps. 
For example, the National Security Council convened the Sandy After-
Action Review Team in December 2012.[Footnote 26] The team was charged 
with identifying challenges experienced during the federal response to 
Hurricane Sandy that required cross-agency attention and development 
of related corrective actions.

Side bar: 

Hurricane Sandy: 

Hurricane Sandy was the second-largest Atlantic Ocean storm to hit the 
United States on record (after Hurricane Katrina in 2005), affecting 
the East Coast from Florida to Maine, and states as far west as the 
Great Lakes. Making landfall as a post-tropical cyclone in southern 
New Jersey on October 29, 2012, the hurricane severely affected the 
densely populated New York and New Jersey areas with heavy rains, 
strong winds, and record storm surges. The storm's effects were 
extensive, leaving more than 8.5 million customers without power, 
causing severe flooding, and contributing to acute fuel shortages in 
parts of New York and New Jersey. The storm damaged or destroyed 
hundreds of thousands of homes, caused tens of billions of dollars in 
damage, and claimed the lives of at least 162 people domestically. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of National Security Council documents, White 
House (photo). GAO-15-20. Damage of New Jersey's barrier beaches. 

[End of side bar]

In December 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security assigned 
FEMA as the departmental lead for coordinating and improving federal 
capabilities associated with responding to and recovering from a 
terrorist IND attack. The DHS IND Strategy was issued in April 2010 
and describes capabilities needed to respond to and recover from an 
IND incident and identified national gaps in these capabilities. The 
March 2012 and September 2013 iterations of the IND Implementation 
Plan described recommended actions to address IND response capability 
gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy, and the 2013 iteration also 
included the status of efforts to close those gaps.

ESF Coordinators Conduct Their Oversight Responsibilities in Various 
Ways, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen the Assessment of ESF 
Preparedness: 

ESF coordinators have taken various approaches to carry out their 
responsibilities under the NRF to oversee the preparedness activities 
of their assigned ESFs. However, opportunities exist to strengthen the 
assessment of ESF preparedness as FEMA--in coordination with other 
federal departments and agencies through the ESF Leadership Group--has 
not yet issued supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators detailing 
minimum standards for activities and product deliverables to 
demonstrate their ESFs' overall emergency response preparedness. In 
addition to the ESF coordinator's oversight responsibilities as 
defined in the NRF, the NRF also states that all ESFs are to support 
the planning core capability that, in part, entails establishing 
capability requirements, cataloging current capabilities, and 
conducting capability gap analyses. This core capability definition 
helps to identify the types of activities that ESF coordinators may 
pursue to engage--per the NRF--in appropriate planning and 
preparedness activities for their ESF. Planning helps to explain how 
federal departments and agencies are to provide the right resources at 
the right time--through, for example, ESFs--to support local, state, 
tribal, territorial, and insular area government response operations.

We found that ESF coordinators conduct a variety of coordination, 
planning, and capability assessment activities to oversee the 
preparedness of their ESFs based on each coordinator's interpretation 
of what is appropriate. Information provided to us by the 10 ESF 
coordinators on their range of activities is summarized in figure 1 
and below.[Footnote 27]

Figure 1: Number of Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinators 
Conducting Selected Activities to Oversee ESF Preparedness: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Activity: Coordinated with ESF partners; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator included the ESF's primary 
and support agencies: 10; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator limited to their home 
department or agency: 0. 

Activity: Developed plans or procedures; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator included the ESF's primary 
and support agencies: 10; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator limited to their home 
department or agency: 0. 

Activity: Set capability requirements; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator included the ESF's primary 
and support agencies: 2; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator limited to their home 
department or agency: 3. 

Activity: Cataloged capabilities; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator included the ESF's primary 
and support agencies: 2; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator limited to their home 
department or agency: 1. 

Activity: Analyzed capability gaps; 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator included the ESF's primary 
and support agencies: 2. 
Activities conducted by the ESF coordinator limited to their home 
department or agency: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by ESF coordinators. 
GAO-15-205U. 

[End of figure]

* Coordination. All 10 ESF coordinators identified at least one 
nonemergency activity through which they coordinate with their ESFs' 
primary and support agencies. These coordination activities included 
conference calls, in-person meetings, trainings, and exercises, among 
others, and varied in how frequently they occur. For additional 
details on the 10 ESFs' coordination activities, see appendix II.

* Planning. All 10 ESF coordinators identified at least one planning 
document--in addition to the information contained in the NRF's ESF 
annexes--that they had developed for their ESFs to further define the 
roles, responsibilities, policies, and procedures for their ESFs' 
coordination and execution. The coordinators cited various types of 
planning documents, including concepts of operations, operational 
plans, standard operating procedures, and manuals. For additional 
details on the 10 ESFs' planning documents, see appendix II.

* Capabilities. ESF coordinators provided varied responses regarding 
whether they had established capability requirements for their ESFs, 
cataloged currently available ESF capabilities, or conducted 
capability gap analyses of currently available capabilities against 
capability requirements for their ESFs. For additional details on the 
10 ESFs' capability requirements, catalogs, and gap analyses, see 
appendix II.

* Established capability requirements: 

- Five of the 10 ESF coordinators identified quantified capability 
requirements for their ESFs.

-- Three of these 5 coordinators identified capability requirements 
that were limited in scope to their department or agency and did not 
include requirements for the ESF's primary and support agencies. For 
example, the Public Safety and Security coordinator (DOJ) established 
a baseline staffing requirement that each DOJ law enforcement 
component is to be ready to provide, if requested, to support the 
ESF's operations.

-- In contrast, 2 of the 5 ESF coordinators identified capability 
requirements that applied to both the coordinator's department or 
agency and the ESF's primary and support agencies. For example, the 
Mass Care coordinator (DHS/FEMA) established sheltering and feeding 
requirements that apply both to DHS (including FEMA) and to the ESF's 
primary and support agencies.[Footnote 28]

- The remaining 5 of the 10 coordinators did not identify having 
established quantified capability requirements for their ESFs. For 
example, the Energy coordinator (DOE) stated that the department did 
not have the authority to establish such requirements, as the ESF's 
support agencies instead develop their own capability requirements 
based upon their individual missions and statutory authorities.

* Cataloged available capabilities.

- Three of the 10 ESF coordinators reported having developed a catalog 
or listing of quantified currently available capabilities for 
executing their assigned ESFs, and the Public Health and Medical 
Services coordinator (HHS) told us that such a catalog or listing was 
in development.

-- Two of the 3 coordinators who cataloged available capabilities--
Mass Care (DHS/FEMA) and Logistics (DHS/FEMA)--quantified capabilities 
for their own department or agency as well as for other primary and 
support agencies for their ESFs.

-- The third coordinator, Public Works and Engineering (DOD), only 
cataloged DOD capabilities.

- The remaining 7 of the 10 ESF coordinators did not identify a 
catalog or listing of quantified currently available capabilities for 
their ESFs. For example, the Search and Rescue coordinator (DHS/FEMA) 
stated that the unique nature of search and rescue operations made it 
impossible to catalog capabilities currently available to execute the 
ESF's mission.

* Conducted capability gap analyses.

- Four of the 10 ESF coordinators identified assessments that analyzed 
the gap between the ESF's currently available capabilities and those 
that the ESF coordinator had identified as required.

-- Two of the 4 coordinators conducted capability gap analyses that 
also included their ESFs' primary and support agencies. For example, 
the Mass Care coordinator (DHS/FEMA) assessed in April 2014 whether 
the ESF's primary and support agencies' available resources were 
sufficient to be considered "mission ready." 

-- In contrast, 2 of the 4 coordinators that reported having conducted 
capability gap analyses--Public Works and Engineering (DOD) and Public 
Safety and Security (DOJ)--limited their assessments to whether there 
were gaps in resources specific to the coordinator's agency.

- The remaining 6 of the 10 ESF coordinators did not identify 
assessments conducted to analyze capability gaps for executing their 
assigned ESFs, but the coordinators for Information and Planning (DHS/ 
FEMA) and Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) said that efforts 
to identify capability gaps were in progress.

The importance of assessing the preparedness of ESFs to provide 
emergency response in advance of responding to a real-world disaster 
was underscored by lessons learned from the federal response to 
Hurricane Sandy. The National Security Council's Hurricane Sandy after-
action report highlighted challenges in ESF preparedness to respond to 
the incident despite considerable warning time before the hurricane 
made landfall--advance notice that will not exist in the event of a no-
notice catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 29] The federal response 
revealed that not all ESFs operated effectively and that similar 
challenges could be experienced by ESFs during future disasters. One 
specific challenge cited by the report was that some ESF coordinators 
had adopted an intradepartmental approach to response operations 
rather than an integrated, interdepartmental approach that included 
all of the ESF's departments and agencies, as prescribed by the NRF. 
As a result, not all ESF coordinators were able to fully draw upon or 
understand the capabilities and associated authorities of other 
departments and agencies, a fact that diminished the federal 
government's unity of effort during the response. For example: 

* During the Hurricane Sandy federal response, the Energy coordinator 
(DOE) experienced significant challenges in attempting to coordinate 
response capabilities among its ESF's primary and support agencies. 
According to FEMA officials, the problems experienced by the Energy 
ESF were due, in part, to a lack of communication and collaboration 
between the ESF coordinator and the ESF's other agencies. The 
officials stated that had the ESF coordinator more effectively 
coordinated with the ESF primary and support agencies in advance of 
the hurricane, it would have been able to rely on a range of sources 
to help reestablish power to affected communities; however, the 
coordinator initially relied only on DOE capabilities, and these 
limited capabilities were quickly overwhelmed by the incident. These 
challenges with the execution of the Energy ESF led the President to 
establish an ad hoc Energy Restoration Task Force as a temporary work-
around to coordinate efforts to restore power and address fuel 
shortages.[Footnote 30] According to DOE officials, DOE has taken 
actions to address challenges it experienced during Hurricane Sandy. 
For example, DOE established a permanent DOE Energy Restoration Team 
that includes private sector stakeholders who may be quickly contacted 
before, during, and after an event to assess the status of private 
sector current conditions and requirements for restoration of energy 
infrastructure.

* On the basis of a request from the Public Safety and Security 
coordinator (DOJ) to support operations, eight agencies provided 
federal law enforcement officers to help secure critical assets, guard 
fuel convoys, and perform other protective duties during the Hurricane 
Sandy federal response.[Footnote 31] However, according to the after-
action report, these agencies decided independently whether or not to 
respond to the ESF coordinator's request, how many officers they would 
supply to support each mission, and how quickly and for how long the 
officers would deploy. This agency-centric approach to responding to 
requests for assistance caused uncertainty and delays in meeting 
operational requirements. The report concluded that ESFs should make 
better use of ESF primary and support agencies' capabilities, which 
includes clearly understanding their capabilities, authorities, and 
limitations.

The after-action report also called for the ESF Leadership Group to 
undertake a scenario-based capability analysis in order to identify 
current capabilities to meet ESF missions as well as related 
capability shortfalls.[Footnote 32] In response, in July 2013 the ESF 
Leadership Group asked each ESF to conduct a hurricane scenario-based 
capability analysis to identify any gaps in its ability to deliver the 
core capabilities described in each ESF's annex to the NRF. Nine of 
the 10 ESF coordinators within the scope of our review produced 
capability gap analyses that were qualitative in nature.[Footnote 33]

Federal departments and agencies that serve as ESF coordinators 
oversee their ESFs' preparedness activities in various ways, as stated 
earlier, in part because the ESF Leadership Group and the group's 
chair, FEMA, have not issued guidance--supplemental to the NRF--to 
coordinators detailing with greater specificity the minimum standards 
for activities and product deliverables to demonstrate their ESFs' 
overall response preparedness.[Footnote 34] Apart from general 
descriptions of ESF coordinator responsibilities, the NRF does not 
include additional guidance or direction on how coordinators are to 
carry out their responsibilities. For example, the NRF does not 
provide guidance on (1) what amount or quality of contact between ESF 
coordinators and ESF primary and support agencies is necessary to 
demonstrate that sufficient coordination is ongoing; (2) what 
constitutes appropriate planning and preparedness activities, or what 
plans should be developed and activities engaged in to demonstrate 
that sufficient planning and activity has been completed or is 
underway; and (3) how ESF coordinators are to support the planning 
response core capability--which, in part, entails determining 
capability requirements for their ESFs, cataloging current 
capabilities, and conducting capability gap analyses--to demonstrate 
that the given ESF is sufficiently prepared. Detailed guidance has 
also not been provided in other documents implementing the National 
Preparedness System.[Footnote 35]

FEMA officials told us that such guidance would be helpful to clarify 
what activities and product deliverables, at a minimum, ESF 
coordinators should engage in and develop to demonstrate effective ESF 
coordination. Further, FEMA officials told us that they prefer that 
ESF-specific expectations on minimum activities and product 
deliverables be established, as such expectations would in turn better 
enable FEMA to assess the status of ESF preparedness by comparing ESF 
coordinator activities against established expectations. For example, 
one potential ESF minimum activity expectation cited by FEMA officials 
could be whether the ESF coordinator held at least an annual ESF 
coordination conference for the ESF's primary and support agencies in 
order establish and strengthen communication among the given ESF's 
partners. FEMA officials stated that they have not yet issued 
supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators because they have not been 
required to do so and because they do not believe FEMA has the 
statutory authority to direct other departments or agencies to 
implement such guidance once issued.

However, responsibility for assessing federal emergency response 
preparedness--including for the ESFs under the NRF--is delegated by 
law and presidential directive to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and the Administrator of FEMA. We recognize that FEMA's authority is 
generally to coordinate, guide, and support--rather than direct--other 
departments and agencies in conducting the national preparedness 
activities delegated to them through the NRF, and that collaboration 
between FEMA and other departments and agencies is an essential 
element of these efforts. However, FEMA's charge to lead national 
preparedness activities and assess the nation's overall preparedness, 
as outlined in the Post-Katrina Act, provides it with the opportunity 
to work with other federal departments and agencies through the ESF 
Leadership Group to provide more detailed guidance to ESF coordinators 
than has been provided to date. Such additional guidance, setting 
expectations for coordinators on minimum standards for activities and 
product deliverables to demonstrate their ESFs' preparedness, would 
better enable the Secretary and the Administrator to assess ESF 
preparedness by comparing actual ESF coordinator activities and 
deliverables produced against established expectations. We have 
previously reported that interagency coordination can be enhanced by 
clearly defining roles and responsibilities--such as minimum 
expectations for ESF coordinators--and that clearly defining and 
communicating expectations for leadership roles and responsibilities 
in advance of catastrophic disasters is essential to better ensuring 
effective emergency response when such disasters occur.[Footnote 36] 
Existing guidance to ESF coordinators on their ESF oversight role 
identifies broad responsibilities, but does not establish minimal 
expectations for coordination activities and product deliverables. 
More specific expectations would provide a basis for the Secretary's 
and Administrator's assessment of current ESF preparedness that does 
not currently exist.

Federal Departments Identified Corrective Actions to Address 
Capability Gaps, but Management Oversight of Implementation Status 
Could Be Improved: 

Federal Departments Monitor the Implementation of Corrective Actions 
from National-Level Exercises to Address Capability Gaps, but Could 
Benefit from Comprehensive Status Reporting: 

Side bar: 

National-Level Exercise 2010 Corrective; Action Example: 

Department: Defense (DOD). 

Capability gap: The issue of National Guard troops being federalized 
and defederalized resulted in extensive senior leader debate and 
consultation during the exercise. 

Corrective action: Convene a roundtable discussion with key 
interagency stakeholders to inform senior leaders regarding the 
employment, command and control, and unity of effort for the 
deployment of National Guard forces in this situation. 

Status: Closed. 

Action taken: DOD officials reported that the department led a series 
of working sessions from June 2011 to July 2013 to examine this issue, 
and as a result, issued a formal DOD instruction in July 2013 on the 
use of the National Guard for defense support to civilian authorities 
for natural and manmade disasters.

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency and DOD 
documents, DOD (photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar] 

The federal departments that participated in NLEs monitor the status 
of their corrective actions; however they do not report this 
information to DHS or FEMA, nor does DHS or FEMA comprehensively 
collect this information from the departments. As a result, DHS and 
FEMA cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the status of national 
preparedness in its reporting, as called for by Presidential Policy 
Directive 8.

NLE 2010 assessed federal preparedness to respond to an IND attack, 
and FEMA's interagency after-action report identified 121 corrective 
actions, 104 of which were directed to one of the five departments in 
our review.[Footnote 37] NLE 2011 assessed federal preparedness to 
respond to a major earthquake, among other things, and FEMA's 
interagency after-action report highlighted areas for improvement--
such as the need to increase familiarization with earthquake response 
plans at the state, regional, and national levels--for federal 
departments and agencies to develop their own corrective actions in 
their own after-action reports. The five departments in our review 
identified 75 actions that they had planned to take to address the 
capability gaps identified in the interagency after-action report. As 
of November 2014, nearly all of the corrective actions from NLEs 2010 
and 2011 have been closed to date, as shown in table 2.[Footnote 38]

Side bar: 

National-Level Exercise 2010 Corrective Action Example: 

Department: Homeland Security (DHS). 

Capability gap: Exercise participants noted that fire departments 
across the country, unlike law enforcement agencies, had no common 
method of communication with one another. 

Corrective action: Examine methods to connect fire departments, a 
vital first responder group. 

Status: Open. 

Plans to address: According to DHS, the Office of Emergency 
Communications continues to reach out and engage state and local 
stakeholders to ensure interoperable emergency communications are 
addressed in the DHS National Emergency Communications Plan. This 
effort helps to improve communications and integration of local police 
and fire departments in response to natural and manmade disasters. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
DHS documents, FEMA (photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar] 

Table 2: Status of Corrective Actions from National-Level Exercises 
(NLE) 2010 and 2011 for the Five Departments, as of November 2014: 

Department: Defense (DOD); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2010: 2/4; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2011: 27/29; 
Method of monitoring the implementation of corrective actions from 
NLEs: According to DOD officials, the department monitors the status 
of corrective actions from NLEs in the DOD Joint Lessons Learned 
Information System.[A]. DOD's system does not interface with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Corrective Action Program 
System (CAPS) and DOD officials stated that they do not use CAPS to 
monitor or provide information updates on the status of these 
corrective actions.[B] 

Department: Energy (DOE); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2010: No corrective 
actions; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2011: 8/8; 
Method of monitoring the implementation of corrective actions from 
NLEs: According to DOE officials, the department does not monitor the 
status of corrective actions from NLEs in a DOE data system. Instead, 
corrective actions assigned to DOE are monitored in an ad hoc manner 
by senior DOE staff responsible for overseeing DOE's emergency 
response activities. DOE officials stated that they do not use CAPS to 
monitor or provide information updates on the status of these 
corrective actions.[C] 

Department: Health and Human Services (HHS): 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2010: 3/3; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2011: 22/22; 
Method of monitoring the implementation of corrective actions from 
NLEs: According to HHS officials, the department monitors the status 
of corrective actions from NLEs using an internal-to-HHS Internet-
based data management system that is updated by an HHS corrective 
action working group. HHS also updated the status of the corrective 
actions assigned to the department in CAPS for NLE 2010 on an ongoing 
and as-needed basis until these 3 corrective actions were closed.[D] 

Department: Homeland Security (DHS); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2010: 90/94; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2011: 14/14; 
Method of monitoring the implementation of corrective actions from 
NLEs: According to FEMA officials, the agency monitors the status of 
corrective actions from NLEs for DHS and its components in CAPS. FEMA 
officials send quarterly emails to corrective action officers at DHS 
components to remind them to update the status of their component's 
assigned corrective actions in CAPS. 

Department: Justice (DOJ); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2010: 3/3; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: NLE 2011: 2/2; 
Method of monitoring the implementation of corrective actions from 
NLEs: According to DOJ officials, the department does not monitor the 
status of corrective actions from NLEs in a DOJ system. Instead, the 
department monitors the status of these corrective actions for DOJ and 
its components through DOJ's Emergency Preparedness Committee, which 
meets on a monthly basis and assigns corrective actions to DOJ 
components following NLEs. DOJ officials stated that they do not use 
CAPS to monitor or provide information updates on the status of these 
corrective actions. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS, 
and HHS. GAO-15-20. 

[A] According to DOD officials, DOD's Joint Lessons Learned 
Information System is a knowledge management system and the 
department's centralized repository for capturing data for development 
and institutionalization of DOD lessons learned. The system is used to 
collect observations and best practices identified during exercises, 
real-world disasters, as well as daily operations. The system's 
process entails recording observations, vetting these observations to 
identify associated issues, then evaluating and verifying resolutions 
to the identified issues. Upon resolution, these issues are officially 
designated as DOD lessons learned. DOD officials stated that the 
system is accessible and shared among some of DOD's federal 
interagency partners, including DHS, FEMA, and HHS.

[B] CAPS is the database that DHS and FEMA use to monitor the status 
of their corrective actions from NLEs. According to FEMA officials, 
other departments and agencies may also use the system to monitor the 
status of their corrective actions.

[C] Within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office 
of Emergency Response formally tracks lessons learned from 
radiological emergency responses and exercises. According to DOE 
officials, observations and findings are rolled up into lessons 
learned from which corrective actions are developed. These corrective 
actions are prioritized and funded according to their importance. 
Regularly scheduled meetings track the progress of these corrective 
actions.

[D] HHS did not update the status of its corrective actions for NLE 
2011 in CAPS, as it had done for NLE 2010, because FEMA did not 
catalog corrective actions for NLE 2011 in CAPS for departments 
outside of DHS. 

[End of table] 

Side bar: 

National-Level Exercise 2011 Corrective Action Example: 

Department: Health and Human Services (HHS). 

Capability gap: While exercise participants recognized the importance 
of understanding the benefits of social media outlets outside of the 
traditional television and radio community during a disaster, HHS 
lacked a policy or procedure on how to utilize information gained 
through social media. 

Corrective action: Continue to foster the awareness of social media 
capabilities but develop HHS standards, policies, and procedures for 
their use. 

Status: Closed. 

Action taken: According to HHS officials, the department developed 
standard operating procedures specifically on the use of social media 
and will reevaluate in the future to ensure that the procedures remain 
relevant to evolving social media. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
Department of Homeland Security documents, FEMA (photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar] 

To enhance FEMA's ability to assess the extent to which corrective 
actions have been implemented and describe strengths and weaknesses in 
the nation's preparedness capabilities, we recommended in April 2009 
that FEMA either (1) revise the National Exercise Program to require 
the use of FEMA's Corrective Action Program System (CAPS), the 
database that DHS and FEMA use to monitor the status of their 
corrective actions from NLEs, or (2) require that federal agencies 
submit a report to FEMA on the status of their corrective actions 
resulting from such exercises.[Footnote 39] In June 2012, FEMA issued 
an updated implementation plan for the National Exercise Program that 
states that all federal-level corrective actions developed from NLEs 
are to be tracked through CAPS from identification through 
implementation. According to FEMA officials, the agency assists in 
this process by initially inputting the corrective actions into CAPS 
following an NLE. However, as shown in table 2, we found that, other 
than DHS, only HHS updated the status of its assigned corrective 
actions in CAPS, and FEMA officials noted that the agency does not 
have authority to compel other departments and agencies to update the 
status of their corrective actions in the system. Officials from DOD, 
DOE, and DOJ told us they do not use CAPS because they instead prefer 
to use their own internal corrective action monitoring systems or 
processes. Thus, while FEMA took actions to enhance its ability to 
monitor corrective actions in CAPS, other federal departments that 
participate in NLEs do not report this information to DHS or FEMA. As 
a result, FEMA has not yet been able to assess the extent to which NLE 
corrective actions have been implemented across the federal government 
and, ultimately, describe strengths and weaknesses in the nation's 
preparedness capabilities. 

Side bar: 

National-Level Exercise 2011 Corrective Action Example: 

Department: Defense (DOD): 

Capability gap: During the exercise, DOD officials noted the need to 
have a mapping product capable of providing the commander with a 
picture of significant interagency activities, but noted that agency 
partners did not use a standard common operating picture product.

Corrective action: Develop a tool to reside on the Non-Classified 
Internet Protocol Router network portal for use by all battle cells 
and directorates to allow internal and external data sharing with 
interagency partners, the private sector, and nongovernmental 
organizations.

Status: Open: 

Plans to address: According to DOD officials, this action developed 
into two issues--information sharing via the Situational Awareness 
Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) and operationalizing SAGE information for 
assessments and decisions--both of which are being addressed by a 
relevant working group. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents (text and photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar] 

FEMA could more comprehensively report on the nation's overall 
preparedness if it had information on the status of implementation of 
corrective actions identified through the NLEs. Specifically, in March 
2011, the White House issued Presidential Policy Directive 8 on 
National Preparedness, which called for FEMA to lead the development 
of a comprehensive approach to assessing national preparedness as well 
as to develop an annual national preparedness report.[Footnote 40] To 
develop the annual National Preparedness Report, FEMA contacts other 
federal departments and agencies requesting information on, among 
other things, strengths and areas for improvement identified following 
exercises over the prior year, which may include both NLEs as well as 
exercises conducted internally at a given department or agency. 
[Footnote 41] However, the agency does not request information on the 
status of corrective actions to be implemented by other federal 
departments and agencies arising from such exercises because, 
according to FEMA officials, the National Preparedness Report is 
written for a national audience and contains limited detail on any 
given federal department or agency. In response to FEMA's request for 
information when preparing the March 2014 National Preparedness 
Report, FEMA officials stated that other federal departments and 
agencies provided anecdotal examples of ongoing efforts and 
accomplishments achieved to improve national preparedness. However, 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 calls for the National Preparedness 
Report to describe the progress made toward meeting the National 
Preparedness Goal.[Footnote 42] Anecdotal examples provided by other 
federal departments and agencies, while illustrative, do not provide a 
comprehensive description of the progress made in closing capability 
gaps identified through prior NLEs. The status of implementation of 
corrective actions to close these known gaps is an integral component 
in describing the overall status of national preparedness.

According to FEMA officials, the National Security Council is 
responsible for monitoring the overall implementation of corrective 
actions across the federal interagency. Specifically, the council is 
responsible for overseeing the progress of corrective action 
implementation from NLEs for all federal departments and agencies to 
ensure priority issues are assigned and completed within a specific 
timeframe.[Footnote 43] FEMA officials stated that the council 
occasionally tasks relevant departments and agencies with providing an 
update on the status of their corrective actions from NLEs. On such 
occasions, FEMA provided this information for DHS and its components, 
while other federal departments and agencies provided the status of 
their corrective actions directly to the council.[Footnote 44]

According to FEMA officials, the agency does not request information 
on the status of corrective actions from NLEs for other departments 
from the National Security Council because it does not have the 
responsibility to do so.[Footnote 45] However, in order to have a 
comprehensive picture of the progress made toward meeting the National 
Preparedness Goal, the Secretary of Homeland Security--through FEMA--
would benefit from comprehensive and up-to-date information on the 
extent to which capability gaps identified through NLEs have been 
addressed. While the departments in our review reported that nearly 
all of the outstanding corrective actions from NLE 2010 and NLE 2011 
have been closed as of August 2014, FEMA plans to conduct future NLEs 
on a biennial and ongoing basis and information on the implementation 
of corrective actions identified through these future exercises will 
be important to providing a more complete picture of the nation's 
preparedness. Thus, collecting information on the status of corrective 
actions from NLEs across the federal government would better position 
the Secretary of Homeland Security--through FEMA--to comprehensively 
describe the status of national preparedness in its annual reporting.

Departments Monitor the Implementation of Corrective Actions from Real-
World Incidents, but DHS Could Benefit from Comprehensive Status 
Reporting: 

Following real-world emergency incidents, such as the federal response 
to Hurricane Sandy in October 2012, federal departments and agencies 
at times develop after-action reports that identify corrective actions 
to address observed federal capability gaps and subsequently monitor 
the status of their corrective actions; however they do not report to 
FEMA or DHS on the status of these actions, nor does DHS or FEMA 
collect this information from the departments. As a result, DHS and 
FEMA cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the status of national 
preparedness in its reporting, as called for by Presidential Policy 
Directive 8.

Side bar: 

Hurricane Sandy Corrective Action Example: 

Department: Justice (DOJ). 

Capability gap: The regional law enforcement coordinators and field 
coordinators of the Public Safety and Security emergency support 
function (ESF) deployed to the field during Hurricane Sandy did not 
have the supplies necessary to perform their mission. 

Corrective action: Develop a deployment kit to be sent with regional 
law enforcement coordinators and field coordinators during all Public 
Safety and Security ESF deployments. 

Status: Closed. 

Action taken: Standardized deployment gear and clothing were provided 
to all deployable Public Safety and Security ESF personnel. Further, 
each region was provided a "deployment kit," and extra deployment kits 
are maintained at the Public Safety and Security ESF headquarters. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ documents, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar]

The five departments we reviewed all identified capability gaps and 
developed associated corrective actions following the federal 
government's response to Hurricane Sandy, and they are each monitoring 
the status of their assigned actions through their own internal 
systems or processes. As shown in table 3, more than half (63 out of 
102) of the corrective actions identified by the five departments or 
their components based on their response to Hurricane Sandy have been 
closed as of November 2014.[Footnote 46] In addition, as shown in 
table 3, DOD, DOE, DOJ, and HHS used the same processes to monitor the 
status of corrective actions they developed in response to Hurricane 
Sandy as they did for the corrective actions they developed in 
response to prior NLEs, as previously discussed. In contrast, FEMA 
uses a different process, monitoring the status of its corrective 
actions through an intra-agency working group and an internal-to-FEMA 
data-sharing repository.[Footnote 47] None of the five departments 
used CAPS to monitor corrective actions from Hurricane Sandy or 
otherwise report this information to DHS or FEMA, nor did FEMA request 
or receive information from the other departments on their status.

Table 3: Status of Corrective Actions from Hurricane Sandy for Five 
Departments, as of November 2014: 

Department and relevant component: 
Defense (DOD); 
* Northern Command (NORTHCOM)[A]; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: 8/10; 
Method of monitoring the implementation: of corrective actions from 
Hurricane Sandy: According to DOD officials, the department monitors 
the status of corrective actions from real-world incidents in the DOD 
Joint Lessons Learned Information System. DOD's system does not 
interface with FEMA's Corrective Action Program System (CAPS) and DOD 
officials stated that they do not use CAPS to monitor or provide 
information updates on the status of these corrective actions.[B].

Department and relevant component: 
Energy (DOE); 
* Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability[C]; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: 7/9; 
Method of monitoring the implementation: of corrective actions from 
Hurricane Sandy: According to DOE officials, the department does not 
monitor the status of corrective actions from real-world incidents in 
a formal DOE data system. Instead, corrective actions assigned to DOE 
are monitored in an ad hoc manner by senior DOE staff responsible for 
overseeing DOE's emergency response activities. DOE officials stated 
that they do not use CAPS to monitor or provide information updates on 
the status of these corrective actions. 

Department and relevant component: 
Health and Human Services (HHS); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: 22/44; 
Method of monitoring the implementation: of corrective actions from 
Hurricane Sandy: According to HHS officials, the department monitors 
the status of corrective actions from real-world incidents using an 
internal-to-HHS Internet-based data management system that is updated 
by an HHS corrective action working group. However, HHS does not 
update or otherwise use CAPS to monitor the status its corrective 
actions from real-world incidents, in part because FEMA does not 
catalog corrective actions in CAPS for other departments for real-
world incidents as it does for national-level exercises. 

Department and relevant component: 
Homeland Security (DHS); 
* Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: 5/14; 
Method of monitoring the implementation: of corrective actions from 
Hurricane Sandy: According to FEMA officials, FEMA monitors the status 
of corrective actions from Hurricane Sandy through its Continuous 
Improvement Working Group and an internal-to-FEMA data-sharing 
repository. Unlike with corrective actions from NLEs, FEMA does not 
require that corrective actions from real-world incidents are tracked 
in CAPS. While FEMA's offices are encouraged to use CAPS, they may use 
other processes as necessary. 

Department and relevant component: 
Justice (DOJ); 
* Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)[D]; 
Number of closed corrective actions/total: 21/25; 
Method of monitoring the implementation: of corrective actions from 
Hurricane Sandy: According to DOJ officials, the department does not 
monitor the status of corrective actions from real-world incidents in 
a formal DOJ system. Instead, the department monitors the status of 
these corrective actions for DOJ and its components through DOJ's 
Emergency Preparedness Committee, which meets on a monthly basis and 
assigns corrective actions to DOJ components following NLEs. DOJ 
officials stated that they do not use CAPS to monitor or provide 
information updates on the status of these corrective actions. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS, 
and HHS. GAO-15-20. 

[A] NORTHCOM is the DOD component primarily responsible for defense 
support to civilian authorities in the continental United States and 
Alaska, among other areas.

[B] CAPS is the database that DHS and FEMA use to monitor the status 
of their corrective actions from NLEs. According to FEMA officials, 
other departments and agencies may also use the system to monitor the 
status of their corrective actions.

[C] DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability is the 
coordinator of the ESF on Energy, which provided situational 
assessments of the electricity, oil, and natural gas sectors, among 
other kinds of support, to assist with the response to Hurricane Sandy.

[D] ATF is the coordinator of the ESF on Public Safety and Security, 
which coordinated the deployment of federal law enforcement officers, 
among other kinds of support to assist with the response to Hurricane 
Sandy. 

[End of table] 

Side bar: 

Hurricane Sandy Corrective Action Example: 

Department: Energy (DOE). 

Capability gap: Situational awareness of fuel supplies was inadequate 
and better communication of power restoration timeframes was needed. 

Corrective action: Leverage technology to improve response and 
communications, including working with public and private sector 
responders to identify effective communication and response 
technologies, as well as processes and opportunities for technology 
solutions to improve information sharing. 

Status: Closed. 

Plans to address: According to DOE, the department is addressing this 
action through a visualization and modeling platform that will allow 
DOE staff to geospatially map energy assets and systems and tie 
together a variety of data sources into one platform. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE documents (text and photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar]

In addition to the after-action reports developed by each department 
following Hurricane Sandy, the National Security Council's Hurricane 
Sandy after-action report recommended 17 corrective actions, most of 
which were assigned to the council, FEMA, or the ESF Leadership Group. 
However, FEMA officials stated that these corrective actions were not 
formally assigned by the National Security Council to FEMA or others 
for implementation and closure. FEMA officials stated that although 
they are not officially monitoring the status of these actions, the 
agency meets regularly with ESF coordinators to discuss issues 
identified in the report, among other things, as the chair of the ESF 
Leadership Group.

In addition to requesting information related to strengths and areas 
for improvement identified following exercises for development of the 
National Preparedness Report, FEMA also requests information for the 
report on strengths and areas for improvement identified following the 
federal response to recent real-world incidents over the prior year. 
According to FEMA officials, in response to this request, other 
federal departments and agencies provided anecdotal examples of 
ongoing efforts and accomplishments to improve national preparedness, 
including examples of progress made to address areas for improvement 
identified during Hurricane Sandy. However, as with NLEs and other 
exercises, FEMA does not request information from other departments 
and agencies on the status of their corrective actions identified 
following real-world incidents because, according to FEMA officials, 
the National Preparedness Report is written for a national audience 
and contains limited detail on any given federal department or agency. 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 calls for the National Preparedness 
Report to describe the progress made toward meeting the National 
Preparedness Goal. Anecdotal examples provided by other federal 
departments and agencies, while illustrative, do not provide a 
comprehensive description of the progress made in closing capability 
gaps identified through prior real-world disasters. The status of 
implementation of corrective actions to close these known gaps is an 
integral component in describing the overall status of national 
preparedness.

As discussed, FEMA is not aware of the full range of information on 
capability gaps identified by other federal departments and agencies 
during this and other real-world incidents. According to FEMA 
officials, the agency does not collect information on the status of 
corrective actions from other departments because it does not have the 
responsibility to do so. However, in order to have a comprehensive 
picture of the progress made toward meeting the National Preparedness 
Goal, the Secretary of Homeland Security--through FEMA--would benefit 
from comprehensive and up-to-date information on the extent to which 
capability gaps identified through real-world disasters have been 
addressed. While the implementation of corrective actions is the 
responsibility of the departments and agencies to which those actions 
are assigned, information on the status of corrective actions 
identified through real-world disasters is important for providing a 
more complete picture of the nation's preparedness. Thus, collecting 
information on the status of these corrective actions across the 
federal government would better position the Secretary of Homeland 
Security--through FEMA--to comprehensively describe the status of 
national preparedness in its annual reporting.

FEMA Developed a Plan to Address IND Response Capability Gaps, but the 
Agency Could Benefit from Adopting Leading Practices for Program 
Management: 

Side bar: 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Capability Gap and Corrective Action 
Example: 

Working group: Medical and Public Health. 

Capability gap: There is a need for greater access to U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration-approved medical countermeasures for treating 
radiation effects in the wake of an IND detonation. Medical 
countermeasures include vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics to treat 
medical conditions such as radiation poisoning that can occur in the 
wake of an IND detonation. 

Corrective action: Pursue research and development of new and 
predeploying existing countermeasures for such treatment. 

Progress: The September 2013 IND Implementation Plan reported that 
completion of this action will take 5 to 10 years. 

[Illustration] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documents, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (graphic). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar] 

FEMA issued the IND Implementation Plan in March 2012 to document 
proposed corrective actions to address IND response capability gaps 
for federal emergency response identified in the April 2010 DHS IND 
Strategy. However, the plan does not capture key program management 
information--including, among other things, estimates of completion 
dates, interim timeframes and milestones, and funding and resource 
requirements--which hinders management's ability to monitor the status 
of the identified corrective actions.[Footnote 48] Specifically, five 
interagency working groups composed of subject matter experts from 
federal departments and agencies as well as stakeholders from state 
and local emergency management organizations, academic institutions, 
and research centers identified over 300 proposed corrective actions 
in the IND Implementation Plan needed to close the 136 capability gaps 
identified in the DHS IND Strategy.[Footnote 49] DHS designated FEMA's 
Response Directorate's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and High Explosives Office to lead monitoring the status of efforts to 
close capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy and 
coordinating the five interagency working groups that are responsible 
for closing the identified gaps. Table 4 describes the focus areas for 
each of the working groups as well as the number of capability gaps 
identified in the DHS IND Strategy for which the working groups were 
assigned lead responsibility.

Side bar: 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Capability Gap and Corrective Action 
Example: 

Working group: Response. 

Capability gap: Emergency shelters proximate to an IND detonation may 
not open following the incident because of public perceptions about 
the potential dangers posed by low levels of radioactive contamination. 

Corrective action: Develop a white paper for Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) officials that addresses, among other things, 
challenges related to decontaminating people and animals in need of 
shelter. 

Progress: The September 2013 IND Implementation Plan reported that 
this action was 75 percent complete. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA documents (text and photo). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar]

Table 4: Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Interagency Working Group 
Focus Areas and Assigned Capability Gaps as Described in the IND 
Implementation Plan: 

Working group: Response; 
Description: 
* Focuses on gaps related to incident response and command 
capabilities required to effectively respond to an IND detonation from 
the first few minutes after the blast to approximately a month after 
the incident; 
* Assigned lead responsibility for 61 of 136 identified capability 
gaps. 

Working group: Recovery; 
Description: 
* Focuses on capability gaps related to post-IND detonation cleanup 
and decontamination of affected areas; 
* Assigned lead responsibility for 18 of 136 identified capability 
gaps. 

Working group: Medical and Public Health; 
Description: 
* Focuses on gaps related to medical response capabilities required to 
effectively respond to post-IND detonation, including medical triage, 
treatment, training for first responders and healthcare providers, 
patient tracking, clinical laboratory surge, and emergency responder 
and evacuee safety; 
* Assigned lead responsibility for 52 of 136 identified capability 
gaps. 

Working group: Communications and Public Messaging; 
Description: 
* Focuses on capability gaps related to disseminating public 
information and communications post-IND detonation for both emergency 
responders and the public, and provides related support to the other 
working groups as needed; 
* Assigned lead responsibility for 5 of 136 identified capability gaps. 

Working group: Scientific Support; 
Description: 
* Provides scientific and technical input for the activities of all 
the working groups; 
* Assigned lead responsibility for none of the 136 identified 
capability gaps. 

Working group: Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management 
Agency documents. GAO-15-20. 

[End of table] 

Side bar: 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Capability Gap and Corrective Action 
Example: 

Working group: Recovery. 

Capability gap: Recovery personnel must be able to minimize 
radioactive waste volume and reduce the public's radiation exposure to 
scientifically defendable and safe levels. 

Corrective action: Develop technologies for containment of the 
radiological or nuclear contaminants as well as guidance on how they 
should be applied to various urban areas, including critical 
infrastructure. 

Progress: The September 2013 IND Implementation Plan reported that 
this was a high-priority capability gap for which there was no 
currently identified program or project. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documents, 
Department of Homeland Security (photo). GAO-15-20. 

[End of side bar]

In September 2013, FEMA issued its first annual update to the IND 
Implementation Plan to describe progress made to address the highest-
priority capability gaps previously identified in the DHS IND 
Strategy.[Footnote 50] Specifically, the updated IND Implementation 
Plan identified ongoing actions of the working groups to close 14 of 
the 136 capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy, noting 
that few, if any, gaps had been completely closed.[Footnote 51] 
Further, the plan also identified an additional 31 high-priority 
capability gaps with associated corrective actions that had not yet 
been initiated. Finally, the plan also noted that the interagency 
working groups were to review all 136 previously identified capability 
gaps and corresponding corrective actions--removing existing or adding 
new gaps and associated actions as necessary--prior to issuance of the 
next iteration of the annual update to the IND Implementation Plan in 
2015.

Our analysis of the September 2013 IND Implementation Plan found that 
the plan provided only general information on ongoing activities to 
address previously identified capability gaps. It did not identify 
detailed program management information. For example, for the 14 
prioritized capability gaps with ongoing activities described in the 
plan, the plan did not describe specific estimated target completion 
dates nor interim timeframes and milestones toward completion, but 
instead described projects in terms of their relative degree of 
completion (e.g., 25 percent complete), general estimated timeframes 
(e.g., 5 to 10 years to complete), or as being ongoing without 
additional detail.[Footnote 52] Further, with regard to funding, none 
of the activities for the 14 gaps identified specific funding or 
resource requirements to complete these activities.[Footnote 53] As a 
result, the IND Implementation Plan as written does not enable DHS and 
FEMA management to know, among other things, when a given capability 
gap will be closed or what interim milestones should exist on its way 
to closure, what detailed actions are necessary by which federal 
actors and in what sequence, or how much it will cost to close the 
given gap. 

Side bar: 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Capability Gap and Corrective Action 
Example: 

Working group: Communications and Public Messaging. 

Capability gap: Public communications systems exist but are inadequate 
for large-scope incidents, such as an IND detonation. Local 
information sources need to establish initial communications with, 
among, and between the affected population and response forces, 
government, and media. 

Corrective action: Develop a public communications strategy to provide 
awareness of safety and security actions in the vicinity of the blast 
area and in the overall federally declared disaster area. 

Progress: The September 2013 IND Implementation Plan reported that 
this action was ongoing, but did not provide a specific date the 
action was to be completed. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA documents (text and photo). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar]

The IND Implementation Plan contains limited information on the five 
working groups' ongoing activities, in part because FEMA has not 
requested the information. According to FEMA officials, detailed 
program management information is maintained by the interagency 
working groups and the relevant departments or agencies funding the 
activities of a given working group. FEMA officials stated during the 
course of our review that, as of August 2014, they had initiated the 
process of developing a multiyear program management plan for 
executing the IND Implementation Plan. The program management plan 
will supersede the existing IND Implementation Plan and be updated on 
a quarterly basis, according to FEMA officials. However, the officials 
stated that they were in the early stages of developing this new 
program management plan and were unable to identify specific elements 
that the plan will contain when finalized, including whether it would 
include estimated completion dates, interim timeframes and milestones, 
and estimates of funding and resource requirements.[Footnote 54]

Side bar: 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Capability Gap and Corrective Action 
Example: 

Working group: Scientific Support. 

Capability gap: The current plume modeling capability uses input 
assumptions derived from empirical data from two surface detonations 
in a nonurban environment, which may lead to uncertain results when 
dealing with an IND detonation in an urban environment. 

Corrective action: Improve model input assumptions for an urban 
environment to account for, among other things, fireball temperature 
in an urban environment and particle size distribution for asphalt, 
concrete, and other urban materials. 

Progress: The September 2013 IND Implementation Plan reported that 
this was a high priority capability gap for which there was no 
currently identified program or project. 

[Photograph] 

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documents, 
Department of Energy (photo). GAO-15-20.

[End of side bar] 

As a leading practice to better enable management oversight for 
monitoring the implementation of a specific program and its related 
projects, The Standard for Program Management calls for the 
development of detailed program management information that should 
include, among other things, estimated completion dates, interim 
timeframes and milestones, and estimates of funding and resource 
requirements to accomplish the program's intended ends.[Footnote 55] 
Such program management information is designed to assist management 
in assessing the status of efforts related to the program and its 
associated projects, identifying potential funding or resource 
shortfalls, and ensuring that resources are properly allocated based 
on management's priorities. Without such information, the IND 
Implementation Plan as currently written cannot on its own provide 
reasonable assurance to the Secretary of Homeland Security that FEMA's 
efforts to coordinate implementation of the DHS IND Strategy will be 
achieved in an effective or efficient manner. Although FEMA officials 
stated that they plan to develop a multiyear program management plan 
in the future for implementation of the DHS IND Strategy, such an 
effort was in the preliminary stages of development at the time of our 
review and officials were unable to describe the extent to which the 
intended plan may include detailed program management information. 
Including such information would better enable FEMA management to 
assess the extent of progress made toward executing the DHS IND 
Strategy against estimated completion dates, interim timeframes and 
milestones, and funding and resources requirements. Developing and 
regularly updating detailed program management plan information for 
execution of the DHS IND Strategy would better enable officials in 
FEMA's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 
Explosives Office and by extension, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to perform necessary management oversight for monitoring 
implementation of the corrective actions to close the 136 identified 
IND response capability gaps.

Conclusions: 

No-notice catastrophic disasters, including IND attacks and major 
earthquakes, have the potential to cause enormous loss of life and 
property. National emergency preparedness activities, including the 
effective coordination of ESFs under the NRF and closure of capability 
gaps identified through national-level exercises, real-world 
disasters, and other assessments are means to better ensure the 
strength and resiliency of the United States in the face of such 
threats. Given the Secretary of Homeland Security's assigned 
responsibility to ensure that overall federal preparedness actions are 
unified, complete, and synchronized to prevent unfilled gaps or seams 
in the federal government's efforts to respond to all hazards, it is 
essential that the Secretary have accurate and up-to-date information 
on the readiness of interagency efforts--including through ESFs--to 
respond to major disasters, and knowledge that identified capability 
gaps are being addressed and closed in a timely manner. However, the 
Secretary cannot fulfill this responsibility without the collaborative 
interagency efforts of the other federal departments and agencies that 
share responsibilities under the NRF to assess their capabilities and 
close gaps. While the federal government has made significant progress 
in implementing elements of the national preparedness system, 
opportunities continue to exist to enhance interagency assessment and 
accountability efforts to close identified capability gaps. 
Establishing supplemental guidance to define minimum standards of 
performance for ESF coordination will better enable the Secretary to 
know that the coordinators have engaged in an appropriate level of 
planning and preparedness activities to provide reasonable assurance 
that any given ESF is ready to respond. Regular and comprehensive 
reporting to the Secretary on the status of implementation of 
corrective actions designed to address capability gaps previously 
identified through national-level exercises and major real-world 
disasters will better enable the Secretary to know that lessons were 
learned and corrective actions implemented in timely manner by 
responsible federal departments and agencies. Finally, ensuring that 
robust program management information has been developed for executing 
the closure of capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy will 
better enable the Secretary to know that such gaps are being addressed 
effectively and efficiently. These modest process and procedural 
improvements will serve to better ensure that the Secretary is able to 
establish and build the unified, complete, and synchronized national 
preparedness system that is envisioned by national preparedness policy 
and doctrine.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance DHS's and FEMA's ability to assess ESF preparedness, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Administrator of FEMA--in coordination and collaboration with other 
federal departments and agencies through the ESF Leadership Group--to 
issue supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators that details minimum 
standards for activities and product deliverables necessary to 
demonstrate ESF preparedness. This guidance should include minimum 
expectations on how ESF coordinators are to demonstrate (1) that 
coordination with ESF primary and support agencies is sufficient, (2) 
that planning and preparedness activities are appropriate, and (3) 
whether required capabilities are available to effectively and 
efficiently respond to a disaster.

To enhance the Secretary of Homeland Security's ability to assess 
national preparedness and provide management oversight of federal 
interagency efforts to close previously identified capability gaps, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Administrator of FEMA--in coordination and collaboration with the 
National Security Council Staff and other federal departments and 
agencies--to collect information on and regularly report to the 
Secretary the status of federal interagency implementation of 
corrective actions identified (1) through prior national-level 
exercises and (2) following real-world incidents, specifically major 
disasters.

To better enable the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that 
capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy are addressed in an 
effective and efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA--in coordination 
and collaboration with other federal departments and agencies--to 
develop detailed program management information, consistent with 
leading practices discussed in this report, for federal interagency 
closure of the capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy. 
This information should include, among other things, detailed 
estimates of completion dates for initiated activities, interim 
timeframes and milestones for monitoring and tracking progress, and 
necessary funding and resource requirements.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, DOJ, HHS, and the 
National Security Council Staff for their review and comment. DHS 
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VI. DOD, 
DOE, DOJ, HHS, and the National Security Staff did not provide written 
comments. In its comments, DHS concurred with our three 
recommendations for the department and described actions under way or 
planned to address them by June 30, 2015. In its overall comments, DHS 
stated that FEMA recognizes the need to continue to improve national 
capabilities to respond to disasters, including through implementation 
of the recommendations raised in this report. DHS, DOD, DOE, DOJ, and 
HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate.

With regard to our first recommendation, for FEMA to issue 
supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators that details minimum 
standards for activities and product deliverables necessary to 
demonstrate ESF preparedness, DHS concurred. DHS stated that FEMA--in 
coordination and collaboration with other federal departments and 
agencies through the ESF Leadership Group--will issue the recommended 
supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators to enhance interagency 
coordination. DHS provided an estimated completion date of June 30, 
2015 for issuance of the supplemental guidance. This action, if fully 
implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.

With regard to our second recommendation, for FEMA to collect 
information on and regularly report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security the status of federal interagency implementation of 
corrective actions identified (1) through prior national-level 
exercises and (2) following real-world incidents, specifically major 
disasters, DHS concurred. DHS stated that FEMA recognizes the need to 
better position the Secretary to comprehensively monitor the status of 
national preparedness through regular reporting on the implementation 
of outstanding corrective actions across the federal interagency. In 
response to technical comments received from FEMA regarding their 
concern that the original wording of our draft recommendation could 
potentially have been perceived to imply that FEMA had the statutory 
authority to compel other federal departments and agencies to provide 
such information, we modified the recommendation's phrasing. Our 
revision was designed to make clear that such information collection 
is a shared responsibility between FEMA and other departments and 
agencies and that coordination and collaboration among all 
stakeholders is required to achieve the recommendation's intent. DHS 
provided an estimated completion date of June 30, 2015 for issuance of 
the initial corrective action status report to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, a report that is to be issued quarterly thereafter. 
This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the 
recommendation.

With regard to our third recommendation, for FEMA to develop detailed 
program management information--consistent with leading practices 
discussed in this report--for federal interagency closure of the 
capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy, DHS concurred. DHS 
stated that FEMA has begun developing a detailed program management 
information system for tracking the closure of capability gaps 
identified in the DHS IND Strategy. This system is to include detailed 
estimates of completion dates for initiated activities, interim 
timeframes and milestones for monitoring progress, and identification 
of necessary funding and resource requirements. DHS also noted that 
while FEMA is unable to compel other federal departments or agencies 
to participate in such efforts or provide FEMA with requested 
information, FEMA will continue to coordinate and collaborate with 
other involved federal entities in order to monitor closure of the 
capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy. DHS provided an 
estimated completion date of April 30, 2015 for finalization of the 
detailed program management information system. This action, if fully 
implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Homeland 
Security, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Attorney 
General of the United States. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (404) 679-1875 or at CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Office of Congressional Relations and Office of Public Affairs can 
be found on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to 
this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Chris P. Currie: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Mark Begich: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and 
the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Robert P. Casey, Jr.
United States Senate: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
United States Senate: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Objectives: 

GAO was asked to review federal preparedness to respond to no-notice 
catastrophic incidents. This report assesses the extent to which 
opportunities exist, if any, to enhance: 

1. the assessment of National Response Framework (NRF) emergency 
support function (ESF) preparedness, and: 

2. management oversight of the status of implementation of federal 
capability gaps identified in national-level exercises, real-world 
incidents, and other gap assessments.

Scope: 

Incident type: Because there are many types of no-notice catastrophic 
incidents to which the federal government would respond, we selected 
two scenarios for the scope of our review: one scenario that is man-
made--improvised nuclear device (IND) attacks--and one scenario that 
is naturally occurring--major earthquakes. We selected these scenarios 
because they represent the two key scenarios the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) uses to plan for no-notice catastrophic 
incidents.[Footnote 56] This review does not address the efforts of 
federal agencies to ensure their own organization's continuity of 
operations, which includes planning to ensure that essential 
government services are not interrupted during and after emergencies. 
[Footnote 57]

Departments and components: Our review covered five federal 
departments--the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health 
and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ). 
We selected these departments because they represent the key federal 
departments with responsibilities for responding to IND attacks and 
major earthquakes as described in the National Response Framework and 
its annexes. Further, these departments also served as coordinators 
for 1 or more of the 14 ESFs and participated in national-level 
exercises (NLE) and other interagency capability gap assessments in 
the scope of our review.[Footnote 58] Within these five departments, 
we collected documentation and interviewed officials from various 
components that departmental officials identified as playing a key 
role at the department for responding to IND attacks and major 
earthquakes. These key components are summarized in table 5.

Table 5: Departments and Key Components in GAO's Review: 

Department: Defense (DOD); 
Components in GAO's review: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: NORTHCOM was established in October 
2002 to provide command and control of DOD's homeland defense efforts 
and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities in the 
continental United States and Alaska. 

Department: Defense (DOD); 
Components in GAO's review: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: USACE is assigned as the coordinating 
agency for emergency support function (ESF) on Public Works and 
Engineering, which the corps does by coordinating federal public works 
and engineering-related support and providing technical assistance, 
engineering expertise, and construction management. 

Department: Energy (DOE); 
Components in GAO's review: Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability (OE); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: OE leads DOE's efforts to ensure a 
resilient, reliable, and flexible electricity system. OE accomplishes 
this mission through research, partnerships, modeling, and emergency 
preparedness. OE is the coordinating agency for the ESF on Energy. 

Department: Energy (DOE); 
Components in GAO's review: National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: NNSA would lead the early federal 
interagency response to characterize the nature and dispersal of 
radioactive material in the event of an IND attack. 

Department: Health and Human Services (HHS); 
Components in GAO's review: Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: ASPR serves as the lead HHS office 
responsible for all federal public health and medical response to 
public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National 
Response Framework. According to agency officials, responsibility for 
coordinating the ESF on Public Health and Medical Services has been 
delegated by HHS to ASPR. 

Department: Health and Human Services (HHS); 
Components in GAO's review: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: According to CDC officials, in the 
event of a major disaster, CDC would play a key role in deploying 
response teams and assets from the Strategic National Stockpile. The 
stockpile has large quantities of medicine and medical supplies if 
local supplies run out, including medical countermeasures to treat 
radiation sickness. 

Department: Homeland Security (DHS); 
Components in GAO's review: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: FEMA has responsibility to reduce the 
loss of life and property and protect the nation from all hazards, 
including IND attacks and major earthquakes. FEMA has a leadership 
role to coordinate the overall federal response to these attacks in 
close coordination with many other federal agencies and departments. 
FEMA is the coordinator for five ESFs.[A] 

Department: Homeland Security (DHS); 
Components in GAO's review: National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: NPPD leads the national effort to 
protect and enhance the resilience of the nation's physical and cyber 
infrastructure. Further, the Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications within NPPD is the coordinator for the ESF on 
Communications. 

Department: Justice (DOJ); 
Components in GAO's review: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: The FBI is the lead federal 
investigative entity for acts of terrorism, including IND attacks. 
According to FBI officials, while FBI officials may be present on 
scene following an IND attack, their activities would be focused on 
investigating the attack.[B].

Department: Justice (DOJ); 
Components in GAO's review: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF); 
Summary of role for responding to improvised nuclear device (IND) 
attacks and major earthquakes: ATF is a federal law enforcement agency 
responsible for investigating federal laws related to firearms, 
explosives, arson, alcohol, and tobacco. Under the National Response 
Framework, ATF is the coordinator for the ESF on Public Safety and 
Security. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, HHS, DHS, and DOJ documents. GAO-15-
20. 

[A] FEMA is the coordinator for five of the ESFs: Firefighting 
(coordinated jointly with the Department of Agriculture's U.S. Forest 
Service); Information and Planning; Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, 
Temporary Housing, and Human Services; Logistics (coordinated jointly 
with the General Services Administration); and Search and Rescue.

[B] FBI officials also noted that the FBI does not have consequence 
management responsibilities under the National Preparedness Goal's 
response mission area, but the agency does have responsibilities 
within the prevention mission area. The FBI leads and coordinates on-
scene law enforcement and associated investigative and intelligence 
activities related to potential imminent terrorist threats, according 
to officials. 

[End of table] 

Methodology: 

We reviewed relevant laws and presidential directives, such as the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), and Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 on National Preparedness. We also reviewed relevant all-
hazards and incident-specific interagency strategies and plans, 
including: the NRF and its annexes on ESFs, catastrophic incidents, 
and nuclear incidents; the Response Federal Interagency Operational 
Plan that supports the NRF; and the DHS Strategy for Improving the 
National Response and Recovery from an IND Attack (DHS IND Strategy). 
We also reviewed relevant assessments of federal preparedness, 
including the 2013 and 2014 National Preparedness Reports and the 
October 2013 Emergency Support Function Report.[Footnote 59] Further, 
we interviewed department and component officials on their 
responsibilities for responding to IND attacks and major earthquakes, 
as well as FEMA officials on their agency's management oversight of 
ESFs and the closure of federal capability gaps identified in national-
level exercises, real-world incidents, and other gap assessments.

To identify opportunities to enhance the assessment of ESF 
preparedness, we gathered information and documentation from agency 
officials for the 10 ESFs that were coordinated by one of the 
departments in our review. The 10 ESFs within the scope of our review 
are identified in table 6. Specifically, we gathered information and 
supporting documentation from these ESFs on the coordination, 
planning, and capability assessment activities they are conducting to 
oversee the preparedness of their ESFs. We requested information on 
these types of activities because such activities are consistent with 
the NRF's description of ESF coordinator responsibilities and the 
National Preparedness Goal's description of the planning response core 
capability. We also compared FEMA's current efforts to assess the 
activities of the ESF coordinators against descriptions of roles and 
responsibilities in the NRF and requirements in the Post-Katrina Act, 
as well as against standards in Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government and leading practices for federal interagency 
coordination and collaboration we have identified in our prior work. 
[Footnote 60]

Table 6: List of Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and their Assigned 
Coordinators: 

ESF: Transportation; (ESF #1); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Transportation; 
Reviewed by GAO: No.

ESF: Communications; (ESF #2); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and 
Programs Directorate/Cybersecurity and Communications; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Public Works and Engineering; (ESF #3); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Firefighting; (ESF #4); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Agriculture/U.S. Forest Service; 
* DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/U.S. Fire 
Administration[A]; 
Reviewed by GAO: No.

ESF: Information and Planning; (ESF #5); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* DHS/FEMA; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human 
Services; (ESF #6); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* DHS/FEMA; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Logistics; (ESF #7); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* General Services Administration; 
* DHS/FEMA; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Public Health and Medical Services; (ESF #8); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Health and Human Services; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Search and Rescue (ESF #9); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* DHS/FEMA; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF #10); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Environmental Protection Agency; 
Reviewed by GAO: No.

ESF: Agriculture and Natural Resources; (ESF #11); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Agriculture; 
Reviewed by GAO: No.

ESF: Energy; (ESF #12); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Energy; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Public Safety and Security; (ESF #13); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

ESF: Long-Term Community Recovery; (ESF #14); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* Not applicable--superseded by the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework; 
Reviewed by GAO: No.

ESF: External Affairs; (ESF #15); 
ESF coordinator(s): 
* DHS; 
Reviewed by GAO: Yes. 

Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Framework. GAO-15-20. 

[A] The Firefighting ESF is jointly coordinated by the Department of 
Agriculture's Forest Service and FEMA's Fire Administration. However, 
FEMA officials stated that FEMA's role is limited to coordinating with 
state, territorial, tribal, and insular agencies and local fire 
departments specifically to expand their firefighting capacity; in 
contrast, the Forest Service coordinates with all stakeholders--
including federal departments and agencies--on issues related to all 
aspects of fire response activities and represents ESF #4 on the ESF 
Leadership Group. Therefore, because the Department of Agriculture was 
not within the scope of our review, the Firefighting ESF was likewise 
not selected for review. 

[End of table] 

To identify opportunities to enhance management oversight of the 
closure of federal capability gaps, we identified and reviewed reports 
related to relevant national-level exercises, real-world incidents, 
and other assessments based on the scope of our review. For NLEs, we 
selected NLE 2010 and NLE 2011 for review because these exercises 
represent the only two NLEs conducted since the development of the 
National Exercise Program in 2007 that assessed federal preparedness 
to respond to an IND attack or a major earthquake.[Footnote 61] NLE 
2010 was a 2-day operations-based exercise conducted in May 2010 that 
concentrated on response and recovery from an IND attack in the United 
States. NLE 2011 was a 4-day functional exercise conducted in May 2011 
that concentrated on response to a major earthquake in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone--a major fault line impacting eight states in the 
southern and midwestern United States. For real-world incidents, we 
selected the federal response to Hurricane Sandy in autumn 2012 for 
review because the incident represented the most recent large-scale 
disaster that involved all five departments within the scope of our 
review.[Footnote 62] While Hurricane Sandy was a disaster with advance 
notice (unlike IND attacks or earthquakes), we believe that it 
provides valuable insights and lessons learned to improve federal 
response to other major disasters, including catastrophic incidents.

To determine the status of corrective actions from NLE 2010, NLE 2011, 
and Hurricane Sandy, we reviewed interagency and departmental after-
action reports, improvement plans, and other documents that identified 
and provided status updates on corrective actions for the five 
departments in our review.[Footnote 63] To assess the reliability of 
this information, we interviewed and gathered information from agency 
officials knowledgeable about how information on the status of 
corrective actions from NLEs and real-world incidents is tracked 
within their department or component. Further, where applicable, we 
reviewed documentation and procedures related to databases that store 
information on the status of corrective actions at the departments in 
our review, such as the Corrective Action Program System (CAPS) 
database--in which FEMA catalogs and tracks the status of corrective 
actions from NLEs for DHS--and DOD's Joint Lesson Learned Information 
System. Although we did not independently verify the accuracy of the 
recorded status of implementation of corrective actions, we found the 
information we gathered reliable for the purpose of describing the 
status of corrective actions from NLEs and real-world incidents as 
reported by the five departments in our review.[Footnote 64]

To identify other capability gap assessments relevant to federal 
response to IND attacks and major earthquakes, we interviewed 
officials from the five departments within the scope of our review to 
gather information on the extent to which such assessments had been 
conducted. Through this effort, we identified one capability gap 
assessment for responding to IND attacks. Specifically, we reviewed 
the April 2010 DHS IND Strategy, which identifies qualitative 
capability gaps for responding to an IND attack.[Footnote 65] We also 
reviewed the March 2012 and September 2013 iterations of the IND 
Response and Recovery Capability-Based Implementation Plan (IND 
Implementation Plan), which describe corrective actions to address IND 
response capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy, as well 
as the status of progress made to close the identified gaps. To assess 
the reliability of information on progress made to address IND 
capability gaps as reported in the IND Implementation Plan, we 
interviewed and gathered information from officials in FEMA's 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office who 
are responsible for management oversight of efforts to close these 
gaps and coordinating the five interagency working groups that help 
develop and implement the corrective actions. Although we did not 
independently verify the accuracy of the recorded status of 
implementation of the actions, we found the information we gathered 
reliable for the purpose of describing the progress made toward 
addressing the identified capability gaps.

Finally, we compared FEMA's current management oversight efforts 
related to closure of capability gaps identified in NLEs, real-world 
incidents, and other gap assessments against descriptions of roles and 
responsibilities in the NRF and requirements in the Post-Katrina Act, 
as well as against leading practices for internal control and program 
management, specifically Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government and The Standard for Program Management.[Footnote 66]

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to December 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Examples of Coordination Activities, Planning Documents, 
and Capability Assessments Identified by National Response Framework 
(NRF) Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinators: 

ESF coordinators within the scope of this review provided GAO the 
following examples, among others, on: 

* their coordination activities with their ESF primary and support 
agencies,

* planning documents they have developed for the coordination and 
execution of their ESF's mission, and: 

* assessments of currently available ESF resources against ESF 
capability requirements to identify related capability gaps.[Footnote 
67]

ESF #2 Communications-Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National 
Communication System: 

Coordination Activities: 

* weekly conference calls: 

* annual exercise: 

Planning Documents: 

* concept of operations describing the ESF's mission, key concepts, 
organization and staffing, roles, and operations and support concepts 
[Footnote 68]

Capabilities Assessments: 

* capability requirements not developed for ESF #2: 

* catalog of currently available capabilities not developed: 

* capability gap analyses include an analysis of likely communications 
shortfalls during an improvised nuclear device (IND) attack or major 
earthquake, but this analysis does not analyze gaps between available 
capabilities and required capabilities before an incident: 

ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering-Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers: 

Coordination Activities: 

* annual seminars: 

* workshops following major disasters or other incidents to identify 
lessons learned: 

Planning Documents: 

* operational orders and plans for all-hazards incidents: 

* operational plans for specific earthquake scenarios: 

* standard operating procedures for response teams[Footnote 69]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* quantified ESF #3 capability requirements specific to the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers: 

* quantified available capabilities--such as the number and type of 
emergency response teams--specific to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 

* capability gaps identified and prioritized for closure, through 
workshops identified above, specific to the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers: 

ESF #5 Information and Planning-DHS/Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA): 

Coordination Activities: 

* drill, working group meeting, and other exercises: 

Planning Documents: 

* FEMA national and regional incident support manuals, which describe 
how FEMA national and regional staff--through the National Response 
Coordinating Center and Regional Response Coordinating Centers--
support FEMA incident operations[Footnote 70]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* qualitative capability requirements identified by reference to 
relevant core capabilities required by the National Preparedness Goal 
[Footnote 71]; 

* qualitative available capabilities cataloged as outlined in the ESF 
#5 annex to the NRF[Footnote 72]; 

* capability gap analysis for ESF #5 under development, according to 
FEMA officials: 

ESF #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, Human 
Services-DHS/FEMA: 

Coordination Activities: 

* conference calls: 

* webinars and training courses for mass care and emergency assistance 
practitioners: 

* annual mass care exercise: 

* national conferences: 

Planning Documents: 

* appendix to the NRF's Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan 
describing the delivery of mass care services such as hydration, 
feeding, and sheltering, as well as support for reunifying families 
[Footnote 73]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* established quantified capability requirements, such as sheltering 
and feeding requirements, for primary and support agencies[Footnote 74]

* identified primary and support agencies' available capabilities 
related to, for example, providing sheltering, feeding, and other 
services: 

* in April 2014, assessed whether these currently available 
capabilities were sufficient to be considered "mission ready": 

ESF #7 Logistics-DHS/FEMA: 

Coordination Activities: 

* biweekly conference calls: 

* annual summit with ESF partners: 

* training course on logistics for interagency partners: 

Planning Documents: 

* operations manual to describe how FEMA and its partners are to 
provide logistics support during domestic emergencies[Footnote 75]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* identified qualitative capability requirements in an annex to the 
NRF's Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan: 

* quantified certain available capabilities at ESF primary and support 
agencies--such as meals and water--in the 10 FEMA regions: 

* capability gap assessment specific to ESF #7 not yet performed: 

ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services-Department of Health and 
Human Services: 

Coordination Activities: 

* does not conduct ESF-specific preparedness coordination because of a 
lack of funding, according to HHS officials: 

* does coordinate with its ESF primary and support agencies during 
FEMA-and state-sponsored preparedness activities: 

Planning Documents: 

* draft plan for all-hazards response: 

* draft annexes for IND attacks and earthquake response: 

* concepts of operations for medical response teams[Footnote 76]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* quantified ESF #8-specific capability requirements for primary and 
support agencies for responding to certain incidents--such as an 
earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone and a hurricane in the Gulf 
of Mexico: 

* catalog of currently available capabilities under development: 

* assessment of capability gaps under development: 

ESF #9 Search and Rescue-DHS/FEMA: 

Coordination Activities: 

* nonemergency coordination takes place formally through the National 
Search and Rescue Committee, which meets three or four times annually 
[Footnote 77]. 

Planning Documents: 

* concept of operations for the national urban search and rescue 
system: 

* field operations guide for the national urban search and rescue 
system[Footnote 78]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* capability requirements specific to DHS/FEMA for responding to an 
earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone: 

* catalog of national search and rescue capabilities not yet developed: 

* capability gap analysis for national search and rescue capabilities 
not yet developed: 

ESF #12 Energy-Department of Energy: 

Coordination Activities: 

* meetings of several energy councils, including the Energy Government 
Coordinating Council, which includes stakeholders from all levels of 
government--federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial--that are 
involved with the energy sector: 

Planning Documents: 

* operational plan for emergency response activities related to energy 
disruption: 

* operations guide for emergency response activities related to energy 
disruption[Footnote 79]. 

Capability Assessments: 

* the coordinator stated that it did not have the authority to 
establish capability requirements for ESF #12 primary and support 
agencies: 

* ESF #12 support agencies develop their own capability requirements 
based upon their individual missions and statutory authorities, 
according to the coordinator: 

* qualitative listing of available capabilities for all-hazards 
response listed in the ESF #12 annex to the NRF[Footnote 80]

* individual primary and support agencies catalog their own 
capabilities, according to the coordinator: 

* the coordinator stated that it did not have the authority to conduct 
a capability gap analysis for ESF #12 other than for the Department of 
Energy, and no capability gap assessments have been performed to date: 

ESF #13 Public Safety and Security-Department of Justice (DOJ)/Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: 

Coordination Activities: 

* semiannual meetings are held with representatives from over 80 
federal law enforcement departments and agencies: 

* regular outreach meetings are conducted with individual law 
enforcement and emergency management partners: 

Planning Documents: 

* concept of operations[Footnote 81]

Capability Assessments: 

* baseline staffing requirement established for components of DOJ: 

* catalog of capabilities not established: 

* capability gap assessment conducted specifically for DOJ for ESF #13 
role: 

ESF #15 External Affairs-DHS: 

Coordination Activities: 

* conference calls prior to hurricane season and other events: 

* tabletop exercises: 

Planning Documents: 

* standard operating procedures[Footnote 82]

Capability Assessments: 

* qualitative required actions and staffing outlined in ESF #15 
planning document: 

* qualitative descriptions of available capabilities identified in 
prescripted mission assignments[Footnote 83]. 

* tabletop exercise used to assess ESF #15 capability gaps: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed for National Level 
Exercises 2010 and 2011, as of November 2014: 

This appendix provides additional information on corrective actions 
developed in response to National Level Exercise (NLE) 2010 and NLE 
2011, which tested the nation's ability to respond to an improvised 
nuclear device (IND) attack and a major earthquake, respectively. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) interagency after-action 
report for NLE 2010 identified 104 corrective actions for the 
Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland 
Security, and Justice. According to information provided by officials 
from these departments, 98 of 104 corrective actions have been closed 
as of November 2014.[Footnote 84] For NLE 2011, FEMA's interagency 
after-action report highlighted areas for improvement--such as the 
need to increase familiarization with earthquake response plans at the 
state, regional, and national levels--for federal departments and 
agencies to develop their own corrective actions in their own after-
action reports. The five departments in our review identified 75 
actions that they had planned to take to address the capability gaps 
identified in the interagency after-action report. According to 
information provided by officials from these departments, as of 
November 2014, 73 of 75 corrective actions have been closed. The 
corrective actions that remain open from NLE 2010 and NLE 2011, and 
departmental comments on efforts being taken to address these actions, 
are described in tables 7 and 8.

Table 7: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed from National Level 
Exercise 2010, as of November 2014: 

Department: Department of Defense (DOD); 
Open corrective action: Review and refine plans and protocols for 
federalizing a state's National Guard and returning it to the state's 
command and control under the interim Federal Interagency Improvised 
Nuclear Device Concept of Operations Plan[A]; 
Departmental comments: According to DOD officials, there is no formal 
interagency mechanism to address this action and the department has 
not acted on the issue to date. 

Department: DOD; 
Open corrective action: Establish and maintain programs to familiarize 
national leaders and response planners with tailored defense support 
for civil authorities military capabilities and the unique 
circumstances that would require their urgent deployment and response; 
Departmental comments: According to DOD officials, there is no formal 
interagency mechanism to address this action and the department has 
not acted on this issue to date. 

Department: Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA); 
Open corrective action: Develop and improve appropriate plans and 
protocols to ensure timely access to U.S. and state courts during a 
catastrophic incident; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the scale and 
complexity of this corrective action resulted in the issue being 
elevated from FEMA's Response and Recovery Directorate to FEMA's 
Continuous Improvement Working Group for consideration.[B] The group 
assigned the corrective action to FEMA's Office of the Chief Counsel, 
which was reviewing related requirements for implementation of the 
action at the time of our review. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Open corrective action: Identify the relevant federal and state 
permitting and approval authorities necessary in a postcatastrophic 
incident restoration scenario and coordinate with those authorities to 
develop plans to expeditiously address permitting requirements for 
infrastructure restoration in accordance with applicable statutes and 
regulations; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the scale and 
complexity of this corrective action resulted in the issue being 
elevated from FEMA's Response and Recovery Directorate to FEMA's 
Continuous Improvement Working Group for consideration. The group 
assigned the corrective action to FEMA's Office of the Chief Counsel, 
which was reviewing related requirements for implementation of the 
action at the time of our review. 

Department: DHS; National Protection Programs Directorate (NPPD); 
Open corrective action: Examine methods to enhance interoperable 
communications with fire departments; 
Departmental comments: According to DHS officials, NPPD's Office of 
Emergency Communications continues to engage state and local 
stakeholders to ensure interoperable emergency communications are 
addressed through the DHS National Emergency Communications Plan. 

Department: DHS; Office of Policy; 
Open corrective action: Determine ways to encourage design measures 
for resiliency in postincident construction and repairs; 
Departmental comments: According to DHS officials, the department 
completed a related resiliency pilot project and was drafting the 
associated after-action report, as of September 2014. Upon completing 
this after action report, the officials stated that they intended to 
close the action. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DHS documents. GAO-15-20. 

Notes: The list of not yet closed corrective actions does not include 
those actions assigned to the White House or to federal departments 
outside of the scope of our review. Departments use varying 
terminology to describe the actions designed to address issues 
identified through national-level exercises. For example, DHS and FEMA 
refer to these actions as corrective actions, while DOD refers to 
these actions as recommendations. For the purposes of this report, we 
refer such actions collectively as corrective actions.

[A] The interim Improvised Nuclear Device Concept of Operations Plan 
was a plan developed in response to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-8, Annex I.

[B] FEMA's Lessons Learned/Continuous Improvement Program identifies 
issues or capability gaps from training, exercises, real-world events, 
readiness assessments, or steady-state operations and resolves these 
issues through the implementation of corrective actions. Those actions 
that are beyond the resolution capability of FEMA components or are of 
significant interest to FEMA leadership are elevated to FEMA's 
Continuous Improvement Working Group, which is responsible for 
developing, assigning, and tracking such actions across the agency. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Corrective Actions Not Yet Closed from National Level 
Exercise 2011, as of November 2014: 

Department: Department of Defense (DOD); 
Open corrective action: Develop a common operating picture tool to 
reside on the nonclassified Internet network portal; 
Departmental comments: This action has evolved into two related 
efforts--information sharing via the Situational Awareness Geospatial 
Enterprise[A] and operationalizing it for conducting assessments and 
providing decision support, both of which are being reviewed by DOD's 
Corrective Action Program Working Group. 

Department: DOD; 
Open corrective action: Establish a collaboration forum of interagency 
partners; 
Departmental comments: This issue is being reviewed by the U.S. 
Northern Command to determine an approach for resolution. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and HHS documents. GAO-15-20. 

Notes: Departments use varying terminology to describe the actions 
designed to address issues identified through national-level 
exercises. For example, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency refer to these actions as corrective actions, while DOD refers 
to these actions as recommendations. For the purposes of this report, 
we refer to such actions collectively as corrective actions.

[A] The Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise system is a 
technological tool that provides the U.S. Northern Command and other 
DOD components with rapid, easy access to detailed physical 
infrastructure data for a given geographical area. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Corrective Actions Developed after Hurricane Sandy Not 
Yet Closed, as of November 2014: 

Following the federal response to Hurricane Sandy in autumn 2012, the 
Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland 
Security, and Justice developed intradepartmental after-action reports 
that identified capability gaps and associated corrective actions. 
According to information provided by officials from these departments, 
102 corrective actions were developed across the five departments, and 
63 of the 102 actions have been closed as of November 2014.[Footnote 
85] The remaining open corrective actions, and efforts being taken to 
address these actions, are described in table 9.

Table 9: Corrective Actions Developed after Hurricane Sandy Not Yet 
Closed, as of November 2014: 

Department: Department of Defense (DOD); Northern Command (NORTHCOM); 
Corrective action: Better utilize the role of the U.S. Marine Corps 
Service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer; 
Departmental comments: According to DOD officials, a subject matter 
expert has addressed this issue and is awaiting a "confirming event" 
before the action will be considered closed.[A] 

Department: DOD; NORTHCOM; 
Corrective action: Improve access to Reserve Component forces; 
Departmental comments: According to DOD officials, a subject matter 
expert has addressed this issue, and is awaiting a "confirming event" 
a before the action will be considered closed. 

Department: Department of Energy (DOE)[B]; 
Corrective action: Leverage technology to improve response and 
communications; 
Departmental comments: According to DOE officials, the department is 
addressing this action through the use of Environment for Analysis of 
Geo-Located Energy Information, a system that allows DOE staff to 
geospatially map energy assets and systems and tie together a variety 
of data sources into one visualization platform. 

Department: DOE; 
Corrective action: Develop a better understanding of how DOE can use 
the Defense Production Act, including to obtain critical supplies, and 
determine what advantages and disadvantages exist for energy sector 
partners when the act is used; 
Departmental comments: According to DOE officials, the department last 
used the act for an energy-related emergency during the Clinton 
administration, although the act has been discussed with energy sector 
entities more recently. Other agencies, including DOD and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), routinely use the act as part of 
their standard operating procedures and in fulfillment of their 
mission but it is an authority that can be perceived as controversial. 
Its use for an energy emergency by DOE's Office of Electricity 
Delivery and Energy Reliability requires concurrence by the DOE 
General Counsel and in some circumstances the Secretary of Commerce. 
As part of the effort to address this action, DOE held an in-depth 
training session on the act in July 2014 for sector and interagency 
partners. 

Department: Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); 
Corrective action: Establish a policy on the approved uses of mobile 
devices/phones during a deployment; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
developing new and assessing the applicability of existing guidance. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish a policy on the use of all forms of 
social media; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
developing new and assessing the applicability of existing guidance. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Improve the integration of planning and response 
activities; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
conducting a strategic review of existing planning functions as well 
as response requirements. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Review the requirements and procedures for 
convening the Disaster Leadership Group; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing standard operating procedures. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Create a single national health and medical common 
operating picture system; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing standard operating procedures, terminology, and existing 
guidelines. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish a comprehensive list of pertinent 
participants for all coordinating meetings; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing policies and standard operating procedures. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish a training program to ensure personnel 
are aware of roles and responsibilities within the Incident Command 
System[C]; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
standardizing trainings, terminology, and guidance. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish a fixed mobilization location to support 
deployment and ensure all personnel are familiar with policies; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing the existing concept of operations and supporting policies. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Develop consistent procedures to support 
accountability of resources for response and recovery personal; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
developing policies and guidance. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Standardize systems to support staff deployment 
including travel, billing, and deployment; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing terminology, procedures, and current systems. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish a consistent format for reporting 
information to senior departmental leadership; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
establishing a template for reports and briefings. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Enhance trainings to support greater familiarity 
with communication capabilities; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, trainings are 
ongoing. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Investigate alternative methods and procedures to 
capture patients within the Electronic Medical Record system; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing the current system, capabilities, standard operating 
procedures, and alternative data collection methods. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish an Electronic Medical Records system 
training program for staff, including hands-on practice and 
instruction; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, trainings are 
ongoing. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Define "patient encounter" and ensure consistency 
across missions and disasters; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
revising terminology and standard operating procedures. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Ensure responders suffering from severe mental 
health issues in theater receive priority care; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
revising standard operating procedures, position descriptions, and 
supporting medical screening policies and procedures. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Develop procedures to support predeploying teams 
when possible (e.g. before hurricanes make landfall, major snowstorms, 
etc.); 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
reviewing and revising the standard operating procedures. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Develop a memorandum of understanding with the 
Office of the Inspector General, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to resolve gaps in force protection; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, discussions are 
ongoing with the Office of the Inspector General, ATF, and the HHS 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Establish procedures to ensure adequate 
transportation, transfer, and care of patients is provided; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, trainings are 
ongoing. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Develop operational policies to formalize positions 
with the Emergency Management Group to ensure the Incident Response 
Command Team is positioned to issue decisions based on ground truth; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the department is 
finalizing a document that will identify formal Emergency Management 
Group positions and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities for 
each. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Utilize the mobilization processing concept of 
operations to ensure team members have essential tools before 
deployment; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the mobilization 
processing document is in the final stages of approval for 
implementation. However, HHS officials noted that mobilization 
processing has been successfully utilized for events and responses 
since Hurricane Sandy. 

Department: HHS; 
Corrective action: Enhance coordination and communication to support 
deployed officers for the Division of Commissioned Corps Personnel and 
Readiness; 
Departmental comments: According to HHS officials, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response does not have the 
ability to monitor Commissioned Corps Personnel and Readiness actions 
as the division does not participate in the Corrective Actions Program 
Working Group and is part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Health. 

Department: Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 
Corrective action: Ensure continuity of operations; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
developing and exercising flexible, scalable, and tiered continuity of 
operations plans. The FEMA headquarters continuity of operations plan 
was signed on January 12, 2014 and the national-level exercise of 2014 
was conducted as planned. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Meet survivors' needs during initial interactions; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
updating policies regarding its Individual Assistance program. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Coordinate among states, localities, and tribes; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
expanding its capacity to coordinate with tribal nations. FEMA 
established the Tribal Integration Group, which will ensure that the 
agency meets requirements to regularly consult with and consider 
tribal governments in program and policy development. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Refine the mission assignment process; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
refining the mission assignment process to ensure the ability to task 
federal agencies effectively for recovery-related missions. FEMA 
solicited input widely from across program areas, leadership, and FEMA 
regions, as well as the Recovery Support Functions Leadership Group. 
FEMA is reviewing updated mission assignment forms and guidance to 
address tasking needs of other federal agencies. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Reduce the complexity of the Public Assistance 
program; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
updating policies and procedures regarding its public assistance 
program. FEMA has also released guidance for two public assistance 
pilot programs authorized by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 
2013, which are currently underway.[D] 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Integrate federal senior leader coordination and 
communications into response and recovery operations, and coordinate 
emergency support functions and recovery support functions to support 
disaster response; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
evaluating the option of appointing liaisons to senior federal 
officials to facilitate greater coordination and communication during 
Level 1 incidents. FEMA is also reviewing doctrine and policy and 
developing possible courses of action and milestones.[E].

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Mobilize the FEMA workforce for disaster response; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
clarifying and automating procedures for deploying permanent full-time 
and Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employment personnel. FEMA 
Administrator Craig Fugate signed the deployment guidance and 
directive on January 29, 2014. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Use planning and analysis to drive operational 
decision making; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
conducting mission analysis of future planning to determine desired 
capabilities and a plan to achieve those capabilities. FEMA has 
applied draft Future Planning Standard Operating Procedures to project 
impacts of recent events including the threat of avian influenza A 
(H7N9), pandemic influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronvirus (MERS CoV), all potential tropical cyclones during the 2013 
season, and Colorado flooding. 

Department: DHS; FEMA; 
Corrective action: Implement incident management structures; 
Departmental comments: According to FEMA officials, the agency is 
developing recommendations regarding forward deployment of FEMA senior 
officials and their relationship with Federal Coordinating Officials 
and the National Response Coordination Center. FEMA is also reviewing 
doctrine and policy and developing courses of action and milestones. 

Department: Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF): 
Corrective action: Improve the functionality of the Public Safety and 
Security Emergency Support Function (ESF) National Coordination Center; 
Departmental comments: According to DOJ officials, the Public Safety 
and Security ESF is attempting to accelerate the building of the 
center, is working with federal law enforcement partners to increase 
staffing of the center during ESF activations, adopted the Law 
Enforcement Online Virtual Command Center to increase the center 
management of information during ESF activations, and revised the 
National Operations and Coordination Standard Operating Procedures 
Annex to incorporate best practices identified during the Hurricane 
Sandy activation. DOJ officials stated that building of the National 
Coordination Center is to commence in December 2014 with an 
anticipated completion date of April 2015. 

Department: DOJ; ATF; 
Corrective action: Investigate the feasibility of deploying a group of 
Public Safety and Security ESF resources to a forward staging area 
with supporting elements from a single prescripted mission assignment, 
and then assigning specific missions; 
Departmental comments: According to DOJ officials, this corrective 
action will be fulfilled through the completion of a related 
corrective action to improve the overall functionality of the National 
Coordination Center. DOJ officials stated that the referenced 
prescripted mission assignment was developed and approved by FEMA in 
August 2013. 

Department: DOJ; ATF; 
Corrective action: Examine the feasibility of developing an 
independent logistical capability that will be able to meet the needs 
of any Public Safety and Security ESF deployment; 
Departmental comments: According to DOJ officials, a logistical 
working group formed to address Public Safety and Security ESF 
deployment logistics determined that the ESF should develop its own 
deployment logistics capability consisting of a deployment logistics 
officer and a full-time deployment logistics contractor. These 
personnel are in place and exploring options related to logistical 
support. 

Department: DOJ; ATF; 
Corrective action: Adequately staff the National Coordination Center 
and provide liaison personnel to the FEMA National Response and 
Coordination Center; 
Departmental comments: According to DOJ officials, the Public Safety 
and Security ESF is working with federal law enforcement partners to 
enhance staffing at the National Coordination Center when the ESF is 
activated, which will enable the national coordinator to assign 
permanent ESF staff to FEMA's National Response and Coordination 
Center. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, HHS, DHS, and DOJ documents. 
GAO-15-20. 

[A] According to DOD officials, "confirming event" is any event or 
exercise during which DOD officials are able to demonstrate the steps 
taken to address the corrective action and verify that the action has 
been closed.

[B] There were 25 corrective actions in the DOE intradepartmental 
Hurricane Sandy after-action report developed by DOE's Office of 
Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. However, DOE officials 
stated that, based upon feedback provided by interagency participants, 
16 of these actions were assigned to entities other than DOE for 
resolution, such as states or private sector stakeholders, and 
therefore DOE is not tracking the status of implementation for these 
16 actions. Because DOE was not assigned responsibility for 
implementing these corrective actions, these 16 actions were not 
included in this report.

[C] According to HHS, the Incident Command System provides guidance 
for how to organize assets to respond to an incident and processes to 
manage the response through its successive stages. The core concepts 
of the Incident Command System are common terminology, integrated 
communications, modular organization, unified command structure, a 
manageable span of control for supervisory-level personnel, 
consolidated action plans, comprehensive resource management, and 
predesignated facilities where expected critical incident-related 
functions will occur.

[D] See Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 39.

[E] FEMA defines Level 1 incidents as those incidents in which 
available assets designed and put in place for the response are 
overwhelmed or broken at the local, regional or national level; 
require an extreme amount of federal assistance for response and 
recovery efforts for which the capabilities do not exist at any level 
of government; require extraordinary coordination among federal, 
state, tribal, and local entities because of massive levels and 
breadth of damage, severe impact, or multistate scope; and require the 
significant involvement of FEMA, the activation of all primary ESF 
agencies, and the deployment of initial response resources to support 
requirements of the affected state. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Program Interagency 
Working Groups' Activities and Projects: 

In March 2012, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) issued 
the IND Response and Recovery Capability-Based Implementation Plan 
(IND Implementation Plan), which identified corrective actions to 
address IND attack emergency response capability gaps that had 
previously been identified in the April 2010 DHS [Department of 
Homeland Security] Strategy for Improving the National Response and 
Recovery from an IND Attack (DHS IND Strategy).[Footnote 86] In 
September 2013, an updated version of the IND Implementation Plan was 
issued to provide information on progress made to address the 
identified gaps.[Footnote 87] The IND Implementation Plan recommended 
actions that were developed by five interagency working groups 
composed of subject matter experts from federal agencies, state and 
local emergency management organizations, academic institutions, 
research centers, and nongovernmental organizations. According to FEMA 
officials, in addition to developing the recommended actions, the 
working groups monitor their implementation. Table 10 summarizes the 
capability gaps, their status, and related ongoing recommended actions 
as reported in the latest iteration of the IND Implementation Plan.

Table 10: Summary of Capability Gaps and Recommended Actions Pursued 
as identified in the September 2013 IND Implementation Plan: 

Working group: Response: 

Capability gap and reported status: The complex all-hazards issues 
involved in an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident will be an 
extreme management challenge. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill caused members of the response community to question 
whether the Incident Command System as written could handle these 
complexities[A]; Status--25% complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: Working group 
to address capability gap: 
* Develop a document to address dividing the incident into manageable 
organizational elements; 
* Develop a document that would outline the required number of 
incident management teams that are needed to ensure a successful 
response; 
* Create an incident action plan template and then demonstrate its use 
with estimating resources for a single geographic sector of a 
simulated IND incident.

Capability gap and reported status: Emergency response officials need 
the ability to receive, interpret, and exchange nuclear information 
among themselves and with decision makers following an IND detonation; 
Status--75% complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop position description and qualifications for subject matter 
expert assistance to first responders and key leaders; 
* Develop a comprehensive inventory of resources available to an IND 
response.

Capability gap and reported status: Because public perception of the 
dangers of very low level radioactive contamination, refugees may be 
denied access to shelters and basic human needs. In addition, this 
same perception of danger will also make it unlikely that many 
shelters will even be allowed to open within a reasonable proximity to 
the incident; Status--75% complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop a document to address problem areas in decontaminating the 
affected populations, pets, and other animals; 
* Develop a document to address the problem of the overwhelming number 
of people and animals in need of assistance after the detonation of an 
IND.

Capability gap and reported status: Household pets, service animals 
and livestock will be an extreme management challenge if not addressed 
within emergency plans. The goal is to identify and provide 
scientifically valid operational processes, adequate staffing, 
resources and facilities to manage animals; Status--50% complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop an animal demographics estimation guidance document; 
* Develop a timeline for animal response missions document; 
* Develop a document to determine training/qualifications for each 
mission area; 
* Develop a document pertaining to just-in-time training for 
volunteers; 
* Compile current bibliography of scientific articles and other 
references pertaining to management of animals in nuclear or 
radiological incidents. 

Working group: Medical and Public Health: 

Capability gap and reported status: Radiation dose assessment 
capabilities for the evaluation of large numbers of potentially 
affected individuals are needed to ensure optimal use of limited 
medical resources and to systematically perform triage; 
Status--the recommended actions will take 1-5 years to complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Research and develop novel methods or systems to conduct radiation 
biodosimetry applicable in mass casualty situations; 
* Develop rapid, high-throughput methods to assess radiation dose and 
laboratory networks for surge capacity.

Capability gap and reported status: First responders and first 
receivers need proper baseline education and just-in-time training to 
appropriately evaluate and manage casualties; Status--actions are 
ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Create just-in-time training for the provision of information on key 
immediate actions for the medical response to an IND detonation; 
* Coordinate with professional societies and national associations to 
improve visibility of currently available educational resources; 
* Develop essential baseline educational curriculum for first 
responders, medical providers, and emergency support function (ESF) #8 
stakeholders[B]. 

Capability gap and reported status: Greater access to medical 
countermeasures with a Food and Drug Administration-approved 
indication for prevention, mitigation, and treatment of acute 
radiation syndrome is needed; Status--the recommended actions will 
take 5-10 years to complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop logistical and operational plans for optimized use of 
medical countermeasures at all levels of the response; 
* Expand approved indications for currently available countermeasures 
to include acute radiation syndrome; 
* Research and develop novel countermeasures with Food and Drug 
Administration-approved prevention, mitigation and treatment of acute 
radiation syndrome. 

Working group: Communications and Public Messaging: 

Capability gap and reported status: Public communications systems 
exist but are inadequate for large-scope incidents, such as an IND 
detonation. Local information sources need to establish initial 
communications with, among, and between the affected population and 
response forces, government, and media; Status--ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop a strategy for implementing communications training specific 
to an IND response; 
* Develop a public communications strategy to provide awareness of 
safety and security actions in the vicinity of the blast area and in 
the overall federally declared disaster area; 
* Develop a website and tools to broadcast sustained lifesaving 
messages using existing social networking sources and text-based 
communications devices.

Capability gap and reported status: First responders are marginally 
aware, and the public is largely unaware and generally unprepared to 
execute effective protective and response actions following an IND 
incident; Status--ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Create, test, and exercise public information on sheltering, 
evacuation, decontamination, reentry and cleanup, along with guidance 
to effectively execute shelter-in-place or other protective and 
response actions following an IND incident; 
* Identify and engage nontraditional federal partners, such as 
spokespeople and corporate disaster/contingency operations planners 
for enhanced private and public sector coordination; 
* Use non-English-language outreach, faith-based, and volunteer 
organizations to help transmit information between the affected 
population and local response forces, government and media following 
an IND detonation.

Capability gap and reported status: Need systems and methods to 
provide the public with information on lifesaving and protective 
measures after an IND detonation; Status--ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop a system to disseminate information for the population in 
the affected and nearby areas that can be used to address critical 
needs, such as family reunification tools, decontamination locations, 
and evacuation routes; 
* Further develop, distribute, and inform local populations about 
Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath messaging document so that 
the public is able to effectively self-protect in the days following 
an IND detonation[C]; 
* Reestablish communications in affected communities to allow the 
population to communicate. 

Working group: Scientific Support: 

Capability gap and reported status: First responders, emergency 
managers, and other public officials may lack the ability to 
communicate post-IND; Status--study 95% complete; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Improve understanding of whether and how federal, state, and local 
response will be hampered by loss of communications.

Capability gap and reported status: Emergency planners lack clear and 
concise guidance for shelter, evacuation, reentry, reoccupation, and 
cleanup; Status--ongoing, four cities completed; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Model Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) cities (1 in each of 
the 10 FEMA regions) to produce a key planning document to be used to 
support the development of local, state, and regional response and 
recovery plans[D]. 

Capability gap and reported status: The general public lacks awareness 
of the actions necessary to survive a nuclear incident; Status--
ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Develop and test a prototype "serious gaming" platform to provide a 
motivating, enriching, and engaging educational preparedness medium.

Capability gap and reported status: The United States needs a 
scientifically sound technique to compare and incorporate data and 
predictions from different sources after an IND incident; 
Status--ongoing; 
Recommended actions pursued to address capability gap: 
* Implement Rad Responder, a web-based data input and output 
framework[E].

Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency documents. 
GAO-15-20. 

[A] The Incident Command System is a management system designed to 
enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by 
integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, 
procedures, and communications operating within a common 
organizational structure, designed to enable effective and efficient 
domestic incident management. It is used to organize both near-term 
and long-term field-level operations for a broad spectrum of 
emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and 
manmade. The Incident Command System is used by all levels of 
government--federal, state, local, and tribal--as well as by many 
private sector and nongovernmental organizations.

[B] Emergency support functions are, according to the National 
Response Framework, the federal government's primary coordinating 
structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response core 
capabilities. ESF #8, one of the 14 ESFs, is the coordinating 
structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response core 
capabilities specifically related to public health and medical services.

[C] Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath is a document developed 
as a resource for emergency responders and federal, state, and local 
officials communicating with the public and the media immediately 
following an IND attack in the United States. An interagency group of 
communications and radiation technical experts developed the messages 
in this document, which include key messages for the affected 
community and the nation, and anticipated questions and answers for 
distribution to the public. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery: Communicating in the 
Immediate Aftermath (Washington, DC: June 2013): 

[D] The Urban Areas Security Initiative is a Department of Homeland 
Security grant program that provides federal assistance to address the 
unique needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas, and assists 
them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.

[E] Rad Responder is a FEMA web-based tool to facilitate coordination 
across all levels of government through the rapid collection and 
organization of the data that are needed to characterize the IND 
incident and support lifesaving decisions (e.g., through modeling of 
the size and direction of the plume containing radioactive materials). 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

November 17, 2014: 

Chris P. Currie: 
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-15-20, "Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities 
Exist to Strengthen Interagency Assessments and Accountability for 
Closing Capability Gaps" 

Dear Mr. Currie: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. The 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognizes the need to 
continue to improve our Nation's capabilities to respond to disasters, 
including addressing the recommendations raised in this report. FEMA 
is committed to supporting our citizens and first responders to ensure 
that as a Nation we work together to build, sustain and improve our
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, 
and mitigate all hazards. 

The draft report contained three recommendations with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to: 

Recommendation 1: In coordination and collaboration with other federal 
departments and agencies through the ESF [Emergency Support Function 1 
Leadership Group, issue supplemental guidance to ESF coordinators that 
details minimum standards for activities and product deliverables 
necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness. This guidance should include
minimum expectations on how ESF coordinators are to demonstrate (1) 
that coordination with ESF primary and support agencies is sufficient, 
(2) that planning and preparedness activities are appropriate, and (3) 
whether required capabilities are available to effectively and 
efficiently respond to a disaster. 

Response: Concur. As the draft report highlights, ESF coordinators 
conduct a variety of coordination, planning, and capability assessment 
activities to oversee the preparedness of the ESFs. To enhance inter-
agency coordination, the Administrator of FEMA--in coordination and
collaboration with other federal departments and agencies through the 
ESF Leadership Group--will issue supplemental guidance to ESF 
coordinators. Per the recommendation guidelines, this supplemental 
guidance will identify minimum standards for activities and product 
deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness. Estimated 
Completion Date (ECD): June 30, 2015. 

Recommendation 2: In coordination and collaboration with the National 
Security Council Staff and other federal departments and agencies, 
collect information on and regularly report to the Secretary the 
status of federal interagency implementation of corrective actions 
identified (1) through prior national-level exercises and (2) 
following real-world incidents, specifically major disasters. 

Response: Concur. FEMA recognizes the need to more widely understand 
the status of interagency corrective actions in order to better 
position the Secretary of Homeland Security to comprehensively monitor 
the status of national preparedness. While FEMA does not have the
authority to compel other federal agencies to provide information 
related to their own corrective actions, FEMA will continue to request 
status updates and relevant information on these corrective actions 
related to major disasters and national-level exercises. 

FEMA collects and monitors the status of its corrective actions 
through the Continuous Improvement Working Group and an internal-to-
FEMA data-sharing repository. FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate 
will ensure that the repository is up-to-date and will assess
and report quarterly to the Secretary on the completeness of the data 
in its repository. ECD: June 30, 2015. 

Recommendation 3: In coordination and collaboration with other federal 
departments and agencies, to develop detailed program management 
information, consistent with leading practices identified in The 
Standard for Program Management, for federal interagency closure of
the capability gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy. This 
information should include, among other things, detailed estimates of 
completion dates for initiated activities, interim timeframes and 
milestones for monitoring and tracking progress, and necessary funding 
and resource requirements. 

Response: Concur. In recent years, FEMA's Response Directorate has 
made substantial progress to address IND preparedness and response 
capacity improvement. FEMA has developed IND Planning initiatives for 
the regions, has adapted an IND Planning Tool, has published guidance 
materials supported by the IND Communications Working Group, and has
developed an official training program to enhance workforce response 
capacity to an IND incident. Concurrent with this engagement effort, 
FEMA had already started developing a detailed program management 
information system for federal interagency closure of the capability 
gaps identified in the DHS IND Strategy. 

Per the recommendation guidelines, the program management system will 
include detailed estimates of completion dates for initiated 
activities, interim timeframes and milestones for monitoring and 
tracking progress, and necessary funding and resource requirements. 
While FEMA is unable to direct other federal entities to participate 
and/or provide information, FEMA will continue to coordinate and 
collaborate with other federal departments and agencies to collect, 
track, and evaluate closure of the capability gaps identified in the 
DHS IND Strategy. ECD: April 30, 2015. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under a 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Chris P. Currie, (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Chris Keisling (Assistant 
Director), David Alexander, Jerry Ambroise, Katherine Davis, Susan 
Hsu, Tracey King, David Lysy, Amanda Miller, Linda Miller, Erin 
O'Brien, Geoff Peck, Laurani Singh, and Kristen Timko made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Disaster Resilience: Actions Are Underway, but Federal Fiscal Exposure 
Highlights the Need for Continued Attention to Longstanding 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-603T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2014).

National Preparedness: Actions Taken by FEMA to Implement Select 
Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-99R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 26, 2013).

Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD's Planning for a 
Complex Catastrophe, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-763] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2013).

Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a 
Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-838] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 12, 2012).

Disaster Recovery: Federal Contracting in the Aftermath of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-942T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).

Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Response to Potential 
Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and 
Agriculture, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-652] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 19, 2011).

Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in 
Assessing National Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-260T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 
2011).

Disaster Response: Criteria for Developing and Validating Effective 
Response Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-969T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2010).

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency 
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364] (Washington D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2010).

Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for 
Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-811] (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 31, 
2009).

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete 
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2009).

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 
2006).

For more information on related GAO products, see: [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disaster_management/issue_summary]. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: May 
2010). 

[2] Mid-America Earthquake Center, Impact of Earthquakes on the 
Central USA (Urbana, Ill: September 2008). 

[3] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: May 2013). One 
Government Performance and Results Act performance metric for the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Response Directorate is 
the goal of achieving a unified, complete, and synchronized federal 
response to emergencies. FEMA established for this goal a target of 
executing100 percent of needed response actions to stabilize an 
incident--including no-notice catastrophic disasters--within 72 hours. 
These actions are defined as those functions that must be initiated 
immediately in order to ensure the best outcomes for survivors.

[4] The White House released Presidential Policy Directive 8 on 
National Preparedness in March 2011. It directed the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to design a national preparedness system to address 
the threats posing the greatest risk to the security of the nation and 
issue various policy and planning documents designed to enhance 
national preparedness. In November 2011, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) published the National Preparedness System, which 
describes activities for developing emergency preparedness 
capabilities, and has worked through FEMA to implement the system. The 
White House, Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2011). DHS, National Preparedness System 
(Washington, D.C.: November 2011). Corrective actions are the 
concrete, actionable steps assigned to responsible entities that are 
intended to resolve gaps and shortcomings experienced during exercises 
and real-world incidents. Federal departments and agencies use varying 
terminology--e.g., recommended actions, recommended courses of action, 
etc.--to describe the actions developed to address such gaps. For the 
purposes of this report, we refer to such actions collectively as 
corrective actions. 

[5] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 requires 
FEMA to carry out a national exercise program and conduct periodic 
national exercises. 6 U.S.C. § 748(b). In 2014, FEMA began labeling 
what had previously been termed "national-level exercises" as 
"capstone exercises."

[6] The following ESFs are included in our review because they are 
coordinated by one of the five departments: DOD-Public Works and 
Engineering; DOE-Energy; HHS-Public Health and Medical Services; DHS-
Communications; Information and Planning; Mass Care, Emergency 
Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services; Logistics; Search 
and Rescue; and External Affairs; and DOJ-Public Safety and Security. 
For more information on the ESFs and their coordinators, including 
those coordinated by departments outside the scope of our review, see 
app. I. 

[7] We compared efforts to assess ESF preparedness to, among other 
things, requirements in the Post-Katrina Act on assessing federal 
preparedness to respond to disasters and federal internal control 
standards for monitoring the execution of management's intent. GAO, 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 1, 1999); Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help 
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005); Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 
2006). 

[8] We selected NLE 2010 and NLE 2011 for our review because these two 
NLEs assessed federal preparedness to respond to an IND attack and a 
major earthquake, respectively--the only NLEs to do so since 
establishment of the National Exercise Program in 2007. We selected 
the federal response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 for review because the 
incident represented the most recent, large-scale real-world disaster 
and involved all five departments within our scope. While Hurricane 
Sandy was a disaster with advanced notice (unlike the two scenarios in 
our review), we believe that it provides valuable insights and lessons 
learned to improve federal response efforts to all kinds of 
catastrophic incidents.

[9] We did not independently verify the accuracy of the status of 
corrective actions as reported to us by agency officials. However, we 
determined the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose 
of describing the reported status of corrective actions from the two 
NLEs and Hurricane Sandy at the five departments in our review. 

[10] We determined at the time of our review, and agency officials 
confirmed, that a federal capability gap assessment similar to the DHS 
IND Strategy had not been conducted for federal response to major 
earthquakes. 

[11] We did not independently verify the accuracy of the status of 
recommended actions as reported to us by agency officials. However, we 
determined the information we gathered to be sufficiently reliable for 
the purpose of describing the status of implementation of recommended 
actions. 

[12] We compared efforts to monitor and track the closure of 
identified capability gaps against, among other things, requirements 
in the Post-Katrina Act on assessing federal preparedness to respond 
to disasters, federal internal control standards for monitoring the 
execution of management's intent, and program management standards for 
overseeing the implementation of complex efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. Project Management 
Institute, The Standard for Program Management, third edition (Newton 
Square, Pa.: 2013). 

[13] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on 
Management of Domestic Incidents (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003). 

[14] Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness updated 
and replaced the former Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on 
the same topic, which identified the same responsibility for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. The White House, Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 on National Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2011). 

[15] The NRF notes that guidance contained in the NRF is not intended 
to alter or impede the ability of any federal government department or 
agency to carry out its authorities or meet its responsibilities under 
applicable laws, executive orders, and directives

[16] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 
Stat. 1355 (2006). 

[17] 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(4).

[18] The NRF incident-specific annexes include the Catastrophic 
Incident and Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annexes. An incident-
specific annex has not been developed for response to major 
earthquakes. Each ESF supports at least 1 of the 14 response core 
capabilities that are defined by the National Preparedness Goal as the 
capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has 
occurred. The National Preparedness Goal also assigns qualitative 
capability targets, or expected levels of performance, to each core 
capability. The response core capabilities are planning, public 
information and warning, operational coordination, critical 
transportation, environmental response/health and safety, fatality 
management services, infrastructure systems, mass care services, mass 
search and rescue operations, on-scene security and protection, 
operational communications, public and private services and resources, 
public health and medical services, and situational assessment. 

[19] According to the NRF, ESF primary agencies have significant 
authorities, roles, resources, and capabilities for a particular 
function within an ESF, and ESF support agencies have specific 
capabilities or resources that support primary agencies in executing 
the mission of the ESF. 

[20] The NRF lists 15 ESFs. One ESF--Long-Term Community Recovery (ESF 
#14)--was superseded by issuance of the September 2011 National 
Disaster Recovery Framework. As a result, for the purposes of this 
report, we refer to the 14 ESFs that remain active.

[21] The ESF Leadership Group also comprises the federal departments 
and agencies that coordinate other NRF annexes, including the incident-
specific annexes. According to the ESF Leadership Group's charter, the 
group's responsibilities include identifying operational preparedness 
and planning priorities to be addressed, developing and maintaining 
federal interagency operational plans, and providing planning 
assistance and oversight through all phases of interagency response 
planning. 

[22] The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to carry out a national 
exercise program and conduct periodic national exercises. 6 U.S.C. § 
748(b). 

[23] Intradepartmental after-action reports may also be developed by 
specific offices or components within a given federal department. 
Generally, the related improvement plans and corrective actions from 
such reports are designed to address tactical or operational issues 
within the given department. FEMA, National Exercise Program 
Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2012). 

[24] Under an earlier iteration of the National Exercise Program Base 
Plan, NLEs were to occur annually. In 2014, FEMA began labeling what 
had previously been termed "national-level exercises" as "capstone 
exercises." 

[25] In March 2014, FEMA conducted an NLE (now termed "capstone 
exercise") based on a catastrophic Alaska earthquake scenario. 
However, because FEMA's evaluation of this exercise was ongoing at the 
time of our review, and corrective actions had not yet been issued, 
this exercise was not included within the scope of this review. 

[26] The National Security Council is the President's principal forum 
for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his 
senior national security advisers and cabinet officials, and the 
National Security Council Staff are the staff that assist the council. 
The council is chaired by the President and its regular attendees and 
advisers (both statutory and nonstatutory) include the Vice President; 
the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of National Intelligence; and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The heads of 
other executive departments and agencies are invited to attend 
meetings of the council when appropriate.

[27] We requested information on coordination, planning, and 
capability assessment activities from 10 of the 14 ESF coordinators 
because the assigned coordinator for each of the 10 is one of the 
federal departments within the scope of our review (DOD, DOE, HHS, 
DHS, and DOJ). We did not assess the quality or the sufficiency of the 
activities reported. For more information on the 14 ESF coordinators, 
see app. I, table 6.

[28] The Mass Care ESF developed guidance that includes planning 
factors for its primary and support agencies to determine what types 
of capabilities will be required to execute the ESF's mission after an 
incident--for example, what percentage of the population will seek 
emergency shelter inside the affected geographic area. This guidance 
identifies an ESF primary or support agency as a "service provider" to 
deliver the required capability; for example, DOD's Defense Logistics 
Agency is responsible for providing tents, camping kits, equipment, 
and supplies.

[29] National Security Council, The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Sandy After-Action Report (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2013).

[30] The National Security Council's Hurricane Sandy after-action 
report recommended the following corrective action: "As a pilot, the 
Energy ESF, working with DHS, the National Business Emergency 
Operations Center, and relevant government and sector coordinating 
councils, should develop a comprehensive, systematic way to track and 
identify issues involving fuel processing and delivery. An interim 
solution should be operational by June 1, 2013." According to DOE 
officials, the development of this pilot was ongoing as of August 2014 
and its implementation would rely on the involvement of both public 
and private sector organizations.

[31] According to the NRF, the Public Safety and Security ESF is 
responsible for coordinating the integration of public safety and 
security capabilities and resources to support the full range of 
incident management activities. Functions include but are not limited 
to facility and resource security; security planning and technical 
resource assistance; public safety and security support; and support 
to access, traffic, and crowd control. 

[32] The National Security Council's Hurricane Sandy after-action 
report recommended the following corrective action: "The ESF 
Leadership Group should undertake a scenario-based capability analysis 
in order to identify current capabilities to meet ESF missions as well 
as shortfalls. The ESFs should develop solutions and short-term work-
arounds to address identified shortfalls, working in concert with non-
Federal partners. The ESF Leadership Group should submit the analysis 
and short-term solutions to the National Security Staff by August 15, 
2013." 

[33] The coordinator for the 10th ESF, Search and Rescue, produced a 
capability gap analysis that compared quantified capability 
requirements against currently available capabilities. 

[34] Minimum standards for coordination activities could include 
establishing guidance that ESF coordinators hold a given number of ESF-
specific conferences, trainings, or exercises for the ESFs' primary 
and support agencies within a given fiscal year. Minimum standards for 
product deliverables could include establishing guidance that ESF 
coordinators develop operational plans or standard operating 
procedures for their ESFs, as well as quantify the ESFs' capability 
requirements and catalog currently available capabilities against said 
requirements.

[35] The NRF includes 14 ESF annexes that contain general descriptions 
of actions to be taken by the ESFs' primary and support agencies to 
execute the given annex's described emergency support function. 
However, the ESF annexes do not provide any additional guidance to ESF 
coordinators on how they are to carry out their coordinator 
responsibilities. FEMA issued the Response Federal Interagency 
Operational Plan for the NRF in July 2014; according to FEMA 
officials, it includes information directing each ESF to deliver 
services, supplies, and resources during the different phases of 
response. However, while the document identifies specific tasks ESFs 
are to take, this document does not provide any additional guidance on 
how all ESF coordinators are to execute their responsibilities to 
oversee ESF preparedness.

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]. See also GAO, 
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency 
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364] (Washington D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2010).

[37] The 17 remaining corrective actions were assigned to the 
following federal entities that were outside the scope of this review: 
2 to the Small Business Administration, 1 to the Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration, 3 to the Department of Agriculture, 1 to 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and 10 to the White 
House. 

[38] The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to establish a program to 
conduct remedial action tracking and long-term trend analyses. See 6 
U.S.C. § 750. Our report will generally refer to "corrective action 
tracking" rather than "remedial action tracking," as used in the 
statute. For the purposes of this report, a closed corrective action 
includes actions that have been implemented, actions that were 
overtaken by other events and as a result were no longer applicable, 
and actions the department declined to implement for other reasons. 
Data fields in the Corrective Action Program System (CAPS) in which 
corrective action officers are to describe why an action was being 
closed did not consistently contain detailed enough information for 
GAO to determine if the action was closed because action had been 
taken or for another reason. For information on the corrective actions 
from NLE 2010 and NLE 2011 that remain open at each department, as 
well as the departments' plans to address these actions, see app. III.

[39] In April 2009, we reported that although the Post-Katrina Act did 
not give FEMA the authority to compel other federal entities to comply 
with the objectives of the National Exercise Program, the act placed 
responsibility for implementing the National Exercise Program on FEMA, 
in coordination with other appropriate federal entities. Further, we 
reported that it was incumbent on FEMA to coordinate with other 
federal entities to better ensure that FEMA obtains the information it 
needs to meet its statutory responsibility to track corrective 
actions. However, the implementation plan for the National Exercise 
Program at that time did not require federal departments and agencies 
to report corrective action information to FEMA. See GAO, National 
Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and 
Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2009). 

[40] The Post-Katrina Act also required FEMA to develop a 
comprehensive assessment system and annual federal preparedness 
reports. 6 U.S.C. §§ 749, 752. 

[41] According to the March 2014 National Preparedness Report, FEMA 
collected and reviewed over 1,000 data and information sources from 
federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and 
nongovernmental entities, among others, to develop the report. For 
example, the report used the results of a self-assessment process that 
states and territories completed in 2013, including Threat and Hazard 
Identification Risk Assessment and State Preparedness Report 
submissions that states and territories are required to complete in 
order to receive preparedness grant funding. 

[42] The National Preparedness Goal, called for by Presidential Policy 
Directive 8 and issued in September 2011, defines the core 
capabilities necessary for emergency response to specific types of 
incidents, including acts of terrorism and natural disasters. 

[43] FEMA, National Exercise Program Base Plan (Washington, D.C.: 
March 18, 2011). 

[44] According to FEMA officials, updates on the status of corrective 
actions provided to the council by other federal departments and 
agencies are subsequently forwarded to FEMA by the council for FEMA's 
situational awareness.

[45] While FEMA does not monitor the status of NLE corrective action 
implementation beyond DHS and its components, FEMA officials noted 
that the agency seeks to increase interagency awareness of open NLE 
corrective actions by providing monthly updates to the interagency 
National Exercise Program Exercise Implementation Committee, which 
includes senior representatives from federal departments and agencies, 
on the status of corrective actions from prior NLEs as displayed in 
CAPS. However, because we found that the other federal departments and 
agencies within the scope of our review generally do not use CAPS, 
this information is not comprehensive or up to date. According to FEMA 
officials, FEMA reminds other departments and agencies at the monthly 
committee meeting of their responsibility to update the status of 
their assigned corrective actions in CAPS. FEMA officials stated that 
they also offer the departments and agencies the option to provide 
status updates through other means, such as email. 

[46] For information on the corrective actions from Hurricane Sandy 
that remain open at each department, as well as their plans to address 
these actions, see app. IV. 

[47] In April 2009, we recommended that FEMA develop procedures for 
including lessons learned from real-world incidents in CAPS. This 
recommendation focused on corrective actions identified internally at 
FEMA. FEMA issued a management directive on the Lessons Learned/ 
Continuous Improvement Program in February 2013. According to the 
directive, all corrective actions identified for assignment and 
tracking based on lessons learned (including from real-world 
incidents) that are beyond the capability of a given FEMA component to 
resolve or that are of significant interest to FEMA management are to 
be presented to the FEMA Continuous Improvement Working Group and 
should be submitted for inclusion in CAPS. The issuance of this 
directive met the intent of our recommendation. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. While the management 
directive encourages FEMA's components to use CAPS, they may use other 
processes as necessary. For corrective actions from Hurricane Sandy, 
FEMA reported using an internal-to-FEMA data-sharing repository to 
monitor their status. 

[48] DHS, DHS Strategy for Improving the National Response and 
Recovery from an IND Attack (Washington, D.C.: April 2010); FEMA, 
Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery Capability-Based 
Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: March 2012). 

[49] The DHS IND Strategy aligns the 136 identified capability gaps to 
seven overarching objectives that must be achieved in order to 
effectively respond to and recover from an IND attack: (1) manage the 
response, (2) characterize the incident, (3) mass evacuation and in-
place protection, (4) medical triage, (5) provide casualty and evacuee 
care, (6) stabilize and control impacted area, and (7) perform site 
recovery and restore essential functions.

[50] FEMA, Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery Capability-
Based Implementation Plan, Revision 1 (Washington, D.C.: September 
2013). According to FEMA officials, each working group determined 
which gaps it would prioritize for closure, drawing from the subset of 
capability gaps assigned to the given working group in the March 2012 
version of the IND Implementation Plan. 

[51] At the time of the September 2013 update to the IND 
Implementation Plan, the Recovery Working Group reported that it was 
in the process of conducting a needs assessment to determine what 
activities to take to address the assigned actions, and the group did 
not identify any ongoing activities to address capability gaps. For 
additional details on the five interagency working groups' ongoing 
activities to address the 14 identified capability gaps with projects 
underway as of September 2013, see app. V. While few gaps have been 
completely closed, FEMA officials noted that the agency has taken a 
number of actions to improve the federal response to an IND attack 
since October 2013. For example, according to FEMA officials these 
actions include, but are not limited to, conducting IND attack 
exercises in two cities, developing regional IND response plans, and 
developing an appendix to the Response Federal Interagency Operational 
Plan on responding to nuclear and radiological incidents and attacks, 
including an IND attack, which is expected to be completed by the end 
of calendar year 2014. 

[52] For the 14 capability gaps described in the plan, their status of 
completion was variably and inconsistently reported. Specifically, 
activities for 5 of the gaps were described in terms of their relative 
degree of completion (e.g., 25 to 75 percent complete); activities for 
2 of the gaps were described in terms of their general estimated 
timeframe for completion (i.e., 1 to 5 and 5 to 10 years to complete, 
respectively); activities for 6 of the gaps were described as ongoing 
without additional detail; and activities for 1 of the gaps did not 
provide information on the status of completion because FEMA was 
reevaluating whether the corrective actions were within its scope of 
responsibilities. For more details, see app.V. 

[53] For the 14 capability gaps described in the plan, activities for 
11 of the gaps were reported as being funded by FEMA and 3 of the gaps 
were reported as being jointly funded by DOD and HHS, but funding 
requirements were not specified. 

[54] FEMA officials stated that the program management plan under 
development at the time of our review was in the early stages of 
drafting and was therefore not available for us to review. According 
to FEMA officials as of August 2014, the draft program management plan 
was scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2014 and was 
intended to cover IND Implementation Plan activities through fiscal 
year 2018. 

[55] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management, third edition.

[56] For the purposes of planning for catastrophic incidents, such as 
when developing the Federal Interagency Operational Plan for Response, 
FEMA officials stated that they use three major types of disasters to 
develop planning factors. Two of these events--an IND attack and a 
major earthquake--are no-notice, while the third--a Category 5 
hurricane--is an event with notice. All three events are based on 
scenarios described in the April 2005 National Planning Scenarios, 
which were created for use in national, federal, state, and local 
preparedness activities. 

[57] For a prior GAO report on this topic, see Continuity of 
Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities during 2006 
Governmentwide Exercise, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-185] (Nov. 19, 2007). 

[58] There was originally a 15th ESF on long-term community recovery, 
which was superseded by the issuance of the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework in September 2011.

[59] For example, see Department of Homeland Security, National 
Preparedness Report (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2014). See also FEMA, 
Emergency Support Function: Fiscal Year 2008 Report to Congress 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2013). According to this report, the 
document was compiled pursuant to a requirement in the Joint 
Explanatory Statement and Senate Report 110-84 that accompany the FY 
2008 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161). 

[60] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999); Results-Oriented Government: 
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among 
Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); and Catastrophic Disasters: 
Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will 
Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

[61] In March 2014, FEMA conducted an NLE (now replaced by the term 
"capstone exercise") on a simulated catastrophic earthquake in Alaska. 
However, because evaluation of this exercise to identify needed 
corrective actions was ongoing at the time of our review, we did not 
include this exercise within the scope of our review. According to 
FEMA officials, an after-action report on the exercise is expected to 
be published in autumn 2014. 

[62] We also considered the March 2011 earthquake and resulting 
tsunami and partial nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, Japan as another 
potential real-world incident that identified federal capability gaps. 
However, on the basis of our review of relevant after-action reports 
and interviews with agency officials, we determined that the gaps 
identified from this incident were largely focused on areas outside 
the scope of this review, such as nuclear power plant safety. 

[63] While the interagency after-action report for NLE 2010 identified 
corrective actions for all departments and agencies that participated 
in the exercise, the interagency after-action report for NLE 2011 
highlighted areas for improvement and each department and agency that 
participated in the exercise was to develop its own corrective 
actions. Therefore, we identified corrective actions from NLE 2011 by 
obtaining from the departments in our review copies of departmental 
after-action reports and other documentation that identified these 
actions. 

[64] A closed corrective action includes actions that have been 
implemented, actions that are no longer applicable, and actions the 
department declined to implement for other reasons. For example, one 
of the corrective actions from NLE 2010 was for FEMA to prepare a 
matrix to determine the benefits, risks, and consequences of changing 
the Homeland Security Advisory System level following an IND 
detonation in a major metropolitan area. The action became obsolete 
after the National Terrorism Advisory System replaced the Homeland 
Security Advisory System. While FEMA officials provided some examples 
of corrective actions being closed in the manner described above, data 
fields in CAPS in which correction action officers are to describe why 
an action was closed did not consistently contain detailed enough 
information for GAO to determine if the action was closed because 
action was taken or for another reason. 

[65] Officials at the five departments within the scope of our review 
did not identify any gap assessments, similar to the DHS IND Strategy, 
that had been conducted relevant to federal response to major 
earthquakes.

[66] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] and 
Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, 
third edition (Newton Square, Pa.: 2013). 

[67] The NRF is a guide to how the nation responds to disasters and 
emergencies of all types and describes the principles, roles and 
responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core 
capabilities required to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, restore communities, and meet basic human needs following 
an incident. The framework includes various annexes, including on 
ESFs, the federal government's primary coordinating structure for 
building, sustaining, and delivering response core capabilities. 
Organized by specific functional areas most frequently needed in a 
national response, ESFs are designed to bring together the 
capabilities of various federal departments and agencies. 

[68] Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Support Function #2 
Communications: Concept of Operations (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2012).

[69] For example, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Operation Order 2014-
11,U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to All Hazards Events 
(Washington, D.C: May 30, 2014); Pacific Ocean Division Operation 
Order 13-02, All Hazards Regional Readiness and Contingency Response 
Operations Plan (Fort Shafter, Hawaii: Jan. 10, 2014); Operations Plan 
2010-70, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to a Catastrophic 
Earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 
2010); Operations Plan 2014-16, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response 
to an Earthquake in the Cascadia Subduction Zone (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 26, 2014); and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Planning and Response 
Team: Infrastructure Assessment Standard Operating Procedures 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2012). 

[70] Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Support 
Manual, Change 1 (Washington, D.C.: January 2013); Regional Incident 
Support Manual (Washington D.C.: January 2013).

[71] Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, 
first edition (Washington, D.C.: September 2011). 

[72] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 
Emergency Support Function #5 Information and Planning Annex 
(Washington D.C.: May 2013). 

[73] Department of Homeland Security, Response Federal Interagency 
Operational Plan (Washington, D.C.: July 2014). 

[74] ESF #6 developed guidance that includes planning factors for its 
primary and support agencies to determine what types of capabilities--
for example, what percentage of the population will seek emergency 
shelter inside an affected geographic area--are required to execute 
the ESF #6 mission after an incident. This guidance identifies an ESF 
#6 "service provider" to deliver each required capability; for 
example, DOD's Defense Logistics Agency is responsible for providing 
tents, camping kits, equipment, and supplies.

[75] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Logistics Management 
Operations Manual (Washington, D.C.: March 2013).

[76] For example, Department of Health and Human Services, National 
Disaster Medical System--Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team 
Concept of Operations (Washington, D.C.: May 2012); National 
Veterinary Response Team Concept of Operations (Washington D.C.: 
November 2011). 

[77] The National Search and Rescue Committee was established in 1973 
as a standing interagency group to oversee the United States National 
Search and Rescue Plan and to act as a coordinating forum for national 
search and rescue matters. The committee serves as the primary 
coordinating forum within the federal government for the conduct and 
support of civil search and rescue operations covered by the National 
Search and Rescue Plan and for matters relating to national civil 
search and rescue policies and positions. 

[78] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Concept of 
Operations Annex to the National Urban Search and Rescue Response 
System Operations Manual (Washington, D.C.: April 2012); National 
Urban Search and Rescue Response System Field Operations Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: September 2003).

[79] Department of Energy, Infrastructure Security and Energy 
Restoration Emergency Response Organization Plan, Version 7 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2010); Infrastructure Security and Energy 
Restoration Emergency Response Organization Operations Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: October 2012). 

[80] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 
Emergency Support Function #12 Energy Annex (Washington, D.C.: May 
2013).

[81] Department of Justice, Emergency Support Function #13 National 
Concept of Operations Plan (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2013). 

[82] Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Support Function #15: 
Standard Operating Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2013). 

[83] Prescripted mission assignments are draft work orders--
established in advance of a disaster and then modified to meet the 
needs of a specific incident--issued by FEMA to another federal agency 
to request disaster response support.

[84] For the purposes of this report, closed corrective actions 
include actions that have been implemented, actions that were 
overtaken by other events and as a result were no longer applicable, 
and actions the department declined to implement for other reasons. 
For example, one of the corrective actions from NLE 2010 was for FEMA 
to prepare a matrix to determine the benefits, risks, and consequences 
of raising and lowering the Homeland Security Advisory System level 
following an improvised nuclear device attack in a major metropolitan 
area. However, the action became obsolete after the National Terrorism 
Advisory System replaced the Homeland Security Advisory System level, 
and thus the action was closed in the Corrective Action Program System 
(CAPS) by FEMA officials. While FEMA officials provided limited 
examples of corrective actions being closed in the manner described 
above, CAPS data fields did not consistently contain detailed enough 
information for GAO to determine whether a given corrective action was 
closed because the action had been implemented or whether it was 
closed for other reasons.

[85] Corrective actions are the concrete, actionable steps assigned to 
responsible entities that are intended to resolve gaps and 
shortcomings experienced during exercises and real-world incidents. 
Federal departments and agencies use varying terminology--e.g., 
recommended actions, recommended courses of action, etc.--to describe 
the actions developed to address such gaps. For the purposes of this 
report, we refer to such actions collectively as corrective actions. 

[86] DHS, DHS Strategy for Improving the National Response and 
Recovery from an IND Attack (Washington, D.C.: April 2010); FEMA, 
Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery Capability-Based 
Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: March 2012). 

[87] FEMA, Improvised Nuclear Device Response and Recovery Capability-
Based Implementation Plan, Revision 1 (Washington, D.C.: September 
2013). 

[End of section] 

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