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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2014: 

Defense Management: 

DOD Needs to Improve Future Assessments of Roles and Missions: 

GAO-14-668: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-668, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOD is one of the largest organizations in the world, with its budget 
representing over half of the U.S. federal government's discretionary 
spending. According to DOD, the global security environment presents 
an increasingly complex set of challenges. Congress requires DOD to 
assess and report on its roles and missions every 4 years. In July 
2012, DOD submitted its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review report. 

In June 2013, GAO was mandated to review DOD's process for conducting 
the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. GAO evaluated the 
extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed report and 
conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and missions. 
GAO compared DOD's July 2012 report with the statutory requirements 
for the assessment, and compared DOD's assessment process with key 
principles derived from a broad selection of principles GAO and other 
federal agencies have identified. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Defense's (DOD) July 2012 submission to Congress 
following its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review did 
not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the 
statutorily required elements of the assessment. Specifically, DOD's 
July 2012 submission included the results of a 2011 review that led to 
the January 2012 release of a new strategic guidance document 
(hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) as well as 
the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report. Although DOD is not 
statutorily required to report on all elements of the assessment, the 
submission that it provided to Congress was lacking key information. A 
key principle for information quality indicates that information 
presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently detailed; 
however, neither the Defense Strategic Guidance nor the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review included sufficiently detailed information 
about certain key elements of the roles and missions assessment. For 
example, while the submitted documents identify the core missions of 
the armed services and provide some information on capabilities 
associated with these missions, neither document provides other 
information required by the roles and missions assessment—including 
identifying the DOD components responsible for providing the 
identified core competencies and capabilities and identifying plans 
for addressing any unnecessary duplication or capability gaps. 

DOD's process for assessing roles and missions missed key principles 
associated with effective and comprehensive assessments. Specifically, 
DOD limited its process to leveraging the prior review that resulted 
in the Defense Strategic Guidance; by doing so its process did not 
include the following: 

* A planned approach: DOD did not develop or document a planned 
approach that included the principles or assumptions used to inform 
the assessment. 

* Internal stakeholder involvement: DOD included limited internal 
stakeholder involvement. For example, DOD gave the armed services a 
limited opportunity to review the draft prior to its release. 

* Identification and involvement of external stakeholders: DOD 
obtained limited input from relevant external stakeholders, such as 
Congress, on the specific guidance and direction they expected of the 
roles and missions assessment. 

* Time frames: DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for 
conducting the assessment and completing the report, which may have 
contributed to the report being provided to Congress over 5 months 
late. DOD officials stated that the primary reason that they did not 
perform a separate roles and missions review is that the statutory 
requirements were duplicative of other reviews and processes, such as 
the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, by not conducting a 
comprehensive assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to conduct a 
department-wide examination of roles and missions. Instead, by relying 
on processes established for other purposes, DOD has limited assurance 
that it has fully identified all possible cost savings that can be 
achieved through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and that 
it has positioned itself to report clear and sufficient information 
about the statutorily required assessment to Congress. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that, in conducting future assessments of roles and 
missions, DOD develop a comprehensive process that includes a planned 
approach, involvement of key internal and external stakeholder 
involvement, and time frames. DOD partially concurred, stating that it 
had leveraged other processes. GAO maintains that the roles and 
missions report was insufficiently detailed and continues to believe 
the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-668]. For more 
information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information in Its Report to 
Congress or Conduct a Comprehensive Process for Assessing Roles and 
Missions: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Related Strategic Reviews and Other Selected Strategic and 
Planning Documents: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Selected Roles and Missions-Related Documents: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 31, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of the largest and most complex 
organizations in the world, and its budget represents over half of the 
entire U.S. federal government's discretionary spending. DOD stated in 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) that the 
global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of 
challenges and opportunities.[Footnote 1] These include those 
resulting from geopolitical changes, changes in modern warfare, and 
changes in the fiscal environment. It is important, therefore, that 
DOD make decisions strategically regarding its missions and associated 
competencies and capabilities, and assign and clarify to its 
components their roles and responsibilities while avoiding unnecessary 
duplication. 

DOD is required to regularly assess and report on its roles and 
missions in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. Specifically, 
every 4 years, DOD is required to assess the roles and missions of the 
armed services, including their core competencies and capabilities to 
support DOD missions.[Footnote 2] DOD is, among other things, required 
to identify which office, agency, activity, or command is responsible 
for providing these core competencies and capabilities, any gaps in 
core competencies and capabilities, and any unnecessary duplication of 
effort. DOD is to submit to Congress a report of this assessment no 
later than the date the President submits the budget for the next 
fiscal year.[Footnote 3] A comprehensive, department-wide assessment 
of DOD's roles and missions can provide DOD an opportunity to identify 
core competencies and capabilities, including human capital and 
acquisition needs, and to clearly assign responsibility for these 
competencies and capabilities across the department. By routinely 
reviewing its roles and missions, DOD is better suited to support the 
development of key strategy and policy guidance, as found in the 
Defense Strategic Guidance and the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
[Footnote 4] and to keep DOD implementing directives that formally 
establish the roles of DOD components current. 

Our prior body of work has found that the department needs to assess 
its strategic roles and mission needs, such as human capital 
management and prioritization of major capital investments including 
weapon system acquisitions. Since 2001, we have listed strategic human 
capital management as a government-wide, high-risk area, stating that 
serious human capital shortfalls threatened the ability of many 
federal agencies to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform 
their missions.[Footnote 5] In February 2011, we narrowed the scope of 
our high-risk area to focus on the most significant challenge 
remaining--closing mission critical skills gaps.[Footnote 6] We have 
also made specific recommendations to DOD to improve the department's 
use of its critical skills and competency assessments to inform its 
strategic human capital management, concluding that it is imperative 
that the department cautiously and strategically take into account 
critical skills and competencies needed to maintain and meet its 
missions.[Footnote 7] We also have found that DOD can improve its 
acquisition outcomes by pursuing an integrated portfolio management 
approach to weapon system investments.[Footnote 8] We found that, 
although the armed services fight together on the battlefield as a 
joint force, they identify needs and allocate resources separately, 
using fragmented decision-making processes that do not allow for an 
integrated portfolio management approach, potentially resulting in 
capability gaps or unnecessary duplication.[Footnote 9] Further, we 
have found that DOD can reduce unnecessary duplication, overlap, and 
fragmentation in its programs and operations, thereby potentially 
achieving cost savings.[Footnote 10] 

A comprehensive assessment of DOD's roles and missions is intended to 
clarify responsibilities for providing key capabilities, identify 
areas of unnecessary duplication, and identify opportunities for 
reducing waste in a time of constrained defense budgets. However, 
Congress has raised concerns with both of the Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review submissions that DOD has issued to date. DOD provided 
its first submission in January 2009, which the House Armed Services 
Committee found was lacking in completeness.[Footnote 11] 
Specifically, the committee urged the Secretary of Defense to take a 
more comprehensive approach, instead of focusing only on the 
department's planned investments to meet asymmetric challenges. In 
July 2012, DOD provided its second submission.[Footnote 12] In the 
House Armed Services Committee's report accompanying the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee stated 
that the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review submission also 
did not meet expectations and was late.[Footnote 13] The committee 
stated in the report that the submission identified only the missions 
of the armed services, one of six required elements of the roles and 
missions assessment.[Footnote 14] 

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying its bill for 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated 
us to review the Secretary of Defense's process for conducting the 
2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.[Footnote 15] This report 
evaluates the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed 
report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and 
missions. 

To evaluate the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed 
report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and 
missions, we reviewed DOD's final submission for the Quadrennial Roles 
and Missions Review, which included the Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review report and the Defense Strategic Guidance, and we reviewed the 
specific processes DOD used to conduct the assessment that preceded 
it. For our review of DOD's submission, three GAO analysts 
independently compared DOD's July 2012 submission for the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review with the statutory requirements for the 
assessment. A fourth analyst reviewed the results of these independent 
comparisons to confirm that consensus had been reached by the other 
analysts. In addition, we used this kind of methodology to compare the 
information in DOD's submission with the key principle that the 
information be sufficiently detailed when reporting information for 
use by Congress and other decision makers, which we derived from GAO 
and DOD guidance.[Footnote 16] For additional context, these analysts 
also independently conducted a similar analysis of DOD's 2009 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report.[Footnote 17] For our 
review of DOD's specific processes, we compared DOD's processes for 
the assessment with key principles for conducting similar reviews 
which, we derived from a broad selection of principles GAO has 
previously established, and other federal agency guidance related to 
conducting department-wide assessments.[Footnote 18] Specifically, we 
distilled the key principles from relevant guidance from the Office of 
Management and Budget for conducting strategic reviews and plans and 
from DOD for providing high-quality information; desirable 
characteristics for developing an effective national strategy; 
guidance for conducting studies; and relevant principles for reporting 
on and conducting other types of assessments such as risk and cost 
assessments. Of the documents we reviewed, the principles we chose 
were found in multiple documents and were applicable to comprehensive 
assessments such as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. We 
discussed these principles with DOD officials, who agreed they were 
reasonable to use to evaluate the assessment process. We also 
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, Office of Director of Administration and 
Management, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department 
of the Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps about the process that DOD 
used for the most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, the 
extent to which DOD's process for conducting and reporting on the 
review was comprehensive, and any thoughts on how future reviews might 
be improved based on lessons learned from the most recent review. 
Finally, we interviewed eight defense experts selected on the basis of 
their prior involvement with the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
and authorship of recent publications about the roles and missions of 
the armed services. While their views are not generalizable, we 
obtained the experts' perspectives on how future reviews might be 
improved. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to July 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Every 4 years, DOD is required to conduct and report on a 
comprehensive assessment--the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review--
of the roles and missions of the armed services and the core 
competencies and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such roles 
and missions.[Footnote 19] Specifically, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is to conduct an independent military assessment of 
the roles and missions of the armed forces, assignment of functions 
among the armed services, and any recommendations regarding issues 
that need to be addressed. The Secretary of Defense is then to 
identify: 

* the core mission areas of the armed services; 

* the core competencies and capabilities associated with these mission 
areas; 

* the DOD component responsible for providing the identified core 
competency or capability; 

* any gaps in the ability of the component to provide the competency 
or capability; 

* any unnecessary duplication of competencies or capabilities between 
components; and: 

* a plan for addressing any gaps or unnecessary duplication. 

The Secretary is then to submit a report on this Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review following the review and not later than the submission 
of the President's budget for the next fiscal year; however, the 
statutory reporting requirement does not explicitly require that all 
required elements of the assessment be reported.[Footnote 20] 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review that resulted in the July 
2012 submission occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews 
that DOD has undertaken over the past 5 years. Some of these reviews 
resulted in specific strategy documents, such as the National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and 
National Security Space Strategy.[Footnote 21] DOD is also required to 
conduct two reviews on a regular basis that relate to the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review: the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
Biennial Review of DOD Agencies and Field Activities. The timing 
requirements for the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review result in each Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review occurring 2 years before and 2 years after a 
Quadrennial Defense Review. In December 2010, DOD also reissued its 
internal DOD Directive 5100.01, which establishes the functions of DOD 
and its major components, and, in September 2011, released an update 
of the Unified Command Plan, which allocates responsibilities among 
the combatant commands.[Footnote 22] In addition to these recurring 
strategy reviews, comprehensive assessments, and updates to DOD 
guidance, DOD has recently completed two other reviews: the Defense 
Strategic Guidance, which identified the strategic interests of the 
United States, and the Strategic Choices Management Review, initiated 
by the Secretary of Defense in 2013 to inform DOD's planning for 
declining future budgets. 

The Defense Strategic Guidance, released in January 2012, was directed 
by the President to identify the strategic interests of the United 
States. The document states that it was an assessment of the defense 
strategy prompted by the changing geopolitical environment and fiscal 
pressures. The Defense Strategic Guidance was developed by senior 
officials from DOD--including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Staff, the armed services, and the combatant commands--and 
the White House. The document outlines security challenges the United 
States faces and is intended to guide the development of the Joint 
Force through 2020 and during a period of anticipated fiscal 
constraints. The Defense Strategic Guidance identified 10 primary 
missions of the armed forces, as well as several principles to guide 
the force and program development necessary to achieve these missions. 
For more information about the Defense Strategic Guidance and other 
selected strategy and planning documents, see appendix I. 

DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information in Its Report to 
Congress or Conduct a Comprehensive Process for Assessing Roles and 
Missions: 

DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information to Congress: 

In July 2012, DOD submitted the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
report, together with the Defense Strategic Guidance, to Congress to 
meet the statutory reporting requirement; however, DOD's submission 
did not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the 
statutorily required elements of the assessment.[Footnote 23] Although 
the statute does not require DOD to report on all elements of the 
roles and missions assessment, a key principle for information quality 
indicates that information presented to Congress should be clear and 
sufficiently detailed.[Footnote 24] Specifically, we found that DOD 
provided the missions of the armed services and some information about 
core capabilities, but did not, for any of the 10 missions, clearly 
identify the components within the department responsible for 
providing the core competencies and capabilities, or identify any 
plans to address any capability gaps or unnecessary duplication. 

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report identifies missions 
of the armed services and provides information about capabilities and 
previously identified areas of duplication. The report restates the 10 
missions of the armed forces identified in the Defense Strategic 
Guidance, and identifies some protected capabilities and investments 
needed to carry out each of the missions. For example, the report 
restates DOD's mission to project power despite anti-access/area 
denial challenges.[Footnote 25] It then lists five key enhancements 
and protected capabilities associated with this mission: enhance 
electronic warfare, develop a new penetrating bomber, protect the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter program, sustain undersea dominance and enhance 
capabilities, and develop and enhance preferred munitions 
capabilities. Additionally, the report also mentioned some previously 
identified areas of duplication and actions that were subsequently 
taken, such as eliminating redundancy in intelligence organizations, 
or proceeding with previous plans to eliminate organizations that 
performed duplicative functions or outlived their original purpose: 
the report notes the consolidation of specialized intelligence offices 
across DOD into two Defense Intelligence Agency task forces focused on 
counterterrorism and terrorism finance. Finally, the report also 
provides specific information about Information Operations as well as 
detention and interrogation, both of which were required to be 
included in this Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.[Footnote 26] 
Prior to the submission to Congress, senior DOD leadership--including 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, the 
DOD General Counsel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative 
Affairs, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Director of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation, Director of the Joint Staff, Under 
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air 
Force--internally concurred that the submission met the statutory 
requirement according to a tracking sheet used by the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

While the submission identifies core missions for the armed services 
and provides some information about capabilities and competencies 
needed for those missions, it does not provide sufficiently detailed 
information about other statutorily required elements of the roles and 
missions assessment. In our review of the report, we found that DOD 
did not, for any of the 10 missions, clearly identify the components 
within the department responsible for providing the core competencies 
and capabilities, or identify any plans to address any capability gaps 
or unnecessary duplication. For example: 

* The submission does not provide clear and sufficiently detailed 
information on which component or components are responsible for 
enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, which is identified by DOD 
as one of the key capabilities needed to project power despite anti-
access/area denial challenges. In our prior work, we have found that 
DOD needed to strengthen its management and oversight of electronic 
warfare programs and activities, reduce overlap, and improve its 
return on its multibillion-dollar acquisition investments.[Footnote 
27] DOD has acknowledged that it faces ongoing challenges in 
determining whether the current level of investment is optimally 
matched with the existing capability gaps.[Footnote 28] However, its 
submission does not provide sufficiently detailed information of its 
approach to assign responsibilities, close potential gaps, or 
eliminate unnecessary duplication. 

* The submission also does not provide clear and sufficiently detailed 
information on which components are responsible for enhancing airborne 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, which are 
required for counterterrorism and irregular warfare missions. In our 
prior work, we have found that ineffective acquisition practices and 
collaboration efforts in the DOD unmanned aircraft systems portfolio 
creates overlap and the potential for duplication among a number of 
current programs and systems.[Footnote 29] Similarly, we have noted 
that opportunities exist to avoid unnecessary redundancies and 
maximize the efficient use of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities.[Footnote 30] However, DOD's submission 
does not clarify responsibilities among the Air Force, Army, or Navy 
for developing these capabilities. 

This is the second time that DOD did not provide sufficiently detailed 
information to Congress following its roles and missions assessment. 
In the first Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report submitted to 
Congress in 2009, DOD identified the core missions of the department 
and identified the DOD Joint Capabilities Areas as the core 
competencies for the department.[Footnote 31] However, the report did 
not provide details for all elements required of the assessment. For 
example, the report did not provide core competencies and capabilities-
-including identifying responsible organizations--for each of the 
missions; instead the report provided some capability information for 
only specific focus areas within some of these missions. Despite the 
limited information contained in the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review Report, the department used that first review to 
inform changes later made in DOD Directive 5100.01, which establishes 
functions of the department and its major components. However, as a 
result of not providing clear, sufficiently detailed, and relevant 
information in the most recent submission, DOD did not provide 
Congress comprehensive information about roles, responsibilities, and 
needed capabilities and competencies that Congress was seeking. 

DOD Did Not Conduct a Comprehensive Process for the Roles and Missions 
Assessment: 

DOD did not conduct a comprehensive process for the roles and missions 
assessment. Instead DOD limited its approach to leveraging the results 
of another review, conducted in 2011, that resulted in the January 
2012 release of the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, this earlier 
review was not intended to assess all elements the statute required of 
the roles and missions review and, as a result, by relying on it DOD 
does not have the assurance that its resulting assessment was 
comprehensive. We recognize that there were some benefits to this 
approach, as the Defense Strategic Guidance did identify primary 
missions of the armed services, which were then provided as the core 
missions required for the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. In 
addition, the Defense Strategic Guidance provided several principles 
to guide the force and program development necessary to achieve these 
missions. The Defense Strategic Guidance also became the basis for 
completing the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. However, 
neither DOD's review for preparing the Defense Strategic Guidance nor 
the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review itself clearly identified 
the components within the department that are responsible for 
providing the core competencies and capabilities needed to address 
each of the primary missions, or plans for addressing any capability 
gaps or unnecessary duplication. 

Further, by using such an approach for preparing the roles and 
missions assessment, DOD did not document and follow key principles 
for conducting an effective and comprehensive assessment.[Footnote 32] 
These principles include (1) developing and documenting a planned 
approach, including the principles or assumptions that will inform the 
assessment, which addresses all statutory requirements; (2) involving 
key internal stakeholders; (3) identifying and seeking input from 
appropriate external stakeholders; and (4) establishing time frames 
with milestones for conducting the assessment and completing the 
report. 

* Planned approach: DOD did not develop and document its planned 
approach, including the principles or assumptions used to inform and 
address all statutory requirements of the assessment.[Footnote 33] 
Specifically, it did not document in its approach how it was going to 
address the statutory requirements related to the identification of 
components responsible for providing the core competencies and 
capabilities, any gaps, or any unnecessary duplication. A documented, 
planned approach provides a framework for understanding the strategic 
direction and the assumptions used to identify, analyze, assess, and 
address the statutory requirements of the assessment. 

* Internal stakeholder involvement: The involvement of key internal 
stakeholders was limited. As part of a comprehensive process, the 
involvement of key internal stakeholders helps ensure that the 
information obtained during the review is complete. According to 
officials from the armed services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, officials from those 
offices had a limited role in the development and review of the roles 
and missions assessment. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff did not conduct an independent assessment of the roles and 
missions assessment prior to the broader, department-wide assessment. 
[Footnote 34] According to officials from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and Joint Staff, this decision was made because the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had provided substantial input to, and had endorsed, 
the recently completed Defense Strategic Guidance. According to Joint 
Staff officials, the Chairman had agreed with the approach proposed by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to rely on the review that 
resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance as the primary basis for 
the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. The Joint Staff reviewed 
the submission prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy and the Chairman then cosigned the submission with 
the Secretary of Defense. The armed services had limited 
responsibility for participating in the preparation of the roles and 
missions submission, and were given a limited opportunity to review 
and provide comment on DOD's draft submission before it was submitted 
to Congress. In addition, officials from the Office of the Director of 
Administration and Management--responsible for the biennial review of 
DOD agencies and field activities where additional efficiencies may be 
identified--told us they sought an opportunity to participate in the 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review process, but were not included 
in the review. According to an official from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, internal stakeholder involvement was 
incorporated from the prior, senior-level review that resulted in the 
Defense Strategic Guidance. However, the Office of the Director of 
Administration and Management was not involved in that prior review. 
By not considering ways to build more opportunity for stakeholder 
input, DOD was not well-positioned to obtain and incorporate input 
from across the armed services, agencies, offices, and commands within 
the department. 

* Identification and involvement of appropriate external stakeholders: 
DOD had limited input from appropriate external stakeholders, such as 
Congress and federal agencies, with related national security goals. 
Input from Congress could have provided more specific guidance and 
direction for what it expected of the roles and missions assessment. 
According to DOD officials, they briefly discussed the assessment with 
some congressional staff early in the process. In addition, the 2012 
Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review report did provide specific 
information about Information Operations as well as detention and 
interrogation, as requested by Congress. This information was 
collected in addition to information leveraged from the review for the 
Defense Strategic Guidance. However, DOD officials told us that they 
would benefit from additional clarification of Congress's expectations 
when performing subsequent roles and missions assessments. For 
example, these officials noted that it would be helpful if Congress 
highlighted which specific roles and responsibilities areas were of 
concern so that more detailed information might be provided about 
these areas in the next report. According to a DOD official, the White 
House was involved with the review for the Defense Strategic Guidance, 
but consultation with interagency partners was limited and occurred 
late in the process. While other federal agency partners were not 
involved with the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
assessment, the involvement of other federal agency partners--such as 
the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence--provides an opportunity to 
enlist their ideas, expertise, and assistance related to strategic 
objectives that are not solely the responsibility of DOD--such as 
homeland security and homeland defense.[Footnote 35] In assessing the 
capabilities and competencies, but not obtaining input from 
appropriate external stakeholders, DOD did not have additional support 
and input for the assessment of its roles and missions, or input as to 
what these stakeholders expected as an outcome of the assessment. 

* Time frames: DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for 
conducting the assessment and completing the report. Developing a 
schedule with time frames is useful to keep the overall review on 
track to meet deadlines and to produce a final product. However, aside 
from tracking the final review of the report in tracking sheets used 
by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Joint 
Staff, DOD did not have planning documents that outlined specific time 
frames with milestones associated with conducting the assessment--
including time allotted for conducting the assessment itself, 
soliciting input from internal and external stakeholders, and drafting 
the report prior to circulation for final review. The lack of such a 
schedule may have been a contributing factor to the delay in DOD's 
submission. The report was required to be submitted to the 
congressional defense committees no later than the date in which the 
President's budget request for the next fiscal year was provided to 
Congress, which was February 13, 2012; however, the report was 
submitted on July 20, 2012. 

DOD's approach for the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
also differed from the department's approach for preparing the 2009 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. For the 2009 effort, DOD 
developed and documented guidance in a "terms of reference" that 
included, among other things, a methodological approach, time frames 
with deliverables, and a list of offices within DOD responsible for 
conducting portions of the assessment. However, no similar document 
was developed for the 2012 roles and missions assessment. According to 
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review occurred before 
DOD had to address the challenges of the current fiscal climate, and 
as a result there might have been more interest in conducting the 
review. In contrast, in preparing the 2012 roles and missions review, 
the officials told us that senior DOD leadership had recently 
considered these difficult issues in preparing the Defense Strategic 
Guidance, and so preferred to rely on those recent discussions rather 
than conduct a separate review. 

According to DOD officials, the primary reason that they did not 
perform a separate effort to examine roles and missions is that the 
statutory assessment and reporting requirements of the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review are largely duplicative of the review 
conducted for the Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as other reviews 
and processes. DOD officials stated that identifying core missions as 
well as core competencies and capabilities is also mirrored in the 
requirements for the Quadrennial Defense Review. Additionally, 
according to DOD officials, the annual budget process is designed to 
identify and assign capabilities within each service's budget request, 
eliminate capability and capacity gaps, and eliminate unnecessary 
duplication among DOD components. However, by not conducting a 
specific, comprehensive roles and missions assessment, DOD missed an 
opportunity to examine these issues through a broad, department-wide 
approach, rather than through processes established for other purposes. 

Conclusions: 

Strategic assessments of the roles, missions, and needed competencies 
and capabilities within DOD--whether conducted through the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review or some other strategic-level, department-
wide assessment--can be used to inform the department and strengthen 
congressional oversight.[Footnote 36] Given the complex security 
challenges and increased fiscal pressures that the department faces, 
such assessments are important to help the department prioritize human 
capital and other investment needs across the many components within 
the department. Without a comprehensive roles and missions assessment, 
documented in a sufficiently detailed report, DOD missed an 
opportunity to lay the groundwork for the Quadrennial Defense Review 
and other department-wide reviews, allocate responsibilities among the 
many components within DOD, prioritize key capabilities and 
competencies, inform the department's investments and budget requests, 
identify any unnecessary duplication resulting in cost savings through 
increased efficiency and effectiveness, and aid congressional 
oversight. A comprehensive process that outlined a planned approach 
for addressing all statutory requirements of the roles and missions 
assessment; involved key internal stakeholders; offered an opportunity 
for key external stakeholders, such as Congress, to provide input 
regarding the department's approach; and set clear time frames to 
gauge progress for the assessment, would have helped provide DOD with 
reasonable assurance that its resulting assessment of roles and 
missions was comprehensive and that DOD was positioned to provide such 
a sufficiently detailed report to Congress. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To assist DOD in conducting any future comprehensive assessments of 
roles and missions that reflect appropriate statutory requirements, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive 
process that includes: 

* a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to 
inform the assessment, that addresses all statutory requirements; 

* the involvement of key DOD stakeholders, such as the armed services, 
Joint Staff, and other officials within the department; 

* an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external 
stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment; and: 

* time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for 
reporting on its results. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with the report's recommendation to develop a comprehensive process to 
assist in conducting future assessments of roles and missions. DOD's 
comments are summarized below and reprinted in appendix II. 

In its comments, DOD agreed that it is important to make strategy-
driven decisions regarding its missions and associated competencies 
and capabilities, and to assign and clarify to its components their 
roles and responsibilities. DOD noted that, in the context of dynamic 
strategic and budgetary circumstances and increasing fiscal 
uncertainty, the department leveraged its strategic planning and 
annual budget processes, which resulted in the release of the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance and associated mission, capability, and 
force structure priorities to inform and address the 2012 Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review. Specifically, DOD commented on the four 
recommended principles of a comprehensive process: 

* Regarding a planned approach, the department stated that it 
determined that using other, ongoing strategic planning efforts to 
complete the roles and missions assessment met the review's statutory 
requirement. As noted in the report, there were some benefits to DOD's 
taking advantage of other processes. However, DOD did not document its 
approach for identifying the components within the department 
responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities, or 
identify any capability gaps or unnecessary duplication. A documented, 
planned approach provides a framework for understanding the strategic 
direction and the assumptions used to identify, analyze, assess, and 
address the statutory requirements of the assessment. 

* Regarding DOD stakeholders, the department stated that the processes 
it used did include the involvement of key DOD stakeholders, but 
acknowledged that formally documenting the process for obtaining 
stakeholder input would have clarified the role of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Documenting the decision regarding the 
Chairman's role would have provided some clarification; however, as 
noted in the report, it is also important to obtain and document input 
from all key internal stakeholders--including the armed services, 
agencies, offices, and commands within the department. 

* Regarding external stakeholders, the department stated that it did 
seek limited additional clarification from Congress prior to 
conducting the roles and missions assessment, but did not seek formal 
input to the assessment from other federal agencies because it relied 
on the external stakeholder input obtained during the development of 
the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, during the course of our 
review, a DOD official told us there was limited involvement from 
other federal agency partners during the review for the Defense 
Strategic Guidance. As noted in the report, not obtaining input from 
appropriate external stakeholders--such as the Department of State, 
Department of Homeland Security, and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence--when assessing the capabilities and 
competencies hindered DOD from having the additional support for the 
assessment of its roles and missions. 

* Regarding time frames and milestones, the department stated that the 
development of time frames just for the roles and missions assessment 
would have been largely duplicative of existing time frames for other 
efforts, including the development of the Defense Strategic Guidance 
and the annual budget process. However, developing a schedule with 
time frames would have been useful to keep the roles and missions 
assessment on track and aid the department in submitting its report by 
the statutory deadline. 

Developing a comprehensive process for its roles and missions 
assessment--a process that outlined the department's planned approach 
for addressing all statutory requirements, involved key internal 
stakeholders, offered an opportunity for Congress and other key 
external stakeholders to provide input, and set clear time frames to 
gauge progress for the assessment--would have helped provide DOD with 
reasonable assurance that its resulting assessment was comprehensive. 
The department's approach resulted in a report that was insufficiently 
detailed, therefore, we continue to believe the recommendation is 
valid to guide future roles and missions reviews. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries 
of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force; the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps; DOD's Director of Administration and Management; and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, this 
report is available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or PendletonJ@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related Strategic Reviews and Other Selected Strategic and 
Planning Documents: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required to regularly assess and 
report on its roles and missions in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review.[Footnote 37] The most recently completed Quadrennial Roles and 
Missions Review occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews 
that DOD has undertaken over the past 6 years, including the first 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review conducted in 2009.[Footnote 38] 
Figure 1 provides a timeline of the issuance of select DOD strategic-
level reports and other documents that contain roles and missions-
related information. 

Figure 1: Selected Roles and Missions-Related Documents: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review assessment period: 2008-
2009. 

June 2008: 
National Defense Strategy. 

January 2009: 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. 

February 2010: 
* Quadrennial Defense Review Report; 
* Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. 

April 2010: 
Nuclear Posture Review Report. 

May 2010: 
National Security Strategy. 

Dec. 2010: 
DOD Directive 5100.01: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its 
Major Components. 

January 2011: 
National Security Space Strategy. 

February 2011: 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: 2011 
Redefining America's Military Leadership. 

March 2011: 
2009-2010 Secretary of Defense Biennial Review of Defense Agencies and 
DOD Field Activities. 

April 2011: 
Unified Command Plan. 

June 2011: 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review assessment period: 2011-
2012. 

January 2012: 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Defense Strategic Guidance). 

July 2012: 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review[A]. 

April 2013: 
2012 Secretary of Defense Biennial Review of Defense Agencies and DOD 
Field Activities. 

May 2013: 
Strategic Choices and Management Review. 

March 2014: 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. 

Source: GAO analysis of strategy and planning documents from the 
Department of Defense (DOD), the Office of the President, and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. GAO-14-668. 

[A] In July 2012, DOD submitted the Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review report, together with the Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense originally issued in January 2012, 
to address the statutory requirement to report on the roles and 
missions review. 

[End of figure] 

National Defense Strategy: 

The National Defense Strategy provides the foundation and strategic 
framework for much of the department's strategic guidance.[Footnote 
39] Specifically, it addresses how the military services plan to fight 
and win America's wars and describes how DOD plans to support the 
objectives outlined in the President's National Security Strategy. It 
also provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance related to 
deliberate planning, force development, and intelligence. Further, the 
National Defense Strategy informs the National Military Strategy and 
describes plans to support the objectives outlined in the President's 
National Security Strategy. 

Quadrennial Defense Review: 

By law, DOD is required to conduct the Quadrennial Defense Review 
every 4 years to determine and express the nation's defense strategy 
and establish a defense program for the next 20 years.[Footnote 40] 
The review is to comprise a comprehensive examination of the national 
defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 
infrastructure, budget planning, and other elements of the defense 
program and policies of the United States. The Quadrennial Defense 
Review also includes an evaluation by the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military's ability to 
successfully execute its missions. The latest Quadrennial Defense 
Review was issued in March 2014.[Footnote 41] In addition to these 
strategic reviews conducted at DOD, both the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Department of State released strategic reviews that 
provide a strategic framework to guide the activities to secure the 
homeland and to provide a blueprint for diplomatic and development 
efforts.[Footnote 42] 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review: 

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review, released in February 2010, is a 
review conducted pursuant to guidance from the President and the 
Secretary of Defense, while also addressing the statutory requirement 
to assess U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy. This 
review evaluated the threats posed by ballistic missiles and developed 
a missile defense posture to address current and future challenges. 
Specifically, this review sought to align U.S. missile defense posture 
with near-term regional missile threats and sustain the ability to 
defend the homeland against limited long-range missile attack. 

Nuclear Posture Review: 

The Nuclear Posture Review is a statutorily mandated review that 
establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force 
posture for the next 5 to 10 years.[Footnote 43] The latest review was 
released by DOD in April 2010 and provided a roadmap for implementing 
the President's policy for reducing nuclear risks to the United States 
and the international community. Specifically, the 2010 report 
identified long-term modernization goals and requirements, including 
sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal through the 
life extension of existing nuclear weapons; increasing investments to 
rebuild and modernize the nation's nuclear infrastructure; and 
strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base. 

National Security Strategy: 

The National Security Strategy describes and discusses the worldwide 
interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital 
to its national security and calls for a range of actions to implement 
the strategy.[Footnote 44] The most recent National Security Strategy, 
released by the President in May 2010, addressed, among other things, 
how the United States would strengthen its global leadership position; 
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; and achieve economic recovery 
at home and abroad. This strategy also emphasized the need for a whole-
of-government approach with interagency engagement to ensure the 
security of the American people and the protection of American 
interests. The National Security Strategy is to be used to inform the 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. 

DOD Directive 5100.01: 

DOD Directive 5100.01 established the functions of the department and 
its major components. DOD reissued the directive in 2010 after the 
first Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review included what DOD 
describes as a thorough review of the directive. DOD updated the prior 
directive to incorporate emerging responsibilities in areas such as 
special operations and cyberspace operations and reflect other changes 
in the department's organization over the preceding decade. 

Space Posture Review: 

The Space Posture Review is a statutorily mandated review of U.S. 
national security space policy and objectives, conducted jointly by 
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. 
[Footnote 45] Through coordination with the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, DOD released the National Security Space 
Strategy in January 2011. The strategy is derived from principles and 
goals found in the National Space Policy and builds on the strategic 
approach laid out in the National Security Strategy. Specifically, the 
strategy's stated objectives for national space security include 
strengthening safety, stability, and security in space; maintaining 
and enhancing the strategic national security advantages afforded to 
the United States by space; and engaging the space industrial base 
that supports U.S. national security. 

National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan: 

The National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities 
Plan, along with other strategic documents, provide DOD with guidance 
and instruction on military policy, strategy, plans, forces and 
resource requirements and allocations essential to successful 
execution of the National Security Strategy and other Presidential 
Directives. Specifically, the National Military Strategy, last issued 
in 2011, provides focus for military activities by defining a set of 
interrelated military objectives from which the service chiefs and 
combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risk.[Footnote 46] 
This strategy defines the national military objectives, describes how 
to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military 
capabilities required to execute the strategy. The Secretary of 
Defense's National Defense Strategy informs the National Military 
Strategy, which is developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. In addition, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is to 
provide guidance to the combatant commanders, the chiefs of the 
military services, and other DOD agencies to accomplish tasks and 
missions based on current capabilities. It also is to serve as the 
link between other strategic guidance and the joint operation planning 
activities. 

Biennial Review of DOD Agencies and Field Activities: 

By law, DOD is required to conduct a review every 2 years of the 
services and supplies that each DOD agency and field activity 
provides.[Footnote 47] The Office of the Director of Administration 
and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has led this 
biennial review. The goals are to determine whether DOD needs each of 
these agencies and activities, or whether it is more effective, 
economical, or efficient for the armed services to assume the 
responsibilities. However, unlike the Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review, which assesses the roles of all DOD components, the biennial 
review focuses on DOD agencies and field activities. The Secretary of 
Defense recently directed that the biennial review should also include 
an assessment of the offices within the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.[Footnote 48] DOD issued the latest report on this biennial 
review in April 2013.[Footnote 49] 

Unified Command Plan: 

The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to combatant commanders and 
establishes their missions, responsibilities, force structure, 
geographic area of responsibility, and other attributes. Section 161 
of Title 10 of the U.S. Code tasks the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to conduct a review of the plan not less often than every 2 
years and submit recommended changes to the President through the 
Secretary of Defense. The Unified Command Plan was last updated in 
2011.[Footnote 50] 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense: 

The Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense report (also referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance), 
released in January 2012, was directed by the President to identify 
the strategic interests of the United States. The document states that 
it was an assessment of the defense strategy prompted by the changing 
geopolitical environment and fiscal pressures. The Defense Strategic 
Guidance was developed by senior officials from DOD--including the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the armed 
services, and the combatant commands--and the White House. The 
document outlines security challenges the United States faces and is 
intended to guide the development of the Joint Force through 2020 and 
during a period of anticipated fiscal constraints. The Defense 
Strategic Guidance identified 10 primary missions of the armed forces: 

* counter terrorism and irregular warfare; 

* deter and defeat aggression; 

* project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges;[Footnote 
51] 

* counter weapons of mass destruction; 

* operate effectively in cyberspace and space; 

* maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; 

* defend the Homeland and provide support to civil authorities; 

* provide a stabilizing presence; 

* conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; and: 

* conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. 

It also identified several principles to guide the force and program 
development necessary to achieve these missions. For example, it noted 
the need for the department to continue to reduce costs through 
reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, and the identification 
of additional efficiencies. 

Strategic Choices Management Review: 

In March 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed the completion of a 
Strategic Choices Management Review. The Strategic Choices Management 
Review was to examine the potential effect of additional, anticipated 
budget reductions on the department and develop options for performing 
the missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance. Specifically, the 
review was to inform how the department would allocate resources when 
executing its fiscal year 2014 budget and preparing its fiscal year 
2015 through fiscal year 2019 budget plans. According to the Secretary 
of Defense, the purpose of the Strategic Choices Management Review was 
to understand the effect of further budget reductions on the 
department and develop options to deal with these additional 
reductions. The Secretary of Defense further emphasized that producing 
a detailed budget blueprint was not the purpose of this review. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Policy: 
2000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000: 

July 14 2014: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-14-668, "Defense 
Management: DOD Needs to Improve Future Assessments of Roles and 
Missions," dated June 26, 2014 (GAO Code 351862). The Department 
partially concurs with the four recommendations in the report (see 
Enclosure A for details). The Department agrees with the GAO that it 
is important to make strategy-driven decisions regarding its missions 
and associated competencies and capabilities, and to assign and
clarify to its components their roles and responsibilities. In the 
context of dynamically evolving strategic and budgetary circumstances, 
and increasing fiscal uncertainty, the Department leveraged its 
strategic planning and annual budget processes resulting in the 
release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and associated mission, 
capability, and force structure priorities to inform and address the 
2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions reporting requirement. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft 
report. We look forward to your continued cooperation and dialogue 
toward improving ongoing and future roles and missions work. Should 
you have any questions, please contact Mr. Brian Arakelian, (703) 697-
4653, brian.m.arakelian.civ@mail.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Robert M. Scher: 
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and 
Forces: 

Enclosure A: 

Gao Draft Report Dated June 26, 2014: 
GAO-14-668 (GAO Code 351862): 

“defense Management: DOD Needs To Improve Future Assessments Of Roles 
And Missions” 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
develop a comprehensive process that includes: 

* a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to 
inform the assessment that addresses all statutory requirements; 

* the involvement of key DoD stakeholders, such as the armed forces, 
Joint Staff, and other officials within the department; 

* an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external 
stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment; and; 

* time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for 
reporting on its results. 

DoD Response: DoD partially concurs with the four GAO recommendations 
on improving future assessments of roles and missions. Specifically: 

* “a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to 
inform the assessment that addresses all statutory requirements”: 

- Partially concur. For the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review, DoD did use a planned assessment approach, which Departmental 
leadership concurred did meet the review's statutory requirements 
despite the absence of explicitly-documented principles and 
assumptions. The Department chose to make use of other, ongoing 
strategic planning efforts to complete the roles and missions
review, in particular the development of the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance (DSG). 

* “the involvement of key DoD stakeholders, such as the armed forces, 
Joint Staff, and other officials within the department”: 

- Partially concur. The processes leveraged to inform the 2012 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review did involve key DOD 
stakeholders. For example, the decision for the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff not to do a separate assessment for roles and missions 
was made because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had provided substantial 
input to, and had endorsed, the recently completed DSG. 

However, formally documenting the process, as noted above, would have 
clarified this decision in relation to the reporting requirement. 

* “an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external 
stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment”: 

- Partially concur. DoD sought limited additional clarification from 
Congress prior to conducting the 2012 Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review. The Department did not seek formal input to the review from 
other federal agencies. However, external stakeholders did contribute 
to the process used to develop the DSG, which subsequently informed 
the roles and missions assessment. 

* “time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for 
reporting on its results”: 

= Partially concur. The Department concluded that time frames with 
milestones for conducting this assessment would have been largely 
duplicative of the DSG review process, as well as other reviews and 
processes, such as the annual budget process, which did follow 
internally agreed-upon milestones. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or PendletonJ@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this 
report were Margaret Morgan and Kevin L. O'Neill, Assistant Directors; 
Tracy Abdo; Darreisha M. Bates; Elizabeth Curda; Leia Dickerson; Gina 
Flacco; Brent Helt; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Travis Masters; Judy 
McCloskey; Terry Richardson; and Sabrina Streagle. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense (January 2012) (hereinafter 
referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance). The document 
identifies strategic interests of the United States and outlines 
security challenges and opportunities. 

[2] 10 U.S.C. §118b. 

[3] 10 U.S.C. §118b(d). Additionally, the Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 provided further guidance that 
the report on the 2011 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review should 
"provide clear guidance on the nature and extent of which core 
competencies are associated with" information operations activities 
and detention and interrogation activities, and it should identify the 
elements of DOD that are, or should be, responsible for providing 
those core competencies, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §942(b). 

[4] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a legally required comprehensive 
examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force 
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget planning, and other 
elements of the defense program and policies of the United States. The 
results of DOD's most recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews were reported 
in 2010 and 2014. 

[5] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-263] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2001). 

[6] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: February 
2011). While improvements have been made, this area remained on the 
high-risk list for the last iteration of the report. See GAO, High-
Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283] (Washington, D.C.: February 
2013). 

[7] See GAO, Human Capital: Critical Skills and Competency Assessments 
Should Help Guide DOD Civilian Workforce Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-188] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 
2013). We found that DOD had not yet completed required competency gap 
assessments to inform its strategic workforce planning. DOD partially 
concurred with our recommendation, but noted that the size and 
structure of the workforce is driven by capabilities, mission, and 
workload and not by competencies and skills; however, the department 
plans to complete its competency gap assessments by 2015. 

[8] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach 
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2007). 

[9] Additionally, we recommended that DOD incorporate certain 
commercial best practices and develop a stronger joint analytical 
capability to assess and prioritize warfighter needs. DOD mostly 
concurred with these recommendations and noted efforts it had under 
way. 

[10] See for example, GAO, 2014 Annual Report: Additional 
Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap and Duplication and 
Achieve Other Financial Benefits, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-343SP] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 
2014). One area identified by our work was in Army workforce planning 
where we found that there was potential overlap between two Army 
information systems that support workforce planning. The Army had 
begun an assessment to determine whether unnecessary overlap exists, 
and we recommended increased leadership involvement and the 
establishment of a fully developed and documented approach for the 
assessment. The Army declined to comment on these specific 
recommendations; however, we continue believe that the recommendations 
are valid. 

[11] H.R. Rep. No. 112-78, at 176 (2011). 

[12] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
(July 2012). This submission also included the Defense Strategic 
Guidance. 

[13] H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 196-98 (2013). The Quadrennial Roles 
and Missions Review report is due no later than when the President 
submits the budget request for the next fiscal year. The fiscal year 
2013 budget was submitted on February 13, 2012, and the Quadrennial 
Roles and Missions Review was submitted on July 20, 2012. 

[14] The committee also noted that it "believes the failure to 
identify core mission areas, core competencies, capability gaps, 
unnecessary duplications, and plans for addressing any such gaps or 
duplications, undermines national security and wastes valuable defense 
funds in a time of constrained budgets. The committee is disappointed 
that the Department did not leverage the requirement for the 2012 QRMR 
as a tool for reducing waste, while also improving its joint 
warfighting capability." H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 197 (2013). 

[15] H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 198 (2013). 

[16] See GAO, A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act to Help 
Inform Congressional Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-621SP] (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 
2012); GAO, Defense Transportation: Study Limitations Raise Questions 
about the Adequacy and Completeness of the Mobility Capabilities Study 
and Report, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2006), which applied generally accepted 
research standards; GAO, Force Structure: Army's Annual Report on 
Modularity Progress Needs More Complete and Clear Information to Aid 
Decision Makers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-183R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2013); and Department of Defense, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Information 
Quality Guidelines (IQG): Ensuring the Quality of Information 
Disseminated to the Public (revised, February 2007). 

[17] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
Report (January 2009). 

[18] See Office of Management and Budget, Strategic Plans, Annual 
Performance Plans, Performance Reviews, and Annual Program Performance 
Reports, Circular No. A-11, Part 6 (July 2013); GAO, Combating 
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-621SP]; GAO, GAO 
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing 
and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2009); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938], which 
applied generally accepted research standards; GAO, Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1999); Interagency Security Committee, The Risk Management 
Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee 
Standard (August 2013), and Project Management Institute, A Guide to 
the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) (2000). 

[19] 10 U.S.C. §118b. As of June 2014, legislation has been passed in 
the House of Representatives to change 10 U.S.C. § 118, which, if 
enacted, may alter the reporting requirement for the Quadrennial 
Defense Review and Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. H.R. 4435, 
113th Cong. §1077 (2014). See, H.R. Rep. No. 113-446 at 226-27 (2014). 

[20] 10 U.S.C.§ 118b(d). 

[21] President of the United States, National Security Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2010); Department of Defense, National Defense 
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: June 2008); Department of Defense, 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining 
America's Military Leadership (Washington, D.C.: February 2011); 
Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy (January 2011). 

[22] Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and 
Its Major Components, DOD Directive 5100.01 (Dec. 21, 2010) and 
Unified Command Plan (updated Sept. 12, 2011). 

[23] The Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of the roles and missions of the armed services and the 
core competencies and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such 
roles and missions. Specific required elements of this assessment are 
provided in statute, see 10 U.S.C. §118b. The Secretary is then 
required to submit a report on the roles and missions review in the 
year following the review, but no later than when the President 
submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress; however, the 
statutory reporting requirement does not explicitly require that all 
required elements of the assessment be reported. 10 U.S.C.§ 118b(d). 
In addition, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011 provided further guidance that the report on the 2011 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review should "provide clear guidance 
on the nature and extent of which core competencies are associated 
with information operations activities and detention and interrogation 
activities, and it should identify the elements of DOD that are, or 
should be, responsible for providing those core competencies," Pub. L. 
No. 111-383, §942(b). 

[24] We derived this principle from GAO reports and DOD guidance for 
providing information to Congress. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-621SP] and DOD, Information Quality 
Guidelines (IQG): Ensuring the Quality of Information Disseminated to 
the Public. See also [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-183R]. 

[25] Anti-access refers to those actions and capabilities, usually 
long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an 
operational area. Area denial refers to those actions and 
capabilities, usually shorter-range, designed not to keep an opposing 
force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational 
area. 

[26] Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §942(a). 

[27] GAO, Electronic Warfare: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen 
Management and Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-479] (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 
2012). We identified DOD's airborne electronic attack programs as an 
area of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in 2012. GAO, 2012 
Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2012). Last updated in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-343SP]. See also GAO, Airborne 
Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming 
Acquisition Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-175] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 
2012). Also, in August 2013, we found that the assessment of the Next 
Generation Jammer program did not examine all of the program's roles 
or take into account the military services' evolving airborne 
electronic attack investment plans to aid the department in reducing 
unnecessary duplication. We recommended that DOD (1) require the Next 
Generation Jammer capability development document to discuss potential 
redundancies, and (2) discuss potential overlapping capabilities in 
the next Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress. DOD agreed to 
continue to assess unnecessary duplication and provide information 
about overlapping capabilities in the next strategy report, but did 
not agree that the capability development document should be used to 
assess duplication and redundancies. GAO, Next Generation Jammer: DOD 
Should Continue to Assess Potential Duplication and Overlap As Program 
Moves Forward, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-642] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2013). 

[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-479]. DOD 
generally concurred with our recommendations to strengthen the 
management, oversight, and coordination of electronic warfare policy 
and programs and has reissued the DOD Directive defining the 
department's electronic warfare policy--updating the policy, 
definitions, and responsibilities. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP]. DOD 
provided technical comments and noted that discussions to share 
hardware and software technology were ongoing. 

[30] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government 
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2011). Last updated in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-343SP]. DOD partially concurred 
with our recommendations and has designed and begun implementing an 
architecture for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that 
may aid the department in aligning its strategic goals. 

[31] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 
Report (January 2009). Joint capability areas are collections of like 
DOD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, 
strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio 
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational 
planning. 

[32] We derived a set of key principles for conducting comprehensive 
assessments--such as the roles and missions review--from a broad 
selection of principles we have previously identified and other 
federal agency guidance including Office of Management and Budget, 
Circular No. A-11; DOD, Information Quality Guidelines (IQG): Ensuring 
the Quality of Information Disseminated to the Public; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-621SP]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]; and Interagency 
Security Committee, The Risk Management Process for Federal 
Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard. 

[33] As provided by 10 U.S.C. §118b and Pub. L. No. 111-383, §942(b). 

[34] Section 118b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires that the 
Chairman of the Joint Staff conduct an independent assessment of the 
roles and missions of the military services prior to the Secretary's 
conducting the comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions 
within the department. 

[35] For example, within DOD's broader homeland defense mission, DOD 
is the lead agency for the maritime homeland defense effort in 
defending against traditional external threats, but this mission 
involves global coordination between DOD components and interagency 
partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, across areas where the 
military is actively deployed and in the maritime approaches to and 
territorial waters of the United States. For more information, see 
GAO, Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Planning and 
Coordination for Maritime Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-661] (Washington, D.C.: June, 23, 
2011). 

[36] As of June 2014, the House of Representatives had adopted 
legislation amending 10 U.S.C. § 118, which, if enacted, may alter the 
reporting requirement for the Quadrennial Defense Review and 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. See H.R. 4435, 113th Cong. 
§1077 (2014) and H.R. Rep. 113-446 at 226-27 (2014). 

[37] 10 U.S.C. §118b. 

[38] For the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, DOD conducted 
its assessment from April 2008 until January 2009, when the report was 
submitted to Congress. The 2012 assessment was conducted from October 
2011 until its submission in July 2012. 

[39] Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (June 2008). 

[40] Congress created a continuing requirement for DOD to conduct a 
Quadrennial Defense Review every 4 years in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 § 901 
(1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 118. As of June 2014, legislation has 
been passed in the House of Representatives to change 10 U.S.C. § 118, 
which, if enacted, may alter the reporting requirement for the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. 
H.R. Rep. 4435 113th Cong. §1077 (2014). See, H.R. Rep. 113-446 at 226-
17 (2014). 

[41] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (March 
2014). 

[42] Department of State, Leading through Civilian Power: The First 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (July 2010); and 
Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (February 2010). 

[43] DOD, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: April 2010). 

[44] President of the United States, National Security Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2010). 

[45] Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy (January 2011). 

[46] Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2011). 

[47] 10 U.S.C. §192c. 

[48] Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Organizational Review Follow-on Actions, Memorandum for Deputy Chief 
Management Officer Director of Administration and Management (Dec. 4, 
2013). 

[49] Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Director of Administration and Management, Secretary of Defense 2012 
Biennial Review of Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities (April 
2013). 

[50] Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (updated Sept. 12, 
2011). 

[51] Anti-access refers to those actions and capabilities, usually 
long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an 
operational area. Area denial refers to those actions and 
capabilities, usually shorter-range, designed not to keep an opposing 
force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational 
area. 

[End of section] 

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