This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-397 
entitled 'DHS Intelligence Analysis: Additional Actions Needed to 
Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce Challenges' which was 
released on June 4, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Congressional Requesters: 

June 2014: 

DHS Intelligence Analysis: 

Additional Actions Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce 
Challenges: 

GAO-14-397: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-397, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DHS plays a vital role in securing the nation, and its intelligence 
analysis capabilities are a key part of this effort. Within DHS, I&A 
has a lead role for intelligence analysis, but other operational 
components also perform their own analysis activities. GAO was asked 
to review the management of departmental analysis efforts.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS intelligence 
analysis activities are integrated to support departmental 
intelligence priorities, (2) I&A customers find analytic products and 
services useful, and (3) I&A has addressed challenges in maintaining a 
skilled analytic workforce. 

GAO examined mechanisms DHS used to coordinate analysis across 
components, I&A reports and feedback surveys, and human capital plans. 
GAO also interviewed officials from I&A, the five DHS components with 
intelligence analysis as a core function, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence who represent the Intelligence Community, 7 
of 78 fusion centers (focal points within states that analyze and 
share information), and the private sector. The fusion center and 
sector interviews, chosen based on geographic location and other 
factors, are not generalizable, but provided insight on progress. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—
including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—
to better integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but 
the mechanisms are not functioning as intended. For example, the 
framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities that can be used to inform annual planning decisions, such 
as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of investment to 
make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from DHS's 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for 
DHS components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and 
more tactical priorities that support their specific operations. 
Absent strategic priorities, DHS used component subject matter experts 
and other information to develop key questions of common interest they 
would address through analysis. As a result, DHS does not have 
reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and resource 
investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The 
mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight 
into one another's work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and 
duplication. 

I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic 
products and services are useful. GAO's interviews with 
representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that two 
groups—-DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial 
partners-—found products to be useful, while three groups-—DHS 
components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—-
generally did not. Representatives of four of the five groups said 
that they found other types of services, such as briefings, to be 
useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products 
indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products' 
usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect 
only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this 
issue, I&A is conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews 
with customers to evaluate the products and services that best meet 
their needs. I&A expects to complete this effort by the end of June. 

I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a 
skilled workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are 
resolving the challenges. For example: 

* I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part 
because of its hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage 
compared with other agencies that were able to process hiring actions 
more quickly. I&A's hiring authority was changed in 2013, a fact that 
could help ease these challenges. 

* I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly 
among its lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A 
restructured its grade levels in 2012 to provide additional career 
advancement opportunities. 

However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts 
and use the results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership 
has focused on other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A 
evaluate if efforts are achieving their intended results of improving 
recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and reducing attrition. In 
addition, using the evaluation results to determine any needed changes 
will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) establish strategic 
intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and 
(2) establish mechanisms to evaluate workforce initiatives and use 
results to determine any needed changes. DHS concurred with our 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-397]. For more 
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 
larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support 
Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as Intended 
but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication: 

Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A Products and 
Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better Understand Customers' Analytic 
Support Needs: 

I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in Maintaining a 
Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could Help Strengthen Future 
Human Capital Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Members of the Intelligence Community: 

Appendix II: Description of Key Finished Intelligence Products from 
the Six DHS Intelligence Entities in Our Review: 

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication in 
DHS Components' Intelligence Analysis: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise Planned Contributions to DHS 
Mission Goals, as Outlined in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS Intelligence 
Enterprise Program of Analysis: 

Table 2: Missions and Customers of DHS Intelligence Analysis Entities: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise: 

Figure 2: Results of Selected Intelligence Community Climate Survey 
Items for Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Fiscal Year 2012: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CINT: Chief Intelligence Officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

FAST: Field Analytic Support Taskforce: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation's: 

FTE: full-time equivalent: 

I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

ISAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center: 

ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

PCIS: Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security: 

POA: Program of Analysis: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 4, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 underscore the 
importance of ensuring that intelligence is analyzed and shared with 
stakeholders across all levels of government in an effective and 
timely manner. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has a lead role in analyzing 
and sharing law enforcement, intelligence, and other information in 
support of the department's missions and responsibilities. Other DHS 
components also have their own intelligence analysis capabilities and 
are part of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (the enterprise).[Footnote 
1] In an effort to promote the understanding of threats, members of 
the enterprise are to deliver intelligence analysis and information to 
DHS leadership; state, local, tribal, and territorial partners; DHS 
components; the Intelligence Community; and private sector partners. 
[Footnote 2] 

Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DHS has a primary mission 
that includes preventing terrorist attacks within the United States 
and reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. 
[Footnote 3] In furtherance of the department's mission, the Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for ensuring 
that the department's information analysis activities are carried out. 
[Footnote 4] For example, to identify and assess the nature and scope 
of terrorist threats to the homeland and to understand such threats in 
light of actual and potential vulnerabilities, the Under Secretary for 
I&A is to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from 
federal, state, and local government agencies, and private sector 
entities, in support of DHS's missions.[Footnote 5] To assist in the 
deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist 
attacks against the United States, the Under Secretary is to, as 
appropriate, disseminate DHS-analyzed information within the 
department; to other federal, state, and local agencies, and to 
private sector entities, with responsibilities relating to homeland 
security.[Footnote 6] In general, the Under Secretary's 
responsibilities encompass intelligence analysis; information sharing; 
department-wide intelligence integration; and supporting state, local, 
and tribal governments, as well as the private sector.[Footnote 7] 

In 2005, we designated the sharing of terrorism-related information as 
high risk because of the significant challenges the federal government 
faces in sharing this information in a timely, accurate, and useful 
manner.[Footnote 8] We have since monitored federal efforts to 
implement the Information Sharing Environment--an approach that is 
intended to serve as an overarching solution to strengthening the 
sharing of intelligence, terrorism, law enforcement, and other 
information among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and 
private sector partners.[Footnote 9] DHS's analysis and sharing of 
terrorism-related information is a key part of this effort. You asked 
that we assess DHS's progress in managing the enterprise's 
intelligence analysis efforts, as well as the usefulness of I&A 
products, and how I&A ensures that it has a staff capable of 
performing I&A's analysis mission. This report addresses the following 
questions: 

* To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the 
enterprise integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence 
priorities, and to what extent are enterprise analysis activities 
unnecessarily overlapping or duplicative? 

* To what extent do I&A's customers report that they find I&A products 
and other analytic services to be useful?[Footnote 10] 

* What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic 
workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges? 

For all objectives, we focused on the six DHS entities in the 
enterprise for which intelligence analysis is a core function in 
supporting their unique missions and operations: I&A, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).[Footnote 
11] Subject to departmental direction, and consistent with any 
direction and guidance from the President and, as applicable, by the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),[Footnote 12] 
the head of each DHS intelligence component is responsible for, among 
other things, ensuring the effective and efficient collection, 
processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information, 
and supporting and implementing the intelligence mission of the 
department.[Footnote 13] See appendix II for a description of the 
intelligence products generated by each entity. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed DHS and I&A documents 
intended to set strategic departmental intelligence priorities--such 
as the fiscal years 2011 through 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise 
Program of Analysis (POA) and the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 Homeland 
Security Intelligence Priorities Framework (the Framework)--to 
determine how strategic intelligence priorities are established and 
how the enterprise is to follow them.[Footnote 14] We also analyzed 
component documents--such as TSA's Mission and Functional Statement 
and ICE's intelligence fact sheet on securing borders, safe travel, 
and legal trade--to help determine to what extent components address 
departmental priorities. We met with officials responsible for 
managing the enterprise to determine expectations for components in 
following the priorities, and with officials from I&A and the 
intelligence offices of CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, TSA, and USCIS 
to obtain views on the extent to which the POA and Framework guide 
their analytic production. We compared DHS's actions with requirements 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, that call for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for 
I&A, to, among other things, establish departmental intelligence 
priorities.[Footnote 15] To assess potential overlap or duplication in 
finished intelligence products, we analyzed all 21 products written by 
I&A, CBP, and ICE in response to questions in the 2012 POA related to 
the DHS mission area of U.S. border security. We selected the 2012 POA 
because it was the most recent available when we began this analysis. 
We selected this mission area because it contained the most questions 
assigned to multiple components, and chose I&A, CBP, and ICE products 
to review because these components all have responsibility for 
different aspects of intelligence related to border security. By 
reviewing only one mission area, we cannot determine if there was 
duplication in other areas. 

To address the second objective, we met with staff from I&A's 
Production Management Division, which is responsible for distributing 
finished intelligence products and measuring their usefulness, to 
determine how I&A uses surveys to obtain feedback on products and 
identify other efforts to improve customer satisfaction. We also 
analyzed the results of customer satisfaction surveys that were 
included with all fiscal year 2012 I&A finished analytic products to 
determine what users of I&A products think of the quality and 
usefulness of the products. We compared I&A's efforts to ensure its 
products' quality and usefulness with criteria in the Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government related to meeting 
stakeholder needs.[Footnote 16] Also, to determine how customers view 
the usefulness of I&A products and other analytic support, we met with 
officials from four of I&A's five customer groups. While we did not 
meet with representatives from DHS leadership, we did meet with 
representatives of the I&A unit that briefs leadership. Specifically, 
we met with (1) officials from DHS component intelligence programs 
(USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA); (2) staff from ODNI; 
(3) state and local officials from 7 of the 78 nationwide fusion 
centers;[Footnote 17] and (4) members of the Partnership for Critical 
Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and the National Council of Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), two organizations composed of 
private sector critical infrastructure sectors that coordinate with 
the federal government on security measures.[Footnote 18] The 
information we obtained from fusion centers and the private sector may 
not be generalized across all fusion centers and throughout the 
private sector, but provided us with an overview of users' 
perspectives on the usefulness of I&A's products and other analytic 
support. 

For the third objective, we reviewed documents from the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), DHS, I&A, and ODNI to obtain information 
on intelligence analyst hiring needs and practices, such as the 
November 2012 I&A memorandum on hiring standards and the January 2010 
I&A recruitment strategy. To determine the challenges I&A experienced 
maintaining a skilled workforce, we reviewed I&A data such as analyst 
attrition rates from 2009 through 2013,[Footnote 19] and documents 
such as I&A's November 2012 memo to the Director of National 
Intelligence requesting conversion of competitive service positions to 
excepted service positions.[Footnote 20] To assess I&A's training and 
development practices, we analyzed training expectations, offerings, 
and strategies by DHS and I&A. We also analyzed documents from DHS and 
I&A to determine I&A's performance management practices, including the 
January 2010 I&A Human Capital Standard Operating Procedures and the 
December 2008 DHS Human Resources Performance Management Program 
Guidance. We compared I&A's workforce hiring and development actions 
against criteria in DHS's Workforce Planning Guide.[Footnote 21] We 
also met with officials from I&A's human capital office, training 
branch, mission support office, and the acting Chief of Staff to 
discuss attrition, recruitment, hiring, training, and evaluation 
practices and procedures. For a complete discussion of the objectives, 
scope, and methodology of this report see appendix III. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise: 

Consistent with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, 
the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the department--who also 
holds the position of DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis and is the head of I&A--is to exercise leadership and 
authority over the enterprise and intelligence policy throughout the 
department.[Footnote 22] For example, the CINT is to provide strategic 
oversight to and support the missions and goals of members of the 
enterprise.[Footnote 23] The enterprise is composed of all DHS 
component intelligence programs.[Footnote 24] Specifically, it 
consists of I&A, the intelligence elements of six DHS operational 
components (CBP, USCIS, ICE, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. 
Secret Service), and three DHS headquarters elements supported by I&A 
(the National Protection and Plans Directorate, the Office of 
Operations Coordination and Planning, and the Office of the Chief 
Security Officer).[Footnote 25] However, as shown in figure 1, not all 
members of the enterprise perform intelligence analysis activities. 

Figure 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

DHS intelligence enterprise: 

DHS participants that conduct intelligence analysis activities: 

Intelligence Community members: 
* Office of Intelligence and Analysis; 
* U.S. Coast Guard. 

DHS operational components: 
* U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
* U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
* Transportation Security Administration. 

Other DHS participants that do not conduct intelligence analysis 
activities: 
* National Protection and Plans Directorate; 
* Office of Operations Coordination and Planning; 
* Office of the Chief Security Officer; 
* Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
* United States Secret Service. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

[End of figure] 

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

I&A emerged from what the Homeland Security Act originally established 
as the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act established within 
DHS the directorate--led by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection--to carry out 
DHS's responsibilities in regard to, among other things, information 
analysis.[Footnote 26] In 2007, amendments to the Homeland Security 
Act included in the Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 reorganized the department by dividing the directorate 
into an Office of Intelligence and Analysis--headed by the Under 
Secretary for Information and Analysis--and an Office of 
Infrastructure Protection, headed by the Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection.[Footnote 27] As a result of the 
reorganization, responsibilities previously assigned to the Under 
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
relating to intelligence analysis became attributed to the Secretary 
(as carried out through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis) and remained largely unchanged.[Footnote 28] I&A is an 
element of the Intelligence Community.[Footnote 29] 

According to its February 2011 strategic plan, I&A's mission is to 
equip the homeland security enterprise with the intelligence and 
information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and 
resilient.[Footnote 30] To carry out its mission, I&A is to ensure 
that information related to homeland security threats is collected, 
analyzed, and disseminated to homeland security partners to keep the 
homeland safe, secure, and resilient. 

I&A prepares written, finished analytical products that it makes 
available to its customers. In addition to written analytical reports, 
I&A provides intelligence analysis to its customers through oral 
briefings (both classified and unclassified) and other analytic 
services, such as access to I&A analysts for review of the customers' 
intelligence products, and advice and instruction on tradecraft 
standards.[Footnote 31] For example, I&A provides services to state, 
local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as the private 
sector, through deployed personnel at fusion centers. Additionally, 
I&A's deployed personnel are to assist fusion centers in obtaining 
needed information and analysis to aid in supporting their own 
customer bases. I&A is also to act as a conduit between the DHS 
component intelligence programs and the Intelligence Community. For 
example, I&A provides relevant information from the Intelligence 
Community to the components. 

Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: 

In 2010, we were mandated to identify programs, agencies, offices, and 
initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments 
and government-wide and report annually to Congress.[Footnote 32] In 
March 2011, February 2012, April 2013, and April 2014 we issued our 
first four annual reports to Congress in response to this 
requirement.[Footnote 33] The annual reports describe, in part, areas 
in which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication 
among federal programs. Using the framework we established in these 
reports, we used the following definitions for the purpose of 
assessing the analysis activities of the enterprise: 

* Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more than 
one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area 
of national need. 

* Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in 
similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target 
similar beneficiaries. 

* Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are 
engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the 
same beneficiaries. 

Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support 
Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as Intended 
but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication: 

DHS has established mechanisms--including a governance board, 
intelligence framework, and analysis planning process--intended to 
better integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help 
ensure that activities support strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities. However, the framework does not establish strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities or drive the analytic planning 
process across the enterprise, as intended. On the other hand, 
intelligence officials from I&A and all five components in our review 
reported that efforts to implement these mechanisms, particularly the 
analytic planning process, have allowed them to coordinate component 
activities and avoid unnecessary overlap or duplication of efforts. 
Likewise, we did not find unnecessary overlap or duplication in our 
review of border security products from I&A and two components. 

DHS's Intelligence Framework and Component Analysis Planning Process 
Are Not Functioning as Intended: 

According to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, an 
integrated and collaborative Intelligence Enterprise is crucial to the 
department accomplishing its homeland security mission.[Footnote 34] 
Further, according to the plan, removing existing barriers to 
integration, while concurrently respecting and supporting DHS 
components' unique missions--such as CBP's mission to protect the 
borders--is necessary in order to fully integrate the DHS components 
that perform intelligence analysis. In 2005, DHS established a 
governance board--the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (the 
council)--to serve as the decision-making and implementation oversight 
body that supports the CINT in leading and managing the activities of 
the enterprise, and furthering a unified, coordinated, and integrated 
intelligence program for the department.[Footnote 35] The council's 
Analysis Working Group--composed of subject matter experts from I&A's 
analytic divisions and the intelligence elements of the components--is 
to coordinate analysis and production across the enterprise. 

Additionally, DHS has established two key mechanisms to help ensure 
that component intelligence analysis activities and resource 
investments align to support strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities--the Framework and the POA. According to the Framework, 
this is an annual document that is intended to present the 
department's overall strategic intelligence priorities and to inform 
annual intelligence planning decisions related to collection, 
analysis, and resource management. In addition to the Framework, the 
POA is to be an annual document that DHS uses to plan and manage the 
more specific intelligence analysis activities of its enterprise. 
Specifically, according to DHS guidance, the POA is to identify a 
series of key intelligence questions that the enterprise will seek to 
address in the upcoming year. According to the 2011 I&A Strategic Plan 
and DHS guidance, the strategic priorities in the Framework should be 
used to drive analytic planning and production in the POA. However, 
neither mechanism is working as intended. Specifically, we identified 
two gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS's 
assurance that component analytic activities support strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities: 

* The Framework does not establish strategic departmental priorities: 
The Framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence planning 
decisions--such as what analytic activities to pursue and what level 
of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. The Framework--
developed by I&A's Information Sharing and Intelligence Enterprise 
Management Division--was established in fiscal year 2011. However, the 
senior I&A official who assumed management of the Framework process in 
May 2013 stated that the Framework does not accomplish its intended 
purpose of informing annual intelligence planning decisions. According 
to this official, DHS took a bottom-up approach to developing the 
Framework in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Specifically, DHS created 
a matrix that links the broad departmental missions outlined in the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review--such as preventing terrorist 
attacks and effectively controlling U.S. borders--to different 
intelligence categories that are relevant to these missions.[Footnote 
36] DHS allocated each component 100 points and asked the components 
to distribute these points across the QHSR missions and intelligence 
categories in accordance with the types of intelligence activities the 
component conducted. I&A then added up the total points assigned by 
the components for each intelligence category. These totals became a 
proxy for the intelligence priorities of the enterprise as a whole. 
Accordingly, the Framework presented the existing intelligence 
activities of the members of the enterprise, rather than outlining 
strategic departmental intelligence priorities. 

According to officials responsible for the Framework, the goal of the 
fiscal years 2011 through 2013 Frameworks was to understand the 
diverse nature of intelligence priorities across the enterprise, not 
to establish overall departmental intelligence priorities. 
Accordingly, the officials acknowledged that the Framework does not 
fulfill its stated purpose of informing annual intelligence planning 
decisions. To begin addressing this problem, the officials stated that 
I&A plans to make some changes to the fiscal year 2014 Framework. 
However, the planned changes relate primarily to the methodology used 
to tally the current intelligence activities of the components. 
Specifically, the officials said that rather than giving all 
components equal weighting, the fiscal year 2014 Framework will give 
greater weight to the priorities of components that have a large 
intelligence portfolio. However, the official stated that the fiscal 
year 2014 Framework will look similar to the fiscal year 2013 
Framework.[Footnote 37] Therefore, the planned changes to the fiscal 
year 2014 Framework will not result in the establishment of strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual 
intelligence planning and resource decisions, as called for in DHS 
guidance. 

* The Framework does not drive analytic planning and production: The 
Framework was not used to drive analytic planning and production in 
the POA. The POA, established in fiscal year 2011, is overseen by the 
Homeland Security Intelligence Council's Analysis Working Group. As 
with the Framework, DHS took a bottom-up approach to developing the 
POA for fiscal years 2012 and 2013.[Footnote 38] Specifically, each 
component independently developed a set of key intelligence questions 
that it would address in the upcoming year. Officials from each of the 
five components we contacted said that they developed these questions 
in order to be responsive to their unique missions and customer needs. 
DHS then aggregated these individual component responses to generate 
the POA. For the 2013 POA, this resulted in a catalogue of more than 
80 questions to be addressed. 

DHS modified the process for the fiscal year 2014 POA in order to 
focus analytic planning efforts on a smaller, more strategic set of 
priority questions of common interest to the enterprise as a whole. As 
a result, the number of key intelligence questions decreased to 15. 
Also, rather than having each component individually generate key 
intelligence questions for inclusion in the POA, subject matter 
experts from participating DHS components brainstormed to collectively 
develop the 2014 key intelligence questions, determine which DHS 
components would contribute analysis to each question, and identify 
what specific intelligence products each would generate to address the 
questions. According to the I&A official responsible for the POA, the 
brainstorming was informed by the subject matter experts' daily 
engagement with DHS leadership, knowledge of operational and policy 
priorities and missions, the current threat environment, customer-
specific requirements, and Intelligence Community and law enforcement 
engagement and collaboration. However, given the Framework limitations 
described above, and because of the new focus of the fiscal year 2014 
POA, the official stated that the 2014 process was not informed or 
influenced by the Framework. 

Because of the gaps we identified in the Framework and POA processes, 
DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that component intelligence 
analysis activities and resource investments throughout the enterprise 
are aligned to support both strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities as well as component-specific priorities driven by their 
unique operational missions. According to I&A officials, it can be 
challenging for components to focus on both overall strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities and their more tactical 
intelligence priorities that support their specific operations and 
component customers. As articulated in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 
Strategic Plan, the CINT recognizes the importance of respecting and 
supporting these unique component intelligence missions. However, to 
achieve its strategic goal of establishing an integrated intelligence 
enterprise, it will be important for DHS to clearly define its 
departmental intelligence priorities and ensure that annual enterprise 
intelligence planning activities are aligned to support these 
priorities. Establishing strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities in the Framework, and using these priorities to inform the 
planned analytic activities of the enterprise, as articulated in the 
POA, would better assure DHS of this alignment. 

Enterprise Officials Reported That the Component Analytic Planning 
Process Has Helped Reduce Duplication, and We Did Not Find Evidence of 
Unnecessary Duplication: 

DHS's efforts to implement mechanisms--particularly the POA--have 
helped to minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication across 
component intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis 
activities within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS 
components conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad 
intelligence topics. For example, I&A, CBP, ICE, TSA, and the U.S. 
Coast Guard all contributed intelligence analysis to the DHS goal of 
Securing and Managing Our Borders in fiscal year 2012, as articulated 
in that year's POA. However, intelligence officials at I&A and all 
five operational components with whom we met stated that the 
mechanisms DHS instituted to integrate analysis throughout the 
enterprise--particularly the POA--helped to avoid unnecessary overlap 
and duplication. Specifically, senior intelligence officials in all 
five components said the POA helped them gain a better understanding 
of the work of other components or prevent duplication in the 
intelligence analysis activities of the components. For example, U.S. 
Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that through the POA 
process, they gained an understanding of what other DHS components 
were doing in the intelligence realm to meet their mission 
requirements and learned that they may have some areas of commonality 
with CBP. This understanding allowed U.S. Coast Guard analysts to 
reach out to CBP analysts to determine which component would lead 
analysis work on different topics, thereby preventing duplication. 
Specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard agreed to lead maritime border 
analysis work and CBP agreed to lead land border analysis work. 
Intelligence officials from another component stated that because of 
the POA, departmental components have developed a relationship such 
that two components conducting similar analysis will work together to 
determine which component is better suited to do the analysis. 

Side bar: 

Enterprise Coordination in Support of the Secretary and DHS Senior 
Leaders: 

I&A has taken additional actions to coordinate enterprise activities 
in support of the Secretary. First, I&A's Current Intelligence 
Division—a group that monitors recent intelligence developments and is 
responsible for coordinating and publishing the Secretary's daily 
brief—began holding a weekly meeting in December 2011 with 
intelligence officials from the DHS operational components to discuss 
ongoing component analysis work that might be beneficial to include in 
the Homeland Intelligence Today product line, which is distributed 
daily to the Secretary and federal partners. This provides DHS with 
the opportunity to coordinate across the components to determine the 
current and immediate, versus longer-term, threats the Secretary needs 
to be aware of and how the department is addressing them. Second, I&A 
began to include an operational box—provided by DHS's Office of 
Operations Coordination and Planning—in its intelligence products in 
January 2013. The operational box outlines the actions the components 
are taking in response to the specific threat discussed in the 
intelligence product. Finally, I&A's Current Intelligence Division 
hosts detailees from several operational components. These initiatives 
help provide DHS with the opportunity to coordinate support for the 
Secretary across the various components within the department. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

[End of side bar] 

Officials from four of the five DHS components we met with also 
reported that the revised POA process used in fiscal year 2014 was an 
improvement over the process used in prior years for various reasons. 
The reasons most often mentioned were improved coordination and 
reduced redundancy, and the ability of the components to display their 
contributions and inject the components' internal needs into the 
broader priorities included in the POA. Additionally, DHS is 
considering additional ways to enhance coordination across its 
enterprise, according to I&A officials. For example, officials said 
that DHS is exploring ways to have the Homeland Security Intelligence 
Council's Analysis Working Group--the group currently responsible for 
developing the POA--play a more active role in sharing information on 
planned analytic production throughout the enterprise and in 
monitoring joint production across the components. 

In addition, we did not find evidence of any duplication among the 
intelligence analysis products that we reviewed as part of our case 
study in the area of border security. We did identify one instance of 
overlap where two DHS components provided similar information to 
similar customers in different products, but the information was 
packaged differently such that the products were not 
duplicative.[Footnote 39] This result is consistent with our 
determination based on our case study review, which senior 
intelligence officials at I&A and the components confirmed, that I&A 
products tend to be more strategic and written to a broader customer 
base than are component intelligence products, which tend to be more 
tactical and written to component operators. We also found that I&A 
products tend to be based on multiple sources of information, 
including DHS component data and information from the Intelligence 
Community, whereas component products tend to be sourced primarily 
from internal component data. In this way, I&A products aggregate 
information from across the department and the Intelligence Community 
to present a national picture, whereas component products use 
component information to discuss the implications on component 
operations. For example, a component intelligence product may provide 
analysis of a specific law enforcement incident, such as a drug 
seizure in a specific jurisdiction, whereas an I&A product may provide 
a strategic look at drug activity across the country using data from 
CBP, ICE, and international law enforcement sources.[Footnote 40] 

Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A Products and 
Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better Understand Customers' Analytic 
Support Needs: 

Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A 
intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these 
products, but the results have limitations that prevent I&A from 
drawing readership-wide conclusions. Our discussions with 
representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that customers 
in two groups--DHS leadership and state and local officials at fusion 
centers--found I&A's products to be useful, while customers in the 
other three groups--DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and 
private critical infrastructure sectors--generally did not. Customers 
in four of the five groups reported that they found other types of I&A 
analytic support to be useful, such as briefings from I&A analysts. 
I&A is taking steps to identify the analytic products and services 
that best meet its customers' needs. 

Customer Feedback Surveys Indicate General Satisfaction with the 
Usefulness of I&A Products, but Results Cannot Be Used to Draw 
Readership-wide Conclusions: 

I&A assesses the accuracy and usefulness of its intelligence analysis 
products through voluntary customer feedback surveys that are attached 
to products. Survey results indicate general satisfaction, but the 
results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing statistically 
significant conclusions about all the readers of its products. 
Specifically, during fiscal year 2013, 73 percent of I&A customers 
that responded to the feedback surveys were very satisfied with the 
products' usefulness, and 68 percent were very satisfied with the 
products' timeliness.[Footnote 41] During this period, I&A issued a 
total of 830 intelligence products, of which 467 included a customer 
feedback survey.[Footnote 42] I&A received survey responses for 104 
(22 percent) of the 467 products, with a total of 4,162 responses. 
[Footnote 43] According to ODNI officials, I&A's level of effort 
directed at obtaining feedback from its customers, along with the 
number of responses received, were above the norm for the Intelligence 
Community. 

While generally positive, I&A survey results have limitations due in 
part to a bias in those who respond to the surveys. This bias exists 
because the results reflect the views of I&A customers who chose to 
respond to the feedback form and do not reflect the views of those who 
did not respond, a fact that prevents I&A from drawing statistically 
significant conclusions about the usefulness of its products since the 
results are not representative of all customers. Also, certain 
products concerning particularly notable topics can also account for a 
disproportionate number of survey responses received, which can bias 
the overall results since the responses do not reflect the full range 
of issued products. For example, in September 2012, I&A data show that 
three intelligence products accounted for 513 (88 percent) of the 586 
total survey responses received during the month. The remaining 73 
responses (12 percent) I&A received during the month covered a total 
of 18 products.[Footnote 44] 

Further, because I&A's products are distributed through broad 
information-sharing networks and generally not sent directly to 
individual recipients, I&A cannot determine the full extent of its 
customer base.[Footnote 45] I&A officials agree that this distribution 
method limits its ability to form readership-wide conclusions based on 
the survey results; however, I&A officials stated that I&A uses these 
networks to further its goal for a wide distribution of its products. 
Additionally, because of the broad distribution through information 
sharing networks, I&A cannot track the number of individuals who 
ultimately open and read its products in order to obtain more complete 
feedback. All of these factors limit I&A's ability to draw any 
readership-wide conclusions about its products. 

Despite these limitations, I&A officials view the survey results as a 
useful tool for generally understanding how their products are being 
received by the customer base. The surveys also allow customers to 
submit product and service improvement recommendations that help to 
inform I&A in making adjustments to products to better serve 
customers' needs. Officials from I&A's Production Management Division 
said they provide the survey results to the I&A analytic division 
responsible for the product in order for the division to consider and 
make improvements in future products. In addition, I&A formed the 
Analytic Production Improvement Council in fiscal year 2012 to 
implement product quality improvement initiatives. For example, one 
product improvement effort the council implemented was to change 
product titles to better inform prospective customers of the topic of 
interest in those products. 

Selected Officials from Two of I&A's Five Customer Groups Said 
Products Were Useful, and Officials from Four of the Five Groups Said 
Other Types of Analytic Services Were Useful: 

According to I&A's strategic plan, because of resource constraints and 
other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts 
to the needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A 
officials added that the priority order of customer groups is (1) 
departmental leadership; (2) state, local, tribal, and territorial 
partners; (3) DHS operational components; (4) Intelligence Community 
members; and (5) private critical infrastructure sectors. Our work 
indicates that I&A's finished intelligence products are useful and 
relevant to DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial 
customers, but generally not to customers in the other three groups. 
Officials from four of the five customer groups (state, local, tribal, 
territorial partners); DHS components; the intelligence community; and 
the private sector) said they found other types of I&A analytic 
support to be useful, including briefings on emerging threats, 
tradecraft review of the customers' own products, assistance with 
developing intelligence analysis, training, and the general exchange of 
information.[Footnote 46] 

DHS Leadership: 

I&A's first priority is to provide finished intelligence products and 
other analytic services to DHS leadership--which consists of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary, and DHS component 
heads--to support decision making. According to I&A officials who 
brief the Secretary, I&A's products and services are useful and 
relevant to meeting leadership needs. For example, I&A's daily 
intelligence report and related threat briefing to the Secretary 
include actions DHS components plan to take in response to threats, 
which helps the Secretary ensure that the department is taking actions 
to mitigate these threats. 

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Partners: 

I&A has given priority to providing intelligence reports and other 
support to state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, consistent 
with provisions of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, and 
subsequently enacted laws.[Footnote 47] Officials from five of the 
seven fusion centers we contacted said that I&A products were useful 
for providing an overall, strategic-level perspective and situational 
awareness regarding emerging threats. The officials also said they 
incorporate threat analysis from I&A products into their own reporting 
to state and local customers. They specifically cited I&A's Joint 
Intelligence Bulletins and Roll Call Releases as products that were 
useful.[Footnote 48] Officials at the two fusion centers that 
generally did not find I&A analytic products to be useful said the 
products rarely addressed concerns that were unique to their 
geographic area, such as domestic terrorist groups that operate in 
their regions. In addition, officials from all seven fusion centers 
said that they valued access to I&A personnel, including analysts, for 
assistance with fusion center needs related to intelligence analysis. 
This assistance included training on proper methods for developing 
analytic products, reviewing fusion center products, and providing 
other analytic services, such as oral briefings on emerging threats 
that may be relevant to the center. 

I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis. 
Specifically, I&A initially deployed one analyst to the Los Angeles 
and San Diego fusion centers. According to I&A officials responsible 
for FAST, the purpose of these embedded analysts is to work with 
fusion centers to do detailed analytic work in accordance with the 
tradecraft standards that I&A follows.[Footnote 49] I&A Production 
Management Division officials noted that these analysts provide an 
avenue for improving the tradecraft skills of fusion center analysts, 
which could help reduce delays in the issuance of I&A's joint products 
with centers. I&A has recently taken steps to deploy additional 
analysts to fusion centers. According to the I&A Deputy Research 
Director, I&A deployed an additional four analysts to fusion centers 
and plans to deploy a fifth analyst in June. 

DHS Components: 

Intelligence officials from all five DHS components we contacted 
generally stated that they did not consider themselves customers of 
I&A with regard to finished intelligence products. The officials 
recognized the overall high-level perspectives and situational 
awareness that I&A products can provide, but noted that their 
operational elements generally have a more critical need for tactical 
information and analysis to support operations and investigations--
such as details on specific individuals or groups--which their own 
intelligence groups typically provide. Officials from all five 
components noted the value of I&A's other analytic support, such as 
providing access to the Intelligence Community and training. Managers 
of the intelligence elements of two components (the U.S. Coast Guard 
and USCIS) cited a desire to have I&A analysts placed in the 
components' intelligence offices to allow for better exchanges of 
information, analysis, and subject matter expertise. For example, 
according to U.S. Coast Guard officials, colocating I&A analysts 
within components would allow I&A to better serve the Secretary by 
facilitating the identification of relevant information and analysis. 
In January 2014, I&A officials said that they were in the process of 
developing and considering several plans to deploy analysts to jointly 
work on high-priority issues of mutual interest to I&A and components. 

Intelligence Community: 

ODNI officials said that they generally do not perceive the members of 
the Intelligence Community to be customers of I&A's finished 
intelligence products because the products are not targeted to the 
Intelligence Community elements, and these agencies rely on other 
sources for analysis. The officials noted that Intelligence Community 
elements also tend to have an international focus, while I&A focuses 
on the homeland. ODNI officials said that they appreciated that I&A 
serves state and local customers since they are not traditional 
Intelligence Community customers. The officials also noted that I&A 
frequently writes its products at an unclassified level, which hinders 
their usefulness to the Intelligence Community. According to ODNI 
officials, the daily interaction between their personnel and I&A 
analysts embedded at ODNI's National Counterterrorism Center provides 
expertise and perspective on DHS data sets--such as data on 
individuals crossing the borders--that are valuable to the 
Intelligence Community.[Footnote 50] The officials noted that they 
value being able to integrate information from these data sets into 
their own analyses. 

Private Critical Infrastructure Sectors: 

Representatives from all nine private critical infrastructure sectors 
and subsectors we contacted said that I&A generally does not generate 
products that are either useful or relevant to them, except for I&A's 
analytic efforts related to cyber security, for which all of the 
officials generally had positive views. The officials said that I&A's 
finished intelligence products are usually more strategic than they 
require, and I&A does not fully understand the intelligence needs of 
their industries.[Footnote 51] The officials added that they are 
interested in developing a relationship with I&A. For example, 
officials from all nine sectors noted that having I&A analysts 
detailed to the private sector on a limited and temporary basis would 
better position I&A to understand their industries and related threats 
and provide intelligence analysis, including written reports, oral 
briefings, and other direct assistance. In January 2014, I&A officials 
said they are not considering long-term deployments (90 days or 
longer) in part because of staffing constraints, but are considering 
shorter-term deployments to interested private sector companies. 

According to I&A officials, I&A has historically given the private 
sector lower priority with respect to intelligence analysis than its 
other customer groups because of resource considerations. However, the 
officials stated that I&A is continuing efforts going forward to 
perform outreach to the private sector to better determine private 
sector's analytic needs and how to satisfy them. For example, I&A is 
participating in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Infragard 
program for sharing information and analysis with the private 
sector.[Footnote 52] Further, I&A's Strategic Plan calls for enabling 
the National Network of Fusion Centers to serve as a conduit for 
disseminating products to private sector partners.[Footnote 53] 

I&A Is Taking Steps to Identify the Analytic Products and Services 
that Best Meet the Needs of Its Customers: 

I&A has not identified the types and mix of analytic products and 
services that best meet the needs of its various customers, but has 
recently taken steps that could support doing so. Specifically, the 
surveys I&A attaches to individual products help obtain customer 
feedback on various aspects of the products, but are not intended to 
obtain customer views on the full range of analytic products or 
services that I&A provides. However, in fiscal year 2012, I&A's 
Production Management Division initiated a Core Customer Study to 
ascertain, among other things, its core customers' organizations, the 
functions they perform, and their intelligence-related mission needs. 
The study is using a combination of interviews and surveys with 
members of I&A's five customer groups. I&A characterized the Core 
Customer Study as a long-term effort to define, identify, and profile 
its core customers as a step to better identify their overall 
intelligence needs. Production Management Division officials said they 
expect to complete the study by the end of June 2014. 

In addition, in January 2014, I&A initiated the Customer Satisfaction 
Assessment to obtain views on I&A products and services that were 
provided to customers during 2013 and forecast how I&A can better meet 
customer needs in the future. To support this assessment, and in 
response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March 
2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers' satisfaction 
with and use of I&A intelligence products and services.[Footnote 54] 
Among other things, the survey covers the types of I&A products the 
customers read in 2013, including finished intelligence and current 
intelligence (e.g., alerts and warnings); the extent to which the 
products were useful in informing actions and decisions, such as in 
making resource investments; and satisfaction with I&A services, such 
as threat briefings and tradecraft assistance. According to I&A 
officials, they sent the survey to customers who were likely 
recipients of I&A intelligence products and services in 2013. 
Specifically, I&A sent the survey to customers who maintained an 
active account to a portal where I&A products are posted (e.g., the 
Homeland Security Information Network), were members of a homeland 
security information-sharing network that regularly distributes I&A 
products (e.g., terrorism liaison officer network), or were 
individually referred by their local fusion center or the I&A private 
sector outreach program. According to I&A officials, the results of 
this survey will be analyzed and provided directly to I&A intelligence 
analysts, managers, and senior leadership to help them better 
understand how their customers use I&A intelligence and determine how 
to tailor and improve products and services in the future. 

I&A officials said that as part of the Customer Satisfaction 
Assessment they also plan to conduct detailed interviews with a 
smaller group of customers in order to obtain a more in-depth 
understanding of ways to increase the usefulness of I&A's analytic 
products and services that will guide its improvement efforts. 
According to I&A officials, the assessment will also help I&A 
understand its customers' desired mix of products and analytic 
services. I&A plans to complete the first draft of a report on the 
results of the assessment by the end of April 2014. 

Once completed, the Core Customer Study and Customer Satisfaction 
Assessment could provide I&A with information to help it more clearly 
define how it plans to support each customer group, the types of 
analytic products and services it will provide, and related levels of 
investment. The results could also assist I&A in determining how best 
to use its available analytic resources, including deciding whether 
additional deployments of I&A intelligence analysts to DHS components, 
fusion centers, and private sector entities would allow for better 
exchanges of information and analysis in support of national 
counterterrorism efforts. 

I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in Maintaining a 
Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could Help Strengthen Future 
Human Capital Efforts: 

I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges Related to Recruiting, 
Hiring, and Professional Development: 

I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the 
skilled workforce it needs and providing training and professional 
development opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low. 
[Footnote 55] Specifically, according to I&A's recruitment strategy, 
I&A's hiring authority under competitive service put it at a 
disadvantage compared with other organizations that were able to 
process hiring actions more quickly and offer career advantages 
associated with excepted service status. [Footnote 56] For example, 
according to officials, under competitive service status, it could 
take anywhere from several months to a year between the initial hiring 
offer and completion of the hiring process, a time lag that they said 
led many applicants to seek employment elsewhere. The officials added 
that when they engaged in Intelligence Community career fairs, many 
individuals were looking for offers on the spot that other 
Intelligence Community elements could provide but that I&A could not, 
a fact that affected their ability to compete for top talent. In 
addition, according officials, the perception of I&A as a less than 
prestigious intelligence agency than the others in the Intelligence 
Community also affects its ability to recruit top talent. 

To some extent, such hiring challenges contributed to I&A's historical 
reliance on contractors to fill the gaps in Intelligence Community 
experience. For example, a 2009 Homeland Security Institute study 
concluded that burdensome recruitment and hiring processes resulted in 
I&A's heavy reliance on contract labor to staff key positions. 
[Footnote 57] I&A officials stated that the use of contractors was the 
primary method outside of federal hiring to acquire the needed 
tradecraft skills. They added that budgetary limitations on the number 
of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, the desire for 
operational flexibility to deal with uncertainty, and the need for 
"surge capability" also made contractors a viable alternative. As of 
November 2013, I&A's Office of Analysis had the smallest percentage of 
contractors compared with the rest of I&A, but the office still relied 
on contractors to support analytical instruction, such as reviews of 
the Program of Analysis.[Footnote 58] 

I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development 
opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and 
high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. 
Regarding professional development, I&A historically did not 
institutionalize a commitment to investing in its workforce, according 
to I&A officials. For example, they said that some managers sent their 
employees to training, assigned mentors, and provided rotational 
opportunities, while others did not. Furthermore, I&A's training 
program did not always focus on mission-specific requirements that its 
workforce needed, according to officials. The 2009 Homeland Security 
Institute report also concluded that I&A lacked a robust training 
program.[Footnote 59] According to officials, these challenges 
contributed to I&A's low morale and high rates of attrition. For 
example, I&A employee responses to the 2012 Intelligence Community 
Climate Survey show that 36 percent of employees responded positively 
when asked if they would recommend I&A as a good place to work, as 
shown in figure 2.[Footnote 60] 

Figure 2: Results of Selected Intelligence Community Climate Survey 
Items for Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Fiscal Year 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Percentage of responses: 

I am given a real opportunity to improve my skills in my organization: 
Positive: 55%; 
Neutral: 17%; 
Negative: 28%. 

I recommend my organization as a good place to work: 
Positive: 36%; 
Neutral: 26%; 
Negative: 38%. 

My work unit is able to recruit people with the right skills: 
Positive: 44%; 
Neutral: 22%; 
Negative: 34%. 

The skill level in my work unit has improved in the past year: 
Positive: 52%; 
Neutral: 25%; 
Negative: 24%. 

Source: 2012 Intelligence Community Climate Survey Results for Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis. 

Note: Survey responses are from all Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis staff and not just limited to intelligence analysts. Results 
could be different if limited to intelligence analysts. 

[End of figure] 

Also, in September 2012, we reported that I&A had one of the lowest 
morale scores within DHS in OPM's Federal Viewpoints Survey--a tool 
that measures employees' perceptions of whether and to what extent 
conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in 
their agencies.[Footnote 61] 

According to I&A officials, attrition among I&A intelligence analysts 
has led to a loss in valuable technical expertise and organizational 
knowledge. I&A data show that attrition has been the highest for lower-
level analysts, with attrition for GS-9 positions fluctuating from a 
high of 80 percent in fiscal year 2009 to 21 percent in fiscal year 
2013. According to exit interviews, I&A officials attributed the 
attrition to a number of factors, including low morale and limited 
promotion opportunities for lower-level analysts. The officials added 
that exit interviews indicate that analysts leave for positions with 
other Intelligence Community agencies, which are often perceived as 
higher-profile agencies. 

To help address these challenges, I&A has taken the following steps: 

* To help address recruitment and hiring challenges, in November 2012, 
DHS requested excepted service status on behalf of I&A from ODNI and 
OPM to align itself with the rest of the Intelligence Community and 
better compete for top talent. In June 2013, I&A received excepted 
service status. According to I&A officials, this will allow them to 
process hiring actions quicker and offer career advantages associated 
with excepted service positions, which will in turn help them recruit 
and hire the right applicants. In addition, I&A human capital 
officials stated that they started working with DHS human capital 
officials in 2013 to improve intelligence analyst position 
descriptions by, for example, targeting specific skill requirements, 
to help ensure that I&A recruits the right people. 

* To address low morale and attrition among its intelligence analysts 
and enhance professional development opportunities, I&A restructured 
its organizational grade structure to provide more career advancement 
and promotion opportunities. In 2012, I&A awarded a contract to the 
MITRE Corporation to review its workforce structure. MITRE concluded 
that I&A had more staff at the higher grade levels and that this was 
out of line with the rest of the Intelligence Community. As a result, 
in November 2012, I&A released a memorandum that noted the grade 
structure changes. Specifically, I&A increased the number of GS-7 
through GS-12 analyst positions and decreased the number of GS-13 
through GS-15 positions.[Footnote 62] According to the directors of 
the four Office of Analysis analytic divisions, this change is 
intended to help I&A grow its workforce through junior analysts and 
increase promotion opportunities that were previously not available. 

I&A has also enhanced its professional development by improving its 
training program, institutionalizing the use of Individual Development 
Plans, and encouraging rotational details. In fiscal year 2013, I&A's 
Office of Analysis established minimum training requirements for its 
analysts, among other training requirements. For example, analysts are 
required to complete four analytical tradecraft courses a year that 
are offered by I&A's Office of the Research Director.[Footnote 63] I&A 
officials noted that these courses are helping I&A build a better, 
more knowledgeable Intelligence Community workforce, which translates 
into better finished intelligence products. This is supported by 
ODNI's annual assessment of Intelligence Community finished 
intelligence products, which shows that I&A's tradecraft scores have 
improved substantially over the past few years and that I&A's scores 
are now above average within the Intelligence Community. In fiscal 
year 2014, I&A also issued guidance intended to standardize the use of 
Individual Development Plans. According to the guidance, the 
development plans are intended to help I&A staff plan their careers 
and motivate them to meet the demands placed on them by constant 
organizational and technological changes. Further, I&A is encouraging 
its analysts to take rotational assignments to other Intelligence 
Community elements and DHS operational components, according to 
officials. As of January 2014, seven I&A intelligence analysts were 
detailed to other Intelligence Community elements or DHS components. 
According to I&A officials, this program helps I&A analysts better 
understand the operations and needs of other Intelligence Community 
elements and DHS components and helps them develop their analytic 
tradecraft.[Footnote 64] 

Assessing Results and Impacts of Recently Completed and Ongoing 
Initiatives Could Help I&A Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts: 

In May 2013, I&A began to strategically assess whether its workforce 
has the right skills--such as written communications, program 
knowledge, and decision making--through a competency gap assessment. 
[Footnote 65] According to officials, this gap assessment will also to 
serve as an opportunity for I&A to determine whether its current 
practice of recruiting and hiring individuals that have strong 
analytical skills as opposed to subject matter expertise, and then 
training them to specialize in areas that support DHS's unique 
operational missions, is appropriate.[Footnote 66] According to 
officials, the gap assessment will include a survey of the knowledge, 
skills, and capabilities of intelligence analysts across the 
enterprise. The survey will cover critical skills and competencies 
that I&A developed in conjunction with other DHS components. According 
to I&A officials, the results of the assessment are to be released in 
fiscal year 2014. I&A officials said that they intend to use the 
results of the assessment to help fill skill gaps within the current 
workforce through training and analyst performance management 
activities. I&A officials acknowledged the importance and the need to 
use the results of the competency gap assessment given the absence of 
other mechanisms or documents that can help guide its overall 
workforce planning efforts. 

While the competency gap assessment is an important step in strategic 
workforce planning, I&A has not assessed the effects of its recently 
completed workforce efforts. In the past 3 years, I&A has implemented 
changes that are intended to strengthen its workforce, however; I&A 
currently has no established mechanisms in place to monitor and 
evaluate the effect of these efforts and use the results to make any 
needed changes. Specifically, we identified three areas where I&A 
could strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of its human capital 
efforts. First, I&A officials stated that they use ODNI and DHS-OPM 
surveys and survey forms from analysts regarding training to review 
changes in morale; however, I&A does not have a systematic way of 
monitoring these activities and using the results to make changes. 
Second, the results I&A receives from the ODNI and DHS-OPM morale 
surveys reflect all of I&A, which makes it difficult for I&A to 
determine whether its workforce activities are having any results on 
the intelligence analysts within the Office of Analysis. Third, I&A 
does not have any mechanisms in place to monitor and assess the 
effects of its excepted service status and grade restructuring. 

According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because 
I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. However, these 
officials agreed that such mechanisms could help ensure that its 
efforts are helping to address the challenges of its analytic 
intelligence workforce. According to DHS workforce planning guidance, 
workforce planners must monitor and assess the progress of their 
strategies, evaluate the outcomes, and use the results from the 
evaluation to revise the strategies, if needed.[Footnote 67] 
Consistent with this guidance, establishing mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes to I&A's hiring authority 
and grade levels restructuring, could help the Office of Analysis 
determine if the efforts are achieving their intended results. In 
addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine any 
need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce 
decisions. 

Conclusions: 

The organizations within the DHS Intelligence Enterprise play critical 
roles in uncovering and analyzing threats to the United States. DHS 
has made efforts, such as developing the Framework and POA, to 
integrate the analysis activities of its enterprise in support of 
common departmental intelligence priorities. These efforts, however, 
are not functioning as intended and as a result, DHS has not yet 
reached its goal of having an intelligence enterprise that responds to 
an integrated set of strategic departmental priorities that in turn 
drive analytical plans and resource decisions. Because of challenges 
I&A experienced in recruiting and hiring a skilled workforce, it has 
also taken actions intended to make it easier to attract, develop, and 
maintain skilled analysts, and many of these actions have been 
recently completed. By not monitoring and evaluating the effect of 
these actions, I&A cannot be confident that it is making progress in 
improving its ability to build and maintain the workforce it needs to 
effectively and efficiently analyze possible threats to the homeland. 
Furthermore, I&A lacks the information essential to know whether 
additional changes are needed to its workforce improvement activities 
and the strategies that underlie those activities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources 
throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the 
following two actions: 

* establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the 
Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used 
to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence 
analysis and resource management and: 

* ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are 
established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic 
activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the 
Program of Analysis. 

To help ensure that I&A maintains critical skills and competencies, 
when planning for and implementing current and future workforce 
actions, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and 
use results to determine any needed changes. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. In 
its written comments, reprinted in appendix V and summarized below, 
DHS concurred with the three recommendations and described actions 
underway and planned to address them. In addition, DHS provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

With regard to the first recommendation, that I&A establish strategic 
departmental intelligence priorities in the Framework that can be used 
to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, DHS concurred and stated 
that, based in part on GAO's work, I&A has revised its approach to 
developing strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Further, 
DHS stated that the 2014 Framework was approved on April 9, 2014, and 
I&A will coordinate future refinements to the methodology with the 
Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise prior to the beginning of 
the 2015 priorities process. We will determine if I&A's revised 
approach and the resulting 2014 Framework address the intent of our 
recommendation as part of our recommendation follow-up process. 

With regard to the second recommendation, that I&A ensure that once 
strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established, the 
Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS 
Intelligence Enterprise, DHS concurred, and stated that the priorities 
established in the 2014 Framework will inform the development of the 
2015 POA. Additionally, DHS stated in its letter that the 2015 POA 
will be informed by updated Intelligence Community-wide guidance from 
the Director of National Intelligence pertaining to both the 
development of the POA and key intelligence questions, and lessons 
learned from last year's development process. If fully implemented, 
these planned actions should address the intent of the recommendation. 

With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms 
to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to 
determine any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is 
developing specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate 
workforce initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures 
by the end of fiscal year 2014. If fully implemented, these planned 
actions should address the intent of the recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and 
interested congressional committees as appropriate. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director Homeland Security and Justice: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D. 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Members of the Intelligence Community: 

The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence agencies 
whose mission is to collect and convey essential information that the 
President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, and 
military communities require to execute their appointed duties. See 50 
U.S.C. § 3003(4).The agencies include the following: 

Central Intelligence Agency: 

Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A): 

Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

Defense Intelligence Agency: 

Drug Enforcement Administration: 

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency: 

National Reconnaissance Office: 

National Security Agency: 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

U.S. Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: 

U.S. Army, Army Military Intelligence: 

U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Intelligence: 

U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity: 

U.S. Navy, Naval Intelligence: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Description of Key Finished Intelligence Products from 
the Six DHS Intelligence Entities in Our Review: 

DHS Intelligence Entity: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis; 

Finished Intelligence Product: Homeland Intelligence Today; 
Product Description: DHS's daily product that provides the Secretary, 
DHS operational component leadership, and other federal partners with 
timely homeland-relevant analysis and reporting. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: Intelligence 
Assessment; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: Provides strategic 
analysis on a variety of topics that impact homeland security; 
can range from covering a single issue to an in-depth multi-themed 
analysis. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: Joint 
Intelligence Bulletin; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: Produced jointly with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and focused on emergent or recent 
terrorism-related threats or events that are pertinent to the Homeland. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: Roll Call 
Release; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: Produced for frontline 
law enforcement officers to highlight emergent terrorist or criminal 
techniques or tactics they may encounter in the field. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: Fire Line; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: A sister product to Roll 
Call Release that is geared toward fire, rescue, and emergency 
management personnel to aid in planning, response, and mitigation. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Reference Aid; 
Product Description: Provides an informational overview on an issue, 
development, key figure, or lasting trend. 

DHS Intelligence Entity: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 

Finished Intelligence Product: CBP Threat Assessment; 
Product Description: Provides a comprehensive analysis of threats and 
hazards that impact CBP operations. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: CBP 
Intelligence Report; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: Provides analysis, 
trends, and patterns that directly relate to CBP efforts. 

Finished Intelligence Product: DHS Intelligence Entity: Special 
Research Report; 
Product Description: DHS Intelligence Entity: Provides research, 
primarily associated with travel and imports, to other law enforcement 
agencies and the Intelligence Community. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Homeland Security Intelligence Report; 
Product Description: Provides DHS and other members of the 
Intelligence Community with CBP analysis of terrorism and other 
criminal activities that affect border security. 

DHS Intelligence Entity: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE); 

Finished Intelligence Product: Homeland Security Assessment (HSA); 
Product Description: Provides a comprehensive analysis of a complex 
intelligence topic or target related to specific events or trends. 
HSA's typically include a threat analysis; 
a discussion or potential threat actors and tactics, techniques, and 
procedures; 
and an outlook or review of potential mitigation strategies, counter-
measures, or vulnerabilities. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Homeland Security Intelligence Report; 
Product Description: Provides in-depth analysis of a single 
intelligence development, discovery, finding, or issue. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Intelligence Note; 
Product Description: Covers new intelligence and summarize 
developments on an issue or topic area of interest to ICE customers. 

DHS Intelligence Entity: Transportation Security Administration; 

Finished Intelligence Product: Transportation Intelligence Note; 
Product Description: Provides information and analysis on a single 
threat or situation involving transportation security. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Modal Threat Assessment; 
Product Description: Provides analyses of threats to transportation's 
critical modal sectors, such as aviation and mass transit. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Poster; 
Product Description: Posters focus on a single topic of concern, such 
as concealment techniques. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
Assessment; 
Product Description: Analyzes how violent extremists, typically 
overseas, attack transportation modes in order to discern impacts on 
the homeland transportation environment. 

DHS Intelligence Entity: United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services; 

Finished Intelligence Product: Immigration Systems History Report; 
Product Description: Provides information on individual subjects such 
as their immigration history, current immigration status/expiration, 
previous and pending immigration benefits, and a list of immigration 
systems checked. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Special Research Report; 
Product Description: Contains the information in an individual's 
Immigration Systems History, as well as additional information on the 
evolution of the subject's immigration history. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Intelligence Assessment; 
Product Description: Provides in-depth analysis and judgments of an 
event or development previously addressed in a previous product. 

DHS Intelligence Entity: United States Coast Guard; 

Finished Intelligence Product: Intelligence Bulletin; 
Product Description: Provides immediate maritime intelligence and law 
enforcement situational awareness. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Intelligence Assessment; 
Product Description: An Analytic product providing judgments and 
prognosis regarding a specific intelligence issue. 

Finished Intelligence Product: Intelligence Estimate; 
Product Description: Provides an overview and summary judgments on an 
intelligence issue based on all-source intelligence information. 

Source: GAO analysis of component-provided information. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report addresses the following questions: 

* To what extent are the intelligence analysis activities of the 
enterprise integrated to support departmental strategic intelligence 
priorities, and to what extent are enterprise analysis activities 
unnecessarily overlapping or duplicative? 

* To what extent do I&A's customers report that they find I&A products 
and other analytic services to be useful? 

* What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic 
workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges? 

To address the first objective, we analyzed documents produced by DHS 
and I&A related to setting intelligence priorities to determine how 
priorities are established and how the priorities are to be followed 
by the enterprise. Specifically, we reviewed the Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, the 2006 and 
2008 versions of DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan; Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2011-Fiscal Year 
2018; Delegation to the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis/ 
Chief Intelligence Officer, August 10, 2012; DHS Management Directive 
8110, Intelligence Integration and Management, January 30, 2006; 
Department of Homeland Security Directive 264-01, Intelligence 
Integration and Management, June 12, 2013; DHS Instruction Number: 264-
01-001 DHS Intelligence Enterprise June 28, 2013; the 2005 and 2009 
versions of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council Charter; I&A 
memos including the fiscal year 2013 and the fiscal year 2014 DHS 
Enterprise Programmatic Guidance; DHS Intelligence Enterprise Programs 
of Analysis (POA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2014; and the Homeland 
Security Intelligence Priorities Framework for fiscal years 2012 and 
2013 to determine the roles and responsibilities of DHS in managing 
its enterprise and the analytic efforts of the enterprise, and how DHS 
was carrying out these responsibilities. 

Additionally, we analyzed documents from DHS components for which 
intelligence analysis is a core function in supporting their unique 
missions and operations--the U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS)--to help determine the roles and 
responsibilities of component agency intelligence programs and how 
they respond to the coordination and prioritization efforts of I&A. 
These included U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance 
Report, Fiscal Years 2011-2013, Appendix A: Measure Descriptions and 
Data Collection Methodologies; National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council, Intelligence Information Sharing, Final Report and 
Recommendations, January 10, 2012; Transportation Security 
Administration Office of Intelligence and Analysis Mission and 
Functional Statement; ICE Strategic Plan, FY 2010-2014; U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, 
Office of Intelligence, Analysis Division, Fact Sheet; Secure Borders, 
Safe Travel, Legal Trade, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fiscal 
Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan; United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Intelligence and Information Products Fact Sheet; 
and U.S. Coast Guard Publication 2-0, Intelligence, May 2010; among 
others. 

We compared these efforts against requirements listed in the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as amended, that call on the DHS Chief 
Intelligence Officer (CINT) to establish the intelligence analysis 
priorities for the intelligence components of the department, 
consistent with any directions from the President and, as applicable, 
the Director of National Intelligence. According to DHS guidance, the 
appropriate vehicle for establishing enterprise-wide intelligence 
priorities is the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework. 

We met with the I&A Research Director and members of his staff, and 
the Director of the Information Sharing and Enterprise Management 
Division and his staff who are responsible for developing and 
implementing the management coordination mechanisms for the 
enterprise. We also met with representatives from the intelligence 
programs of USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA to discuss 
the coordination mechanisms established by DHS. 

Additionally, to address in the first objective whether overlap or 
duplication exists in the analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence 
Enterprise, we analyzed all 21 products written by I&A, CBP, and ICE 
where these three organizations shared responsibility to answer 
questions in the 2012 POA in support of DHS's border security mission. 
We selected the 2012 POA because it was the most recent available when 
we began this analysis. We selected this mission area for our analysis 
because this departmental mission contained contributions from the 
largest number of DHS intelligence components, and chose I&A, CBP, and 
ICE products to review because these three entities had the greatest 
number of key intelligence questions assigned to them within the 
border security mission area. By reviewing only one mission area, we 
cannot determine if there was duplication in other areas, but our 
findings support statements from intelligence officials in both I&A 
and the operational components that the content of their products 
differs because of their unique missions and primary customer sets 
and, therefore the products are not duplicative, even when they cover 
the same broad topical area. 

Within the DHS mission area of securing the border, we requested an 
inventory of finished intelligence products for fiscal year 2012 from 
I&A, CBP, and ICE--the three entities with the greatest number of key 
intelligence questions assigned to them in this topic area. Products 
written in 2012 were chosen because this was the most recent complete 
available to us at the time of this analysis. According to an analysis 
of these product inventories, we identified six key intelligence 
questions in which I&A and either ICE or CBP both generated finished 
intelligence products. In support of these six key intelligence 
questions, I&A, ICE, and CBP generated a total of 21 finished 
intelligence products--15 authored by I&A, 4 by ICE, and 2 by CBP. We 
analyzed these 21 products to determine the extent to which 
duplication existed by comparing the topics, sources, and customers of 
these products. 

To address the second objective, we met with I&A staff from the 
Production Management Division to determine how I&A develops, 
administers, and analyzes feedback surveys included with all I&A 
finished intelligence products, as well as to discuss the efforts I&A 
had in place through February 2014 to improve customer satisfaction. 
We then analyzed the results of the feedback surveys that were 
included with all fiscal year 2012 I&A finished analytic products to 
determine what readers of these products thought about the quality and 
usefulness of them. We also met with representatives from four of the 
five I&A customer groups: DHS components; the Intelligence Community; 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private 
sector. While we did not meet with representatives from DHS 
leadership, we did meet with representatives of the I&A unit that 
briefs leadership. Specifically, we met with representatives from the 
intelligence programs of the DHS components for which intelligence 
analysis is a core function in supporting their missions and 
operations--USCIS, the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and TSA--to discuss 
the extent to which these organizations find I&A analysis relevant and 
useful. We met with staff from the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence--the office that administers the overall efforts of the 
Intelligence Community--to discuss their review of the quality of I&A 
analytic products, as well as the usefulness of these products to the 
Intelligence Community. We met with DHS and state and local government 
agency staff members working at 7 of 78 state and major urban area 
fusion centers--centers that serve as primary focal points within the 
state and local environments for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and 
sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, 
tribal, and territorial homeland security partners. The fusion centers 
we met with were (1) the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, 
(2) El Paso (Texas) Fusion Center (no DHS staff were located in the El 
Paso Fusion Center at the time of our discussion), (3) Montana All 
Threat Intelligence Center, (4) New York State Intelligence Center, 
(5) San Diego (California) Law Enforcement Coordination Center, (6) 
Texas Fusion Center in Austin, and (7) the Washington State Fusion 
Center. These fusion centers comprised 4 of the 6 centers we 
considered southwest border fusion centers and 3 of the 11 northern 
border fusion centers. We selected each center to provide access to a 
range of state-level users of I&A analytic products with an emphasis 
on border issues because of our examination of potential overlap or 
duplication related to DHS components' intelligence analysis reporting 
on border issues. While information we obtained at these locations 
cannot be generalized across all fusion centers because we selected 
these locations based on the diversity of participation in the POA and 
geographic locations along the southwest and northern border, the 
units we visited provided us with an overview of users' perspectives 
on the usefulness and relevance of I&A analytic products. We also met 
with representatives of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 
Security (PCIS), the National Council of Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISAC),[Footnote 68] and individual representatives 
from the Transportation and Commercial Facilities critical 
infrastructure sectors to determine how the private sector views the 
analytic services provided by I&A.[Footnote 69] We compared I&A's 
efforts against criteria in the Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government that note the importance for management to 
communicate to, and obtain information from, both internal and 
external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the 
organization's ability to achieve its goals and utilize resources 
effectively and efficiently.[Footnote 70] 

For objective two, we also reviewed the standards by which I&A's 
products are judged. To do so we reviewed I&A Policy Directive 900.2-
Producing Finished Intelligence (July 15, 2011), I&A Policy Directive 
900.4-I&A Joint Production with State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers (August 31, 2011), I&A Policy Instruction IA-901 DHS 
Intelligence and Analysis Review and Clearance of Analytic Products 
Disseminated Outside the Federal Government, I&A memos including 
Fiscal Year 2013 and Fiscal Year 2014 DHS Intelligence Enterprise 
Programmatic Guidance; and ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203, 
Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007). To obtain a general view of the 
quality of these products, we reviewed the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
DHS Report to Congress on Voluntary Feedback from State, Local, 
Tribal, and Private Sector Consumers; I&A's fiscal year 2011 Customer 
Feedback Report and the September 2012 Production Performance Report 
that includes monthly production and feedback information. 

For the third objective, we reviewed the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management Position Classification Standard Flysheet for Intelligence 
Series GS-0132 June 1960, the classification standard in effect as of 
December 2013, and the I&A Human Capital Standard Operating Procedures 
to obtain basic information about personnel standards and operations 
at I&A. To determine the challenges I&A experienced maintaining a 
skilled workforce, we reviewed correspondence between I&A and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to obtaining 
excepted service hiring (November 2012-June 2013) and I&A-reported 
data on personnel attrition. To obtain information on intelligence 
analyst hiring needs and practices, we reviewed the I&A memo on career 
ladder decision and hiring standards (November 2012), the DHS 
Competency Assessment Pilot frequently asked questions and 
presentation, and the I&A Recruitment Strategy (January 2010). To 
determine I&A training and development practices and needs we reviewed 
the Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Training Academy Catalog, DHS 
Intelligence Learning Roadmap for Analysts (September 2012), and the 
Analysis 101/BITAC Study Report comparing two alternative introductory 
courses for intelligence analysts prepared for I&A by Booz Allen and 
SAIC (November 2008). We also reviewed the DHS Human Resources, 
Performance Management Program (December 2008), and I&A performance 
competencies to determine I&A's performance management practices. We 
then compared I&A's work force planning activities with those 
enumerated in DHS's Workforce Planning Guide (November 2012), the DHS 
document that outlines the process for workforce planning at DHS. We 
also met with representatives from I&A's human capital office, 
training branch, mission support office, and the acting Chief of Staff 
to discuss human capital recruitment, hiring, training, and evaluation 
practices and procedures. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Analysis of Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication in 
DHS Components' Intelligence Analysis: 

Appendix IV provides additional information about our analysis of 
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in DHS components' 
intelligence analysis activities. The intelligence analysis activities 
within DHS are inherently fragmented, as multiple DHS components 
conduct intelligence analysis in support of the same broad 
intelligence topics. However, on the basis of our case study in the 
area of border security, we did not find evidence of unnecessary 
overlap or duplication among the activities. DHS intelligence entities 
said that implementing the mechanisms to date has helped them to 
minimize such overlap and duplication. 

Analysis Activities are Inherently Fragmented: 

The intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise are inherently 
fragmented, as multiple DHS components conduct intelligence analysis 
in support of shared departmental goals. As articulated in the fiscal 
year 2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Program of Analysis, three to 
five DHS intelligence components planned to provide intelligence 
analysis products in support of each departmental goal in fiscal year 
2012. For example, as shown in table 1, five components planned to 
support the departmental goal of Securing and Managing Our Borders 
through their fiscal year 2012 intelligence analysis activities. 

Table 1: DHS Intelligence Enterprise Planned Contributions to DHS 
Mission Goals, as Outlined in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS Intelligence 
Enterprise Program of Analysis: 

DHS goal[B]: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security; 
DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributions[A]: 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis: [Check]; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: [Empty]; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: [Check]; 
Transportation Security Administration: [Check]; 
U.S. Coast Guard: [Check]; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service: [Empty]. 

DHS goal[B]: Securing and Managing Our Borders; 
DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributions[A]: 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis: [Check]; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: [Check]; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: [Check]; 
Transportation Security Administration: [Check]; 
U.S. Coast Guard: [Check]; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service: [Empty]. 

DHS goal[B]: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws; 
DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributions[A]: 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis: [Empty]; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: [Check]; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: [Check]; 
Transportation Security Administration: [Empty]; 
U.S. Coast Guard: [Check]; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service: [Check]. 

DHS goal[B]: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace; 
DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributions[A]: 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis: [Check]; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: [Empty]; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: [Empty]; 
Transportation Security Administration: [Check]; 
U.S. Coast Guard: [Check]; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service: [Empty]. 

DHS goal[B]: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters; 
DHS Intelligence Enterprise Analytic Contributions[A]: 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis: [Check]; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: [Empty]; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: [Check]; 
Transportation Security Administration: [Empty]; 
U.S. Coast Guard: [Check]; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service: [Check]. 

Source: GAO analysis of fiscal year 2012 DHS Intelligence Enterprise 
Program of Analysis. 

[A] DHS components may conduct additional intelligence analysis 
activities beyond those reflected in the Program of Analysis. 
Accordingly, the chart may under represent the true intelligence 
analysis contributions of DHS components to the various DHS mission 
goals. 

[B] DHS goals as outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review. 

[End of table] 

Although this creates fragmentation, each entity is providing distinct 
perspectives because of its unique missions and primary customer sets. 
As shown in table 2, I&A focuses on threats to the homeland in 
general, whereas the operational components--such as CBP, ICE, and 
TSA--each focus more narrowly on supporting their unique operational 
missions through intelligence analysis. Further, DHS intelligence 
officials report that the primary customers of I&A are DHS leadership 
and state and local partners, whereas the primary customers of the 
operational components are generally internal component customers. 

Table 2: Missions and Customers of DHS Intelligence Analysis Entities: 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: I&A Office of Analysis[A]; 
Mission: Provide timely, accurate, and relevant all-source 
intelligence analysis of threats to the homeland and homeland security 
operations; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* DHS departmental leadership; 
* State, local, tribal, and territorial partners; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* DHS components; 
* Intelligence Community; 
* Private sector; 
* Federal departments and agencies. 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: CBP Office of Intelligence and 
Investigative Liaison, Analysis Division; 
Mission: Analyze, produce and disseminate tactical and strategic 
intelligence products in support of CBP's missions; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* CBP frontline officers; 
* CBP national, regional, and local offices; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* External law enforcement, including state and local partners; 
* Intelligence Community. 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: ICE Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), Office of Intelligence, Analysis Division; 
Mission: Conduct complex strategic-level analysis using all-source 
information to positively affect ICE's worldwide investigations and 
operations; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* ICE; 
* DHS leadership; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* Other DHS elements; 
* Intelligence Community; 
* Domestic and international law enforcement partners. 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: TSA Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis[B]; 
Mission: Receive, assess, and distribute actionable intelligence and 
vetting information related to transportation security to arm security 
professionals with timely and relevant information needed to 
prevent/mitigate threats to transportation; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* TSA leadership; 
* TSA field personnel; 
* Industry stakeholders; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* DHS leadership; 
* DHS components; 
* Intelligence Community; 
* Federal partners; 
* Congress; 
* State, local, tribal, and territorial partners. 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: United States Coast Guard[C]; 
Mission: To provide objective, thorough, accurate, timely, usable, 
relevant intelligence about the maritime domain; 
potential threats; 
and adversaries' capabilities, limitations, and intentions; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* U.S. Coast Guard leadership; 
* U.S. Coast Guard field personnel; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* Intelligence Community; 
* Canadian government; 
* State and local fusion centers. 

DHS intelligence analysis entity: USCIS Fraud Detection and National 
Security Directorate Intelligence Division; 
Mission: Manage the analysis, production, and dissemination of USCIS 
immigration-related intelligence and information products; 
Primary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* USCIS Immigration officers; 
* USCIS managers and executives; 
Secondary customers of intelligence analysis: 
* Intelligence Community; 
* Other DHS components; 
* Law enforcement agencies. 

Source: GAO analysis of component-provided information. 

[A] Several divisions within I&A's Office of Analysis conduct 
intelligence analysis activities, including the Border Security 
Division, the Homeland Counterterrorism Division, and the Cyber 
Division. 

[B] Several divisions within TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
conduct intelligence analysis activities, including the Intelligence 
Analysis Division, the Vetting Operations Division, and the Current 
Operations Division. 

[C] Several entities within the U.S. Coast Guard conduct intelligence 
analysis activities, including the Intelligence Coordination Center, 
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, Coast Guard Counterintelligence 
Service, and Area Intelligence Staff. 

[End of table] 

Despite distinct missions and primary customer sets, some overlap does 
exist in the secondary customers that the six DHS intelligence 
entities serve. For example, as shown in table 2, all six entities 
reported serving the Intelligence Community, and three entities 
reported serving state and local partners as part of their secondary 
customer sets. In some cases, it may be appropriate for multiple 
entities to be involved in the same programmatic or policy area 
because of the nature or magnitude of the federal efforts. For 
example, having multiple DHS entities contributing intelligence 
analysis to shared departmental goals and serving overlapping 
customers can be beneficial, as it provides a mechanism to share and 
validate information and to facilitate complementary analysis. 
However, fragmentation and overlap may create inefficiencies if 
customers are burdened with too much information or if entities are 
inefficiently using resources to develop duplicate products. 

Our Analysis Showed No Unnecessary Overlap or Duplication among Select 
Products, and Customers We Interviewed Agreed: 

We did not find evidence to suggest that DHS customers were being 
burdened with too much information or that DHS resources were being 
used to develop products that unnecessarily overlapped or were 
duplicative. Specifically, senior intelligence officials from all 
seven fusion centers we contacted said that they had not experienced 
any instances of unnecessary overlap or duplication in the border 
security-related intelligence products they received from various DHS 
components. Further, we did not find any duplicative products among 
those we reviewed in the area of border security that were generated 
by different components. We did identify one instance of overlap where 
two DHS components provided similar information to similar customers 
in different products, but the information was packaged differently 
such that the products were not duplicative. Specifically, we 
identified one instance where I&A and ICE each wrote an intelligence 
product on a similar topic--human smuggling--and for similar 
customers--DHS leadership and the Intelligence Community. Both 
products discussed the relationship between permissive visa policies 
and the potential for exploitation by human-smuggling networks. 
Further, both products specifically identified one particular country 
as susceptible to exploitation from human smugglers due at least in 
part because of its permissive visa policies. 

However, we determined that the overlapping information was presented 
in a different context in each product. Specifically, the I&A product 
provided a summary graphic depicting the visa permissiveness level of 
each country within a particular region of the world. This provided 
its customers with a snapshot of countries with permissive visa 
policies and a warning that these countries may be more susceptible to 
exploitation from human smugglers than others. This graphic was 
presented as part of I&A's Border Security Monitor--a quarterly 
compilation of relevant border security intelligence analysis from 
throughout the enterprise. Alternatively, the ICE product was a 
broader assessment of the factors that make certain locations 
vulnerable to exploitation from human smuggling networks. Accordingly, 
the ICE product provided an analysis of the reasons that the 
specifically identified country may be vulnerable to human smuggling, 
identifying its visa permissiveness policy as just one contributing 
factor. 

While our results cannot be generalized beyond the border security 
mission area, our findings support statements from intelligence 
officials in both I&A and the operational components that the content 
of their products differs because of their unique missions and primary 
customer sets and, therefore, are not duplicative, even when the 
products cover the same broad topical area. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

May 14, 2014: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-397SU, "DHS Intelligence Analysis: Additional 
Actions Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce Challenges" 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in conducting its 
review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note that GAO found DHS' coordination 
mechanisms have avoided unnecessary duplication. Additionally, GAO 
found that the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is taking 
steps to identify the analytic products and services that best meet 
its customers needs, and address challenges related to recruiting, 
hiring, and professional development. I&A will continue to take 
actions to ensure that intelligence analysis activities throughout the 
enterprise align to an integrated set of intelligence priorities, 
along with ensuring that critical skills and competencies are 
maintained in I&A's workforce. 

The draft report contained three recommendations, with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation 1: Establish strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities in the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework 
that can be used to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, 
including intelligence analysis and resource management. 

Response: Concur. Based in part on GAOs work, I&A's Office of Plans, 
Policies and Performance Management in collaboration with I&A's Office 
of Analysis, Office of Enterprise Management Support, and the State 
and Local Program Office, and the leadership of the DHS Component
Intelligence Organizations has revised its approach to developing 
strategic departmental intelligence priorities. In January 2014, an 
Intelligence Enterprise (IE)-wide focus group developed the Homeland 
Security Intelligence Priorities Framework (HSIPF) for 2014. The HSIPF 
was approved by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council on April 9, 
2014. I&A will coordinate future refinements to the methodology with 
the IE prior to the beginning of the 2015 priorities process. We 
believe these actions satisfactorily address the intent of this 
recommendation; therefore request that GAO consider this 
recommendation resolved and closed. Classified supporting 
documentation has been provided under separate cover for GAO review. 

Recommendation 2: Ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence 
priorities are established, the Framework is used to inform the 
planned analytic activities of the DRS Intelligence Enterprise,
as articulated in the Program of Analysis. 

Response: Concur. The strategic intelligence priorities established in 
the 2014 RSIPF will inform the development of the Fiscal Year (FY) 
2015 Program of Analysis (POA), which will begin later this month. As 
the draft report indicates, the revised planning process for the FY 
2014 POA - which focused on the development of a small, strategic set 
of intelligence questions of common interest to the DRS Intelligence 
Enterprise (IE) as a whole - provided improved opportunities to 
coordinate and reduce redundancy on analytic production across the DRS 
IE. In addition to the new priorities framework, the 2015 POA will be 
informed by updated Intelligence Community-wide guidance from the 
Director of National Intelligence pertaining both to the development 
of the POA, and Key Intelligence Questions, and lessons learned from 
last year's development process. The new HSIPF contains common 
definitions and prioritization for each of the intelligence topics to 
be considered in the development of Enterprise-wide Key Intelligence 
Questions in the FY 2015 POA. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 
December 31, 2014. 

Recommendation 3: Establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate 
workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. 

Response: Concur. I&A Office of Plans, Policies and Performance is 
developing specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate 
workforce initiatives. As an example, reduced attrition and the rate 
at which I&A keeps its authorized billets filled are excellent 
indicators of success. Annualized attrition for I&A has decreased from 
just over 12% in FY 2013, to 7% for FY 2014; and, for FY 2014 through 
April, I&A has filled its authorized positions at a rate of over 97%, 
an increase of2% over FY 2013. A complete set of measures will be 
developed by the end of the fiscal year. ECD: September 30, 2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Erdman (Assistant 
Director), Jonathan Bachman, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Michael 
Harmond, Eric Hauswirth, Katherine Lee, Thomas Lombardi, Bintou Njie, 
and Anthony Pordes made significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The enterprise consists of all entities of DHS that are engaged in 
directing, collecting, reporting, processing, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence and information in support of the 
department's missions. 

[2] The Intelligence Community consists of 17 U.S. intelligence 
agencies whose mission is to collect and convey essential information 
that the President and members of the policymaking, law enforcement, 
and military communities require to execute their appointed duties. 
See app. I for a list of Intelligence Community member agencies. 

[3] See 6 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)-(b). 

[4] See 6 U.S.C. § 121(c) (providing specifically that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, through the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
Analysis, is responsible for carrying out the department's information 
analysis activities). 

[5] See 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1) (providing further that the analysis and 
integration of such information is to support the functions of the 
National Counterterrorism Center, which serves as the primary 
organization in the U.S. government for integrating and analyzing all 
intelligence pertaining to terrorism--except purely domestic 
terrorism--possessed or acquired by the U.S. government). 

[6] See 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(8). 

[7] See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 121-124m. 

[8] Terrorism-related information sharing remained a high-risk area 
for our February 2013 update. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-283] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb.14, 2013) for the most recent update. Every 2 years, at the start 
of a new Congress, we call attention to agencies and program areas 
that, according to our audits and evaluations, are at high risk of 
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of 
transformation. 

[9] See 6 U.S.C. § 485. 

[10] I&A's five customer groups are (1) DHS leadership; (2) DHS 
operational components; (3) Intelligence Community members; (4) state, 
local, tribal, and territorial partners; and (5) private critical 
infrastructure sectors. 

[11] As discussed later, there are other DHS entities in the 
enterprise. However, intelligence analysis is not a core function of 
these entities; therefore we excluded them from our review. 

[12] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was 
established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 to manage the efforts of the Intelligence Community. See 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3023-25. Its mission is to lead intelligence integration and 
forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most insightful 
intelligence possible. Among its goals are to integrate intelligence 
analysis and collection to inform decisions, drive responsible and 
secure information sharing, and set strategic direction and priorities 
for national intelligence resources and capabilities. 

[13] See 6 U.S.C. § 124d. 

[14] The POA is the document used to plan and manage the more specific 
intelligence analysis activities of the enterprise. Specifically, the 
POA is to identify a series of key intelligence questions that the 
enterprise will seek to address in the upcoming year. The Framework is 
intended to present the department's overall strategic intelligence 
priorities and to inform annual intelligence planning decisions 
related to collection, analysis, and resource management. 

[15] See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(19). 

[16] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov.1, 1999). 

[17] State and major urban area fusion centers serve as primary focal 
points within the state and local environment for the receipt, 
analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among 
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security 
partners. We selected these centers to provide access to a range of 
state-level users of I&A analytic products with an emphasis on border 
issues because of our examination of potential overlap or duplication 
related to DHS components' intelligence analysis reporting on border 
issues. 

[18] We met with representatives from 5 of the 17 critical 
infrastructure sector committees of PCIS and 6 of the 16 information-
sharing and analysis center members of the National Council of ISACs 
during scheduled meetings of these organizations. We also met with 
private sector officials from the PCIS Commercial Facilities Sector 
Committee and the Transportation Sector Committee in separate meetings. 

[19] Attrition is the percentage of personnel losses for all reasons 
during the fiscal year, and is measured by comparing personnel losses 
during the year with the total number of personnel on board at the 
beginning of the year. Our work focused on attrition among I&A 
analysts classified as GS-0132. According to the Office of Personnel 
Management's Position Classification Standard for Intelligence Series, 
GS-0132s advise on, administer, supervise, or perform work in the 
collection, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of 
information on political, economic, social, cultural, physical, 
geographic, scientific, or military condition, trends, and forces in 
foreign and domestic areas that directly or indirectly affect the 
national security. 

[20] The Director of National Intelligence may, with concurrence of 
the head of the department concerned and in consultation with the 
Director of OPM, convert competitive service positions within an 
element of the Intelligence Community in such department to excepted 
service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines 
necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. See 
50 U.S.C. § 3024. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a) (defining "competitive 
service"), 2103(a) (defining "excepted service"), and 5 C.F.R. pt. 
213, subpt. C (specifying the types of positions eligible for excepted 
appointments) Pursuant to its regulations, OPM may except a position 
from the competitive service if it determines, for example, that 
appointments into such positions are not practicable. See 5 C.F.R. § 
6.1(a). 

[21] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Workforce Planning Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: November, 2012). The DHS Workforce Planning Guide 
outlines the process for workforce planning at DHS. It provides steps, 
tools, and resources to plan for current and future organizational and 
workforce needs. According to the guide, workforce planners must 
monitor and assess the progress of their strategies, evaluate the 
outcomes, and use the results from the evaluation to revise the 
strategies, if needed. 

[22] See generally 6 U.S.C. § 121. 

[23] See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(18), (20). 

[24] Pursuant to DHS Directive 264-01: Intelligence Integration and 
Management (June 12, 2013), component intelligence programs consist of 
any organizations within a DHS intelligence component, a significant 
purpose of which is the collection, gathering, processing, analysis, 
production, or dissemination of any intelligence, and would include 
any organization within a component that employs intelligence 
professionals (0132 job series) to perform national or departmental 
intelligence functions. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, 
defines "intelligence component of the Department [of Homeland 
Security]," in general, as "any element or entity of the Department 
that collects, gathers, processes, analyzes, produces, or disseminates 
intelligence information within the scope of the information sharing 
environment, including homeland security information, terrorism 
information, and weapons of mass destruction information, or national 
intelligence." See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9). 

[25] Each component maintains an intelligence capability consistent 
with its existing authorities. For example, the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, which established TSA, specifically 
requires that the head of TSA "receive, assess, and distribute 
intelligence information related to transportation security." 49 
U.S.C. § 114(f). The U.S. Coast Guard may also conduct intelligence 
activities when operating, for example, as an armed force under the 
command and control of the Commandant of the Coast Guard or, with 
respect to U.S. Coast Guard as an element of the Intelligence 
Community, under the authority of ODNI. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9)(B). In 
addition, although U.S. Secret Service is specifically excluded from 
the definition of "intelligence component of the department," DHS and 
the U.S. Secret Service officials indicated they do participate in the 
enterprise and, by statute, the U.S. Secret Service must provide 
certain information to and cooperate with the Under Secretary for I&A. 
See 6 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A); Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 502(b), 121 Stat. 266, 
311 (2007), 6 U.S.C. § 124a Note. 

[26] See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(a)-(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2145 
(2002) (establishing also the positions of Assistant Secretary for 
Information Analysis and Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
Protection to assist the Under Secretary). 

[27] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 531(a), 121 Stat. at 332-35. 

[28] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 501(a)(2)(A), (b), 531(a), and 
1002(a), 121 Stat. at 309, 332-35, 374. 

[29] See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(K). The U.S. Coast Guard is also 
recognized as a separate member of the Intelligence Community. See 50 
U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H). See also Exec. Order No. 12,333, reprinted as 
amended at 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, 45,340-41 (Aug. 4, 2008) (identifying 
both I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard as Intelligence Community elements). 

[30] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis Strategic Plan, Fiscal Year 2011 - Fiscal Year 2018, February 
2011. 

[31] In general, tradecraft denotes the skills, means, and techniques 
intelligence analysts use to develop intelligence analysis. 

[32] See Pub. L. No 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 8, 29-30 (2010), 31 
U.S.C. § 712 Note. 

[33] GAO, 2011 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Potential 
Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance 
Revenue, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to 
Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and 
Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed 
to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other 
Financial Benefits, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-279SP] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 
2013); and 2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce 
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial 
Benefits, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-343SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2014). 

[34] In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as a 
high-risk area, as DHS faced challenges integrating its 22 legacy 
agencies into one cohesive department. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An 
Update, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-119] 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003).We have continued to assess the 
department's ability to build a single cohesive and effective 
department that is greater than the sum of its parts--a goal that 
requires effective collaboration and integration of DHS's various 
components and management functions. 

[35] In accordance with its 2009 charter, the council is composed of 
members from the following DHS components: I&A, U.S. Coast Guard, 
USCIS, U.S. Secret Service, CBP, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
TSA, and ICE. We did not evaluate the extent to which the council was 
meeting its goals as part of this review. 

[36] Pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, DHS released its first Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review (QHSR) in February 2010. See 6 U.S.C. § 347. The 
purpose of the QHSR is to outline the strategic framework to guide the 
activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end. 
The QHSR identified 14 goals, organized in five mission areas: (1) 
Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security, (2) Securing and Managing 
Our Borders, (3) Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, (4) 
Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and (5) Ensuring Resilience to 
Disasters. Specific examples of intelligence categories are classified. 

[37] As of March 2014, the fiscal year 2014 Framework had not been 
finalized. 

[38] The fiscal year 2011 POA was an internal I&A document. Component 
participation in the POA began in fiscal year 2012. 

[39] Additional details of our border security case study and results 
are contained in app. IV. 

[40] There may be exceptions to the general trend we identified 
through our review of border security products. For example, according 
to a senior intelligence official from the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. 
Coast Guard generates strategic-level assessments of threats to the 
maritime domain and, as a standing member of the Intelligence 
Community, relies on Intelligence Community information sources. 
Similarly, a senior intelligence official from ICE stated that ICE 
also strives to write strategic intelligence products and may use non-
ICE sources of information. 

[41] I&A surveys ask customers to rate satisfaction on a five-point 
scale--very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied. 

[42] I&A officials noted that many of the products that did not 
include an attached survey were quick-turnaround, information-only in 
nature and produced by I&A's Current Intelligence Division. The 
officials noted that customer surveys are more appropriate for longer-
term products that are often analytical in nature and produced by 
I&A's other analytic divisions. 

[43] Ten of the 104 products had more than 100 responses--of which 4 
concerned a recent high-profile terrorist incident--and 42 received 
fewer than 10 responses. 

[44] Additional information on I&A's efforts to survey customers is 
discussed later in this report. 

[45] I&A has established portals on web-based distribution networks to 
facilitate customers' access to its intelligence products, such as the 
Homeland Security Information Network for unclassified products and 
the Homeland Secure Data Network for classified reporting. 

[46] Since I&A is internal to DHS and I&A analysts are already tasked 
with directly supporting DHS leadership, we did not discuss with 
leadership representatives their desire for direct access to I&A 
analysts (as we did with I&A's other four customer groups). 

[47] See e.g., 6 U.S.C. §§ 121 (articulating the department's 
intelligence and analysis responsibilities), 124h (articulating the 
department's responsibilities with respect to fusion centers), and 485 
(directing establishment of an information-sharing environment of 
which DHS is a participant). 

[48] The Joint Intelligence Bulletin is produced with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in response to significant or emerging threats 
or developments. The Roll Call Release is a single-topic intelligence 
product for first responders on terrorist tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that may be encountered during daily routines. 

[49] I&A is to follow the same tradecraft standards as the rest of the 
Intelligence Community. These standards are detailed in Intelligence 
Community Directive Number 203--Analytic Standards (June 21, 2007), 
which is the basis on which ODNI evaluates DHS intelligence analysis 
products (along with those from other members of the Intelligence 
Community). 

[50] The National Counterterrorism Center is organizationally part of 
ODNI and serves as the principal adviser to ODNI on intelligence 
operations and analysis related to counterterrorism. See 50 U.S.C. § 
3056(a), (f)(1). Further, it describes its missions as, among other 
things, serving as the primary organization in the U.S. government for 
integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to terrorism 
possessed or acquired by the U.S. government (except purely domestic 
terrorism), serving as the central and shared knowledge bank on 
terrorism information, and providing all-source intelligence support 
to government-wide counterterrorism activities. 

[51] Critical infrastructure refers to the systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of 
such may have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, environment, or any 
combination of those matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 5195c. The critical 
infrastructure sectors are the Defense Industrial Base; Energy; Food 
and Agriculture; Healthcare and Public Health; Financial Services; 
Water and Wastewater Systems; Chemical; Commercial Facilities; 
Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Emergency Services; Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste; Information Technology; Communications; 
Transportation Systems; and Government Facilities. GAO, Transportation 
Security Information Sharing: Stakeholders Generally Satisfied but TSA 
Could Improve Analysis, Awareness, and Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-44] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 
2011). 

[52] InfraGard is an FBI-sponsored initiative that brings together 
representatives from the private and public sectors to help protect 
our nation's critical infrastructure from attacks by terrorists and 
criminals. Members have access to an FBI secure communications network 
featuring an encrypted website, web mail, Listservs, and message 
boards. The FBI uses the InfraGard website to disseminate threat 
alerts and advisories. InfraGard also sends out intelligence products 
from the FBI and other agencies. 

[53] The National Network of Fusion Centers describes the association 
of individual fusion centers that serve the national homeland security 
mission, including counterterrorism. The federal government identifies 
fusion centers within the National Network as the primary conduit for 
sharing federal terrorism-related information with state, local, 
tribal, and territorial partners. 

[54] See GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Has Demonstrated Leadership and 
Progress, but Additional Actions Could Help Sustain and Strengthen 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-809] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012). In an e-mail accompanying the 
customer satisfaction survey, I&A officials stated they were 
conducting the survey in response to a recommendation in this GAO 
report to survey an identified population of I&A customers in order to 
(1) gauge their satisfaction with I&A products and services and (2) 
identify opportunities for future improvement. 

[55] Attrition is the percentage of personnel losses for all reasons 
during the fiscal year, and is measured by comparing personnel losses 
during the year with the total number of personnel on board at the 
beginning of the year. Our work focused on attrition among I&A 
analysts classified as GS-0132. According to OPM's Position 
Classification Standard for Intelligence Series, GS-0132 analysts 
advise on, administer, supervise, or perform work in the collection, 
analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information 
on political, economic, social, cultural, physical, geographic, 
scientific, or military condition, trends, and forces in foreign and 
domestic areas that directly or indirectly affect the national 
security. 

[56] The Director of National Intelligence may, with concurrence of 
the head of the department concerned and in consultation with the 
Director of OPM, convert competitive service positions within an 
element of the Intelligence Community in such department to excepted 
service positions as the Director of National Intelligence determines 
necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element. See 
50 U.S.C. § 3024. See also 5 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a) (defining "competitive 
service"), 2103(a) (defining "excepted service"), and 5 C.F.R. pt. 
213, subpt. C (specifying the types of positions eligible for excepted 
appointments) Pursuant to its regulations, OPM may except a position 
from the competitive service if it determines, for example, that 
appointments into such positions are not practicable. See 5 C.F.R. § 
6.1(a). 

[57] Homeland Security Institute, Independent Evaluation of Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis Programs (Arlington, Virginia: Apr. 25, 
2009). 

[58] See GAO, Additional Actions Needed to Improve Reporting on and 
Planning for the Use of Contract Personnel, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-204] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 
2014) for more on the use of contract personnel in the Intelligence 
Community. 

[59] Homeland Security Institute, Independent Evaluation of Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis Programs. 

[60] The climate survey measures employee perceptions about an 
organization's ability to recruit and retain top talent. It gauges if 
employees understand how their work relates to their agency's goals 
and mission priorities and if they get a sense of accomplishment from 
their work. It also assesses employee satisfaction with coworkers, 
supervisors, working conditions, involvement in workplace decisions, 
training and development opportunities, promotions, pay, and rewards. 

[61] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Taking Further Action to 
Better Determine Causes of Morale Problems Would Assist in Targeting 
Action Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-940] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28 2012). Responses to the Office of 
Personnel Management survey are from all I&A employees and not 
specific to analysts within I&A's Office of Analysis. 

[62] To communicate its new workforce composition, I&A released a 
memorandum in November 2012 stating that I&A will cap hiring at 25 
percent for GS-12/13 to ensure it maintains a proper distribution of 
personnel within the GS 7 through GS-13 range. For fiscal year 2013, 
the Office of Analysis was capped at five new hires at the GS-12/13 
level. The memorandum does not specify whether those five are 
intelligence analysts or other staff positions. 

[63] In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, I&A provided over 20 courses 
related to analytic tradecraft for its analytic workforce. According 
to I&A officials, these courses were developed in accordance with ODNI 
standards. 

[64] The current Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for the Office of 
Analysis is on detail from the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

[65] The competency gap assessment is sponsored by OPM and DHS and 
includes all intelligence analysts within DHS's enterprise. 

[66] According to the directors of the four analytical divisions 
within I&A's Office of Analysis--Current Intelligence, Border 
Security, Homeland Counterterrorism, and Cyber--I&A looks for people 
that have the ability to analyze and piece together seemingly 
unrelated information from multiple sources and have strong written 
and oral communication skills. I&A does recruit for and hire 
individuals for their specific expertise in certain areas. For 
example, according to I&A officials, some positions that require 
technical expertise are difficult to train in-house, a fact that makes 
it more feasible to directly hire for this expertise. 

[67] DHS Workforce Planning Guide. 

[68] ISACs are entities established by critical infrastructure key 
resource owners and operators to provide comprehensive sector 
analysis, which is shared within the sector, with other sectors, and 
with government. 

[69] We met with representatives from 5 of the 17 critical 
infrastructure sector committees of PCIS and 6 of the 16 information 
sharing and analysis center members of the National Council of ISACs 
in group meetings. All of the representatives at the PCIS meeting met 
with us at the conclusion of their meeting. Additionally, of the 9 
representatives who attended the National Council of ISACs meeting, 6 
individuals volunteered to meet with us at the conclusion of the 
meeting. The individuals at the PCIS meeting represented the (1) 
Communications Sector Committee, (2) Defense Industrial Base Sector 
Committee, (3) Energy Sector Committee, (4) Financial Services Sector 
Committee, and (5) Transportation Sector Committee. The individuals 
who spoke with us at the conclusion of the National Council of ISACs 
meeting represented the (1) Financial Services ISAC, (2) Information 
Technology ISAC, (3) Highway and Motor Carrier ISAC, (4) Public Health 
ISAC, (5) Real Estate ISAC, and (6) Water ISAC. In addition, DHS 
officials from the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
referred us to two additional private sector officials from the PCIS 
Commercial Facilities Sector Committee and the Transportation Sector 
Committee whom we met with in separate meetings. Information we 
obtained at these meetings cannot be generalized across all private 
critical infrastructure sectors because we did not meet with 
associations representing all such sectors. These meetings, however, 
provided us with an overview of users' perspectives on the usefulness 
and relevance of I&A analytic products. 

[70] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov., 1999). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]