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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

September 2014: 

Secure Flight: 

TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness: 

GAO-14-531: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-531, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2009, DHS's TSA began using Secure Flight to screen passengers 
against high-risk lists. These lists, subsets of the TSDB—-the U.S. 
government's consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—-
included the No Fly List, to identify those who should be prohibited 
from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, to identify those who 
should receive enhanced screening at airport checkpoints. 

GAO was asked to assess the current status of the program. This report 
examines (1) changes to the Secure Flight program since 2009, (2) 
TSA's efforts to ensure that Secure Flight's screening determinations 
for passengers are implemented at airport checkpoints, and (3) the 
extent to which program performance measures assess progress toward 
goals. GAO analyzed TSA data and documents—including checkpoint data 
from 2012 through 2014 and Secure Flight performance measures—and 
interviewed relevant DHS officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that identifies 
passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high 
risk, low risk, or unknown risk. In 2010, following the December 2009 
attempted attack of a U.S.-bound flight, which exposed gaps in how 
agencies used watchlists to screen individuals, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) began using risk-based criteria to 
identify additional high-risk passengers who may not be in the 
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), but who should be designated as 
selectees for enhanced screening. Further, in 2011, TSA began 
screening against additional identities in the TSDB that are not 
already included on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. In addition, as part 
of TSA Precheck™, a 2011 program through which TSA designates 
passengers as low risk for expedited screening, TSA began screening 
against several new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers. TSA also 
began conducting TSA Precheck™ risk assessments, an activity distinct 
from matching against lists that uses the Secure Flight system to 
assign passengers scores based upon travel-related data, for the 
purpose of identifying them as low risk for a specific flight. 

TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening 
determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance 
these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 
indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing 
Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not 
have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these 
screening errors. GAO's interviews with TSA officials at airports 
yielded examples of root causes TSA could identify and address. 
Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing 
corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control 
standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen 
security screening at airports. 

Since 2009, Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect 
new program functions to identify additional types of high-risk and 
also low-risk passengers; however, current program performance 
measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress 
toward achieving all of its goals. For example, Secure Flight does not 
have measures to assess the extent of system matching errors. 
Establishing additional performance measures that adequately indicate 
progress toward goals would allow Secure Flight to more fully assess 
the extent to which it is meeting program goals. Furthermore, TSA 
lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure 
Flight system matching errors. More systematic documentation of the 
number and causes of these cases, in accordance with federal internal 
control standards, would help TSA ensure Secure Flight is functioning 
as intended. 

This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 
2014. Information that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been removed. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that TSA develop a process to regularly evaluate the 
root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement 
measures to address these causes. GAO also recommends that TSA develop 
measures to address all aspects of performance related to program 
goals and develop a mechanism to systematically document the number 
and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors. DHS concurred with 
GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-531]. For more 
information, contact Jennifer A. Grover at (202) 512-7141 or 
GroverJ@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Secure Flight Initially Identified Passengers on Terrorist Watchlists 
and Now Also Differentiates Passengers Based on Risk: 

TSA Has Processes in Place to Implement Secure Flight Screening 
Determinations at Checkpoints, but Could Take Further Action to 
Address Screening Errors: 

TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight 
Program Is Achieving Its Goals: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Secure Flight Screening Lists and Activities: 

Appendix III: Secure Flight Performance Data for Fiscal Years 2012 and 
2013: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Aspects of Secure Flight Performance, with Respect to 
Accuracy-Related Program Goals, Including Performance That Is Not 
Being Measured: 

Table 2: Secure Flight Key Performance Parameters and Results for 
Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013: 

Table 3: Secure Flight Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Performance Measures and Results for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Secure Flight Screening as Implementation Began: 

Figure 2: Secure Flight Screening to Identify High-and Low-Risk 
Passengers: 

Figure 3: Secure Fight Screening Activities to Identify High-Risk 
Passengers: 

Figure 4: Secure Flight Screening Activities to Identify Low-Risk 
Passengers: 

Figure 5: Other Lists Secure Flight Uses for Screening: 

Abbreviations: 

ATS-P: Automated Targeting System-Passenger: 

BPSS: boarding pass scanning system: 

CAT: Credential Authentication Technology: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

IVCC: Identity Verification Call Center: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OSO: Office of Security Operations: 

SFPD: Secure Flight Passenger Data: 

SOC: Secure Flight Operations Center: 

TDC: Travel Document Checker: 

TRIP: Traveler Redress Inquiry Program: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSBD: Terrorist Screening Database: 

TSO: Transportation Security Officer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 9, 2014: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Richard Hudson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mike Rogers: 
House of Representatives: 

The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight 
program--established to identify those passengers who may pose 
security risks before boarding an aircraft--is a frontline defense 
against acts of terrorism that target the nation's civil aviation 
system. TSA developed and implemented Secure Flight in response to 
requirements in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 and a recommendation of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) that TSA assume 
from air carriers the function of matching passengers against 
watchlists maintained by the federal government.[Footnote 1] At the 
time, these watchlists, which were intended to identify high-risk 
individuals, included the No Fly List, composed of individuals who 
should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and the Selectee List, 
composed of individuals who should receive enhanced screening at the 
airport security checkpoint.[Footnote 2] After initiating the 
development of Secure Flight in August 2004, TSA began implementing 
the program in January 2009, and completed transitioning foreign and 
domestic air carriers to the program in November 2010. Secure Flight 
is now responsible for screening passengers and certain nontraveling 
individuals on all domestic and international commercial flights to, 
from, and within the United States; certain flights overflying the 
continental United States; and international point-to-point flights 
operated by U.S. aircraft operators.[Footnote 3] 

Beginning with a provision of the fiscal year 2004 Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act and pursuant to requests by 
Congress, we have had regular and recurring responsibilities to assess 
and report on efforts by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of 
which TSA is a component, to develop and implement a passenger 
prescreening system, which TSA eventually implemented as Secure 
Flight.[Footnote 4] In May 2009, we reported that after initial 
challenges, TSA had made significant strides in developing Secure 
Flight and that risks associated with implementing the program had 
been reduced.[Footnote 5] Specifically, we reported on TSA's progress 
with respect to system accuracy, which involves activities to ensure 
that the Secure Flight system's automated matching of passenger and 
watchlist data correctly identifies passengers on watchlists. TSA 
designed the system to identify passengers who are the subject of 
watchlist records without producing an unacceptable number of 
misidentifications (incorrect matches). We reported in May 2009 that 
TSA was in the process of taking steps to test system accuracy, and 
without this testing, TSA would lack adequate assurance that Secure 
Flight would fully achieve its desired purpose and operate as 
intended. Therefore, to ensure the system was achieving its intended 
effects, we recommended that TSA periodically assess the accuracy of 
the Secure Flight system's matching capabilities and results. DHS 
concurred with our recommendation. In 2012, we reported that TSA 
responded to our recommendation by establishing a multidepartmental 
Match Review Board and its associated Match Review Board Working Group 
to, among other things, review performance measurement results and 
recommend changes to improve system performance.[Footnote 6] 
Furthermore, TSA reported plans to periodically assess the extent to 
which the Secure Flight system did not identify individuals who are 
actual matches to the watchlist.[Footnote 7] 

In May 2009, we also reported that passengers could attempt to provide 
fraudulent information when making an airline reservation to avoid 
Secure Flight detection.[Footnote 8] For example, an individual on the 
No Fly or Selectee List could submit identifying information not 
included on the terrorist watchlist when making travel arrangements 
and, using a corresponding fraudulent identity document (such as a 
driver's license), pass through the security checkpoint undetected. At 
the time we issued our report, Secure Flight was aware of the 
vulnerability, but we did not assess any of the actions TSA was taking 
to address the problem because they were not part of our review. 

In light of our prior work, you asked us to review the current status 
of the program, identify steps TSA has taken to address the Secure 
Flight vulnerability related to passengers providing fraudulent 
information, and report upon the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to 
assess Secure Flight system performance. 

This report addresses the following questions: 

1. How, if at all, has Secure Flight changed since implementation 
began in January 2009? 

2. To what extent does TSA ensure that Secure Flight screening 
determinations for passengers are fully implemented at airport 
security checkpoints? 

3. To what extent do TSA's performance measures appropriately assess 
progress toward achieving the Secure Flight program goals? 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you. DHS and the Department of Justice deemed some of the 
information in the report as sensitive security information and law 
enforcement sensitive, respectively, both of which must be protected 
from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits this sensitive 
information, which includes information about Secure Flight processes, 
high-risk lists used for screening, Secure Flight's ability to 
correctly identify individuals for screening, and the ability of 
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) to carry out Secure Flight 
determinations at the checkpoint. In some places throughout the 
report, we note that sensitive information was omitted from the text 
in order to explain why additional details were not provided. Although 
the information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it 
addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the 
overall methodology used for both reports is the same. 

To identify how the Secure Flight program has changed since 2009, we 
analyzed TSA documentation related to new agency initiatives involving 
Secure Flight screening, including the Secure Flight program concept 
of operations, privacy notices TSA issued from 2008 (in preparation 
for program implementation) through 2013, and TSA memorandums 
describing the rationale for new agency initiatives involving the 
Secure Flight system. We also submitted questions on changes to Secure 
Flight to TSA's Office of Chief Counsel and reviewed its written 
responses. To clarify our understanding of new agency initiatives to 
identify high- and low-risk passengers, we interviewed the officials 
responsible for implementing these initiatives from TSA and also U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which facilitates the generation 
of one high-risk list. 

To determine the extent to which TSA ensures that the Secure Flight 
vetting results are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints, 
we analyzed TSA documents governing the screening checkpoint, such as 
standard operating procedures for checkpoint screening operations and 
Travel Document Checkers (TDC) and reviewed reports about the 
performance of TSOs at the checkpoint by TSA's Office of Inspections 
and GAO.[Footnote 9] To determine the extent to which TSA made errors 
at the screening checkpoint, we analyzed certain TSA data on TSO 
performance at the screening checkpoint from May 2012, when TSA began 
tracking these data, through February 2014, when we conducted the 
analysis. We examined documentation about these data and interviewed 
knowledgeable officials, and determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.[Footnote 10] In addition, to 
clarify our understanding of TSA's checkpoint operations and inform 
our analysis, we interviewed officials with TSA's Office of Security 
Operations (OSO), which is responsible for checkpoint operations, and 
officials at nine airports. We selected these nine airports based on a 
variety of factors, such as volume of passengers screened and 
geographic dispersion. The results of these interviews cannot be 
generalized to all airports, but provide insight into TSA's challenges 
to correctly identify and screen passengers at checkpoints. To better 
understand how TSA ensures that all passengers have been appropriately 
vetted by Secure Flight, we visited TSA's Identity Verification Call 
Center (IVCC) to interview officials and observe their identity 
verification procedures. We compared TSA's checkpoint procedures 
against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government.[Footnote 11] Finally, to determine the extent to which 
TSA's planned technology solutions could address checkpoint errors, we 
analyzed documents, such as requests for proposals, related to TSA's 
planned technology solutions and interviewed knowledgeable TSA 
officials. 

To determine the extent to which Secure Flight performance measures 
appropriately assess progress toward achieving the program's goals, we 
reviewed documentation of TSA's program goals and performance measures 
for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 and assessed these measures against 
provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
requiring agencies to compare actual results with performance goals. 
[Footnote 12] We also interviewed relevant TSA officials about the 
fiscal year 2013 performance measures for the Secure Flight program 
and the adequacy of these measures in assessing TSA's progress in 
achieving program goals. In addition, to understand how TSA uses 
Secure Flight-related performance data, we reviewed documentation 
related to all meetings that TSA identified of the Secure Flight Match 
Review Board--a multidepartmental organization established to, among 
other things, review performance measures and recommend changes to 
improve system performance--from the time the board was initiated, in 
March 2010, through August 2013, a total of 51 meetings. To identify 
the extent to which TSA monitors and evaluates the reasons for Secure 
Flight matching errors, we analyzed a list that TSA compiled at our 
request of missed passengers on two high-risk lists (including the 
reasons for these matching errors) that occurred from November 2010 
through July 2013. We evaluated TSA's efforts to track cases in which 
TSA discovered a Secure Flight system matching error against Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 13] 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 to September 2014, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions. Additional details on our scope and 
methodology are contained in appendix I. 

Background: 

Responsibility for Secure Flight Operations: 

Several entities located within TSA's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis share responsibility for administering the Secure Flight 
program. Among these are the Operations Strategy Mission Support 
Branch, which acts as the program's lead office; the Secure Flight 
Operations Branch, which oversees passenger vetting and other 
operational activities; and the Systems Management and Operations 
Branch and the Secure Flight Technology Branch, both of which focus on 
technology-related issues. Collectively, these entities received about 
$93 million to carry out program operations in fiscal year 2014. 

Overview of Secure Flight Matching and Screening Processes at 
Implementation: 

The Secure Flight program, as implemented pursuant to the 2008 Secure 
Flight Final Rule, requires U.S.-and foreign-based commercial aircraft 
operators traveling to, from, within, or overflying the United States, 
as well as U.S. commercial aircraft operators with international point-
to-point flights, to collect information from passengers and transmit 
that information electronically to TSA.[Footnote 14] This information, 
known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), includes 
personally identifiable information, such as full name, gender, date 
of birth, passport information (if available), and certain 
nonpersonally identifiable information, such as itinerary information 
and the unique number associated with a travel record (record number 
locator).[Footnote 15] 

Since implementation began in January 2009, the Secure Flight system 
has identified high-risk passengers by matching SFPD against the No 
Fly List and the Selectee List, subsets of the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB), the U.S. government's consolidated watchlist of known 
or suspected terrorists maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, 
a multiagency organization administered by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).[Footnote 16] (We discuss screening activities 
initiated after TSA began implementing Secure Flight in 2009 later in 
this report.) To carry out this matching, the Secure Flight system 
conducts automated matching of passenger and watchlist data to 
identify a pool of passengers who are potential matches to the No Fly 
and Selectee Lists. Next, the system compares all potential matches 
against the TSA Cleared List, a list of individuals who have applied 
to, and been cleared through, the DHS redress process.[Footnote 17] 
Passengers included on the TSA Cleared List must submit a redress 
number when making a reservation, which allows the Secure Flight 
system to recognize and clear them.[Footnote 18] After the system 
performs automated matching, Secure Flight analysts are to conduct 
manual reviews of potential matches, which may involve consulting 
other classified and unclassified data sources, to further rule out 
individuals who are not those included on the No Fly and Selectee 
Lists. 

After the completion of manual reviews, TSA precludes passengers who 
remain potential matches to certain lists from receiving their 
boarding passes. These passengers, for whom air carriers receive a 
"passenger inhibited" message from Secure Flight, must undergo a 
resolution process at the airport. This process may involve air 
carriers sending updated passenger information back to Secure Flight 
for automated rematching or placing a call to Secure Flight for 
assistance in resolving the match.[Footnote 19] At the conclusion of 
automated and manual screening processes (including the airport 
resolution process) air carriers may not issue a boarding pass to a 
passenger until they receive from Secure Flight a final screening 
determination. These determinations include a "cleared" message, for 
passengers found not to match a watchlist, and a "selectee" message, 
for matches to the Selectee List who are to be to be designated by air 
carriers for enhanced screening. For passengers matching the No Fly 
List, Secure Flight's initial "passenger inhibited" message is the 
final determination, and the air carrier may not issue a boarding pass 
(see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Secure Flight Screening as Implementation Began: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Passenger: 
Passenger submits reservation data, including full name, date of 
birth, and gender, which are submitted to TSA as Secure Flight 
Passenger Data (SFPD); 
Air carrier: 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA): 
Secure Flight screening: Automated matching and manual reviews are 
conducted; 
Cleared to fly. 

Terrorist Screening Center: 
Sends No Fly and Selectee Lists for Secure Flight screening. 

Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
(DHS TRIP): 
Sends TSA Cleared List. 

Air carrier sends updated passenger information to Secure Flight for 
rematching; 
Air carrier may be required to call Secure Flight. 

Secure Flight screening: Potential matches: 
Airport resolution process: 
Airline reviews information in passenger identification document; 
Passenger is either: 
1) Cleared to fly; 
2) Designated a selectee, or; 
3) Prohibited from flying. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-14-531. 

[End of figure] 

Passenger Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints: 

In general, passengers undergo one of three types of screening, based 
on the Secure Flight determinations shown on boarding passes--standard 
screening, enhanced screening for selectees, and expedited screening 
for low-risk passengers.[Footnote 20] Standard screening typically 
includes a walk-through metal detector or Advanced Imaging Technology 
screening, which is to identify objects or anomalies concealed under 
clothing, and X-ray screening for the passenger's accessible property. 
In the event a walk-through metal detector triggers an alarm, the 
Advanced Imaging Technology identifies an anomaly, or the X-ray 
machine identifies a suspicious item, additional security measures, 
such as pat-downs, explosives trace detection searches (which involve 
a device certified by TSA to detect explosive particles), or 
additional physical searches may ensue as part of the resolution 
process. Enhanced screening includes, in addition to the procedures 
applied during a typical standard screening experience, a pat-down and 
an explosives trace detection search or physical search of the 
interior of the passenger's accessible property, electronics, and 
footwear. Expedited screening typically includes walk-through metal 
detector screening and X-ray screening of the passenger's accessible 
property, but unlike in standard screening, travelers do not have to, 
among other things, remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear. 
Passengers not designated for enhanced or expedited screening 
generally receive standard screening unless, for example, identified 
by TSA for a different type of screening through the application of 
random and unpredictable security measures at the screening 
checkpoint.[Footnote 21] 

Secure Flight Initially Identified Passengers on Terrorist Watchlists 
and Now Also Differentiates Passengers Based on Risk: 

Since January 2009, the Secure Flight program has changed from one 
that identifies high-risk passengers by matching them against the No 
Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: 
high risk, low risk, or unknown risk.[Footnote 22] Specifically, 
Secure Flight now identifies passengers as high risk if they are 
matched to watchlists of known or suspected terrorists or other lists 
developed using certain high-risk criteria, as low risk if they are 
deemed eligible for expedited screening through TSA Precheck™--a 2011 
initiative to preapprove passengers for expedited screening--or 
through the application of low-risk rules, and as unknown risk if they 
do not fall within the other two risk categories. To separate 
passengers into these risk categories, TSA utilizes lists in addition 
to the No Fly and Selectee Lists, and TSA has adapted the Secure 
Flight system to perform risk assessments, a new system functionality 
that is distinct from both watchlist matching and matching against 
lists of known travelers. At airport checkpoints, those passengers 
identified as high risk receive enhanced screening, passengers 
identified as low risk are eligible for expedited screening, and 
passengers identified as unknown risk generally receive standard 
screening.[Footnote 23] 

Secure Flight Is Using New High-Risk Lists for Screening, Including 
Two Lists of Individuals Who Meet Various Threat Criteria, but Who May 
Not Be Known or Suspected Terrorists: 

Since January 2009, TSA has been using new high-risk lists for 
screening, including two lists to identify passengers who may not be 
known or suspected terrorists, but who--based on TSA's application of 
threat criteria--should receive enhanced screening, and an expanded 
list of known or suspected terrorists in the TSDB. As initially 
implemented under the October 2008 Secure Flight Final Rule, the 
program matched the names of passengers against the No Fly and 
Selectee List components of the TSDB. According to the rule, comparing 
passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee components of 
the TSDB (versus the entire TSDB) would be generally satisfactory 
during normal security circumstances to counter the security threat. 
The rule also provides that TSA may use the larger set of watchlists 
maintained by the federal government as warranted by security 
considerations, for example, if TSA learns that flights on a 
particular route may be subject to an increased security risk. 
[Footnote 24] In such circumstances, TSA may decide to compare 
passenger information on some or all flights on that route against the 
full TSDB or other government databases, such as intelligence or law 
enforcement databases. 

Rules-Based Watchlists: 

After the December 25, 2009, attempt to detonate a concealed explosive 
on board a U.S.-bound flight by an individual who was not a known or 
suspected terrorist in the TSDB, TSA sought to identify ways to 
mitigate unknown threats--individuals not in the TSDB for whom TSA has 
determined enhanced screening would be prudent. To that end, TSA 
worked with CBP to develop new lists for Secure Flight screening, and 
in April 2010, began using the lists to identify and designate for 
enhanced screening passengers who may represent unknown threats. 
[Footnote 25] To create these lists, TSA leveraged CBP's access to 
additional data submitted by passengers traveling internationally and 
the capabilities of CBP's Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-
P)--a tool originally created and used by CBP that targets passengers 
arriving at or departing the United States by comparing their 
information against law enforcement, intelligence, and other 
enforcement data using risk-based targeting scenarios and assessments. 
[Footnote 26] Specifically, analysts within the Intelligence and 
Analysis Division of TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis review 
current intelligence to identify factors that may indicate an elevated 
risk for a passenger. TSA creates rules based on these factors and 
provides them to CBP.[Footnote 27] CBP then uses ATS-P to identify 
passengers who correspond with the rules and provides TSA information 
on them in the form of a list.[Footnote 28] Upon receiving the list, 
TSA creates another rules-based list--a subset of the larger rules-
based list--based on additional criteria. Through Secure Flight 
screening, TSA designates passengers matching either rules-based list 
as selectees for enhanced screening.[Footnote 29] 

The Expanded Selectee List: 

In addition to the two ATS-P-generated lists, Secure Flight 
incorporated an additional list derived from the TSDB into its 
screening activities in order to designate more passengers who are 
known or suspected terrorists as selectees for enhanced 
screening.[Footnote 30] Specifically, in April 2011, TSA began 
conducting watchlist matching against an Expanded Selectee List that 
includes all records in the TSDB with a full name (first name and 
surname) and full date of birth that meet the Terrorist Screening 
Center's reasonable suspicion standard to be considered a known or 
suspected terrorist, but that are not already included on the No Fly 
or Selectee List.[Footnote 31] TSA began using the Expanded Selectee 
List in response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, as 
another measure to secure civil aviation. Collectively, the No Fly, 
Selectee, and Expanded Selectee Lists are used by Secure Flight to 
identify passengers from the government's consolidated database of 
known or suspected terrorists.[Footnote 32] 

Secure Flight Is Identifying Low-Risk Passengers by Screening against 
TSA Precheck™ Lists and Conducting Passenger Risk Assessments: 

Since October 2011, TSA has also begun using Secure Flight to identify 
passengers as low risk, and therefore eligible for expedited 
screening, through the use of new screening lists and by performing 
passenger risk assessments.[Footnote 33] According to TSA, identifying 
more passengers as eligible for expedited screening will permit TSA to 
reduce screening resources for low-risk travelers, thereby enabling 
TSA to concentrate screening resources on higher-risk passenger 
populations. In August 2013, TSA officials stated that this approach 
would support the agency's goal of identifying 25 percent of airline 
passengers as eligible for expedited screening by the end of calendar 
year 2013. As of May 2014, TSA officials stated the goal had been 
revised to identify 50 percent of airline passengers as eligible for 
expedited screening by the end of calendar year 2014.[Footnote 34] 
According to officials within TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, TSA's 
efforts to identify low-risk travelers also fulfill a stated goal of 
the 2008 Secure Flight rule to implement a "known traveler" concept 
that would allow the federal government to assign a unique number to 
known travelers for whom the federal government had conducted a threat 
assessment and determined did not pose a security threat. 

TSA Precheck™ Lists of Preapproved Low-Risk Travelers: 

In 2011, TSA's Office of Risk-Based Security began implementing TSA 
Precheck™, a program that allows TSA to differentiate passengers into 
a low-risk screening category and therefore identify them as eligible 
for expedited screening.[Footnote 35] As part of TSA's effort to 
implement the TSA Precheck™ program, Secure Flight has begun screening 
against several new lists of preapproved, low-risk travelers to 
identify passengers who are eligible for expedited screening.[Footnote 
36] In October 2011, Secure Flight began screening against the first 
of these lists, which contained information on certain members of 
three CBP trusted traveler programs (programs in which applicants 
submit to federal background checks to be approved as low-risk 
travelers eligible to receive expedited processing at ports of 
entry).[Footnote 37] Since then, TSA has established separate TSA 
Precheck™ lists for additional low-risk passenger populations, 
including members of the U.S. armed forces, Congressional Medal of 
Honor Society members, and members of the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council (see appendix II for a full listing of TSA Precheck™lists used 
by Secure Flight for screening).[Footnote 38] To identify these and 
other low-risk populations, TSA coordinated and entered into 
agreements with a lead agency or outside entity willing to compile and 
maintain the associated TSA Precheck™ list.[Footnote 39] Members of 
the list-based, low-risk populations participating in TSA Precheck™ 
are provided a unique known traveler number, and their personal 
identifying information (name and date of birth), along with the known 
traveler number, is included on lists used by Secure Flight for 
screening. 

In addition to TSA Precheck™ lists sponsored by other agencies or 
entities, TSA created its own TSA Precheck™ list composed of 
individuals who apply to be preapproved as low-risk travelers through 
the TSA Precheck™ Application Program, an initiative launched in 
December 2013. [Footnote 40] The program is another DHS trusted 
traveler program, in which DHS collects a fee to conduct a background 
investigation for applicants.[Footnote 41] Applicants approved as low 
risk through the program receive a known traveler number and are 
included on an associated TSA Precheck™ Application Program list used 
by Secure Flight for screening. To be recognized as low risk by the 
Secure Flight system, individuals on TSA Precheck™ lists must submit 
their known traveler numbers when making a flight reservation. 
[Footnote 42] As of April 2014, there were about 5.6 million 
individuals who, through TSA Precheck™ program lists, were eligible 
for expedited screening.[Footnote 43] 

TSA Precheck™ Risk Assessments: 

To further increase the number of passengers identified as low risk 
(and therefore TSA Precheck™eligible), TSA adapted the Secure Flight 
system to begin assigning passengers risk scores to designate them as 
low risk for a specific flight. Beginning in 2011, TSA piloted a risk-
based security program to identify certain members of participating 
airlines' frequent flier programs as low risk, and therefore eligible 
for expedited screening for a specific flight.[Footnote 44] 
Specifically, TSA used the Secure Flight system to assess data 
submitted by these frequent fliers during the course of travel and 
assign them scores, which were then used to determine eligibility for 
expedited screening. In October 2013, TSA expanded the use of these 
assessments to all passengers, not just frequent fliers, and also 
began using other travel-related data to assess passengers.[Footnote 
45] These assessments are conducted only if the passenger has not been 
designated as high risk by other Secure Flight screening activities or 
matched to one of the TSA Precheck™ Lists. The scores assigned to 
passengers correspond with a certain likelihood of being designated as 
eligible to receive expedited screening through TSA Precheck™[Footnote 
46]. According to officials within TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, the 
assessments are not watchlist matching, rather they are a means to 
facilitate the secure travel of the public--a purpose of Secure 
Flight, as stated in the program's final rule and in accordance with 
TSA's statutory responsibilities to ensure the security of civil 
aviation. 

As of May 2014, TSA uses Precheck™ risk assessments to determine a 
passenger's low-risk status and resulting eligibility for TSA Precheck™
expedited screening, but according to TSA officials, TSA also has the 
capability to use this functionality to identify high-risk passengers 
for enhanced screening. TSA made adjustments to enable the Secure 
Flight system to perform TSA Precheck™ risk assessments to identify 
high-risk passengers in March 2013. However, TSA officials stated the 
agency has no immediate plans to use the assessments to identify high-
risk passengers beyond those already included on watchlists. 

New Secure Flight Screening Activities Allow TSA to Differentiate 
Passengers by Risk Category: 

Given the changes in the program since implementation, the current 
Secure Flight system screens passengers and returns one of four 
screening results to the air carriers for each passenger: TSA Precheck™
 eligible (expedited screening), cleared to fly (standard screening), 
selectee (enhanced screening), or do not board (see figure 2). 

Figure 2: Secure Flight Screening to Identify High-and Low-Risk 
Passengers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Passenger: 
Airline: 
Secure Flight screening: 

Low risk: 
* Match TSA Precheck™ list; 
* Identified by TSA Precheck™ risk assessments. 
Boarding pass: TSA Precheck™;
Screening: Expedited. 

Unknown risk: 
Passengers do not match high- or low-risk lists or match; 
* TSA Precheck™ Disqualification List; 
Boarding pass: 
Screening: Standard. 

High risk: 
Passengers match: 
* Rules-based lists; 
* Expanded Selectee List; 
* Selectee List; 
Passengers designated random selectees[A]; 
Boarding pass: Selectee; 
Screening: Selectee. 

Highest risk: 
Passengers match
* No Fly List
* Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Do Not Board List. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-14-531. 

[A] These passengers are identified for enhanced screening at random; 
they not are included on government watchlists. 

[End of figure] 

TSA Has Processes in Place to Implement Secure Flight Screening 
Determinations at Checkpoints, but Could Take Further Action to 
Address Screening Errors: 

TSA has developed processes to help ensure that individuals and their 
accessible property receive a level of screening at airport 
checkpoints that corresponds to the level of risk determined by Secure 
Flight.[Footnote 47] However, TSA could take additional actions to 
prevent TSO errors in implementing these risk determinations at the 
screening checkpoint. Furthermore, fraudulent identification or 
boarding passes could enable individuals to evade Secure Flight 
vetting, creating a potential vulnerability at the screening 
checkpoint. TSA's planned technology solutions could reduce the risk 
posed by fraudulent documents at the screening checkpoint. 

TSA Has Developed Processes to Implement Secure Flight Determinations 
at Airport Checkpoints: 

TSA has developed processes to help ensure that individuals and their 
accessible property receive a level of screening at airport 
checkpoints that corresponds to the level of risk determined by Secure 
Flight.[Footnote 48] TDCs are primarily responsible for ensuring that 
passengers receive the appropriate level of screening because they are 
to verify passengers' identities and identify passengers' screening 
designations. TSA requires passengers to present photo identification 
and a boarding pass at the screening checkpoint.[Footnote 49] Using 
lights and magnifiers, which allow the TDC to examine security 
features on the passenger's identification documents, the TDC is to 
examine the identification and boarding pass to confirm that they 
appear genuine and pertain to the passenger. The TDC is also to 
confirm that the data included on the boarding pass and in the 
identity document match one another. According to TSA standard 
operating procedures, TDCs may accept minor name variations between 
the passenger's boarding pass and identification.[Footnote 50] If the 
TDC finds that the information on the identification varies 
significantly from the boarding pass, the TDC is to refer the 
passenger to another TSA representative for identity verification 
through TSA's Identity Verification Call Center (IVCC). If the 
passenger's information varies from the SFPD submitted to Secure 
Flight, the IVCC is to contact Secure Flight to vet the new 
information. If the identification or boarding pass appears 
fraudulent, the TDC is to contact law enforcement. 

The TDC is also required to review the passenger's boarding pass to 
identify his or her Secure Flight passenger screening determination--
that is, whether the passenger should receive standard, enhanced, or 
expedited screening. TDCs either examine the boarding pass manually 
or, where available, scan the boarding pass using an electronic 
boarding pass scanning system (BPSS). In addition, Secure Flight 
provides TSA officials in the airports with advance notice of upcoming 
selectees from the Selectee and Expanded Selectee Lists, as well as 
those on the No Fly List. Secure Flight provides this information to 
TSA officials at the passenger's airport of departure via e-mail 
beginning 72 hours prior to flight departure for the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists, and via a shared electronic posting beginning 26 to 29 
hours prior to flight departure for the Expanded Selectee List. 

TSA also has requirements related to TDC performance. First, according 
to TSA officials, TSA designated the TDC a qualified position in 
February 2013, meaning that TSOs must complete training and pass a job 
knowledge test to qualify as TDCs. Second, TSA has documented 
processes to govern the screening checkpoint, such as standard 
operating procedures applicable to the TDC, the screening checkpoint, 
and expedited screening that specify responsibilities and lines of 
reporting. In March 2011, TSA also updated its Screening Management 
standard operating procedures to clarify that supervisory TSOs are 
required to monitor TSO performance to ensure compliance with all 
applicable standard operating procedures and correct improper or 
faulty application of screening procedures to ensure effective, 
vigilant, and courteous screening. According to officials in TSA's 
Office of Inspection, many checkpoint failures resulted from a lack of 
supervision. These officials stated that when TDCs are not properly 
supervised, they are more likely to take shortcuts and miss steps in 
the standard operating procedures and that because working as a TDC 
can be tedious and repetitive, supervision and regular rotation are 
particularly important to ensure TDCs' continued vigilance. 

TSOs Have Made Errors in Implementing Secure Flight Screening 
Determinations at the Screening Checkpoint, and Additional Actions 
Could Reduce the Number of Screening Errors: 

Our analysis of TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 
found that TSOs have made errors in implementing Secure Flight risk 
determinations at the screening checkpoint.[Footnote 51] By evaluating 
the root causes of these errors and implementing corrective measures 
to address those root causes, TSA could reduce the risk posed by TSO 
error at the screening checkpoint. TSA officials we spoke with at five 
of the nine airports conduct after-action reviews of screening errors 
at the checkpoint and have used these reviews to take action to 
address the root causes of those errors. However, TSA does not have a 
systematic process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors 
at the checkpoint across airports, which could allow TSA to identify 
trends across airports and target nationwide efforts to address these 
issues. 

TSA OSO officials told us that evaluating the root causes of screening 
errors would be helpful and could allow them to better target TSO 
training efforts. In January 2014, TSA OSO officials stated that they 
are in the early stages of forming a group to discuss these errors. 
However, TSA was not able to provide documentation of the group's 
membership, purpose, goals, time frames, or methodology. Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government states that managers should 
compare actual performance with expected results and analyze 
significant differences.[Footnote 52] As TSA moves forward with its 
plans to form this group, it will be important for TSA to develop a 
process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the 
checkpoint and identify and implement corrective measures, as needed, 
to address these root causes. Uncovering and addressing the root 
causes of screening errors could help TSA reduce the number of these 
errors at the checkpoint. 

Fraudulent Documents Pose Risks at Airport Screening Checkpoints, and 
TSA's Planned Technology Solutions Are in Early Stages: 

Fraudulent identification or boarding passes could enable individuals 
to evade Secure Flight vetting, creating a potential vulnerability at 
the screening checkpoint. TDCs are responsible for verifying the 
validity of identification documents and boarding passes presented by 
passengers. In June 2012, the TSA Assistant Administrator for the 
Office of Security Capabilities testified before Congress that the 
wide variety of identifications and boarding passes presented to TDCs 
poses challenges to effective manual verification of passenger 
identity, ticketing, and vetting status.[Footnote 53] He testified 
that there are at least 2,470 different variations of identification 
that could be presented at security checkpoints and stated that it is 
very difficult for a TSO to have a high level of proficiency for all 
of those identifications. From May 2012 through July 2013, TSA denied 
1,384 individuals access to the sterile area as a result of identity 
checking procedures. These denials include travelers who did not 
appear to match the photo on their identification, who presented 
identification that appeared fraudulent or showed signs of tampering, 
and who were unwilling or unable to provide identifying 
information.[Footnote 54] During this same time period, TDCs also made 
852 referrals to airport law enforcement because of travelers who did 
not appear to match the photo on their identification, presented 
identification or boarding passes that appeared fraudulent or showed 
signs of tampering, or exhibited suspicious behaviors. However, TSA 
would not know how many travelers successfully flew with fraudulent 
documents unless those individuals came to TSA's attention for another 
reason. 

We have previously reported on security vulnerabilities involving the 
identity verification process at the screening checkpoint. For 
example, in our May 2009 report on Secure Flight, we identified a 
vulnerability involving the Secure Flight system--namely, airline 
passengers could provide fraudulent information when making a flight 
reservation to avoid detection.[Footnote 55] In addition, in June 
2012, we reported on several instances when passengers used fraudulent 
documentation to board flights. For example, we reported that in 2006, 
a university student created a website that enabled individuals to 
create fake boarding passes. In addition, in 2011, a man was convicted 
of stowing away aboard an aircraft after using an expired boarding 
pass with someone else's name on it to fly from New York to Los 
Angeles. We also reported that news reports have highlighted the 
apparent ease of ordering high-quality counterfeit driver's licenses 
from China.[Footnote 56] 

TSA's planned technology solutions could reduce the risk posed by 
fraudulent documents at the screening checkpoint. Boarding pass 
scanners are designed to verify the digital signature on these 
boarding passes, allowing TDCs to know that the boarding passes are 
genuine. The scanners are also to notify the TDC when a passenger 
is a selectee.[Footnote 57] In September 2013, TSA purchased 1,400 
boarding pass scanners, at a cost of $2.6 million, and planned to 
deploy 1 for every TDC at airport security checkpoints, beginning with 
TDCs in TSA Precheck™ lines. According to TSA officials, as of March 
2014, TSA had deployed all 1,400 scanners at airport security 
checkpoints.[Footnote 58] 

In December 2013, TSA released a request for proposal for Credential 
Authentication Technology (CAT), which is a system that is designed to 
verify passenger identity, ticketing status, and Secure Flight risk 
determination at the screening checkpoint. CAT could address the risks 
of fraudulent identifications, as well as TSO error and reliance on 
air carriers to properly issue boarding passes. CAT is to verify the 
authenticity of identification documents presented at the screening 
checkpoint, confirm the passenger's reservation, and provide the 
Secure Flight screening result for that traveler. TDCs would no longer 
need to examine passengers' boarding passes to identify those who 
should receive enhanced screening, which could reduce the potential 
for error. In April 2014, TSA awarded a contract for the CAT 
technology solution. 

TSA has faced long-standing challenges in acquiring CAT technology. In 
May 2009, we found that TSA had begun working to address the 
vulnerability posed by airline passengers providing fraudulent 
information when making a flight reservation to avoid detection. TSA 
has issued four previous requests for proposals for CAT/BPSS 
technology, two of which resulted in no vendors meeting minimum 
requirements. In 2012, TSA piloted a joint CAT/BPSS technology from 
three vendors at a cost of $4.4 million. According to TSA's final 
report on the pilot, TSA decided not to move forward with these 
systems because of significant operability and performance 
difficulties. None of the units tested met TSA's throughput 
requirements, creating delays at the screening checkpoint. According 
to TSA officials, after the joint CAT/BPSS pilot failed, TSA decided 
to separate CAT technology from BPSS technology and procure each 
separately. 

TSA has also faced challenges in estimating the costs associated with 
the CAT system. In June 2012, we reported that we could not evaluate 
the credibility of TSA's life-cycle cost estimate for CAT/BPSS because 
it did not include an independent cost estimate or an assessment of 
how changing key assumptions and other factors would affect the 
estimate.[Footnote 59] At that time, according to the life-cycle cost 
estimate for the Passenger Screening Program, of which CAT/BPSS is a 
part, the estimated 20-year life-cycle cost of CAT/BPSS was 
approximately $130 million based on a procurement of 4,000 units. As 
of April 2014, TSA had not approved a new life-cycle cost estimate for 
the CAT program, so we were unable to evaluate the extent to which TSA 
has addressed these challenges in its new estimate. 

TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight 
Program Is Achieving Its Goals: 

Secure Flight Measures Do Not Fully Assess Progress toward Goals: 

Secure Flight has six program goals that are relevant to the results 
of screening performed by the Secure Flight computer system and the 
program analysts who review computer-generated matches, including the 
following: 

* goal 1: prevent individuals on the No Fly List from boarding an 
aircraft, 

* goal 2: identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced 
screening, 

* goal 3: support TSA's risk-based security mission by identifying 
high-risk passengers for appropriate security measures/actions and 
identifying low-risk passengers for expedited screening, 

* goal 4: minimize misidentification of individuals as potential 
threats to aviation security, 

* goal 5: incorporate additional risk-based security capabilities to 
streamline processes and accommodate additional aviation populations, 
and: 

* goal 6: protect passengers' personal information from unauthorized 
use and disclosure. 

To assess progress with respect to these goals, the program has nine 
performance measures that it reports on externally (see appendix III 
for the nine Secure Flight performance measures and performance 
results for fiscal years 2012 and 2013).[Footnote 60] In addition, 
Secure Flight has measures for a number of other program activities 
that it reports internally to program managers to keep them apprised 
of program performance with respect to the goals (such as the number 
of confirmed matches identified to the No Fly and Selectee Lists). 
[Footnote 61] 

However, Secure Flight's performance measures do not fully assess 
progress toward achieving its six program goals. For goals 1 through 4 
and goal 6, we found that while TSA measured some aspects of 
performance related to these goals, it did not measure aspects of 
performance necessary to determine overall progress toward the goals. 
In addition, for goal 5, we could not identify any program measures 
that represented the type of performance required to make progress 
toward achieving the goal, in part because the goal itself did not 
specify how performance toward the goal should be measured. GPRA 
establishes a framework for strategic planning and performance 
measurement in the federal government.[Footnote 62] Part of that 
framework involves agencies establishing quantifiable performance 
measures to demonstrate how they intend to achieve their program goals 
and measure the extent to which they have done so. These measures 
should adequately indicate progress toward performance goals so that 
agencies can compare their programs' actual results with desired 
results.[Footnote 63] Our prior body of work has shown that measures 
adequately indicate progress toward performance goals when they 
represent the important dimensions of their performance goals and 
reflect the core functions of their related programs or 
activities.[Footnote 64] Further, when performance goals are not self-
measuring, performance measures should translate those goals into 
concrete conditions that determine what data to collect in order to 
learn whether the program has made progress in achieving its goal. 
[Footnote 65] 

Measures Addressing Accuracy (Goals 1 through 4): 

With respect to the program's first four goals, which address the 
Secure Flight system's ability to accurately identify passengers on 
various watchlists for high-and low-risk screening, the program does 
not measure all aspects of performance that are essential to achieving 
these goals. To measure performance toward the first three goals, 
Secure Flight collects various types of data, including the number of 
passengers TSA identifies as matches to high-and low-risk lists 
(including the No Fly, Selectee, Expanded Selectee, rules-based, and 
TSA Precheck™ lists). However, Secure Flight has no measures to 
address the extent to which Secure Flight is missing passengers who 
are actual matches to these lists (see table 1). 

Table 1: Key Aspects of Secure Flight Performance, with Respect to 
Accuracy-Related Program Goals, Including Performance That Is Not 
Being Measured: 

Goals: 1. Prevent individuals on the No Fly List from boarding an 
aircraft; 
Secure Flight performance measures that address goal: 
* Potential matches: TSA collects and regularly reviews data on the 
number of passengers identified as a potential matches to the No Fly 
List by the Secure Flight system; 
* Confirmed matches: TSA collects and regularly reviews data on the 
number of passengers confirmed as being individuals on the No Fly List; 
Performance the TSA does not measure: 
* Missed No Flys: Passengers on the No Fly List who were not 
identified as matches by the Secure Flight system. 

Goals: 2. Identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced 
screening; 
Secure Flight performance measures that address goal: 
* Potential matches: TSA collects and regularly reviews data on the 
number of passengers identified as potential matches to the Selectee 
List by the Secure Flight system; 
* Confirmed matches: TSA collects and regularly reviews data on the 
number of passengers confirmed as being individuals on the Selectee 
List; 
Performance the TSA does not measure: 
* Missed selectees: Passengers on the Selectee List who were not 
identified as matches by the Secure Flight system. 

Goals: 3. Support TSA's Risk-Based Security mission by identifying 
high- and low-risk passengers for appropriate screening; 
Secure Flight performance measures that address goal: * Potential 
matches to high-risk lists: In addition to regularly reviewing data on 
potential matches to the No Fly and Selectee Lists (see 1 and 2 
above), TSA collects and regularly reviews data on the number of 
passengers identified by the Secure Flight system as potential matches 
to the Expanded Selectee and rules-based lists; 
* Passengers identified as low risk: TSA collects and regularly 
reviews data on the number of boarding passes identified as TSA 
Precheck™ eligible by the Secure Flight system--including passengers 
matched to TSA Precheck™ lists and those identified through Precheck™
risk assessments; 
Performance the TSA does not measure: 
* Missed high-risk passengers: Passengers on any high-risk list (No 
Fly, Selectee, Expanded Selectee, or rules-based) who were not 
identified as matches by the Secure Flight system; 
* Missed low-risk passengers: Passengers on TSA Precheck™ Lists who 
were not identified as matches by the Secure Flight system. 

Goals: 4. Minimize misidentification of individuals as potential 
threats to aviation security; 
Secure Flight performance measures that address goal: 
* Misidentifications: TSA collects and regularly reviews data on its 
rate of false positives--the percentage of passengers who, upon 
arrival at the airport, are found to be incorrectly identified as 
matches to the No Fly and Selectee Lists--and on the number of 
passengers cleared through the TSA Cleared List; 
Performance the TSA does not measure: 
* Misidentifications to all high-risk lists: Secure Flight's 
performance measure does not account for the number of passengers 
incorrectly identified as being on the Expanded Selectee or rules-
based lists. 

Source: GAO analysis of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
data. GAO-14-531. 

[End of table] 

TSA Secure Flight officials stated that measuring the extent to which 
the Secure Flight system may miss passengers on high-risk lists is 
difficult to perform in real time.[Footnote 66] However, our prior 
work and current program documentation show that the Secure Flight 
program has used proxy methods to assess the extent to which the 
system is missing passengers on watchlists. For example, we reported 
in May 2009 that when the Secure Flight system was under development, 
TSA conducted a series of tests--using a simulated passenger list and 
a simulated watchlist created by a TSA contractor with expertise in 
watchlist matching--to measure the extent to which Secure Flight did 
not identify all simulated watchlist records.[Footnote 67] In 
addition, for this review, we examined meeting minutes of the Secure 
Flight Match Review Board--a multidepartmental board that reviews 
system performance and recommends changes--for the period May 2010 
through August 2013, to determine how the board assesses system 
performance. The minutes show that Secure Flight, when contemplating a 
change in the system's search capabilities, measures the impacts of 
proposed changes on system performance, including the extent to which 
the changes result in failures to identify watchlisted individuals. To 
make these assessments, Secure Flight rematches historical passenger 
data and watchlist data under proposed system changes, and compares 
the results with prior Secure Flight screening outcomes to determine 
whether any previously identified individuals on high-risk lists were 
missed.[Footnote 68] While helpful for Match Review Board 
deliberations, the testing reflected in meeting minutes was performed 
on an ad hoc basis and therefore is not a substitute for ongoing 
performance measurement. 

In addition, with respect to low-risk lists, TSA could measure the 
extent to which the Secure Flight system correctly identifies 
passengers submitting valid known traveler numbers (i.e., an actual 
number on a TSA Precheck™ list) and designates them for expedited 
screening.[Footnote 69] TSA officials have stated that variations in 
the way passengers enter information when making a reservation with a 
valid known traveler number can cause the system to fail to identify 
them as TSA Precheck™ eligible. For example, TSA Match Review Board 
documentation from December 2012 identified that the Secure Flight 
system had failed to identify participants on one TSA Precheck™ list 
because they used honorific titles (e.g., the Honorable and Senator) 
when making reservations, and, as a result, they were not eligible for 
expedited screening.TSA has a process in place to review and resolve 
inquiries from passengers who believe they should have received TSA 
Precheck™ but did not during a recent travel experience.[Footnote 70] 
Although helpful for addressing some TSA Precheck™-related problems, 
the process does not provide information on the extent to which TSA is 
correctly identifying passengers on low-risk lists, because some 
passengers may not report problems. 

TSA's fourth goal (to minimize the number of passengers misidentified 
as threats on high-risk lists) also addresses system accuracy. The 
program's related performance measure, its false positive rate, 
accounts for the number of passengers who have been misidentified as 
matches to some, but not all, high-risk lists and, thus does not fully 
assess performance toward the related goal (as shown above, in table 
1). TSA's false positive rate does not account for all 
misidentifications, because, under the current Secure Flight process, 
TSA has information on passengers misidentified to the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists, but does not have information on passengers 
misidentified to the Expanded Selectee or rules-based lists.[Footnote 
71] TSA is currently implementing changes that will allow it to 
collect more information about passengers misidentified to other high-
risk lists.[Footnote 72] This information, if factored into Secure 
Flight's false positive measure, would allow TSA to more fully assess 
the program's ability to minimize the misidentification of individuals 
as potential threats to aviation security. 

Measures Addressing Risk-Based Security Capabilities (Goal 5): 

TSA does not have any measures that clearly address its goal of 
incorporating additional risk-based security capabilities to 
streamline processes and accommodate additional aviation populations 
(goal 5). According to TSA officials, the goal addresses the program's 
ability to adapt the Secure Flight system for risk-based screening 
initiatives, such as TSA Precheck™ and similar efforts that allow TSA 
to distinguish high-risk from low-risk passengers. TSA officials 
identified several measures that address this goal, including program 
measures for responding to a change in the national threat level, the 
system false positive rate, and the system availability measure. 
[Footnote 73] However, none of the measures TSA identified clearly 
relate to the goal of adapting the Secure Flight system for different 
risk-based screening activities, or specify what data should be 
collected to measure progress toward the goal. 

Measures Addressing Privacy (Goal 6): 

Secure Flight's privacy-related measure does not allow TSA to fully 
assess progress toward protecting passenger personal information (goal 
6). Upon implementing the program, in January 2009, TSA established 
privacy protections to, among other things, ensure that personally 
identifiable information maintained by the Secure Flight system (such 
as passenger name and date of birth) is properly collected, used, and 
stored. To assess performance in this area, TSA measures the 
percentage of passenger records that are purged from the Secure Flight 
system according to requirements established when the program was 
implemented.[Footnote 74] By purging the results of Secure Flight 
matching and scoring activities from the Secure Flight system, TSA 
ensures that passenger data do not remain in the system and thus will 
not be subject to unauthorized use or disclosure. Nevertheless, the 
measure does not assess other points in time in which the records 
could be subject to unauthorized use or disclosure, such as before the 
records are purged or when other government agencies request the 
results of Secure Flight screening for various purposes, such as an 
ongoing investigation. When the Secure Flight program was in 
development, TSA included among a list of possible measures for the 
fully implemented program a measure for privacy incident compliance 
(i.e., percentage of privacy incidents reported in compliance with DHS 
Privacy Incident Handling Guidance). According to TSA officials, since 
then, TSA has determined that such a measure is not needed because 
privacy incidents are tracked and publicly reported on at the 
department level. Nevertheless, additional measures, such as the 
percentage of government agencies' requests for Secure Flight data 
that are handled consistently with program privacy requirements, would 
allow Secure Flight to determine the extent to which the program is 
appropriately handling passenger information before it is purged from 
the system. 

Secure Flight's performance measures provide program managers some 
information on its progress with respect to its accuracy-related and 
privacy-related goals (goals 1 through 4 and 6), but do not measure 
all aspects of performance critical to achieving these goals. In 
addition, the measures do not provide information on progress toward 
the program's risk-based security capabilities goal (goal 5). 
Additional measures that address key performance aspects related to 
program goals, and that clearly identify the activities necessary to 
achieve goals, would allow the program to more fully assess progress 
toward its goals. For example, the extent to which the Secure Flight 
system is missing individuals on the No Fly, Selectee, and other high-
and low-risk lists is an important dimension of performance related to 
each of the accuracy-related goals and speaks to a core function of 
the Secure Flight program--namely to accurately identify passengers on 
lists. Without measures that provide a more complete understanding of 
Secure Flight's performance, TSA cannot compare actual with desired 
results to understand how well the system is achieving these goals. 
Similarly, without a measure that reflects misidentifications to all 
high-risk lists, TSA cannot appropriately gauge its performance with 
respect to its goal of limiting such misidentifications. Likewise, 
with respect to its privacy-related goal, additional measures that 
address other key points in the Secure Flight process in which 
passenger records could be inappropriately accessed would allow Secure 
Flight to more fully assess the extent to which it is meeting its goal 
of protecting passenger information. Finally, establishing measures 
that clearly represent the performance necessary to achieve the 
program's goal that addresses risk-based security capabilities (goal 
5) will allow Secure Flight to determine the extent to which it is 
meeting its goal of adapting the Secure Flight system for different 
risk-based screening activities. 

TSA Does Not Have Timely and Reliable Information on the Secure Flight 
System's Matching Errors: 

TSA does not have timely and reliable information on past Secure 
Flight system matching errors. As previously discussed, preventing 
individuals on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft and 
identifying individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced screening 
are key goals of the Secure Flight program. Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government states that agencies must have 
relevant, reliable, and timely information to determine whether their 
operations are performing as expected, and that such information can 
assist agencies in taking any necessary corrective actions to achieve 
relevant goals.[Footnote 75] According to TSA officials, when TSA 
receives information related to matching errors of the Secure Flight 
system (i.e., the computerized matching and manual reviews conducted 
to identify matches of passenger and watchlist data), the Match Review 
Board reviews this information to determine if any actions could be 
taken to prevent similar errors from happening again. We reviewed 
meeting minutes and associated documentation for the 51 Match Review 
Board meetings held from March 2010 through August 2013, and found 16 
meetings in which the Match Review Board discussed system matching 
errors; investigated possible actions to address these errors; and, 
when possible, implemented changes to strengthen system performance. 
[Footnote 76] 

However, when we asked TSA for complete information on the extent and 
causes of system matching errors, we found that TSA does not have 
readily available or complete information. It took TSA over 6 months 
to compile a list of such errors, a process that, according to TSA 
officials, required a significant amount of manual investigation and 
review.[Footnote 77] Further, we found that the list was not complete 
because it did not reflect all system errors that were discussed at 
the Match Review Board meetings.[Footnote 78] In addition, we 
identified in the list TSA provided us discussion of a system error 
that was not included in the Match Review Board documentation. We also 
found that, for many incidents on the list, TSA's description of the 
cause of the error was not sufficiently detailed to understand whether 
the Secure Flight system was at fault. 

Developing a mechanism to systematically document the number and 
causes of the Secure Flight system's matching errors would provide 
Secure Flight more timely and reliable information on the extent to 
which the Secure Flight system is performing as intended. TSA Match 
Review Board documentation from February, 2012 confirmed the 
importance of such information, citing the need for more detailed 
information on instances when the Secure Flight system has not 
performed as intended. A mechanism to ensure that the results of Match 
Review Board investigations are systematically documented would be one 
way to provide such information. Furthermore, without timely and 
reliable information on system matching errors, TSA is not in the best 
position to determine whether Secure Flight is achieving relevant 
goals, investigate all potential causes of these errors, and identify 
and implement sufficient corrective actions. 

Conclusions: 

The Secure Flight program is one of TSA's key tools for defending 
civil aviation against terrorist threats. Since TSA began implementing 
the program, in January 2009, Secure Flight has expanded from a system 
that matches airline passengers against watchlists of known or 
suspected terrorists to a system that uses additional high-risk lists 
and conducts risk-based screening assessments of passengers. 
Specifically, through the use of new high-risk screening lists, the 
program now identifies a broader range of high-risk travelers--
including ones who may not be on lists of known and suspected 
terrorists but who nevertheless correspond with known threat criteria. 
TSA has also begun using Secure Flight to identify low-risk passengers 
eligible for expedited screening through TSA Precheck™. Given Secure 
Flight's importance to securing civil aviation and achieving TSA's 
risk-based screening goals, the extent to which passengers are being 
accurately identified by the system (including computerized matching 
and manual reviews) for standard, expedited, and enhanced screening is 
critically important. More broadly, to fully realize the security 
benefits of the Secure Flight program, it is critical that TSA 
checkpoint personnel correctly identify and appropriately screen 
travelers according to Secure Flight determinations. Better 
information on both system and checkpoint performance, therefore, 
would provide TSA with greater assurance that Secure Flight is 
achieving its desired purpose to correctly identify passengers for 
standard, expedited, and enhanced checkpoint screening. 

Specifically, TSA would have better assurance that all passengers are 
screened in accordance with their Secure Flight risk determinations by 
investigating checkpoint errors and taking appropriate corrective 
action. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors across all 
airport checkpoints would provide TSA more complete information on 
such cases and serve as the basis for policies to ensure the 
checkpoint is correctly processing passengers. In addition, 
implementing corrective measures to address the root causes that TSA 
identifies through its evaluation process would help strengthen 
checkpoint operations. Furthermore, establishing measures that cover 
all activities necessary to achieve Secure Flight program goals would 
allow TSA to more fully assess progress toward these goals. Finally, 
when TSA learns of Secure Flight system matching errors, a mechanism 
to systematically document the number and causes of these errors would 
help ensure that TSA had timely and reliable information to take any 
corrective action to strengthen system performance. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration's 
Administrator take the following four actions: 

* to further improve the implementation of Secure Flight risk 
determinations at the screening checkpoint, develop a process for 
regularly evaluating the root causes of screening errors across 
airports so that corrective measures can be identified; 

* to address the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint, 
thereby strengthening checkpoint operations, implement the corrective 
measures TSA identifies through a root cause evaluation process; 

* to assess the progress of the Secure Flight program toward achieving 
its goals, develop additional measures to address key performance 
aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these measures 
clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve progress toward 
the goal; and: 

* to provide Secure Flight program managers with timely and reliable 
information on cases in which TSA learns of Secure Flight system 
matching errors, develop a mechanism to systematically document the 
number and causes of such cases, for the purpose of improving program 
performance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of 
Justice for their review and comment. DHS provided written comments on 
August 25, 2014, which are summarized below and reproduced in full in 
appendix IV. DHS concurred with all four of our recommendations and 
described actions under way or planned to address them. In addition, 
DHS provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into 
the report as appropriate. 

DHS concurred with our first recommendation, that TSA develop a 
process for regularly evaluating the root causes of checkpoint 
screening errors across airports so that corrective measures can be 
identified. DHS stated that TSA is collecting data on the root causes 
of checkpoint screening errors in its Security Incident Reporting Tool 
(SIRT) and that TSA OSO's Operations Performance Division will 
develop a process for regularly evaluating the root causes of 
checkpoint screening errors across airports and identify corrective 
measures. DHS estimates that this will be completed by September 30, 
2014. These actions, if implemented effectively, should address the 
intent of our recommendation. 

Regarding our second recommendation, that TSA implement the corrective 
measures it identifies through a root cause evaluation process, DHS 
concurred. DHS stated that TSA OSO's Operations Performance Division 
will evaluate the data gathered from airports through SIRT to 
identify root causes of checkpoint screening errors and on the basis 
of the root cause, work with the appropriate TSA program office to 
implement corrective measures. Such actions could help to reduce the 
likelihood that TSA will fail to appropriately screen passengers at 
the screening checkpoint. 

Additionally, DHS concurred with our third recommendation, that TSA 
develop additional measures to address key performance aspects related 
to each program goal and ensure these measures clearly identify the 
activities necessary to achieve progress toward the goal. DHS stated 
that TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis will evaluate its 
current Secure Flight performance goals and measures and develop new 
performance measures as necessary. DHS further stated that TSA will 
explore the possibility of implementing analyses to measure match 
effectiveness through the use of test data sets. Such actions could 
help TSA better monitor the performance of the Secure Flight program. 

DHS also concurred with our fourth recommendation, that TSA develop a 
mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of cases in 
which TSA learns that the Secure Flight system has made a matching 
error. DHS stated that TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis will 
develop a more robust process to track all known cases in which the 
Secure Flight system has made a matching error, and that the Secure 
Flight Match Review Board will conduct reviews to identify potential 
system improvement measures on a quarterly basis. TSA plans to 
implement these efforts by December 31, 2014. These actions, if 
implemented effectively, should address the intent of our 
recommendation. We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts. 

The Department of Justice did not have formal comments on our draft 
report, but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the TSA Administrator, the 
United States Attorney General, and interested congressional 
committees as appropriate. In addition, the report will be available 
at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Jennifer A. Grover at 202-512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Key 
contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix IV. Key 
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. 

Signed by: 

Jennifer A. Grover: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report addresses the following questions: 

1. How, if at all, has Secure Flight changed since implementation 
began in January 2009? 

2. To what extent does the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) ensure that Secure Flight screening determinations for 
passengers are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints? 

3. To what extent do TSA's performance measures appropriately assess 
progress toward achieving the Secure Flight program goals? 

To identify how the Secure Flight program has changed since 
implementation began, we analyzed TSA documentation related to new 
agency initiatives involving Secure Flight screening since January 
2009, including the Secure Flight program concept of operations, 
privacy notices TSA issued from 2008 (in preparation to begin program 
implementation) through 2013, and TSA memorandums describing the 
rationale for new agency initiatives involving the Secure Flight 
system. We also submitted questions on how Secure Flight has changed 
to TSA's Office of Chief Counsel and reviewed its responses. To 
clarify our understanding of a new agency initiative to identify high-
risk passengers not already included in the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB)--the U.S. government's consolidated list of known or 
suspected terrorists--we spoke with relevant officials in the 
Intelligence and Analysis Division of TSA's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, who are responsible for the initiative, and with officials 
from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, who facilitate the generation 
of one rules-based list. In addition, to understand new initiatives 
involving Secure Flight screening to identify low-risk travelers, we 
spoke with Secure Flight program officials and with officials in TSA's 
Office of Risk Based Security who oversee TSA Precheck™, a 2011 
program that allows TSA to designate preapproved passengers as low 
risk, and TSA Precheck™ risk assessments, another initiative to 
identify passengers as low risk for a specific flight. 

To determine the extent to which TSA ensures that the Secure Flight 
vetting results are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints, 
we analyzed TSA documents governing the screening checkpoint, such as 
standard operating procedures for checkpoint screening operations and 
Travel Document Checkers (TDC) and reviewed reports about the 
performance of Transportation Security Officers (TSO) at the 
checkpoint by TSA's Office of Inspections and GAO.[Footnote 79] To 
determine the extent to which TSA made errors at the screening 
checkpoint, we analyzed certain TSA data on TSO performance at the 
screening checkpoint from May 2012, when TSA began tracking these 
data, through February 2014, when we conducted the analysis.[Footnote 
80] We examined documentation about these data and interviewed 
knowledgeable officials, and determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In addition, to clarify our 
understanding of TSA's checkpoint operations and inform our analysis, 
we interviewed officials within TSA's Office of Security Operations, 
which is responsible for checkpoint operations, and TSA officials at 
nine airports. We selected these nine airports based on a variety of 
factors, such as volume of passengers screened and geographic 
dispersion. The results of these interviews cannot be generalized to 
all airports, but provide insight into TSA's challenges to correctly 
identify and screen passengers at checkpoints. To better understand 
how TSA ensures that all passengers have been appropriately screened 
by Secure Flight, we visited TSA's Identity Verification Call Center 
to interview officials and observe their identity verification 
procedures. We compared TSA's checkpoint procedures against Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 81] Finally, 
to determine the extent to which TSA's planned technology solutions 
could address checkpoint errors, we analyzed documents, such as 
requests for proposals, related to TSA's planned technology solutions 
and interviewed knowledgeable TSA officials. 

To determine the extent to which Secure Flight performance measures 
appropriately assess progress toward achieving the program goals, we 
reviewed documentation of TSA's program goals and performance measures 
for fiscal years 2012 and 2013--including the measures Secure Flight 
reports externally to the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as well as other internal 
performance measures Secure Flight officials use for program 
management purposes--and discussed these measures with Secure Flight 
officials. We assessed these measures against provisions of the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the GPRA 
Modernization Act of 2010 requiring agencies to compare actual results 
with performance goals.[Footnote 82] Although GPRA's requirements 
apply at the agency level, in our prior work, we have reported that 
these requirements can serve as leading practices at lower levels 
within an organization, such as individual programs or initiatives, 
through a review of our related products, OMB guidance, and studies by 
the National Academy of Public Administration and the Urban 
Institute.[Footnote 83] We also interviewed relevant TSA officials 
about the current performance measures for the Secure Flight program 
and the adequacy of these measures in assessing TSA's progress in 
achieving program goals. 

In addition, to understand how TSA uses Secure Flight-related 
performance data, we reviewed documentation related to all meetings 
that TSA identified of the Secure Flight Match Review Board--a 
multidepartmental entity established to, among other things, review 
performance measures and recommend changes to improve system 
performance--from the time was the board was initiated, in March 2010, 
through August 2013, a total of 51 meetings. To identify the extent to 
which TSA monitors and evaluates the reasons for any Secure Flight 
system matching errors, we analyzed a list of such errors that 
occurred from November 2010 (the point at which the Secure Flight 
program was implemented for all covered domestic and foreign air 
carriers) through July 2013 that TSA compiled at our request. To 
assess the accuracy and completeness of the list TSA provided, we also 
checked to see if system matching errors we identified in 
documentation from the Match Review Board meetings were included in 
TSA's list. We evaluated TSA's efforts to document system matching 
errors against standards for information and communications identified 
in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. 
[Footnote 84] 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Secure Flight Screening Lists and Activities: 

In January 2009, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
began implementing the Secure Flight program to facilitate the 
identification of high-risk passengers who may pose security risks to 
civil aviation, and designate them for additional screening at airport 
checkpoints. Since then, TSA has begun using Secure Flight to identify 
low-risk passengers eligible for more efficient processing at the 
checkpoint. This appendix presents an overview of the lists and other 
activities as of July 2013 that Secure Flight uses to identify 
passengers as high risk or low risk.[Footnote 85] The Secure Flight 
program, as implemented pursuant to the 2008 Secure Flight Final Rule, 
requires commercial aircraft operators traveling to, from, within, or 
overflying the United States to collect information from passengers 
and transmit that information electronically to TSA.[Footnote 86] The 
Secure Flight system uses this information to screen passengers by 
conducting computerized matching against government lists and other 
risk assessment activities.[Footnote 87] As a result of this 
screening, passengers identified as high risk receive enhanced 
screening, which includes, in addition to the procedures applied 
during a typical standard screening experience, a pat-down and either 
an explosive trace detection search involving a device certified by 
TSA to detect explosive particles or a physical search of the interior 
of the passenger's accessible property, electronics, and footwear. 
[Footnote 88] Those passengers Secure Flight identifies as low risk 
are eligible to receive expedited screening, which unlike standard 
screening, affords travelers certain conveniences, such as not having 
to remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear when screened. 

Figure 3 provides information on the lists Secure Flight uses to 
identify high-risk passengers. Figure 4 describes Secure Flight's 
activities to identify low-risk passengers, including screening 
against lists associated with the TSA Precheck™Program, a 2011 
initiative that allows TSA to designate preapproved passengers as low 
risk, and TSA Precheck™ risk assessments, which assess passengers' 
risk using data submitted to Secure Flight for screening. Figure 5 
describes two additional lists Secure Flight uses for passenger 
screening that, depending on the list, exempt passengers from being 
designated as low or high risk. 

Figure 3: Secure Fight Screening Activities to Identify High-Risk 
Passengers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC): 

No Fly List: 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: January 2009: 
List owner: Terrorist Screening Center (TSC): 
Description: The No Fly List is a subset of the TSDB containing 
records of individuals who pose a threat to aviation or national 
security and are prohibited from boarding an aircraft or entering the 
sterile area of a U.S. airport. 

Selectee List: 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: January 2009: 
List owner: TSC: 
Description: The Selectee List is a subset of the TSDB containing 
records of individuals who pose a possible threat to aviation or 
national security and who are required to undergo enhanced screening 
at the airport checkpoint prior to entering the airport's sterile area. 

Expanded Selectee List: 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: April 2011: 
List owner: TSC: 
Description: The Expanded Selectee List is a subset of the TSDB. It 
consists of terrorist records in the TSDB that contain a full name and 
a full date of birth and meet the reasonable suspicion standard to be 
considered a known or suspected terrorist, but that do not meet the 
criteria to be placed on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. Passengers 
matched to the Expanded Selectee List are to receive enhanced 
screening at the airport checkpoint prior to entering the airport's 
sterile area. 

High-risk, rules-based lists: 

Rules-based lists: 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: April 2010 and April 
2012; 
List owner: TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA); 
Description: TSA's rules-based lists include passengers who correspond 
with certain intelligence-based, high-risk factors, but who may not be 
in the TSDB. To create the lists, analysts within the Intelligence and 
Analysis Division of TSA's OIA review current intelligence to identify 
factors that may indicate an elevated risk for a passenger. TSA 
creates rules based on these factors and provides them to U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP). CBP uses its border screening technology 
to identify passengers who correspond with the rules and provides TSA 
information on them in the form of a list. Upon receiving CBP's list, 
TSA creates a subset of the larger rules-based list, based on 
additional criteria. Through Secure Flight screening, TSA designates 
passenger on either rules-based list as selectees for enhanced 
screening. 

Other high-risk lists: 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Do Not Board List 
(DNBL): 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: Approximately June 
2009; 
List owner: CDC; 
Description: The CDC DNBL includes individuals with communicable 
diseases who pose a significant health risk to other travelers and, 
therefore, should not be allowed to fly. 

Other activities to identify selectees: 

Random identification of selectees: 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: June 2010; 
Description: Secure Flight randomly identifies a certain number of 
travelers for selectee screening. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-14-531. 

[A] All TSDB-based watchlists utilized by the Secure Flight program 
contain records determined to meet the Terrorist Screening Center's 
reasonable suspicion standard. In general, to meet the reasonable 
suspicion standard, the agency nominating an individual for inclusion 
in the TSDB must consider the totality of information available that, 
taken together with rational inferences from that information, 
reasonably warrants a determination that an individual is known or 
suspected to be or have been knowingly engaged in conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism 
or terrorist activities. In addition, to be included on the No Fly or 
Selectee Lists, individuals must meet certain criteria specific to 
these lists. The TSDB, which is the U.S. government's consolidated 
watchlist of known or suspected terrorists, also contains records on 
additional populations of individuals that do not meet the reasonable 
suspicion standard articulated above but that other federal agencies 
utilize to support their border and immigration screening missions. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Secure Flight Screening Activities to Identify Low-Risk 
Passengers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Precheck™ program lists: 
5.6 million travelers as of April 2014: 
The TSA Precheck™ Program lists offer passengers included on the lists 
the opportunity to experience expedited screening. 

Screening operation: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) trusted 
travelers[A]; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 2,492,962; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: October 2011; 
List owner: CBP; 
Description: A list of individuals enrolled in one of CBP's Trusted 
Traveler programs (Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI) who have undergone a 
background check and an interview by CBP and who wish to participate 
in TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: Medal of Honor recipients; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 79; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: February 2013; 
List owner: Congressional Medal of Honor Society; 
Description: A list of Medal of Honor recipients who wish to 
participate in TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: Department of Defense (DOD) military personnel; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 2,202,596; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: December 2013; 
List owner: DOD; 
Description: A list of eligible DOD service members, including active 
duty, National Guard, reserves, and U.S. Coast Guard, who wish to 
participate in TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: National intelligence agencies; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 70,254; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: May 2012; 
List owner: Office of Director of National Intelligence; 
Description: A list of individuals employed by a national intelligence 
agency with active Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information 
clearances who wish to participate in TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP); 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 66; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: February 2013; 
List owner: IACP; 
Description: A list of members of the major U.S. law enforcement 
associations and other members of the IACP who wish to participate in 
TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: TSA Precheck™ Application Program; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 180,573; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: December 2013; 
List owner: TSA; 
Description: A list of individuals who apply to the TSA Precheck™ 
Application Program to be preapproved as low-risk travelers. TSA 
conducts a background check to determine if an applicant should be 
included on this list. 

Screening operation: Federal judges and federal tax court judges; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 1,308; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: June 2012; 
List owner: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; 
Description: A list of federal judges who wish to participate in TSA 
Precheck™. 

Screening operation: Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC); 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 14; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: August 2013; 
List owner: HSAC; 
Description: A list of current HSAC members who wish to participate in 
TSA Precheck™ HSAC members provide insight and guidance to the DHS 
Secretary on matters related to homeland security. 

Screening operation: DOD and U.S. Coast Guard civilian employees; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014 and date incorporated 
into Secure Flight operations: 700,000; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: April 2014; 
List owner: DOD; 
Description: A list of eligible DOD and U.S. Coast Guard civilian 
employees who wish to participate in TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: Members of Congress; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 447; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: January 2013; 
List owner: TSA Office of Legislative Affairs; 
Description: A list of Members of Congress who wish to participate in 
TSA Precheck™. 

Screening operation: Homeland Security Advisors; 
Number of travelers in program as of April 2014: 49; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: August 2013; 
List owner: National Governors Association; 
Description: A list of Homeland Security Advisors (HSA) who wish to 
participate in TSA Precheck™. HSAs advise governors of states and 
territories on homeland security issues. 

Other activities to identify low-risk travelers: 

Screening operation: TSA Precheck™ risk assessments; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: October 2013; 
Description: TSA risk-based analysis of passenger data submitted to 
Secure Flight for screening. Data are used to score passengers to 
identify low-risk passengers who are eligible for expedited screening 
at the checkpoint. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-14-531. 

[A] In addition to U.S. citizens, the CBP Trusted Traveler Lists also 
includes U.S. lawful permanent residents and non-U.S. citizen members. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: Other Lists Secure Flight Uses for Screening: 

[Refer to PDF for image:illustration] 

Additional screening lists: 

Screening operation: TSA Precheck™ Disqualification List; 
Approximate size as of February 2014: 26,090; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: July 2012; 
List owner: TSA Office of Security Operations; 
Description: The TSA Precheck™ Disqualification Protocol List is a 
watchlist created and maintained by TSA that includes individuals who, 
based upon their involvement in violations of security regulations of 
sufficient severity or frequency, are disqualified from receiving 
expedited screening for some period of time or permanently (e.g., 
bringing a loaded firearm to the checkpoint). 

Screening operation: TSA Cleared List; 
Approximate size as of February 2014: 135,094; 
Date incorporated into Secure Flight operations: January 2009; 
List owner: TSA-DHS TRIP; 
The TSA Cleared List is composed of individuals who have applied to 
Description: DHS's Travel Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), and who 
have been determined not to be individuals on the No Fly, Selectee, or 
Expanded Selectee Lists, and who, therefore, should not be 
misidentified by Secure Flight as a match to one of these lists. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA information. GAO-14-531. 

[End of figure] 

Appendix III: Secure Flight Performance Data for Fiscal Years 2012 and 
2013: 

This appendix presents data on the Secure Flight program's performance 
measures and associated performance results that the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) reported externally to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Specifically, table 2 displays data on six Secure Flight Key 
Performance Parameters--key system capabilities that must be met in 
order for a system to meet its operational goals--that TSA management 
reported to DHS for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Table 3 displays data 
on five Secure Flight program measures that TSA management reported to 
OMB for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The OMB measures are part of the 
program's yearly exhibit 300, also called the Capital Asset Plan and 
Business Case, a document that agencies submit to OMB to justify 
resource requests for major information technology investments. 
[Footnote 89] TSA reports performance data for all these measures on a 
monthly basis, and for each measure, we have provided the range of the 
performance measurement results for each fiscal year. 

Overview of the Secure Flight Screening Process: 

The Secure Flight program, as implemented pursuant to the 2008 Secure 
Flight Final Rule, requires commercial aircraft operators traveling 
to, from, or overflying the United States to collect information from 
passengers and transmit that information electronically to TSA. This 
information, known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger Data 
(SFPD), includes personally identifiable information, such as full 
name, gender, date of birth, passport information (if available), and 
certain nonpersonally identifiable information, such as itinerary 
information and the unique number associated with a travel record 
(record number locator).[Footnote 90] 

The Secure Flight program designates passengers for risk-appropriate 
screening by matching SFPD against various lists composed of 
individuals who should be identified, for the purpose of checkpoint 
screening, as either high risk or low risk.[Footnote 91] With respect 
to matching passengers against lists, the Secure Flight computer 
system first conducts automated matching of passenger and watchlist 
data to identify a pool of passengers who are potential matches to 
various lists. Next, the system compares all potential matches against 
the TSA Cleared List, a list of individuals who have applied to, and 
been cleared through, the DHS redress process.[Footnote 92] Passengers 
included on the TSA Cleared List submit a redress number when making a 
reservation, which allows the Secure Flight system to recognize and 
clear them.[Footnote 93] After the system performs automated matching, 
Secure Flight analysts conduct manual reviews of potential matches to 
further rule out individuals who are not included on the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists. 

After the completion of manual reviews, TSA precludes passengers who 
remain potential matches to certain lists from receiving their 
boarding passes. These passengers, for whom air carriers receive a 
"passenger inhibited" message from Secure Flight, must undergo a 
resolution process at the airport. This process may involve air 
carriers sending updated passenger information back to Secure Flight 
for automated rematching or placing a call to Secure Flight for 
assistance in resolving the match.[Footnote 94] At the conclusion of 
automated and manual screening processes, Secure Flight provides air 
carriers with a final screening determination for each passenger. 
[Footnote 95] At airport checkpoints, those passengers identified as 
high risk receive enhanced screening and those identified as low risk 
are eligible for expedited screening.[Footnote 96] 

Table 2: Secure Flight Key Performance Parameters and Results for 
Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013: 

Goal: Program response time to a change in threat level; 
Definition: Secure Flight's ability to adjust the Secure Flight system 
and appropriately staff the Secure Flight Operations Center (SOC) to 
match a change in threat level[C]; 
Threshold[A]: 48 hours; 
Objective[B]: 24 hours; 
Range for 2012: 24 hours[D]; 
Range for 2013: Not applicable[E]. 

Goal: Resolution Service Center service level; 
Definition: The percentage of phone calls to the SOC that are answered 
in 10 seconds or less; 
Threshold[A]: 88%; 
Objective[B]: 90%; 
Range for 2012: 79.73% to 97.51%[F]; 
Range for 2013: 94.85% to 98.03%. 

Goal: Secure Flight system match rates (domestic); 
Definition: The estimated match rates by the Secure Flight system 
under normal operating circumstances, assuming that the passenger 
information provided includes full name and date of birth; 
Threshold[A]: 0.125%; 
Objective[B]: less than or equal to 0.1%; 
Range for 2012: 0.08% to 0.12%; 
Range for 2013: 0.07% to 0.09%. 

Goal: False positive rate; 
Definition: The percentage of passengers whose name is deemed a match 
after being processed through the Secure Flight name-matching 
processing, including identification verification; 
Threshold[A]: 0.06%; 
Objective[B]: 0.03%; 
Range for 2012: 0.0015% to 0.0023%; 
Range for 2013: 0.0017% to 0.0026%. 

Goal: Service availability[G]; 
Definition: The total percentage of time the system is up and 
running[H]; 
Threshold[A]: 99.95%; 
Objective[B]: 99.99%; 
Range for 2012: 99.98% to 100%[I]; 
Range for 2013: 100%[J]. 

Goal: Automated clearing of redressed individuals[K]; 
Definition: The percentage of redressed individuals automatically 
cleared by Secure Flight who have submitted a redress number that is 
on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Cleared List; 
Threshold[A]: 98%; 
Objective[B]: 99.99%; 
Range for 2012: 99.57% to 99.99%; 
Range for 2013: 99.78% to 99.99%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Transportation Security Administration data. 
GAO-14-531. 

[A] According to Secure Flight officials, the threshold represents the 
minimum acceptable performance for the parameter. 

[B] According to Secure Flight officials, the objective represents 
Secure Flight's desired level of performance for the parameter. 

[C] The Department of Homeland Security National Terrorism Advisory 
System is to communicate information about the risk of a terrorist 
attack on the United States by providing timely, detailed information 
to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and 
other transportation hubs, and the private sector. Using available 
information, the Secretary of Homeland Security will make a statement 
to indicate that there has been a change in the threat level. These 
alerts are to provide a clear statement that there is an imminent 
threat or an elevated threat. 

[D] There was one change in threat level during fiscal year 2012, and 
in response to that change, Secure Flight met its performance 
objective. 

[E] According to TSA officials, there are no performance data for this 
measure for fiscal year 2013 because there was no change in the 
national threat level during this period. 

[F] Secure Flight did not meet its performance threshold or objective 
for Resolution Service Center Service Level for 1 month during fiscal 
year 2012. According to a TSA official, there was a high number of 
airline system outages reported to the SOC for multiple airlines, 
which caused an unexpected workload increase. 

[G] Secure Flight also tracks service availability as one of its 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)-reported measures (see table 3). 

[H] The percentage is derived from a 12-month rolling average. 

[I] Secure Flight did not meet its performance objective for service 
availability for 2 months in fiscal year 2012. 

[J] Performance results were 100 percent throughout fiscal year 2013. 

[K] Secure Flight also tracks automated clearing of redressed 
individuals as one of its OMB-reported measures (see table 3). 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Secure Flight Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Performance Measures and Results for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013: 

Measure: Percentage of aircraft operators on-boarded with Secure 
Flight; 
Definition: The percentage of aircraft operators on-boarded with 
Secure Flight of all aircraft operators covered by the Secure Flight 
final rule; 
Performance target: 100%; 
Range for 2012: 100%[A]; 
Range for 2013: 100%[A]. 

Measure: Automated clearing of redressed individuals[B]; 
Definition: The percentage of redressed individuals automatically 
cleared by Secure Flight who have submitted a redress number that is 
on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Cleared List; 
Performance target: 95%; 
Range for 2012: 99.57% to 99.99%; 
Range for 2013: 99.78% to 99.99%. 

Measure: Percentage of records purged in accordance with National 
Archives and Records Administration schedule retention guidelines[C]; 
Definition: The percentage of records purged of those records 
scheduled to be purged; 
Performance target: 100%; 
Range for 2012: 100%[D]; 
Range for 2013: 100%[D]. 

Measure: Service availability[E]; 
Definition: The total monthly minutes of Secure Flight system 
availability minus the total duration in minutes of significant Secure 
Flight system disruptions, divided by total monthly availability of 
Secure Flight in minutes; 
Performance target: 99.99%; 
Range for 2012: 99.98% to 100%[F]; 
Range for 2013: 100%[G]. 

Measure: Compliant Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) submissions; 
Definition: The percentage of air carrier submissions that include the 
passenger's full name, date of birth, and gender (i.e., the key 
passenger data required for Secure Flight screening); 
Performance target: 100%; 
Range for 2012: 97.24% to 97.88%[H]; 
Range for 2013: 97.44% to 99.96%[H]. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. GAO-14-531. 

[A] Performance results were 100 percent for each month of the fiscal 
year. 

[B] Secure Flight also tracks automated clearing of redress 
individuals as one of its Key Performance Parameters (see table 2). 
According to Secure Flight officials, the Key Performance Parameter 
objective and the OMB 300 performance target should not be different 
for this measure. 

[C] In implementing Secure Flight, TSA established privacy 
protections to, among other things, ensure that personally 
identifiable information maintained by the Secure Flight system, such 
as passenger name and date of birth, is properly collected, used, and 
stored. Specifically, the requirements allow Secure Flight to store 
results for passengers not identified as a match to a government 
watchlist for up to 7 days, potential matches for up to 7 years, and 
confirmed matches for 99 years, after which they must be purged from 
the system. According to Secure Flight documentation, records for 
passengers identified as low risk are treated the same as nonmatches 
and must be purged within 7 days. Records for passengers who match the 
Expanded Selectee and rules-based lists are treated as potential 
matches and must be purged within 7 years. 

[D] Performance results were 100 percent throughout the fiscal year. 

[E] Secure Flight also tracks service availability as one of its Key 
Performance Parameters (see table 2). 

[F] Secure Flight did not meet its performance target for service 
availability for 2 months during the fiscal year. 

[G] Performance results were 100 percent throughout fiscal year 2013. 

[H] Secure Flight did not meet its performance target for any month 
during this fiscal year. Secure Flight officials stated that this 
metric is outside of the program's control because Secure Flight 
relies on air carriers to submit these data. According to TSA 
officials, to improve air carrier compliance, TSA monitors carrier 
submissions and works with carriers to inform them about Secure Flight 
data requirements. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

August 25, 2014: 

Jennifer A. Grover: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-531, "Secure Flight: TSA Should Take 
Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness" 

Dear Ms. Grover: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

As highlighted in this report, Secure Flight is a frontline defense 
against terrorism targeting the Nation's civil aviation system. Secure 
Flight has been a very effective tool in identifying individuals who 
should not be allowed to board commercial aircraft, should receive 
enhanced screening prior to boarding an aircraft, or who should be 
given expedited screening. 

The draft contained four recommendations with which the Department 
concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) Administrator: 

Recommendation 1: Develop a process for regularly evaluating the root 
causes of screening errors across airports so that corrective measures 
can be identified. 

Response: Concur. The TSA Office of Security Operations, Operations 
Performance Division, will develop a process for regularly evaluating 
the root causes of screening errors across airports and identify 
corrective measures. TSA is collecting data on the root causes of 
screening errors in its Security Incident Reporting Tool (SIRT). SIRT 
collects the following data regarding each identified screening error: 
root cause, corrective action implemented locally, date implemented,
name of verifying official, date verified, additional root cause 
comments, corrective action comments, and lessons learned-preventative 
actions. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2014. 

Recommendation 2: Implement the corrective measures TSA identifies 
through a root cause evaluation process. 

Response: Concur. The TSA Office of Security Operations, Operations 
Performance Division, will evaluate the data gathered from airports 
through SIRT to identify root causes of screening errors and based on 
the root cause, work with the appropriate TSA program office to 
implement appropriate corrective measures. ECD: To Be Determined (TBD). 

Recommendation 3: Develop additional measures to address key 
performance aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these 
measures clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve progress 
toward the goal. 

Response: Concur. TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, will 
evaluate its current Secure Flight performance goals and measures and 
will develop new performance measures as necessary. Specifically, for 
Secure Flight performance goals 1 through 4, TSA will explore the
possibility of implementing analyses to measure match effectiveness 
through the use of test data sets. 

Secure Flight performance goalS addresses Secure Flight's ability to 
incorporate additional risk-based security capabilities to streamline 
processes and accommodate additional aviation populations. TSA will 
review current performance measures and make adjustments as deemed
appropriate for this goal. 

Secure Flight performance goal 6, TSA has control measures in-place 
that address key points in the Secure Flight process such as: robust 
security implemented in the Secure Flight system; access restriction 
to approved, authorized users; badge-controlled access; account 
lockouts after unsuccessful attempts to access a system; and, audit 
logs and other physical and technical controls. TSA has also 
implemented administrative control measures such as privacy awareness
training, privacy rules of behavior, and a formal system access 
approval process before access is granted. 

TSA has implemented a process for handling requests for Secure Flight 
data that has been documented in TSA Management Directive (MD) 1300.4, 
Requests for Secure Flight Data. TSA will implement a tracking 
mechanism for requests and their disposition under MDI300.4. ECD:
July 31, 2015. 

Recommendation 4: Develop a mechanism to systematically document the 
number and causes of such cases for the purpose of improving program 
performance. 

Response: Concur. Currently, the Secure Flight Match Review Board 
selectively reviews Secure Flight system matching errors when 
technical changes to Secure Flight's matching logic can likely prevent 
similar errors in the future. TSA's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis will develop a more robust process to track all instances in 
which Secure Flight becomes aware of Secure Flight system matching 
errors. The Match Review Board will conduct reviews to identify 
potential improvement measures on a quarterly basis. ECD: December 31, 
2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on 
this draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jennifer A. Grover, 202-512-7141, groverj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Maria Strudwick (Assistant 
Director), Mona Nichols Blake (Analyst-in-Charge), John de Ferrari, 
Michele Fejfar, Imoni Hampton, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Richard 
Hung, Justine Lazaro, Benjamin Licht, Tom Lombardi, Linda Miller, 
David Plocher, and Ashley Vaughan made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-18 (2004) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C)). The 9/11 Commission, The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (Washington, D.C.: July 
2004). TSA efforts to develop a computer-assisted passenger 
prescreening system predated the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act and the report of the 9/11 Commission. 

[2] The No Fly and Selectee Lists are subsets of the Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB)--the U.S. government's consolidated 
watchlist of known or suspected terrorists. Not all identities within 
the TSDB are included on the No Fly and Selectee Lists; rather, to be 
included on either list, individuals must meet certain criteria 
specific to the list. 

[3] In addition to passengers, Secure Flight screens certain 
nontraveling individuals, such as escorts for minor, elderly, and 
disabled passengers; airport and aircraft operator employees; and law 
enforcement officers who are authorized to access the airport's 
sterile area--the portion of an airport beyond the security screening 
checkpoint that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to 
which access is generally controlled through the screening of persons 
and property. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5. Also, Secure Flight began 
screening passengers on certain flights operated by foreign air 
carriers overflying United States airspace on October 24, 2012. 
Specifically, this includes flights over the continental United 
States, which includes the contiguous lower 48 states and excludes 
Hawaii and Alaska, and flights transiting the continental United 
States between two airports or locations in the same country where 
that country is Canada or Mexico. In addition, on October 31, 2013, 
Secure Flight began screening passengers traveling on certain 
Department of Defense flights. For purposes of this report, the terms 
"commercial flight" and "commercial aircraft operators" include the 
passenger operations of U.S. and foreign-flagged air carriers 
operating in accordance with 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.101(a) and 1546.101(a)-
(b), respectively. These terms correspond to "covered flight" and 
"covered aircraft operator," respectively as those terms are defined 
in the Secure Flight Final Rule. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3. 

[4] In 2003, TSA initiated work on developing a passenger prescreening 
system operated by the federal government. At the time, passenger 
prescreening involved U.S. and foreign air carriers matching passenger 
information against watchlists to identify passengers who should 
undergo additional security scrutiny. We performed this work in 
accordance with statutory mandates, beginning with the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, § 519, 
117 Stat. 1137, 1155-56 (2003), and, most recently, the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. 
D, § 512, 122 Stat. 3574, 3682-83 (2008), and pursuant to the requests 
of various congressional committees. 

[5] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities 
Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are 
Needed to Mitigate Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292] (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 
2009). 

[6] GAO, Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency 
Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help 
Inform Future Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-476] (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2012). 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-476]. These actions 
addressed our 2009 recommendation. 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292]. 

[9] For purposes of this report, and unless otherwise noted, 
references to TSOs, which include TDCs, include both TSA-employed 
screening personnel and screening personnel employed by a private 
sector company contracted with TSA to perform screening services at 
airports participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49 
U.S.C. § 44920. 

[10] We did not evaluate the extent to which Secure Flight screening 
determinations for low-risk passengers are implemented at airport 
security checkpoints. 

[11] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1, 1999). 

[12] See generally Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
(GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). GPRA was updated by 
the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 
3866 (2011). Although GPRA's requirements apply at the agency level, 
on the basis of our review of related GAO products, Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and studies by the National 
Academy of Public Administration and the Urban Institute, we have 
previously reported that these requirements can serve as leading 
practices in lower levels within an organization, such as with 
individual programs or initiatives. See GAO, Pipeline Safety: 
Management of the Office of Pipeline Safety's Enforcement Program 
Needs Further Strengthening, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-801] (Washington D.C.: July 23, 
2004). 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[14] Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008) 
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1560). 

[15] See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3. Aircraft operators must transmit 
available SFPD to Secure Flight approximately 72 hours prior to 
scheduled flight departure. For reservations created within 72 hours 
of flight departure, covered aircraft operators must submit passenger 
data as soon as they become available. 

[16] Secure Flight also matches passenger data against the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Do Not Board List, which includes 
individuals who pose a significant health risk to other travelers and 
are not allowed to fly. The Do Not Board List is managed by CDC. See 
appendix II for information on all the lists Secure Flight uses for 
screening. 

[17] The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) administers 
the TSA Cleared List. DHS established DHS TRIP in February 2007 to 
provide individuals, including those who believe they have been 
delayed or inconvenienced during travel because they have been wrongly 
identified as the subject of a watchlist record, an opportunity to be 
cleared. We have ongoing work on the extent to which DHS TRIP addresses 
delays and inconveniences associated with Secure Flight screening and 
expect to report on this work in September 2014. 

[18] Because of the application of other TSA security measures, such 
as random selection, an individual's presence on the Cleared List will 
diminish, but not preclude, the possibility of being selected for 
enhanced screening. The technical term for redress number is "redress 
control number." 

[19] This process may also involve the Secure Flight analyst 
contacting the Terrorist Screening Center for assistance in confirming 
or ruling out the match. 

[20] This section describes checkpoint screening activities as of May 
2014. When Secure Flight implementation began, in 2009, TSA did not 
have a program in place to identify low-risk passengers eligible for 
expedited screening. We discuss more recent activities of TSA and the 
Secure Flight program to identify low-risk passengers for expedited 
screening later in this report. 

[21] Passengers who are to receive standard screening could receive 
expedited screening as part of Managed Inclusion at the screening 
checkpoint. Under Managed Inclusion, TSA randomly directs a certain 
percentage of passengers not otherwise designated that day as eligible 
for expedited screening to the expedited screening lane. Additionally, 
passengers designated for expedited screening may receive standard 
screening as part of random and unpredictable security measures. We 
expect to issue a report on expedited screening, including managed 
inclusion, later this year. 

[22] The level of screening for a passenger may change from flight to 
flight based on the particulars of a flight or the individual. 

[23] Passengers matched to the No Fly and CDC Do Not Board Lists are 
considered highest risk, and thus are not to receive boarding passes, 
and should not be allowed entry at airport checkpoints. 

[24] Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, TSA was to assume performance of the passenger prescreening 
function of comparing passenger information against the No Fly and 
Selectee Lists and utilize all appropriate records in the consolidated 
and integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the federal 
government in performing that function. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C). 

[25] TSA uses two separate lists to address vulnerabilities exposed by 
the 2009 attempted attack. Further detail about these lists has been 
designated sensitive information, and thus cannot be included in a 
public report. 

[26] CBP collects additional passenger information in order to fulfill 
its mission of securing the U.S. border while facilitating lawful 
travel and trade. See 19 C.F.R. § 122.49a(b)(3). 

[27] These rules are criteria used by ATS-P to create the rules-based 
watchlists. The Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties, Privacy Office, and Office of the General 
Counsel are responsible for conducting quarterly reviews of these 
rules. The reviews are intended to ensure the rules are based on 
current intelligence identifying specific potential threats; are 
deactivated when no longer necessary to address those threats; are 
appropriately tailored to minimize the impact upon bona fide 
travelers' civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy; and are in 
compliance with relevant legal authorities, regulations, and DHS 
policies. 

[28] According to TSA officials, individuals remain on the list for 
the time required to cover the scheduled travel. 

[29] According to officials within TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, 
Secure Flight's use of rules-based watchlists is consistent with 
conducting watchlist matching under the "larger set of watchlists 
maintained by the Federal government as warranted by security 
considerations" as explained in the Secure Flight Final Rule, and 
nothing in statute or regulation prevents TSA from using non-TSDB-
derived watchlists citing, among other provisions, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114 
and 44903(j)(2)(C). 

[30] According to TSA officials, the entire TSDB is not used for 
Secure Flight screening because records with partial data (i.e., 
without first name, surname, and date of birth) could result in a 
significant increase in the number of passengers misidentified as 
being on the watchlist and cause unwarranted delay or inconvenience to 
travelers. 

[31] All TSDB-based watchlists utilized by the Secure Flight program 
contain records determined to have met the reasonable suspicion 
standard. In general, to meet the reasonable suspicion standard, the 
agency nominating an individual for inclusion in the TSDB must 
consider the totality of information available that, taken together 
with rational inferences from that information, reasonably warrants a 
determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or have 
been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in 
aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. As previously 
discussed, to be included on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, 
individuals must meet criteria specific to these lists. The TSDB, 
which is the U.S. government's consolidated watchlist of known or 
suspected terrorists, also contains records on additional populations 
of individuals that do not meet the reasonable suspicion standard 
articulated above that other federal agencies utilize to support their 
border and immigration screening missions. 

[32] Secure Flight also randomly identifies passengers as selectees 
for enhanced screening. 

[33] When TSA, through Secure Flight, determines that a passenger is 
eligible for expedited screening, the passenger's boarding pass is 
encoded so that he or she is routed to the proper screening lane. 

[34] TSA also tracks the number of passengers who receive expedited 
screening. 

[35] We expect to issue a report on TSA's Precheck™ program later this 
year. 

[36] Individuals on the TSA Precheck™ lists receive Known Traveler 
Numbers that they must submit when making travel reservations to be 
identified as low-risk. See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3 (defining "Known 
Traveler Number"). TSA also refers to these lists as Known Traveler 
lists. 

[37] The three CBP Trusted Traveler programs are NEXUS, SENTRI, and 
Global Entry. See GAO, Trusted Travelers: Programs Provide Benefits 
but Enrollment Processes Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-483] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 
2014). 

[38] As of March 2014, the TSA Precheck™list for the U.S. armed forces 
included eligible members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
and Coast Guard. 

[39] According to TSA officials, per these agreements, agencies are to 
maintain the lists by ensuring that individuals continue to meet the 
criteria for inclusion and to update the lists as needed. We did not 
review the extent to which agencies are maintaining the lists. 

[40] TSA leveraged existing federal capabilities to both enroll and 
conduct background checks for program applicants. For example, for the 
TSA Precheck™Application Program, TSA is using enrollment centers 
previously established for the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential Program (TSA's program to provide a biometric credential to 
certain transportation workers) and existing transportation vetting 
systems to conduct applicant background checks. 

[41] An applicant must be a U.S. citizen, U.S. national, or lawful 
permanent resident and cannot have been convicted of certain crimes. 
To apply, individuals must visit an enrollment center, provide 
biographic information (name, date of birth, and address) and valid 
identity and citizenship documentation, and be fingerprinted. The 
program requires a nonrefundable application processing fee of $85.00. 

[42] Passengers identified by Secure Flight as low risk are eligible 
for expedited screening through TSA Precheck™, but may not receive 
this expedited screening. For example, TSA Precheck™ includes a level 
of randomness to ensure unpredictable results. One potential result of 
the randomness is that a passenger who is eligible to receive 
expedited screening may instead be randomly selected to receive 
standard or enhanced screening. 

[43] In July 2012, TSA also began screening against a TSA Precheck™ 
Disqualification Protocol List, a watchlist created and maintained by 
TSA that includes individuals who, based upon their involvement in 
violations of security regulations of sufficient severity or frequency 
(e.g., bringing a loaded firearm to the checkpoint), are disqualified 
from receiving expedited screening for some period of time or 
permanently. 

[44] Only those frequent flier members who meet the criteria 
established by TSA are eligible for these assessments. Because Secure 
Flight does not collect or maintain frequent flier information, air 
carriers signal to TSA which passengers meet these criteria. 

[45] In addition, TSA continues to use frequent flier data to identify 
as low risk those individuals who opted into the TSA Precheck™program 
through their airline during the pilot. 

[46] Also, because these TSA Precheck™ risk assessments identify 
percentages of passengers likely to have received expedited screening, 
the same passenger who is TSA Precheck™-eligible on one flight may not 
be designated as such on another flight. 

[47] At airports participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program, 
private companies under contract to TSA are to perform screening 
functions with TSA supervision and in accordance with TSA standard 
operating procedures. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. At these airports, 
private sector screeners, and not TSA employees, have responsibility 
for screening passengers and their property. For purposes of this 
report, references to TSOs include both TSA employees and screeners 
employed by private screening contractors. 

[48] This report focuses on TSA efforts to ensure that individuals 
receive appropriate levels of screening at U.S. airports. At foreign 
airports, U.S.- and foreign-flagged air carrier operations destined for 
the United States are responsible for ensuring that passengers and 
their carry-on baggage are screened according to their risk level--
consistent with requirements in the air carriers' TSA-approved 
security programs and any applicable TSA security directives or 
emergency amendments. See generally 49 C.F.R. pts. 1544 and 1546. 
Unlike at U.S. airports, TSA does not conduct or oversee screening 
operations at foreign airports. Therefore, we are not discussing 
passenger screening at foreign airports in this report. TSA's Office 
of Global Strategies inspects air carrier compliance with Secure 
Flight-related requirements at foreign airports. We reported in 
October 2011 on the challenges the Office of Global Strategies faces 
in this process, including limited access to some foreign airports. 
See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Its Foreign 
Airport Assessments, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen the 
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-163] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2011). 

[49] In November 2007, in addition to allowing paper boarding passes, 
TSA began allowing air carriers to issue mobile boarding passes, 
which, for example, passengers may download to their cell phones. 

[50] These variations are identified in the TDC standard operating 
procedures. 

[51] The details of these screening errors are considered sensitive 
information. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[53] Statement of Kelly Hoggan, Assistant Administrator, TSA Office of 
Security Capabilities, before the House Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, June 19, 2012. 

[54] See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107(c) (prohibiting, in general, an 
individual from entering a sterile area or boarding an aircraft if the 
individual does not present a verifying identity document when 
requested for purposes of watchlist matching). 

[55] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292]. 

[56] GAO, Aviation Security: Status of TSA's Acquisition of Technology 
for Screening Passenger Identification and Boarding Passes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-826T] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 19, 2012). 

[57] Boarding pass scanners also indicate when a passenger is eligible 
for expedited screening through TSA Precheck™. 

[58] TSA initially used boarding pass scanners provided and owned by 
airlines to scan TSA Precheck™ and mobile boarding passes. According 
to TSA officials, as these airline-owned scanners become inoperable, 
TSA plans to phase them out and replace them with TSA-owned scanners. 

[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-826T]. 

[60] Secure Flight program management reports externally (to DHS and 
the Office of Managementand Budget (OMB)) on nine measures. Specifically, 
Secure Flight reports to DHS on six Key Performance Parameters, which 
are key system capabilities that must be met for a system to meet its 
operational goals. In addition, Secure Flight reports on five measures 
to OMB as part of its yearly exhibit 300, also called the Capital Asset 
Plan and Business Case--a document that agencies submit to OMB to 
justify resource requests for major information technology (IT) 
investments. Two of the Key Performance Parameters and OMB measures 
are the same; therefore, the program reports externally on nine 
distinct measures. 

[61] The measures are contained on the Secure Flight Executive 
Dashboard, a compilation of data capturing various aspects of Secure 
Flight's operations on a weekly, monthly, and year-to-date basis. 

[62] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). GPRA was updated by the GPRA Modernization 
Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 stat. 3866 (2011). 

[63] GAO, Agencies' Annual Performance Plans under the Results Act: An 
Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD,10.1.18] 
(Washington, D.C.: February 1998), and The Results Act: An Evaluator's 
Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20] (Washington, D.C.: April 
1998). 

[64] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20]. 

[65] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20]. 

[66] Further details on the challenges TSA faces in identifying when 
Secure Flight may miss individuals on lists is sensitive information 
and therefore could not be included in a public report. 

[67] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292]. 

[68] These passenger data are available to Secure Flight for testing 
purposes because the system retains passenger data and the results of 
Secure Flight matches in the system for up to 7 days after completion 
of the passenger's directional travel. After 7 days, all data for 
passengers not identified as matches to a high-risk watchlist must be 
expunged from the system. 

[69] Valid Known Traveler Numbers are those that appear on TSA Precheck™
 program lists of passengers eligible for expedited screening. 

[70] The process involves TSA's Contact Center, which is staffed with 
personnel to answer passenger questions or accept passenger feedback 
about travel-related security screening. Specifically, when passengers 
submit oral or written feedback that involves failure to receive TSA 
Precheck™screening, a Contact Center representative is to forward this 
information to Secure Flight. Secure Flight staff investigate these 
cases to identify and, if necessary, address factors that caused the 
passenger not to receive TSA Precheck™ status, such as, for example, 
mistyping the known travel number or other personal information when 
making a reservation. 

[71] A more detailed explanation of why Secure Flight does not have 
this information is considered sensitive information and therefore 
could not be included in a public report. 

[72] According to TSA officials, as of June 2014, Secure Flight had 
not obtained authorization for additional staff that would be 
necessary to obtain additional information on misidentifications; 
therefore, officials were unable to provide a time frame for when 
these requirements would be implemented. 

[73] The Secure Flight system availability measure--a Key Performance 
Parameter and an OMB 300 Measure--tracks the total amount of time the 
Secure Flight system (within Secure Flight bounds) is available for 
matching activities. Secure Flight's false positive measure was 
discussed previously. All Secure Flight measures are defined in 
appendix III. 

[74] These requirements allow Secure Flight to retain Secure Flight 
matching results for passengers not identified as a match to a 
government watchlist for up to 7 days, potential matches for up to 7 
years, and confirmed matches for up to 99 years, after which they must 
be purged from the system. According to Secure Flight documentation, 
records for passengers identified as low risk (either because they 
match one of the low-risk TSA Precheck™ Lists or because they were 
identified as low risk through Secure Flight's flight-by-flight 
assessments) are treated the same as nonmatches and must be purged 
within 7 days. Records for passengers who match other watchlists are 
treated as potential matches and must be purged within 7 years. 

[75] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[76] We requested documentation for all meetings of the Match Review 
Board since its implementation in March 2010 through fiscal year 2013, 
and TSA provided documentation pertaining to 51 meetings. The 
documentation distributed for meetings included meeting minutes and 
Power Point slides. The Power Point slides contained detailed 
information (such as the results of analyses or the status of ongoing 
work) pertaining to meeting agenda items. More detailed information on 
performance issues discussed in the meetings is considered sensitive 
information and cannot be included in a public report. 

[77] Information on the time frames of our request and the number of 
system matching errors TSA identified is considered sensitive 
information and cannot be included in a public report. 

[78] These cases were ones in which the Match Review Board 
documentation contained sufficient identifying information about 
Secure Flight system matching errors to allow us to determine it was 
not included on the list TSA provided us. 

[79] For purposes of this report, and unless otherwise noted, 
references to TSOs, which include TDCs, include both TSA-employed 
screening personnel and screening personnel employed by a private 
sector company contracted with TSA to perform screening services at 
airports participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49 
U.S.C. § 44920. 

[80] We did not evaluate the extent to which Secure Flight screening 
determinations for low-risk passengers are implemented at airport 
security checkpoints. We expect to issue a report on screening for low-
risk passengers later this year. 

[81] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1, 1999). 

[82] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). GPRA was updated by the GPRA Modernization 
Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). 

[83] See GAO. Pipeline Safety: Management of the Office of Pipeline 
Safety's Enforcement Program Needs Further Strengthening, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-801] (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). 

[84] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[85] TSA considers passengers who are not identified by Secure Flight 
as either low risk or high risk as having unknown risk. 

[86] This information, known collectively as Secure Flight Passenger 
Data (SFPD), includes personally identifiable information, such as 
full name, gender, date of birth, passport information (if available), 
and certain nonpersonally identifiable information, such as itinerary 
information and the unique number associated with a travel record 
(record number locator). See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3. 

[87] TSA also screens certain nontraveling individuals who are 
authorized to access the airport's sterile area, such as escorts for 
minor, elderly, and disabled passengers; airport and aircraft operator 
employees; and law enforcement officers. In general, the "sterile 
area" is the portion of an airport beyond the security screening 
checkpoint that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to 
which access is generally controlled or overseen by TSA. See 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1540.5. 

[88] Standard screening typically includes a walk-through metal 
detector or Advanced Imaging Technology screening, which is to 
identify objects or anomalies concealed under clothing, and X-ray 
screening for the passenger's accessible property. 

[89] Measures prepared as part of the agency's exhibit 300 are 
displayed on the Federal Information Technology dashboard website, 
which was established to provide information on the effectiveness of 
government information technology programs and to support decisions 
regarding the investment and management of resources. 

[90] See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.3. Aircraft operators must transmit 
available SFPD to Secure Flight approximately 72 hours prior to 
scheduled flight departure. For reservations created within 72 hours 
of flight departure, covered aircraft operators must submit passenger 
data as soon as they become available. 

[91] The lists Secure Flight uses to identify high-risk passengers 
include the No Fly, Selectee, and Expanded Selectee Lists, which are 
subsets derived from the Terrorist Screening Database, the U.S. 
government's consolidated watchlist of known or suspected terrorists 
that is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, a multiagency 
organization administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 
lists Secure Flight uses to identify low-risk passengers are 
associated with the TSA Precheck™Program, a 2011 initiative that 
allows TSA to designate preapproved passengers as low risk. In 
addition, the system uses passenger data to perform TSA Precheck™ risk 
assessments to identify travelers as low risk for a specific flight. 

[92] The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) administers 
the TSA Cleared List. DHS established DHS TRIP in February 2007 to 
provide individuals, including those who believe they have been 
delayed or inconvenienced during travel because they have been wrongly 
identified as the subject of a watchlist record, an opportunity to be 
cleared. We plan to report later this year on Secure Flight-related 
redress issues. 

[93] Because of the application of other TSA security measures, such 
as random selection, an individual's presence on the Cleared List will 
likely diminish, but not preclude, the possibility of being selected 
for enhanced screening. The technical term for redress number is 
"redress control number." 

[94] This process may also involve the Secure Flight analyst 
contacting the Terrorist Screening Center for assistance in confirming 
or ruling out the match. The Secure Flight Operations Center (SOC) 
serves as a centralized point for handling the manual review of 
potential matches, resolving potential matches at the airport, and 
answering general air carrier questions. 

[95] See 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b). 

[96] Standard screening typically includes a walk-through metal 
detector or Advanced Imaging Technology screening, which identifies 
objects or anomalies concealed under clothing, and X-ray screening for 
the passenger's accessible property. In the event a walk-through metal 
detector triggers an alarm or the Advanced Imaging Technology 
identifies an anomaly or suspicious item, additional security 
measures--such as pat-downs, explosives trace detection searches 
(which involve a device certified by TSA to detect explosive 
particles), or additional physical searches--may ensue as part of the 
resolution process. Enhanced screening includes, in addition to the 
procedures applied during a typical standard screening experience, a 
pat-down and an explosives trace detection search or physical search 
of the interior of the passenger's accessible property, electronics, 
and footwear. Expedited screening typically includes walk-through 
metal detector screening and X-ray screening of the passenger's 
accessible property, but unlike in standard screening, travelers do 
not have to, among other things, remove their belts, shoes, or light 
outerwear. Passengers with boarding passes that are not marked for 
enhanced or expedited screening receive standard screening, unless 
otherwise identified by TSA for enhanced or expedited screening 
through the application of random and unpredictable security measures 
at the screening checkpoint. 

[End of section] 

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