This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-350R 
entitled 'Missile Defense: DOD's Report Provides Limited Insight on 
Testing Options for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System' which 
was released on April 30, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

GAO-14-350R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

Missile Defense: DOD's Report Provides Limited Insight on Testing 
Options for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System: 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has sought to rapidly develop and 
field the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the 
United States against a limited intermediate and intercontinental 
ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran. 
The GMD system defends against these threats by launching a ground-
based interceptor toward the enemy ballistic missile, releasing a kill 
vehicle that detects and destroys the threat. In March 2013, we found 
the total cost of the GMD system to be around $41 billion, 
approximately $4.5 billion of which will be spent between fiscal years 
2013 and 2017.[Footnote 1] Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
has deployed 30 GMD interceptors and it plans to deploy 14 more by the 
end of fiscal year 2017. However, flight testing intended to 
demonstrate the system's capabilities and limitations is not scheduled 
to be completed until at least 2022. Since 2003, we have found this 
approach of concurrently manufacturing, deploying, and testing 
interceptors is high risk because tests may uncover issues requiring 
costly design changes and retrofit programs.[Footnote 2] These risks 
materialized when MDA failed both of its attempts in 2010 to 
demonstrate the upgraded GMD interceptor, called Capability 
Enhancement (CE)-II, causing MDA to fall several years behind on 
deploying new interceptors. Additionally, the cost to demonstrate, as 
well as fix, the already produced CE-IIs has increased from $236 
million to $1.309 billion.[Footnote 3] 

A second CE-II attempt to intercept a target missile, called Flight 
Test GMD (FTG)-06a, occurred in December 2010. According to the 
Director, MDA, the test failed because of excessive vibration in the 
inertial measurement unit--a component of the kill vehicle's guidance 
system. As a result, MDA halted deliveries of the remaining CE-IIs 
until the failure is resolved. We reported in April 2012 that the 
failure investigation for FTG-06a concluded the inertial measurement 
unit required a redesign and additional development.[Footnote 4] MDA 
developed and implemented steps to mitigate the effects on that 
guidance component and successfully tested the mitigation in a non-
intercept flight test, called Controlled Test Vehicle-01, in January 
2013. MDA plans to further demonstrate the mitigation through an 
intercept flight test called FTG-06b, which, if successful, will allow 
interceptor deliveries to resume. The program experienced a setback, 
though, in July 2013, when the program failed an intercept attempt of 
the initial fielded version of the GMD interceptor, called CE-I, which 
has subsequently delayed FTG-06b to the third quarter of fiscal year 
2014.[Footnote 5] 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 provided 
that: MDA's highest priority should be to correct the problem that 
caused the FTG-06a test failure; MDA should demonstrate the correction 
in flight tests before resuming CE-II production; and MDA should have 
a robust, rigorous, and operationally realistic GMD testing program. 
[Footnote 6] Additionally, the act required the Secretary of Defense 
to submit to congressional defense committees a report on GMD's test 
program that included, among other items: an explanation of GMD test 
options if Controlled Test Vehicle-01 and FTG-06b do not demonstrate 
the successful correction to the problem that caused the FTG-06a 
failure; and an assessment of the feasibility, advisability, and cost 
effectiveness of accelerating GMD's flight testing pace. [Footnote 7] 

In addition, the act required GAO to brief the congressional defense 
committees on our views of DOD's report and submit a report as soon as 
practicable. For the briefing, we assessed: (1) the extent to which 
DOD's report identified testing options and known risks of the GMD 
system, and (2) the extent to which DOD's report assessed the 
feasibility and cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD flight testing. 
This report formally transmits the briefing that we provided to the 
congressional defense committees on December 16, 2013, which is 
attached as an enclosure, and meets the reporting requirement. 

To assess the extent to which DOD's report identified testing options, 
we reviewed DOD's report for testing options if FTG-06b does not 
demonstrate the successful correction to the problem that caused the 
FTG-06a failure. We then compared those testing options against MDA's 
testing plans. To assess the extent to which DOD's report assessed the 
feasibility and cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD's testing plan, 
we compared information included in DOD's report to a generally 
accepted definition of the term feasible (the extent to which 
something is both possible and likely to occur) and assessed the 
support provided in DOD's report against GMD's testing performance. We 
also compared information contained in DOD's report to GAO, Office of 
Management and Budget, and DOD guidance on the elements of a cost 
effectiveness assessment. Due to lack of availability of data, we did 
not independently assess whether accelerating GMD's testing pace was 
advisable. Finally, we met with MDA and DOD officials to corroborate 
key acquisition information. 

The issuance of this report was delayed by about a month because of 
delays in the security review process performed by DOD. DOD initially 
identified classified and sensitive information in our draft report 
but subsequently reversed its determination after we referred DOD to 
several publicly released documents that included the same 
information. We also revised some language in our report, as 
appropriate, based on DOD's security review. As a result of these 
discussions and revisions, DOD confirmed that this report does not 
contain classified or sensitive information. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to April 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

DOD's report provided decision makers with limited insight on 
potential testing options if MDA does not successfully demonstrate a 
correction to the problem that caused the December 2010 FTG-06a 
failure. First, we found that DOD's report included one testing 
option--a development effort to redesign and test kill vehicle divert 
thrusters, which help maneuver the kill vehicle in flight. According 
to the Director, MDA, this effort will address the systemic problem of 
vibration which is currently being addressed by isolating the inertial 
measurement unit from that environment. In our view, it was reasonable 
for DOD to focus testing options on plans to address the vibration 
problem. However, DOD's report included few details about that 
development effort, such as the cost, schedule, benefits, and risks, 
leaving decision makers with limited insight on this option. Second, 
we also found that DOD's testing options were limited because of a 
July 2013 intercept failure of the fielded CE-I interceptor. Until the 
ongoing CE-I failure review is completed and the root cause is 
determined, it would be premature in our view for MDA to determine the 
timing and nature of additional CE-I testing. 

DOD's report provided limited insight into the feasibility and no 
insight into whether accelerating GMD's testing pace would be cost 
effective. We found that DOD's report did not provide a complete 
assessment as to whether it is feasible to increase GMD's testing 
pace. Specifically, the report did not assess whether it was likely 
MDA could accelerate GMD's testing pace--limiting the report's 
usefulness for decision makers. We also found that DOD's report 
included some basic cost information but did not provide decision 
makers with an assessment of whether increasing GMD's testing pace 
would be cost effective. Further, in our view, it is unlikely that DOD 
can successfully accelerate the pace of GMD's testing given its 
testing track record and the increasing complexity of planned tests. 
In addition, the report provided insufficient information to assess 
whether accelerating GMD's testing pace is prudent because it did not 
address the potential full cost, benefits, and risks of accelerating 
testing. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. 
Although DOD provided technical comments for our report and we 
incorporated them as appropriate, DOD did not provide written comments 
to include in this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees and to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are: David Best, Assistant Director; Carol Petersen; 
Steven Stern; Robert Swierczek; Brian Tittle; Hai V. Tran; and Alyssa 
Weir. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

Enclosure: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense System Test Plan: 

DOD’s Report to Congress Provides Limited Insight on Testing Options 
for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System: 

Prepared for a Briefing of the Congressional Defense Committees on 
December 16, 2013: 

Overview: 

* Introduction; 
* Objectives; 
* Scope and Methodology; 
* Background; 
* Objective 1: GMD testing options and known risks; 
* Objective 2: Feasibility and cost effectiveness of accelerating 
GMD’s testing pace; 
* Concluding Observations; 
* Summary of Agency Comments. 

Introduction: 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the United States against a 
limited intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missile attack. 

The GMD program relies on ground and flight testing to assess and 
demonstrate system capability, but has failed all three of its 
intercept tests since 2010. 

GMD’s 2010 flight test failures have disrupted its broader 
developmental flight test plan and has resulted in cost growth of over 
$1 billion due to, in part, re-conducting flight tests and conducting 
reviews of test failures. 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 GMD Test 
Report Requirements: 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13 
NDAA), Pub. L. No. 112-239, Section 231, required the Secretary of 
Defense to submit to congressional defense committees a report on the 
GMD testing program and include: 

Part 1: 
An explanation of testing options for the ground-based midcourse 
defense system if planned flight tests CTV-01 and FTG-06b do not 
demonstrate the successful correction to the problem that caused the 
failure of the capability enhancement-2 kill vehicle in flight test 
FTG-06a in December 2010, including additional testing of the 
capability enhancement-1 kill vehicle. 

Part 2: 
An assessment of the feasibility, advisability, and cost effectiveness 
(including the potential benefits, risks, and impact on the current 
test plan and integrated master test plan for the ground-based 
midcourse defense system) of adjusting the test plan of the ground-
based midcourse defense system to accomplish, at an acceptable level 
of risk: 
(A) accelerating to fiscal year 2014 the date for testing such system 
using a capability enhancement-1 kill vehicle against an 
intercontinental ballistic missile-range target; and; 
(B) increasing the pace of the flight testing of such system to a rate 
of three tests every two years. 

Part 3: 
If the Secretary determines that either option described in 
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) [accelerating the test date 
for capability enhancement-1 testing and increasing the pace of flight 
testing] would be feasible, advisable, and cost effective, a 
discussion of whether increased funding beyond the funding requested 
in the budget for fiscal year 2013 is required to carry out such 
options and, if so, what level of increased funding would be necessary 
to carry out each such option. 

Part 4: 
Any additional matters the Secretary determines appropriate. 

Part 5: 
DOT&E [Director, Operational Test & Evaluation] Views.—The Secretary 
shall include an appendix to the report under subsection (a) that 
contains the views of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
regarding the contents of the report. 

Objectives: 

The Act further requires the Comptroller General to brief the 
congressional defense committees on his views of DOD’s report. 

Our specific objectives are to answer the following questions: 

1. To what extent does DOD’s report identify testing options and known 
risks of the GMD system? 

2. To what extent does DOD’s report assess the feasibility and cost 
effectiveness of accelerating GMD flight testing? 

Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which DOD’s report identified testing options, 
we reviewed DOD’s report for testing options if Flight Test GMD (FTG)-
06b does not demonstrate the successful correction to the problem that 
caused the FTG-06a failure. We then compared those testing options 
against MDA’s current testing plan and baseline report. We also met 
with MDA and DOD officials to corroborate key acquisition information. 

To assess the extent to which DOD’s report assessed the feasibility 
and cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD’s testing plan, we compared 
information included in DOD’s report to a generally accepted 
definition of the term feasible (the extent to which something is both 
possible and likely to occur) and assessed the support provided in 
DOD’s report against the GMD’s testing performance and environment. We 
also compared information contained in DOD’s report to GAO, Office of 
Management and Budget, and DOD guidance on the elements of a cost 
effectiveness assessment. Due to lack of availability of data, we did 
not independently assess whether accelerating GMD’s testing pace was 
advisable. We also met with MDA and DOD officials to corroborate key 
acquisition information. 

Background – GMD System Overview: 

Table: Components of the GMD System: 

Component: Ground Based Interceptor (GBI); 
Mission: The interceptor consists of a silo-based, three-stage booster 
stack and a “hit-to-kill” exoatmospheric kill vehicle. The kill 
vehicle is the weapon component of the interceptor that detects and 
destroys the threat through a hit-to-kill impact; 
Location: Missile fields in Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California. 

Component: Fire Control and Communications; 
Mission: The fire control (battle management) component is the 
integrating and controlling entity of the GMD element. Its 
sophisticated software plans engagements and tasks GMD components to 
execute a mission. The in-flight interceptor communications system 
enables the fire control component to communicate with the kill 
vehicle while in flight; 
Location: Fire control nodes in Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Shriever Air 
Force Base, Colorado. 

[End of table] 

The GMD program has completed fielding 23 of the original GBI missiles 
with the Capability Enhancement I (CE-I) version of the exoatmospheric 
kill vehicle (EKV), one of which was used in a flight test. 

The GMD program has also manufactured and delivered 13 of the GBI 
missile with the Capability Enhancement II (CE-II) version of the EKV, 
three of which have been used in flight tests. 

On March 15, 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced the U.S. will 
deploy 14 additional CE-II GBIs by fiscal year 2017, increasing the 
number of deployed GBIs from 30 to 44. 

Background – GMD Testing Issues: 

Table: GMD Intercept Flight Test History[1]: 

CE-I Interceptor Tests: 

Test Name: FTG-02; 
Test Date: Sept. 2006; 
Test Result: Success – met primary objectives[2]. 

Test Name: FTG-03; 
Test Date: May 2007; 
Test Result: Failure – target failed. 

Test Name: FTG-03a; 
Test Date: Sept. 2007; 
Test Result: Success - intercept. 

Test Name: FTG-05; 
Test Date: Dec. 2008; 
Test Result: Success - intercept. 

Test Name: FTG-07; 
Test Date: July 2013; 
Test Result: Failure – review ongoing. 

CE-II Interceptor Tests: 

Test Name: FTG-06; 
Test Date: Jan. 2010; 
Test Result: Failure – EKV failure. 

Test Name: FTG-06a; 
Test Date: Dec. 2010; 
Test Result: Failure – EKV failure. 

Source: GAO Analysis of MDA Data. 

[1] Includes only intercept tests involving operationally configured 
interceptors. 

[2] Although an intercept was not part of the test’s primary 
objectives, the kill vehicle hit the target. However, DOT&E has 
reported that the hit would not have resulted in a kill. 

[End of table] 

Background – FTG-06a Failure Cause and Resolution Status: 

FTG-06a: 
* FTG-06a failed in December 2010, according to the Director, MDA, 
because of excessive vibration in the inertial measurement unit (IMU); 
- IMU: guidance system sensor that provides flight data to assist EKV 
navigation. 

Controlled Test Vehicle – 01 (CTV-01): 
* CTV-01, a non-intercept flight test, was conducted in January 2013 
to demonstrate the performance of the redesigned guidance system 
component; 
- According to DOD budget documents, MDA developed a cradled IMU in 
response to the FTG-06a failure; 
* The Director, MDA stated CTV-01 demonstrated the successful 
dampening of the vibration environment that caused the FTG-06a failure. 

FTG-06b: 
* FTG-06b is intended to resolve the FTG-06a failure by demonstrating 
the cradled IMU and newly developed firmware through an intercept test; 
- FTG-06b was originally scheduled for 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2012 
but has since been delayed to at least the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 
2014; 
* According to MDA, interceptor production will restart if FTG-06b is 
successful. 

Objective 1: 

Objective 1: To what extent does DOD’s report identify testing options 
and known risks of the GMD system? 

Finding 1: DOD’s report included one testing option—-the development 
and future testing of alternate divert thrusters—-but included few 
details, leaving decision makers with limited insight on the testing 
option. 

Finding 2: The recent FTG-07 intercept failure, with an ongoing 
failure review, precluded DOD from developing CE-I testing options. 

Objective 1 – DOD Reported One Testing Option, With Few Details: 

What DOD Reported: 

* MDA is developing alternate divert thrusters expected to mitigate 
the vibration problem that was the root cause of the FTG-06a failure. 

* MDA plans to test the alternate divert thrusters after FTG-06b. 

GAO Views: 

* The report included few details on how or when the alternate divert 
thrusters would be developed and tested, such as: (1) development and 
testing strategy; (2) cost, schedule, benefits, and risks; and (3) 
impact on new production and fielded interceptors. 
- We requested more information, but did not receive any in time to 
assess the development and testing plans for this option. 

* While DOD should pursue efforts to resolve the root cause of 
recurring issues revealed in flight tests, more information is needed 
about alternate thruster development testing plans. 

* It was reasonable for DOD to focus testing options on plans that 
would address the vibration problem. The root cause of any FTG-06b 
failure would need to be known and addressed before determining 
additional CE-II testing options. 

Objective 1 – Latest CE-I Test Failure Precluded DOD from Providing 
Additional Testing Options: 

What DOD Reported: 

* FTG-07, a CE-I intercept test conducted July 2013, was unsuccessful 
and the failure review is currently ongoing. 

* FTG-07 was primarily intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the CE-I interceptor against an intermediate range target using 
updated software that improves performance. 

GAO Views: 

* At the time the FY13 NDAA was enacted in January 2013, DOD had a 
variety of testing options under consideration, including CE-I tests, 
to address the FTG-06a failure. 

* However, because DOD later added and conducted FTG-07 and it failed, 
that failure and MDA’s ongoing failure review precluded DOD from 
providing CE-I testing as an option until the root cause of that 
failure is identified and resolved. 

Jan 2, 2013 – FY13 NDAA enacted; 
July 5, 2013 – FTG-07 failed; 
Oct 18, 2013 – DOD submitted GMD test report. 

[End of Objective 1] 

Objective 2: 

Objective 2: To what extent does DOD’s report assess the feasibility 
and cost effectiveness of accelerating GMD flight testing? 

Finding 1: DOD’s report did not provide a complete assessment as to 
whether it is feasible to increase GMD’s testing pace—-limiting the 
report’s usefulness for decision makers. 

Finding 2: DOD’s report included some basic cost information but did 
not provide decision makers with an assessment of whether increasing 
GMD’s testing pace is cost effective. 

Objective 2 – DOD Report Did Not Provide a Complete Feasibility 
Assessment: 

What DOD Reported: 

* With additional funding, it should be possible to accelerate GMD’s 
testing pace to three flight tests every two years beginning in fiscal 
year 2018. 

* The requirement to meet fielding obligations of 44 GBIs, 
availability of targets, and the need to increase personnel and 
testing infrastructure limit DOD’s ability to accelerate testing 
before fiscal year 2018. 

GAO Views: 

* For our assessment, we defined feasibility as the extent to which 
something is both possible and likely to occur. 

* While DOD’s report stated that it should be possible to accelerate 
the pace of testing, it does not address whether it is likely. 

* It is not likely that testing could be accelerated given the 
program’s track record and the increasingly complex developmental 
tests it will be attempting. 
- Because of a number of flight test delays, anomalies, and failures, 
the GMD flight test program has not been stable since 2005.
- Each successive test explores new areas of performance, increasing 
in complexity and difficulty. 

Objective 2 – DOD Report Did Not Include a Cost Effectiveness 
Assessment: 

What DOD Reported: 

* To increase GMD’s testing pace beginning in fiscal year 2018, 
additional funding for infrastructure, personnel, interceptors, and 
targets would be needed. 

GAO Views: 

* For this assessment, we defined a cost effectiveness assessment as a 
comparison of the total costs with the projected benefits and risks of 
the action(s) under consideration. 

* DOD’s report did not make a determination as to whether it is cost 
effective to increase GMD’s testing pace beginning in fiscal year 2018.
DOD’s report included some limited cost information, but it is unclear 
what the total costs are and whether the costs are full and complete 
because they provided few details. 
- DOD did not discuss the benefits and risks of accelerating testing 
in the body of its report. 
- DOT&E identified risks in their appendix of DOD’s report that GMD’s 
flight tests are becoming more complex and therefore, “Rushing to test 
threatens the adequacy of the analyses of previous test results” and “
increases the risk MDA will miss or overlook important information 
that could affect subsequent tests”. 

* DOD did not address the advisability of adjusting their test plan in 
their report. 

[End of Objective 2] 

Concluding Observations: 

DOD’s report provided decision makers with limited insight on 
potential testing options. While some of the testing option 
limitations were unavoidable, additional information on test plans for 
the alternate thruster development would be beneficial for Congress. 
In our view, alternate thrusters could be a means of resolving the 
root cause of the failure, but additional information on development 
and testing plans is needed. 

DOD’s report provided limited insight into the feasibility, and no 
insight into the cost effectiveness and advisability of accelerating 
GMD testing. In our view, it is unlikely that DOD could successfully 
accelerate GMD’s testing given its testing track record and the 
increasing complexity of planned tests. The report provided 
insufficient information to assess whether accelerating GMD’s testing 
pace is prudent because the potential full cost, benefits, and risks 
are not provided in the report. 

Summary of Agency Comments: 

We obtained technical comments from DOD and incorporated them as 
appropriate in the briefing. 

[End of briefing slides] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-294SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013), 51. 

[2] See GAO, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being 
Adopted, but Risks Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2003); and more recently, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving 
Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-351] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 
2014). 

[3] In April 2013, we found that MDA initially planned to demonstrate 
the CE-II capability for an estimated $236.3 million but subsequently 
increased to $1.1739 billion as of August 2012 (see GAO, Missile 
Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-432] 
[Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2013], 90). Since then, we received 
updated cost information from MDA in June 2013 and the total cost is 
now estimated at $1.3091 billion. This recent cost increase was 
largely a result of a $146.5 million cost increase of the test failure 
review. 

[4] GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen 
Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-486] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 
2012). 

[5] MDA initially planned to conduct FTG-06b in the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2012 but the test was delayed to the second quarter of 
fiscal year 2014 because of challenges developing the FTG-06a 
mitigation. The July 2013 CE-I test has further delayed FTG-06b to 
third quarter of fiscal year 2014 in order to implement corrective 
actions based on an ongoing failure review of the CE-I test. 

[6] Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 228(a)(4), (6). 

[7] Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 231. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]