This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-577 
entitled 'DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need 
to Reevaluate the Program' which was released on September 19, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2014: 

DOD Joint Bases: 

Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program: 

GAO-14-577: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-577, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO designated DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area to
address efficiency challenges. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission combining 26 installations
into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings, initially
estimated to be $2.3 billion. In 2009, DOD reduced this estimate to $273
million. GAO was mandated to assess DOD's progress in consolidating
common services across joint bases. This report addresses the extent to
which officials reported consolidating installation-support functions, 
and meeting joint basing goals to achieve greater efficiencies and 
cost savings. GAO conducted a survey of 11 joint bases, and reviewed 
applicable guidance. GAO did not survey Joint Region Marianas because 
it was subject to different expectations. 

What GAO Found: 

Joint base officials reported varying progress in consolidating 
installation-support functions, and challenges resulting from 
consolidation efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. 
Overall, the joint bases reported partially consolidating 80 percent 
of their installation-support functions, but the extent of 
consolidation varied across the bases and among the various functions. 
None of the joint bases have reported consolidating all functions. 
However, all 11 joint bases reported consolidating some portion of 
eight functions, such as custodial services and installation safety. 
The least consolidated functions were reported to be military service-
specific or mission-specific, such as small-arms range management and 
port services. Also, joint base officials reported several challenges 
resulting from consolidation, such as multiple inspections and 
employees being potentially disadvantaged in competing for promotion
opportunities due to military service-specific personnel policies. The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service 
officials have not evaluated which functions are still suitable for 
consolidation or taken policy actions to address any challenges 
resulting from consolidation. Without an evaluation of the suitability 
of installation-support functions for consolidation and without 
actions to address any negative consequences that emerged from 
consolidation, the Department of Defense (DOD) may continue to 
experience challenges in its efforts to consolidate these functions. 

Figure: Variances in Installation-Support Functions Consolidated at 11 
Joint Bases Surveyed: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Port services: 25%; 1 of 4 joint bases consolidated the function; 
Small arms range management: 38%; 3 of 8 joint bases consolidated the 
function; 
Custodial services: 100%; 11 of 11 joint bases consolidated the 
function; 
Installation safety: 100%; 11 of 11 joint bases consolidated the 
function. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Not all of the joint bases that GAO surveyed have small-arms 
range management or port services functions. 

[End of figure] 

Joint base officials reported that consolidation of support functions 
has resulted in some progress toward achieving the goals of joint 
basing (achieving efficiencies and cost savings), by reducing 
redundant positions and finding contracting efficiencies. However, as 
GAO reported in November 2012, DOD does not have a method to collect 
cost savings information achieved specifically from joint basing. 
Thus, GAO recommended that DOD develop a plan for doing so. DOD 
disagreed and has not yet taken action. GAO continues to believe this
recommendation has merit and should be addressed. Also, officials said 
they are uncertain of the extent to which the goals of joint basing 
are still appropriate, and to what extent they are required to take 
actions to pursue them. OSD has not collaborated with the military 
services to evaluate whether the goals of joint basing remain 
appropriate and has not provided direction to the joint bases on
future priorities. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint 
basing program by OSD and military service officials to determine if 
the goals remain appropriate—-and without additional direction to help 
meet reporting requirements-—it will be difficult for DOD to determine 
the extent to which the joint basing initiative is achieving its 
intended goals. 

What GAO Recommends: 

Congress should consider directing DOD to evaluate joint basing goals,
provide direction on requirements to meet the goals, and determine next
steps for joint basing. GAO included this matter because DOD did not
concur with GAO's recommendations to conduct such an evaluation and
provide direction, in part because DOD stated joint bases have achieved
savings. GAO also recommended DOD evaluate which installation-support
functions remain suitable for consolidation, with which DOD concurred, 
and take policy actions to address challenges, with which DOD 
partially concurred, noting its existing processes to address 
challenges. GAO continues to believe its findings and recommendations 
are valid as discussed in this report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-577]. For more 
information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 
leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Joint Base Officials Have Reported Varying Levels of Progress in 
Consolidating Functions, but Cited Limited Opportunities and 
Challenges from Consolidation Efforts: 

Joint Basing Has Produced Some Benefits, but Officials Reported They 
Are Unable to Achieve Greater Efficiencies and Potential Cost Savings 
without Additional Direction: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Survey on Consolidation of Joint Base Operations: 

Appendix III: BRAC Commission Recommendation on Joint Basing 
(Including Elements of DOD's Recommendation to the Commission): 

Appendix IV: Status of Reported Consolidation at Each of the 11 Joint 
Bases: 

Appendix V: Locations of Joint Bases: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Joint Bases Established Since 2010: 

Table 2: List of 42 Installation-Support Functions Included in Our 
Survey: 

Table 3: Joint Bases with the Highest Percent of Functions in Which 
Officials Reported Significant or Moderate Hindrances in Consolidating 
Because of Differences in Workforces: 

Table 4: Joint Bases with the Highest Percent of Functions That Cited 
Geography as a Hindrance to Consolidation: 

Table 5: List of 42 Installation-Support Functions Included in Our 
Survey: 

Table 6: Status of Reported Consolidation at Each of the 11 Joint 
Bases by Installation-Support Function (Part 1 of 2): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Locations of Joint Bases: 

Figure 2: Status of Consolidation of Installation-Support Functions: 

Figure 3: Percent of 42 Installation-Support Functions That Officials 
Reported Were Partially Consolidated by Each of the 11 Joint Bases: 

Figure 4: Percent of the 11 Joint Bases That Reported at Least 
Partially Consolidating Each Installation Support Function: 

Figure 5: Percent of Functions in Which Officials Reported Hindrances 
in Consolidating Because of Differences in Workforces: 

Figure 6: Percent of Functions in Which Officials Reported Some 
Challenges Resulting from Consolidation: 

Figure 7: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported 
Reductions in Redundant Funded Positions Related to Joint Basing: 

Figure 8: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported a 
Reduction of Redundant Contracts or an Increase in Contract 
Efficiencies Related to Joint Basing: 

Figure 9: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported a Merger 
or Consolidation of Redundant Procedures Related to Joint Basing: 

Figure 10: Percent of Functions with Some Consolidation in Which 
Officials Reported Benefits Resulting from Consolidation: 

Figure 11: Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling: 

Figure 12: Joint Base Andrews: 

Figure 13: Joint Base Charleston: 

Figure 14: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson: 

Figure 15: Joint Base Langley-Eustis: 

Figure 16: Joint Base Lewis-McChord: 

Figure 17: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: 

Figure 18: Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall: 

Figure 19: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam: 

Figure 20: Joint Base San Antonio: 

Figure 21: Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story: 

Figure 22: Joint Region Marianas: 

Abbreviations: 

BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

MOA: Memorandum of Agreement: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

RMD: Resource Management Decision: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 19, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

In the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) proposed a recommendation to the BRAC 
Commission to consolidate 26 service-specific stand-alone 
installations into 12 joint bases to take advantage of opportunities 
for efficiencies. In DOD's justification for its recommendation to the 
BRAC Commission, the Secretary of Defense noted, among other things, 
that because the installations either shared a common boundary or were 
in proximity to at least one other installation and performed common 
support functions, there was a significant opportunity to reduce 
duplication of similar support services, which could produce savings. 
DOD projected savings in various areas, such as by paring unnecessary 
management personnel, achieving greater efficiencies through economies 
of scale, and consolidating and optimizing existing and future service 
contract requirements. DOD and the BRAC Commission estimated that the 
creation of joint bases could save about $2.3 billion over a 20-year 
period in net present value terms.[Footnote 1] 

DOD's joint basing initiative--implemented in two phases, with five 
joint bases established in October 2009 and the remaining seven bases 
established in October 2010--created 12 joint bases from the 26 
previously stand-alone installations that were originally operated by 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, combining installation-
support services such as airfield operations, grounds maintenance, and 
custodial services. The 2005 BRAC recommendation on joint basing 
established which military bases would receive installation-management 
functions from one or more other bases in lieu of each base providing 
the same services. On the basis of these realignments, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) designated the military service 
responsible for delivering installation support at each joint base as 
the lead service, and in 2008 OSD issued further guidance for joint 
basing implementation.[Footnote 2] According to this guidance, the 
lead service is referred to as the supporting component and the 
military services receiving installation support are referred to as 
the supported components. 

We previously reported on DOD's implementation of its joint basing 
concept. In 2009, we found that DOD had made a comprehensive effort to 
ensure the consistent delivery of installation support at the joint 
bases, and that the cost of installation support was expected to rise 
because OSD increased the standards for installation support, which 
would require additional administrative costs, and because of the loss 
of some existing installation-support efficiencies.[Footnote 3] As a 
result, in 2009 DOD significantly reduced its 20-year net present 
value cost savings projection from $2.3 billion to about $273 million. 
We recommended that DOD periodically review the installation-support 
standards and administrative costs at the joint bases, and report to 
Congress on estimated installation-support costs. DOD partially agreed 
with the recommendations, and did not agree to take steps to fully 
implement them. In June 2012, we reported that DOD's updated 20-year 
net present value savings estimate had fallen to $249 million. 
[Footnote 4] In November 2012, we found that OSD did not have a fully 
developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, 
savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and 
that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving 
cost savings and efficiencies. We recommended, among other things, 
that DOD develop and implement a plan to guide joint bases in 
achieving anticipated cost savings and efficiencies goals.[Footnote 5] 
DOD disagreed with this recommendation, stating that DOD should 
continue its approach of being patient with obtaining savings and 
efficiencies, maintaining that joint basing was a relatively new 
initiative and implementation issues were still being resolved. We 
continue to believe that these recommendations are valid and should be 
implemented. 

For almost two decades, we have designated DOD infrastructure as a 
high-risk area, citing that reducing the cost of excess infrastructure 
activities was critical to making use of scarce resources and 
maintaining high levels of military capabilities. During this time, we 
reported that DOD faced challenges in three areas: (1) reducing excess 
and obsolete infrastructure, (2) sustaining facilities, and (3) 
achieving cost savings and efficiencies in base-support services. 
After DOD made significant progress in addressing the issues regarding 
planning and funding to sustain facilities, in 2011 we narrowed this 
high-risk area to focus on the two remaining issues.[Footnote 6] DOD 
has cited its joint basing initiative as the mechanism through which 
it could achieve greater economies of scale and savings by 
consolidating and eliminating duplicative installation-support 
services. In GAO's 2013 high-risk update, we reported that DOD had 
made little progress in realizing the anticipated cost savings and 
efficiencies from consolidations and from the elimination of duplicate 
base support at specific installations.[Footnote 7] 

The House Armed Services Committee, in its 2013 report accompanying a 
bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 
mandated that we assess the progress DOD has made in consolidating 
common services across the joint bases.[Footnote 8] This report 
addresses the extent to which officials have reported (1) 
consolidating installation-support functions at the joint bases, and 
(2) meeting the goals of joint basing to achieve greater efficiencies 
and cost savings as stated in the 2005 BRAC recommendation. 

To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating 
their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD's 2008 Joint 
Basing Implementation Guidance to identify DOD's expectations for 
consolidation, and compared these with the results of our web-based 
survey of 11 of the 12 joint bases.[Footnote 9] We also interviewed 
joint base officials from a nongeneralizable sample of four joint 
bases, and reviewed the joint bases' memorandums of agreement. 
[Footnote 10] To determine why consolidation had or had not occurred 
as intended, to identify any factors that have hindered consolidation, 
and to identify any challenges that have resulted from consolidation 
efforts, we analyzed information obtained through our survey and 
interviewed joint base officials. We evaluated DOD's efforts to 
address reported hindrances to consolidation and challenges that have 
resulted from consolidation efforts and compared those efforts to key 
federal practices for consolidation.[Footnote 11] We did not 
independently assess the extent to which consolidation occurred as 
identified by survey respondents and during interviews. 

To determine the extent to which officials have reported meeting the 
goals of joint basing to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings 
as stated in the 2005 BRAC recommendation, we reviewed documents and 
guidance from OSD, the military services, and individual joint bases. 
We reviewed survey results and information collected from interviews 
and compared them to key federal practices for consolidation of 
management functions and to key practices agencies can take to improve 
efficiency as identified in our prior work.[Footnote 12] To understand 
the role of OSD and military service headquarters in overseeing joint 
bases, we interviewed OSD joint basing officials; members of the Joint 
Base Working Group that represents the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps headquarters; and officials from the Army Installation 
Management Command, the Air Force Civil Engineering Command, and Navy 
Installations Command as they provide varying levels of funding for 
and oversight of installation support for their corresponding military 
services.[Footnote 13] To understand the roles and responsibilities of 
the regional commands in managing joint bases, we interviewed regional 
officials with responsibility for joint bases, including officials 
from Army Installation Management Command as well as four Air Force 
major commands and two Navy regional commands. To collect information 
about specific initiatives undertaken by the joint bases and about the 
related outcomes, we drew from our survey and interviews. See appendix 
I for a detailed description of our overall scope and methodology, and 
appendix II for a copy of the survey questions. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Establishment of Joint Bases: 

DOD consolidated 26 service-specific stand-alone installations into 12 
joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for 
efficiencies.[Footnote 14] See table 1 for a list of joint bases, 
their locations, and the identification of which military service is 
the supporting component that delivers installation support. 

Table 1: Joint Bases Established Since 2010: 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling; 
Location: District of Columbia; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval District 
Washington and Bolling Air Force Base; 
Component delivering installation support: Navy. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington; 
Location: Maryland; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Andrews Air Force 
Base and Naval Air Facility Washington; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Charleston; 
Location: South Carolina; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Charleston Air Force 
Base and Naval Weapons Station Charleston; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson; 
Location: Alaska; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Elmendorf Air Force 
Base and Fort Richardson; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Langley-Eustis; 
Location: Virginia; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Langley Air Force 
Base and Fort Eustis; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Lewis-McChord; 
Location: Washington; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Fort Lewis and 
McChord Air Force Base; 
Component delivering installation support: Army. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst; 
Location: New Jersey; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: McGuire Air Force 
Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall; 
Location: Virginia; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Fort Myer and 
Henderson Hall; 
Component delivering installation support: Army. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam; 
Location: Hawaii; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval Station Pearl 
Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base; 
Component delivering installation support: Navy. 

Name of joint base: Joint Base San Antonio; 
Location: Texas; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Lackland Air Force 
Base, Fort Sam Houston, and Randolph Air Force Base; 
Component delivering installation support: Air Force. 

Name of joint base: Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story; 
Location: Virginia; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval Expeditionary 
Base Little Creek and Fort Story; 
Component delivering installation support: Navy. 

Name of joint base: Joint Region Marianas; 
Location: Guam; 
Installations consolidating into the joint base: Naval Base Guam and 
Andersen Air Force Base; 
Component delivering installation support: Navy. 

Source: GAO summary of Office of Secretary of Defense information. 
GAO-14-577. 

[End of table] 

Figure 1 is an interactive map that depicts the locations of the 11 
joint bases and Joint Region Marianas. The map (see interactive 
instructions) also features individual maps of each of the joint bases 
and joint region. See appendix V for the printed version of each map. 

Figure 1: Locations of Joint Bases: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Interactivity instructions: Click on a joint base name to see more 
information. See appendix V for the noninteractive, printer-friendly 
version. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Implementation of Joint Basing: 

In January 2008, OSD issued guidance to implement the joint basing 
initiative.[Footnote 15] The guidance established a comprehensive 
framework to consolidate installation-support functions while meeting 
mission requirements. It also created a Joint Management Oversight 
Structure to establish the lines of authority for handling disputes 
and directed the transfer of installation-support authority and real 
property to the supporting component.[Footnote 16] Further, the 
guidance requires that the military services at each joint base enter 
into a memorandum of agreement to define the relationships between the 
components; to detail the transfer of real property and funding to the 
supporting component; and to require the establishment of the Joint 
Base Partnership Council, which is a group consisting of 
representation from the major supported component(s) and the tenants 
on the base. The council's role includes helping at the joint base 
level to resolve any disputes that arise between the supporting and 
supported components.[Footnote 17] The agreements generally require 
the Joint Base Partnership Council to annually review any financial 
effects from the agreements, and to triennially review each agreement. 

OSD guidance requires that each joint base have a Joint Base Commander 
from the supporting component, and a Deputy Joint Base Commander who 
is generally from the supported component.[Footnote 18] The Joint Base 
Commander has the authority and responsibility for effectively using 
available resources for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, 
and controlling the delivery of installation support as detailed in 
each joint base's memorandum of agreement. 

Additionally, OSD guidance required that all civilian authorizations 
providing installation support from the supported component will 
become part of the supporting component, under the supporting 
components' civilian personnel management system. Some joint bases 
incorporated military positions from the supported component into the 
joint base structure. These positions generally were identified in the 
agreements for each joint base and now perform installation-support 
duties for the Joint Base Commander. 

Installation-Support Functions: 

DOD's 2008 guidance originally identified and defined 47 common 
installation-support functions to be aligned under the authority of 
the Joint Base Commander, subject to certain exceptions. According to 
OSD officials, individual installation-support functions have been 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis and removed from the list. We 
reviewed 42 installation-support functions as part of our survey; see 
table 2 for a list of those functions.[Footnote 19] 

Table 2: List of 42 Installation-Support Functions Included in Our 
Survey: 

1. Airfield operations; 
2. Advisory services; 
3. Base support vehicles and equipment; 
4. Chaplain ministries; 
5. Child and youth services; 
6. Command management; 
7. Custodial services; 
8. Emergency management; 
9. Environmental; 
10. Facilities demolition; 
11. Facilities restoration and modernization; 
12. Facility sustainment; 
13. Family housing; 
14. Financial management; 
15. Fire and emergency services; 
16. Food and dining; 
17. Honors and protocols; 
18. Inspector general and internal review; 
19. Grounds maintenance and landscaping; 
20. Installation movement; 
21. Installation safety; 
22. Information technology and services management; 
23. Laundry and dry cleaning; 
24. Law enforcement services; 
25. Legal services; 
26. Lodging; 
27. Management analysis; 
28. Military and family support; 
29. Military personnel services; 
30. Morale, welfare, and recreation; 
31. Pavement clearance; 
32. Pest control; 
33. Physical security; 
34. Port services; 
35. Procurement operations; 
36. Public affairs; 
37. Real property management and engineer services; 
38. Refuse collection; 
39. Small-arms range management; 
40. Supply, storage, and distribution non-munitions; 
41. Unaccompanied housing; 
42. Utilities. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. GAO-14-577. 

[End of table] 

Joint Base Officials Have Reported Varying Levels of Progress in 
Consolidating Functions, but Cited Limited Opportunities and 
Challenges from Consolidation Efforts: 

Joint base officials reported varying levels of progress in 
consolidating installation-support functions, several limitations that 
inhibited consolidation, and challenges resulting from consolidation 
efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. DOD guidance 
outlined more than 40 specific, common installation-support functions 
at joint bases to be aligned under the authority of the Joint Base 
Commander, unless the relevant memorandums of agreement provide 
otherwise.[Footnote 20] According to key federal practices for 
consolidation, federal agencies need to plan to monitor and to 
evaluate their efforts to identify areas for improvement. Overall, we 
found that the 11 joint bases had reported partially consolidating 80 
percent of the functions for which the joint base commander had some 
responsibility, but the extent of consolidation varied from one joint 
base to another and among the various installation-support functions. 
Our analysis of information gathered from the survey and interviews 
showed that the joint bases reported having limited opportunities to 
consolidate some functions, such as those unique to a single military 
service's mission (e.g. airfield operations and port services) and 
those managed by a military service's headquarters such as legal-
support services. Furthermore, joint base officials reported several 
challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple military 
service inspections and employees being disadvantaged in competing for 
promotion opportunities, resulting from service-specific personnel 
policies. DOD has not comprehensively evaluated installation-support 
functions to determine whether they are all still appropriate for 
consolidation. Also, DOD has not taken steps to address any 
inefficiencies and inequities arising from consolidation, or assessed 
any actions that can be taken to facilitate consolidation and address 
any negative effects in these circumstances. Without a comprehensive 
evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for 
consolidation--and without guidance to address any negative 
consequences that emerge from consolidation--individual joint bases 
will still be expected to merge support functions, which may result in 
ongoing inefficiencies and inequities. 

Joint Base Officials Reported Varying Levels of Progress in 
Consolidating Installation-Support Functions: 

Joint base officials whom we surveyed and interviewed reported 
variations in the extent to which installation-support functions were 
consolidated. None of the 11 joint bases we surveyed or the Joint 
Region Marianas reported that they have consolidated all installation 
support functions identified in DOD's 2008 Joint Basing Implementation 
Guidance.[Footnote 21] DOD's guidance identified and defined more than 
40 specific installation-support functions to be aligned under the 
authority of the Joint Base Commander, unless the relevant agreement 
provides otherwise. In written comments to our 2012 report on joint 
basing and during the course of this review, OSD reaffirmed its 
expectations that Joint Base Commanders are to merge their management 
structures, operating procedures, financial systems, and staffs to 
consolidate installation-support functions.[Footnote 22] 

For the 11 joint bases that we surveyed, our analysis indicated that 
of the potential 462 installation-support functional areas (42 common 
functions at each of the 11 joint bases) to be transferred to the 
supporting component, Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility 
for 438, or about 95 percent, of those support functions. Our analysis 
showed that the joint bases reported that they have at least partially 
consolidated 350 (about 80 percent) of the 438 installation-support 
functional areas for which the joint base commander had some 
responsibility. About 4 percent of the installation-support functions 
that are included in the 80 percent were consolidated prior to joint 
basing via agreements between the military services. According to our 
analysis, most instances of consolidation prior to joint basing (16 
out of 18) occurred at Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility 
Washington. Figure 2 illustrates the status of consolidation based on 
our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation. 

Figure 2: Status of Consolidation of Installation-Support Functions: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Consolidated before joint basing (18): 4%; 
Consolidated during joint basing (332): 76%; 
Not consolidated (85): 19%; 
Don't know (1): 0.2%; 
Blank (2): 0.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the installation-support functions for 
which the Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of 
our review. Percents do not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Consolidation varied greatly by location among the 11 joint bases. 
[Footnote 23] For example, our analysis of survey responses and other 
supporting documentation showed that Joint Base Langley-Eustis had 
reported some level of consolidation in 52 percent of its functions, 
whereas three other joint bases had some consolidation in 
approximately 90 percent or more of the functions. Figure 3 
illustrates the status of consolidation for each installation based on 
our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation. 

Figure 3: Percent of 42 Installation-Support Functions That Officials 
Reported Were Partially Consolidated by Each of the 11 Joint Bases: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Joint base: Langley-Eustis; 
Partially consolidated: 52%; 
Not consolidated: 48%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Myer-Henderson Hall; 
Partially consolidated: 64%; 
Not consolidated: 33%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 3. 

Joint base: San Antonio; 
Partially consolidated: 77%; 
Not consolidated: 23%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Little Creek-Fort Story; 
Partially consolidated: 78%; 
Not consolidated: 22%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Charleston; 
Partially consolidated: 
Not consolidated: 78%; 
Don't know: 20%; 
Blank: 2 

Joint base: Pearl Harbor-Hickam; 
Partially consolidated: 78%; 
Not consolidated: 22%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Lewis-McChord; 
Partially consolidated: 83%; 
Not consolidated: 15%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 3. 

Joint base: Andrews-NAF Washington; 
Partially consolidated: 85%; 
Not consolidated: 15%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Elmendorf-Richardson; 
Partially consolidated: 93%; 
Not consolidated: 7%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst; 
Partially consolidated: 95%; 
Not consolidated: 5%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Joint base: Anacostia-Bolling; 
Partially consolidated: 98%; 
Not consolidated: 2%; 
Don't know: 0; 
Blank: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Joint base percents are based on the support functions for which 
the Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our 
review. 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, our analysis of joint base officials' responses and 
other supporting documentation found wide variances--25 to 100 
percent--in the extent that they consolidated some level of specific 
installation-support functions at their installations. Our survey 
question allowed respondents to identify installation-support 
functions as either consolidated or not. If actions had been taken to 
consolidate any portion of the consolidation, respondents were allowed 
to count the support function as consolidated. Figure 4 illustrates 
the number of joint bases that reported consolidation of each of the 
support functions according to our definition of consolidated. In 
addition, appendix IV identifies which installation-support functions 
have been consolidated for each of the 11 joint bases in our survey. 

Figure 4: Percent of the 11 Joint Bases That Reported at Least 
Partially Consolidating Each Installation Support Function: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Number of joint bases that consolidated the function: 

Port services: 1 of 4; 25%. 

Small arms range management: 3 of 8; 38%. 

Airfield operations: 4 of 9; 44%. 

Military personnel services: 5 of 11; 45%. 

Laundry and dry cleaning: 3 of 6; 50%. 

Inspector General/Internal review: 7 of 11; 64%. 

Advisory services: 7 of 11; 64%. 

Children and youth services: 7 of 11; 64%. 

Command management: 7 of 11; 64%. 

Pest control: 7 of 11; 64%. 

Honors and protocols: 7 of 10; 70%. 

Management analysis: 7 of 10; 70%. 

Utilities: 8 of 11; 73%. 

Military and family support services: 8 of 11; 73%. 

Pavement clearance: 8 of 11; 73%. 

Supply, storage, and distribution – Non-munitions: 8 of 11; 73%. 

Lodging: 7 of 9; 78%. 

Information Technology Services Management: 8 of 10; 80%. 

Food and dining: 8 of 10; 80%. 

Installation movement: 8 of 10; 80%. 

Legal services: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Fire and emergency services: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Base support vehicles and equipment: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Law enforcement patrols: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Physical security: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Family housing: 9 of 11; 82%. 

Environmental: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Public affairs: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Unaccompanied housing: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Emergency management: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Facility sustainment: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Financial management: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Grounds maintenance and landscaping: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Morale, welfare, and recreation: 10 of 11; 91%. 

Custodial services: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Facilities demolition: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Facilities restoration and modernization: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Installation safety: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Procurement operations: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Real property management and engineering services: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Chaplain ministry: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Refuse collection and disposal: 11 of 11; 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Joint base percents are based on the support functions for which 
the Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our 
review. 

[End of figure] 

All 11 joint bases reported that they had consolidated at least some 
portion of eight installation-support functions primarily related to 
installation facilities and infrastructure, such as custodial 
services, facilities demolitions and installation safety. The support 
functions reported to be consolidated at the fewest joint bases tended 
to have military service-specific or mission-specific characteristics, 
such as military personnel services, port services, small-arms range 
management, and airfield operations. 

Joint Base Officials Reported Limited Opportunities to Consolidate 
Some Support Functions and Workforces: 

Joint base officials reported that there were limited opportunities to 
consolidate some installation-support functions, and that the 
workforces used by the military services to provide support services--
as well as geography--can affect consolidation efforts. The officials 
stated that they may not be able to fully consolidate some functions 
because these functions are unique to one military service's mission 
or the function is mainly managed by a military service's 
headquarters. Also, joint base officials stated that limited 
opportunities exist to consolidate workforces because of the 
differences in the original types of workforces--military, civilian, 
and contractor--that were in place prior to joint basing. As part of 
our review, we are reporting our analyses of responses to our survey 
questions and examples provided during interviews with joint base and 
military service officials. We did not independently assess the extent 
to which consolidation occurred as identified by survey respondents 
and by officials during interviews. 

Our survey and interview data showed the support functions that 
provided the least amount of opportunity for consolidation generally 
are unique to a single military service's mission, or are mainly 
managed by a military service headquarters, including those that have 
the need to follow military service-specific requirements and 
procedures. 

Support functions unique to military service mission. Our analysis of 
survey results and other supporting documentation, as illustrated in 
figure 4, showed that installation-support functions reported to be 
consolidated at the fewest joint bases tended to have military service-
specific or mission-specific characteristics. According to officials, 
these functions offered limited opportunities to consolidate because 
they were unique to the missions of the individual military services. 
In most instances, these functions either did not transfer to the 
supporting component as part of joint basing because the function was 
considered to be mission-related rather than part of installation 
support or did not have a counterpart in the other military service. 
For example: 

* Port services. We found that one, or 25 percent, of the four joint 
bases that have a port and included port services as part of the joint 
base commander's responsibility had reported consolidating this 
function. The one base that did consolidate was a location where the 
Navy was a supported component and did not have an operational 
mission. The three bases that did not consolidate were locations where 
there was only one service with the function (so there was not a need 
to consolidate).[Footnote 24] 

* Small-arms range management. We found that three, or 38 percent, of 
the eight joint bases where the joint base commander had 
responsibility for small-arms range management had reported 
consolidating this function. For all three of the joint bases that had 
consolidated this function, this function tended to be installation 
support rather than directly tied to a mission requirement. Officials 
for the other five joint bases that did not consolidate this function 
reported that they had not done so because the Army was exempt at four 
of the bases from consolidating this function and there was only one 
service with this function at the other base (so there was not a need 
to consolidate).[Footnote 25] 

* Airfield operations. We found that four, or 44 percent, of the nine 
joint bases where the joint base commander had some responsibility for 
airfield operations had reported consolidating this function. The Air 
Force was the supporting component for three of the joint bases while 
the Navy was supporting for the other one. Officials for the other 
five joint bases reported that they had not consolidated this function 
because the Air Force had variances to consolidating the function at 
two of the bases and there was only one service with this function at 
the other three bases (so there was not a need to consolidate). 
[Footnote 26] 

Support functions managed by military service headquarters. Our 
analyses of survey results and other supporting documentation found 
some functions were limited in the amount of overlapping activities 
that could be consolidated because the functions remained largely 
managed by a military service headquarters, or officials executing 
these functions were required to follow specific military service 
requirements or procedures. In our survey, 45 percent of 438 joint 
base officials reported that their consolidation efforts had been 
hindered by military service-specific requirements, practices, or 
policies. For example: 

* Information technology system management. Joint base officials 
reported that opportunities to merge or consolidate information 
technology systems were limited since the military services operate 
separate information technology systems with distinct email and 
operational requirements, as well as maintain service-specific 
databases. According to our analysis, 34 percent of 438 functional 
area respondents stated that they had not merged or consolidated 
information technology systems.[Footnote 27] DOD has two department-
wide initiatives underway to standardize some information technology 
and services, called the Joint Information Environment and Enterprise 
Email service.[Footnote 28] As DOD implements these initiatives, 
opportunities for further consolidation may emerge. 

* Advisory services. Joint base officials reported that Equal 
Opportunity Employment services offered limited opportunities for 
consolidation beyond the intake of complaints. According to officials 
whom we interviewed, equal opportunity complaints are filed against 
specific military department Secretaries, and the formal grievance of 
any complaint must follow the procedures of the particular military 
department where the individual filing the complaint either works or 
serves. For instance, these officials told us that an employee of the 
supported component, such as a service member or civilian (a position 
that did not transfer to the supporting component as part of the 
installation-support workforce), would submit a complaint through the 
local equal opportunity office, which is part of the supporting 
component. However, these officials also indicated that the grievance 
would then transfer back to the supported component since it must 
follow that service's procedures. Therefore, in the officials' 
opinions, responsibility for equal opportunity may not have been 
suitable for transfer in joint basing. 

* Legal support services. Joint base officials indicated that the 
level of consolidation for this installation-support function is very 
limited, even though nine of the 11 joint bases reported consolidating 
some portion of the function. Joint base officials reported that each 
service must adhere to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for courts-
martial and nonjudicial punishment, but the ways in which each service 
carries out military justice are substantially different. For example, 
according to these officials, it would be very difficult for Air Force 
personnel to conduct an Army court-martial or nonjudicial punishment 
and vice versa. As a result, in the opinion of these officials, this 
aspect of the legal support services cannot be further consolidated at 
the joint bases. 

Officials from Joint Region Marianas were not part of our survey, but 
we interviewed them to discuss their efforts to consolidate support 
services. Officials indicated that some functions were easier to 
consolidate than others, and they stated that they have made some 
progress. However, the officials reported that at times conflicting 
service practices have also hindered their efforts. For example, the 
officials stated that they have not been able to fully consolidate the 
chaplain services function because of differences in how religious 
programs are managed by the Navy and Air Force. The Navy requires that 
tithes and offerings be sent to charitable organizations, whereas the 
Air Force allows tithes and offerings to be reinvested in chapel 
facilities. 

Our survey also showed that 59 of 438 respondents (13 percent)--in 
comments about functions for which the joint base commander had some 
responsibility--reported that there were additional opportunities to 
consolidate installation-support functions that have not been pursued. 
The respondents who reported additional opportunities to consolidate 
provided a varied range of response details. Of those respondents who 
provided detailed responses, we found the following examples. 
Officials from one joint base stated that additional consolidation 
could occur in the pest-control function by expanding in-house 
capabilities and eliminating contract services, but did not elaborate 
as to why further consolidation had not been pursued at the time of 
the survey. In another example, officials from a different joint base 
stated that additional consolidation could occur in the pavement-
clearance function by analyzing the function and selecting the most 
cost-effective method between in-house and contract work, as it would 
allow for completely centralized management of resources. Furthermore, 
we asked survey respondents if they had any additional comments 
pertaining to the consolidation of their installation-support 
functions. Our survey results showed that 70 out of 438 respondents 
(16 percent) provided comments. Generally, the comments mirrored the 
issues raised throughout this report. For example, some reported that 
certain support functions offered limited opportunities for 
consolidation because of geography and others cited differences in 
military service policies and procedures that hindered consolidation 
efforts. 

We also found that, according to survey responses, in some instances 
workforces used by the military services to provide installation-
support services prior to joint basing limited opportunities to 
consolidate some installation-support functions. The military services 
can differ in which workforce--military, civilian, or contractor--they 
employ to provide installation support. In our survey, we asked to 
what extent, if any, differences in installation-support workforces 
caused hindrances to consolidation. In our survey results, 182 of 438 
respondents (approximately 42 percent) reported that differences in 
workforces used by the individual military services hindered their 
ability to consolidate installation-support functions. Figure 5 
illustrates the percent of functions in which officials reported 
hindrances in consolidating due to differences in workforces. 

Figure 5: Percent of Functions in Which Officials Reported Hindrances 
in Consolidating Because of Differences in Workforces: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Significantly (69): 16%; 
Moderately (64): 15%; 
Slightly (49): 11%; 
Not at all (210): 48%; 
Not applicable (28): 6%; 
Don't know (15): 3%; 
Blank (3): 1%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. 

[End of figure] 

The seven joint bases with the highest percent of functions reporting 
significant or moderate consolidation hindrances because of 
differences in workforces are listed in table 3. 

Table 3: Joint Bases with the Highest Percent of Functions in Which 
Officials Reported Significant or Moderate Hindrances in Consolidating 
Because of Differences in Workforces: 

Joint Base: Charleston; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 48.8%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 12.2%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 31.7%. 

Joint Base: Pearl Harbor-Hickam; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 46.3%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 7.3%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 39.0%. 

Joint Base: McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 46.2%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 12.8%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 36.0%. 

Joint Base: Elmendorf-Richardson; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 45.0%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 7.5%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 42.5%. 

Joint Base: San Antonio; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 35.9%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 15.4%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 43.6%. 

Joint Base: Lewis-McChord; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 35.0%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 20.0%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 35.0%. 

Joint Base: Langley-Eustis; 
Percent reporting significant or moderate hindrances: 31.0%; 
Percent reporting slight hindrances: 11.9%; 
Percent reporting no hindrances: 50.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses. GAO-14-577. 

Notes: Totals may not add to 100 percent because of "don't know," "not 
applicable," and blank responses. Percents are based on the support 
functions for which the Joint Base Commanders had some responsibility 
at the time of our review. 

[End of table] 

In interviews and written responses to our survey, Air Force officials 
stated that they may use a mix of military and civilian personnel to 
provide a specific installation-support function, whereas the Army may 
have outsourced the provision of the same support function to 
contractors. Also, we found in interviews and in written responses to 
our survey that the Navy at times, used a regionalized civilian 
workforce to provide some installation-support services for stand-
alone Navy bases in the region. In the survey's written responses, we 
also found examples in which respondents stated that some 
consolidation efforts were hindered by the types of workforces used. 
For example, 

* Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Charleston reported that 
consolidation efforts have been limited by personnel shortfalls in the 
procurement services function. Prior to joint basing, the Navy 
provided much of the procurement services for Naval Weapons Station 
Charleston, through regional service centers rather than at the 
installation. For this reason, according to these officials, no local 
civilian workforce transferred to the Air Force. The joint base 
received approval to hire more Air Force civilians to carry out the 
function. However, many of the approved positions were eventually cut 
in 2012 as part of the military departments' response to the DOD 
effort to cap the number of civilian positions department-
wide.[Footnote 29] 

* Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson reported 
that they have not been able to consolidate the facility-sustainment 
function because of how the Army and Air Force provided installation 
support prior to joint basing. The Army outsourced delivery of this 
function to contractors at Fort Richardson, whereas the Air Force 
provided this function in-house at Elmendorf Air Force Base. According 
to the officials, the Air Force will likely maintain the contracts for 
the Richardson side of the base because of insufficient military and 
civilian manpower available to insource the function. These officials 
reported that, at the same time, the Air Force will continue to 
provide the function in-house for the Elmendorf side of the base as 
there is currently no authorization to conduct public-private 
competitions, which are required before contracting out for functions 
currently performed by DOD civilians.[Footnote 30] 

* Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base Langley-Eustis reported that 
they had not been able to consolidate the utilities function because 
of privatization of some support services. The Army privatized water, 
wastewater, electricity, and natural gas on the Fort Eustis side of 
the base. These officials stated that because of privatization, when 
responsibility for the utilities function transferred to the joint 
base, the joint base officials could not consolidate the Fort Eustis 
side with the in-house provision of utility services that occurred on 
the Langley Air Force Base side of the base. 

In our survey, we also asked joint base officials about other 
hindrances to consolidation. Our content analysis of survey data 
showed that the most-often cited hindrance was geography, with 111 out 
of 438 respondents (25 percent) citing geography as a hindrance. The 
five joint bases with the highest percent of functions in which 
officials that cited geography as a hindrance are listed in table 4. 

Table 4: Joint Bases with the Highest Percent of Functions That Cited 
Geography as a Hindrance to Consolidation: 

Joint base: Langley-Eustis: 
Percent: 76%. 

Joint base: McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst; 
Percent: 46%. 

Joint base: Langley-Eustis: San Antonio; 
Percent: 44%. 

Joint base: Langley-Eustis: Charleston; 
Percent: 42%. 

Joint base: Langley-Eustis: Lewis-McChord; 
Percent: 30%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. 

[End of table] 

According to respondents from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, opportunities 
to consolidate support functions, such as information technology 
services management, real property management and engineering services 
functions are limited because of the geographical separation between 
Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis--approximately 18 miles. In 
addition, some bases that may share some common fence line can also be 
hindered by geography. For example, officials at Joint Base Lewis-
McChord stated that Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base entrances 
are separated by about 5 miles of interstate highway. Having to 
navigate the interstate to travel between the two entrances can be a 
problem because of traffic according to officials at both locations. 
The Army has proposed constructing a gate on the joint base between 
the two locations, but has not completed this action. In addition, 
McChord Airfield is separated from the rest of the joint base by a 
public road, making it necessary to clear security a second time when 
traveling from the base to the airfield. 

Although cited to a much lesser extent than geography, 28 of the 438 
respondents reported that personnel shortages (6 percent) and 19 of 
the 438 respondents reported budget or funding limitations (4 percent) 
hindered consolidation efforts. For example, officials from Joint Base 
Charleston reported that the base does not have enough personnel to 
adequately provide services in the pest-control function, and that a 
workforce study is needed to determine the appropriate size of the 
function. In another example, officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst reported that current fiscal limitations as well as a hiring 
freeze have, in part, hindered the base's ability to consolidate the 
real property management and engineering services function. 

OSD officials stated that there is currently not a process to evaluate 
installation-support functions on a regular basis (annually or 
otherwise) and that they have not systematically identified common 
limitations to consolidation and what actions, if any, can be taken to 
address such limitations. We found DOD has eliminated--on a case-by-
case basis--three installation-support functions from consolidation 
from the original list of 47, but has not similarly comprehensively 
evaluated whether the remaining functions are still suitable for 
consolidation. As noted above, joint base officials have identified 
limited opportunities to consolidate some areas of installation 
support. Furthermore, DOD has not systematically identified how 
consolidation can be limited by, for example, different types of 
workforces used to provide installation-support services or geography, 
and what actions, if any, could potentially help facilitate 
consolidation in these situations or any others that may be 
identified. Our prior work on federal agency consolidation efforts 
found that consolidation initiatives can be immensely complex, 
politically charged, and costly and are not quick, easy, or automatic 
ways of producing desired change.[Footnote 31] In addition, key 
federal practices for consolidation state that federal agencies need 
to plan to evaluate and monitor efforts to identify areas for 
improvement. Further, reporting on consolidation activities can help 
key decision makers within the agencies to obtain feedback for 
improving both policy and operational effectiveness.[Footnote 32] OSD 
and military service officials discussed that their approach to date 
has been to give the program time to mature but said they now believe 
a review would be beneficial because some functions may not easily be 
consolidated and there may be common limitations to consolidation that 
can be addressed through policy improvements. However, they did not 
elaborate as to when they would conduct such a review or provide 
specifics on how they planned to do so. Without comprehensively 
evaluating whether installation-support functions are still suitable 
for consolidation and without identifying and addressing limitations 
reported by the joint bases, such as those related to workforces and 
geography, DOD may not be able to fully consolidate all installation-
support functions. 

Officials Reported Challenges in Consolidation Efforts That Resulted 
in Inefficiencies or Inequities: 

Joint base officials whom we surveyed and interviewed reported that at 
times consolidation of installation-support functions created 
challenges resulting in unintentional inefficiencies or inequities. 
According to key federal practices for consolidation, federal agencies 
need to evaluate their efforts to identify areas for improvement, and 
obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational 
effectiveness.[Footnote 33] 

Our analysis identified that of the 350 out of 438 responses about 
functions that were partially consolidated, 224 officials (64 percent) 
reported challenges resulting from consolidation. See figure 6 for a 
breakout of the responses of the functions in which officials reported 
some challenges with consolidation. 

Figure 6: Percent of Functions in Which Officials Reported Some 
Challenges Resulting from Consolidation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Yes (224): 64%; 
No (116): 33%; 
Don't know (10): 3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions that were at least 
partially consolidated at the time of our review and includes 
functions that were reported to be consolidated prior to joint basing. 

[End of figure] 

Our analyses of interview and written survey responses found instances 
in which respondents stated that some challenges resulting from 
consolidation resulted in inefficiencies. For example: 

* Multiple inspections. Officials whom we interviewed as well as those 
who provided written survey responses reported that some functions 
were subject to multiple inspections. For example, officials at Navy-
led Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam reported that Air Force officials 
continue to inspect emergency management exercises although the Navy, 
as the lead component, is responsible for emergency management on the 
base and carries out similar inspections. In addition, officials at 
Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported confusion among Air Force 
military units about whether they had to follow Air Force or Army 
environmental requirements, practices, and policies while conducting 
inspections. Furthermore, officials whom we interviewed at Joint Base 
Lewis-McChord stated that both the Army and the Air Force are 
inspecting the joint base's child development centers, though the 
Army, as the lead component, is responsible for managing the centers, 
including inspections. However, Air Force officials stated they are 
also conducting their own inspections because of their concern that 
the centers meet Air Force standards of service for providing child 
care, even though joint bases have agreed to provide a common level of 
service for installation-support functions.[Footnote 34] 

* Multiple Data Requirements. Officials at Air Force-led Joint Base 
Langley-Eustis reported that staff from the physical-security function 
must use two distinct systems for processing personnel-security 
investigations--one for Army personnel and one for Air Force 
personnel--because of differences in the systems. In another example, 
Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported that the lack of 
transferring personnel files locally between the Army and Air Force 
has caused the Army to rebuild employee files and submit criminal 
background checks more than once for staff in the children and youth-
services function, potentially wasting funds by recreating what 
already exists. 

Our analysis of interview information found instances in which 
respondents stated that challenges resulting from consolidation also 
resulted in inequities. For example: 

* Limited promotion opportunities. According to joint base officials, 
in some instances the transfer of civilian personnel from one military 
service to another may have created inequities, in that civilians 
transferring from another military department may have lost some 
benefits of seniority, which may have disadvantaged them in competing 
for promotion opportunities. For example, former Army civilian 
employees at the Air Force-led Joint Base San Antonio reported limited 
career opportunities because their total service time as DOD employees 
was not recognized by the Air Force, and their job classifications, in 
some cases, were downgraded when their positions were transferred to 
the joint base. The former Army employees reported that the military 
departments do not credit years of employment from another department. 
As a result, they cannot compete for promotions or other Air Force 
positions that may require a minimum number of years of service as 
eligibility criteria for promotion. In addition, joint base officials 
whom we interviewed commented that they believe military service 
practices of preferentially hiring internal applicants in response to 
DOD's civilian hiring freeze have prevented these former Army 
employees from qualifying or being competitive for vacant Army 
positions because they are now Air Force employees. 

* Limited training opportunities. According to joint base officials, 
consolidation has resulted in differences in training for some 
installation-support personnel. For example, Air Force officials at 
the Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord reported that consolidation has 
eliminated some training opportunities for uniformed airmen, and 
expressed concern that airmen at Joint Base Lewis-McChord are not 
receiving training comparable to that which they would receive if they 
were stationed at a stand-alone Air Force installation.[Footnote 35] 
This situation is primarily because of the consolidation of 
installation-support functions under Army processes--which are largely 
civilian and contractor driven--whereas at a stand-alone Air Force 
base many installation-support functions are performed by airmen. 

We found that neither OSD nor the military services have addressed 
these consolidation challenges that may have resulted in 
inefficiencies and inequities. Specifically, feedback on 
inefficiencies and inequities have not been incorporated into policy 
improvements, such as additional guidance, to help the joint bases 
resolve confusion about which service-specific guidance should be 
followed to avoid challenges such as multiple inspections, multiple 
data requirements, and concerns about limited promotion and training 
opportunities. Our survey results identified that about 59 percent of 
respondents stated that they did not think additional guidance from 
OSD or the military services would improve the level of consolidation 
of their installation-support functions. However, officials from the 
joint bases, military service headquarters, and OSD stated in 
interviews that additional guidance is necessary to address 
consolidation challenges. 

OSD and military service officials stated that they have not 
comprehensively identified the extent to which the joint bases have 
consolidated installation-support functions, including any common 
challenges associated with consolidation that may have resulted in 
negative consequences as described above. OSD and military service 
officials stated that their approach to date has been to give the 
program time to mature but said they now believe policy actions may be 
needed to help address challenges resulting from consolidation. 
Without having comprehensively identified any common challenges 
associated with consolidation, OSD is unlikely to develop policy 
solutions, such as guidance, to assist the joint bases in addressing 
them. In one instance in which joint base officials identified a 
common challenge associated with consolidation--multiple inspections 
related to installation support--OSD officials acknowledged the issue 
and stated that they were taking action to address it. Joint base 
officials stated in interviews that they have raised concerns at OSD's 
annual joint base program-management meetings about which service-
specific guidance to follow when conducting inspections of 
installation-support functions on joint bases. OSD officials told us 
that while a policy solution is not currently available to resolve 
this issue, they are working to update a DOD instruction for 
inspections that will address the issue at joint bases. However, in 
the absence of policy solutions, such as additional guidance to 
mitigate other common challenges resulting from consolidation efforts, 
including multiple data requirements for installation-support 
functions and concerns about limited promotion and training 
opportunities for installation-support staff, joint bases may be 
unable to avoid or reduce any inefficiencies and inequities resulting 
from consolidating installation-support functions. 

Joint Basing Has Produced Some Benefits, but Officials Reported They 
Are Unable to Achieve Greater Efficiencies and Potential Cost Savings 
without Additional Direction: 

Joint base officials have reported that consolidation of support 
functions has resulted in some progress toward achieving greater 
efficiencies and cost savings as well as produced some benefits, but 
stated that they need further clarification and guidance to take 
additional actions to achieve consolidation goals. Military service 
and joint base officials indicated that they are unclear to what 
extent the stated goals of joint basing are still appropriate and to 
what extent they are required to take actions to pursue them. OSD has 
not collaborated with the military services to reevaluate whether the 
goals of joint basing are still appropriate and has not provided 
additional direction to help the joint bases achieve the program's 
goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings. 
We previously reported that the cost of installation support was 
expected to rise because OSD increased the installation-support 
standards for joint bases, which would require additional 
administrative costs.[Footnote 36] In a November 2012 report, we also 
found that OSD did not have a fully developed method for accurately 
collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved 
specifically from joint basing, and had not developed a plan to guide 
joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies.[Footnote 37] 
We found during this review that the extent to which joint bases 
pursued initiatives to reduce duplication and achieve greater 
efficiencies and cost savings in providing installation support 
depended on the discretion of joint base commanders. Joint base and 
military officials indicated the degree to which joint bases looked 
for such opportunities depended on the commitment of the individuals 
involved, and the level of support they received from their parent 
service headquarters. According to key federal practices, when federal 
organizations collaborate they can define common outcomes, establish 
strategies, and develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and report the 
results of their collaborative efforts.[Footnote 38] Further, key 
federal practices state that agencies can improve efficiency by 
reexamining programs and related processes or organizational 
structures to determine whether they effectively and efficiently 
achieve the mission.[Footnote 39] Without a collaborative evaluation 
of the joint basing program to determine if the stated goals of the 
program are still appropriate and subsequent direction to include the 
monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of program goals, it will 
be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which the joint basing 
initiative is achieving its intended goals. 

Joint Bases Have Reported Some Progress and Benefits in Addressing 
Joint Basing Goals: 

Joint base officials reported that they have made some progress in 
achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings, which are the goals 
of the joint base program, as well as attained additional benefits. In 
our November 2012 report, we found that DOD does not have a fully 
developed method for accurately collecting information on cost savings 
and efficiencies achieved specifically as a result of joint 
basing.[Footnote 40] As a result, to gain insight into the degree to 
which DOD has gained efficiencies and cost savings, our survey asked 
respondents to identify the extent to which they have (1) reduced 
redundant funded positions; (2) reduced redundant contracts or 
increased contract efficiencies; and (3) merged or consolidated 
redundant procedures. 

Reduced Redundant Funded Positions: 

Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation 
showed that 53 of 438 respondents (12 percent) stated that they were 
able to reduce redundant funded positions (excluding contractors) 
related to joint basing. Figure 7 illustrates our analysis. 

Figure 7: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported 
Reductions in Redundant Funded Positions Related to Joint Basing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Yes (53): 12%; 
No (177): 40%; 
Not applicable (178): 41%; 
Don't know (28): 6%; 
Blank (2): 0.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Notes: Percents are based on the support functions for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. Not 
applicable applies to functions without redundancy, not consolidated, 
or consolidated prior to joint basing. 

[End of figure] 

Our analysis of survey data indicated that joint bases experienced 
reductions in funded positions, which respondents attributed to 
efforts to reduce redundancy. For example, officials from Joint Base 
Little Creek-Fort Story reported that the base was able to reduce four 
staff positions in the morale, welfare, and recreation function 
because they were redundant. In another example, officials from Joint 
Base Anacostia-Bolling reported that base was able to reduce two 
positions in the physical security function. In other instances, the 
respondents did not attribute reductions to joint basing, but rather 
attributed them to other reasons, such as service-level programmatic 
decisions. For instance, officials from Joint Base Charleston noted 
that a housing manager retired shortly after the joint base's 
establishment, and the Air Force abolished the position because of 
personnel cuts unrelated to joint basing. 

Many of the respondents who reported no reductions did not provide 
detailed explanations. Of those who provided a reason for no 
reduction, many reported there were no redundancies in installation-
support positions or there was an increased workload requiring extra 
positions. For instance, officials from Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air 
Facility Washington reported that the refuse collection and disposal 
function was consolidated prior to joint basing, so no positions were 
available to consolidate. In another example, officials from Joint 
Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported an increased workload in the 
facilities sustainment function because of aging facilities and a lack 
of funding, making consolidation unlikely to result in fewer 
personnel. Also, officials from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson 
reported that no redundant positions were reduced in the physical 
security function because of no decrease in workload following 
consolidation. 

Joint base officials whom we interviewed provided some reasons for why 
the reduction of redundant funded positions was limited. For example, 
officials from Joint Base Langley-Eustis told us that it would have 
been difficult to consolidate the functions of the two former bases 
because of differences in the mix of personnel who provided 
installation support. They said that at Fort Eustis the Army had 
transitioned almost entirely to private contracts for installation 
support, and had eliminated most of its related civilian workforce. 
Therefore, in their view, there were no opportunities to reduce 
redundant funded positions. In another example, officials from Joint 
Base Lewis-McChord said the Air Force transferred few civilian 
positions to the Army, the supporting component, because prior to 
joint basing the Air Force used uniformed airmen to provide 
installation-support services at McChord Air Force Base. 

Reduced Redundant Contracts or Increased Contract Efficiencies: 

Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation 
showed that 111 of 438 respondents (25 percent) stated that they had a 
reduction of redundant contracts or increased contract efficiencies 
related to joint basing. Figure 8 illustrates our analysis. 

Figure 8: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported a 
Reduction of Redundant Contracts or an Increase in Contract 
Efficiencies Related to Joint Basing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Yes (111): 25%; 
No (107): 24%; 
Not applicable (192): 44%; 
Don't know (26): 6%; 
Blank (2): 0.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. 

[End of figure] 

Officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported that they 
were able to consolidate eight separate telephone contracts in the 
information technology services management function into a single 
contract for the joint base, which they reported saved about $650,000. 
In another example, officials from Joint Base Charleston reported that 
two custodial contracts existed--one for the Air Force and one for the 
Navy--and that these contracts have been combined into a single joint 
base contract, which according to the officials, resulted in 
efficiencies in contract administration by eliminating the need for 
multiple contract administrators. In a third example, officials from 
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall reported the consolidation of contracts 
for facility fire and alarm inspection and maintenance in the fire and 
emergency services function--from three to one. In another example, 
officials from Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling reported that they were 
able to eliminate a contract in the public affairs function that was 
used to provide the supported component's base newspaper prior to 
joint basing. 

Many of the respondents who reported no reductions or no increased 
efficiencies did not provide a detailed explanation. Of those who 
provided a reason for no reduction or increased efficiencies, the 
reasons included simply that there were no redundant contracts. In 
other instances an installation-support function was not provided via 
contract, so consolidation was not applicable. For example, officials 
from Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington reported there 
were no reductions in the small-arms range management function because 
there were no contracts were in place for the function--it is handled 
by military and civilian personnel. 

Joint base officials whom we interviewed provided some reasons for why 
reduction of redundant contracts or achieving greater contract 
efficiencies was limited. For example, officials from Joint Base San 
Antonio stated that federal contracting preferences complicate the 
task of consolidating all custodial services under a single contract. 
Officials from Joint Base Langley Eustis cited geography as a factor 
affecting the bases' ability to reduce redundant contracts. They told 
us the distance between Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis is 
approximately 18 miles, and thereby would likely increase a contract's 
cost because of a wider area of required service. 

Merged or Consolidated Redundant Procedures: 

Our analysis of survey responses and other supporting documentation 
showed that 105 out of 438 respondents (24 percent) stated they were 
able to merge or consolidate redundant procedures related to joint 
basing. Figure 9 illustrates our analysis. 

Figure 9: Percent of Functions in Which Respondents Reported a Merger 
or Consolidation of Redundant Procedures Related to Joint Basing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Yes (105): 24%; 
No (112): 26%; 
Not applicable (195): 45%; 
Don't know (24): 6%; 
Blank (2): 0.5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. 

[End of figure] 

Officials from Joint Base Charleston reported that the base reduced 
the work of two newspapers and separate news coverage into one 
newspaper and website. In another example, officials from Joint Base 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam reported that the base eliminated Air Force 
procedures for grounds maintenance, which is part of the grounds 
maintenance and landscaping function, in favor of standardizing the 
procedures under the Navy, the supporting component. In another 
example, officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported that 
requirements processing for base telephone services under the 
information technology services management function were consolidated 
from three offices into one. 

Of those respondents who provided a reason for no merger or 
consolidation of redundant procedures, a frequently cited reason was 
that there were no redundant procedures to merge or consolidate. For 
example, officials from Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling reported that 
there were no redundant procedures in the custodial services, 
emergency management, and facility sustainment functions. In another 
instance, officials from Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility 
Washington reported no redundant procedures in the emergency 
management function because the Navy did not have an emergency 
management function prior to consolidation. In another example, 
officials from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported no merger or 
consolidation of redundant procedures in the emergency management 
function because there was not an emergency management function at 
Fort Dix or Naval Engineering Station Lakehurst. 

Additional Consolidation Benefits: 

In our analysis of 350 of 438 survey responses in which officials 
stated they had consolidated functions, 213 of 350 respondents (61 
percent) reported benefits from consolidation of support functions. 
Figure 10 illustrates our analysis. 

Figure 10: Percent of Functions with Some Consolidation in Which 
Officials Reported Benefits Resulting from Consolidation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Yes (213): 61%; 
No (119): 34%; 
Don't know (17): 5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: Percents are based on the support functions that were at least 
partially consolidated at the time of our review and includes 
functions that were reported to be consolidated prior to joint basing. 

[End of figure] 

Our analysis of survey data found that benefits included improvements 
in the delivery of installation-support services and the sharing of 
information and practices across military services. Respondents 
reported that as a result of some of these improvements, they believe 
customer satisfaction increased. Also, in many instances functional 
area officials reported increased efficiencies, but did not elaborate 
as to what the efficiencies were or how they were achieved. The 
following examples are specific to joint bases, and illustrate that, 
according to base officials, DOD's current approach to joint basing 
has produced some benefits. 

* Improved service delivery. Officials from Air Force-led Joint Base 
Langley-Eustis reported that the fire chiefs at Fort Eustis are 
satisfied with the increased performance of maintenance services on 
firefighting vehicles as the Air Force maintains vehicles at a much 
higher level than the levels provided by the Army prior to joint 
basing. In another example, officials from Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam reported that the base's intramural sports program is larger, 
providing more games and better competition, which service members 
enjoy. 

* Improved information sharing. Officials from Joint Base Charleston 
reported that a primary benefit in the family housing function is the 
ability to share best practices between two privatization deals--one 
used by the Air Force and one used by the Navy prior to joint basing--
to better service the local community. In another example, officials 
from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson reported that consolidation has 
provided soldiers and airmen with the opportunity to work and operate 
in a nondeployed joint environment as part of the law enforcement 
patrols function, which has allowed for a better understanding of each 
military service's mission. In a third example, officials from Joint 
Base Myer-Henderson Hall reported that consolidation of the physical 
security function helped increase awareness of activities affecting 
the base's control point because of access and information that was 
not previously available to the individual bases prior to joint basing. 

Joint base officials whom we interviewed also reported some benefits 
from consolidating installation-support functions and additional 
benefits from working closely with other military services. For 
example, Air Force officials at the Army-led Joint Base Lewis-McChord 
told us they were able to save approximately $280,000 per month in 
training fees by leveraging their joint base relationship with the 
Army to use local Army facilities in Washington State for Air Force 
training flights. Prior to the establishment of the joint base, the 
Air Force used its own facilities farther away in Arizona for these 
flights. In an additional example, Army officials at the Air Force-led 
Joint Base San Antonio said the Air Force adopted the Army Family 
Action Plan, which the Army operated for soldiers and their families 
at Fort Sam Houston, to expand the process, which allows service 
members to submit concerns about quality of life issues to the base 
command staff to all service members residing in the joint base area. 
[Footnote 41] In another example from Joint Base San Antonio, an Air 
Force official stated that the base was able to take advantage of in-
house Air Force welding expertise to repair damage to the main gate of 
the Fort Sam Houston area of Joint Base San Antonio rather than 
contract for the maintenance, which would have been done prior to 
joint basing and this resulted in quicker repairs and avoidance of 
contract fees. 

In our interviews with officials from Joint Region Marianas, officials 
indicated that they had been able to take some actions to gain 
efficiencies, such as reducing from five to one the number of cell-
phone contracts used to provide cell phones to military and civilian 
personnel. They also pointed out that they are in the process of 
evaluating approaches to consolidate housing to provide better 
visibility to service members on Guam regarding available housing 
options on the island. According to the officials, this effort will 
result in reducing the need for duplicative housing managers. 

Lack of Direction Has Hindered Joint Base Progress in Achieving Goals: 

Joint base and military service officials whom we interviewed said OSD 
has not provided them with direction on how to achieve greater 
efficiencies and cost savings as the goals of joint basing, including 
reporting requirements and milestones. OSD officials told us that they 
have not collaborated with the military services to evaluate whether 
the goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost 
savings are still appropriate. According to key federal practices, 
when federal organizations collaborate they can define common 
outcomes, establish strategies, and develop mechanisms to monitor, 
evaluate and report the results of their collaborative efforts. 
[Footnote 42] Moreover, key change management practices state that it 
is essential that top government and agency leaders are committed to 
consolidation and play a lead role in executing it by setting the 
direction, pace, and tone as well as providing a clear, consistent 
rationale for doing so. These practices also state that establishing 
implementation goals and milestone dates, and tracking progress toward 
those goals helps agency officials pinpoint performance shortfalls and 
suggest midcourse corrections, including any needed adjustments to the 
organization's future goals and milestones.[Footnote 43] Further, key 
federal practices state that agencies can improve efficiency by 
reexamining programs and related processes or organizational 
structures to determine whether they effectively and efficiently 
achieve the mission.[Footnote 44] 

OSD officials whom we interviewed indicated that they have not 
evaluated the joint basing program to determine whether it is meeting 
the goals of the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation or if the goals 
of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings are 
still appropriate for the program today and looking forward. In 
written comments to our 2012 report on joint basing, OSD stated that 
DOD's approach to joint basing was to be patient with obtaining 
savings and efficiencies, maintaining that joint basing was a 
relatively new initiative and implementation issues were still being 
resolved. The officials reaffirmed they were taking this approach 
during the course of our review. According to the Secretary of 
Defense's justification for joint basing reproduced in the 2005 BRAC 
Commission Report, joint basing would allow DOD to take advantage of 
opportunities to reduce duplication of efforts. DOD stated that the 
resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements 
would help generate savings by paring unnecessary management personnel 
and achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale. 
However, as we found in prior work, OSD did not have a developed 
method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and 
efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and had not 
developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and 
efficiencies.[Footnote 45] Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the 
progress that joint bases have made in achieving the goals for joint 
basing. 

When asked about any challenges associated with consolidation of 
installation-support functions, some survey respondents reported that 
consolidation increased the need for additional resources in their 
functional area. For example, Joint Base Charleston officials reported 
that the size of the joint base and the diversity of missions have 
greatly increased the need for additional resources for restoration 
and modernization of facilities and has also resulted in decreased 
customer satisfaction. In another example, Joint Base Little Creek-
Fort Story officials reported that an increase of unaccompanied 
housing facilities was not met with a staff increase to help support 
the additional facilities. Also, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 
officials reported that the requirements for the physical security 
function increased following the joint base's establishment, but no 
additional personnel were gained, thus increasing staff workload. 
However, OSD officials whom we interviewed told us respondents may 
have attributed the consolidation of functions as driving an increased 
need for resources, when other factors may have been the reason. For 
instance, the OSD officials stated that higher performance standards 
for installation support at joint bases may have caused an increase in 
workload. Although OSD has provided joint bases with a memo that 
acknowledges a reduced funding environment and encourages Joint Base 
Commanders to ensure that mission partners continue to collaboratively 
determine priorities for applying resources, OSD officials told us 
that they have not modified the goals for the joint base program in 
light of the current fiscal environment.[Footnote 46] They stated that 
joint bases have been designed to look for efficiencies and cost 
savings in providing installation support, and are therefore better 
positioned than other installations to withstand budget cuts and 
operate with lower budgeted resources. 

Our survey data showed that some progress had been made in the joint 
bases' ability to reduce redundant funded positions; reduce redundant 
contracts or find contract efficiencies; and merge or consolidate 
redundant procedures to gain efficiencies and produce cost savings. 
According to joint base and military service officials whom we 
interviewed, the joint bases would benefit from more direction on how 
to pursue initiatives in a systematic way to achieve these goals or to 
report on the achievement of these goals. The officials said OSD has 
left it up to individual joint base leadership to determine how to 
manage and operate the joint bases, including the extent to which they 
pursue efficiencies. As a result, joint base and military service 
headquarters officials whom we interviewed stated that in an 
environment when priority is placed on getting the mission done with 
fewer resources, the investment of resources to pursue initiatives or 
conduct studies to determine the feasibility of efforts to cut 
redundancies and gain efficiencies has not always been a priority. The 
officials said that without more direction, the extent to which joint 
basing commanders pursued these types of initiatives was left to their 
discretion. Furthermore, the officials noted the degree to which joint 
bases looked for opportunities to gain efficiencies and cost savings 
depended on the commitment of the officials involved as well as the 
level of support and commitment they received from their service 
headquarters, rather than guided by overarching goals, plans, 
milestones, and reporting requirements. 

OSD officials stated that they had not conducted a mid-program review 
for joint basing and believe this type of review is a good management 
practice and may be beneficial at this stage in the joint basing 
program, in part because of concerns about the lack of understanding 
regarding the goals for the program as well as direction on how to 
achieve such goals. However, the officials noted that they do not yet 
have detailed plans for such a review. Without a collaborative 
evaluation of the joint basing program by OSD and the military 
services to determine if the stated goals of the program are still 
appropriate and continue to be priorities for DOD--and without clear 
communication on any revised goals and additional direction on how to 
achieve such goals, including reporting requirements and milestones--
it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate that the joint basing 
program has effectively and efficiently achieved its goals. 

Conclusions: 

DOD's 11 joint bases and one joint region have been fully operational 
since 2010, yet progress to consolidate installation-support functions 
at the 11 we surveyed varied by location as well as support function. 
According to survey respondents, some functions offer limited, if any, 
opportunities for consolidation, including those that are primarily 
military service, mission-specific--such as managing a small-arms 
range--and those that must adhere to military service-specific policy 
and procedures such as legal support services. DOD has eliminated some 
functions from consolidation on a case-by-case basis, but has not 
comprehensively reviewed the entire list of functions to determine 
whether additional functions should be removed from consolidation. 
Moreover, joint base officials have reported challenges from 
consolidation of installation-support functions, such as multiple 
inspections and limited civilian personnel promotion opportunities. 
OSD has not taken steps to address the challenges that, according to 
joint base officials, have resulted in inefficiencies and inequities. 
Without a comprehensive evaluation of the suitability of installation-
support functions for consolidation and guidance to address any 
identified challenges that emerged from consolidation, individual 
joint bases may experience inefficiencies and inequities in 
consolidating these functions. 

Furthermore, DOD has not yet demonstrated that merging 26 bases to 
consolidate installation-support functions into 12 joint bases has 
yielded the results it forecast when it proposed this initiative to 
the 2005 BRAC Commission as a means to reduce duplication of efforts 
that would in turn generate cost savings and increase efficiencies. 
The joint base officials, in their responses to survey questions and 
during interviews, did not report significant achievements in reaching 
these goals. DOD has data that indicate the joint bases are obligating 
less funding than they would have obligated as stand-alone bases, but 
it is not clear to what extent these savings are attributable to the 
consolidation of installation support functions. Furthermore, it is 
not clear to what extent savings and efficiencies are still the goals 
of this program. Joint base officials indicated that they are unclear 
to what extent these goals are still appropriate and to what extent 
they are required to pursue additional opportunities to meet these 
goals. DOD has not collaborated with the military services to 
reevaluate whether the goals of joint basing are still appropriate or 
provided direction to the joint bases for meeting program goals, 
including milestones and reporting requirements for the achievement of 
these goals. As a result, joint base commanders are responsible for 
determining to what extent they will pursue initiatives to reduce 
redundancy and achieve potential cost savings or efficiencies, and the 
extent to which such initiatives have been pursued varies by joint 
base. Key practices from efficiency initiatives state that a primary 
approach an agency can take to determine whether a program is 
effectively and efficiently achieving its goals is to periodically 
reexamine it. Furthermore, key change management practices state that 
it is essential for top leadership to set the direction, pace, and 
tone of organizational change. Until DOD evaluates its current 
approach to joint basing and determines whether the stated goals of 
the program are still appropriate and continue to be priorities--and 
without direction provided to the joint bases to pursue the goals and 
report on the ability to meet these goals--it will be difficult for 
DOD to determine whether the joint basing program is meeting its 
purpose. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To help ensure DOD's approach to joint basing achieves the goals as 
outlined by DOD in its justification for the 2005 BRAC recommendation 
and leverages additional opportunities to reduce duplication of effort 
that could in turn generate cost savings and increased efficiencies, 
Congress should consider directing the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Environment), in collaboration with the 
military services and joint bases, to evaluate the purpose of the 
program and determine whether the current goals, as stated in the 2005 
BRAC Commission recommendation, are still appropriate, or whether 
goals should be revised; communicate these goals to the military 
services and joint bases, and adjust program activities accordingly; 
provide direction to the joint bases on requirements for meeting 
program goals, including determining reporting requirements and 
milestones; and determine any next steps for joint basing, including 
whether to expand it to other installations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To assist the joint bases in achieving additional opportunities to 
consolidate installation-support functions, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations and Environment), in coordination with the military 
services and joint bases, to take the following two actions: 

* Evaluate the 44 support functions identified in DOD's guidance for 
joint base implementation to determine which functions are still 
suitable for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and make any 
changes that are appropriate to address limitations reported by the 
joint bases in consolidating installation-support functions, such as 
limitations related to workforces and geography. 

* Take policy actions, as appropriate--such as issuing additional 
guidance--to address any challenges resulting in inefficiencies and 
inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation-support 
functions including, at a minimum, those identified in this report. 

To ensure DOD's approach to joint basing aligns with the intent of the 
2005 BRAC recommendation and DOD's current position on the intent of 
joint basing, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), in 
collaboration with the military services and joint bases, to take the 
following two actions: 

* Evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether DOD's 
current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost 
savings for the joint basing program, as stated in the 2005 BRAC 
Commission recommendation, are still appropriate or whether goals 
should be revised, and communicate these goals to the military 
services and joint bases and then adjust program activities 
accordingly. 

* Subsequent to the evaluation above, provide direction to joint bases 
on their requirements for meeting the joint base program's goals. 
DOD's leadership should work with the military services to determine 
what reporting requirements and milestones should be put in place to 
increase support and commitment for the program's goals. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In 
its written comments, DOD concurred with one of the four 
recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did not concur with 
two. Given DOD's disagreement with the two recommendations, we have 
added a matter for congressional consideration to this report. Further 
details are discussed below. DOD's comments are summarized below and 
reprinted in their entirety in appendix VI. In addition, DOD provided 
technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate. 

In its comments, DOD stated that the department and GAO have 
fundamentally different approaches in viewing how DOD should manage 
the 12 joint bases, and noted that the report's recommendations imply 
that the joint bases are OSD-run entities that should be addressed 
through new DOD policies. DOD stated that it believes that although 
joint bases involve added complexities from crossing traditional 
service lines, they are ultimately service-run bases similar to all 
other installations. Additionally, DOD noted that the military 
departments already have the responsibility, as well as sufficient 
authority and incentives, to deliver effective and efficient 
installation support across all their installations, including joint 
bases. We believe that the report reflects an understanding that the 
joint base management structure consists of shared responsibility and 
authority between OSD and the military departments to manage the joint 
base program. This point is highlighted by the fact that we designed 
our audit work, including our survey and interviews, to focus on the 
perspectives of joint base and military service officials. 
Nonetheless, the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance assigns 
responsibilities to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 
Technology, and Logistics to establish overarching guidance, 
procedures, and policy, in coordination with appropriate OSD 
organizations, and to mediate any support agreement disputes between 
the components that are not resolved by the Joint Management Oversight 
Structure.[Footnote 47] We also cited an example in the report where 
OSD indicated that it was working to issue policy to resolve military 
service inconsistencies, identifying that OSD is providing such 
oversight. Furthermore, DOD provided an example of OSD's involvement 
in the management and oversight of the joint bases in its written 
comments on the report, citing a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Installation and Environment policy memo on the subject of joint bases 
and the supply, storage, and distribution of munitions. As a result, 
we continue to view the management of the joint bases as a shared 
responsibility between OSD and the services, and believe the 
recommendations directed to both are appropriate. 

DOD concurred with the first recommendation to evaluate the 44 
installation-support functions identified in DOD's guidance for joint 
base implementation to determine which functions are still suitable 
for consolidation, and to subsequently identify and make any changes 
that are appropriate to address limitations, such as workforce 
policies and geography, reported by the joint bases in consolidating 
the support functions. DOD also stated that it had already removed 
some installation-support functions from joint basing because they 
were not compelled for inclusion as part of the BRAC recommendation, 
and otherwise did not offer opportunities for savings or 
consolidation. We acknowledge in the report that OSD has reviewed 
individual installation-support functions on a case-by-case basis, and 
has removed three from the original list of 47 functions to be 
consolidated. However, during the course of our review, and as stated 
in the report, OSD officials told us that there was no process in 
place to evaluate the remaining 44 installation-support functions on a 
regular basis. We discussed this with military service and OSD 
officials in early April 2014. In its letter, DOD stated that in April 
2014, the Senior Joint Base Working Group principals tasked their 
staffs to identify which installation support functions and 
performance standards were not providing value to the joint bases' 
various military missions, and to explore whether these functions and 
standards should continue to be included in joint basing. DOD did not 
provide time frames for completing such actions. If implemented as 
intended, these actions should meet the intent of the recommendation. 

DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation to take policy 
actions, as appropriate, such as issuing additional guidance, to 
address challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities in 
consolidating installation-support functions. DOD stated that it is 
mindful of challenges in implementing and operating joint bases, and 
agreed that policy actions can address some challenges. However, DOD 
stated that it does not agree that these challenges require OSD-level 
policies, citing instead the existing responsibilities and authorities 
already assigned to the military departments and the Joint Management 
Oversight Structure. We recognize the responsibilities and authorities 
of the military departments. Accordingly, the recommendation is for 
OSD, in coordination with the military services and joint bases, to 
take policy actions to help address any challenges resulting in 
efficiencies and inequities from consolidation of installation-support 
functions at the joint bases. As stated in the report, and noted 
above, the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance assigns 
responsibilities to OSD to mediate any support agreement disputes 
between the components that are not resolved by the Joint Management 
Oversight Structure. We also describe the responses of joint base 
officials to our survey questions about any need for additional 
guidance from OSD and the military services, as well as the interview 
statements from joint base, military service headquarters, and OSD 
officials, who all stated that there is a need for such guidance. The 
report also includes an example of a challenge that required action 
from OSD to help resolve: OSD issued guidance in May 2014 that was 
based on a concern raised more than 2 years earlier in February 2012 
to resolve contradictions in military service-level guidance, which 
had created certain duplicative service-level inspections on joint 
bases. DOD also stated in its letter that its Joint Management 
Oversight Structure is the process by which the military departments 
can formally request OSD assistance to change joint or DOD policies. 
However, joint base officials expressed frustration about the lack of 
progress and slowness of OSD and the Joint Management Oversight 
Structure process to address challenges resulting from consolidation, 
particularly regarding issues where the military departments are 
unable to identify solutions on their own. Further, some survey 
respondents and officials we interviewed at the joint bases and 
military service headquarters stated that they wanted additional 
guidance from OSD or the military services, or both, to resolve 
contradictions between service-level policy where needed or, in some 
cases, to provide clearer direction. As a result, we continue to 
believe that the recommendation is valid and should be implemented. 

DOD did not concur with the third recommendation that OSD, in 
collaboration with the military services, evaluate the purpose of the 
program and determine whether DOD's current goals of achieving greater 
efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program, 
as stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still 
appropriate or should be revised, and to communicate these goals to 
the military services and joint bases and then to adjust program 
activities accordingly. DOD stated in its comments that the goal of 
joint basing remains to increase the efficiency of delivering 
installation support at the 12 joint bases as described in the BRAC 
Commission's recommendation number 146. However, as noted in the 
report, OSD has not evaluated the joint basing program to determine 
this or whether the goals are appropriate for the program today and 
looking forward. 

Further, DOD stated in its written comments that the 12 joint bases 
have generated savings. Specifically, DOD stated that the joint bases 
had obligated $255 million less in fiscal year 2012 compared to what 
these previously stand-alone bases would have obligated, and did so 
with 1,600 fewer personnel. While we agree that DOD's estimates show 
that the joint bases are obligating less, these reductions in 
obligations cannot be attributed solely to the consolidation of 
installation-support functions at the joint bases, as OSD 
acknowledges. We discussed these estimates with OSD officials in July 
2014 after we received their agency comments on a draft of this report 
where these numbers were included. OSD officials explained that their 
methodology for calculating savings from joint bases consists of 
comparing the joint bases' current fiscal year obligations with a 
baseline amount--the cost to provide installation support at the 26 
previously stand-alone installations that constitute the joint bases--
which is updated every fiscal year to reflect changes in mission 
requirements and inflation, among other factors. However, this 
approach is unable to distinguish savings from efficiencies obtained 
through consolidation of installation-support services at the joint 
bases or from other factors that also contributed to lower 
obligations. For instance, OSD officials said fiscal year 2012 savings 
were also attributable to factors such as the military departments' 
response to DOD's efforts to cap the number of civilian positions. In 
addition, DOD stated in its letter that the joint bases' fiscal year 
2013 obligations were $830 million less than if they were still 
separate installations. DOD stated that this was a combination of 
savings and reduced expenditures caused by the Budget Control Act and 
fiscal year 2013's sequestration actions, as well as from joint 
basing. However, OSD cannot determine how much of the $830 million in 
reduced obligations in fiscal year 2013 is attributable to budget cuts 
or efficiencies gained through the consolidation of installation 
support functions at the joint bases. Further, OSD cannot explain how 
sequestration-driven budget cuts have led to joint basing efficiencies. 

Also, as stated in the report, joint base officials told us they are 
unclear to what extent achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings 
are still appropriate for the goals of joint basing, and to what 
extent they are required to pursue additional opportunities beyond the 
consolidation of installation-support functions in the joint base 
memorandums of agreement to achieve these goals. Joint base and 
military service headquarters officials said that in an environment 
when priority is placed on getting the mission done with fewer 
resources, the investment of resources to pursue initiatives or 
conduct studies to determine the feasibility of efforts to cut 
redundancies and gain efficiencies has not always been a priority. We 
believe that the continued confusion at the joint bases over the goals 
of the program, as well as cost savings estimates that reflect 
uncertainty as to the extent consolidation of installation-support 
functions drives savings as compared to simply cutting the budget, 
indicate a continuing need to review the goals of the program and 
communicate them to the military services and joint bases, as 
recommended. 

DOD did not concur with the fourth recommendation that OSD, in 
collaboration with the military services, provide direction to joint 
bases on their requirements for meeting the joint base program's goals 
and work with the military services to determine reporting 
requirements and milestones to be put in place to increase support and 
commitment for the program's goals. In its comments, DOD stated that 
the joint bases have been fully operational since October 2010 and 
have proven they can deliver measurable and tangible savings across 
the installation-support portfolio. As such, DOD stated that it does 
not believe OSD should establish program milestones. However, DOD's 
assertion that the joint bases have proven they can deliver tangible 
savings is based on a method of calculating savings that cannot 
distinguish savings attributable to consolidation of installation-
support functions at the joint bases from savings attributable to 
other factors, including sequestration-driven budget cuts, as noted 
above. 

DOD further stated that it does not agree OSD should provide 
additional direction towards meeting the program's goals because the 
joint base commanders and military departments are in the best 
position to balance efficiency with effectiveness and that directing 
additional consolidations circumvents their ability to make these 
decisions. In addition, DOD stated that establishing milestones 
implies joint bases are still in an implementation phase, and noted 
that OSD has transitioned from managing joint base implementation to a 
steady-state oversight role. 

The report does not call for OSD to make additional consolidations; 
rather, the recommendation states that OSD, in collaboration with the 
military services, should provide additional direction to the joint 
bases on how to achieve the goals of the program. Moreover, we agree 
that the military services are in the best position to balance 
efficiency with effectiveness when managing and operating 
installations, which is one reason we sent our survey to the joint 
bases to solicit their views. However, as stated in the report and 
noted above, joint base and military service headquarters officials 
told us that in an environment when priority is placed on getting the 
mission done with fewer resources, the investment of resources to 
pursue initiatives or conduct studies to determine the feasibility of 
efforts to cut redundancies and gain efficiencies has not always been 
a priority. As such, the officials indicated that the degree to which 
joint bases looked for opportunities to gain efficiencies and cost 
savings depended on the commitment of the officials involved as well 
as the level of support and commitment they received from their 
service headquarters, because overarching goals, plans, milestones, 
and reporting requirements have not been established. Without OSD 
establishing goals and milestones to be achieved across the joint 
bases, there is a risk that emphasis or priority will not be given to 
this pursuit. 

Furthermore, DOD stated that it advocates treating joint bases no 
differently than other Army, Navy, and Air Force installations, and 
noted the only unique quality of joint bases is the sizable joint 
presence they support. Although DOD indicated that joint bases are 
similar to all other installations, as stated in the report, 64 
percent of survey respondents reported challenges stemming from 
consolidation of installation-support functions--consolidations 
unlikely to occur on stand-alone installations. Moreover, joint bases 
are required to meet certain different installation-support standards 
that are, at times, higher than those on a stand-alone installation. 
Meeting these standards can require additional resources or 
prioritization that other installations may not face. DOD did not 
explain how joint bases can have support standards and challenges that 
are unique to joint basing while still being considered the same as 
all other installations. Given (1) that joint bases face unique 
challenges, and (2) that joint base and military service officials 
said it is unclear as to the extent initial joint basing goals are 
still appropriate as well as the extent they are required to pursue 
cost savings and efficiencies, additional direction would help joint 
bases better understand the current and ongoing goals of joint basing. 
Therefore, we believe the recommendation is still warranted. 

For the reasons cited above, we continue to believe that OSD should 
collaborate with the military services, especially in light of OSD's 
assertions that joint bases have generated savings, to (1) evaluate 
the purpose of the program and determine whether the current goals, as 
stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still 
appropriate; (2) communicate the goals to the military services and 
joint bases, and then adjust program activities accordingly; (3) 
provide direction to the joint bases on requirements for meeting 
program goals, including reporting requirements and milestones; and 
(4) determine any next steps for joint basing, including whether to 
expand it to other installations. If joint basing may result in 
savings, particularly at the level that OSD asserts, then DOD may want 
to consider expanding joint basing to other installations. Further, 
key change management practices state that it is essential that top 
government and agency leaders are committed to consolidation and play 
a lead role in executing it by setting the direction, pace, and tone 
as well as providing a clear and consistent rationale for doing so. 
These practices also state that establishing implementation goals and 
milestone dates, and tracking progress toward those goals, helps 
agency officials pinpoint performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse 
corrections, including any needed adjustments to the organization's 
future goals and milestones.[Footnote 48] Consequently, and given 
DOD's disagreement with our recommendations that OSD collaborate with 
the military services and joint bases to evaluate the purpose of the 
program and determine whether DOD's current goals of achieving greater 
efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program 
are still appropriate and subsequently provide direction to joint 
bases on their requirements for meeting the joint base program's 
goals, we have added a matter for congressional consideration to this 
report. Our intent is to help ensure DOD's approach to joint basing 
achieves the goals as outlined by DOD in its justification for the 
2005 BRAC recommendation and leverages additional opportunities to 
reduce duplication of effort that could in turn generate cost savings 
and increase efficiencies. 

We will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, and Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Office of 
Management and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Mark Kirk: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Abney Culberson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Sanford Bishop, Jr. 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

For this review, we conducted site visits at a nongeneralizable sample 
of four joint bases: one Navy led, one Army led, and two Air Force 
led.[Footnote 49] We selected these bases to ensure representation 
from each of the military services, and to include bases that share 
and do not share a physical boundary. Information collected during 
these site visits provided insight about initiatives undertaken and 
outcomes experienced at these locations. We also obtained and analyzed 
documents and conducted interviews, as described later in this 
section. Furthermore, we conducted a web-based survey of 11 of the 12 
joint bases. Our web-based survey did not include Joint Region 
Marianas because it is a joint region rather than a joint base, and is 
subject to different expectations for the consolidation of 
installation-support, but we interviewed officials from Joint Region 
Marianas. Those surveyed at the 11 joint bases included 
representatives affiliated with 462 installation-support functional 
areas (42 each at each of the joint bases) as well as the 11 Joint 
Base Commanders (or their designated representative), and we obtained 
a response rate of 100 percent. 

To conduct our web-based survey, we sent to each joint base the 
electronic links to 43 questionnaires, one questionnaire for each of 
the 42 installation-support functions identified for consolidation per 
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Base Implementation Guidance 
and one questionnaire asking a single open-ended question to capture 
additional comments from each Joint Base Commander. In consultation 
with DOD we excluded two installation-support functions from the 
survey (facilities new footprint and real property leases) because DOD 
officials indicated that they did not have performance management data 
and survey participants may not be able to fully respond to the 
questions. For the list of installation-support functions that we 
included in our survey, see table 5 below. The survey contained 16 
main questions and several follow-up questions. It was designed to 
obtain information, using closed-and open-ended responses, about 
progress in consolidating functions, factors that hinder 
consolidation, and outcomes from consolidation such as any benefits, 
challenges, or reductions in duplication (defined as reductions in 
redundancy) in three areas--personnel other than contractors, base 
operating contracts, and procedures and policies. The survey also 
asked about the need for additional or modified guidance from one or 
more of the military services or Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) and if there were any additional opportunities to consolidate 
that had not yet been implemented. See appendix II for a copy of the 
survey questions. 

Table 5: List of 42 Installation-Support Functions Included in Our 
Survey: 

1. Airfield operations; 
2. Advisory services[A]; 
3. Base support vehicles and equipment; 
4. Chaplain ministries; 
5. Child and youth services; 
6. Command management; 
7. Custodial services; 
8. Emergency management; 
9. Environmental[B]; 
10. Facilities demolition; 
11. Facilities restoration and modernization; 
12. Facility sustainment; 
13. Family housing; 
14. Financial management; 
15. Fire and emergency services; 
16. Food and dining; 
17. Honors and protocols[A]; 
18. Inspector general and internal review[A]; 
19. Grounds maintenance and landscaping; 
20. Installation movement; 
21. Installation safety; 
22. Information technology and services management; 
23. Laundry and dry cleaning; 
24. Law enforcement services; 
25. Legal services; 
26. Lodging; 
27. Management analysis; 
28. Military and family support; 
29. Military personnel services; 
30. Morale, welfare, and recreation; 
31. Pavement clearance; 
32. Pest control; 
33. Physical security; 
34. Port services; 
35. Procurement operations; 
36. Public affairs; 
37. Real property management and engineer services; 
38. Refuse collection; 
39. Small-arms range management; 
40. Supply, storage, and distribution non-munitions; 
41. Unaccompanied housing; 
42. Utilities. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. GAO-14-577. 

[A] The command-management function consists of seven subfunctions. In 
consultation with OSD, we broke out three of these subfunctions (1) 
honors and protocol; (2) advisory services; and (3) inspector general 
and internal review because the responses would be suitably unique for 
each and may not be collectively reflected in responses for the single 
command-management function. 

[B] The environmental function listed in our survey includes four 
installation-support functions: (1) environmental compliance; (2) 
environmental conservation; (3) environmental pollution; and (4) 
environmental restoration. In consultation with OSD, we collapsed this 
group into one function to reduce duplication of effort since the 
responses to each would be answered by the same individual and would 
be quite similar in content. 

[End of table] 

To administer the survey, we provided unique survey log-in information 
for each function to the Joint Base Commander's office. That office 
was then responsible for disseminating the information to the 
appropriate lead service component's subject-matter expert for each of 
the functional areas. While the survey was provided to the lead 
component's subject-matter expert, each base had the opportunity to 
incorporate views and comments from the supported component(s). For 
joint bases that did not have a given function (e.g., port 
operations), the joint base representative simply indicated that the 
function did not exist and no further questions were asked or answered. 

Our analysis of the survey responses included descriptive statistics 
from closed-ended responses and content analysis of open-ended 
responses. We reviewed the closed-ended responses to ensure accuracy 
of information for six key survey questions: (Q2) "Is any part of this 
support function currently the responsibility of the Joint Base 
Commander?", and (Q3) "Since your joint base established the terms of 
the Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), has any part of this 
support function been consolidated?", and questions 9 through 12 (see 
Appendix II for the complete wording of these questions). For these 
questions, we compared the closed-ended response to the open-ended 
elaborations to ensure that the closed-ended response accurately 
represented the respondent's meaning. When there was a mismatch we 
also checked the base's MOA and supplemental Joint Base Implementation 
Guidance, if applicable. In some cases, we modified the closed-ended 
response to match the response in the open-ended elaboration or the 
MOA (e.g., if a respondent answered "yes" to the closed-ended question 
about the function being consolidated but then clearly indicated in 
the elaboration space "this function has not been consolidated"). For 
example, these cases related to changing: (1) "no" responses to "not 
applicable" when a function was not present at the joint base; (2) 
"not applicable" responses to "no" when the Joint Base Implementation 
Guidance excepted the installation-support function in some instances 
from being transferred to the Joint Base Commander; and (3) "no" 
responses to "yes" when the installation-support function had been 
consolidated prior to joint basing. Inconsistent responses were 
identified through a content analysis of the open-ended survey 
questions, in which two GAO analysts independently reviewed the 
responses and coded them into several categories, such as 
"consolidated prior to joint basing", "reports no reduction", and 
"reductions but not directly related to joint basing.": 

When the coding was completed, both analysts reviewed every code made 
by the other analyst and indicated whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the code. Then, the analysts met to discuss their coding 
determinations and reached agreement on any differences. Because we 
made changes to the closed-ended survey responses for the key 
questions above based on our analysis of the open-ended responses and 
the base MOAs, the results for those questions are not the raw survey 
responses; they are the combined result of the original survey 
responses and our analyses of those survey responses.[Footnote 50] We 
have worded the results in our report carefully to accurately 
represent that fact. Additionally, two analysts independently 
summarized the responses to open-ended questions that were not 
elaborations of closed-ended questions (e.g., Question 6 regarding 
other factors that might have hindered the ability of the base to 
consolidate a function) through the same content analysis process 
described above. We believe the data analyzed are sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We sent e-mail notifications to base points of contact beginning on 
January 13, 2014. We then sent a cover e-mail with the log-in 
information for the questionnaire beginning on January 14, 2014, and 
asked the bases to complete the questionnaire within one month. To 
encourage respondents to complete the questionnaire, we sent e-mail 
message reminders and log-in information approximately two weeks, 
three weeks, and five weeks after the initial questionnaire was sent; 
we also extended the deadline for completion. We also sent customized 
emails and made follow-up phone calls to the base points of contact to 
maximize the response rate from all functions and to clarify responses 
for key individual questions. We closed the survey on March 19, 2014. 
We achieved a 100 percent response rate from all base functions and 
commanders. 

To minimize errors that might occur from respondents interpreting our 
questions differently than we intended, we pretested the questionnaire 
with knowledgeable representatives from four joint bases.[Footnote 51] 
During these pretests, we asked the officials to complete the 
questionnaire as we observed the process and noted potential problems 
(two sessions were conducted in-person and by phone, two were 
conducted only by phone). We then discussed the questions and 
instructions with the officials to check whether (1) the questions and 
instructions were clear and unambiguous, (2) the terms used were 
accurate, (3) the questionnaire was unbiased, (4) the questionnaire 
did not place an undue burden on the officials completing it, and (5) 
to identify potential solutions to any problems identified. We also 
submitted the questionnaire for review by an independent GAO survey 
specialist, OSD officials, and senior staff from one additional joint 
base. We modified the questionnaire based on feedback from the 
pretests and reviews, as appropriate. 

Because we collected data from every joint base rather than a sample 
of bases, there was no sampling error. However, the practical 
difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly 
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how a 
particular question is interpreted, the sources of information 
available to respondents, how the responses were processed and 
analyzed, or the types of people who do not respond can influence the 
accuracy of the survey results. We took steps in the development of 
the survey, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize 
these nonsampling errors and to help ensure the accuracy of the 
answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey 
specialist designed the questionnaire, in collaboration with GAO staff 
with subject-matter expertise. Then, as noted earlier, the draft 
questionnaire was pretested to ensure that questions were relevant, 
clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. The questionnaire was also 
reviewed by external experts and an additional GAO survey specialist. 
From these pretests and reviews, we made revisions as necessary to 
reduce the likelihood of nonresponse and reporting errors on our 
questions. Our analysts answered respondent questions and resolved 
difficulties that respondents had in answering our questions. We 
examined the survey results and performed computer analyses to 
identify inconsistencies and other indications of error and addressed 
such issues. A second, independent analyst checked the accuracy of all 
computer analyses to minimize the likelihood of errors in data 
processing. To obtain additional narrative and supporting context, 
survey respondents were given multiple opportunities to provide 
additional open-ended comments throughout our survey. Data were 
electronically exported from the web survey software into a 
statistical program for analyses. No manual data entry was performed, 
thereby removing an additional potential source of error. We examined 
the survey results and performed computer analyses to identify 
inconsistencies and other indications of error (e.g., open-ended 
responses conflicting with closed-ended responses), and addressed such 
issues as necessary. 

To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating 
their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD's 2008 Joint 
Basing Implementation Guidance to identify DOD's expectations for 
consolidation. Next, we analyzed data obtained through the survey and 
information from interviews with officials from the Joint Region 
Marianas and the joint bases and compared the results of our analysis 
to DOD's expectations for consolidation. To determine why 
consolidation had or had not occurred as intended and to identify any 
reported factors that have hindered consolidation and challenges that 
have resulted from consolidation efforts, we analyzed information 
obtained through our survey and interviewed joint base officials. We 
evaluated DOD's efforts to address reported hindrances to 
consolidation and challenges that have resulted from consolidation 
efforts with key federal practices for consolidation identified in our 
prior work on federal agency consolidation efforts.[Footnote 52] We 
did not independently assess the extent to which consolidation 
occurred as identified by survey respondents and by officials during 
interviews. 

To determine the extent to which officials have reported meeting the 
goals of joint basing to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings 
as stated in the 2005 BRAC recommendation, we reviewed documents and 
guidance from OSD, the military services, and individual joint bases. 
We reviewed survey results and information collected from interviews 
and compared them to key federal practices for consolidation of 
management functions and to key practices agencies can take to improve 
efficiency as identified in our prior work.[Footnote 53] Additionally, 
our past work identified key federal practices for consolidation, such 
as establishing implementation goals and milestone dates, and tracking 
progress toward those goals.[Footnote 54] 

Our interviews of officials from the joint base service components 
included the Joint Base Commanders, Deputy Joint Base Commanders, and 
installation-support functional area specialists, as well as officials 
from units who were receiving support from the Joint Base Commander's 
office at each installation. In addition, we interviewed a 
nongeneralizable sample of key joint basing stakeholders including OSD 
joint basing officials; members of the Joint Base Working Group that 
represents the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters; 
as well as officials from the Army Installation Management Command, 
the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, and the Naval Installations 
Command. We also interviewed officials at the following locations: 

* Air Force Air Education and Training Command, Texas: 

* Air Force Air Mobility Command, Illinois: 

* Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, District of Columbia: 

* Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia: 

* Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington: 

* Joint Base San Antonio, Texas: 

* Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Virginia: 

* Joint Region Marianas, Guam: 

* Navy Region Naval District Washington; Washington, District of 
Columbia: 

* Navy Region Hawaii U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Hawaii: 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Survey on Consolidation of Joint Base Operations: 

The questions that we asked in our survey on consolidation of joint 
base operations are shown below. The percents in parentheses[Footnote 
55] indicate the percent of the functional area respondents who chose 
that particular answer or that our analysis of open-ended responses 
and other supporting documentation for the joint bases indicated were 
the correct answers. The number in parentheses next to a closed-ended 
question (e.g., "N=462") indicates the number of respondents who were 
eligible to answer that question and is the denominator of the 
percents reported for that question. See Appendix I for details of the 
analyses that led to the results reported here. 

Section 1: Functional Area: 

1. Functional Area[Footnote 56] 

[When a respondent for a specific functional area logged on, the name 
of the functional area was displayed along with the definition of the 
function taken from the May 2013 Cost and Performance Visibility 
Framework Handbook. When the Joint Base Commander's office logged on, 
the following question was displayed.] 

If the Joint Base Commander or his/her representative has any comments 
about this questionnaire or about your joint base's consolidation of 
installation-support functions, please type them in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

Section 2: Function Responsibility: 

2. Is Any part of this support function currently the responsibility 
of the Joint Base Commander (JBC)? Check only one answer. (N=462): 

Yes (94.8%); 
No (1.9%); 
N/A - this base does not have this function (3.2%): 

Optional for "Yes" and "Not applicable" responses: If you would like 
to elaborate on your answer above, please type your comments in the 
box below: 

[Open Ended] 

For "No" responses: Please elaborate on your answer above. Please type 
your comments in the box below: 

[Open Ended] 

Section 3: Consolidation of Installation-Support Function: 

3. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), has ANY part of this support function 
been consolidated? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (75.8%); 
No (19.4%); 
Not applicable (4.1%); 
Don't know (.2%); 
Blank (.5%). 

Please explain your answer in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

4. How much, if at all, did the preexisting model of providing this 
support function (e.g., military personnel, civilian personnel, 
contract personnel) hinder the ability of your joint base to 
consolidate this support function? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Significantly (15.8%); 
Moderately (14.6%); 
Slightly (11.2%); 
Not at all (47.9%); 
Not applicable (6.4%); 
Don't know (3.4%) Blank (.7%). 

Please explain your answer in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

Please explain your answer in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

5. How much, if at all, do military service-specific requirements, 
practices, or policies hinder the ability to consolidate this support 
function? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Significantly (17.8%); 
Moderately (11.9%); 
Slightly (15.5 %); 
Not at all (46.1%); 
Not applicable (6.4%); 
Don't know (1.6%); 
Blank responses (.7%). 

6. What other factors, if any, have hindered the ability of your joint 
base to consolidate this support function (e.g., geography, use of 
contractors, impact to mission, etc.)? 

[Open Ended] 

7. Have there been any benefits resulting from the consolidation of 
this support function (e.g., adoption of streamlined practices, 
increased efficiency, increased customer satisfaction, etc.)? Check 
only one answer. (N=350): 

Yes (60.9%); 
No (34.0%); 
Don't know (4.9%); 
Blank (.3%). 

Please describe the benefit(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

8. Have there been any challenges resulting from the consolidation of 
this support function (e.g., increased burden on staff, decreased 
efficiency, decreased customer satisfaction, etc.)? Check only one 
answer. (N=350): 

Yes (64.0%); 
No (33.1%); 
Don't know (2.9%). 

Please describe the challenge(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

9. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base MOA, 
has there been ANY reduction of redundant funded positions--excluding 
contractors--(i.e., authorized positions that were determined to be 
duplicative or unnecessary after transfer of total obligation 
authority, because they included the similar roles and 
responsibilities) required to perform this support function? Check 
only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (12.1%); 
No (40.4%); 
Not applicable (40.6%); 
Don't know (6.4%); 
Blank (.5%). 

9.a. Please describe the reduction(s) and the reason for the 
reduction(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

9.b. How many redundant authorized positions have been eliminated? 

[Open Ended] 

9.c. Please explain in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

10. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base MOA, 
has there been ANY reduction of redundant contracts or any increased 
contract efficiencies (i.e., contracts for the provision of the same 
support service that were determined to be duplicative, or where 
consolidation of the contract resulted in improvements, for example, 
leveraging economies of scale) used to perform this support function? 
Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (25.3%); 
No (24.4%); 
Not applicable (43.8%); 
Don't know (5.9%); 
Blank (.5%). 

10.a. Please describe the reduction(s) or efficiencies in the box 
below. 

[Open Ended] 

10.b. How many redundant contracts, if any, have been eliminated? 

[Open Ended] 

10.c. Please explain in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

11. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base MOA, 
has there been ANY merger or consolidation of Information Technology 
(IT) systems related to performing this support function (e.g., 
networks, databases, etc.)? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (25.3%); 
No (34.2%); 
Not applicable (32.4%); 
Don't know (7.5%); 
Blank (.5%). 

11.a. Please describe the merger/consolidation(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

11.b. Please explain in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

12. Since your joint base established the terms of the Joint Base MOA, 
has there been ANY merger or consolidation of redundant procedures 
(i.e., procedures that were determined to be duplicative or 
unnecessary) used to perform this support function? Check only one 
answer. (N=438): 

Yes (24.0%); 
No (25.6%); 
Not applicable (44.5%); 
Don't know (5.5%); 
Blank (.5%). 

12.a. Please describe the merger/consolidation(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

12.b. Please explain in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

13. Are there specific areas where additional or modified guidance 
from one or more of the military services would improve the 
consolidation of this function? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (26.3%); 
No (60.3%); 
Don't know or no opinion (12.8%); 
Blank (.7%). 

Please describe the change(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

14. Are there specific areas where additional or modified guidance 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would improve the 
consolidation of this function? Check only one answer. (N=438): 

Yes (26.7%); 
No (58.2%); 
Don't know or no opinion (14.2%); 
Blank (.9%). 

Please describe the change(s) in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

15. If there are any additional opportunities to consolidate this 
installation-support function that have not yet been implemented, 
please describe them in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

16. If you have any additional comments related to the consolidation 
of this support function since your joint base established the terms 
of the Joint Base MOA, please type them in the box below. 

[Open Ended] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: BRAC Commission Recommendation on Joint Basing 
(Including Elements of DOD's Recommendation to the Commission): 

Joint Basing: 
Recommendation # 146 (HASA 41): 
ONE Time Cost:	$50.6 million: 
Annual Recurring Costs/(Savings): ($183.8 million): 
20-Year Net Present Value: ($2,342.5 million): 
Payback Period:	Immediate: 

Secretary Of Defense Recommendation: 

Realign McChord Air Force Base (AFB), WA, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Fort Lewis, WA, establishing 
Joint Base Lewis-McChord. 

Realign Fort Dix, NJ, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, NJ, 
by relocating the installation management functions to McGuire AFB, 
NJ, establishing Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. 

Realign Naval Air Facility Washington, MD, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Andrews AFB, MD, establishing 
Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, MD. 

Realign Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, by relocating the installation 
management functions to Naval District Washington at the Washington 
Navy Yard, Washington, DC, establishing Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling-
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Washington, DC. 

Realign Henderson Hall, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Fort Myer, VA, establishing Joint Base Myer-Henderson 
Hall, VA. 

Realign Fort Richardson, AK, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Elmendorf AFB, AK, establishing Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson, AK. 

Realign Hickam AFB, HI, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, establishing Joint Base 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI. 

Realign Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Randolph AFB, TX, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Lackland AFB, Tx. 

Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Charleston AFB. 

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Langley AFB, VA. 

Realign Fort Story, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Commander Naval MidAtlantic Region at Naval Station 
Norfolk, VA. 

Realign Andersen AFB, Guam, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Commander, US Naval Forces, Marianas Islands, Guam. 

Secretary of Defense Justification: 

All installations employ military, civilian, and contractor personnel 
to perform common functions in support of installation facilities and 
personnel. All installations execute these functions using similar or 
near similar processes. Because these installations share a common 
boundary with minimal distance between the major facilities or are in 
near proximity, there is significant opportunity to reduce duplication 
of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities 
requirements capable of generating savings, which will be realized by 
paring unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater 
efficiencies through economies of scale. Intangible savings are 
expected to result from opportunities to consolidate and optimize 
existing and future service contract requirements. Additional 
opportunities for savings are also expected to result from 
establishment of a single space management authority capable of 
generating greater overall utilization of facilities and 
infrastructure. Further savings are expected to result from 
opportunities to reduce and correctly size both owned and contracted 
commercial fleets of base support vehicles and equipment consistent 
with the size of the combined facilities and supported populations. 
Regional efficiencies achieved as a result of Service regionalization 
of installation management will provide additional opportunities for 
overall savings as the designated installations are consolidated under 
regional management structures. 

Specific exceptions not included in the functions to relocate are 
Health and Military Personnel Services. In general, the Department 
anticipates transferring responsibility for all other Base Operating 
Support (BOS) functions and the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
portion of Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SAM), to the 
designated receiving location. 

However, because of the variety of circumstances at each location, the 
Department requires flexibility to tailor implementation to the unique 
requirements at each location. 

In all but three realignments, discussed below, the quantitative 
military value score validated by military judgment was the primary 
basis for determining which installation was designated as the 
receiving location. 

McGuire's quantitative military value compared to the Fort Dix 
quantitative military value score was too close to be the sole factor 
for determining the receiving installation for installation management 
functions. Military judgment favored McGuire AFB as the receiving 
installation for the installation management functions because its 
mission supports operational forces, in contrast to Fort Dix, which 
has a primary mission of support for Reserve Component training. 

As an installation accustomed to supporting operational forces, it was 
the military judgment of the JCSG that McGuire was better able to 
perform those functions for both locations. 

Similarly, the quantitative military value score of Charleston AFB 
compared to that of Naval Weapons Station Charleston was too close to 
be the sole factor for determining the receiving installation for 
installation management functions. Military judgment favored 
Charleston AFB as the receiving installation for the installation 
management functions because of its mission in support of operational 
forces compared to Naval Weapons Station Charleston, which has a 
primary mission to support training and industrial activities. It was 
the military judgment of the JCSG that Charleston AFB, as an 
installation accustomed to supporting operational forces, was better 
able to perform those functions for both locations. 

Langley AFB's quantitative military value score compared to the Fort 
Eustis quantitative military value score was a clear margin for Fort 
Eustis. However, pending changes to Fort Eustis resulting from other 
BRAC recommendations causes military judgment to favor Langley AFB as 
the receiving installation for the installation management functions. 
Relocations of organizations currently based at Fort Eustis will cause 
a significant population decline and overall reduction in the scope of 
the instillation's supporting mission. Based on these changes, it was 
the military judgment of the JCSG that Langley AFB was better able to 
perform these functions for both locations. 

Community Concerns: 

Although affected communities supported the concept of Joint Basing, 
several communities expressed concerns about the effect of personnel 
curs on the mission, questioned DoD's process used to determine the 
proposed number of personnel cuts, and expressed concern over the 
overall health and welfare of the bases involved. Additionally, 
communities argued that the "clash of cultures" and service-specific 
interests would impair installation management Ivy a different 
service. To avoid this likely problem, some community advocates argued 
DoD would need to develop a common installation management approach by 
establishing a joint basing office in DoD to implement the new Joint 
Bases so that individual military services did not issue conflicting 
guidance and procedures. Finally, there was concern expressed that non-
appropriated fund employees were not addressed specifically in the DoD 
recommendation. 

Commission Findings: 

While the Commission supports the concept of Joint Basing strongly, it 
is concerned, as is GAO, that DoD must assess and remedy several 
issues before implementation will be successful. For instance, common 
terminology is lacking to define Base Operating Support (BOS) 
functions among the military services and OSD. The Commission concurs 
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that DoD needs an 
analytic process for developing BOS requirements. Also, while each 
military service has standards, there are no DoD-wide standards for 
common support functions. 

Additionally, the Commission learned that DoD determined the manpower 
reductions through application of a formula and not deliberations 
among commanders of the affected installations. In other words, the 
manpower savings were directed rather than derived from functional 
analyses and manpower studies. 

Finally, the Commission found that currently Naval District Washington 
provides non-mission related services to the Naval Research Laboratory 
because the Navy has centralized its installation management 
functions. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is a Secretary of the Navy 
Working Capital Fund Activity, so it must maintain control of 
laboratory buildings, structures, and other physical assets that are 
essential to the NRL research mission. 

Commission Recommendations: 

The Commission found that the Secretary of Defense deviated 
substantially from final selection criteria I and 4 and from the Force 
Structure Plan. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

Realign McChord Air Force Base (AFB), WA, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Fort Lewis, WA, establishing 
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. 

Realign Fort Dix, NJ, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, NJ, 
by relocating the installation management functions to McGuire AFB, 
NJ, establishing Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ. 

Realign Naval Air Facility Washington, MD, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Andrews AFB, MD, establishing 
Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, MD. 

Realign Bolling AFB, DC, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Naval District Washington at the Washington Navy Yard, 
DC, establishing Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, DC. 

Realign Henderson Hall, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Fort Myer, VA, establishing Joint Base Myer-Henderson 
Hall, VA. 

Realign Fore Richardson, AK, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Elmendorf AFB, AK, establishing joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson, AK. 

Realign Hickam AFB, HI, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI, establishing Joint Base 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI. 

Realign Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Randolph AFB, TX, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Lackland AFB, TX. 

Realign Naval Weapons Station Charleston, SC, by relocating the 
installation management functions to Charleston AFB, SC. 

Realign Fort Eustis, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Langley AFB, VA. 

Realign Fort Story, VA, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Commander Naval Mid-Atlantic Region at Naval Station 
Norfolk, VA. 

Realign Andersen AFB, Guam, by relocating the installation management 
functions to Commander, US Naval Forces, Marianas Islands, Guam. 

The Commission found this change and the recommendation as amended are 
consistent with the final selection criteria and the Force Structure 
Plan. The full text of this and all Commission recommendations can be 
found in Appendix Q. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Status of Reported Consolidation at Each of the 11 Joint 
Bases: 

Table 6: Status of Reported Consolidation at Each of the 11 Joint 
Bases by Installation-Support Function (Part 1 of 2): 

Installation-support function: Advisory services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Airfield operations; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: n/a; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Base support vehicles and equipment; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Chaplain ministry; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Children and youth services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Command management; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: [A]; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Custodial services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Emergency management; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: [A]; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Environmental; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Facilities demolition; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Facilities restoration and 
modernization; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Facility sustainment; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Family housing; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Financial management; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Fire and emergency services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Food and dining; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: n/a; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Grounds maintenance and landscaping; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Honors and protocols; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: n/a; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Information technology services 
management; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Inspector general and internal review; 
Joint Base: Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is 
consolidated; 
Joint Base: 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: [A]; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Installation movement; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: :Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Installation safety; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Laundry and dry cleaning; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: n/a; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: n/a; 
Charleston: n/a; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: n/a; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: n/a. 

Installation-support function: Law enforcement patrols; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Legal services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Lodging; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: n/a; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Management analysis; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: n/a. 

Installation-support function: Military and family support services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Military personnel services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Morale, welfare, and recreation; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Pavement clearance; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Pest control; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Physical security; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Port services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: n/a; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: n/a; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: n/a; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: n/a; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: n/a; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: No part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: n/a. 

Installation-support function: Procurement operations; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Public affairs; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Real property management and 
engineering services; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Refuse collection and disposal; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Small-arms range management; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: n/a; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: n/a; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: n/a; 
San Antonio: No part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Supply, storage, and distribution non-
munitions; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Unaccompanied housing; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

Installation-support function: Utilities; 
Joint Base: 
Anacostia-Bolling: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Andrews-NAF Washington: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Charleston: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Elmendorf-Richardson: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Langley-Eustis: No part of the function is consolidated; 
Lewis-McChord: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Little Creek-Fort Story: No part of the function is consolidated; 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Myer-Henderson Hall: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
Pearl Harbor-Hickam: Some part of the function is consolidated; 
San Antonio: Some part of the function is consolidated. 

n/a = Joint base does not have the function or the function was not 
the joint base commander's responsibility. 

Source: GAO analysis of joint base survey responses and supporting 
documentation. GAO-14-577. 

Note: The support functions included were those for which the Joint 
Base Commanders had some responsibility at the time of our review. 

[A] Missing or unknown data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Locations of Joint Bases: 

This appendix contains information presented in figure 1 in a 
noninteractive format. 

Figure 11: Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Joint Base Andrews: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Joint Base Charleston: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 14: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 15: Joint Base Langley-Eustis: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 16: Joint Base Lewis-McChord: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 17: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 18: Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 19: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 20: Joint Base San Antonio: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 21: Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 22: Joint Region Marianas: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: Department of Defense (DOD). GAO-14-577. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office of The Under Secretary of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

July 17, 2014: 

Mr. Brian Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Mr. Lepore: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-14-577, "DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges 
Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program," dated June 6, 2014 (GAO 
Code 351842). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are 
enclosed. 

The Department appreciates GAO's ongoing effort to evaluate the 
progress made by our Joint Bases, but we continue to see that we and 
the GAO have fundamentally different approaches to managing these 
twelve installations. The recommendations in the draft report
imply that the Joint Bases are OSD-run entities that should be 
addressed through new DoD policies. On the contrary, we believe the 
Joint Bases, although they involve added complexities from crossing 
traditional service lines, are ultimately Service-run bases similar to 
all other installations. The Military Departments already have the 
responsibility, as well as sufficient authority and incentives, to 
deliver effective and efficient installation support across all their
installations, including their Joint Bases. 

As the Joint Bases complete their fourth year of operations we can 
review what the Military Departments have accomplished through Joint 
Basing. As a frame of reference, the BRAC 2005 Commission's 
recommendation #146 estimated Joint Basing would generate $183M in 
recurring annual savings. In FY 2012, the twelve Joint Bases exceeded 
this by saving $255M. We expect there are still some additional 
consolidation opportunities within these installations, but we have 
transitioned from the implementation to the operational phase in which
the Military Departments exercise their existing authorities to find 
the proper balance of savings and mission support, just as at every 
other base. 

We look forward to continuing to work with the GAO as it examines our 
ability to deliver efficient and effective installation support across 
the entire DoD enterprise. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John Conger: 
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Installations and Environment) 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated June 6, 2014: 
GAO-14-577 (GAO CODE 351842): 

“DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need To 
Reevaluate The Program” 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), in coordination with the military services and Joint 
Bases, to evaluate the 44 support functions identified in DOD's
guidance for Joint Base implementation to determine which functions 
are still suitable for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and make 
any changes that are appropriate to address limitations reported by 
the Joint Bases in consolidating installation-support functions, such as
limitations related to workforces and geography. 

DoD Response: Concur. We agree that some of Joint Basing's 44 
functions did not provide as many consolidation opportunities as 
others. The DoD has, in fact, already removed some functions from 
Joint Basing because they were not compelled for inclusion as part of 
the BRAC recommendation and otherwise did not offer opportunities for 
savings or consolidation (see DUSD(I&E) policy memo, Variance to the 
DoD Initial Guidance for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 Joint 
Implementation Definition for Supply, Storage, and Distribution of
Munitions, March 16, 2009). The Senior Joint Base Working Group 
principals recognize there may still be more functions like this, and 
in April 2014 tasked their staffs to identify which installation 
support functions and performance standards were not providing value 
to the Joint Bases' various military missions, and to explore whether 
these functions and standards should continue to be included in Joint 
Basing. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), in coordination with the military services and Joint 
Bases, to take policy actions, as appropriate, such as issuing
additional guidance, to address any challenges resulting in 
inefficiencies and inequities regarding efforts to consolidate 
installation-support functions including, at a minimum, those 
identified in this report. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. We are mindful of the challenges in 
implementing and operating Joint Bases, and agree that policy actions 
can address some of these challenges. However, we do not agree that 
these challenges require OSD-level policies to bring about the
desired changes. Instead we look to the existing responsibilities and 
authorities that are already assigned to the Military Departments and 
the Joint Management Oversight System (JMOS). 

The Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBIG) assigns the Supporting 
Component with the responsibility to deliver consistent and effective 
installation support. The Military Departments have the authority to 
establish policy to fulfill this responsibility, as already assigned 
in statute and policy, at their Joint Bases and across all of their 
other installations. For matters unique to Joint Bases, the JMOS is 
the forum for stakeholders to discuss local challenges and raise issues,
to higher headquarters for resolution, as needed. 

The JMOS is also the process by which the Military Departments can, 
when needed, formally request OSD assistance in changing joint or DoD 
policies. The draft report contains a good example of this process 
when it discusses the challenge of multiple compliance inspections,
raised through the JMOS is 2012. As a result, the Department updated 
DoD Directive 5106.04, Defense Inspectors General on May 22, 2014 with 
a new section specifying ways for the Military Departments to conduct 
compliance inspections on the Joint Bases' installation support 
activities. We stand ready to support future requests that are 
formally raised in a similar fashion through the JMOS process. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), in collaboration with the military services and Joint 
Bases, to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether
DOD's current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating 
cost savings for the Joint Basing program, as stated in the 2005 BRAC 
Commission recommendation, are still appropriate or whether goals 
should be revised, and communicate these goals to the military 
services and Joint Bases and then adjust program activities 
accordingly. 

DoD Response: Non-Concur. The goal of the Joint Basing initiative, as 
described in the BRAC 2005 Commission's recommendation #146, was to 
increase the efficiency of delivering installation support at these 12 
locations. This is still the Department's goal for Joint Bases, 
consistent with our fundamental expectation for the DoD's entire 
installation support portfolio. Joint Basing is just one of several 
tools the Military Departments use to improve operational efficiency. 
Therefore, our goals for Joint Basing remain unchanged. 

BRAC Recommendation #146 estimated that Joint Basing would generate 
$183.8M in annual savings. While this figure was not a goal, it was 
generated using savings modeled from notional consolidation 
opportunities and is a reasonable benchmark by which to measure the 
Joint Bases' overall performance. In FY12 our cost accounting system 
reported that the twelve Joint Bases had exceeded this estimate by 
obligating $255M less (and using 1,600 fewer personnel) than they 
would have if they were still operating as 26 separate installations. 
In fact, the Joint Bases actually obligated $505M less than projected 
in FY 12, but we use the more conservative $255M figure because the 
Services estimate it cost $250M to meet the Joint Base Common Output 
Level Standards. Using a similar calculation, the Joint Bases' FY13 
obligations were an impressive $830M less than if they were still 
separate installations – an amount that is the combination of 
consolidation savings and the reduced expenditures caused by the 
Budget Control Act and FY13's sequestration actions. We also found the 
Joint Bases had consistently improved their performance against Joint 
Base Common Output Level Standards over FY11 and FY12. This cost and 
performance data, taken together, leads us to conclude the Military 
Departments have been successful in exceeding the estimates of BRAC 
Recommendation #146. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), in collaboration with the military services and Joint 
Bases, to provide direction to the joint bases on their requirements for
meeting the Joint Base program's goals. DOD's leadership should work 
with the military services to determine what reporting requirements 
and milestones should be put in place to increase support and 
commitment for the program's goals. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. The Joint Bases have been fully operational 
since October 2010 and have since proven they can deliver measurable 
and tangible savings across the installation support portfolio. In 
fact, the Joint Bases' performance reporting system (the Cost and 
Performance Visibility Framework) is an extensive reporting system 
that is fully implemented. But, while the savings are important, the 
operational effectiveness of our bases is paramount. We do not agree 
that OSD should provide additional direction towards meeting the
program's goals because the Joint Base Commander and the Military 
Departments are in the best position to balance efficiency with 
effectiveness, and that directing additional consolidations
circumvents their ability to make these decisions. 

We also do not agree that OSD should establish program milestones 
because that implies the Joint Bases are still in an implementation 
phase. I want to reiterate that we have transitioned from managing the 
Joint Bases' implementation to a steady-state oversight role. These
installations have already saved more than projected by the BRAC 2005 
Commission – by consolidating 80% of their installation support 
functions in the first four years of operations – in spite of the 
complexity and cultural differences involved. We see less opportunity 
to realize additional consolidations among the remaining functions. As 
such, we see the focus should shift to fiscal and performance 
oversight, reinforcing good practices, and arbitrating the occasional
inter-service dispute. 

We also advocate treating Joint Bases no differently than other Army, 
Navy, and Air Force installations, with their only unique quality 
being the sizable joint presence they support. This approach is more 
sustainable over the long-term and is consistent with how other 
organizational mergers are managed. A similar instance occurred in 
1990 when the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued Defense Management 
Review Decision 902, which consolidated the Military Departments' 
network of distribution depots under the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) to reduce overhead and costs. While this realignment to DLA 
initially required significant oversight, we no longer treat commodity 
centers as special entities within DLA or the DoD. We should strive 
towards a similar approach with the Joint Bases. Instead of an OSD 
effort specifically focused on these 12 bases, we better serve the DoD 
by monitoring efficiency and effectiveness across all installations. 
By evaluating Joint Base performance against that of all other 
installations, their savings and efficiencies will become more 
apparent to the Military Departments – thus increasing institutional 
support and commitment to Joint Basing. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant 
Director; Chaneé Gaskin, Susan Langley, Amanda Manning, Joshua 
Margraf, Stephanie Moriarty, Richard Powelson, Tida Reveley, Michael 
Silver, Amie Steele, Sarah Veale, and Michael Willems made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

DOD Joint Bases: Management Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 15, 2012. 

BRAC 2005 Results. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-513T]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2012. 

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy 
to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-814]. Washington, D.C.: September 
19, 2011. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan 
Army Ammunition Plants. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-488R]. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 
2011. 

GAO's 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-394T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
17, 2011. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278]. Washington, D.C.: February 
2011. 

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 
Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the 
Defense Access Roads Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-165]. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 
2011. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to 
Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-725R]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 21, 2010. 

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning 
Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant 
Growth. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-602]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 
Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 
2009. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-98R]. Washington, 
D.C.: November 13, 2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of 
Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are 
Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-750]. Washington, D.C.: September 
9, 2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 
Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply-
Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-703]. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 
2009. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 
Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 
Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336]. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 
2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 
Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating 
Savings Estimates. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217]. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 
2009. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 
Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1010R]. Washington, D.C.: August 
13, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 17, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 
2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 
Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 
Recommendations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-315]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 
Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-244R]. Washington, D.C.: January 
18, 2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 
Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-341T]. Washington, D.C.: December 
12, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased 
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-159]. Washington, D.C.: December 
11, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute 
of Pathology. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-20]. 
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 
and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 
Agency. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-121R]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-
1007]. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 
Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1040]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 
2005 Round. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1203R]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 
Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 
Overcome Certain Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-304]. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007. 

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-641]. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 
2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-166]. Washington, D.C.: 
January 30, 2007. 

Military Bases: Observations on DOD's 2005 Base Realignment and 
Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-905]. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-785]. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 
2005. 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-614]. Washington, D.C.: 
May 3, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 
Closures. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-138]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need 
for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-760]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2004. 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 
Base Realignment and Closure Round. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-558T]. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 
2004. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOD, Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume I (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2005). Net present value is a financial calculation that 
accounts for the time value of money by determining the present value 
of future savings minus up-front investment costs over a specific 
period of time. Determining net present value is important because it 
illustrates both the up-front investment costs and long-term savings 
in a single amount. Net present value is used in analyzing estimated 
costs and savings from BRAC recommendations. 

[2] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Transforming Through Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005-Joint Basing (Jan. 22, 2008), and 
DOD, Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Basing Implementation (Jan. 
22, 2008). 

[3] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review 
Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress 
of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 
2009). 

[4] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and 
Savings Estimates from BRAC 2005, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-709R] (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2012). These figures are expressed in 2005 dollars to facilitate 
comparison with the original 20-year savings estimates developed in 
2005. 

[5] GAO, DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve 
Greater Efficiencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 
2012). 

[6] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 
2011); and High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HR-97-7] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 
1997). 

[7] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283], (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 
2013). 

[8] H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 320 (June 7, 2013). 

[9] We did not survey Joint Region Marianas, Guam, because it is a 
joint region rather than a joint base, and is subject to different 
expectations for the consolidation of installation support. Instead, 
we interviewed Joint Region Marianas officials. 

[10] Each joint base or region has a formal, binding agreement that 
describes the organizational structure, resourcing, output levels, and 
dispute resolution processes (as well as other procedures) to be 
followed by the military services that are part of the base. 

[11] GAO, Streamlining Government, Questions to Consider When 
Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and 
Management Functions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542] (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 
2012). We developed key federal practices that agencies should 
consider when evaluating whether to consolidate physical 
Infrastructure and management functions through a review of our prior 
reports on specific consolidation initiatives that have been 
undertaken and through review of the relevant literature on public-
sector consolidations produced by academic institutions, professional 
associations, and various other organizations. 

[12] GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select 
Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2011); and Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help 
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). In our report on streamlining government, we identified key 
practices associated with efficiency initiatives that can be applied 
more broadly across the federal government, through a review of 
federal initiatives that were implemented department-wide, involved 
reexamination of federal programs and their related processes or 
structures or involved the streamlining or consolidation of existing 
processes to become more efficient; the practices were identified by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or government management 
experts as having potentially promising practices, among other things. 
In reviewing results-oriented government, we identified effective 
practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration by 
interviewing experts in the area of collaboration and gathering 
information on select areas where federal agencies have developed 
substantial ongoing collaborations. 

[13] The Joint Base Working Group consists of OSD joint basing and 
military service headquarters representatives, and is intended to 
incorporate functional expertise in developing guidance as well as 
provide support for knowledge sharing, arbitration, change management, 
public awareness planning, and strategic planning. 

[14] The full text of the BRAC Commission's joint basing 
recommendation and the justification for DOD's recommendation to the 
commission (as reproduced in the commission's report) appear in 
appendix III of this report. The BRAC Commission assessed all of DOD's 
recommendations against eight statutory selection criteria and DOD's 
force-structure plan. 

[15] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Transforming Through Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005-Joint Basing; and DOD, Initial 
Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Basing Implementation. 

[16] The Joint Management Oversight Structure was established as a 
mechanism to provide for various levels of performance review and 
dispute resolution as part of managing joint base implementation. The 
structure established that issues raised at the joint bases are to be 
addressed first locally at the installation. The next step of 
involvement is to include military service installation commands such 
as Commander, Navy Installations Command, and the Army Chief of Staff 
Installation Management Command. If the issues remain unresolved, the 
next step is to involve the military service Vice Chiefs of Staff and 
finally OSD. 

[17] The Joint Base Commander is chair of the Joint Base Partnership 
Council. 

[18] In the case of Joint Region Marianas, the requirement was for a 
Navy-appointed Joint Regional Commander, and a Deputy Regional 
Commander to be determined by the supporting and supported components. 
For Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which includes three military 
services, the Joint Base Commander was to be an Air Force officer 
(from the supporting component), and the two Deputy Joint Base 
Commanders were to be from the supported components--one from the Navy 
and one from the Army. In the case of Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air 
Facility Washington, the Joint Base Commander and the Deputy Joint 
Base Commander were to be from the Air Force, which is the supporting 
component. 

[19] DOD currently requires 44 installation-support functions to be 
consolidated at the joint bases. See appendix I for an explanation of 
how we determined which installation-support functions to include in 
our survey. 

[20] These memorandums of agreement can contain variances or other 
agreements to diverge from the organizational structure as outlined in 
DOD's implementation guidance. These variances and other agreements 
document specific installation-support functions that are not 
consolidated at a given joint base or region. 

[21] DOD, Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Basing Implementation. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134]. 

[23] Joint Region Marianas officials whom we interviewed reported that 
they had also achieved consolidation of installation-support 
functions, but had not consolidated all functions as required in the 
agreement establishing the joint region. 

[24] The remaining seven joint bases do not have ports and thus do not 
need port services. Joint Region Marianas has a port, but we did not 
send our survey questions to officials at the joint region. 

[25] DOD's Joint Base Implementation Guidance provides the Army an 
exemption from transferring authority for small-arms range management 
to the joint base because this function is considered mission support 
for the Army. 

[26] DOD's Joint Base Implementation Guidance for Memorandum of 
Agreement templates state that at locations where the Air Force is the 
supporting component, airfield operations will be performed by the Air 
Force Mission Commander, rather than the Joint Base Commander. 

[27] Hereafter we will refer to "functional area respondents" as 
respondents. 

[28] The DOD Joint Information Environment is an initiative within the 
department to establish a secure, joint information environment 
consisting of shared information technology infrastructure and 
services. The DOD Enterprise Email service is an initiative to create 
a common email platform for DOD to ensure that DOD components can 
easily and effectively share information. 

[29] In this context, respondents to our survey referred to Resource 
Management Decision (RMD) 703, which was a budget decision document 
issued during the joint review of military service budget submissions 
by OSD and OMB that extended the civilian workforce cap to the 
military services for fiscal years 2012 and 2013, and provided for 
departmentwide exceptions for certain critical capabilities. We 
previously reported on the progress made by the military services in 
meeting adjusted civilian workforce cap targets for fiscal year 2012 
and associated savings as well as the steps DOD has taken to help 
ensure that, in implementing the cap, it has maintained critical 
skills and competencies for its civilian workforce. See GAO, Human 
Capital: Critical Skills and Competency Assessments Should Help Guide 
DOD Civilian Workforce Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-188] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 
2013). 

[30] OMB Circular A-76 establishes federal policy and procedures for 
determining whether commercial activities currently performed by the 
federal government should be performed in-house, by another federal 
agency, or by the private sector. In 2008, Congress enacted 
legislation placing a moratorium on DOD public-private competitions 
for functions currently performed by DOD civilians, which, as amended 
by subsequent legislation, remains in effect. 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[34] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, Modification to the Joint Basing 
Implementation Guidance (July 1, 2010). According to OSD guidance, DOD 
developed standards to provide common output or performance-level 
standards for installation support, and to establish a common language 
for each base support function on the joint bases. 

[35] The Air Force officials said their military service transferred 
billets for uniformed airmen and some of the airmen to assist the Army-
-which is the supporting component at this joint base--as part of the 
memorandum of agreement to help provide installation support. The Air 
Force traditionally uses military personnel to provide installation 
support. 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336]. In this 
report we recommended that DOD periodically review installation-
support standards and administrative costs at joint bases, and report 
to Congress on estimated installation-support costs. DOD partially 
agreed with our recommendations, but did not state that it would take 
steps to fully implement them. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134]. In this 
report we recommended that DOD develop and implement a plan that 
provides measurable goals linked to achieving savings and efficiencies 
at the joint bases and provide guidance to the joint bases that 
directs them to identify opportunities for cost savings and 
efficiencies. DOD did not concur with this recommendation and noted 
that it should be patient with obtaining savings and efficiencies as 
joint basing was a relatively new initiative and implementation issues 
were being resolved. The officials said this is the approach they were 
taking during the course of our review. We continue to believe that 
these recommendations are valid and should be implemented. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908]. 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134]. We found 
that OSD developed a data-collection tool, called the Cost and 
Performance Visibility Framework, through which the joint bases report 
installation-support performance data, including annually reporting on 
funds obligated to provide base-support services, and officials 
involved in management and oversight of the joint bases can use this 
information to improve joint base-management. OSD can measure these 
data against the level of funding that the military services expect 
they would have had to obligate for installation support on the joint 
bases if no savings resulted from joint basing--what DOD refers to as 
the Cost and Performance Visibility Framework baseline. However, in 
our November 2012 report, we found that due to inconsistencies in the 
way the joint bases reported data through the framework, and because 
the data reported through the framework do not exclude costs and 
savings that are not specific to joint basing, OSD is not able to 
accurately isolate the effects of joint basing on the cost of 
providing support services. 

[41] The Army Family Action Plan/Armed Forces Action Plan is a year-
round grassroots process to identify and elevate the most significant 
quality-of-life issues impacting military service members (active, 
reserve and National Guard), retirees, and DOD civilians and their 
families. It alerts commanders and leadership to areas of concern in 
their communities that need attention. The year-round process begins 
at the installation or unit level. An Armed Forces Action Plan 
Conference is held annually. With the completion of joint basing, the 
2011 Fort Sam Houston Conference became the Joint Base San Antonio 
Armed Forces Action Plan Conference, inclusive of delegates and issues 
from all service branches. 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908]. 

[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-134]. 

[46] DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Operating Joint 
Bases in a Reduced Environment (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 4, 2013). 

[47] Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Basing Implementation. 

[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[49] We visited Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, 
Virginia (Navy supporting, Army supported); Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 
Washington (Army supporting, Air Force supported); Joint Base Langley-
Eustis, Virginia (Air Force supporting, Army supported); and Joint 
Base San Antonio, Texas (Air Force supporting, Army supported). 

[50] The percent of responses that changed were: Question 2, 5 
percent; Question 3, 10 percent; Question 9, 40 percent; Question 10, 
30 percent; Question 11, 25 percent, and Question 12, 41 percent. 

[51] We pretested the survey with officials from Joint Base Langley-
Eustis, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Joint Base Little Creek-Fort Story, 
and Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908]. 

[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-542]. 

[55] Percents may total more than 100 percent because of rounding. 

[56] See Table 5 in Appendix I for the list of support functions 
addressed in our survey. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]