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Estimates, and Ridership Forecasts for Capital-Investment Grant 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

May 2014: 

Public Transit: 

Length of Development Process, Cost Estimates, and Ridership Forecasts 
for Capital-Investment Grant Projects: 

GAO-14-472: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-472, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

FTA provides funds to transit project sponsors to build new or 
extensions to existing fixed-guideway transit systems through the 
Capital Investment Grant program. This program funds New, Small, and 
Very Small Starts projects—funds that are based partly on the project'
s total estimated cost. For example, for New Starts, project capital 
costs exceed $250 million or the program contribution exceeds $75 
million; for Small Starts, capital costs are less than $250 million 
and the program contribution is less than $75 million. The pre-
construction development process for these projects includes various 
steps between the time when a project sponsor identifies the project 
to be funded and the formal award of FTA construction funds. During 
this process, the scope, capital cost, and ridership estimates can 
change. 

The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act mandated that 
GAO biennially review these types of projects. This report describes 
(1) the length of the development process across these projects and 
the factors affecting the length, (2) capital cost-estimate changes 
throughout this process, and the factors contributing to the changes, 
and (3) how project sponsors forecast ridership, including support 
that FTA provides. GAO analyzed pertinent laws, regulations, agency 
guidance, and FTA data for the 32 New, Small, and Very Small Starts 
projects initiated and funded from 2005 to 2013, prior to recent 
changes in program processes. GAO interviewed FTA staff and project 
sponsors. DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

For the 32 New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects 
funded from 2005 to 2013 that GAO reviewed, the length of the 
development process varied substantially, from as little as 2 to as 
long as 14 years, based on GAO's analysis of data from the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA) and project-sponsors. GAO found that the 
development process took 3 to 14 years to complete for New Starts 
projects, 3 to 12 years for Small Starts projects, and 2 to 11 years 
for Very Small Starts projects. The length of the process is generally 
driven by factors that are often unique to each project, including (1) 
the extent of local-planning activities prior to formal approval for 
funding, (2) the extent and availability of local and financial 
support, and (3) the extent of FTA oversight activities. For example, 
sponsors of 17 of the 32 projects GAO reviewed stated that activities 
to secure local funding contributed to the length of the development 
process. FTA has taken some steps to streamline this process. For 
example, in January 2012, FTA eliminated the requirement for the 
development of a hypothetical alternative that served as a basis of 
comparison to evaluate a proposed project. 

GAO found that capital cost estimates for New Starts, Small Starts, 
and Very Small Starts projects during the development process 
generally did not change substantially prior to the award of federal 
funding. For 23 of the 32 projects GAO reviewed, the final cost 
estimated prior to receiving federal funding was within 10 percent of 
the original cost estimates. The remaining 9 projects varied by as 
much as 41 percent lower and 55 percent higher than the estimates used 
at the end of the development process. Several project sponsors told 
us that, when changes did occur, it was a result of changing market 
conditions and FTA's recommending that sponsors increase project costs 
to cover unforeseen events, among other factors. For example, 
officials at the Valley Transportation Authority, located in Santa 
Clara, California, stated that FTA recommended that it increase the 
project's cost by $100 million to cover unforeseen events. 

New and Small Starts project sponsors whom GAO interviewed generally 
forecast ridership using regional travel models prepared by 
metropolitan-planning organizations (MPO). Specifically, 8 out of the 
9 New Starts project sponsors and 3 out of 4 Small Starts project 
sponsors GAO spoke with use these travel models. For example, for a 
Portland, Oregon, streetcar project, the project sponsor used travel 
forecasts prepared by the Portland MPO. The other New Starts and Small 
Starts project sponsors use actual transit-ridership data from surveys 
of regional transit riders; and a statewide travel model, 
respectively. On the other hand, FTA procedures permit sponsors of 
Very Small Starts projects to essentially demonstrate, through a 
detailed counting of riders of existing public transportation in the 
project's corridor, that the proposed project will service at least 
3,000 transit riders on an average weekday. FTA has taken a number of 
actions to support the development of ridership forecasts. These 
include, among other actions, providing funding to state agencies and 
MPOs to help them collect travel data and develop forecasting 
procedures and providing technical support, such as reviews of final 
forecasts. GAO interviewed 13 New Starts and Small Starts project 
sponsors and most said that FTA's technical assistance, which includes 
reviewing the ridership forecasts, was generally helpful. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-472]. For more 
information, contact David J. Wise at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Length of the Development Process for Projects Varies 
Substantially Depending upon Project-Specific and Local Factors: 

The Majority of Capital Cost Estimates Did Not Change Significantly 
during the Development Process, and Changes That Did Occur Were due to 
Various Factors: 

Project Sponsors Use Regional Travel Models to Forecast Ridership, and 
FTA Provides Funding and Technical support: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Key Milestone Dates and Cost Estimates for Selected New 
Starts Projects Reviewed by GAO (Dollars in Millions): 

Appendix III: Key Milestone Dates and Cost Estimates for Selected 
Small and Very Small Starts Projects Reviewed by GAO (Dollars in 
Millions): 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Duration of Development Process for Selected New Starts, 
Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects by Mode, 2005-2013: 

Table 2: New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Project 
Sponsors Interviewed: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Development Process for New Starts and Small Starts 
(Including Very Small Starts) Projects as Defined by the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy 
for Users: 

Figure 2: Length of Development Process for Selected Funded New 
Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects, 2005-2013: 

Figure 3: Length of Development Process and Pipeline (in Years) for 
Selected New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects, 
2005-2013: 

Figure 4: Differences between Initial Cost and Final Cost Estimated 
during the Development Process: 

Abbreviations: 

BRT: bus rapid transit: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FFGA: full-funding grant agreement: 

FTA: Federal Transit Administration: 

LPA: locally preferred alternative: 

MAP-21: Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act: 

MPO: metropolitan-planning organization: 

NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended: 

PCGA: project-construction grant agreement: 

SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act--A Legacy for Users: 

STOPS: Simplified Trips-on-Project Software: 

TRB: Transportation Research Board: 

TRIMET: Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon: 

UTA: Utah Transportation Authority: 

VTA: Valley Transportation Authority (in Santa Clara, California): 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 30, 2014: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Michael D. Crapo: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bill Shuster: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Nick J. Rahall, II: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) Capital Investment Grant 
program,[Footnote 1] which includes the New Starts and Small Starts 
programs, provided, as we found in a 2012 report, about $15.1 billion 
in federal capital funds over the past 8 fiscal years[Footnote 2] to 
help many states, cities, and localities plan and build new "fixed-
guideway" systems[Footnote 3] or extensions to existing fixed-guideway 
systems.[Footnote 4] Since the early 1970s, the federal government has 
provided a large share of the nation's capital investment through the 
New Starts program. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) created the 
Small Starts program for funding lower-cost fixed-guideway-system 
projects in 2005. FTA created the Very Small Starts project category 
for funding very low cost projects at the same time.[Footnote 5] While 
MAP-21 made certain revisions to the program, because this report 
covers projects under SAFTEA-LU prior to the implementation of MAP-21 
changes, we focus on SAFETEA-LU related requirements.[Footnote 6] 
Although FTA has provided funding for New, Small, and Very Small 
Starts projects, these projects are designed and implemented by 
project sponsors, typically local transit agencies. The project 
sponsors often coordinate with local metropolitan-planning 
organizations (MPOs) in designing and implementing these projects, and 
FTA awards funding to project sponsors upon completion of the pre-
construction development process,[Footnote 7] which includes a range 
of local policy development and decision-making activities, where the 
specific transit corridor and project are identified, and then refined 
as design progresses. FTA evaluates and rates the projects selected, 
and, ultimately, awards funding. The scope and estimates of capital 
costs and ridership can change as the local project sponsor refines 
the project before FTA awards funding. 

The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) 
mandated GAO to biennially review FTA's processes and procedures for 
evaluating, rating, and recommending new fixed-guideway capital 
projects and core-capacity improvement projects and the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) implementation of such processes and 
procedures.[Footnote 8] In this report, we focus on the 2005 through 
2013 time period to identify (1) the extent to which the length of the 
development process varies across New Starts, Small Starts, and Very 
Small Starts projects and what factors affect the length of this 
process; (2) the extent to which capital cost estimates for New 
Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects change throughout 
the development process, and what factors contribute to the changes; 
and (3) how project sponsors forecast ridership, including any support 
that FTA provides in helping them develop these forecasts. 

To address all of these objectives, we reviewed and summarized 
relevant laws, such as SAFETEA-LU, FTA circulars, and policy guidance, 
as well as our body of work on the Capital Investment Grant Program. 
To determine the extent to which the length of the development process 
varied across New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects 
and the extent to which capital cost estimates for these projects 
changed throughout the development process, we collected and analyzed 
schedule milestone data and capital-cost estimate data from FTA on all 
32 of the New Starts, Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects that 
had been: (1) approved to enter the preliminary engineering phase 
[Footnote 9] of the development process following the implementation 
of SAFETEA-LU in October 2005 and (2) awarded a grant agreement prior 
to the March 2013 implementation of the current surface transportation 
legislation, MAP-21. To verify and assess the reliability of the data 
compiled by FTA, we compared it to project data we received from 
project sponsors we interviewed. We resolved any discrepancies with 
the data with FTA headquarters staff, and we determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To provide 
insight on the factors contributing to the project's timeline trends 
and challenges and the project's cost-estimate changes and to obtain 
information on how ridership forecasts are developed, we interviewed 
23 project sponsors representing 30 of the 32 projects.[Footnote 10] 
The information obtained from these interviews is not generalizable to 
all New Starts, Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects. We also 
interviewed FTA officials to determine the support that FTA provides 
to help project sponsors develop ridership forecasts. Further details 
on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Under SAFETEA-LU, FTA's primary source of funding for new fixed-
guideway capital projects or extensions to existing fixed-guideway-
transit systems was the Capital Investment Grant program. Within the 
Capital Investment Grant program, project sponsors typically applied 
for funding as either a New Starts or Small Starts project. FTA's New 
Starts projects under SAFETEA-LU were defined as new fixed guideway or 
extensions to existing fixed guideway capital projects with a total 
capital cost of $250 million or more or a Capital Investment Grant 
program contribution of $75 million or more. The Small Starts program 
was created by SAFETEA-LU in 2005 to provide a more streamlined 
evaluation and rating process for lower-cost and less complex 
projects, defined as new fixed-guideway projects, extensions to fixed 
guideways or corridor-based bus projects whose estimated capital cost 
was under $250 million and whose Capital Investment Grant program 
contribution was under $75 million. Within the Small Starts program, 
as defined in SAFETEA-LU, FTA created a category for very low cost 
Small Starts projects, known as Very Small Starts. These projects must 
contain the same elements as Small Starts projects and also contain 
the following three features: (1) location in corridors with more than 
3,000 existing riders per average weekday who will benefit from the 
proposed project, (2) have a total capital cost of less than $50 
million for all project elements, and (3) have a per-mile cost of less 
than $3 million, excluding rolling stock (such as train cars, buses, 
etc). As part of the application process, sponsors of New Starts, 
Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects are expected to identify 
local sources of funding to contribute to the project along with 
federal funding provided through both the Capital Investment Grant 
program and potentially other sources of federal funding.[Footnote 11] 

The steps in the development process depend on whether a project is a 
New Starts project or a Small or Very Small Starts project (see figure 
1). 

Figure 1: Development Process for New Starts and Small Starts 
(Including Very Small Starts) Projects as Defined by the Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy 
for Users: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

New Starts projects: 
Alternatives analysis; 
Locally preferred alternative added by project sponsor; 
Preliminary engineering; 
Final design; 
FFGA[A]; 
Construction. 

Small Starts projects, including Very Small Starts projects: 
Alternatives analysis; 
Locally preferred alternative added by project sponsor; 
Project development; 
PCGA or single-year construction grant[B]; 
Construction. 

[A] FFGA = full-funding grant agreement. 

[B] PCGA = project-construction grant agreement. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* New Starts. Under SAFETEA-LU, sponsors of New Starts projects were 
required by statute to go through a planning and development process. 
In the alternatives analysis phase, project sponsors identified the 
transportation needs in a specific corridor and evaluated a range of 
alternatives to address the locally identified problems in that 
corridor.[Footnote 12] Project sponsors completed the alternatives 
analysis phase by selecting a locally preferred alternative (LPA). 
Subsequently, during the preliminary-engineering phase, project 
sponsors refined the design of the locally preferred alternative and 
its estimated costs, benefits, and impacts. Further, under the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended, and 
implementing regulations, New Starts project sponsors were required to 
complete the NEPA environmental review process to receive Major 
Capital Investment program funding.[Footnote 13] When the preliminary -
engineering phase was completed and federal environmental requirements 
are satisfied, FTA may approve the project's advancement into final 
design, if the project obtained an acceptable rating under the 
statutory evaluation criteria and met other readiness requirements. 
[Footnote 14] For a project to receive funding, FTA needed to 
recommend it for a full funding grant agreement (FFGA) in the 
President's budget.[Footnote 15] 

* Small Starts. Under SAFETEA-LU, the development process for Small 
Starts was condensed by combining the preliminary-engineering and 
final-design phases into one "project development" phase. When 
projects applied to enter project development, FTA evaluated and rated 
them according to the statutory criteria. Under SAFETEA-LU, there were 
fewer statutory criteria specified for Small Starts projects compared 
to New Starts projects. Either using annual appropriations or existing 
FTA appropriations that remain available, FTA provided funding for 
Small Starts projects in one of two ways: through project-construction 
grant agreements (PCGA) or single-year construction grants when the 
Small Starts funding request was less than $25 million.[Footnote 16] 
For a project to receive funding, FTA needed to recommend it in the 
President's budget. 

* Very Small Starts. Very Small Starts projects also progressed 
through a single-project development phase and were evaluated and 
rated on the same project criteria as Small Starts projects. However, 
they qualified for automatic medium or better ratings, which required 
submittal of less data to FTA, because they had sufficient existing 
transit ridership in the corridor and met low cost parameters to 
"warrant" them for satisfactory ratings. FTA provided funding for Very 
Small Starts projects through PCGAs or single-year construction 
grants. For a project to receive funding, FTA needed to recommend it 
in the President's budget. 

Under SAFETEA-LU, any transit project that fit the definition of a new 
fixed-guideway capital project or extension to an existing fixed-
guideway project was eligible to compete for funding under the Capital 
Investment Grant program that provides funding for New Starts, Small 
Starts, and Very Small Starts projects. Such projects included: 

* Commuter rail--systems that operate along electric or diesel-
propelled railways and provide train service for local, short distance 
trips between a central city and adjacent suburbs. 

* Heavy rail--systems that operate on electric railways with high-
volume traffic capacity and are characterized by separated rights-of-
way, sophisticated signaling, high platform loading, and high-speed, 
rapid-acceleration rail cars operating singly or in multi-car trains 
on fixed rails. 

* Light rail--systems that operate on electric railways with light-
volume traffic capacity and are characterized by shared or exclusive 
rights-of-way, or low or high-platform-loading, single or double-car 
trains, and overhead electric lines that power rail vehicles. 

* Streetcars--systems that are similar to light rail, but 
distinguishable because they are usually smaller and designed for 
shorter routes, more frequent stops, and lower travel speeds. 

* Bus rapid transit (BRT)--bus systems that vary in design, but 
generally included service enhancements to attract riders and provide 
similar transit-related benefits as rail transit, characterized by 
improvements such as dedicated bus lanes, improved stations, improved 
vehicles, off-vehicle fare collection, special branding of the 
service, and frequent service, among other things.[Footnote 17] 

FTA's most recent authorization legislation, MAP-21, has made changes 
to the overall Capital Investment Grant program that provides funding 
for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects, to 
consolidate and streamline the number of phases for New Starts and 
Small Starts projects and alter the definition of eligible bus rapid 
transit projects, among other things.[Footnote 18] In addition, the 
legislation removed the New Starts transportation-planning-related 
alternatives analysis requirement, and FTA's final rule implementing 
the MAP-21 changes provides that the new process will instead rely on 
the review of alternatives performed during the Metropolitan 
Transportation Planning and NEPA environmental-review processes. 
[Footnote 19] According to FTA officials, for New Starts projects MAP-
21 requires that the first phase in the process, entitled "project 
development" must be completed within a 2-year time frame. MAP-21 also 
requires FTA to develop an expedited review process for determining 
the technical capacity of project sponsors to undertake the proposed 
project if they have recently and successfully completed at least one 
other New Starts project.[Footnote 20] FTA has not yet implemented 
these changes fully, but has issued some guidance on how these changes 
will affect the program.[Footnote 21] FTA plans to conduct additional 
rule-making on MAP-21 topics in the future, though FTA officials told 
us that there is no firm date on when the various policy changes will 
take effect. 

FTA and its project-management oversight contractors are to provide 
oversight during the development process. FTA maintains its 
headquarters in Washington, D.C., with 10 regional offices throughout 
the continental United States, and employs about 500 employees to 
oversee and provide funding for a variety of transit programs and 
initiatives, including for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small 
Starts projects. FTA and its contractors are to conduct oversight 
reviews throughout the project's planning and design as well as before 
FTA recommends a project for funding; these reviews are to include an 
evaluation of the project's risk, scope, cost, schedule, and project 
management plan, as well as the project sponsor's technical capacity 
and capability. Project sponsors also submit periodic updates to FTA 
on different aspects of major projects, such as the cost, expected 
schedule, and projected ridership of the project. In addition, 
proposed projects are required to complete the NEPA environmental 
review processes in order to receive federal funding.[Footnote 22] 
Specifically, NEPA and implementing regulations require, among other 
things, an environmental review document with information on 
alternative courses of action and a consideration of social, economic, 
and environmental impacts of the proposed transportation improvement. 
[Footnote 23] 

The Length of the Development Process for Projects Varies 
Substantially Depending upon Project-Specific and Local Factors: 

The length of the development process for New Starts, Small Starts, 
and Very Small Starts projects under SAFETEA-LU varied substantially. 
As discussed previously, the development process encompasses both 
local and federal activities that occur between when a project sponsor 
selects the locally preferred alternative and the formal award of 
funding through a grant agreement.[Footnote 24] According to our 
analysis of FTA and project sponsor data, the length of the 
development process varied from as short as 2 years for a Small Starts 
project to as long as 14 years for a New Starts project and is 
generally driven by factors that are often unique to each project and 
local in nature. More specifically, these factors included the extent 
of local planning activities conducted prior to entering the Capital 
Investment Grant pipeline[Footnote 25], the extent and availability of 
local and financial support, and the extent of FTA's oversight 
activities, among other factors. 

Length of the Development Process Varies Substantially across Projects: 

Among the 32 transit projects we reviewed, we found significant 
variation in the length of time sponsors of New Starts, Small Starts, 
and Very Small Starts projects needed to complete the development 
process (see figure 2). Specifically, for the approved projects we 
examined, the development process ranged from 2 years for a 6.8 mile 
Bus Rapid Transit project in Monterey, California, to over 14 years 
for a 30 mile commuter rail project in Denver, Colorado. The wide 
range of time needed to plan, design, and secure funding for these 
transit projects prior to construction is similar to the range of time 
that is generally considered necessary to plan and design other types 
of capital projects. For example, studies have suggested that for 
major highway projects the activities leading up to the construction 
of a highway may vary from 1 year for a minor project to 7 to 14 years 
for a major project.[Footnote 26] 

Figure 2: Length of Development Process for Selected Funded New 
Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects, 2005-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Development process length[C] (years): 

Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects: 

Monterey Bay Rapid Transit: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.3 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.8 years. 

Livermore-Amador Route 10 BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.8 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.7 years. 

Pioneer Parkway EmX BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.6 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.9 years. 

King County, RapidRide F Line BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 1.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.5 years. 

Central Mesa Light Rail Transit Extension: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.9 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 2.2 years. 

Streetcar Loop: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.8 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 2.5 years. 

Troost Corridor: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.3 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.6 years. 

Metro Express-Airport Way Corridor BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 2.3 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.8 years. 

Mountain Links BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 2.3 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.8 years. 

Metro Rapid Bus System Gap Closure Project: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.5 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.8 years. 

Fitchburg Commuter Rail Improvements: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.8 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.8 years. 

Wilshire Boulevard Bus-Only Lane: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.3 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 4.4 years. 

Silver Line BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 0.9 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 4.8 years. 

E Street Corridor sbX BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 2 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.8 years. 

West Seattle BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 5.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.8 years. 

MetroRapid BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 3.7 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.2 years. 

Pacific Highway South BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 5.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 2.4 years. 

VelociRFTA Bus Rapid Transit: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 5.6 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 2.7 years. 

Bellevue-Redmond BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 6.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 3.3 years. 

King County, RapidRide E Line BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 9.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 1.5 years. 

Mason Corridor BRT: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to project development: 7.1 years; 
Project development to construction funding award: 4.5 years. 

New Starts projects: 

Mid Jordan: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 1.6 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 0.9 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 0.8 years. 

Draper Transit Corridor: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 1.3 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 1.3 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 0.7 years. 

University Link Light Rail Transit: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 0.4 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 1 year; 
Final design to FFGA award: 2.1 years. 

Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 0.7 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 2 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 1.2 years. 

Central Corridor: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 0.5 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 3.4 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 0.9 years. 

High Capacity Transit Corridor: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 2.8 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 2.2 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 1 year. 

Central Florida Commuter Rail Transit: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 2.8 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 1.4 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 2.9 years. 

LYNX Blue Line Extension: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 5 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 4.7 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 0.3 years. 

Silicon Valley Berryessa Extension[A]: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 8.1 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 1.3 years; 
Final design to FFGA award: 0.9 years. 

Eagle Commuter Rail Line[B]: 
Locally preferred alternative selected to preliminary engineering: 11.8 years; 
Preliminary engineering to final design: 1 years 
Final design to FFGA award: 1.3 years. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

Notes: Figure reflects data for 31 of 32 projects accepted into 
preliminary engineering (New Starts) or project development (Small 
Starts and Very Small Starts) on or after October 1, 2005, and awarded 
funding no later than March 31, 2013. Figure does not include data for 
Mid-City Rapid bus rapid transit project as we could not obtain data 
on the date the locally preferred alternative was selected. For more 
information on these projects, see appendixes II and III. BRT refers 
to bus rapid transit. 

[A] The Silicon Valley Berryessa Extension was originally approved for 
preliminary engineering in 2002 as a 16-mile project, but was 
withdrawn from the New Starts program in 2005. The project was re-
admitted into preliminary engineering in December 2009. 

[B] The Eagle Commuter Rail project was originally two separate 
projects--the East Corridor and the Gold Line--that eventually were 
combined into a single FFGA. The East Corridor locally preferred 
alternative (LPA) was selected in July 1997, while the Gold Line LPA 
was selected in January 2005. According to project sponsor officials, 
the East Corridor LPA was identified in July 1997, but final adoption 
by all parties did not occur until September 1998. 

[C] For the purposes of this report, we define the development process 
as the activities related to the development of a New Starts, Small 
Starts, or Very Small Starts project that occur between when a project 
sponsor identifies the project that FTA is to evaluate for funding 
(known as the locally preferred alternative) and the formal award of 
construction funding through a grant agreement. 

[End of figure] 

The variation across projects is attributable, in part, to conditions 
and factors specific to each project. 

* For some projects, the development process was lengthy. For example, 
for the Eagle Commuter Rail Line project, the development process, 
beginning with the selection of the locally preferred alternative in 
1997 until the project was awarded an FFGA, lasted over 14 years. 
Project sponsors stated that they did not pursue entry into 
preliminary engineering until after completing further investment 
studies that expanded the scope of the project in the early 2000s and 
securing funding through a local referendum in 2004. In addition, 
prior to entering the Capital Investment Grant pipeline, officials 
worked to finalize the technology for the project and secure approval 
from the project sponsor's board of directors. Officials stated that 
once the project was approved into the pipeline in 2009, the project 
progressed quickly through the remainder of the process, and the 
project sponsor secured an FFGA approximately two and a half years 
after acceptance into preliminary engineering. 

* For sponsors of the Mason Corridor project, which successfully 
completed a Small Starts bus rapid-transit line from Aspen to Glenwood 
Springs, Colorado, the development process extended over 11 years as a 
result of challenges related to, among other things, securing funding 
for the project and obtaining agreement for the project among local 
stakeholders. 

However, for other projects, the length of the development process was 
comparatively shorter. For example, the development process for the 
7.3-mile, 10 station, Portland-Milwaukie light-rail New Starts project 
lasted about 4 years. In this case, project sponsors stated that they 
encountered no major obstacles during this time, though they noted 
that the process was extended by 6 months while the project sponsor 
identified additional local funds and reduced to project's scope in 
response to lower than anticipated federal funding for the project. We 
will discuss in more detail the general types of factors that affected 
the length of the development process later in the report. 

In general, larger projects, such as those that applied for funding as 
New Starts projects, required more time to progress through the 
development process than smaller projects, such as those that apply 
for funding as Small and Very Small Starts projects. On average, the 
development process was 17 months longer in duration for New Starts 
projects than for Small Starts projects and 12 months longer than for 
Very Small Starts projects. Specifically, according to our analysis of 
FTA and project sponsor data, we found that New Starts projects took 
about 3 to 14 years to complete the development process, Small Starts 
projects took about 3 to 12 years, while Very Small Starts projects 
took about 2 to 11 years. According to FTA officials, the length of 
the development process is unique for each project, and generally 
depended upon the project's specific characteristics, such as scope, 
corridor location, and availability of local funding, among other 
factors. 

Some of the variability across the New Starts, Small Starts, and Very 
Small Starts projects resulted from activities that took place later 
in the process, after the locally preferred alternative was selected 
and before the project was formally accepted into FTA's pipeline. The 
"pipeline" is a sub-component of the overall development process and 
is defined as the period of time between when a project is accepted 
into the preliminary-engineering (New Starts) or project-development 
(Small and Very Small Starts) phase and the final award of 
construction funding by FTA. Depending on the project, the time 
between the selection of the locally preferred alternative and entry 
into the pipeline took as little as a few months to over a decade. 
According to project sponsors, activities during this period included 
revising the project scope, securing local funding, and preparing to 
enter into the project pipeline, among other things. Once a project 
was been accepted into the pipeline, we found that the length of the 
process was similar across all three project categories, and generally 
lasts from 2 to 5 years, and averages about 3 years (see figure 3). 
However, within each of the three types of projects, the length of 
time in the pipeline for an individual project varied widely depending 
on the project's specific characteristics. Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, FTA officials stated it is difficult to characterize an 
"average" project, as each proposed transit project has its own unique 
project characteristics, physical-operating environment, and 
challenges. 

Figure 3: Length of Development Process and Pipeline (in Years) for 
Selected New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects, 
2005-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Length of development process (in years): 

Project: New Starts; 
Total development process: 14.1 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 3.3 years; 
Average length: 6.6 years; 
Maximum length: 14.1 years. 

Project pipeline: 4.9 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 1.7 years; 
Average length: 3.1 years; 
Maximum length: 4.9 years. 

Project: Small Starts; 
Total development process: 11.6 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 2.5 years; 
Average length: 5.1 years; 
Maximum length: 11.6 years. 

Project pipeline: 4.5 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 1.9 years; 
Average length: 3.1 years; 
Maximum length: 4.5 years. 

Project: Very Small Starts; 
Total development process: 10.6 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 2.0 years; 
Average length: 5.6 years; 
Maximum length: 10.6 years. 

Project pipeline: 4.8 years; 
Individual project's development process length: indicated on graph; 
Minimum length: 1.5 years; 
Average length: 2.8 years; 
Maximum length: 4.8 years. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

Notes: Figure reflects data for 31 of 32 projects accepted into 
preliminary engineering (New Starts) or project development (Small 
Starts and Very Small Starts) on or after October 1, 2005, and awarded 
construction funding no later than March 31, 2013. Figure does not 
include data for Mid-City Rapid bus rapid transit project, as we could 
not obtain data on the date the locally preferred alternative was 
selected. For more information on these projects, see appendixes II 
and III. 

For the purposes of this report, we define the development process as 
the activities related to the development of a New Starts, Small 
Starts or Very Small Starts project that occur between when a project 
sponsor's identifies the project that FTA is to evaluate for funding 
(known as the locally preferred alternative) and the formal award of 
construction funding through a grant agreement. The pipeline, which is 
a sub-component of the overall development process, is defined as the 
period of time between when a project is accepted into the preliminary-
engineering (New Starts) or project-development (Small and Very Small 
Starts) phase and the final award of construction funding by FTA. 

[End of figure] 

While there was substantial variation in the length of the overall 
development process within and across transportation modes, the 
variation in the Capital Investment Grant pipeline duration was 
similar across the modes of the projects we reviewed. (See table 1.) 
For example, light rail projects required 3 to 10 years to complete 
the development process, while commuter rail projects required 5 to 14 
years to complete this process. As previously noted, a portion of the 
variability in length of the development process was due to activities 
that occur after a locally preferred alternative is selected but 
before FTA accepted the project into the pipeline. However, projects 
generally required 2 to 5 years to progress through the pipeline, 
regardless of the mode proposed by a project sponsors. 

Table 1: Duration of Development Process for Selected New Starts, 
Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Projects by Mode, 2005-2013: 

Bus rapid transit: 
Number of funded projects: 18; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 2 to 12; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Bus rapid transit: New Starts; 
Number of funded projects: [Empty]; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: [Empty]; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: [Empty]. 

Bus rapid transit: Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 3; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 3 to 12; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Bus rapid transit: Very Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 15; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 2 to 11; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Commuter rail: 
Number of funded projects: 3; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 5 to 14; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Commuter rail: New Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 2; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 7 to 14; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 4. 

Commuter rail: Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 1; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 5; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 5. 

Commuter rail: Very Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: [Empty]; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: [Empty]; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: [Empty]. 

Heavy rail[C]: 
Number of funded projects: 2; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 6 to 10; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 3. 

Light rail: 
Number of funded projects: 7; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 3 to 10; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Light rail: New Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 6; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 3 to 10; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2 to 5. 

Light rail: Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: 1; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 3; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 2. 

Light rail: Very Small Starts; 
Number of funded projects: [Empty]; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: [Empty]; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: [Empty]. 

Streetcar[D]: 
Number of funded projects: 1; 
Duration of overall development process (years)[A]: 3; 
Duration of Capital Investment Grant pipeline (years)[B]: 3. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

Note: Data is rounded to the nearest year. Table reflects data for 31 
of 32 projects accepted into preliminary engineering (New Starts) or 
project development (Small Starts and Very Small Starts) on or after 
October 1, 2005 and awarded funding no later than March 31, 2013. 
Table does not include data for Mid-City Rapid bus rapid transit 
project, as we could not obtain data on the date the locally preferred 
alternative was selected. For more information on these New Starts and 
Small Starts projects, see appendices II and III. 

[A] The development process was the activities related to the 
development of a New Starts, Small Starts, or Very Small Starts 
project that occur between when a project sponsor's identifies the 
project that FTA will evaluate for funding (known as the locally 
preferred alternative) and the formal award of construction funding 
through a grant agreement. 

[B] The pipeline, which is a sub-component of the overall development 
process, is defined as the period of time between when a project is 
accepted into the preliminary-engineering (New Starts) or project-
development (Small and Very Small Starts) phase and the final award of 
construction funding by FTA. 

[C] Each of the heavy rail projects approved by the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) was a New Starts project. 

[D] This project was a Small Starts project. 

[End of table] 

Local Factors Substantially Affect the Length of the Development 
Process: 

Our review found that local factors, specific to each project, were 
generally the primary elements that determined the development 
process's length. Furthermore, our prior work has found that some of 
these of factors--particularly obtaining project funding and community 
support--also commonly affect the length of time to complete other 
types of capital projects, including highway projects.[Footnote 27] 

* Local Financing: Project sponsors noted that securing local funding, 
such as through local sales taxes and referendums, can be challenging. 
We previously found that local funding remains a substantial component 
of the overall funding for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small 
Starts projects.[Footnote 28] Sponsors of 17 of 32 of the projects we 
reviewed stated that activities to secure local funding contributed to 
the length of the development process. For example, the project 
sponsor of the Mason Corridor BRT stated that securing local 
commitment was particularly challenging and extended the development 
process by about 7 years. The project sponsor selected a bus rapid 
transit as a locally preferred alternative in 2000, but was unable to 
secure local funding until 2007. The time needed to identify and 
secure local funding was a significant factor in extending the 
development process over 11 years, as federal funding for the project 
was contingent upon the project's sponsor securing a local funding 
source. Similarly, the project sponsor of the Mid-Jordan light rail 
project in Salt Lake City, Utah, stated that securing local funding 
for the project delayed its development by about a year. According to 
the project's sponsor, while it selected the locally preferred 
alternative in 2005, the project sponsor did not enter into 
preliminary engineering until 2007, when the project had secured 
funding through a local referendum in 2006 that increased the local 
sales tax. 

* Local Community Support: The development process can also be 
extended as a result of efforts project sponsors undertake to secure 
local community approval for a project. Sponsors of 12 of the 32 of 
the projects we reviewed stated that community support for their 
project affected the length of the development process. For example, 
project sponsor officials who oversaw the development of a BRT project 
in Northern California stated that the major hurdle in the development 
of the project was overcoming some community opposition to the planned 
route that arose in 2008 after the selection of the locally preferred 
alternative. Specifically, the alignment of the project was scheduled 
to go through a residential area where residents had historically 
opposed the location of a bus route. According to the project sponsor, 
the change provoked some community opposition to the project, and as a 
result, the alignment of the project was modified. Officials estimated 
that the development process was extended by about 3 to 6 months. 
However, community support can take a significant amount of time to 
develop and sustain. For example, officials from the project sponsor 
overseeing the construction of the High Capacity Transit Corridor 
heavy rail project in Honolulu worked for 10 years--starting before 
the locally preferred alternative was selected--to develop support for 
the project. 

* Stakeholder Coordination: Coordinating with other local government 
agencies as well as other transportation providers can also be 
challenging and may affect the length of the development process. 
Specifically, for 8 of the 32 projects we reviewed, sponsors stated 
that the process of coordinating with other stakeholders extended the 
development process. For example, project sponsors overseeing the 
development of a light rail project in Charlotte, North Carolina, had 
to coordinate with local freight-rail operators and Amtrak to relocate 
service to minimize disruption to Amtrak's existing service. The 
project's design was modified as a result of these negotiations, which 
extended the project's development nearly 7 months, according to the 
project's sponsor. Project sponsor officials stated that they did not 
anticipate the complexity of the negotiations with the railroad 
operators and, accordingly, noted that earlier coordination with these 
operators might have accelerated the project timeline modestly. 

* Environmental review. The effect of a proposed project on the local 
environment, as well as steps required by law to mitigate 
environmental impacts from the proposed project, may also affect the 
duration of the development process. Specifically, under the NEPA 
environmental review process, project sponsors may measure the impact 
of different alternatives by the extent to which the alternative meets 
the project's purpose and need, and is consistent with the goals and 
objectives of any local urban planning. The NEPA environmental review 
process also requires federal agencies to evaluate and in some cases 
prepare detailed statements assessing the environmental impact of and 
alternatives to major federal actions significantly affecting the 
environment. However, according to FTA officials and project sponsors, 
this process can be time consuming. Specifically, both FTA officials 
and project sponsors for 8 of the 32 projects we reviewed noted that 
the required NEPA environmental review process, may add time to the 
development process. For example, officials from one project sponsor 
stated that it took nearly two and a half years to complete the NEPA 
process. 

* Scope and configuration changes. The factors described above may 
also result in revisions to the project's scope and configuration, 
which may in turn extend the development process. Revisions to a 
project's design ranged from minor alterations to pedestrian access to 
a project to changes to a project's proposed alignment or service 
route. Project sponsors for 7 of the 32 projects we reviewed 
identified changes in scope as a factor affecting the development 
process, which sometimes resulted from one of the factors described 
above. For example, for the Charlotte light rail project described 
above, in addition to the design changes arising from coordination 
with local stakeholders, recession-related reductions in the sales-tax 
revenue funding the project forced the project sponsors to further 
revise the project, thus extending the overall development process. 

FTA Has Taken Steps and Identified Future Opportunities to Reduce the 
Duration of the Development Process: 

According to some project sponsors we interviewed, FTA assistance is 
generally helpful in completing the development process, though they 
noted that the duration of some oversight reviews can be lengthy. We 
have previously found FTA and its oversight approach have improved 
sponsor's management of their projects.[Footnote 29] However, for 12 
of the 32 projects we reviewed, project sponsors stated that some 
types of oversight reviews can be time-intensive and extend the 
development process, sometimes by weeks or months. For example, 
project sponsors for 2 of the 32 projects we reviewed cited FTA's risk 
assessment as a requirement that affected the length of the 
development process.[Footnote 30] In addition, sponsors of 4 of the 16 
Very Small Starts projects we reviewed speculated that some of the 
longer review times for smaller projects may have been a result of 
FTA's initial uncertainty in how it would implement the simplified 
review process for Very Small Starts projects. Conversely, one project 
sponsor noted that because much of the development process is driven 
by local factors, there was not much FTA could have done to accelerate 
the process. 

Finding the right balance between protecting federal investments 
through project management oversight and advancing projects through 
the development process is challenging. We have previously found that 
a balance exists between expediting project development and 
maintaining the rigor and accountability over the development of New 
Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects.[Footnote 31] 
Furthermore, we have previously found that FTA's oversight efforts 
help the agency ensure that a federally funded transit project's 
scope, schedule, and cost are well developed and that the project's 
design and construction conform to applicable statutes, regulations, 
and guidance.[Footnote 32] We also previously found that reviews may 
take longer than expected, because project sponsors sometimes provide 
information that is incomplete or inaccurate, resulting in additional 
review time and delays. While FTA has acknowledged that the process 
can be lengthy and frustrating, FTA has taken some steps over the last 
several years to further streamline the development process. 

* In its January 2013 final rule implementing some MAP-21 changes, FTA 
eliminated the requirement for the development of a baseline 
alternative, removing the requirement to compare a proposed project to 
a hypothetical alternative.[Footnote 33] Project sponsors for 3 of 32 
projects we reviewed stated that development of a baseline alternative 
was a time-and resource-consuming part of the development process. 

* The January 2013 final rule also allows proposed projects to 
automatically receive a satisfactory rating on a certain rating and 
some evaluation criteria based on the project's characteristics or the 
characteristics of the project corridor. For example, for Small Starts 
projects, if the operating and maintenance cost of the proposed 
project is less than 5 percent of current system-wide operating and 
maintenance cost, the project qualifies for automatic medium or better 
rating on its local financial commitment evaluation. FTA officials 
told us that they plan to explore expanding the types of projects that 
may prequalify for automatic ratings. 

* In September 2013, FTA introduced a new tool to assist project 
sponsors in estimating ridership on their projects. According to FTA 
officials, the tool, known as the Simplified Trips-on-Project Software 
(STOPS), may help to significantly shorten the time projects' sponsors 
need to develop ridership estimates. We will discuss ridership 
estimation for projects later in this report. 

FTA estimates these changes could reduce the development process time 
for projects by six months or more. [Footnote 34] In addition, FTA 
expects that as more MAP-21 requirements are formally implemented 
through the rule-making process, it may identify additional 
efficiencies in the development process. 

The Majority of Capital Cost Estimates Did Not Change Significantly 
during the Development Process, and Changes That Did Occur Were due to 
Various Factors: 

We found that capital cost estimates for New Starts, Small Starts, and 
Very Small Starts projects during the development process generally 
did not change substantially prior to the award of federal 
funding.[Footnote 35] Project sponsors told us that cost estimate 
changes occurred as a result of changing market conditions, FTA's 
application of additional project contingencies[Footnote 36] and scope 
modifications, among others. However, most estimates did not change 
much from the initial capital cost estimated upon entry into the 
development process. 

While Cost Estimates Changed Significantly for Several Projects, the 
Majority of Capital Cost Estimates Did Not: 

The majority of cost estimates of the projects we reviewed did not 
change significantly. For 23 of the 32 projects we reviewed, the 
original cost estimated upon entry into the Capital Investment Grant 
pipeline was within 10 percent of the final cost estimated prior to 
receiving federal funding. The original capital cost estimates for the 
remaining 9 projects varied by as much as 41 percent lower and 55 
percent higher from the estimates used at the end of the development 
process. Of those projects, 4 were New Starts, 3 were Small Starts, 
and 2 were Very Small Starts projects. Figure 4 shows the range of 
cost changes for these projects. 

Figure 4: Differences between Initial Cost and Final Cost Estimated 
during the Development Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Depicted on graph: 

Small Starts; 
New Starts; 
Very Small Starts. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

[End of figure] 

While the majority of the capital cost estimates did not change 
significantly during the development process, some estimates did 
change. However, we did not assess project sponsors' cost-estimating 
procedures, or related FTA policies, and how that might have 
contributed to the cost estimates that did change. But, as noted in 
our previous reports, federal agencies have experienced challenges in 
conducting cost estimating--some of the agencies' programs cost more 
than expected and deliver results that do not satisfy all 
requirements.[Footnote 37] Project sponsors may experience some of 
those same challenges. Reliable capital-cost estimates are necessary 
for the New Starts program for a number of reasons: 

* to support decisions about funding one capital improvement project 
over another, 

* to develop annual funding requests to Congress, 

* to evaluate resource requirements at key project-development 
decision points, and: 

* to develop performance measurement baselines. 

* We plan to examine FTA's and project sponsors' implementation of 
best practices for developing and managing capital program costs in 
future work on the Capital Investment Grant program. 

Several Factors Have Contributed to Cost Estimate Changes: 

Our review identified a number of factors that led to cost estimate 
changes during the development process, as described below. In some 
cases, a combination of factors contributed to cost estimate changes. 

* Economic and Market Conditions. Nine project sponsors stated that 
economic conditions, such as the recession from 2007 to 2009, likely 
increased competition for some of its contracts and created a bidding 
environment favorable to the agency for reducing costs. For example, 
Livermore Amador Valley Transit Authority (located in Livermore, 
California) officials stated that because of the recession, companies 
submitted lower bids than initially anticipated on each of the four 
major construction contracts associated with the project. According to 
the officials, the project finished about $4.5 million under its 
approved budget, due in large part to the recession. The Utah 
Transportation Authority (UTA) also stated that the recession affected 
the cost estimate over the development process. The officials said 
that the recession created competition that helped reduce the 
construction costs associated with these projects due to a reduced 
demand for construction and contracting services. However, these types 
of projects are also sensitive to changes in material prices. For 
example, right before FTA awarded the grant for the Mid-Jordan 
project, the cost of steel increased substantially, adding $1.5 
million to the cost of the overall project. 

* Contingency levels. According to project sponsors, capital cost 
estimates for 6 projects increased as a result of FTA's risk and 
contingency reviews. For example, officials at Valley Transportation 
Authority (VTA) (located in Santa Clara, California) stated that, as 
part of FTA's risk assessment review, the project-management oversight 
contractor recommended an increase in the contingency amount for the 
project by $100 million. VTA officials further stated that contingency 
amounts fluctuated throughout the development process as the design of 
the project was further refined. We have previously found that FTA's 
risk reviews have helped to improve project sponsors' controls over 
project costs and provided FTA with a better understanding of the 
issues surrounding projects, such as the potential problems that could 
lead to cost increases.[Footnote 38] 

* FTA uses its reviews to analyze whether the project sponsor has 
included a sufficient level of contingency within their cost estimate. 

* Scope and Configuration Changes. Project sponsors stated that the 
scope of 12 projects was reduced or increased significantly during the 
development process, changes that led to capital cost-estimate 
changes. For example, the Minneapolis Metropolitan Council stated that 
its project had a $24 million increase from preliminary engineering to 
FFGA, and $15.6 million of the increase in capital cost that was 
attributable to inclusion of three at-grade infill stations. 

* Refined Cost Estimate as Project Progressed: Because the majority of 
project estimates were developed in the planning stage, they will 
continue to change as part of the development process. For example, 
the Denver Regional Transportation District stated that the capital 
cost estimate for their project decreased because as the project 
advanced through the project development process, the cost estimators 
had a better idea of the project's scope and design, which led to more 
accurate cost estimating. Generally, the more information that is 
known about a project, the more accurate and less variable the 
estimate is expected to be. We have previously found that cost 
estimates are based on many assumptions and are expected to change as 
project requirements are clarified.[Footnote 39] 

Project Sponsors Use Regional Travel Models to Forecast Ridership, and 
FTA Provides Funding and Technical support: 

Project Sponsors Generally Forecast Ridership Using Regional Travel 
Models: 

Project sponsors rely on support from MPOs to develop their ridership 
forecasts. According to FTA officials, most travel-forecasting 
procedures are maintained by MPOs. The MPOs produce travel forecasts 
as they prepare transportation plans for metropolitan areas and assess 
the plans' conformity with federal air-quality requirements. Based on 
a Transportation Research Board (TRB) study on metropolitan travel 
forecasting, MPOs estimate future travel demand and analyze the 
impacts of alternative transportation investment situations using 
computerized travel-demand-forecasting models. According to this 
study, forecasts derived from travel models enable policy makers to 
make informed decisions on investments and policies relating to the 
transportation system.[Footnote 40] In a 2009 report, we found that 
these MPO travel models are complex and require inputs of extensive 
current information on roadway and transit system characteristics and 
operations, as well as current and forecasted demographic information. 
[Footnote 41] Creating and operating the models requires a high degree 
of technical training and expertise. However, we also found in 2009 
that some MPOs face challenges in travel demand forecasting, including 
a lack of technical capacity and data necessary to conduct the complex 
transportation modeling required to meet planning needs.[Footnote 42] 
The TRB also noted that MPOs face a much broader and more complex set 
of requirements and needs in their travel modeling.[Footnote 43] 

By and large, New and Small Starts project sponsors whom we 
interviewed generally use the regional travel models of the project 
sponsor's local MPO to forecast ridership. 

* Eight out of the nine New Starts project sponsors reported using MPO 
travel models. For example, officials from the Regional Transportation 
District (Denver, CO) said that the local MPO's (Denver Regional 
Council of Government) approved regional travel-demand model is used 
to develop the Regional Transportation District's ridership forecasts. 
Officials from the Utah Transit Authority (Salt Lake City, Utah) also 
used a regional travel model maintained by the Wasatch Front Regional 
Council--the MPO for the Salt Lake City area. The model incorporates 
information from highway usage, rail, and other mass transit 
ridership, as well as transit rider surveys. However, one project 
sponsor, Sound Transit (Seattle, WA) used the incremental method to 
forecast its ridership. This method essentially uses actual transit 
ridership data, which includes, among other data, observed origins and 
destinations of transit users and surveys of region-wide transit 
riders. 

* Three out of four Small Starts project sponsors use travel models 
developed by the local MPO. For example, for the Portland, Oregon, 
Streetcar Loop project, the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation 
District of Oregon (TRIMET) used travel forecasts prepared by the 
Portland Metropolitan Planning Organization. According to TRIMET 
officials, the model includes and is continually updated with 
employment and population data, as well as, data on roadway and 
transit routes. According to these officials, the MPO travel model is 
one of the more sophisticated ridership models for an urban area. One 
project sponsor used its statewide travel model to forecast ridership, 
instead of a local MPO travel model. According to the Montachusett 
Regional Transit Authority (Fitchburg, MA), it used a local travel 
model which was a component of the overall Massachusetts state travel 
model to forecast ridership. 

Project sponsors that use regional travel models to forecast transit 
ridership for New Starts and Small Starts projects are required to 
test the forecasts for accuracy against current data describing actual 
transit ridership, per FTA requirements. To implement this test, the 
travel models are used to prepare a forecast of current ridership 
using current population, employment, highway conditions, and transit 
service levels. According to FTA, comparisons of these current-year 
forecasts against current-year data demonstrate the extent to which 
the models grasp actual ridership patterns and support improvements to 
the models when errors are evident. When the models are able to pass 
the tests, they are then ready to make forecasts for the proposed 
project. 

FTA procedures permit Very Small Starts project sponsors to document 
current transit volumes in the project corridor and thereby avoid the 
need to prepare ridership projections for the project. As previously 
mentioned, according to FTA, one of the key requirements for a Very 
Small Starts project is that at least 3,000 existing transit riders 
will use the proposed project on an average weekday. Through this 
requirement, FTA can ensure that the proposed project will have 
sufficient ridership and produce enough travel benefits to be 
considered cost-effective without having to do detailed travel 
forecasts or other complicated analysis to prove the project is 
justified. To adequately document the required number of existing 
transit riders, the sponsoring agency must conduct a detailed counting 
of riders of existing public transportation in the project corridor, 
and estimate the number of existing riders that will use the Very 
Small Starts project. FTA guidance requires that the counts be 
conducted on existing routes serving the project corridor that either: 

* operate on the street segments where the Very Small Start will 
operate, or: 

* on streets parallel or nearby that will be rerouted to operate on 
the Very Small Starts street segments after the project is completed. 

* For example, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (Metro) developed its ridership projections for its two Very 
Small Starts bus rapid transit projects we reviewed, based on actual 
experience with another bus rapid-transit service. According to Metro 
officials, in order to validate ridership projections, Metro used data 
collected from its Automatic Passenger Counter system on the existing 
bus rapid-transit service. Metro officials told us that automatic 
passenger counters are installed on every bus in its fleet to provide 
accurate passenger ridership data. 

FTA has endorsed two alternative approaches for developing ridership 
forecasts that rely less on travel models and more on current data on 
actual travel patterns. 

1. Incremental Methods rely on rider survey data to describe current 
transit ridership patterns. This method essentially focuses on changes 
in transit ridership caused by proposed projects and by growth in 
population and employment. According to FTA officials, in corridors 
where transit is well established, these incremental methods offer a 
quick, and possibly more reliable, ridership-forecasting approach. 

2. Simplified Trips-on-Project Software package (STOPS) which FTA 
released in September 2013, is an approach that local agencies can use 
instead of, or in conjunction with, metro-area models. STOPS uses data 
from the Census Transportation Planning Package (currently from the 
2000 decennial census) to replace some component models and provides 
already calibrated models of transit-versus-auto choice. For local 
agencies whose travel models are not ready to provide reliable 
forecasts for transit projects, STOPS offers an alternative that can 
avoid the need for project sponsors to perform data collection and 
model updates, processes that can sometimes take as long as 2 years to 
complete. Instead, using STOPS, developing ridership forecasts can 
take as little as 2 weeks. 

We did not assess the adequacy of any of these travel models. However, 
the TRB study noted that there is no single approach to travel 
forecasting or set of procedures that is correct for all applications 
or all MPOs. Additionally, the study stated that FTA is to be 
commended for taking steps to ensure quality in the travel forecasting 
methods used for major project planning. In particular, the study 
noted that FTA's initiatives to ensure the quality of New Starts 
ridership forecasting have been useful in uncovering weaknesses and 
that FTA has taken a strong role in improving modeling practice. 
[Footnote 44] 

Uncertainties Create Challenges for Developing Ridership Forecasts: 

According to FTA officials, regardless of the approach project 
sponsors use to forecast ridership, all ridership forecasts have 
uncertainties. FTA officials identified at least two areas of 
uncertainty: 

* Data inputs that are forecasts. Travel models require information on 
population, employment, household incomes, transit service levels, 
transit fares, highway capacity, and other influences on travel 
patterns. Consequently, ridership forecasts for future years are 
grounded in predicted future conditions rather than data on actual 
conditions. For distant years and in rapidly growing metro areas, 
uncertainties in these predictions can be large. 

* Optimism. Sponsors and planners of new transit projects anticipate 
good outcomes. As a result, optimistic assumptions are common on such 
things as operating speeds, accessibility to stations, and the amount 
of new development within a given area. Travel models tend to compound 
this across-the-board optimism in many ways leading to forecasts that 
may be much more optimistic than any one of the inputs, and this 
optimism may lead sponsors to reject less-than-hoped-for ridership 
projections and search for ways to increase the projections. 

Some project sponsors we interviewed also identified the following 
challenges affecting ridership estimates: 

* The difficulty in developing accurate population and employment 
growth estimates. 

* The unpredictability of gas price levels on ridership. For instance, 
higher prices will encourage higher ridership and a large decline in 
prices will discourage ridership. One project sponsor told us that the 
economy has a significant effect on ridership, and more specifically, 
the economy affects the price of gas and cost of parking, which in 
turn affects ridership. 

FTA Supports the Development of Ridership Forecasts through Funding 
and Technical Support: 

FTA has taken a number of actions to support the development of 
ridership forecasts. These include the following: 

Funding. According to FTA officials, the agency contributes funding to 
state agencies and MPOs to support, among many other activities, the 
collection of travel data and the development of travel-forecasting 
procedures. MPOs receive annual funding from both the Federal Highway 
Administration and FTA, in addition to state matching funds. 
Nationally, FTA's share of this funding is about $129 million for 
fiscal year 2014. 

Technical support. FTA told us that, since the inception of the 
Capital Investment Grant program, it has filled at least one staff 
position with a nationally recognized expert in travel forecasting who 
is responsible for assisting project sponsors in the development of 
travel forecasts and for oversight of Capital Investment Grant project 
ridership forecasts. FTA has also allocated approximately two full-
time staff to oversight activities. These activities include the 
following: 

* Technical assistance in travel forecasting methods development. 
According to FTA, at the invitation of local agencies, FTA staff 
provides comments, participates in peer-review panels, and engages in 
ongoing discussions with local project sponsors and their contractors 
during the development of new travel forecasting procedures for 
metropolitan areas. 

* Early reviews of methods and assumptions. FTA officials also stated 
that the agency encourages project sponsors and their contractors to 
meet with FTA staff early in the preparation of forecasts in support 
of proposed projects. These officials said that this early engagement 
identifies potential problems with forecasting methods and planning 
assumptions at a point in time when these issues can be dealt with 
efficiently--essentially avoiding late surprises when project sponsors 
have finished their forecasts. 

* Reviews of final travel forecasts. Before a proposed project is 
approved for entry into preliminary engineering (New Starts) or 
project development (Small Starts), FTA staff review the travel 
forecasts submitted by project sponsors in support of these projects. 
Staff document any significant uncertainties found in the forecasts 
and make recommendations to FTA's Office of Planning and Environment 
regarding acceptance of the forecasts as sufficiently reliable for the 
agency's use in project evaluation and rating. 

We interviewed 13 New Starts and Small Starts project sponsors, and a 
majority (7) said that FTA's technical assistance, which includes 
reviewing ridership forecasts, was generally helpful. For example, an 
official from the Metropolitan Council (Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN) 
told us that he has found it useful that FTA reviews its ridership 
forecasts for different projects. In particular, it can be very 
insightful to have FTA ask probing questions regarding forecasts, a 
process that gives project sponsors a quality check on the veracity of 
their ridership-forecast numbers. In another example, officials from 
Valley Metro (Phoenix, AZ) told us that FTA provided them assistance 
for 9 months as the ridership forecasting was being developed, 
assistance that helped them deliver a credible document for evaluation 
and rating. Furthermore, another project sponsor said that the FTA 
team that reviewed its ridership projections was both thorough and 
timely with its reviews. 

Requirement for testing of travel models. In 2007, FTA required that 
local travel models used to forecast transit ridership for New Starts 
and Small Starts project be tested for accuracy against current data 
describing actual transit ridership. According to FTA, the requirement 
ensures that local methods used to prepare ridership forecasts 
submitted to FTA have been demonstrated to have a basic grasp of 
current local transit ridership. FTA officials said that the 2013 
policy guidance on the Capital Investment Grant program continues this 
requirement.[Footnote 45] 

Agency Comments: 

We provided DOT with a draft of this report for review and comment. 
DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any 
questions or would like to discuss this work, please contact me at 
(202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Individuals making key contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

David J. Wise: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) 
mandated GAO to biennially review FTA's processes and procedures for 
evaluating, rating, and recommending new fixed-guideway capital 
projects and core capacity improvement projects and the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) implementation of such processes and 
procedures.[Footnote 46] In this report, we identify (1) the extent to 
which the length of the development process varies across New Starts, 
Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects and what factors affect 
the length of this process, (2) the extent to which capital cost 
estimates for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects 
change throughout the development process, and what factors contribute 
to the changes, and (3) how project sponsors forecast ridership, 
including any support that FTA provides in helping them develop these 
forecasts. 

To address all of these objectives, we reviewed and summarized 
relevant laws, such as The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), FTA 
circulars and policy guidance, as well as our body of work on the 
Capital Investment Grant Program. To determine the extent to which the 
length of the development process varies across New Starts, Small 
Starts, and Very Small Starts projects and the extent to which capital 
cost estimates for these projects change throughout this process, we 
collected and analyzed project milestone data and cost estimate data 
(see apps. II and III) from FTA staff and analysis of FTA Annual 
Reports on Funding Recommendations for fiscal years 2008 through 2014. 
We included all 32 New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts 
projects that had been: 1) approved to enter preliminary engineering 
following SAFETEA-LU (October 2005) and (2) awarded a grant agreement 
prior to the implementation of MAP-21 (March 2013). To verify and 
assess the reliability of the data compiled by FTA, we compared it to 
project data we received from project sponsors we interviewed. We 
resolved any discrepancies with the data with FTA headquarters staff, 
and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. 

To provide insight on the factors contributing to project's timeline 
trends and challenges and project cost-estimate changes and to obtain 
information on how ridership forecasts are developed, we interviewed 
23 project sponsors representing 30 of the 32 projects.[Footnote 47] 
Table 2 lists the New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts 
project sponsors we interviewed for our review. The information 
obtained from these interviews is not generalizable to all New Starts, 
Small Starts, and Very Small Starts projects. We also interviewed FTA 
officials to determine the support that FTA provides to help project 
sponsors develop ridership forecasts. 

Table 2: New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts Project 
Sponsors Interviewed: 

Name of project sponsor: Capital Metro; 
Location: Austin, TX; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: City of Charlotte; 
Location: Charlotte, NC; 
Mode[A]: LRT; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: City of Ft. Collins; 
Location: Fort Collins, CO; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: City of Honolulu; 
Location: Honolulu, HA; 
Mode[A]: HR; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Florida Department of Transportation; 
Location: Orlando, FL; 
Mode[A]: CR; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Kansas City Area Transportation Authority; 
Location: Kansas City, MO; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: King County; 
Location: Seattle, WA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Livermore Amador Valley Transit Authority; 
Location: Livermore, CA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority; 
Location: Los Angeles, CA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Minneapolis Metropolitan Council; 
Location: Minneapolis, MN; 
Mode[A]: LRT; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Montachusetts Regional Transit Authority; 
Location: Fitchburg, MA; 
Mode[A]: CR; 
Project type: Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Monterey Salinas Transit; 
Location: San Diego, CA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Northern Arizona Intergovernmental Public 
Transportation; 
Location: Flagstaff, AZ; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Ride UTA; 
Location: Salt Lake City, UT; 
Mode[A]: LRT; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Roaring Fork Transportation Authority; 
Location: Roaring Fork, CO; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: RTD Fast Tracks; 
Location: Denver, CO; 
Mode[A]: CR; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: San Diego Association of Governments; 
Location: San Diego, CA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: San Joaquin Regional Transit District; 
Location: Stockton, CA; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (VTA); 
Location: San Jose, CA; 
Mode[A]: HR; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Sound Transit; 
Location: Seattle, WA; 
Mode[A]: LRT; 
Project type: New Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: The Rapid; 
Location: Grand Rapids, MI; 
Mode[A]: BRT; 
Project type: Very Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: TriMet; 
Location: Portland, OR; 
Mode[A]: Streetcar, LRT; 
Project type: Small Starts. 

Name of project sponsor: Valley Metro; 
Location: Phoenix, AZ; 
Mode[A]: LRT; 
Project type: Small Starts. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] BRT = bus rapid transit; HR = heavy rail; CR = commuter rail; LRT 
= light rail transit. 

[End of table] 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Key Milestone Dates and Cost Estimates for Selected New 
Starts Projects Reviewed by GAO (Dollars in Millions): 

Project: Central Corridor; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: St. Paul - Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: June 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
December 2006; $932; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: May 2010; $957; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
April 2011; $957. 

Project: Central Florida Commuter Rail Transit - initial operating 
segment; 
Mode: Commuter rail; 
Location: Orlando, Florida; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: May 2004; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
March 2007; $602; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: August 2008; 
$357; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: July 
2011; $357. 

Project: Draper Transit Corridor; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: August 2008; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
December 2009; $212; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: April 2011; 
$194; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
December 2011; $194. 

Project: Eagle Commuter Rail Line; 
Mode: Commuter rail; 
Location: Denver, Colorado; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: July 1997/January 2005[A]; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
April 2009; $2,904; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: April 2010; 
$2,137; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
August 2011; $2,043. 

Project: High Capacity Transit Corridor; 
Mode: Heavy rail; 
Location: Honolulu, Hawaii; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: January 2007; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
October 2009; $5,348; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: December 2011; 
$5,126; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
December 2012; $5,122. 

Project: LYNX Blue Line Extension; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2002; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
November 2007; $749; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: July 2012; 
$1,160; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
October 2012; $1,160. 

Project: Mid Jordan; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: October 2005; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: May 
2007; $522; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: April 2008; 
$535; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
January 2009; $535. 

Project: Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: Portland, Oregon; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: July 2008; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
March 2009; $1,472; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: March 2011; 
$1,490; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: May 
2012; $1,490. 

Project: Silicon Valley Berryess[A] Extension; 
Mode: Heavy rail; 
Location: San Jose, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2001[B]; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
December 2009; $2,509; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: April 2011; 
$2,623; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
March 2012; $2,330. 

Project: University Link; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Location: Seattle, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: July 2005; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into preliminary engineering: 
December 2005; $1,720; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into final design: December 2006; 
$1,646; 
Date and cost estimate when full funding grant agreement awarded: 
January 2009; $1,948. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

Note: Dollars are rounded to the nearest million. 

[A] The Eagle Commuter Rail project was originally two separate 
projects--the East Corridor and the Gold Line--that eventually were 
combined into a single FFGA. The East Corridor locally preferred 
alternative (LPA) was selected in July 1997, while the Gold Line LPA 
was selected in January 2005. According to project sponsor officials, 
the LPA was identified in July 1997, but final adoption by all parties 
did not occur until September 1998. 

[B] The Silicon Valley Berryessa Extension was originally approved 
into preliminary engineering in 2002 as a 16-mile project, but 
withdrew from the New Starts program in 2005. The project was re-
admitted into preliminary engineering in December 2009. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Key Milestone Dates and Cost Estimates for Selected 
Small and Very Small Starts Projects Reviewed by GAO (Dollars in 
Millions): 

Project: Bellevue-Redmond Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: King County, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2001; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $27; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: April 2011; $27. 

Project: Central Mesa Light Rail Transit Extension; 
Mode: Light rail; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: Mesa, Arizona; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: September 2009; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: August 
2010; $199; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: October 2012; $199. 

Project: E Street Corridor sbX Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: San Bernadino, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: December 2005; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $163; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2011; $192. 

Project: Fitchburg Commuter Rail Improvements; 
Mode: Commuter rail; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: Fitchburg, Massachusetts; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: March 2007; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $150; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2011; $159. 

Project: King County, RapidRide E Line Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: King County, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2001; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2010; $48; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: June 2012; $48. 

Project: King County, RapidRide F Line Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: King County, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2009; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2010; $37; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: June 2012; $48. 

Project: Livermore-Amador Route 10 Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Livermore, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: February 2007; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $22; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: August 2009; $22. 

Project: Mason Corridor Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: Fort Collins, Colorado; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: October 2000; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
November 2007; $74; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: May 2012; $87. 

Project: Metro Express-Airport Way Corridor Bus Rapid Transit Project; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: San Joaquin, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: September 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2008; $10; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2010; $10. 

Project: Metro Rapid Bus System Gap Closure Project; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Los Angeles, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: June 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2006; $29; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2010; $29. 

Project: MetroRapid Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Austin, Texas; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: June 2005; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
February 2009; $47; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: April 2012; $48. 

Project: Mid-City Rapid; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: San Diego, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: [A]; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $43; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: August 2010; $45. 

Project: Monterey Bay Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Monterey, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: September 2008; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2008; $4; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2010; $4. 

Project: Mountain Links Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Flagstaff, Arizona; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: December 2005; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $10; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: May 2011; $10. 

Project: Pacific Highway South Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: King County, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2001; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2006; $25; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: May 2009; $25. 

Project: Pioneer Parkway EmX Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: Springfield, Oregon; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: May 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2006; $37; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: November 2008; $41. 

Project: Silver Line Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Grand Rapids, Michigan; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: January 2007; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $37; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: October 2012; $35. 

Project: Streetcar Loop; 
Mode: Streetcar; 
Category: Small Starts; 
Location: Portland, Oregon; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: July 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: April 
2007; $127; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: October 2009; $128. 

Project: Troost Corridor Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Kansas City, Missouri; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: September 2006; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2006; $31; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: July 2010; $31. 

Project: VelociRFTA Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Roaring Fork Valley, Colorado; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: May 2003; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2008; $46; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: August 2011; $46. 

Project: West Seattle Bus Rapid Transit; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: King County, Washington; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: November 2004; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2009; $28; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: September 2011; $28. 

Project: Wilshire Boulevard Bus-Only Lane; 
Mode: Bus rapid transit; 
Category: Very Small Starts; 
Location: Los Angeles, California; 
Date locally preferred alternative selected: August 2007; 
Date and cost estimate when accepted into project development: 
December 2007; $32; 
Date and cost estimate when funding awarded: May 2012; $32. 

Source: GAO analysis of FTA and project sponsor data. 

Note: Dollars are rounded to the nearest in million. 

[A] We could not determine the date when the locally preferred 
alternative was selected for this project. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David J. Wise, (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Brandon Haller (Assistant 
Director), Antoine Clark, Catherine Colwell, Dwayne Curry, Geoffrey 
Hamilton, Terence Lam, Jason Lee, Karen Richey, Amy Rosewarne, Kelly 
Rubin, and Matt Voit made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) the 49 U.S.C. § 5309 
Capital Investment Grant program comprised three FTA funding-programs: 
Major Capital Investment (New Starts and Small Starts), Fixed Guideway 
Modernization, and Buses and Bus-Related Equipment and Facilities. 
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1573-1589 (2005). Given that this 
report utilizes program data during the time period of October 2005, 
through March 2013, discussion of programs in this report primarily 
reflects statutory provisions in place during that time and does not 
focus on various amendments made subsequently in July 2012 by the 
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) Pub. L. No. 
112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012). 

[2] GAO, Public Transit: Funding for New Starts and Small Starts 
Projects, October 2004 through June 2012, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-40] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 
2012). 

[3] "Fixed-guideway" systems use and occupy a separate right-of-way 
for the exclusive use of public transportation services, such as fixed 
rail and exclusive lanes for buses and other high-occupancy vehicles. 

[4] Under the MAP-21, revised definition, "new fixed guideway capital 
project" means (1) a new fixed-guideway project that is a minimum 
operable segment or extension to an existing fixed-guideway system; or 
(2) a fixed-guideway bus rapid transit project that is a minimum 
operable segment or an extension to an existing bus rapid transit 
system. 49 U.S.C. § 5309(a)(5). 

[5] SAFETEA-LU created Small Starts to streamline the project-
development process and the evaluation and rating criteria that apply 
to larger-dollar New Starts projects. FTA created an even more 
streamlined evaluation process for Very Small Starts. 

[6] For the purposes of this report, unless otherwise provided, 
references to New Starts-related statutory, regulatory and other FTA 
requirements are to those provisions in place following the 
implementation of SAFETEA-LU related requirements and prior to the 
implementation of MAP-21-related requirements. 

[7] We define the development process as the activities related to the 
development of a New Starts, Small Starts, or Very Small Starts 
project that occur between when a project sponsor selects the project 
and the formal award of construction funding through a grant agreement. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 20008, 126 Stat. 656, 674 (July 6, 2012). 
See, for example, GAO, Public Transit: Funding for New Starts and 
Small Starts Projects, October 2004 through June 2012, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-40] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.14, 
2012); and GAO, Public Transit: Requirements for Smaller Capital 
Projects Generally Seen as Less Burdensome, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-778] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 
2011). 

[9] During this phase, project sponsors refine the design of the 
selected project and its estimated costs, benefits, and impacts. 

[10] One project sponsor declined to be interviewed; and we were 
unable to contact one other after several attempts. 

[11] In addition to the Capital Investment Grant program, federal 
sources for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small starts projects 
may include the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. 
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), Federal Highway Administration 
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement, or other FTA 
program funds. Project sponsors may use local sources of revenue, 
including, sales taxes, fees, concessions, etc., to pay the project's 
costs. In addition, financing mechanisms, such as bonds, or loans, may 
be used to pay for these projects costs as payments come due. 

[12] A corridor is a largely linear geographic band defined by 
existing and forecasted travel patterns involving both people and 
goods. The corridor serves a particular travel market or markets that 
are affected by similar transportation needs and mobility issues. 

[13] See Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1070), codified, as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. See also, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2; 23 C.F.R. 
Part 771. Under SAFETEA-LU, to gain approval for entry into 
preliminary engineering, a New Starts project must have been (1) 
selected as the locally preferred alternative at the completion of an 
alternatives analysis process, (2) included in the region's fiscally 
constrained long-term transportation plan, (3) rated acceptably under 
statutorily defined project justification and financial criteria, and 
(4) met other FTA readiness requirements including a demonstration by 
the project's sponsors that they had the technical capability to 
manage the project during the preliminary engineering phase. 

[14] Under SAFETEA-LU, final design was the last phase of project 
development before construction and may include right-of-way 
acquisition, utility relocation, and the preparation of final 
construction plans and cost estimates. 

[15] An FFGA establishes the terms and conditions for federal 
participation in a transit project 

[16] A PCGA is a contract that sets the terms and conditions for Small 
Starts funding, as an FFGA does for New Starts funding. 

[17] This definition of bus rapid transit corresponds to the 
definition as described in implementing regulations prior to MAP-21. 
MAP-21 included a few changes that affected BRT. For example, MAP-21 
defined BRT more narrowly and specifically than under SAFETEA-LU. 
Specifically, MAP-21 requires that BRT projects include features that 
emulate the services provided by rail, including defined stations 
rather than bus stops. In addition, MAP-21 made a distinction between 
BRT projects that are eligible for New Starts versus Small Starts 
funding. 

[18] Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 20008, 126 Stat. 405 (2012). As noted 
previously, this report describes the project development process in 
effect from October 2005 through March 2013, prior to the 
implementation of changes from MAP-21. 

[19] 76 Fed. Reg. 1992 (Jan. 9, 2013). 

[20] MAP-21 requires the expedited technical capacity review process 
to be applicable to such applicants that (1) have achieved budget, 
cost, and ridership outcomes for the project that are consistent with 
or better than projections, and (2) demonstrated staff expertise and 
other resources necessary to implement a new project. 49 U.S.C. § 
5309(c)(3). 

[21] In a notice in the Federal Register published in March 2014, (70 
Fed. Reg. 13462, (Mar. 10, 2014)) FTA stated that the agency will be 
completing future additional rulemaking and guidance documents related 
to MAP-21 provisions including: getting into and through the steps in 
the New Starts and Small Starts processes; warrants; expedited 
technical capacity reviews; and programs of inter-related projects, 
among other things. However, FTA has not yet determined when these 
activities will be completed. 

[22] 49 C.F.R. § 611.7(c)(1)(i). For example, FTA Guidance on New 
Starts Policies and Procedures requires projects to have progressed 
beyond the NEPA scoping phase before entering into New Starts 
preliminary engineering. The scoping phase of a project is a 
requirement of the NEPA process focused on identifying significant 
issues related to a proposed federal action. Additionally, the scoping 
phase may include a determination of the range of alternatives to be 
addressed in NEPA documents. 

[23] See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (iii), 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(c) 
requiring the application of the NEPA process including the study and 
development of alternatives to a proposed action. See also 23 C.F.R. 
Part 771. 

[24] FTA considered the federal portion of the development process 
under SAFETEA-LU to have begun when a project sponsor entered either 
the preliminary engineering (New Starts) or the project development 
phase (Small Starts and Very Small Starts). 

[25] Under SAFETEA-LU, FTA referred to New Starts projects in 
preliminary engineering and final design, as well as Small Starts and 
Very Small Starts projects in the project development phase, as being 
in the "pipeline" through which successful projects advance to receive 
funding. 

[26] Congressional Research Service, Accelerating Highway and Transit 
Project Delivery: Issues and Options for Congress, R41947 (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 3, 2011). 

[27] GAO, Highway Projects: Some Federal and State Practices to 
Expedite Completion Show Promise, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-593] (Washington, D.C: June 6, 
2012). 

[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-40]. 
Specifically, in that report, we found that for the 25 New Starts 
projects funded between October 2004 and June 2012, local funding 
exceeded total federal funding contributions, accounting for $16.3 
billion, or almost half, of $33.8 billion of total project funding. 
Local funding for the 32 Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects 
approved over the same time period represented nearly one-quarter, or 
$513 million of the $2.1 billion used for overall project funding. 

[29] GAO, Public Transportation: Use of Contractors Is Generally 
Enhancing Transit Project Oversight, and FTA Is Taking Actions to 
Address Some Stakeholder Concerns, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-909] (Washington, D.C: Sept. 14, 
2010). 

[30] FTA's risk assessment review evaluates the reliability of the 
project sponsor's project scope, cost estimate, and schedule, focusing 
specifically on the uncertainty associated with project implementation 
and surrounding project conditions. 

[31] GAO, Public Transportation: Better Data Needed to Assess Length 
of New Starts Process, and Options Exist to Expedite Project 
Development, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-784] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009). 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-909]. 

[33] 78 Fed. Reg. 1992 (Jan. 9, 2013), The final rule became effective 
in April 2013. Under SAFTEA-LU, FTA required that the proposed project 
be evaluated against a baseline alternative. Within the New Starts 
program, the baseline alternative established a basis of comparison 
for project evaluation and provided a consistent framework for 
estimating the relative merits of proposed projects during project 
development. The baseline alternative was drawn from the alternatives 
defined during alternatives analysis. Under SAFTEA-LU, FTA required 
that the proposed project be evaluated against a baseline alternative. 

[34] Peter M. Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, 
Statement on The Capital Investment Grants (New Starts) Program, 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Highways and 
Transit, 113TH Cong., 1st sess., December 11, 2013. 

[35] We examined capital cost estimates that project sponsors 
developed and updated during the project development pipeline, which 
is defined as the period of time between when a project is accepted 
into the preliminary-engineering (New Starts) or project-development 
(Small and Very Small Starts) phase and the final award of 
construction funding by FTA. 

[36] Contingencies are set-aside estimated amounts that are included 
within the overall cost targets for a project. The amounts are 
designed to be used to overcome increases in cost that are due to 
potential risks, and for which no other mitigation measure is 
available. 

[37] See for example, GAO, IRS Management: Cost Estimate for New 
Information Reporting System Needs to be Made More Reliable, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-59] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 31, 2012); Information Technology: Better Informed Decision 
Making Needed on Navy's Next Generation Enterprise Network 
Acquisition, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-150] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2011); Department of Energy: Actions 
Needed to Develop High-Quality Cost Estimates for Construction and 
Environmental Cleanup Projects, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-199] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 
2010); and VA Construction: VA Is Working to Improve Initial Project 
Cost Estimates, but Should Analyze Cost and Schedule Risks, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-189] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 14, 2009). 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-909]. 

[39] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

[40] TRB, Metropolitan Travel Forecasting: Current Practice and Future 
Direction, Special Report 288 (2007). 

[41] See GAO, Metropolitan Planning Organizations: Options Exist to 
Enhance Transportation Planning Capacity and Federal Oversight, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-868] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2009). 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-868]. 

[43] TRB, Metropolitan Travel Forecasting: Current Practice and Future 
Direction, Special Report 288 (2007). 

[44] TRB, Metropolitan Travel Forecasting: Current Practice and Future 
Direction, Special Report 288 (2007). 

[45] 78 Fed. Reg. 2019 (Jan. 9, 2013) 

[46] Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 656, 674 (July 6, 2012). 

[47] One project sponsor declined to be interviewed; and we were 
unable to contact one other after several attempts. 

[End of section] 

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