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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

April 2014: 

Army Modular Force Structure: 

Annual Report Generally Met Requirements, but Challenges in Estimating 
Costs and Assessing Capability Remain: 

Army Modular Force Structure: 

GAO-14-294: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-294, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Army considers its modular force transformation, which began in 
2004, to be its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The 
Army expanded the number of deployable units and incorporated advanced 
equipment and specialized personnel, but removed a maneuver battalion 
from its brigades. Throughout the transformation, GAO reported, 
testified, and made recommendations on associated challenges the Army 
faced. In 2013, the Army stated it had completed its transformation 
and submitted its last required report to Congress on its modular 
progress. It also announced plans to restore a maneuver battalion to 
most brigades. 

Congress mandated that GAO report annually on the Army's modular 
force. For this report, GAO (1) evaluates whether the Army addressed 
the legislative requirements in its modular force report and (2) 
provides an overview of any challenges that the Army faced in its 
modular force transformation and describes how the Army is addressing 
these challenges as it implements further changes in its force 
structure. GAO analyzed the Army's report against the legislative 
requirements, reviewed key Army reports, and spoke to Army officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army's annual report on its modular force either fully or 
partially addressed all of the requirements mandated by law. GAO's 
analysis showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report 
fully addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The requirements that 
were fully addressed included an assessment of the modular force 
capabilities and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among 
others. Some of the requirements that were partially addressed 
included information related to risks and mitigation strategies 
associated with shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, 
and replacing equipment; and itemizing information by active-duty and 
reserve components. The 2013 report provided more thorough information 
to congressional decision makers on the Army's progress in its modular 
force transformation than previous reports. 

GAO's body of work since 2005 on the Army's modular restructuring 
found that the Army faced challenges in creating a results-oriented 
plan, developing realistic cost estimates, and planning comprehensive 
assessments. GAO made 20 recommendations from 2005 through 2008 to 
help address these challenges; the Army generally agreed with 18 of 
the recommendations but so far has implemented only 3. As the Army 
plans to restructure its modular force it has made some progress in 
creating a results-oriented plan, but more work remains in developing 
realistic cost estimates and planning comprehensive assessments. 

* Creating a results-oriented plan. As the Army plans further changes 
to its modular force design, it has taken initial steps to create a 
results-oriented plan by developing a timeline with associated tasks 
and milestones. When the Army began its modular force transformation 
it did not create a plan with clear milestones to guide its efforts to 
fully staff and equip the modular force. By incorporating lessons 
identified in GAO's prior work as it makes further changes, the Army 
has established a baseline against which to measure performance and 
may provide decision makers the ability to mitigate any potential 
problems that may arise. 

* Developing realistic cost estimates. From 2005 through 2013, the 
Army did not create realistic cost estimates or provide a reliable 
accounting of past spending or future funding needs for implementing 
its modular force transformation. As the Army plans further changes to 
its modular force design, it has not developed cost estimates for 
military construction, personnel relocation, or training for the 
reorganized units. GAO continues to believe that realistic cost 
estimates would better position the Army to weigh competing priorities 
in a fiscally constrained environment and provide Congress with the 
information needed to evaluate funding requests. 

* Planning comprehensive assessments. Since 2004, the Army has made 
many changes to its modular design based on limited assessments, but 
it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan to measure the 
extent that its modular force transformation is meeting performance 
goals. As the Army continues to make changes to its modular design, 
the Army plans to conduct assessments but has not identified outcome-
oriented metrics to measure progress. If the Army created a 
comprehensive assessment plan, it could help decision makers identify 
capability gaps and mitigate risks. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making new recommendations, but this analysis provides 
additional support for past recommendations to develop realistic cost 
estimates and to create a comprehensive assessment plan to measure 
achievement of desired benefits. In oral comments on a draft of this 
report, the Army concurred with the report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-294]. For more 
information, contact John H. Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Army's Modular Report Generally Met Legislative Requirements: 

Lessons Learned from Modular Restructuring Provide Opportunities in 
Future Restructuring: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Status of GAO Recommendations from Army Modularity 
Reviews: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: GAO Assessment of the Extent to Which the Army's Annual 
Report Addressed the Legislative Requirements on Modularity Progress: 

Table 2: GAO Recommendations Regarding Creating a Results-Oriented 
Plan for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the Status of 
Each Recommendation: 

Table 3: GAO Recommendations Regarding Creating Realistic Cost 
Estimates for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the Status 
of Each Recommendation: 

Table 4: GAO Recommendations Regarding Completing a Comprehensive 
Assessment Plan for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the 
Status of Each Recommendation: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Standard Armored, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades: 

Figure 2: Planned Active-Duty and National Guard Brigade Combat Teams 
and Authorized End Strength, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2015: 

Abbreviation: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 16, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Army considers its modular force transformation, which began in 
2004, to be the most extensive restructuring that it has undertaken 
since World War II. The Army's primary goals in creating modular 
(i.e., standardized) forces were to expand the number of brigades in 
order to meet operational requirements and increase the flexibility of 
its forces. In creating its new modular force, Army leaders made a 
controversial decision to organize the modular force under a two-
battalion brigade combat team formation, moving away from the 
traditional three-battalion brigades. Although generally smaller than 
the brigades they replaced, modular brigade combat teams were expected 
to maintain combat effectiveness equal to or better than the previous 
division brigades by using specialized equipment and specialist 
personnel called "key enablers." For example, modular brigade combat 
teams included embedded combat support functions, such as military 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics. Throughout the Army's 
transition to the modular design, we reported and testified on the 
Army's management of its modular transformation and made 20 
recommendations intended to help the Army improve management controls, 
enhance transparency, and reduce the risk associated with modularity 
costs. In 2013, the Army stated that its transition to a modular force 
was completed and, due to decreasing financial resources and 
increasing ambiguity regarding future missions, announced plans to 
modify its modular brigade combat team designs to include more 
engineering capabilities and restore a third maneuver battalion to 
most brigades.[Footnote 1] 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007,[Footnote 2] as amended by the Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,[Footnote 3] mandated the Army 
to report annually on its progress in fulfilling the requirements for 
key enablers of modular units and in repairing, recapitalizing, and 
replacing items used in support of overseas contingency operations. 
The law required the Army's report to include, among other things, a 
comparison of the authorized and on-hand levels of key enabler 
equipment, an identification of the risks associated with shortfalls 
of equipment and personnel, and mitigation strategies for addressing 
those risks. In addition, the law required that the Army's report 
include an assessment of modular force capabilities, the status of the 
development of doctrine on the modular force, and comments from both 
the National Guard and Army Reserve on all the legislative 
requirements. Also, the law mandated us to review the report and to 
provide information and any recommendations deemed to be appropriate 
in light of our review. In September 2013, the Army issued its fiscal 
year 2013 report, which is the last required report on the progress of 
the modular force. In our report, we (1) evaluate whether the Army 
addressed the legislative requirements in its modular force report and 
(2) provide an overview of any challenges that the Army faced in its 
modular force transformation and describe how the Army is addressing 
these challenges as it implements further changes to its force 
structure. 

To determine the extent to which the Army addressed the legislative 
requirements in its modular force report, three GAO analysts 
independently reviewed the Army's fiscal year 2013 report, comparing 
it with each element required by the law and determining whether each 
required reporting element was included. In the case of any 
conflicting determinations, a fourth GAO analyst adjudicated the 
difference. To gain a full understanding of the elements included in 
the annual report and to discuss the methodology used for collecting 
information and reporting on the Army's progress toward modular 
restructuring, we met with Army officials knowledgeable about 
compiling information for the report, including individuals from the 
Department of the Army, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army 
Reserve, and Army National Guard. We also reviewed related 
documentation used to compile the report, including a Director of the 
Army Staff memorandum to complete the fiscal year 2013 modular report 
and the list of key enabler personnel and equipment required to be 
included in the report. Additionally, we reviewed the Army's fiscal 
year 2012 report on progress in fulfilling modularity requirements to 
compare it with the fiscal year 2013 report and to determine the 
extent of progress made in fulfilling modularity requirements between 
fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 

For the overview of the challenges related to the Army's modular force 
transformation and how the Army is addressing these challenges, we 
reviewed our prior testimonies and reports on modularity. To determine 
how the Army is addressing these challenges, we reviewed whether the 
Army implemented recommendations made in prior GAO reports evaluating 
the Army modular force structure. We reviewed documents regarding the 
Army's changes to its modular force design, including an analysis 
supporting the decision to add a third maneuver battalion to most 
brigades and the Army Structure Memorandum for fiscal years 2014 to 
2019. We also interviewed Army officials from the Department of the 
Army and Army Training and Doctrine Command to obtain information on 
challenges or lessons learned from the Army's modular force 
transformation, as well as how those lessons learned are being applied 
to ongoing efforts to modify the force structure. More details about 
our scope and methodology are included in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to April 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Army's modular force transformation affected the Army's combat 
units and the related command and support organizations in both the 
active and reserve components. The Army's objective in redesigning its 
force structure was to create more units to meet operational needs and 
be more flexible in deploying independently while maintaining combat 
capabilities of division-based brigades. According to the Army, having 
more combat brigades with specialized equipment and specialist 
personnel would increase combat capability and add value for combatant 
commanders. To increase the flexibility of units, the Army 
standardized brigade combat teams in one of three designs--armored 
brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade (see fig. 1). The Army's 
new modular units were designed, equipped, and staffed differently 
than the units they replaced, and thus the transformation required 
many changes, such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix of 
skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel, and 
significant changes to training and doctrine. A key change was the 
reduction in the number of maneuver battalions within the modular 
units from three battalions per brigade under the division-based 
organization to two battalions for most brigade combat teams. Critics 
of the decision to have only two battalions raised concerns about 
whether the new structure would maintain as much combat capability as 
the division-based battalion. However, the Army expected to increase 
the modular brigade combat teams' capability through specialized 
equipment and personnel, called "key enablers." 

Figure 1: Standard Armored, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 illustrations] 

Standard Modular Combat Brigade Designs: 

Armored brigade: 
Equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles. 

Infantry brigade: 
Dismounted infantry. 

Stryker brigade: 
Equipped with Stryker vehicles. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data; National War College and U.S. Army 
(photos) 

[End of figure] 

Since 2004, when the Army introduced its modular restructuring 
initiative, the Army has made multiple adjustments to its original 
plans for restructuring its operational force. The Army's initial 
restructuring plan called for 77 modular brigade combat teams--43 
active-duty brigade combat teams and 34 National Guard brigades. As of 
fiscal year 2013, the Army had 71 brigade combat teams, consisting of 
43 active-duty brigade combat teams and 28 National Guard brigades. In 
2013, the Army announced plans for another change in the structure of 
the modular force related to the need to reduce the active-duty 
component from 570,000 to 490,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2015. As 
figure 2 shows, the Army plans to reduce the number of active-duty 
brigade combat teams from a high of 45 teams to 32 teams by fiscal 
year 2015. The number of National Guard brigades would remain at 28, 
bringing the total of brigade combat teams to 60. In addition to the 
reduction in the numbers of brigade combat teams, the Army plans to 
refine the designs of the remaining brigades to add engineering and 
artillery capabilities, as well as increase the number of maneuver 
battalions from two to three for most brigade combat teams. According 
to the Army, the modifications to the modular force would enable it to 
preserve operational capability and flexibility, while reducing the 
number of soldiers in the active-duty component. 

Figure 2: Planned Active-Duty and National Guard Brigade Combat Teams 
and Authorized End Strength, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2015: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar and line graph] 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 43; 
National Guard: 34; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 482,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 350,000. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 43; 
National Guard: 34; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 502,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 350,000. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 42; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 512,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 350,000. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 48; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 512,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 350,000. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 48; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 525,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 351,300. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 45; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 532,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 352,600. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 45; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 562,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 358,200. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 45; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 569,400; 
Authorized National Guard: 358,200. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 45; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 562,000; 
Authorized National Guard: 358,200. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 43; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 570,000; 
Authorized National Guard: 358,200. 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 38; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 520,000; 
Authorized National Guard: 354,200. 

Fiscal year: 2015; 
Brigade combat teams: 
Active: 32; 
National Guard: 28; 
End strength: 
Authorized active: 490,000; 
Authorized National Guard: 350,200. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data and National Defense Authorization 
Act. 

Note: Although for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 the chart lists 48 
planned active-duty brigade combat teams, the Army only formed 45 
active-duty brigade combat teams. 

[End of figure] 

Our body of work on the Army's modular force transformation includes 
seven reports and three testimonies. The related work is listed at the 
end of this report. Based on our work, we made several recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense and to the Army intended to improve the 
information on the Army's transition to a modular design that the Army 
provided to decision makers in Congress. Because of the magnitude of 
the Army's transformation plans and concerns about their 
affordability, we initially conducted work under the Comptroller 
General's statutory authority and examined both the force structure 
and cost implications of the Army's transformation into a modular 
force. Subsequently, Congress enacted requirements that the Army 
submit an annual report on its progress on its modular force 
transformation and that we review the Army's report. According to the 
Army, the transition to the modular force structure, which began in 
2004, was completed by the end of fiscal year 2013. The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 repealed the 
requirement for the Army and GAO to prepare annual reports about the 
Army's modular force restructuring.[Footnote 4] 

Army's Modular Report Generally Met Legislative Requirements: 

The Army's annual report on its modular force generally met 
legislative requirements by providing information that either fully or 
partially addressed each of the requirements.[Footnote 5] Our analysis 
showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report fully 
addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The fully addressed 
requirements included information related to the status of key enabler 
personnel and equipment, an assessment of the modular force 
capabilities, and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among 
others. The partially addressed requirements included risks associated 
with shortfalls; mitigation strategies for shortfalls; scheduling for 
repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment; itemizing 
information by active-duty and reserve components; and comments by the 
National Guard and Army Reserve regarding key enabler personnel and 
equipment. By fully or partially addressing the requirements, the 
Army's 2013 report provided more thorough information to congressional 
decision makers on the Army's progress in its modular force 
transformation than previous reports. 

Army officials gave several reasons why the report did not fully 
address some of these requirements. For example, the Army's report 
discussed mitigation strategies for personnel shortfalls but not for 
all equipment shortfalls. According to Army officials, the Army 
mitigated risk by providing equipment to the next deploying units. In 
other cases, the Army chose not to mitigate equipment shortfalls due 
to the costs involved or because the specific equipment item no longer 
met the needs of the modular force. Additionally, the Army did not 
fully report on a schedule for the repair of equipment because, 
according to Army officials, the number of battle losses and the 
related amount of wear and tear on equipment returning from overseas 
operations was unpredictable.[Footnote 6] However, the Army provided 
some general information about its repair schedule for fiscal years 
2013 and 2014, such as when the Army expects to begin addressing 
postcombat equipment repairs. In addition, according to officials the 
report did not itemize information by component because the report 
included a separate section with comments from the reserve components. 
However, the comments by the reserve components did not include all 
required information, such as identifying risks and mitigation 
strategies associated with equipment shortfalls. Table 1 summarizes 
our assessment of the extent to which the Army's annual modular force 
report included each of the legislative requirements. 

Table 1: GAO Assessment of the Extent to Which the Army's Annual 
Report Addressed the Legislative Requirements on Modularity Progress: 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (1) Does the report 
describe the Army's progress in fulfilling the requirements for key 
enabler[Footnote 7] equipment of modular units? 
Comments: The Army's report included the required information on the 
progress made in fulfilling requirements for key enabler equipment. 
The report specifically described 10 systems from the fiscal year 2014 
budget request that the Army deemed are critical to success in 
operations. The report included two appendixes listing key enabler 
equipment, funding requests associated with the equipment, and 
specific line item numbers for the listed equipment. The report also 
included an appendix that provided details about key enabler equipment 
on hand, procurements, and shortages between fiscal year 2015 and 
fiscal year 2018, which allows the Army to observe a trend and 
provides information on progress made; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (2) Does the report 
describe the Army's progress in repairing, recapitalizing, and 
replacing equipment and materiel used in support of overseas 
contingency operations, and associated sustainment? 
Comments: The report included information on the repairing, 
recapitalizing, and replacing of equipment and identifies reset 
funding obligations for fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013. The report 
included an appendix that lists the quantities of equipment expected 
to be repaired, recapitalized, and replaced in fiscal year 2013 based 
on contingency operations. The report also noted that in fiscal year 
2013, the Army would repair approximately 70,000 items through depot 
reset and 275,000 items through special repair teams; according to the 
report, this would restore readiness to 23 brigades and supporting 
elements; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (3) Is information in the 
report itemized by active-duty and reserve components? 
Comments: The appendixes in the report are itemized by active-duty and 
reserve components, but the major sections of the report on key 
enabler equipment and personnel do not itemize the information. 
According to Army officials, the report mostly covered the active-duty 
component, although the introduction and equipment sections covered 
both the active-duty and reserve components. Army officials stated 
that they did not itemize the information because the report included 
a separate section with comments from the reserve component. Although 
the report includes a section with comments from the reserve component, 
this section does not cover the same information detailed in the 
sections on key enabler equipment and personnel for the active-duty 
component; 
Our assessment: Addressed in part. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (4) Does the report include 
an assessment of the Army's key enabler equipment and personnel? 
Comments: The report assessed both the Army's key enabler equipment 
and personnel. The appendixes in the report included assessments on 
the levels of key enablers. For example, the report provided 
information on 10 equipment systems that according to the Army are 
critical to success in operations. The Army included as key enabler 
equipment and personnel all line item numbers and military 
occupational specialties as defined in our prior work;[Footnote 8] 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (5) Does the assessment 
referred to in requirement 4 include a comparison of the authorized 
level of key enabler equipment, the level of key enabler equipment on 
hand, and planned purchases of key enabler equipment as set out in the 
future years defense program for fiscal year 2013? 
Comments: The Army's report showed the levels of authorized, on hand, 
and future procurement of key enabler equipment projected through the 
future years defense program for 2018 based on existing inventory; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (6) Does the report include 
a comparison of the authorized and actual personnel levels for 
personnel having key enabler specialties with the requirements for 
such specialties? 
Comments: An appendix in the report showed authorized and assigned 
levels of key enabler personnel; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (7) Does the report include 
an identification of any shortfalls indicated by the comparisons 
described in requirements 5 and 6? 
Comments: The report identified shortfalls for both key enabler 
equipment and personnel. For example, the report highlighted 
noteworthy shortfalls in specific personnel categories for the active-
duty component including field artillery firefinder radar operators, 
counterintelligence agents, cryptologic network warfare specialists, 
psychological operations specialists, and civil affairs specialists; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (8) Does the report include 
an assessment of the number and type of key enabler equipment the Army 
projects it will have on hand by the end of the future years defense 
program that will require repair, recapitalization, or replacement by 
the end of the time covered by the future years defense program 
(including repair, recapitalization, or replacement resulting from use 
in overseas contingency operations)? 
Comments: An appendix of the report included quantities of key enabler 
equipment expected to be repaired, replaced, and recapitalized in 
fiscal year 2013 based on overseas contingency operations requirements; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (9) If the assessment in 
requirement 4 and including the items in requirements 5-8 identifies 
shortfalls with the future years defense program, does the report 
identify the risks associated with such shortfalls? 
Comments: The report described some of the risks associated with key 
enabler equipment, but it did not describe risks associated with key 
enabler personnel shortfalls. For example, the report identified the 
risk that aviation units might lack high-frequency capability due to 
an equipment shortfall of specific radios. Although the report did not 
describe risks associated with personnel shortfalls, according to Army 
officials there were two identifiable risks. First, for some military 
occupational specialties, the soldiers had a shorter time at home and 
rotated more quickly back into combat. Second, there is a risk of 
future shortfalls in higher-ranking officers because there is a 
current shortage of younger officers. Army officials did not explain 
why these risks were not included in the report; 
Our assessment: Addressed in part. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (10) If shortfalls 
discussed in requirement 9 exist, does the report identify mitigation 
strategies? 
Comments: The report described mitigation strategies for shortfalls on 
key enabler personnel but not for key enabler equipment. The report 
identified how the Army is mitigating the shortfalls for the active-
duty component through efforts such as increased accessions, increased 
training base output, and adjustments to promotion rate targets. 
However, although the report listed 83 shortfalls for key enabler 
equipment, only 4 of the 83 shortfalls listed mitigation plans and 
those 4 plans were not specific. For example, for shortfalls in 
aircraft-unmanned aerial systems, the mitigation plan stated that the 
Army has already fielded the system. The Army noted that the mandated 
reduction of 80,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2015 and the reductions in 
the numbers of battalions would mean fewer requirements for equipment, 
which would decrease the difference between equipment need and the 
amount available. In addition, according to Army officials, during 
periods of high deployments the Army mitigated equipment shortfall 
risks by giving equipment from returning units to deploying units. 
Moreover, according to an Army official in some cases the Army 
deliberately chose not to mitigate equipment shortfalls for particular 
items due to the costs involved or because the equipment was outdated 
and no longer met the needs of the modular force. Army officials did 
not explain why specific equipment mitigation strategies were not 
included in the report; 
Our assessment: Addressed in part. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (11) Does the report 
include a schedule to accomplish the fulfillment of requirements for 
key enabler equipment and repair, recapitalization, and replacement of 
equipment and materiel used in support of overseas contingency 
operations, and associated sustainment? 
Comments: The report included general information but did not include 
a schedule for repair, recapitalization, and replacement of equipment. 
According to the report, the Army could not accurately forecast a 
schedule because the schedule is driven by battle losses and not part 
of projecting normal attrition. However, the Army did include some 
general information about its repair schedule, such as identifying the 
amount of equipment repairs to be completed in fiscal year 2013 and 
the post-combat equipment repairs to begin in fiscal year 2014. 
Although Army officials asserted that battle losses may be 
unpredictable and affect their ability to prioritize equipment for 
reset, the Army Materiel Maintenance Policy describes how the Army is 
to prioritize maintenance and repairs. We previously reported that, in 
2010, the Army took steps to synchronize national depot-level reset 
efforts and, in 2011, the Army issued a priority list for the reset of 
equipment. 
Although the Army did not fully calculate a schedule, according to 
officials, the Army tried to shorten repair time by sending reset and 
repair teams to the troops rather than sending the equipment to a 
repair depot and then back to the troops. The report noted that to 
ensure future readiness the Army requires reset funding during 
deployments and for 3 years after equipment leaves the theater. Due to 
sequestration, the Army deferred approximately $500 million in funding 
for the Army's depot reset program to future fiscal years, which 
affects operational readiness; 
Our assessment: Addressed in part. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (12) Does the report 
include the results of Army assessments of modular force capabilities, 
including lessons learned from existing modular units and 
modifications to modularity? 
Comments: The report identified some of the centers that assessed 
force structure and force capabilities such as the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army 
Capabilities Integration Center, and Army Training and Doctrine 
Command's Analysis Center. The report included five key emerging 
changes to the modular force operational concepts, doctrine, and 
organizational designs based on the analytical efforts of these 
centers; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (13) Does the report 
include a description of the status of the development of doctrine on 
how modular combat, functional, and support forces will train, be 
sustained, and fight? 
Comments: The report identified the Army Training and Doctrine 
Command's efforts to refocus and reorganize doctrinal publications to 
provide a more logical flow of doctrine to the force and to categorize 
content, resulting in Doctrine 2015. The report noted that the change 
would create a concise, relevant, and accessible doctrine for the 
force. According to Army officials, Doctrine 2015 encompasses all 
modularity initiatives, but the recent change to reorganize the 
brigades from two to three maneuver battalions will require further 
updates to the doctrine. As of August 2013, the Army published 15 Army 
Doctrine Publications, 15 Army Doctrine Reference Publications, and 11 
Field Manuals of Doctrine 2015. Additionally, the Army was developing 
35 Field Manuals, which lay out Army tactics and procedures; 
Our assessment: Addressed. 

Legislative requirements and GAO comments: (14) Does the report 
include comments of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the 
Chief of the Army Reserve on each of the preceding requirements? 
Comments: The report included comments received from both the Chief of 
the Army Reserve and the Director of the Army National Guard.[Footnote 
9] 
The comments, however, did not address all of the preceding 
requirements 
of the report. For example, while the Army Reserve identified 
shortfalls in key enabler personnel categories, it did not address 
risks or mitigation strategies. Although the report did not describe 
mitigation strategies associated with personnel shortfalls, according 
to Army Reserve officials, the Army Reserve mitigated shortfalls 
through recruitment of the individual ready reserves[Footnote 10]. 
Similarly, the Army National Guard identified that its equipment on 
hand is at 88 percent of authorized requirements, but did not comment 
on the shortfalls and the risks associated with the shortfalls. 
Although information was not included in the report, according to Army 
National Guard officials, the Army National Guard mitigates equipment 
shortfalls by receiving older equipment rather than newly developed 
and more modernized equipment; 
Our assessment: Addressed in part. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

By fully or partially addressing each of the legislative requirements, 
the Army's fiscal year 2013 report on its modular force improved on 
its fiscal year 2012 report, which we reported did not address all of 
the legislative requirements.[Footnote 11] In our review of the Army's 
fiscal year 2012 report, we reported that Army officials responsible 
for providing information on the modular force progress were not given 
sufficient guidance to ensure the completeness of its report. We 
recommended that the Army provide guidance on the level and type of 
detail needed for each office within the Army responsible for 
providing information on the Army's progress in meeting modularity 
requirements. In preparing the fiscal year 2013 report, the Army 
implemented our recommendation to provide guidance to Army officials 
to ensure the completeness of its report. The Director of the Army 
Staff sent a memorandum in March 2013 to Army staff that outlined the 
coordination process for preparing the fiscal year 2013 report, 
identifying each office responsible for providing information for the 
report. In addition, Army officials coordinating the report held 
meetings with each office early in the process to ensure they complied 
with the mandated language. Additionally, the Army provided the 
offices with a list of the key enabler items to report on rather than 
letting the offices interpret what to report. By implementing our 
recommendation, the Army's fiscal year 2013 modularity report 
generally met legislative requirements and provided congressional 
decision makers with additional information on the Army's progress in 
its modular force restructuring. 

Lessons Learned from Modular Restructuring Provide Opportunities in 
Future Restructuring: 

The Army has completed its transition to modular brigade combat team 
designs, but it has not addressed the key challenges of creating a 
results-oriented plan, creating realistic cost estimates, and planning 
comprehensive assessments that we identified in our work since 2005. 
In our prior reports between 2005 and 2008 on the Army's modular 
transformation, we made 20 recommendations intended to help the Army 
address these challenges. The Army generally agreed with 18 of those 
recommendations, but it has so far implemented only 3 of them. 
[Footnote 12] The Army has begun to create a results-oriented plan, but 
more work remains to create realistic cost estimates and plan 
comprehensive assessments. As the Army continues to make changes to 
the structure of its modular brigade combat team--including adding a 
maneuver battalion to the infantry and armored brigade combat teams--
it has the opportunity to incorporate lessons learned and reduce the 
risk of repeating mistakes from its recent experience in changing its 
force structure. 

Army Has Made Some Progress Creating a Results-Oriented Plan, 
Including Taking Initial Steps in Ongoing Restructuring: 

Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Creating a Results-Oriented 
Plan: 

In order to improve the Army's focus on the relationship between key 
enabler investments and results and the completeness of the 
information that the Army provides Congress, between 2005 and 2008 we 
made four recommendations regarding creating a results-oriented plan. 
Our recommendations were rooted in key practices that we have 
identified for assisting organizational transformations, suggesting 
agencies can be more results-oriented by focusing on a key set of 
principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation as well 
as setting implementation goals to show progress from the beginning of 
the transformation.[Footnote 13] Our recommendations to the Army 
included developing a plan to identify authorized and projected 
personnel and equipment levels as well as an assessment of the risks 
associated with any shortfalls. The Army generally agreed with three 
of the recommendations and ultimately implemented two of them. For 
example, the Army concurred with but did not implement our 2006 
recommendation to provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with 
details about the Army's equipping strategy; when we reiterated a 
similar recommendation in 2008, the Army implemented it by providing 
more detailed information on its progress in providing the modular 
force with key personnel and equipment enablers. For a full list of 
our past recommendations and their implementation status regarding 
creating a results-oriented plan for the Army's modular force 
transformation, see appendix II. 

GAO's Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Have Adequate Plans to 
Staff and Equip Modular Forces: 

Our work since 2005 found that the Army began its modular transition 
without creating a results-oriented plan with clear milestones to 
provide units with specially trained personnel and specialized 
equipment. In 2005 and 2006, we reported that the Army began its 
modular transformation without creating a staffing plan that 
considered the size and composition of the modular force. For example, 
in 2005 we testified that the Army had begun its modular 
transformation without deciding on the number of brigade combat teams 
or finalizing the design of supporting units.[Footnote 14] Without 
finalized designs or key decisions, the Army did not have a complete 
understanding of the personnel needed to achieve its goals. As a 
result, the Army could not assure decision makers when modular units 
would have the required key enabler staff in place to restore 
readiness, and it experienced cost growth and timeline slippage in its 
efforts to transform to a modular and more capable force. In 2006, we 
testified[Footnote 15] and reported[Footnote 16] that the Army did not 
plan to fill some key intelligence positions required by its new 
modular force structure. Without continued and significant progress in 
meeting personnel requirements, the Army had to accept increased risk 
in its ability to support its combat forces, and it ultimately sought 
support for an increase in overall personnel from the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and Congress. 

Additionally, in 2005 and 2006 we reported that the Army did not 
develop an equipping plan to provide modular units the required 
quantities of key enabler equipment considered critical for the 
transformation. For example, in 2005 we testified that although the 
Army had some of its key enabler equipment on hand at the start of its 
modular transformation, the amount of equipment provided to brigade 
combat teams was well below the levels tested by the Army Training and 
Doctrine Command.[Footnote 17] As a result, officials from two 
divisions that we visited expressed concern over their soldiers' 
ability to train and become proficient with some of this high-tech 
equipment because the equipment was not available in sufficient 
numbers. In 2006, we similarly testified that although active modular 
combat brigades were receiving considerable quantities of equipment, 
they initially lacked required quantities of items such as 
communications systems that were key for providing the enhanced 
intelligence, situational awareness, and network capabilities needed 
to help match the combat power of the Army's former brigade structure. 
[Footnote 18] At that time, the Army's modular combat brigade 
conversion schedule outpaced the planned acquisition or funding for 
some equipment requirements, and the Army had not defined specific 
equipping plans for brigades. By not completing development of its 
equipping strategy, the Secretary of Defense and Congress were not in 
a good position to assess the Army's equipment requirements and the 
level of risk associated with the Army's plans. 

Moreover, in 2008 we reported that although the Army had established 
over 80 percent of its modular units, it did not have a results-
oriented plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to staff 
and equip those new units.[Footnote 19] The Army extended its 
estimates of how long it would take to equip the modular force from 
2011 to 2019, but it provided few details about interim steps. While 
the Army projected that it would have enough personnel and equipment 
in the aggregate, its projections relied on uncertain assumptions 
related to meeting recruiting and retention goals as well as restoring 
equipment used in current operations. For example, the Army centered 
its equipping strategy on the Future Combat System, a longer-term 
transformation effort that comprised 14 integrated weapon systems and 
an advanced information network. The Army expected brigade combat 
teams equipped with the Future Combat System to provide significant 
warfighting capabilities to DOD's overall joint military operations. 
However, in 2009, after 6 years and an estimated $18 billion invested, 
DOD canceled the Future Combat System acquisition program and instead 
identified alternate plans to modernize equipment. The cancellation of 
the Future Combat System presented setbacks to the equipping of the 
modular force. Without a results-oriented plan for equipment and 
staffing with realistic milestones, the Army could not assure decision 
makers when modular units would have the required equipment and staff 
in place to restore readiness. 

Army Is Taking Initial Steps to Plan for Ongoing Restructuring: 

In 2013, when the Army announced plans to change its modular force 
designs and add a third battalion to most brigade combat teams, it 
incorporated some lessons we identified in our prior work and took 
some initial steps to create a results-oriented plan to guide 
implementation of the changes. The Army based decisions on which units 
to inactivate on quantitative and qualitative analyses and developed a 
timeline for the changes, with associated tasks and milestones. For 
example, as we reported in December 2013, the Army established a 
planning team for the brigade combat team reorganization to assess 
factors such as strategic considerations, military construction costs, 
and proximity to embarkation points, among others, and to develop 
stationing options for decision makers.[Footnote 20] Furthermore, the 
Army has developed a plan to reduce risk to the readiness of the force 
during this reorganization by providing equipment, personnel, and 
training resources to units currently deployed or deploying for 
operations or contingencies and then to seven brigade combat teams 
that will maintain a high level of readiness for 18 to 24 months. 
According to Army officials, these seven teams will remain at the 
highest level of readiness in order to support any planned or 
unexpected operations while the remaining brigade combat teams undergo 
their reorganizations and accept a risk of low readiness to respond to 
potential contingencies. 

Moreover, the Army Structure memorandum for 2015 through 2019 
documented interim steps in reorganizing the Army modular force 
structure.[Footnote 21] For example, the Army identified inactivation 
and reorganization dates as well as changes to the tables of equipment 
for the brigade combat teams. Additionally, once the Army identified 
which units would be inactivated or reorganized, officials developed 
an online tracking system that provides information such as when the 
reorganization and associated training will occur and what tasks each 
reorganized unit will have to complete. According to an Army official, 
senior leaders--including three-star generals and the Chief of Staff 
of the Army--reviewed the online system to track progress in 
implementing planned changes. However, the Army has not always been 
able to implement its plans to achieve its goals. For example, the 
Army was not able to fulfill plans for some key enabler equipment such 
as through its Future Combat System program that were deemed critical 
to achieving the combat effectiveness of the modular brigade combat 
teams. The Army could face risks in implementing current plans without 
sustaining attention and following through on its plans for changes to 
the modular force design. By creating a results-oriented plan for the 
inactivations and reorganizations, the Army has established a baseline 
against which to measure performance. If the Army follows through its 
initial steps to create a results-oriented plan for changes to the 
modular force design, it would help to provide senior officials and 
Congress the ability to identify and mitigate any potential problems 
that may arise. 

Army Did Not Develop Realistic Cost Estimates Associated with Its 
Modular Force Transformation, and Costs and Savings of Ongoing 
Restructuring Are Not Clear: 

Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Developing Realistic Cost 
Estimates: 

In order to improve information available to decision makers on the 
cost of the Army's plan for its modular force transformation, between 
2005 and 2008 we made 10 recommendations regarding creating a 
realistic cost estimate. In the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress specifically required 
the Army to report on a complete itemization of the amount of funds 
expended to date on the modular brigades and itemization of the 
requirements for the funding priorities.[Footnote 22] Our 
recommendations to the Army included submitting an annual cost plan 
that incorporated a clear definition of the costs the Army considered 
to be related to the modular transformation, estimates for equipment 
and personnel, and divergences from the plan as stated in the prior 
year's report, among others. The Army generally agreed with all the 
recommendations, but it did not implement any of them. For example, 
the Army did not develop a plan for overseeing the costs related to 
the Army's transformation to a modular force as we had recommended, 
stating that the administrative costs of such an effort would outweigh 
any benefit. For a full list of our past recommendations and their 
implementation status regarding creating realistic cost estimates for 
the Army's modular force transformation, see appendix II. 

GAO's Prior Work Found That Modularity Costs Increased Dramatically 
from Initial Estimates, but Were Never Clearly Reported: 

From 2005 through 2013, the Army did not create realistic cost 
estimates for implementing its modular force transformation. We 
reported in 2005 that the Army might not have estimated all potential 
costs for its modular force transformation because it had not made 
decisions related to force design, equipment, facilities, and 
personnel.[Footnote 23] We reported that the Army likely understated 
its estimates for equipment costs because it did not entirely reflect 
the cost of purchasing all the equipment needed to bring the planned 
units to the modular design--and therefore to the level of capability-
-that the Army validated in testing. In addition, Army officials were 
uncertain whether the personnel authorization was enough to support 
the modular transformation, putting costs at risk of increasing if the 
Army determined that the transformation required additional personnel. 
Additionally, the Army was uncertain of the costs of constructing 
permanent facilities because it did not incorporate proposals for base 
realignment and closure and restationing of personnel from overseas. 
As costs grew due to these uncertainties, the Army required additional 
funding or needed to accept reduced capabilities among some or all of 
its units. By not developing a better understanding of costs 
associated with the modular force and a clearer picture of the effect 
of resource decisions on the modular force capability, DOD was not 
well positioned to weigh competing priorities or to provide 
congressional decision makers the information they needed to evaluate 
funding requests. 

Additionally, in 2007 we reported that Army officials did not identify 
how much additional funding they needed to fully equip modular units 
but they planned to request funds for additional equipment needs 
through DOD's annual budget process.[Footnote 24] We noted that in the 
absence of a complete cost estimate, the Army would not be in a good 
position to identify detailed costs and provide transparency to 
Congress of its total funding needs. We also reported that the Army 
sought multiple sources of money without linking funding to its 
modular unit design requirements, thus complicating decision makers' 
ability to assess the Army's progress in fully equipping the modular 
force. In 2007, we reported that the Army estimated the modular 
restructuring could cost $52.5 billion--more than two-and-a-half times 
greater than its initial cost estimate of $20 billion in 2004. In 
2009, the Army reported to Congress that it could no longer itemize 
modular costs because all Army personnel and equipment budgets support 
the modular force. Without linking funding to requirements, decision 
makers would have difficulty assessing the Army's progress in meeting 
its goals, knowing what resources would be required to equip and staff 
modular units, and balancing funding requests for these initiatives 
with other competing priorities. 

Costs and Savings Associated with Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Clear: 

As the Army continues planning for changes to its modular force 
design, Army officials compiling the fiscal year 2013 report were not 
aware of any cost estimates developed for inactivating 12 brigade 
combat 
teams and adding a third battalion to the infantry and armored brigade 
combat teams. According to Army officials, the Army expects that the 
costs will be low because 9 of the 12 inactivations would involve 
reorganizations within the same installation, minimizing military 
construction and personnel relocation costs. However, the Army did not 
provide us with any detailed cost analysis. Further, the Army did not 
provide cost estimates for military construction and personnel 
relocation costs for those reorganizations occurring across 
installations or for associated doctrine development or training for 
the reorganized units. Without realistic cost estimates, the Army may 
encounter many of the same risks that we reported previously. 

The Army plans to reduce its budget by $170 billion between fiscal 
years 2013 and 2022, and the reorganization of the brigade combat 
teams and the associated reduction of 80,000 personnel should 
contribute to the cost savings. However, given two decades of GAO 
reports delineating DOD's overly optimistic planning assumptions in 
budget formulation, which often lead to costly program delays, we 
believe that not having a detailed cost analysis could lead to 
increases in the Army's incremental costs for its reorganization. 
Specifically, if costs grow due to uncertainties regarding equipment 
and personnel movement costs, the Army may require additional funding 
or need to accept reduced capabilities among some or all of its units. 
In the absence of a complete cost estimate, the Army may be unable to 
assure Congress that the Army has identified the total funding needs 
for reorganizing modular forces. We continue to believe that realistic 
cost estimates would enhance DOD decision makers' ability to weigh 
competing priorities in a fiscally constrained environment and provide 
Congress with the information needed to evaluate funding requests. 

Army Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Assessment Plan to Monitor 
Performance of Its Modular Force Transformation, and Assessments for 
Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Formalized: 

Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Planning Comprehensive 
Assessments: 

In order to assess the implications of changes to the Army force 
structure in terms of the goals of modular restructuring, from 2005 
through 2008 we made six recommendations regarding creating 
comprehensive assessment plans. Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government state that agencies should provide reasonable 
assurance to decision makers that their objectives are being achieved 
and that decision makers should have reliable data to determine 
whether they are meeting goals and using resources effectively and 
efficiently.[Footnote 25] Our recommendations to the Army included 
developing a comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress 
toward achieving the benefits of the modular transformation that 
incorporated quantifiable metrics and addressed a wide range of both 
traditional and irregular security challenges. The Army generally 
agreed with five of the recommendations but implemented only one. For 
example, the Army agreed with but did not implement our recommendation 
to develop a comprehensive assessment plan that includes steps to 
evaluate modular units in full-spectrum combat. However, the Army 
acted upon our recommendation by assessing aspects of the modular 
force and refining its modular designs based on lessons learned in the 
areas of equipment, doctrine, and training. For a full list of our 
past recommendations and their implementation status regarding 
completing a comprehensive assessment plan for the Army's modular 
force transformation, see appendix II. 

GAO's Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Provide Comprehensive 
Assessments of Modular Restructuring: 

Since 2004, the Army has made many refinements to its modular design 
based on lessons learned and limited assessments of specific 
capabilities, but it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan 
to measure the extent that its modular force transformation is meeting 
performance goals. In 2006, we reported that the Army did not have a 
comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against 
stated modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to 
modular designs, and monitor implementation plans.[Footnote 26] While 
DOD had identified the importance of establishing objectives that 
translate into measurable metrics that in turn provide accountability 
for results, the Army had not established outcome-related metrics 
linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, we reported that 
although the Army analyzed lessons learned from Iraq and training 
events, the Army did not have a long-term comprehensive plan for 
further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and 
fielded capabilities. As a result, decision makers did not have 
sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of 
the Army's modular force implementation plans. 

Moreover, in 2007 we reported that the Army was evaluating and 
applying lessons learned from its counterinsurgency operations. 
However, it did not have a comprehensive assessment plan to determine 
whether fielded modular unit designs met the Army's original goals for 
modular units across the full spectrum of low-and high-intensity 
warfare, and it did not have outcome-oriented metrics that helped to 
measure progress in achieving the goals of the modular force.[Footnote 
27] The Army evaluated the experiences of modular units deployed to 
Iraq and Afghanistan and had made some changes in unit designs based 
on these lessons; however, the Army did not develop a plan for 
assessing modular units in high-intensity combat operations. In 
seeking approval to establish modular units, the Army identified a 
number of planned benefits associated with them, such as providing the 
same or better combat effectiveness of the Army's division-based 
brigades. However, the Army limited its evaluations to the performance 
of modular units during predeployment exercises and counterinsurgency 
operations and did not evaluate their performance across the full 
spectrum of combat operations that include large-scale, high-intensity 
combat operations. As a result, the Army did not have a clear way to 
measure the extent to which new modular brigades were as effective as 
its division-based brigades for a range of missions. Without a 
comprehensive assessment plan that included a wider range of potential 
missions, the Army may have missed opportunities to strengthen its 
designs. 

Additionally, we reported in our 2008 report on Army modularity that 
the Army tested its units with the full complement of required 
equipment and personnel, and not at the somewhat lower level of 
personnel and equipment the Army actually provided to units. As a 
result, the Army assessment of whether the capabilities that it was 
fielding could perform mission requirements did not capture realistic 
missions and outcomes.[Footnote 28] Without an analysis of the 
capabilities of the modular force at realistic personnel and equipment 
levels, the Army was not in a position to assess whether the 
capabilities that it was fielding could perform mission requirements. 

Army Has Ongoing Steps for Planning Comprehensive Assessments: 

Faced with decreasing financial resources and increasing ambiguity 
regarding future missions, decision makers sought to determine how to 
organize combat formations to best position the Army for a range of 
possible missions. The Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis 
Center prepared an analysis in May 2012 to consider whether the Army 
should add a third maneuver battalion to the armored and infantry 
brigade combat team designs. To begin this analysis, the Army 
assembled 23 commanders of brigade combat teams to gather insights 
into the effectiveness of the both the two-and three-battalion designs 
across a wide range of possible future demands, such as major combat 
operations, low-threat activities, and enhanced protective posture. In 
doing so, the Army considered several factors we reported on in our 
prior work, including reviewing the full spectrum of low-and high-
intensity warfare and identifying assessment metrics such as security 
of vehicles. However, the analysis was not an assessment of the Army's 
prior performance under a two-battalion construct. Rather, the 
analysis was a projection of how to organize the Army for future 
demands and thus did not meet the intent of our past recommendations. 

The Army has developed some plans to conduct assessments and capture 
lessons learned as it changes its modular force design, but it has not 
formalized these plans with a detailed methodology, data-collection 
procedures, or outcome-based metrics. According to Army officials, the 
Army plans to conduct assessments and capture lessons learned during 
the reorganization of the brigade combat teams. The Army issued an 
execution order for the Army Training and Doctrine Command to conduct 
assessments for this reorganization. According to a senior official 
from the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Army plans to collect 
baseline metrics on the brigades both prior to and following their 
reorganization. Additionally, the Army has developed new mission-
essential task lists for the infantry, Stryker, and armored brigade 
combat teams on which to base assessments. When the brigade combat 
teams participate in training exercises in their new organizational 
designs, assessors will evaluate how well the teams achieve their 
mission-essential tasks. The assessors can then adjust the training if 
the brigade combat teams are having difficulties understanding the new 
tasks. However, the Army officials stated that there is no checklist 
or detailed plan on how to conduct these assessments or what outputs 
to measure. Moreover, according to Army officials, the assessments are 
dependent upon receiving sufficient funding and potentially may not 
occur. If the Army created a comprehensive assessment plan, it could 
help enable the Army to clearly measure the extent to which it is 
achieving desired benefits in the design of its modular force. 

Agency Comments: 

We are not making new recommendations in this report. However, this 
report's analysis provides additional support for past recommendations 
to develop realistic cost estimates and to create a comprehensive 
assessment plan to measure achievement of desired benefits. We 
provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. Army officials 
provided oral comments on the draft indicating that DOD concurred with 
our report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army. 
The report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent that the Army addressed legislative 
requirements to report information regarding key equipment and 
personnel needs for its reorganized modular force, three analysts 
independently reviewed the Army's fiscal year 2013 modularity report 
and compared the report to the legislative requirements. A fourth 
analyst adjudicated the differences in cases of dispute and determined 
a final categorization. The analysts used an evaluation tool that 
listed the legislative requirements and categorized the extent to 
which the Army's report included information required for each 
reporting element from the mandate. The categories were "Addressed," 
"Addressed in part," and "Not addressed." "Addressed" meant the report 
thoroughly addressed all components of the requirement. "Addressed in 
part" meant that one or more, but not all, components of the 
requirement were addressed, or that all components of the requirement 
were addressed, but the information provided was insufficient to 
answer the requirement fully due to limitations in the data or 
information provided. "Not addressed" meant that the report did not 
address any part of the requirement. To gain a full understanding of 
the method and data the Army used to prepare the report, clarify the 
significance of the information presented in the report, and obtain 
additional information that addressed the legislative reporting 
requirements, we met with Army officials knowledgeable about compiling 
information for the report, about key enabler personnel and equipment, 
and about equipment reset, doctrine, and force structure changes. 
Specifically we met with Army officials from the Offices of the Deputy 
Chiefs of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Logistics (G-4), Operations and 
Plans (G-3/5/7), and Programs (G-8); Training and Doctrine Command; 
Army National Guard; and Army Reserve who provided data for the Army's 
fiscal year 2013 modularity report. To gain a full understanding of 
the data the Army used to prepare the report, analysts reviewed 
documents the Army used to compile the report, including a Director of 
the Army Staff memorandum, the list of key enabler personnel and 
equipment required to be included in the report, and the Army 
Equipment Reset Update. To gain a full understanding of the progress 
made in fulfilling modularity requirements in the fiscal year 2013 
report, we reviewed the fiscal year 2012 report to determine the 
extent of progress made between fiscal years 2012 and 2013. After the 
initial interview, document review, and completion of the evaluation 
tool and adjudication of the differences, the analysts determined that 
of the 14 legislative requirements, 9 were addressed and 5 were 
addressed in part. Analysts conducted a follow-up interview regarding 
the five legislative requirements that were addressed in part to 
obtain additional information or documentation on why the elements 
were not fully addressed. 

To identify challenges in the Army's modular force restructuring over 
the past 10 years, we reviewed prior GAO reports evaluating the Army 
force structure. We also reviewed prior GAO reports evaluating 
technology and equipment related to the Army's modular restructuring 
to identify challenges. From our review of prior reports, we 
identified three main challenges the Army faced during its modular 
force restructuring. To determine how the Army is addressing these 
challenges, we reviewed whether the Army implemented the 
recommendations in our prior GAO reports that evaluated the Army's 
modular force structure. To determine whether the Army plans in its 
modular force structure reorganization to address challenges 
previously identified in our reports, we reviewed Army documents and 
interviewed Army officials. We reviewed documents including the 
Brigade Combat Team inactivation execution order, Army Structure 
Memorandum for fiscal years 2014 to 2019, Army of 2020 Analysis 
Supporting the Brigade Combat Team Design Decision, and the Army 
Campaign Plan portal, which the Army uses to track the reorganization. 
We met with officials knowledgeable about the changes to the brigade 
combat team designs to gain a full understanding of the plans the Army 
is developing to execute the changes. We also spoke with an official 
from the Army Training and Doctrine Command to learn about the Army's 
plans to conduct comprehensive assessments of its modular force 
reorganization. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to April 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Status of GAO Recommendations from Army Modularity 
Reviews: 

This appendix presents a list of (1) the 20 recommendations that we 
had previously made regarding the Army's modular force transformation, 
(2) the Department of Defense (DOD) response to those recommendations, 
and (3) our analysis of whether the Army has addressed the issues that 
gave rise to the recommendations. From 2005 to 2008, we made 20 
recommendations regarding the Army's modular force transformation in 
the following four reports: 

* Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight 
of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-926]. Washington, D.C.: September 
29, 2005. (Referred to below as September 2005 recommendations). 

* Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More 
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation 
Plans. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-745]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. (Referred to below as September 
2006 recommendations). 

* Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee 
the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve 
Accountability for Results. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145]. Washington, D.C.: December 
14, 2007. (Referred to below as December 2007 recommendations). 

* Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and 
Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 14, 2008. (Referred to below as November 2008 
recommendations). 

We tracked the recommendations for 4 years following each report's 
publication and closed each one as either implemented or not 
implemented. We grouped our recommendations by the types of issues and 
challenges on which the recommendations focused: (1) creating a 
results-oriented plan, (2) developing realistic cost estimates, and 
(3) planning comprehensive assessments. The appendix lists the 
recommendations by these three key challenges. 

Table 2: GAO Recommendations Regarding Creating a Results-Oriented 
Plan for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the Status of 
Each Recommendation: 

Recommendation date: September 2006; 
Recommendation: In order for decision makers to have the visibility 
needed to assess the Army's ability to meet the personnel requirements 
for its new modular operational forces while simultaneously managing 
the risk to its noncombat forces, the Army should develop and provide 
the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the status of 
its personnel initiatives, including executable milestones for 
realigning and reducing its noncombat forces, and an assessment of how 
the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force while 
managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force structure; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The decision to expand the size of the Army by 74,400 
soldiers from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013 changed the 
condition we originally reported. At the time of our September 2006 
report, the Army was attempting to reduce its end strength back to a 
482,400 level from approximately 512,400, and we expected the Army 
would face significant challenges in executing its plans. Since the 
Army's increased end strength level changed the condition we 
originally reported, this recommendation no longer applied. 

Recommendation date: September 2006; 
Recommendation: In order for decision makers to better assess the 
Army's strategy for equipping modular combat brigades, the Secretary 
of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and 
provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about the 
Army's equipping strategy, to include the types and quantities of 
equipment active component and National Guard modular units would 
receive in each phase of the force rotation model, including how these 
amounts compare to design requirements for modular units, and an 
assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping 
strategy; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army stated that it considered this information as part 
of its biannual equipping conference. However, the Army did not 
provide information to the Secretary of Defense and Congress that 
included the level of detail in our recommendation. 

Recommendation date: November 2008; 
Recommendation: To enhance the Army's efforts to comprehensively 
assess modular designs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Secretary of the Army to develop a plan, including timelines, for 
completing doctrine for modular support forces; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--implemented; 
Comments: The Army completed several initiatives and studies to 
examine the modular force. According to its reports to Congress, the 
results of assessments of modular force capabilities, including 
lessons learned from existing modular units, led to modifications to 
modular designs, equipment, doctrine, and training. 

Recommendation date: November 2008; 
Recommendation: To improve the Army's focus on the relationship 
between investments and results and the completeness of the 
information that the Army provides Congress, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and report to 
Congress a results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on 
the Army's progress in providing the modular force with key equipment 
and personnel enablers. The plan should show actual status and planned 
milestones through 2019 for each type of key equipment and personnel, 
including (1) goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the 
end of each fiscal year; (2) projected on-hand equipment and personnel 
levels at the end of each fiscal year, including planned annual 
investments and quantities of equipment expected to be procured or 
repaired as well as key assumptions underlying the Army's plans; 
and (3) an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army 
requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls; 
DOD response: Nonconcur; 
Status: Closed--implemented; 
Comments: Even though the Army nonconcurred, it included information 
about its progress in equipping the modular force in its 2011 and 2012 
reports to Congress as required by section 323 of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, as amended by 
section 332 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: GAO Recommendations Regarding Creating Realistic Cost 
Estimates for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the Status 
of Each Recommendation: 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To facilitate his oversight of the program and 
collecting the data for Congress mentioned above, the Secretary of 
Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army in coordination with 
the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) to develop a plan for 
overseeing the costs related to the Army's transformation to a modular 
force. This plan should include an approach for tracking modular 
transformation costs that clearly identifies obligations for the 
modular force; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not establish an encompassing framework that 
would group Army projects together under the heading of modularity. 
The Army commented that the administrative costs of such an effort 
would outweigh any benefit. 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To improve information available to decision makers on 
the cost of the Army's plan for modularity, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a detailed 
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress 
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of 
modularity as designed and tested. Such a plan should be prepared 
annually and submitted as part of justification material supporting 
DOD's budget request, until the modular force is fully implemented. It 
should include divergences from the plan as stated in the prior year's 
report, and contributing factors; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army reported to Congress in 2006, 2007, and 2008 on the 
status of its modularity initiative. The reports discussed funding 
challenges, equipment requirements, and program-management oversight 
practices, but they did not address divergences from the plan as 
stated in the prior year's report and contributing factors. 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To improve information available to decision makers on 
the cost of the Army's plan for modularity, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a detailed 
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress 
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of 
modularity as designed and tested. Such a plan should be prepared 
annually and submitted as part of justification material supporting 
DOD's budget request, until the modular force is fully implemented. It 
should include a report on obligations related to the modular force 
made the previous fiscal year; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army stated it provided some information on the status 
of its modularity initiative in its budgets since 2006. However, the 
Army did not include information on obligations related to the modular 
force from the previous year. 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To improve information available to decision makers on 
the cost of the Army's plan for modularity, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a detailed 
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress 
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of 
modularity as designed and tested. Such a plan should be prepared 
annually and submitted as part of justification material supporting 
DOD's budget request, until the modular force is fully implemented. It 
should include identification of uncertainties in the plan due to 
pending force structure design decisions or other decisions that may 
affect costs, and updates to the plan as these decisions are made; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army reported to Congress in 2006, 2007, and 2008 on the 
status of its modularity initiative. The reports discussed funding 
challenges, equipment requirements, and program-management oversight 
practices, but they did not identify uncertainties in the plans due to 
pending force structure design decisions or other decisions that could 
affect costs. 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To improve information available to decision makers on 
the cost of the Army's plan for modularity, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a detailed 
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress 
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of 
modularity as designed and tested. Such a plan should be prepared 
annually and submitted as part of justification material supporting 
DOD's budget request, until the modular force is fully implemented. It 
should include estimates for equipment, facilities and personnel; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army reported to Congress in 2006, 2007, and 2008 on the 
status of its modularity initiative. The reports discussed funding 
challenges, equipment requirements, and program management oversight 
practices, but they did not provide estimates for equipment, 
facilities, and personnel. 

Recommendation date: September 2005; 
Recommendation: To improve information available to decision makers on 
the cost of the Army's plan for modularity, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress a detailed 
plan estimating the costs of modularity sufficient to provide Congress 
reasonable assurance that estimated costs reflect total costs of 
modularity as designed and tested. Such a plan should be prepared 
annually and submitted as part of justification material supporting 
DOD's budget request, until the modular force is fully implemented. It 
should include a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does 
not consider to be related to the modular transformation; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army reported to Congress in 2006, 2007, and 2008 on the 
status of its modularity initiative. The reports discussed funding 
challenges, equipment requirements, and program management oversight 
practices, but they did not provide a clear definition of the total 
costs for modularity as designed and tested. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To improve management controls, enhance transparency, 
and reduce the risk associated with the Army modularity and force 
expansion initiatives' costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct 
the Secretary of the Army to include exhibits with the annual budget 
submissions to show how the budget requests help meet the equipment 
and personnel requirements of the Army's modular units and help 
identify what remains to be funded in future years; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not report in detail how its budget requests 
met the equipment and personnel requirements as they related 
specifically to modular units. The Army stated that modularity became 
the Army's design, and all personnel and equipment requirements and 
budgets supported the modular force. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To improve management controls, enhance transparency, 
and reduce the risk associated with the Army modularity and force 
expansion initiatives' costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the Director, 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the DOD Comptroller, and in 
keeping with the overall priorities of the department and current and 
expected resource levels, to replace the Army's existing Office of the 
Secretary of Defense-approved funding plan for modularity that ends in 
fiscal year 2011, with a new approved Office of the Secretary of 
Defense funding plan that fully considers the Army's requirements for 
a modular force and is consistent with the Army's extended time frames 
to fully staff and equip the modular force. This plan should also be 
reported to Congress; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not develop a comprehensive strategy and 
funding plan that identified equipment and personnel requirements 
based on the modular designs, identified total funding, and included 
management controls. According to the Army, it completed the 
transition to modularity and its equipping and personnel strategies 
represented the Army in its modular structure. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To improve management controls, enhance transparency, 
and reduce the risk associated with the Army modularity and force 
expansion initiatives' costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with support from the Director, 
Program Analysis and Evaluation, to review and assess whether the 
Army's strategy and funding plan clearly identifies and links 
requirements, progress to date, and additional funding requirements; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, performed 
assessments of the Army's personnel and equipping plans as part of the 
budget development for Program Objectives Memorandum. However, the 
linkage between requirements, progress toward goals, and additional 
funding needed was not clear. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To improve management controls, enhance transparency, 
and reduce the risk associated with the Army modularity and force 
expansion initiatives' costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct 
the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive strategy and 
funding plan that identifies requirements for equipment and personnel 
based on modular unit designs, identifies total funding needs, and 
includes management controls for measuring progress in staffing and 
equipping units. Also, direct the Secretary of the Army to report its 
estimates to Congress; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not develop the transition plan recommended. 
According to the Army, the transition to the modular force was 
complete, and department personnel and equipping strategies and 
budgets represented plans for the modular force. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: GAO Recommendations Regarding Completing a Comprehensive 
Assessment Plan for the Army's Modular Force Transformation, and the 
Status of Each Recommendation: 

Recommendation date: September 2006; 
Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should provide a testing 
plan as part of its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for 
conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is 
being implemented so that decision makers--both inside and outside the 
Army--can assess the implications of changes to the Army force 
structure in terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The results 
of these assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the 
Army's justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011; 
DOD response: Nonconcur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not provide a testing plan as part of the 
Army's Campaign Plan. According to the Army, it had thoroughly 
evaluated modular force designs both in training and combat operations. 

Recommendation date: September 2006; 
Recommendation: To improve information available for decision makers 
on progress of the Army's modular force implementation plans, the Army 
should develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with 
a comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress toward 
achieving the benefits of modularity to include specific, quantifiable 
performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting the goals and 
objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan, and plans and 
milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit designs 
that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient 
capabilities needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and 2006 
QDR objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and 
irregular security challenges; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army did not establish performance metrics to measure 
progress toward meeting the goals and objectives established in the 
Army Campaign Plan. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To enhance the rigorousness of the Army's efforts to 
assess modular designs, the Secretary of Defense should oversee the 
Army's assessment program; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Army assessed elements of its modular designs, but it 
did not develop a comprehensive assessment plan that included steps to 
evaluate modular units in full-spectrum combat. 

Recommendation date: December 2007; 
Recommendation: To enhance the rigorousness of the Army's efforts to 
assess modular designs, the Secretary of Defense should require the 
Army to develop a comprehensive assessment plan that includes steps to 
evaluate modular units in full spectrum combat; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: The Office of the Secretary of Defense did not require the 
Army to develop a comprehensive assessment plan as recommended. 
Rather, the department commented that current practices accomplished 
the intent of the recommendation. 

Recommendation date: November 2008; 
Recommendation: To enhance the Army's efforts to comprehensively 
assess modular designs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Secretary of the Army to assess the capabilities of the modular force 
based on the amount and type of authorized equipment and personnel to 
identify capability shortfalls between authorized and design levels 
and take steps to revise authorized levels where appropriate; 
DOD response: Partially concur; 
Status: Closed--implemented; 
Comments: In the Army's fiscal year 2012 report to Congress on its 
modular force, the Army cited lessons learned that precipitated 
modularity changes in the areas of equipment, doctrine, and training 
related to modular force capabilities. In addition, it reported 
ongoing efforts to support the development of modular forces, 
including leveraging all available resources, new production, reset, 
and equipment redistribution to meet deployed and deploying unit 
requirements and achieve a fully equipped force. Although the Army did 
not complete a review at the time of our report, the Army continued to 
refine the modular brigades' organizational design and equipment needs 
to identify shortfalls and mitigate risks, addressing the intent of 
the recommendation. 

Recommendation date: November 2008; 
Recommendation: To enhance the Army's efforts to comprehensively 
assess modular designs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Secretary of the Army to establish an organizational focal point to 
ensure that integrated assessments of modular support units' designs 
are performed across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities domains; 
DOD response: Concur; 
Status: Closed--not implemented; 
Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation indicating that the 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army was the focal point for all Army 
organization, integration, decision making, and execution of the 
spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force 
development and integration, force structuring, combat development, 
training development, resourcing, and prioritization. However, our 
recommendation was not directed toward the responsibilities of senior 
Army leadership. Rather, our recommendation focused more narrowly on 
the need to address the lack of integrated assessments for support 
units. The Army did not take the recommended action. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan (Assistant 
Director), Alice Paszel, Richard Powelson, Kelly Rubin, Jodie Sandel, 
Amie Steele, and Sabrina Streagle made significant contributions to 
this report. 

[End of table] 

Related GAO Products: 

Force Structure: Army's Annual Report on Modularity Progress Needs 
More Complete and Clear Information to Aid Decision Makers. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-183R]. Washington, 
D.C.: January 16, 2013. 

Force Structure: Assessment of Army Report on Fiscal Year 2011 
Progress in Modular Restructuring. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-527R]. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 
2012. 

Force Structure: Assessment of Army Progress in Modular Restructuring, 
Prepositioned Equipment, and Equipment Reset. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-507R]. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 
2010. 

Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and 
Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 14, 2008. 

Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost 
Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-669T]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 10, 2008. 

Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the 
Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve 
Accountability for Results. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145]. Washington, D.C.: December 
14, 2007. 

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More 
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation 
Plans. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-745]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain 
Uncertain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-548T]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-926]. Washington, D.C.: September 
29, 2005. 

Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement 
and Fund Modular Forces. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-443T]. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 
2005. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Brigade combat teams outside of the continental United States in 
Hawaii, Alaska, and Italy will not receive a third maneuver battalion. 
Also, Stryker brigade combat teams already have a third maneuver 
battalion and will not receive an additional battalion. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323 (2006). 

[3] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 332 (2011). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 332. 

[5] Section 323(c) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 as amended by Section 332 of the Ike Skelton 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. 

[6] Although according to Army officials battle losses may be 
unpredictable and affect their ability to prioritize equipment for 
reset, Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy, 
describes how the Army is to prioritize maintenance and repairs. We 
previously reported that, in 2010, the Army took steps to synchronize 
national depot-level reset efforts and, in 2011, the Army issued a 
priority list for the reset of equipment. For additional information, 
see GAO, Warfighter Support: Army Has Taken Steps to Improve Reset 
Process, but More Complete Reporting of Equipment and Future Costs Is 
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-133] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012). 

[7] The legislation defines “key enabler” as follows: The term ‘key 
enabler', in the case of equipment or personnel, means equipment or 
personnel, as the case may be, that make a modular force or unit as 
capable or more capable than the non-modular force or unit it replaced, 
including the following: (A) Equipment such as tactical and high 
frequency radio, tactical wheeled vehicles, battle command systems, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, all-source analysis systems, analysis and 
control elements, fire support sensor systems, firefinder radar, joint 
network nodes, long-range advanced scout surveillance systems, Trojan 
Spirit systems (or any successor system), and any other equipment 
items identified by the Army as making a modular force or unit as 
capable or more capable than the non-modular force or unit it replaced 
and (B) Personnel in specialties needed to operate or support the 
equipment specified in above and personnel in specialties relating to 
civil affairs, communication and information systems operation, 
explosive ordinance disposal, military intelligence, psychological 
operations, and any other personnel specialties identified by the 
Army as making a modular force or unit as capable or more capable 
than the nonmodular force or unit it replaced. 

[8] In general, we track recommendations for 4 years following a 
report's publication. From 2005 to 2008, we made 20 recommendations 
regarding the Army's modular force structure. We tracked each 
recommendation for 4 years and closed them as either implemented or 
not implemented. The Army concurred with 9 recommendations, partially 
concurred with 9 recommendations, and nonconcurred with 2 
recommendations. 

[9] Army officials told us that they included the comments of the 
Director of the Army National Guard rather than the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau because the National Guard Bureau is a 
coordinating organization that includes both the Army National 
Guard and the Air National Guard, while the Army National Guard 
has the responsibility of training and equipping Army National 
Guard Forces. 

[10] The Individual Ready Reserve is a subcategory of the Ready 
Reserve of the Army Reserve. Members of the Individual Ready 
Reserve include individuals who were previously trained during 
periods of active service, but have not completed their service 
obligations; individuals who have completed their service 
obligation and voluntarily retain their reserve status; and 
personnel who have not completed basic training. Most of these
members are not assigned to organized units, do not attend 
weekend or annual training, and do not receive pay unless they 
are called to active duty. 

[11] GAO, Force Structure: Army's Annual Report on Modularity Progress 
Needs More Complete and Clear Information to Aid Decision Makers, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-183R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 16, 2013). 

[12] In general, we track recommendations for 4 years following a 
report's publication. From 2005 to 2008, we made 20 recommendations 
regarding the Army's modular force structure. We tracked each 
recommendation for 4 years and closed them as either implemented or 
not implemented. The Army concurred with 9 recommendations, partially
concurred with 9 recommendations, and nonconcurred with 2 
recommendations. 

[13] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003). 

[14] GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to 
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-443T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 
2005). 

[15] GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force 
Remain Uncertain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-548T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006). 

[16] GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More 
Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation 
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-745] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-443T]. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-548T]. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]. 

[20] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Army Brigade Combat Team 
Inactivations Informed by Analyses, but Actions Needed to Improve 
Stationing Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-76] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2013). 

[21] Army Director of Force Management, Army Structure (ARSTRUC) 
Memorandum 15-19, Version 1301 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2013) and 
Addendum 1 to Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum 15-19, Version 1403 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2013). 

[22] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(c). 

[23] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and 
Oversight of Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-926] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 29, 2005). 

[24] GAO, Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to 
Oversee the Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve 
Accountability for Results, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 
2007). 

[25] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-745]. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145]. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]. 

[End of section] 

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Washington, DC 20548. 

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