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Entitled 'State Department: Pervasive Passport Fraud Not Identified, 
But Cases Of Potentially Fraudulent And High-Risk Issuances Are Under 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

May 2014: 

State Department: 

Pervasive Passport Fraud Not Identified, but Cases of Potentially 
Fraudulent and High-Risk Issuances Are under Review: 

GAO-14-222: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-222, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to
conceal the true identity of the user and potentially facilitate other 
crimes, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking. State 
issued over 13.5 million passports during fiscal year 2013. 

GAO was asked to assess potential fraud in State's passport program. 
This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk
issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010-—the
most recently available data at the time GAO began its review. GAO 
matched State's passport data from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for 
approximately 28 million issuances to databases with information about 
individuals who were deceased, incarcerated in state and federal 
prison facilities, or who had an active warrant at the time of issuance.
GAO also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to 
applicants who provided a likely invalid SSN, which had not been 
assigned at the time of the passport application, or had been publicly 
disclosed. From each of these five populations, GAO selected
nongeneralizable samples for additional review. GAO also randomly
selected a generalizable sample from a population of passport 
issuances to applicants who used only the SSN of a deceased 
individual. GAO reviewed State's adjudication policies, and examined 
passport applications for these populations to further assess whether 
there were potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State
provided technical comments and generally agreed with our findings. This
report contains no recommendations. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 
and 2010 that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used 
the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, 
had active felony warrants, or used an incorrect Social Security 
number (SSN); however, GAO did not identify pervasive fraud in these 
populations. The Department of State (State) has taken steps to 
improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying
information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, 
State modified its process for identifying applicants with active 
warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO 
referred, and State is reviewing, matches from this analysis. The 
following summarizes GAO's findings: 

* Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at 
least 1 case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as 
likely data errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and 
indicated fraud could likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State 
plans to further review 6 cases. 

* State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the 
sample of 14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be 
ruled out in 10 of the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional 
reviews of 4 cases. 

* Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud 
indicators, since all individuals were not actually in prison when 
applying for passports. 

* Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State
identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the 
figure shows, GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State 
was not aware of or alerted to, but should have been in State's system 
for detection during adjudication. 

Figure: Summary of GAO's Matching Analysis and Nongeneralizable 
Samples: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Deceased individuals; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 181; 
Sample size: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 1. 

GAO's population of passport applicants: State prisoners (from 11 
states); 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 68; 
Sample size: 14; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 7. 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Federal prisoners; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 206; 
Sample size: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 0. 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Individuals with active 
warrants; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 486; 
Sample size: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 3. 

Total: 
Sample size: 59; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State), the Social Security Administration (SSA), state departments 
of correction, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the U.S. 
Marshals Service. 

[A] Total passport issuances are solely based on the matching 
criteria. GAO did not verify that all issuances from its match 
populations were actual fraud cases or issuances to individuals with 
active warrants. Rather, it selected samples for further review and 
referred all matches to State. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who 
used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 
24,278 issuances to applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO 
reviewed a 140-case generalizable sample and a 15-case 
nongeneralizable sample for these two populations, respectively, and 
determined the cases were likely data errors. State has taken steps to 
capture correct SSN information more consistently. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-222]. For more 
information, contact Stephen M. Lord at (202) 512-6722 or 
lords@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport Issuances 
Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

Appendix III: The Department of State's (State) Use of the Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) Records for Death Checks: 

Appendix IV: Description of Warrant-Matching Analysis: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Warrants by Type of Offense to Individuals Issued Passports 
from Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population: 

Figure 2: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

Figure 3: Description of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased 
Individuals: 

Figure 4: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of State Prisoners: 

Figure 5: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Federal Prisoners: 

Figure 6: Timeline Showing When the Department of State (State) Began 
Checking for Federal, State, and Local Warrants: 

Figure 7: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Applicants with 
Active Warrants: 

Figure 8: Summary of Whether State Identified the Warrants in Our 
Sample Population: 

Figure 9: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased-SSN 
Errors: 

Figure 10: Estimated Percentage of Causes of Incorrect SSNs Associated 
with Deceased Individuals in State's Passport Data: 

Figure 11: Summary of Analysis and Invalid Social Security Number 
Sample: 

Figure 12: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population: 

Figure 13: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

Figure 14: Social Security Administration's Responses and Actions of 
Passport Specialists: 

Abbreviations: 

BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 

CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System: 

DS: Bureau of Diplomatic Security: 

EVS: Enumeration Verification System: 

FAM: Foreign Affairs Manual: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FinCEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: 

FPM: Fraud Prevention Manager: 

NCIC: National Crime Information Center: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

SSN: Social Security number: 

State: Department of State: 

TDIS: Travel Document Issuance System: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 1, 2014: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Chairman: 
Select Committee on Intelligence: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Benjamin L. Cardin: 
United States Senate: 

Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used 
to conceal the true identity of the user. In addition, according to 
the Department of State (State), passport and visa fraud are often 
committed in connection with crimes such as international terrorism, 
drug trafficking, organized crime, alien smuggling, money laundering, 
pedophilia, and murder. As a result, even a few instances of passport 
fraud can have far-reaching effects. A passport is an official 
government document that conveys certain benefits, such as certifying 
an individual's identity, permitting a citizen to travel abroad, 
proving citizenship, assisting with loan applications, and fulfilling 
other needs not related to international travel. State issued over 
13.5 million passport cards and books during fiscal year 2013. 

Since May 2005, we have issued several reports identifying fraud 
vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process.[Footnote 1] In 2005 
and 2007, we reported on weaknesses in State's information sharing 
with other federal agencies, such as the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), as well as opportunities to improve the agency's 
oversight of passport acceptance facilities. In 2010, we tested 
State's passport issuance procedures by using counterfeit documents 
and the identities of fictitious or deceased individuals, inducing 
State to issue five genuine U.S. passports.[Footnote 2] State 
identified two of our seven applications as fraudulent during its 
adjudication process; however, we were able to obtain passports using 
counterfeit documents in three cases.[Footnote 3] We have made several 
recommendations beginning in 2005 designed to help reduce passport 
fraud, including that State improve information sharing with other 
federal agencies, improve execution of passport fraud-detection 
efforts, and strengthen internal controls at its passport-acceptance 
facilities. State generally concurred with our recommendations and has 
taken steps to address them. 

You asked that we assess potential fraud in State's passport program. 
This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-
risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. 

To examine potentially fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances in 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010,[Footnote 4] we matched State's passport-
issuance data for approximately 28 million passport issuances 
(including passport books and cards)[Footnote 5] to databases 
containing information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) 
incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the 
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of an active 
warrant at the time of the passport issuance.[Footnote 6] We conducted 
this matching on the basis of common data elements including Social 
Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We also analyzed the 
passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided an 
invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN that had not been assigned at 
the time of the passport application, or had a high risk of misuse. 
[Footnote 7] From each of these five populations, we selected 
nongeneralizable samples for further review. In addition, from a 
population of 13,470 passport issuances to applicants who used the 
SSN, but not the name, of a deceased individual, we selected a 
generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport issuances, 
including 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009 and 2010. 
We analyzed these cases to determine whether the applicant provided 
the correct SSN and State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the 
applicant provided the wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN 
in its system. Figure 1 summarizes the focus of our matching analysis 
and the related sample sizes selected for further review. 

Figure 1: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Deceased individuals; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 181; 
Sample size: 15; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 1. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: State prisoners (from 11 
states); 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data[B]; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 68[C]; 
Sample size: 14[D]; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 7. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Federal prisoners; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 206[E]; 
Sample size: 15; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 0. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Individuals with active 
warrants; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 486[F]; 
Sample size: 15; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 3. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using invalid SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Not used or available for matching 
analysis; 
Name: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 24,278; 
Sample size: 15; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors. [Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using deceased SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Did not match State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 13,470; 
Sample size: 140[G]; [Generalizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors. [Generalizable sample] 

Total: 
Sample size: 214; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State), the Social Security Administration (SSA), state departments 
of correction, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the U.S. 
Marshals Service. 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states 
including Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. However, even though we 
used data from all 11 states during our matching analysis, three of 
these state prison databases did not have any valid matches to the 
passport data. In addition, data from three states did not include 
dates of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to 
State's passport data based on Social Security number (SSN) and name 
only. 

[C] As described in more detail later in this report, our review 
indicated that some matches may be a result of identity theft 
perpetrated by the state prisoner, prior to incarceration, and not the 
passport applicant. 

[D] We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners 
incarcerated in each of the states we reviewed for a total of 14 cases 
from eight different states. 

[E] This number includes passport issuances to people residing in 
halfway houses, and therefore may not represent issuances to 
individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a 
passport. 

[F] These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique 
individuals that had a total of 564 open warrants. We did not confirm 
that all of these warrants were associated with felony charges, but we 
excluded warrants with a description of either a "traffic crime" or 
"misdemeanor" from our analysis. 

[G] The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport 
issuances included 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009 
and 2010. 

[End of figure] 

As highlighted in figure 1, we selected a total of 214 passport 
issuances for additional review from our five nongeneralizable and one 
generalizable samples. For each of the 214 passport issuances 
selected, we reviewed a copy of the original passport application, 
submitted the SSN from State's passport data to SSA for verification, 
and obtained records of the passport holder's travel activity from the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. We also reviewed State's documentation of 
additional investigative steps the agency took, if any, to resolve 
fraud indicators during the adjudication of the passports. Where 
applicable, we obtained additional documentation about the death, 
incarceration, or fugitive status of applicants from federal and state 
agencies. For this review, we included only issued passports; we did 
not examine passport applications that were rejected by State or 
abandoned by the applicant. Furthermore, we did not attempt to 
identify all possible types of passport fraud. 

We assessed the reliability of State's passport data, TECS travel-
activity data provided by FinCEN, SSA's full death file, state and 
federal prisoner data, and data on individuals with open warrants 
provided by the U.S. Marshals Service by reviewing relevant 
documentation, interviewing knowledgeable agency officials, and 
examining the data for obvious errors and inconsistencies.[Footnote 8] 
With the exception of prisoner data from five states, which we did not 
use, we concluded that all of the data we used were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. We examined State's 
policies, guidance, including the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), and 
other materials provided to passport specialists. We reviewed changes 
to State's controls since fiscal years 2009 and 2010 with respect to 
preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk passport issuances. We also 
interviewed State officials, observed the adjudication process at a 
passport facility, and reviewed the 214 passport applications in our 
samples to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or 
high risk issuances. For a more-detailed description of our 
objectives, scope, and methodology, see appendix I. 

We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.[Footnote 9] 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Background: 

Passport Application Process: 

According to agency officials and guidance posted on State's public 
website, applicants can apply for a U.S. passport in one of three 
ways: in person at an acceptance facility, by mail (for renewal 
applications), or at a passport facility that offers acceptance 
services (typically expedited applications). Applicants submit 
documents, such as a birth certificate or driver's license, to 
passport acceptance agents to provide evidence of citizenship, or 
noncitizen nationality, and proof of identity. The acceptance agents 
are to watch the applicant sign the application, review submitted 
documents for completeness, and check for application inconsistencies. 
For example, acceptance agents are to assess whether photographs and 
descriptions in the identification documents match the applicant. If 
an acceptance agent suspects that an applicant has submitted 
fraudulent information or exhibits nervous behavior, the acceptance 
agent is instructed to accept the application and complete a checklist 
indicating the reason for suspected fraud. The agents are to then send 
the application, checklist, and photocopy of the identification to 
State's Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM). Acceptance agents are not 
State employees; however, State provides training, as well as detailed 
guidance that governs their work. State also conducts periodic 
inspections and audits of acceptance facilities to ensure compliance 
with regulations and policies. 

According to State officials, the most common way to renew a passport 
is by mail. An individual with a passport issued during the previous 
15 years may renew it by submitting a mail-in application, along with 
the previously issued passport, a recent photograph, and documentation 
of a name change, if applicable. Applications submitted by mail or at 
an acceptance facility are sent to a Department of the Treasury 
contracted lockbox service provider for data entry and payment 
processing. The lockbox service provider converts handwritten or typed 
text into electronic data and deposits passport fees paid by the 
applicant. Once the lockbox data entry and payment are complete, the 
electronic data and paper passport application are sent to passport-
issuing facilities around the United States for adjudication. 

Applicants who demonstrate a need for in-person expedited service for 
either a first-time issuance or a renewal may submit their 
applications directly to a passport-issuing facility. State employees 
at these facilities accept passport fees and enter application data 
directly into State's electronic processing system, called the Travel 
Document Issuance System (TDIS), before forwarding the application for 
expedited adjudication. 

Figure 2 provides an overview of the passport application and 
adjudication process for applications received in person at an 
acceptance facility, by mail, or at a passport facility that offers 
acceptance services (see appendix 2 for static version of this figure). 

Figure 2: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Print Version: Go to appendix II. 

Source: GAO review of the Department of State (State) data. Art 
Explosion (images). 

[End of figure] 

Passport Adjudication Process: 

As we have noted in previous products, each passport application is to 
be individually reviewed by a passport specialist during a process 
known as adjudication.[Footnote 10] State's FAM specifies the steps 
passport specialists must take to address various fraud indicators. 
According to State documents, specialists are responsible for 
reviewing applications and documents establishing the applicants' 
identity and citizenship, as well as conducting various checks, as 
described below. Depending on the results of the adjudication, 
passport specialists may approve or deny the passport issuance, 
conduct additional checks, request more information from the 
applicant, or forward the application for additional review by their 
supervisor, the FPM, or by offices in Passport Headquarters.[Footnote 
11] Once a passport has been issued, the application is scanned and 
archived. Passports issued to individuals 16 years or older are 
generally valid for 10 years.[Footnote 12] 

Several federal statutes and regulations either require or permit 
State to withhold a passport from an applicant in certain situations. 
For example, State must withhold passports from individuals who are in 
default on certain U.S. loans, who are in arrears of child support in 
an amount determined by statute, or who are imprisoned, on parole, or 
on supervised release as a result of certain types of violations of 
the Controlled Substances Act, Bank Secrecy Act, and some state-level 
drug laws.[Footnote 13] Likewise, State may choose to refuse a 
passport to applicants who are the subject of an outstanding local, 
state, or federal warrant of arrest for a felony, or the subject of 
probation conditions or criminal court orders that forbid the 
applicant from leaving the country and the violation of which could 
result in the issuance of a federal arrest warrant.[Footnote 14] 

During the adjudication process, passport specialists are to review 
applications and results of checks against various databases to detect 
fraud and suspicious activity, and for other purposes. Application 
data are entered into TDIS, State's electronic processing system. TDIS 
automatically checks applicants' names against a number of sources, 
including SSA's death records and a database of warrants. For example, 
TDIS automatically checks key identifying information of all passport 
applicants against SSA's full death file, as well as a database of 
felony warrants for certain crimes. Passport specialists are to 
compare the application to the information in TDIS to make sure it was 
entered properly and to identify missing information. 

Passport specialists are also to review the results of automatic 
checks during a process State refers to as "the front-end" process of 
adjudication. For instance, during this process, passport specialists 
are to determine whether an applicant currently holds a passport, has 
a history of lost or stolen passports, or has already submitted a 
passport application. According to State officials, such checks are 
intended to facilitate the identification of suspicious activity and 
prevent multiple passport issuances to the same person. Passport 
specialists also are to consider the results from facial recognition 
technology which is used to help prevent the issuance of passports to 
individuals using false identities and people who should be denied 
passports for other legal reasons, such as terrorists in the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) terrorist database.[Footnote 15] In 
addition, passport specialists may employ commercial databases and 
other tools during the adjudication process to assist in confirming an 
applicant's identity or citizenship. 

Selected Controls for Detecting Potentially Fraudulent and High-Risk 
Issuances: 

SSN Verification and Data Checks for Deceased Individuals: 

In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement 
that allows State to query SSA's records for verifying applicants' 
identities and identifying deceased individuals. In accordance with 
this agreement, State's TDIS automatically queries SSA's Enumeration 
Verification System (EVS) to verify that a passport applicant's SSN, 
name, and date of birth match the records at SSA.[Footnote 16] EVS 
includes a death indicator based on SSA's full death file of 
approximately 98 million records, which aids State in identifying 
applicants using the identity of a deceased individual to apply for a 
passport.[Footnote 17] In most cases, State's controls will not flag 
an applicant as deceased unless certain fields such as the SSN, name, 
and date of birth all match the identifying information of a deceased 
individual. According to State's procedures, passport specialists must 
refer any applications with a positive death indicator to State's FPM 
for additional review, since the match may indicate a case of stolen 
identity. The FPM reviews all applications referred to it by passport 
specialists to determine whether the identifying information on the 
passport application is in fact associated with a deceased individual. 
The FPM can approve the passport application once it has reviewed and 
resolved any indicators of potential fraud. See appendix III for 
additional details on State's use of SSA's records for death checks. 

Data Checks for Incarcerated Individuals: 

In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the years of passport issuances we 
reviewed, State did not have access to federal and state prisoner 
databases in order to check whether applicants' identities matched 
those of incarcerated individuals. Since then, State has taken steps 
to explore access to such databases. For example, in June 2013, State 
entered into a data-sharing agreement with the BOP in order to access 
federal prisoner data. In addition, officials told us that in December 
2013, State completed the first phase of a pilot project using 
prisoner data from two states, Florida and Rhode Island, to identify 
whether applicants are fraudulently using identities of state 
prisoners. We provide additional details on State's initiatives to 
improve data checks for incarcerated individuals in a subsequent 
section. 

Data Checks for Individuals with Active Warrants: 

In 2002, the Marshals Service began transmitting certain warrant data 
to State for use during the passport adjudication process. Since then, 
the information State receives has changed to include additional 
warrants from the FBI, as described in detail below. To help State 
determine whether an applicant may have an active warrant for a felony 
charge, TDIS automatically checks applicants' identifying information 
in State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), a database 
that maintains warrant data.[Footnote 18] TDIS indicates a possible 
match if certain data elements from the passport application, such as 
the name, SSN, date of birth, place of birth, or gender, matches 
information in CLASS within certain parameters. State's policies 
require that passport specialists refer likely matches in CLASS to 
State's passport legal office. Officials said paralegals in the 
passport legal office are to review the information and contact the 
warrant issuer to confirm the identity of the subject in the warrant 
against the passport applicant, verify that the warrant is active and 
related to a felony charge, and further coordinate, as necessary. The 
passport legal office may also use commercial databases, or 
photographs obtained from the warrant issuer, to confirm applicants' 
identities. In technical comments, State officials clarified that the 
passport legal office is authorized to deny the passport issuance when 
it determines, or is informed by a competent authority, that the 
applicant is the subject of an outstanding federal, state, or local 
warrant of arrest for a felony crime. In addition, the passport legal 
office can authorize the passport issuance if it determines, upon 
additional review, that there was not in fact a legitimate match in 
CLASS. The legal office may approve an issuance in cases where the 
warrant was closed, associated with a misdemeanor charge, or for other 
reasons, such as a request by law enforcement agencies. 

Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport Issuances 
Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified: 

Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 
we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of 
issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying 
information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as 
applicants with active felony warrants. The total number of cases we 
identified represented a small percentage of all issuances during the 
two fiscal years, indicating that fraudulent or high-risk issuances 
were not pervasive. We also determined that State's data contained 
inaccurate SSN information for thousands of passport recipients. Most 
of the instances in which there was inaccurate SSN information 
appeared to be applicant or State data-entry errors, rather than 
fraud. Since fiscal years 2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to 
improve its detection of passport applicants using the identifying 
information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, 
State modified its process for identifying applicants with active 
warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. 

Passport Issuances to Applicants Associated with Deceased Individuals, 
Prisoners, and Individuals with Active Warrants: 

Issuances to Applicants Using Identifying Information of Deceased 
Individuals: 

Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 
we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 181 
passports issued to individuals whose name and SSN both appeared in 
SSA's full death file, suggesting that the applicant may have 
inappropriately used the identity of a deceased person.[Footnote 19] 
To ensure that our matches did not contain legitimate applicants who 
died shortly after submitting their applications, we included only 
individuals who had died more than 120 days before the passport 
issuance.[Footnote 20] Figure 3 summarizes our matching analysis and 
sample results. 

Figure 3: Description of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased 
Individuals: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Deceased individuals; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 181; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 1; 
Sample type: Nongeneralizable sample. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[End of figure] 

It is not possible to determine from data matching alone whether the 
passport issuance was appropriate or fraudulent without reviewing the 
facts and circumstances for each individual case from the 181 passport 
issuances. Thus, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 
cases for additional analysis. For each case, we attempted to verify 
death information from SSA's full death file by obtaining a copy of 
the death certificate and confirming that SSA's most-current records 
listed the individual as deceased. We also requested TECS travel data 
from FinCEN and reviewed open-source information to search for 
additional fraud indicators. The following information provides 
additional details on the 15 cases. 

* In one case, the applicant applied for and received an expedited 
passport by mail in January 2009 using the SSN, name, and date of 
birth of a deceased individual. The SSA's full death file and the 
death certificate indicated that the purported applicant had died in 
May 2008. According to TECS travel data, the passport was used in June 
2009 to fly to the United States from Mexico and had not been used 
again as of June 2013. As a result of information we provided, State 
reviewed this case in 2013 and determined that the applicant appeared 
to be an imposter. State officials noted that the application should 
have been referred to the FPM during adjudication, because it 
contained multiple fraud indicators. State officials said this case 
should be referred to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for 
further investigation. 

* In another case, the applicant's passport issuance was delayed by 
more than a year because her name mistakenly appeared in SSA's full 
death file. In our May 2013 testimony, we found that SSA's data 
contained a small number of inaccurate records, and SSA has stated, in 
rare instances, it is possible for the records of a person who is not 
deceased to be included erroneously in the death file.[Footnote 21] 
Situations where a living individual is inappropriately listed as 
deceased in SSA's records can create a hardship for the person who has 
been falsely identified as deceased. This case highlights one of the 
challenges State encounters when querying SSA's full death file, and 
illustrates why State reviews applicants with death indicators on a 
case-by-case basis. 

* In 4 of the 15 cases, the applicant used a similar name to, as well 
as the same SSN as, a deceased individual. For each of the four cases, 
we verified the death information in SSA's full death file by 
obtaining a copy of the deceased person's death certificate. However, 
State officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases 
for various reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN. 

* In 9 of the 15 cases, we could not verify the death of the 
applicants because we were unable to identify the state in which the 
individual's death was recorded (possibly because the applicant was 
not deceased) or because state officials would not or could not 
provide the death certificate to us. State's subsequent review of 
these cases indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four 
cases, and that five of the cases should be referred to DS for further 
investigation. 

As of May 2014, we have referred all 181 passport issuances we 
identified from our matching analysis using SSA's full death file, 
including the 15 cases we examined in more detail, to State for 
further review and investigation. 

Issuances to Applicants Using the Identifying Information of State and 
Federal Prisoners: 

Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport 
issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 
68 issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and in some cases, 
date of birth of a state prisoner on their passport application. 
[Footnote 22] Without reviewing the facts and circumstances for each 
case, it is not possible on the basis of data matching alone to 
determine the extent to which these instances represent fraudulent 
issuances. Thus, from the group of individuals related to the 68 
issuances, we selected 14 cases for further review.[Footnote 23] For 
each sample case, we obtained additional documentation from state 
departments of corrections to verify key data fields for these 
passport recipients. Figure 4 summarizes our matching analysis and 
sample results. 

Figure 4: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of State Prisoners: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: State prisoners (from 11 
states); 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data[B]; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 68[C]; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 14[D]; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 7; 
Sample type: Nongeneralizable sample. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the state departments of correction. 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] Our review indicated that some matches may be a result of identity 
theft perpetrated by the state prisoner, prior to incarceration, and 
not by the passport applicant. In addition, data from three states 
with matches did not include dates of birth, and therefore records in 
these databases matched to State's passport data based on SSN and name 
only. 

[C] We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners 
incarcerated in each of the states we reviewed for a total of 14 cases 
from eight different states. 

[End of figure] 

From our nongeneralizable sample of 14 cases, we identified seven 
passport applicants who may have fraudulently used the identities of 
state prisoners, since the incarcerated individuals could not have 
physically appeared at a passport facility to submit their 
applications.[Footnote 24] The seven remaining cases in our state 
prisoner sample of 14 individuals were either not incarcerated at the 
time of application submission, applied for passports using mail-in 
applications, or represented possible identity theft by the prisoner 
prior to incarceration. Federal regulations do not prohibit State from 
issuing passports to prisoners; however, according to officials, 
State's policy is to deny passport issuances to individuals who are 
incarcerated at the time of application submission. 

We could not conclusively determine that all our sample cases or 
matches represented passport fraud, because for instance, it is 
possible that the state prisoner may have stolen the identity of the 
applicant prior to incarceration. For example, we identified two cases 
involving data from the same prison facility in which the prisoner had 
an alias name, in addition to an SSN and date of birth, that matched 
the information of the passport applicant. We provided information on 
all our matches, including the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, 
to State for review. According to officials, State's review of these 
cases included, but was not limited to, an assessment of fraud 
indicators in the passport applications, and review of the applicants' 
information in commercial and internal databases. State determined 
that fraud could likely be ruled out in eight cases. Officials 
initially said they should refer the remaining six cases to DS for 
further investigation. In their technical comments on a draft of this 
report, State officials said they conducted a second review of the six 
remaining cases and determined that two individuals used their true 
identities on their passport applications, and they ultimately 
referred four cases to DS for investigation. 

Of the four cases in our state prisoner sample that State officials 
referred to DS, we identified three instances where the passport was 
used to cross an international border during the prisoners' periods of 
incarceration. These cases highlighted the active use of passports 
obtained by potentially fraudulent means. We verified this travel 
activity by comparing the names, dates of birth, and passport numbers 
in State's passport data for these cases with TECS travel data 
provided by FinCEN. The TECS travel log for the three cases showed 
that the individuals used the passports for international travel at 
least once during the prisoners' periods of incarceration. In one 
case, an individual used the passport obtained by potentially 
fraudulent means to cross the U.S.-Mexico border more than 300 times. 

In addition to our analysis of state prisoners, we also identified 206 
passport issuances to individuals who used an SSN, name, and date of 
birth in their applications that matched identifying information in 
the BOP's federal prisoner data. However, the data we received 
included individuals residing in halfway houses. Unless otherwise 
stated in the conditions of release for parole, passport issuances to 
individuals living in halfway houses are legally permissible. Since we 
focused our in-depth analysis on a nongeneralizable sample of 15 
cases, we did not determine the extent to which the 206 cases 
represented individuals in federal prison facilities as opposed to 
halfway houses. Figure 5 summarizes our matching analysis and sample 
of 15 cases. 

Figure 5: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Federal Prisoners: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Federal prisoners; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 206[B]; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 0; 
Sample type: Nongeneralizable sample. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] This number includes passport issuances to people residing in 
halfway houses, and therefore may not represent issuances to 
individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a 
passport. 

[End of figure] 

From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who 
applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in 
their passport application. We determined that at least 9 of the 15 
individuals were living in BOP halfway houses when the passport 
application was submitted. Moreover, we did not find any indications 
of identity theft. The other six individuals were either not in a 
halfway house at the time of application submission, or we were unable 
to determine, on the basis of the information provided, their location 
after they were released from a federal prison facility.[Footnote 25] 
However, the documentation for these six individuals indicated that 
they were not incarcerated when the application was submitted. 

In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, officials said State did not have 
access to federal and state prisoner databases in order to check 
whether applicants' identities matched those of incarcerated 
individuals. In June 2013, State entered into a data-sharing agreement 
with the BOP that will allow it to access federal prisoner data, 
including information about individuals incarcerated in federal 
facilities or halfway houses. In addition, State obtained data-sharing 
agreements with two individual state departments of corrections, 
Florida and Rhode Island, as part of a pilot project to identify 
whether applicants fraudulently used the identities of state 
prisoners. State officials said these states represent different 
geographical regions and a large and small inmate population, and both 
had technical capabilities to transfer data efficiently and securely 
to State for adjudication purposes. Officials said in their technical 
comments that State completed the first phase of the pilot project in 
December 2013. This phase included the development of search criteria 
for detecting the fraudulent use of prisoners' identities. According 
to officials, State referred three potential fraud cases to DS for 
further investigation as a result of this effort. Officials also 
reported in their technical comments that State plans to acquire 
prisoner data from other states, and that it is developing best 
practices for obtaining such data. In addition, officials noted that 
State is in the early stages of planning a second phase of the pilot 
project. 

State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using 
prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements 
and issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal 
limitations. For example, according to BOP officials, State and the 
BOP will have to develop a technical infrastructure to facilitate 
sharing of federal prisoner data, which officials expected to occur no 
later than the end of fiscal year 2014. Similarly, with respect to 
state prisoner data, State officials noted that data from state 
departments of corrections would need to be automatically transmitted 
to allow for the updating of information on a consistent basis. In 
technical comments, State officials clarified that they would prefer 
to receive data from individual state departments of corrections on a 
real-time basis; however, the frequency with which State receives 
these data is not a factor in determining whether State enters into a 
data-sharing agreement with a department of corrections. State 
officials also highlighted issues regarding the compatibility of 
systems from various states, as well as concerns about poor data that 
could lead to false matches and delays in processing passport 
applications. Moreover, State officials told us legal limitations may 
prevent the transfer of state-level inmate data; however, State did 
not report having such challenges working with Florida and Rhode 
Island during its pilot project. 

Issuances to Individuals with Active Warrants: 

Out of a combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances 
we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 486 
issuances to individuals using the SSN, name or alias, and date of 
birth of people with active warrants on their passport 
applications.[Footnote 26] We could not determine from matching 
analysis alone whether all warrants were associated with felonies, but 
our analysis excluded warrants with a description of either a "traffic 
crime" or "misdemeanor" in data provided by the Marshals Service (see 
appendix IV for additional details). The type of warrant data State 
has received for detecting active felony warrants through CLASS has 
changed over time. In 2002, the Marshals Service began providing State 
with certain warrant information in CLASS. These only included Class 1 
warrants, which is a designation for warrants the Marshals Service 
enters and maintains in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
database, a criminal database that provides the warrant data to CLASS. 
[Footnote 27] According to State officials, the FBI began providing 
State with federal felony warrants in 2005 for use during the 
adjudication process. In late July 2009, officials said State began 
receiving state and local warrants from the FBI for crimes of varying 
degrees of severity, including misdemeanors, serious felonies, and 
nonserious felonies.[Footnote 28] According to State officials, the 
high volume of warrant cases was unmanageable and State had no 
authority to take action on misdemeanor warrants. Thus, in November 
2010, State officials said they updated CLASS so that it included only 
state or local warrants connected to more-serious felonies they 
selected. Officials also said CLASS is updated daily with information 
provided by the Marshals Service and the FBI, and currently contains 
information for federal, state, and local felony warrants related to 
State's selected felony charges. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution in 
State's data checks for warrants. 

Figure 6: Timeline Showing When the Department of State (State) Began 
Checking for Federal, State, and Local Warrants: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

2002: 
Class 1 warrants from the U.S. Marshals Service[A]. 

2005: 
Federal warrants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Start of fiscal year 2009 through end of fiscal year 2010: 
Passport issuances we reviewed. 

July 2009[B]: 
State and local warrants from the FBI. 

Source: GAO analysis of documentation provided by the Department of 
State (State) and the U.S. Marshals Service. 

[A] "Class 1" is a designation of the Marshals Service for warrants it 
enters and is responsible for in the NCIC database, a criminal 
database that sources the warrant data in Consular Lookout and Support 
System (CLASS). 

[B] According to officials, in November 2010, State selected certain 
felonies for inclusion in State's CLASS in response to a high volume 
of state and local warrants it received in July 2009, which also 
included warrants for misdemeanors. 

[End of figure] 

From the population of 486 issuances with active warrants that we 
identified through matching, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable 
sample of 15 individuals for additional analysis. Figure 7 summarizes 
our matching analysis and sample results. 

Figure 7: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Applicants with 
Active Warrants: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Individuals with active 
warrants; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 486[B]; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 3; 
Sample type: Nongeneralizable sample. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the U.S. Marshals Service. 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique 
individuals with a total of 564 open warrants. Beyond our sample 
items, we did not confirm whether the warrant was associated with a 
felony charge. However, these records excluded all warrants with a 
description of either a "traffic crime" or "misdemeanor." 

[End of figure] 

According to the Marshals Service, all 15 of the individuals in our 
nongeneralizable sample had warrants related to felony charges, 3 of 
which the Marshals Service was responsible for executing. Fugitives 
with felony warrants may pose a risk to public safety, and passports 
could help them evade capture by law enforcement agencies. State may 
choose to refuse a passport to applicants who are the subject of an 
outstanding felony warrant. In our analysis of the 15 cases, we took 
into account the evolution in State's controls. Figure 8 summarizes 
our review of the cases in our sample. 

Figure 8: Summary of Whether State Identified the Warrants in Our 
Sample Population: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Results of the Department of State's (State) warrant checks in the 
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS): State identified the 
warrant through CLASS or other means; 
Type of warrant data: 
Class 1 warrants from the U.S. Marshals Service (transmitted since 
2002): 3; 
Federal warrants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(transmitted since 2005): 1[A]; 
State or local warrants (transmitted since July 2009): 1; 
Total number of warrants: 5. 

Results of the Department of State's (State) warrant checks in the 
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS): CLASS did not have the 
particular warrant data at the time of application submission; 
Type of warrant data: 
Class 1 warrants from the U.S. Marshals Service (transmitted since 
2002): 0; 
Federal warrants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(transmitted since 2005): 0; 
State or local warrants (transmitted since July 2009): 5; 
Total number of warrants: 5. 

Results of the Department of State's (State) warrant checks in the 
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS): State was not aware of, 
or alerted to, the warrant, and CLASS should have included the warrant 
data at the time of application submission; 
Type of warrant data: 
Class 1 warrants from the U.S. Marshals Service (transmitted since 
2002): 0; 
Federal warrants from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
(transmitted since 2005): 3; 
State or local warrants (transmitted since July 2009): 0; 
Total number of warrants: 3. 

Total number of warrants: 13[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the U.S. Marshals Service. 

[A] According to officials, State received a notice from the relevant 
U.S. District Court regarding this individual that indicated the court 
order for the person had ceased and the individual was sentenced to 
probation. As a result, State officials said the warrant for this 
individual was not included in the Consular Lookout and Support System 
(CLASS) for State's warrant check. 

[B] Upon further review of our original sample of 15 cases, we 
identified one individual who had a state or local warrant that was 
not issued until after the applicant applied for his passport. In 
addition, our review of court documents for another case indicated the 
individual was unlikely to have been a fugitive when applying for the 
passport, since he was arrested and faced criminal charges after the 
warrant was issued, but about a decade before submitting the 
application. As a result, we did not further review these cases as 
part of our sample. 

[End of figure] 

Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases 
with warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. 
For instance, after detecting the warrant in one case, State's 
passport legal office ultimately determined the passport applicant was 
a victim of identity theft and was not the subject of the warrant. In 
another case, State identified a warrant at the state or local level 
for an applicant who applied for a passport at a time when State's 
controls had begun checking for such warrants. In this case, State's 
passport legal office authorized the passport issuance to the 
individual after concluding the associated charge was for a 
misdemeanor crime, as opposed to a felony offense. We also identified 
five cases where the applicants had outstanding state or local felony 
warrants on the application date, and State's CLASS did not have data 
for such warrants when the individuals applied.[Footnote 29] In the 
other 3 of the 13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications 
that State was aware of or alerted to the individuals' warrants at the 
time they applied for passports, even though it appeared that CLASS 
should have included the warrant data.[Footnote 30] We referred all 
passport issuances we identified from our matching analysis, including 
our sample cases, to State for further review and investigation. 

State's Records Contained Erroneous SSNs for Thousands of Passport 
Issuances as a Result of Applicant or State Data-Entry Error: 

Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport 
issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 
passport issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with 
a deceased individual,[Footnote 31] but where the name used in the 
passport application did not match the name of the deceased 
individual.[Footnote 32] As we previously noted, we analyzed these 
cases to determine whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and 
State recorded it incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the 
wrong SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN its system. 
Specifically, from this population, we selected a stratified random 
sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (see figure 9). We refer to these 
cases below as deceased-SSN errors. 

Figure 9: Summary of Matching Analysis and Sample of Deceased-SSN 
Errors: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using deceased SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Did not match State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 13,470; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 140[B]; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors; 
Sample type: Generalizable. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport 
issuances included 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009 
and 2010. 

[End of figure] 

We estimated that approximately 50 percent of the 13,470 cases with 
deceased-SSN errors were instances where the applicant provided an SSN 
that did not belong to him or her.[Footnote 33] We did not identify 
any other evidence of potential fraud in this group of cases, which 
suggests that applicants may have made mistakes in filling out the 
passport application. We estimated that in approximately 44 percent of 
the 13,470 cases with deceased-SSN errors applicants provided the 
correct SSNs, but State entered them incorrectly into TDIS. State 
officials could not provide an explanation for the errors related to 
these cases, which included applications with handwritten SSNs that 
were difficult to read, as well as typed SSNs. The remaining 6 percent 
of cases did not fall into either of these categories. Such cases 
included instances where the applicant did not provide an SSN, or 
where we were unable to ascertain the applicant's actual SSN. Figure 
10 summarizes the issuances we reviewed involving deceased-SSN errors. 

Figure 10: Estimated Percentage of Causes of Incorrect SSNs Associated 
with Deceased Individuals in State's Passport Data: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Applicant provided an incorrect SSN: 50%; 
Applicant provided a correct Social Security number (SSN), but the 
Department of State (State) recorded the SSN incorrectly: 44%; 
Other[A]: 6%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). 

Notes: All percentage estimates in figure 10 are generalized to the 
population of 13,470 cases with deceased-SSN errors. All estimates in 
figure 3 have a margin of error of +/-9 percentage points or fewer at 
the 95 percent confidence level. 

[A] Records that did not fall into any of the two categories above 
were classified as "other." Examples include instances where the 
applicant did not provide an SSN, or where GAO was unable to ascertain 
the applicant's actual SSN. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to deceased-SSN errors, we also found 24,278 issuances 
during fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to individuals who applied for a 
passport using a likely invalid SSN that SSA has never issued. 
[Footnote 34] For example, SSA has never issued the SSN "999-99-9999," 
so we would have included an applicant who used that SSN in this 
population.[Footnote 35] We randomly selected a nongeneralizable 
sample of 15 cases from the population of unique, likely invalid SSNs 
for additional review (see figure 11). In seven cases, State 
improperly recorded the applicants' SSNs in TDIS. In six cases, the 
applicant provided an incorrect SSN, five of which were close to the 
applicant's actual SSN.[Footnote 36] We did not determine the cause of 
the invalid SSNs in the remaining two cases, because they involved 
minors for whom we could not ascertain the passport recipient's actual 
SSNs. 

Figure 11: Summary of Analysis and Invalid Social Security Number 
Sample: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using invalid SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Not used or available for matching 
analysis; 
Name: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 24,278; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors; 
Sample type: Nongeneralizable. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State). 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[End of figure] 

State officials were unable to identify the specific reason for the 
deceased-SSN errors or likely invalid SSNs we identified, but the 
agency said it has taken actions to capture correct SSN information 
more consistently. For example, since January 2010, State's management 
has issued memorandums clarifying the policies and procedures for 
capturing and correcting applicant SSN information. In addition, in 
September 2011, State signed an information-exchange agreement with 
SSA to implement a real-time verification process through a secure 
online system. As of June 2013, State officials said all 28 domestic 
agencies and centers were able to verify SSNs in real time. We have 
not assessed these measures' effects on reducing SSN errors, but among 
the issuances we reviewed, SSN errors fell from about 24,762 in fiscal 
year 2009 to approximately 12,986 in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 37] 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to State and the Department of 
Justice for comment. State provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Department of 
Justice did not have any comments. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney 
General. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Stephen M. Lord: 
Managing Director: 
Forensic Audits and Investigative Service: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State's 
(State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent 
or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 
and 2010.[Footnote 38] 

To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010,[Footnote 39] we matched State's passport-
issuance data for approximately 28 million passport issuances to 
databases containing information about individuals who were (1) 
deceased, (2) incarcerated in a state prison facility, (3) in the 
custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), or (4) the subject of 
an active warrant at the time of the passport issuance.[Footnote 40] 
We conducted this matching on the basis of common data elements 
including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth. We 
also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants 
who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN that had not 
been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had a high 
risk of misuse. Because our review focused on passport issuances with 
certain fraud indicators, we did not review other types of passport 
fraud, such as identity theft involving individuals who were not 
deceased or imprisoned. Similarly, since we focused on high-risk 
issuances involving applicants with active warrants, we did not match 
the passport data against all databases with individuals at risk of 
misusing a passport, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Terrorist Screening Center data. We only reviewed data with passport 
issuances, therefore we did not examine passport applications that 
were rejected or abandoned by the applicant. In addition, our unit of 
analysis was passport issuances, instead of passport holders. Some 
individuals in our sample may have been issued multiple passports. 

In addition, we examined policies, guidance, including the Foreign 
Affairs Manual, and other materials provided to passport specialists. 
We reviewed changes to State's controls since fiscal years 2009 and 
2010 with respect to preventing certain fraudulent or high-risk 
passport issuances. We also assessed the reliability of State's 
passport data, TECS travel activity data provided by the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Social Security 
Administration's (SSA) full death file, prisoner databases provided by 
the BOP and by departments of corrections in 15 selected states, as 
well as data on individuals with open warrants provided by the 
Marshals Service, by reviewing relevant documentation, interviewing 
knowledgeable agency officials, and examining the data for obvious 
errors and inconsistencies. We concluded that all but four of these 
databases were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 
Through data tests and interviews, we concluded that state prisoner 
data from Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were not 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We did not assess the 
reliability of state prisoner data from North Carolina because they 
were not provided in time to be included in our analysis. 

To identify individuals using the SSN of a deceased individual, we 
matched State passport data to SSA's full death file as of September 
2011. The full death file contains all of SSA's death records, 
including state-reported death information. We included only those 
individuals who died more than 120 days before the passport was issued 
to ensure that our matches did not include legitimate applicants who 
died shortly after submitting an application.[Footnote 41] We further 
divided these passport applications into two groups on the basis of 
whether the name in the passport file matched the name in the 
corresponding death file record. 

From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the 
corresponding record in the full death file, we selected a stratified 
random sample that consisted of 140 passport issuances, evenly divided 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2010. For each case, we examined a copy 
of the original passport application and submitted the SSN from 
State's passport data to SSA for verification. We analyzed these cases 
to determine whether the applicant provided the correct SSN and State 
recorded it incorrectly, or whether the applicant provided the wrong 
SSN and State recorded the incorrect SSN in its system. Our estimates 
had a margin of error of at most +/-9 percentage points for the entire 
population, at the 95 percent confidence level. 

From 181 passport records with names that matched the corresponding 
record in the death file, we randomly selected a nongeneralizable 
sample of 15 records for additional analysis. To verify that these 
individuals were deceased at the time their identity was used to apply 
for a passport, we attempted to obtain a death certificate for each 
applicant. In some cases, we were unable to obtain a death certificate 
because we could not identify the state in which the individual's 
death was recorded or because state officials could not or would not 
provide the death certificate to us. The results of this sample are 
not generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the SSN 
and name of a deceased person. 

To identify individuals incarcerated at the time of passport issuance, 
we matched State passport data to a database of federal prisoners 
provided by the BOP and prisoner databases from Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, 
Texas, and Virginia. Federal prisoner data included individuals 
incarcerated during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. State prisoner data 
included individuals incarcerated as of the date the state provided 
data to us, which ranged from May to November 2011. We identified 
records for which the passport applicant's SSN, name, and date of 
birth matched that of a person who was incarcerated on the date of 
passport issuance. State prisoner data from Florida, New York, and 
Texas did not contain dates of birth. For these states, we matched 
passport data to state prison data by SSN and name only. From our 
matches, we randomly selected 15 federal prisoners and up to 2 
prisoners incarcerated in each of the states for additional analysis. 
If a state had two or fewer valid matches, we selected all matches 
from that state, for a total of 14 cases from eight different states. 
Three states did not have any matches. We obtained documentation from 
BOP and prison officials from the eight states to confirm that the 
selected individuals were incarcerated on the dates of passport 
application and issuance. The results of these samples are not 
generalizable to the entire population of applicants using the name, 
SSN, or date of birth of an incarcerated person. However, the cases 
offered insights on applicants who potentially used the identity of 
prisoners to apply for passports, and related efforts by State to 
identify such individuals. 

To identify individuals with active warrants at the time they applied 
for a passport, we matched State passport data to warrant data 
provided by the Marshals Service. We identified records for which the 
passport applicant's SSN, name (or alias), and date of birth matched 
that of an individual with an open warrant on the date of passport 
issuance. From this population, we randomly selected 15 warrants for 
crimes other than misdemeanors and traffic violations for additional 
analysis. We confirmed with the Marshals Service that all 15 
individuals had warrants related to felony charges. In addition, we 
referred to documentation provided by the Marshals Service that had 
warrant information for each case. We compared the warrant dates, the 
SSNs, names, and dates of birth, if available, in the warrant data we 
received from the Marshals Service for our matching analysis to the 
hard-copy documentation. For all 15 cases, the warrant issuance dates, 
as well as the names and fugitive unique identifiers, in the hard-copy 
documentation matched the information in the warrant data we used to 
match with the passport database. In addition, for 12 cases, at least 
one date of birth and SSN noted in the hard-copy documentation matched 
the warrant data used for our matching analysis. The dates of birth 
and SSNs in the documentation for 3 of the 15 individuals were 
redacted, and therefore the match was based on name and unique 
identifier only. The results of this sample are not generalizable to 
the entire population of applicants using the name (or alias), SSN, 
and date of birth of a fugitive, but provided insights about State's 
efforts to identify such individuals during the adjudication process. 

Because we matched passport data to databases of deceased individuals, 
prisoners, and fugitives using two or more identifiers--SSN, name, 
date of birth--we are generally confident in the accuracy of our 
results. However, in some cases, our matches may include applicants 
who were not deceased, incarcerated, or the subject of an active 
warrant. This can occur when a passport applicant has an SSN, name, 
and date of birth that are similar to an individual listed in one of 
the other databases or when the applicant is listed in the other 
database erroneously. In addition, our matches may be understated 
because we may not have detected applicants whose identifying 
information in the passport data differed slightly from their 
identifying information in other databases. Moreover, federal warrant 
data do not contain information on all individuals with an open 
warrant issued by a state court. 

We analyzed State passport data to identify issuances to individuals 
using an invalid SSN. We defined invalid SSNs as SSNs that had not 
been issued as of fiscal year 2010 or commonly misused SSNs. SSNs with 
certain digit combinations, such as those starting with 000 or 666, 
had never been issued as of fiscal year 2010. Commonly misused SSNs 
include single-character SSNs, or SSNs that have been publicly 
disclosed in advertisements. From this population, we selected 15 
cases for additional analysis. The results of this sample are not 
generalizable to the entire population of applicants using an invalid 
SSN, but the cases provided insights on State's controls related to 
identifying inaccurate SSNs on passport applications. In total, we 
selected 214 cases for additional analysis, as shown in figure 12. 

Figure 12: Summary of Matching Analysis and Samples by Population: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Deceased individuals; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 181; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; [Nongeneralizable 
sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 1. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: State prisoners (from 11 
states); 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data[B]; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 68[C]; 
Sample size: 14[D]; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 7. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Federal prisoners; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 206[E]; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; [Nongeneralizable 
sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 0. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Individuals with active 
warrants; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Matched the Department of State's passport data; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 486[F]; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 15; [Nongeneralizable 
sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 3. 
[Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using invalid SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Not used or available for matching 
analysis; 
Name: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 24,278; 
Sample size: 15; [Nongeneralizable sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors. [Nongeneralizable sample] 

GAO's population of passport applicants: Applicants using deceased SSN; 
Matching criteria: 
Social Security number (SSN): Matched the Department of State's 
passport data; 
Name: Did not match State's passport data; 
Date of birth: Not used or available for matching analysis; 
Total passport issuances[A]: 13,470; 
Sample size of cases for further analysis: 140[G]; [Generalizable 
sample] 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: Likely data 
errors. [Generalizable sample] 

Total: 
Sample size: 214; 
Sample cases with potential fraud or high-risk indicators: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State), the Social Security Administration (SSA), state departments 
of correction, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the U.S. 
Marshals Service. 

[A] These totals are solely based on the matching criteria described. 
We conducted additional reviews to verify data for the sample items in 
the next column. We did not verify that all issuances from our 
matching analysis were actual cases of fraud or issuances to 
individuals with active warrants. Rather, we selected samples for 
additional review, and referred all matches to State for further 
investigation. 

[B] In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states 
including Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. However, even though we 
used data from all 11 states during our matching analysis, three of 
these state prison databases did not have any valid matches to the 
passport data. In addition, data from three states did not include 
dates of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to 
State's passport data based on Social Security number (SSN) and name 
only. 

[C] As described in more detail later in this report, our review 
indicated that some matches may be a result of identity theft 
perpetrated by the state prisoner, prior to incarceration, and not the 
passport applicant. 

[D] We selected a nongeneralizable sample of up to two prisoners 
incarcerated in each of the states we reviewed for a total of 14 cases 
from eight different states. 

[E] This number includes passport issuances to people residing in 
halfway houses, and therefore may not represent issuances to 
individuals using the identities of federal prisoners to apply for a 
passport. 

[F] These 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique 
individuals that had a total of 564 open warrants. We did not confirm 
that all of these warrants were associated with felony charges, but we 
excluded warrants with a description of either a "traffic crime" or 
"misdemeanor" from our analysis. 

[G] The generalizable stratified random sample of 140 passport 
issuances included 70 passport issuances from both fiscal years 2009 
and 2010. 

[End of figure] 

In all, we selected a total of 214 passport issuances for additional 
review for our five nongeneralizable and one generalizable samples. 
For each of the 214 passport issuances selected, we reviewed a copy of 
the original passport application, verified the SSN in State's 
passport data using SSA's database, and obtained records of the 
passport holder's travel activity from FinCEN. We also reviewed State 
documentation of additional investigative activities taken in any of 
our cases. Where applicable, we obtained additional documentation 
about the death, incarceration, or fugitive status of applicants from 
federal and state agencies, and follow-up actions planned or taken by 
State. We could not determine whether the passport issuance was 
inappropriate or fraudulent without additional investigation of the 
facts and circumstances for each individual case. We were not able to 
perform these investigations due to restrictions on the use of State's 
passport data. The period required for our review was a result of 
various factors, including a data-sharing negotiation with State, time 
required to receive requested data and documentation, extensive data 
preparation and analysis involving multiple databases, and the 
necessity for resource-intensive reviews of information on-site, given 
the sensitivity of certain information. 

We performed this audit from March 2010 through May 2014 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

This figure is a printable version of the interactive graphic 
presented above, which provides an overview of the passport 
application and adjudication process. 

Figure 13: Passport Application and Adjudication Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Application submitted at an acceptance facility; 
Application mailed; 
Application submitted at a passport facility; 
Data entry and payment processing. 

Role of Passport Specialist: 

Passport specialists adjudicate all applications: 
The Department of State's (State) Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 
specifies the steps passport specialists must take to address various 
fraud indicators. 

Passport specialist checks identity and citizenship documentation. 

Passport specialist reviews results of database checks: 
Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS) automatically checks 
applicants' identities against various sources, including Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) records for deceased individuals, 
warrant databases, database of lost or stolen passports, and a 
terrorist watchlist. 

Passport specialist addresses issues identified as a result of 
database checks and review of documentation: 
During adjudication, specialists and State's passport legal office can 
request additional supporting documentation from applicants or use 
commercial databases to verify applicants' identities. 

Passport specialist refers applications with fraud or ineligibility 
indicators to supervisor or authorizing entity: 
Examples of authorizing entities include State's passport legal office 
and the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM). 

Authorizing entity reviews application: 
Depending on the indicator, the authorizing entity may conduct 
additional outreach to external parties, such as law-enforcement 
agencies, to resolve any flags. 

Issuance approved, or: 
Issuance denied. 

Source: GAO review of the Department of State's (State) policies and 
procedures. Art Explosion (images). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: The Department of State's (State) Use of the Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) Records for Death Checks: 

In April 2007, State and SSA signed an information-exchange agreement 
that allows State to automatically query SSA's Enumeration 
Verification System records for verifying applicants' identities and 
identifying deceased individuals. SSA provides State the death status 
of an applicant when all identifying fields--the Social Security 
number (SSN), name, and date of birth on the passport application--
match an SSA record.[Footnote 42] However, if one of these identifying 
elements does not match, SSA will not provide a response with respect 
to death status. For example, SSA would not provide State a death 
status if an applicant submitted the SSN of a deceased individual but 
used a different name. Figure 14 summarizes the potential responses 
State receives from SSA. 

Figure 14: Social Security Administration's Responses and Actions of 
Passport Specialists: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS) checks applicant's Social 
Security number (SSN), name, and date of birth against the Social 
Security Administration's (SSA) records: 

Potential SSA responses in TDIS: 

Match: SSN, name, and date of birth match SSA's records, and no death 
record exists: 
Notes match on application. 

Death match: SSN, name, and date of birth match SSA's record for a 
deceased individual: 
Refers to Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM). 

No match: SSN, name, and date of birth do not match SSA's record: 
Verifies that identifying information on the application was entered 
correctly in TDIS: 
* Incorrect: Makes correction in TDIS, and checks applicant again in 
SSA's records; 
* Correct: Checks commercial databases, the National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunication System, and applicant's documentation to verify 
applicant provided the correct information: 
- Incorrect: Makes correction in TDIS, and checks applicant again in 
SSA's records. Sends letter to applicant, or refers potential fraud to 
supervisor and FPM, as necessary; 
- Correct: Absent fraud indicators, notes on application confirmation 
of identity and database used. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) information (for 
data); Art Explosion (for images). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Description of Warrant-Matching Analysis: 

Out of the approximately 28 million combined passport issuances we 
reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we identified 1,096 
individuals whose Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of 
birth were associated with 1,309 warrants in data provided by the 
Marshals Service from the Justice Detainee Information Center 
database. Of these 1,309 warrants, we identified 486 passport 
issuances to individuals who may have had active felony warrants at 
the time of application submission. Over half of the 1,309 warrants 
were for offenses such as misdemeanors and traffic violations. 
According to officials at the Department of State (State), the 
department has no regulatory authority to take action on misdemeanor 
warrants. 

Officials from the Marshals Service said the agency tracks other 
warrants for federal agencies, including those related to misdemeanors 
and traffic offenses, as well as cases at the state level that require 
the assistance of the Marshals Service. Officials of the Marshals 
Service also said they do not have responsibility for entering 
information about such warrants into the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) database, and therefore such warrants are classified as 
non-Class 1 warrants. On the other hand, Class 1 warrants are those 
that the Marshals Service is responsible for entering into NCIC and 
that it transmits to State's Consular Lookout and Support System 
(CLASS) for adjudication. 

Marshals Service officials told us that of the 1,309 warrants we 
identified in our matching analysis, 111 (9 percent) were Class 1 
warrants. Because the Marshals Service only transmits Class 1 warrants 
into CLASS, State would have identified the non-Class 1 warrants only 
if it received them from another source, such as warrants provided by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Table 1 lists the types of open 
warrants we identified from our matching analysis.[Footnote 43] 

Table 1: Warrants by Type of Offense to Individuals Issued Passports 
from Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010: 

Offense type: Traffic Crimes and Misdemeanors; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 766; 
Percentage: 59%. 

Offense type: Others[B]; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 112; 
Percentage: 9%. 

Offense type: Parole Violation and Bond Default; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 110; 
Percentage: 8%. 

Offense type: Drug Crimes; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 101; 
Percentage: 8%. 

Offense type: Weapon Offenses and Violent Crimes; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 79; 
Percentage: 6%. 

Offense type: Fraud, Forgery, and Financial Crimes; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 66; 
Percentage: 5%. 

Offense type: Sex Offenses; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 65; 
Percentage: 5%. 

Offense type: Border and Immigration Crimes; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 10; 
Percentage: less than 1%. 

Offense type: Total; 
Number of active warrants[A]: 1,309; 
Percentage: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by the Department of State 
(State) and the Marshals Service: 

[A] One individual can have more than one warrant. The table includes 
warrants for 1,096 different fugitives. 

[B] This offense type includes various crimes, such as gambling, 
burglary, and child neglect. 

[End of table] 

Some of the 1,309 passport issuances we identified with active 
warrants were associated with felony offenses, including violent 
crimes ranging from assault to homicide. Ten of the warrants were 
associated with border and immigration crimes such as smuggling aliens 
and immigration violations. State may have identified and reviewed 
these warrants during the adjudication process, and decided to issue 
the passport after reviewing and resolving the circumstances of the 
case. We referred all our matches to State for further review and 
investigation. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Stephen M. Lord, (202) 512-6722 or lords@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact above, Heather Dunahoo (Assistant 
Director); Hiwotte Amare; James Ashley; Patricia Donahue; Richard 
Hillman; Leslie Kirsch; Maria McMullen; Sandra Moore; Anthony Moran; 
James Murphy; Rebecca Shea; and Gavin Ugale made key contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, State Department: Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance 
Process Remains Vulnerable to Fraud, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-922T] (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 
2010); State Department: Significant Vulnerabilities in the Passport 
Issuance Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-681T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2009) Addressing Significant Vulnerabilities 
in the Department of State's Passport Issuance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-583R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 
2009); Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant 
Vulnerabilities in State's Passport Issuance Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 
2009); Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, 
but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2007); and State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-477] (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 
2005). 

[2] Suspicious identifying information and documentation included 
passport photos of the same investigator on multiple applications; a 
62-year-old applicant using a recently issued Social Security number 
(SSN); passport and driver's license photos showing about a 10-year 
age difference; as well as the use of a California mailing address, a 
West Virginia permanent address and driver's license address, and a 
Washington, D.C., phone number in the same application. 

[3] In the two remaining cases, State recovered the passports from the 
mail before they were delivered. 

[4] We used data from these fiscal years because they were the most 
recent, full fiscal years available at the time State complied with 
our data request. In addition, for purposes of this report, 
potentially fraudulent passport issuances are those that involved an 
applicant using someone else's identity to apply for and receive a 
passport. We defined high-risk passport issuances as issuances to 
individuals who may pose a risk to public safety, but who did not 
necessarily steal someone's identity to apply for a passport, such as 
people with active warrants for felony charges. 

[5] According to publicly available passport issuance statistics, 
State issued a combined total of 28,964,775 passports during fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010. GAO reviewed domestically issued passports and 
excluded passports issued by the Special Issuance Agency to government 
travelers. We reviewed a total of 28,000,063 passport issuance records 
for these fiscal years. 

[6] Our review included state prison data from 11 states including 
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, New 
York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. We also obtained state prisoner data 
from five other states including Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, but did not use the data from these 
sources for our matching analysis for various reasons, including the 
absence of key fields or delays in receiving the data. We selected 
these 16 states because they had the largest prisoner populations as 
of December 31, 2009. 

[7] Prior to June 25, 2011, the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
issued SSNs according to a sequential and geographic logic. SSNs that 
were issued after fiscal years 2009 and 2010 should not be found in 
passport data from that time and therefore all SSNs in the passport 
data should be subject to SSA's sequencing logic. In addition, SSNs 
that have been publicly disclosed in advertisements or those used as 
placeholders by data entry clerks (e.g., 012-34-5678 or 111-11-1111) 
are at higher risk of misuse, and may represent a fraud indicator if 
found in the passport data. 

[8] TECS is a data repository to support, among other things, law 
enforcement "lookouts" and border screening. TECS is owned and managed 
by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection with the Department of 
Homeland Security. 

[9] The extended period required for our review was a result of 
various factors, including data-sharing negotiations with State, the 
time required to receive and review requested documentation, extensive 
data preparation and analysis involving multiple agency databases, and 
State's requirement to review all sensitive information on-site at the 
State Department. 

[10] For example, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-922T]. 

[11] According to a State official, Passport Headquarters consists of 
eight offices, such as the Office of Adjudication and the Office of 
Technical Operations. 

[12] A passport issued to an applicant who is under 16 years old is 
generally valid for 5 years. 

[13] 22 U.S.C. § 2671(d), 42 U.S.C. § 652(k), and 22 U.S.C. § 2714. 

[14] 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(b). 

[15] In technical comments, State officials clarified that specialists 
do not deny passport applications based solely on the results of 
facial recognition technology. According to officials, facial 
recognition technology is one of many tools specialist use to 
determine whether an application should be referred for further review 
and investigation. Officials added that State does not deny passports 
to individuals identified in the FBI's terrorist database without 
additional review and investigation by the appropriate office. 

[16] 26 U.S.C. § 6039E requires passport applicants to provide an SSN, 
if they have one, when applying for or renewing a passport. However, 
passports may be issued to applicants who do not have an SSN. 

[17] As GAO previously reported in May 2013, (GAO, Social Security 
Administration: Preliminary Observations on the Death Master File, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-574T] [Washington, 
D.C.: May 8, 2013]), the Social Security Act places limitations on 
SSA's sharing of state-reported death information; SSA removes the 
state-reported records from the full death file and provides the 
public death file, or public Death Master File, to the Department of 
Commerce's National Technical Information Service, which sells it 
through a subscription service. Since October 2009, State used its 
subscription to the public death file, which excludes state-reported 
death information and is available publicly to any interested party 
for a fee. State officials noted in their technical comments that all 
applications are now checked using SSA's real-time verification 
system, and that State uses the public death file in exceptional 
circumstances, such as when the real-time system is unavailable or for 
postissuance audits. Unlike the public death file, the full death file 
contains all death records, including state-reported death 
information, and is available to federal benefit-paying agencies; 
however, State has access to certain data elements from the full death 
file as a result of its information-exchange agreement with SSA. 

[18] In addition to warrant data, CLASS contains other information, 
such as data from the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center database and 
information from the Department of Health and Human Services about 
individuals delinquent on child support. 

[19] These 181 passport issuances were associated with 167 unique 
individuals. 

[20] We selected 120 days after death to allow for approximately 60 
days of passport application processing time and 60 days of lag time 
in reporting an individual's death to SSA for inclusion in the full 
death file. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-574T]. 

[22] In our data matching, we used state prisoner data from 11 states 
including Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Three of these state 
prison databases did not have any valid matches to the passport data. 
In addition, data from three states with matches did not include dates 
of birth, and therefore records in these databases matched to State's 
passport data based on SSN and name only. 

[23] The 68 passport issuances were associated with 61 unique 
individuals. In addition, our review indicated that some matches may 
reflect situations in which a prisoner stole the applicant's identity 
prior to incarceration, resulting in matches to State's passport data 
that do not represent fraud. 

[24] These seven individuals applied for a passport using a DS-11 
application, which must be submitted in person at an acceptance 
facility or passport agency. 

[25] Of these six individuals, one was incarcerated in a federal 
prison facility at the time of passport issuance. However, the 
individual applied for the passport prior to being in federal custody, 
and was subsequently issued a passport once his sentence began. 

[26] These issuances include individuals whose SSN, partial name (or 
alias), and date of birth in warrant data provided by the Marshals 
Service matched information in State's passport data. In addition, 
these 486 passport issuances were associated with 442 unique 
individuals with a total of 564 open warrants. 

[27] The NCIC database is an electronic repository of data on crimes 
and criminals of nationwide interest and a locator file for missing 
and unidentified persons. 

[28] FBI officials told us the bureau completed modifications of its 
warrant data for State in August 2007 to include not only federal 
warrants, but also state and local warrants. According to State 
officials, it would have been infeasible for State to receive or use 
state or local warrant data in 2007, given the technical and 
operational requirements for preparing CLASS, guidance to passport 
specialists, and instructions to offices that assist in the passport 
adjudication process. Officials added that State's regulatory 
authority to deny or revoke passports on the basis of an outstanding 
state or local felony warrant was not effective until February 2008. 
Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and State 
for sharing state and local warrants was not signed by both parties 
until January 2009. 

[29] For one of these cases, State provided additional details on a 
subsequent passport issuance. Specifically, State highlighted a case 
of passport fraud involving an individual in our sample that occurred 
after the period of passport issuances we reviewed from fiscal years 
2009 and 2010. 

[30] Officials of the Marshals Service told us there can be delays 
between the date a warrant is issued and the date a law enforcement 
agency validates it in the NCIC database. Alternatively, the officials 
said, law enforcement agencies may elect not to enter the warrant into 
a federal database at all. In such circumstances, State would not be 
alerted to the warrant, regardless of whether it was federal, state, 
or local, because CLASS would not contain information about it for use 
during the passport adjudication process. 

[31] State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such 
as when the applicant applies for both a passport book and a passport 
card. These 13,470 passport issuances were associated with 12,781 
unique individuals. 

[32] We also found 181 passport issuances where both the applicant's 
name and SSN matched the SSN and name of a deceased individual. These 
issuances are described in detail in the previous section under the 
subheading "Issuances to Applicants Using Identifying Information of 
Deceased Individuals." 

[33] From 13,470 passport records with names that did not match the 
corresponding record in the SSA full death file, we selected a 
stratified random sample of 140 passport issuances. All estimates from 
this sample have a margin of error of +/-9 percentage points or fewer 
unless otherwise noted. See appendix I for more details. 

[34] State may issue multiple passports to the same individual, such 
as when the applicant applies for both a passport book and a passport 
card. These 24,278 passport issuances were associated with 22,543 
unique SSNs. In some cases, more than one individual used the same 
likely invalid SSN to apply for a passport. 

[35] 26 U.S.C. § 6039E requires passport applicants to provide an SSN, 
if they have one, when applying for or renewing a passport. When an 
applicant has not been issued an SSN, State requests applicants to 
enter all zeroes in the SSN field on the passport application. We 
therefore excluded SSNs with all zeroes from our analysis of invalid 
SSNs. However, we included in our analysis other single-character 
SSNs, such as "999-99-9999." While these SSNs are invalid, they may 
reflect an attempt by applicants without SSNs to follow State's 
guidance. 

[36] We defined a "close" SSN as one where at least six digits matched 
the applicant's actual SSN. SSNs that were not close were defined as 
those with more than three digits that did not match the applicant's 
actual SSN. 

[37] These incorrect SSNs only include SSNs associated with a deceased 
individual, or SSNs that we could identify as having never been 
issued. They do not include legitimately issued SSNs listed 
incorrectly in State's data that do not belong to a deceased 
individual, and therefore the count may be understated. 

[38] For purposes of this report, potentially fraudulent passport 
issuances are those that involve an applicant using someone else's 
identity to apply for and receive a passport. We defined high-risk 
passport issuances as issuances to individuals who may pose a risk to 
public safety, but who did not necessarily steal someone's identity to 
apply for a passport, such as people with active warrants for felony 
charges. 

[39] We used data from these fiscal years because they were the most 
recent, full fiscal years available at the time State complied with 
our data request. 

[40] According to publicly available passport issuance statistics, 
State issued a combined total of 28,964,775 passports during fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010. GAO reviewed domestically issued passports and 
excluded passports issued by the Special Issuance Agency to government 
travelers. We reviewed a total of 28,000,063 passport issuance 
records. State erroneously excluded passport records from the Houston 
Passport Agency for the months of October 2008, November 2008, and 
December 2009 and provided duplicate passport records from the Houston 
Passport Agency for the months of November 2009 and September 2010. 

[41] As previously noted, we selected 120 days after death to allow 
for approximately 60 days of passport application processing time and 
60 days of lag time in reporting an individual's death to SSA for 
inclusion in the full death file. 

[42] SSA's criteria for matching include tolerances on the name and 
date of birth to account for input or typographical errors on records 
submitted. 

[43] The warrant data we received from the Marshals Service included 
warrants classified as "State/Local" that may have included both 
felonies and misdemeanors. In addition, the underlying offense may 
have been a misdemeanor or traffic violation for some warrants that 
were parole violations; we were unable to identify these on the basis 
of the data provided. 

[End of section] 

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