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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: 

February 2014: 

Student and Exchange Visitor Program: 

DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students 
with Employment Authorization: 

GAO-14-356: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-356, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million 
foreign students in the United States were approved to participate in 
OPT—an employment benefit that allows foreign students to obtain 
temporary work in their areas of study during and after completing an 
academic program. ICE is responsible for certifying schools; 
monitoring foreign students and schools, including their compliance 
with OPT requirements; and enforcing immigration laws for those that 
fail to comply. 

GAO was asked to review the management of OPT. This report examines 
the extent to which DHS has (1) identified and assessed risks 
associated with OPT, and (2) collected information and developed 
monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with OPT 
requirements and maintain their legal status. GAO analyzed ICE 
regulations and policies and data on schools that recommend and 
foreign students approved for OPT, as of August 2013. GAO interviewed 
ICE and USCIS officials, including those from 7 of 26 ICE field 
offices selected based on factors such as OPT-related fraud 
investigations. Interview results cannot be generalized, but they 
provided insights about OPT risks. 

What GAO Found: 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has not identified or assessed 
fraud or noncompliance risks posed by schools that recommend and 
foreign students approved for optional practical training (OPT), in 
accordance with DHS risk management guidance. ICE's Student and 
Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) officials consider OPT to be a low-
risk employment benefit for foreign students because, in part, they 
believe foreign students approved for OPT do not have an incentive to 
jeopardize their legal status in the United States. However, SEVP has 
not determined potential risks in OPT. Further, officials from the 
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), ICE's 
investigative unit, and ICE field agents GAO interviewed have 
identified potential risks involving OPT based on prior and ongoing 
investigations. For example, ICE field agents identified cases where 
school officials recommended OPT for foreign students to work outside 
of their major areas of study, which is not allowed under ICE 
regulations. In response to a June 2012 GAO recommendation, ICE has 
taken initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools 
but has not identified and assessed OPT risks or determined the extent 
to which potential OPT risks will be part of its efforts to assess 
risks SEVP-wide. Further, SEVP has not coordinated with CTCEU, 
including obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field 
offices regarding OPT risks, as part of its efforts. Identifying and 
assessing OPT risks, in coordination with CTCEU, could better position 
SEVP to manage risks in OPT. 

ICE has not consistently collected the information and developed the 
monitoring mechanisms needed to help ensure foreign students comply 
with OPT requirements, thereby maintaining their legal status in the 
United States. Foreign students can participate in OPT while attending 
classes and after graduation for up to 12 months; students studying in 
science, technology, engineering, or mathematics fields may be 
eligible for an additional 17 months (29 months total). However, ICE 
does not have complete information on which foreign students approved 
for OPT are actively working and whether employment is related to 
their studies, per ICE regulations. For example, GAO's analysis of ICE 
data on students engaged in all types of OPT indicates that 38 percent 
(48,642 of 126,796) of student records do not contain an employer's 
name. Furthermore, the data do not include the date on which students 
granted authorization began working. ICE does not require that 
students and school officials report this information. Without these 
data, ICE cannot determine whether students with employment 
authorization are working in jobs related to their studies and not 
exceeding regulatory limits on unemployment. Collecting and monitoring 
complete information on foreign students approved for OPT would better 
position ICE to determine whether these students are maintaining legal 
status in the United States. 

This is a public version of a For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement 
Sensitive report that GAO issued in January 2014. Information DHS 
deemed sensitive has been redacted. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that ICE, among other things, identify and assess OPT-
related risks and require additional employment information from 
students and schools. DHS concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-356]. For more 
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or 
gamblerr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

ICE Has Not Identified or Assessed Risks in OPT: 

ICE Cannot Fully Ensure Foreign Students Working under Optional 
Practical Training Are Maintaining Their Legal Status in the United 
States: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Requirements for the Three Types of Optional Practical 
Training (OPT): 

Table 2: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) Receipts 
of Employment Authorization Applications for Optional Practical 
Training and Adjudication Results, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013: 

Table 3: Employer Name in Student Records by Type of Optional 
Practical Training (OPT), as of August 2013: 

Table 4: Student Records for Optional Practical Training (OPT) 
Students Containing Information in Employment Comment and Remark 
Fields, as of August 2013: 

Table 5: Student Records for Optional Practical Training (OPT) 
Students' Dates of Educational Program and Employment, as of August 
2013: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Approval Process for a Foreign Student Seeking to 
Participate in Optional Practical Training (OPT): 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CLAIMS: Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3: 

CTCEU: Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DSO: designated school official: 

HSI: Homeland Security Investigations: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

OPT: optional practical training: 

SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System: 

SEVP: Student and Exchange Visitor Program: 

STEM: science, technology, engineering, and mathematics: 

USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 27, 2014: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Senator Grassley: 

As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million 
foreign students in the United States (or about 10 percent) were 
approved to participate in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 
optional practical training (OPT). OPT is an employment benefit that 
allows foreign students to seek temporary work during and after 
completing an academic program to gain practical experience in their 
major areas of study. The February 1993 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center, which involved foreign students, drew attention to the 
need to improve the monitoring of foreign students by, among other 
things, moving from a manual paper-based foreign student tracking and 
monitoring system to a computer-based system. Subsequently, the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as the April 2013 terrorist 
attack on the Boston Marathon, drew renewed attention to the need to 
further enhance the monitoring of foreign students. According to DHS 
officials, those foreign students who remain in the United States 
after completing their program of study by working under OPT can pose 
risks. Thus, proper monitoring is important to ensure that, for 
example, foreign students who complete an academic program and any 
authorized OPT leave the United States as required or take steps to 
legally extend their stay in the country to avoid becoming overstays. 
[Footnote 1] 

Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), through 
its Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), is responsible for 
certifying schools to enroll foreign students and managing the 
participation of certified schools in the program and nonimmigrant 
foreign students in the F and M visa classifications.[Footnote 2] SEVP 
oversees F and M student policy, including OPT requirements, and 
monitors F and M student status.[Footnote 3] According to SEVP's 
strategic plan framework, SEVP's two primary objectives are to (1) 
prevent terrorist exploitation of legitimate student entry paths into 
the United States, and (2) facilitate legitimate flows of people and 
commerce.[Footnote 4] Specifically, according to the plan, SEVP is to 
deny terrorists acceptance into the U.S. academic system, monitor 
accepted students and certified schools to identify those that fall 
out of compliance with immigration laws, and enforce immigration laws 
for those that fail to comply. Also, SEVP manages the Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which assists in tracking 
and monitoring certified schools and foreign students. 

Working with SEVP, designated school officials (DSO) are responsible 
for entering and maintaining foreign students' information in SEVIS, 
such as information on students' courses of study.[Footnote 5] DSOs 
are also responsible for recommending eligible foreign students for 
OPT to DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which 
adjudicates foreign students' applications for employment 
authorization. Once a foreign student receives approval from USCIS for 
temporary employment under OPT, the student can start working on the 
approved starting date. ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal 
Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), as the investigative component of ICE, is 
responsible for, among other things, combating the criminal 
exploitation of the foreign student visa system, including conducting 
criminal investigations of school and foreign student fraud, such as 
OPT fraud. Further, CTCEU is responsible for locating and apprehending 
F and M students who have violated their immigration status, including 
those who have done so by failing to comply with OPT requirements. 
CTCEU gathers and analyzes leads on nonimmigrants in the United States 
to identify potential national security or criminal threats and ensure 
compliance with immigration laws. 

In April 2011, we reported that some schools had attempted to exploit 
the immigration system by knowingly reporting that foreign students 
were fulfilling their visa requirements, such as attending school full-
time, when they were not attending school or attending intermittently. 
[Footnote 6] In June 2012, we reported on ICE's efforts to assess 
risks of fraud and noncompliance in SEVP and oversee schools that are 
certified to accept foreign students.[Footnote 7] Specifically, we 
reported that ICE had not developed a process to identify and analyze 
risks across SEVP-certified schools, in accordance with internal 
control standards and risk management guidance. We reported that 
officials from SEVP and CTCEU had expressed concerns about the fraud 
risks posed by schools that do not comply with requirements. However, 
we found that SEVP did not have processes to identify and analyze 
program risks, including (1) evaluating prior and suspected cases of 
school noncompliance and fraud, and (2) obtaining and assessing 
information from CTCEU and ICE field offices on school investigations 
and outreach. In addition, we found that ICE had not consistently 
implemented existing controls, in accordance with federal internal 
control standards and fraud prevention practices, to verify schools' 
legitimacy and eligibility during initial SEVP certification and once 
schools began accepting foreign students. Further, we found that ICE 
did not maintain records to document SEVP-certified schools' ongoing 
compliance with regulatory requirements and that school case files 
were incomplete or missing. On the basis of these findings, we 
recommended that ICE develop and implement a process to identify and 
assess risks in SEVP, consistently implement procedures for ensuring 
schools' eligibility, and establish a process to identify and address 
all missing school case files, among other things. DHS concurred with 
these recommendations and, as of December 2013, has taken steps to 
address them. For example, SEVP has taken initial steps to develop 
preliminary risk indicators for certified schools and recover 
documentation that had been missing from school case files. 

You asked us to review DHS's management of OPT, including whether DHS 
considers risk information in monitoring those schools that recommend 
foreign students, and foreign students approved, for this employment 
benefit. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) 
identified and assessed risks associated with OPT, and (2) collected 
information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure 
students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status 
in the United States. 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you. DHS deemed some of the information in the prior 
report as For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must 
be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits 
sensitive information on risk indicators related to OPT, specific 
details on types of foreign student information maintained and shared 
in DHS databases, and specific information on actions DHS could take 
related to foreign students' school transfers. Although the 
information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it 
addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the 
overall methodology used for both reports is the same. 

To evaluate the extent to which DHS has identified and assessed risks 
associated with OPT, we analyzed documentation such as ICE's 
compliance and watch lists that contain schools that SEVP has 
identified as potentially noncompliant or fraudulent. Also, we 
analyzed ICE news bulletins from January 2008 to November 2013 to help 
determine the magnitude of previous cases of fraud and evaluated 
information provided by CTCEU on criminal investigations related to 
school or student noncompliance or fraud involving OPT. In addition, 
we analyzed documentation CTCEU officials provided regarding risks and 
vulnerabilities they have identified in OPT-related policies, 
procedures, and regulations during the course of their work. Moreover, 
we analyzed SEVIS data on schools that had at least one foreign 
student approved for OPT, as of August 2013, to identify examples of 
schools that pose a potential risk for fraud or noncompliance 
involving OPT using a risk indicator identified by CTCEU. Further, we 
compared DHS's risk management practices related to OPT against DHS's 
Policy for Integrated Risk Management and Risk Management 
Fundamentals.[Footnote 8] 

To determine the extent to which DHS has collected information and 
developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with 
OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States, 
we analyzed the processes ICE uses to collect information on where and 
when students are working and to monitor schools' and students' 
compliance with specific requirements for maintenance of their student 
visa status. We also assessed the implementation of SEVP's management 
and oversight controls against criteria in Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government as they relate to, among other 
things, compliance with applicable laws and regulations.[Footnote 9] 
Using the SEVIS data on foreign students approved for OPT as of August 
2013, we analyzed the extent to which foreign student records 
contained employer information, included information on whether 
employment was related to the major area of study, and indicated the 
amount of OPT authorized. 

To assess the reliability of the SEVIS data on foreign students 
approved for OPT that we analyzed for both objectives, we (1) reviewed 
existing documentation on the controls in the system and the policies 
for ensuring data reliability, and (2) interviewed agency officials 
responsible for managing the data about the data's sources, the 
system's controls, and any quality assurance steps performed after 
data are entered into the system. We identified several limitations to 
the data, which we discuss later in the report. While we identified 
such limitations, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for 
providing descriptive information on the population of SEVP-certified 
schools that have recommended OPT and of foreign students engaged in 
OPT. We also found the data sufficiently reliable for analyzing 
student records for compliance with certain regulatory and policy 
requirements. In addition, we analyzed USCIS's Computer-Linked 
Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS) data on the 
results of USCIS's adjudications of requests for OPT employment 
authorization from fiscal years 2008 through 2013.[Footnote 10] To 
assess the reliability of these CLAIMS data, we interviewed agency 
officials responsible for managing the data about the data's sources 
and the system's controls. We found the data to be sufficiently 
reliable to report information on the number of, among other things, 
employment authorization applications and approvals for foreign 
students engaged in OPT. 

In addition, to address both objectives, we interviewed officials from 
SEVP's School Certification, Policy, Analysis and Operations Center, 
Field Representative, and Systems Management branches and units to 
discuss their involvement in OPT. We also interviewed officials from 
CTCEU, as well as investigators from 7 of ICE's 26 Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI) field offices, which allowed us to obtain their 
perspectives on any risks associated with OPT.[Footnote 11] We 
selected these offices based on their experience in investigating 
previous and ongoing cases of school or student fraud or noncompliance 
related to OPT. Although the results from these interviews cannot be 
generalized to officials at all 26 ICE field offices, they provided us 
with useful insights into lessons learned from cases related to OPT. 
We also interviewed USCIS officials to determine the extent to which 
USCIS has implemented processes for ensuring the eligibility of 
students applying for employment authorization under OPT. In addition, 
we interviewed 11 DSOs, and received a written response from 1 DSO, 
from schools in and around the Washington, D.C., area. We selected 
these officials because, as of July 2013, they composed a group of 
representatives from SEVP-certified schools of various types and sizes 
in the Washington, D.C., region that meets regularly with SEVP to 
discuss matters such as SEVIS and SEVP policy and requirements. The 
results from these interviews cannot be generalized to all DSOs, but 
provided us with useful insights into the role of the DSOs in OPT. 
Further, we interviewed officials from NAFSA: Association of 
International Educators to discuss the organization's views on OPT, 
including the involvement of DSOs in OPT.[Footnote 12] Appendix I 
presents more details about our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to February 
2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Federal Agencies' and School Officials' Roles and Responsibilities 
Regarding Foreign Students Approved for OPT: 

Foreign students interested in studying in the United States must 
first be admitted to a school or university before applying for a visa 
at a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas. DSOs use SEVIS to issue Form 
I-20s to students, which enable them to apply for nonimmigrant student 
visas.[Footnote 13] The Department of State (State) issues 
nonimmigrant visas to eligible foreign students. The process for 
determining who will be issued or refused a visa, including F and M 
visas, contains various steps, including documentation reviews, in-
person interviews, collection of applicants' fingerprints, and cross-
references against State's name check database. F visas are for 
academic study at 2-and 4-year colleges and universities and other 
academic institutions.[Footnote 14] M visas are for nonacademic study 
at institutions such as vocational and technical schools.[Footnote 15] 
Nonimmigrants who wish to work temporarily in the United States 
typically need to obtain a visa that allows them to work in the United 
States; F and M visas allow for limited employment authorization and 
may not be used in place of visa classifications designated for 
temporary employees.[Footnote 16] F and M visa holders are not allowed 
to work in the United States after completing their program of study 
unless they receive employment authorization through OPT. 

A visa allows a foreign citizen to travel to a U.S. port of entry and 
request permission from an officer with DHS's U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) to enter the United States.[Footnote 17] However, a 
visa does not guarantee entry into the country. By interviewing 
individuals and examining the validity of their required 
documentation, CBP officers determine whether to admit individuals 
into the United States. Foreign nationals traveling on student visas 
are not generally issued specific dates until which they are 
authorized to remain in the United States, but instead are admitted 
for what is referred to as duration of status. This means that they 
may remain in the country so long as they maintain their student 
status (such as by enrolling full-time in an academic program or being 
approved for OPT after completing their program of study). USCIS 
adjudicates, among other things, change-of-status requests from other 
classes of nonimmigrants in the United States who wish to become F or 
M students. With regard to OPT, in particular, USCIS is responsible 
for adjudicating employment authorization requests from the foreign 
students who have obtained DSOs' recommendations to participate in OPT. 

Within ICE, SEVP, in conjunction with DSOs, is responsible for 
overseeing foreign students approved for OPT and maintaining 
information on these students in SEVIS. Also within ICE, CTCEU is 
responsible for (1) investigating foreign students who fail to enroll 
in or maintain status at their schools, including those foreign 
students approved for OPT, and (2) conducting criminal investigations 
of certified schools that do not remain in compliance with regulatory 
requirements. For example, CTCEU pursues criminal investigations 
against school officials who have exploited the system by operating 
sham institutions, which are operated solely to admit foreign 
nationals into the country without participation in educational 
programs. CTCEU assigns school and foreign student fraud-related 
investigations to ICE field offices; the offices can also open their 
own fraud investigations. 

Requirements for Initial Approval and Ongoing Eligibility for OPT: 

According to ICE regulations and policies, OPT is available to 
eligible foreign students (F and M visa holders) who are enrolled in a 
college, university, conservatory, seminary, or established vocational 
or other recognized nonacademic institution, in a program other than 
English language training.[Footnote 18] Employment under OPT must be 
in a job directly related to the foreign student's major area of 
study, and foreign students who apply to participate in OPT must have 
completed at least 1 academic school year or, in the case of M visa 
holders, their entire course of study. Foreign students on an F visa 
can temporarily work in the country under one of three types of 
OPT.[Footnote 19] First, foreign students may work part-time while 
they are in school or full-time on school breaks (pre-completion 
OPT).[Footnote 20] Second, foreign students may work full-time for up 
to 12 months after completing a program of study (12-month post-
completion OPT). Third, foreign students studying in areas of study 
related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
are eligible to work full-time for an additional 17 months (17-month 
STEM extension post-completion OPT).[Footnote 21] Table 1 shows the 
three types of OPT and their requirements. 

Table 1: Key Requirements for the Three Types of Optional Practical 
Training (OPT): 

Requirements: Eligibility; 
Pre-completion OPT: F visa students who have been enrolled in a 
program of study at a college, university, conservatory, or seminary 
for at least 1 academic year; 
12-month post-completion OPT[A]: F and M visa students who have 
completed their program of study at a college, university, 
conservatory, seminary, or recognized nonacademic institution such as 
a vocational school; 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: F visa students who have completed 
their program of study at a college, university, conservatory, or 
seminary and who have completed the 12-month post-completion OPT; 
Students must have a bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree in a 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-designated STEM program[B]; 
Employers must be participants in E-Verify[C]; Only one 17-month 
extension is permitted per student. 

Requirements: Employment duration and accrual limits; 
Pre-completion OPT: Employment may occur only during the student's 
program of study; Any part-time pre-completion employment counts as 
half of the amount of time worked in calculating the total allowed OPT 
for each foreign student (for example, 6 months of part-time pre-
completion OPT counts as 3 months toward the 12-month total allowed 
OPT); 
12-month post-completion OPT[ A]: F visa students cannot exceed 12 
months of post-completion OPT, including any time spent in pre-
completion OPT; F visa students' employment end dates must be within 
14 months of the program of study end date (for example, by July 2014 
if the student graduated in May 2013); M visa students can work for a 
maximum of only 6 months following the completion of their program of 
study (for example, by November 2013 if the student graduated and 
started to work in May 2013); 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: F visa students cannot exceed 17 months 
of STEM extension OPT; F visa students' employment start and end dates 
must be within 17 months of the 12-month post-completion OPT end date 
and 31 months of the program of study end date (for example, by 
December 2015 if the student finished the 12-month post-completion OPT 
in July 2014 and graduated in May 2013). 

Requirements: Employment hours; 
Pre-completion OPT: Students are allowed to work no more than 20 hours 
per week while school is in session; During scheduled school breaks 
(such as summer and winter break), students may work more than 20 
hours per week; 
12-month post-completion OPT[A]: Students may work part-time (at least 
20 hours per week) or full-time in paid employment; Students must work 
at least 20 hours per week in unpaid employment; 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: Students must work at least 20 hours 
per week. 

Requirements: Employment-reporting requirements; 
Pre-completion OPT: Students must report interruption of employment or 
any change in name or address to the designated school official (DSO); 
12-month post-completion OPT[A]: Students must report interruption of 
employment or any change in name or address to the DSO; 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: Students must submit validation reports 
of all information to the DSO every 6 months and must report a change 
in name, address, or employment within 10 days of the change[D]; 
Employers must agree to report the termination or departure of a 
student to the DSO within 48 hours. 

Requirements: Unemployment; 
Pre-completion OPT: Students do not accrue unemployment; 
12-month post-completion OPT[A]: Students may not accrue more than 90 
days of unemployment; 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: Students may not accrue more than 120 
days of unemployment (including the 90 days allowed during the initial 
12-month post-completion OPT). 

Requirements: Termination of OPT; 
Pre-completion OPT: Authorization is automatically terminated if the 
student transfers to another school or begins study at another level 
of study; 
12-month post-completion OPT[A]: Authorization is automatically 
terminated if the student transfers to another school or begins study 
at another level of study; 
17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
extension post-completion OPT: Authorization is automatically 
terminated if the student transfers to another school or begins study 
at another level of study. 

Source: GAO analysis of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10)(ii), (f)(12), (m)(14) 
and SEVP Policy Guidance 1004-03. 

[A] M visa students can work for a maximum of 6 months following 
completion of their program of study. 

[B] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains the Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)-Designated Degree 
Program List. This DHS list sets forth eligible courses of study based 
on the Classification of Instructional Programs codes developed by the 
U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education 
Statistics. DHS originally released this list in April 2008 and last 
updated it in May 2012. 

[C] E-Verify is a free, largely voluntary, Internet-based system 
operated by the Verification Division of USCIS and the Social Security 
Administration. The goals of E-Verify are to (1) reduce the employment 
of individuals unauthorized to work, (2) reduce discrimination, (3) 
protect employee civil liberties and privacy, and (4) prevent undue 
burden on employers. See GAO, Employment Verification: Federal 
Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve E-Verify, but Significant 
Challenges Remain, GAO-11-146 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2010). 

[D] Validation reports include students' employment and personal 
information. 

[End of table] 

As shown in figure 1, foreign students initiate the OPT application 
process by requesting a recommendation for OPT from their DSOs. 
[Footnote 22] The DSO is to ensure that students are eligible for the 
requested type and length of OPT and that the students are aware of 
their responsibilities for maintaining status while on OPT. ICE 
regulations do not require that students have secured employment prior 
to applying for pre-completion OPT or 12-month post-completion OPT; 
therefore, an employer name is not required to be entered in SEVIS at 
the time of the application. Regarding the 17-month STEM extension 
post-completion OPT, students must have secured employment prior to 
applying for this extension and must provide the employer's name to 
the DSO. Prior to recommending the extension, the DSO must confirm 
that a student's degree is a bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree 
that is in DHS's STEM-Designated Degree Program list.[Footnote 23] The 
DSO makes the recommendation through SEVIS, which updates the 
student's Form I-20 to reflect the recommendation. The DSO is to 
update the student's SEVIS record with the student's requested start 
and end dates of employment, as well as whether the employment will be 
part-or full-time. In the case of the 17-month post-completion STEM 
extension OPT, the DSO is to enter and update employer information. 

Figure 1: Approval Process for a Foreign Student Seeking to 
Participate in Optional Practical Training (OPT): 

[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration] 

Foreign student applies to and is accepted at a Student and Exchange 
Visitor Program certified school: 

Designated school official (DSO), using Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System, issues certificate of eligibility, Form I-20, to 
student to apply for student visa. 

Department of State issues nonimmigrant visa to student. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection admits the student into the United 
States. 

Student begins academic program. 

After completing at least 1 full academic year of an academic program, 
student may be eligible for and request a recommendation from the DSO 
for pre-completion OPT. If the DSO recommends the student for OPT, the 
student submits employment authorization application to U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).[A] When USCIS approves 
the application, USCIS issues an employment authorization document 
(EAD) that allows the student to work in major area of study while 
attending school. 

Upon completion of program of study, student may be eligible for 12-
month post-completion OPT. After requesting and obtaining 
recommendation from the DSO, student may submit application for 
employment authorization to USCIS.[B] After adjudicating application, 
USCIS issues EAD that allows the student to work in major area of 
study for up to 12 months. 

After completing the 12-month post-completion OPT and obtaining a
bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree in a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) designated science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) program,student may request and obtain 
recommendation from the DSO and approval from USCIS to participate in 
17-month STEM extension post-completion OPT. If student receives 
approval from USCIS, the student can work in major area of study for 
another 17 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and State Department information. 

[A] A student may apply for pre-completion OPT up to 90 days before 
being enrolled for 1 full academic year, provided that the period of 
employment will not start prior to completion of the full academic 
year. 

[B] A student may apply for post-completion OPT up to 90 days before 
or up to 60 days after completing the program of study. 

[End of figure] 

After receiving the Form I-20 that notates the DSO's recommendation 
for OPT, the foreign student must file a Form I-765, Application for 
Employment Authorization, with USCIS within 30 days of the date the 
DSO enters the OPT recommendation into SEVIS and pay the required 
application fee.[Footnote 24] USCIS adjudicates all nonimmigrants' 
applications for employment authorization by determining whether an 
applicant has submitted the required information and documentation, 
such as proof of the student's financial support, and whether the 
applicant is eligible.[Footnote 25] Specifically, USCIS adjudicates 
the application for OPT employment authorization on the basis of the 
DSO's recommendation and other eligibility considerations, such as 
whether the student can financially support himself or herself while 
on OPT, and for those students applying for the 17-month STEM post-
completion extension, determining whether the employer is registered 
with E-Verify. Table 2 presents data on OPT-related employment 
authorization application receipts and related adjudication results 
(approvals, denials, and revocations) from fiscal years 2008 through 
2013. During this period, the data show that USCIS approved 96 percent 
of the applications for OPT employment authorization. In fiscal year 
2013, approximately 123,000 foreign students received approval from 
USCIS to seek temporary employment through OPT to complement their 
academic coursework. 

Table 2: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) Receipts 
of Employment Authorization Applications for Optional Practical 
Training and Adjudication Results, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013: 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Receipts: 38,730; 
Approvals[A]: 28,497; 
Denials[B]: 360; 
Revocations[C]: 1. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Receipts: 87,636; 
Approvals[A]: 90,896; 
Denials[B]: 2,125; 
Revocations[C]: 71. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Receipts: 99,876; 
Approvals[A]: 96,916; 
Denials[B]: 1,731; 
Revocations[C]: 57. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Receipts: 109,895; 
Approvals[A]: 105,357; 
Denials[B]: 2,226; 
Revocations[C]: 67. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Receipts: 117,141; 
Approvals[A]: 115,303; 
Denials[B]: 2,801; 
Revocations[C]: 71. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Receipts: 128,591; 
Approvals[A]: 123,328; 
Denials[B]: 3,400; 
Revocations[C]: 77. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Receipts: 581,869; 
Approvals[A]: 560,297; 
Denials[B]: 12,643; 
Revocations[C]: 344. 

Source: USCIS Computer-Linked Application Information Management 
System 3 data. 

[A] Approvals are the number of applications that are approved during 
the reporting period. Approvals may include applications received in a 
previous fiscal year. For example, the number of approvals exceeded 
the number of applications received in fiscal year 2009. 

[B] Denials are the number of applications that are denied because of 
ineligibility or fraud during the reporting period: 

[C] Revocations are the number of approved employment authorizations 
that are revoked, or canceled, during the reporting period. For 
example, approved employment authorizations can be revoked when it 
appears that any condition upon which employment authorization was 
granted has not been met or no longer exists or upon a showing that 
the information contained in the application is not true and correct. 

[End of table] 

If USCIS approves the application, it issues the student an Employment 
Authorization Document, or Form I-766. Employment authorization for 
pre-completion OPT, 12-month post-completion OPT, and 17-month STEM 
extension post-completion OPT begins on the student's requested date 
or the USCIS-approved date, whichever is later, and ends at the 
conclusion of the approved period of OPT. 

ICE Has Not Identified or Assessed Risks in OPT: 

SEVP has not identified or assessed risks associated with OPT, such as 
potential fraud or noncompliance with ICE regulations. Senior SEVP 
officials told us they consider OPT to be a low-risk employment 
benefit for foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign 
students under OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their 
foreign student visa status and future legal status to stay and work 
in the United States. However, SEVP has not developed a process to 
determine the extent to which schools that recommend and foreign 
students approved for OPT may pose risks. 

Further, CTCEU officials and ICE field agents we interviewed at all 
seven ICE field offices in our review stated they believe OPT to be at 
risk for fraud and noncompliance based on their experience 
investigating these types of cases. Specifically, senior CTCEU 
officials stated that OPT is at risk for fraud and noncompliance, in 
part, because it enables eligible foreign students to work in the 
United States for extended periods of time without obtaining a 
temporary work visa. In addition, ICE field office agents we 
interviewed stated that foreign students approved for OPT present a 
risk for becoming overstays because they are allowed to work and 
remain in the United States for 12 to 31 months after graduation from 
school. Also, ICE agents and DSOs we interviewed stated that DSOs face 
greater challenges in monitoring foreign students in post-completion 
OPT because the students are no longer attending classes. Moreover, 
CTCEU officials stated that nonimmigrants are a vulnerable population 
that can be exploited by illegitimate companies or organizations that 
lure students to the United States with false promises of high-paying 
jobs and potential ways to stay in the country. For example, CTCEU 
officials stated that a recruiter or other third party may offer to 
help foreign students find OPT work for a fee or percentage of the 
foreign student's salary once the student begins work under OPT. 
Additionally, SEVP's compliance unit maintains a log of schools 
identified as potentially out of compliance with ICE regulations. As 
of September 2013, out of the 133 schools on the log, SEVP had 
identified 17 schools as potentially noncompliant with ICE regulations 
related to OPT. 

Further, CTCEU officials and ICE field agents we interviewed described 
various cases involving OPT that demonstrate their concerns with the 
management and oversight of OPT. For example, in a 2012 case, 
according to an ICE investigator, a school charged students for an OPT 
recommendation on the Form I-20 and for keeping students in status 
once they had entered the country, without requiring school 
attendance. In another case, in 2012, ICE investigators initiated an 
investigation after they received a complaint about a school's 
noncompliance with OPT requirements, such as students not working in 
their area of study. In particular, ICE investigators found that the 
DSOs at the school would submit fraudulent Form I-20s to recommend 
students for OPT; however, the foreign students were not using OPT to 
work jobs related to their areas of study (e.g., a nursing student 
working in a pizza parlor), which is not allowed under ICE 
regulations. In a third case, in 2011, ICE field office investigators 
initiated an investigation of a school on the basis of information 
received from CBP that indicated that one of the school's DSOs was 
allegedly providing documentation authorizing students to work in jobs 
not related to their major areas of study. 

Using information obtained through prior ICE field offices' 
investigations of schools' and students' noncompliance with ICE 
regulations and policy requirements, CTCEU officials have identified 
potential risk indicators specifically associated with OPT and stated 
they have provided this information to SEVP. Specifically, CTCEU 
officials stated they provided position papers on multiple occasions 
from 2011 through 2013 to SEVP officials expressing concerns about 
risks in SEVP in general and OPT in particular, including 
recommendations to help mitigate these risks. For example, in a 
position paper dated April 2013, CTCEU officials recommended to SEVP 
that DSOs enter the date on which USCIS grants OPT employment 
authorization in SEVIS to allow ICE and USCIS officials to compare 
this date with the date of enrollment to identify potential risks of 
students seeking to commit immigration fraud. Also, in April 2013, 
CTCEU briefed SEVP's compliance officials on SEVP-and OPT-related risk 
indicators. For example, CTCEU officials identified that a certain 
threshold, or percentage, of a school's foreign student population 
approved for OPT may be a potential indicator of fraud involving 
OPT.[Footnote 26] According to our analysis of SEVIS data, as of 
August 2013, of the approximately 2,650 SEVP-certified schools with at 
least 1 foreign student approved for OPT, the percentage of each 
school's registered foreign students approved for OPT met or exceeded 
the threshold identified by CTCEU at 193 schools. Of the 193 schools, 
100 percent of registered foreign students were approved for OPT at 60 
schools; most of these schools had 4 or fewer total foreign students, 
except for 1 school, where the data show that all 35 of the school's 
foreign students were approved for OPT. The Deputy Director of SEVP 
agreed that the percentage of a school's foreign student population 
approved for OPT could be an indicator of potential fraud. 

In November 2013, the Deputy Director of SEVP stated that, in response 
to the recommendation from our June 2012 report that ICE develop and 
implement a process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, SEVP has 
taken initial actions to identify potential risks across SEVP-
certified schools by developing a risk scorecard by which to assess 
schools and preliminary risk indicators to classify SEVP-certified 
schools by risk category. While these are positive steps taken in 
response to our June 2012 recommendation, SEVP is in the early stages 
of developing this risk scorecard and the risk indicators, and these 
efforts are focused on identifying potential risks to SEVP overall. As 
part of these efforts, SEVP officials have not identified and assessed 
potential risks specific to OPT posed by schools and foreign students 
or determined the extent to which the office will include potential 
OPT risks as part of their efforts to assess risks SEVP-wide. Senior 
SEVP officials told us they have not identified and assessed risks 
specific to OPT because they have not considered OPT to be a high-risk 
employment benefit; however, SEVP has not developed or implemented a 
risk management process to determine potential risks in OPT. 
Furthermore, on the basis of information from ICE field office 
investigations, CTCEU officials have identified SEVP-and OPT-related 
risks, but, as of November 2013, senior SEVP officials told us they 
had not yet incorporated CTCEU's input, including relevant information 
from ICE field offices, into their efforts to assess potential SEVP-
wide risks because they preferred to develop and implement a process 
to identify and assess risks in SEVP on their own before coordinating 
with CTCEU. DHS's 2010 Policy for Integrated Risk Management[Footnote 
27] and 2011 Risk Management Fundamentals[Footnote 28] establish DHS's 
policy and guidance on risk. They instruct DHS and its components to 
incorporate a risk management process to their planning and management 
activities that includes, among other things, identifying the risks 
associated with goals and objectives, analyzing and assessing the 
identified risks, and using risk information and analysis to inform 
decision making. Also, DHS's Policy for Integrated Risk Management is 
based on the premise that entities responsible for homeland security 
can most effectively manage risks by working together, and emphasizes 
that DHS and its components are to effectively communicate with 
stakeholders, partners, and customers within and throughout the risk 
management process. Without identifying and assessing risks in OPT in 
coordination with CTCEU, SEVP is not well positioned to incorporate a 
risk management process into its management of OPT. Further, obtaining 
and assessing risk information from CTCEU and ICE field offices from 
prior noncompliance and fraud cases involving OPT throughout the 
development of its process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, to 
include OPT, could better position SEVP to manage any risks associated 
with OPT. 

ICE Cannot Fully Ensure Foreign Students Working under Optional 
Practical Training Are Maintaining Their Legal Status in the United 
States: 

ICE Does Not Consistently Collect Information Needed to Oversee OPT 
Requirements: 

ICE does not consistently collect information needed to oversee OPT 
requirements related to the type and timing of foreign students' 
employment, as ICE regulations do not specifically require the 
collection of information on foreign students' places and dates of 
employment in SEVIS. Such information could help ICE to better ensure 
that foreign students are maintaining their legal status in the United 
States and to identify and assess potential risks to OPT. 

As indicated in table 3, SEVIS data on foreign students approved for 
the three types of OPT show that 38 percent of student records (48,642 
of 126,796) do not contain an employer name, as of August 2013. 
Specifically, according to our analysis, the employer's name is not 
included in 65 percent and 48 percent of pre-and 12-month post-
completion OPT students' SEVIS records, respectively. Foreign students 
are not required to have secured a job before seeking pre-and 12-month 
post-completion OPT, and an employer name is not required of the 
student at the time of application. Because 17-month STEM extension 
students are required to have employment prior to application and have 
ongoing reporting requirements, employer information is more complete, 
with less than 1 percent of student records missing the employer name. 

Table 3: Employer Name in Student Records by Type of Optional 
Practical Training (OPT), as of August 2013: 

Pre-completion OPT: 
Records not containing employer name: 940 (65 percent); 
Records containing employer name: 500 (35 percent); 
Total number of foreign students: 1,440. 

Post-completion OPT: 

12-month post-completion: 
Records not containing employer name: 47,686; (48 percent); 
Records containing employer name: 52,589; (52 percent); 
Total number of foreign students: 100,275. 

17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics extension: 
Records not containing employer name: 16; (less than 1 percent); 
Records containing employer name: 25,065; (almost 100 percent); 
Total number of foreign students: 25,081. 

Total: 
Records not containing employer name: 48,642; (38 percent); 
Records containing employer name: 78,154; (62 percent); 
Total number of foreign students: 126,796. 

Source: GAO analysis of Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) student record data for OPT, as of August 2013. 

[End of table] 

In addition to noting the lack of employers' names, our analysis of 
SEVIS data indicates that other information about employers that would 
be helpful to identify where foreign students are working, such as the 
physical address that can be used to differentiate between two 
employers with the same name, is not consistently collected and 
maintained in SEVIS. For example, of the 62 percent of student records 
that have the employer's name populated, approximately 5 percent of 
those records (3,545 of 78,154) do not include other information on 
the employer, such as the employer's address, state, city, and postal 
code. In addition, for all three types of OPT, ICE regulations and 
policy do not specifically require students to report to their DSOs 
when they begin or stop working, and do not require DSOs to enter 
those corresponding dates into SEVIS.[Footnote 29] 

Without information on employers or employment start and end dates, 
ICE's ability to oversee requirements for OPT is limited. 

Job directly related to major area of study. ICE requires DSOs to 
ensure that a student is eligible prior to recommending OPT, and 
remains eligible for the duration of OPT, by being employed in a job 
directly related to his or her major area of study. ICE regulations 
and policy state that DSOs are responsible for reporting in SEVIS 
subsequent known changes in a student's name and address, employer 
name and address, and known instances of a student's failure to report 
to work. Specifically for students seeking the 17-month STEM extension 
of OPT, SEVP and USCIS require that DSOs enter the students' employer 
information in SEVIS prior to recommending OPT, and SEVP requires 
regular confirmation of such students' personal and employer 
information throughout the time of OPT. Although ICE regulations and 
policy require DSOs to ensure students' eligibility and to report 
known changes in students' employer information, they do not require 
that students report and DSOs provide students' initial employer 
information (name and address, for example) in SEVIS for students 
pursuing pre-or 12-month post-completion OPT. According to SEVP 
officials, requiring this initial employer information for pre-and 12-
month post-completion could place an additional burden or requirement 
on DSOs. Thus, SEVP officials stated that their office would prefer to 
make this type of change through regulation rather than policy. SEVP 
officials stated that, in general, changing regulatory language has 
been difficult and time consuming. However, previous regulatory 
changes that created the 17-month STEM extension, for example, have 
been implemented and added reporting requirements in SEVIS for 
employer information for foreign students approved for this 
extension.[Footnote 30] As of August 2013, approximately 20 percent of 
all OPT students were approved for the STEM extension and, according 
to our analysis of SEVIS data, almost 100 percent of SEVIS records for 
those students have the employment information as required by 
regulation for OPT students who have been approved for the STEM 
extension. 

ICE regulations and policy require that DSOs ensure that a foreign 
student is eligible for OPT and assume responsibility for maintaining 
the student's SEVIS record for the entire period of authorized OPT. 
ICE regulations and policy also require all OPT employment to be in a 
job that is directly related to the foreign student's area of study. 
However, ICE has not provided guidance to DSOs to help determine and 
document whether the student's job is related to his or her area of 
study. Requirements for DSOs to collect information on how a job is 
related to an area of study and guidance on how DSOs should provide 
such information in SEVIS could help provide ICE with reasonable 
assurance that foreign students engaged in OPT are working in jobs 
directly related to their area of study, as required under OPT. In 
addition to fields for foreign students' employer name and address, 
SEVIS has two fields for DSOs to add comments or remarks regarding 
students' employment; however, ICE does not require DSOs to provide 
any information on how DSOs arrived at the determination that 
students' jobs relate to their studies in these SEVIS fields. 
According to SEVP officials and the program's DSO training materials, 
DSOs could use these two SEVIS fields to explain how a student's 
employment relates to the student's program of study. According to our 
analysis of the two fields available in SEVIS for DSOs to enter 
remarks or comments regarding students' OPT employment, we found that 
27 percent of foreign students' records (34,454 of 126,796) did not 
have any information in either field, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Student Records for Optional Practical Training (OPT) 
Students Containing Information in Employment Comment and Remark 
Fields, as of August 2013: 

Pre-completion OPT: 
Percentage of student records with employment comment field blank: 58; 
Percentage of student records with employment remark field blank: 41; 
Percentage of student records with both fields blank: 26. 

Post-completion OPT: 

12-month post-completion: 
Percentage of student records with employment comment field blank: 61; 
Percentage of student records with employment remark field blank: 38; 
Percentage of student records with both fields blank: 28. 

17-month science, technology, engineering and mathematics extension: 
Percentage of student records with employment comment field blank: 100; 
Percentage of student records with employment remark field blank: 23; 
Percentage of student records with both fields blank: 23. 

Total; 
Percentage of student records with employment comment field blank: 69 
(87,068 of 126,796; 
Percentage of student records with employment remark field blank: 35 
(44,676 of 126,796); 
Percentage of student records with both fields blank: 27 (34,454 of 
126,796). 

Source: GAO analysis of Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) student record data for OPT, as of August 2013. 

[End of table] 

Although information is included in at least one of the employment 
comment or remark fields for the majority of student records, this 
information may not be relevant to whether students' employment is 
related to their studies. SEVP has not developed or provided guidance 
for DSOs on how to determine whether a student's job is related to his 
or her program of study and has provided limited guidance on how to 
report this information in SEVIS using the existing fields. 
Specifically, SEVP's guidance on OPT recommends that students maintain 
evidence for how each job is related, including a job description, but 
is limited in that it does not direct students to report this 
information to DSOs or DSOs to enter this information into SEVIS. In 
addition, SEVP's DSO training materials state that DSOs should use the 
remarks area in SEVIS to explain how the work relates to the students' 
studies. However, the training materials are limited in that they do 
not detail both SEVIS fields that are available. In addition, the 
materials do not provide guidance on how DSOs should show that they 
took steps to help ensure that students' jobs are related. Federal 
internal control standards state that federal agencies should, among 
other things, design and document internal control activities, such as 
guidance, to help ensure compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.[Footnote 31] SEVP officials stated that determining 
whether a job is directly related to a program of study is not defined 
in the regulations and would be too difficult to define in policy 
because it is a subjective process. Therefore, ICE has not required 
DSOs to provide this information in SEVIS. 

Because ICE has not required information on how students' jobs are 
related to their studies and SEVP has provided limited guidance on how 
to provide this information in SEVIS, ICE does not have information 
needed to oversee OPT even when employer information is included in 
SEVIS. For example, we examined those student records for which an 
employer name was included for certain industries in which CTCEU 
officials were concerned about the potential of students working in 
unrelated jobs. According to our analysis, we found cases in which the 
SEVIS record indicated that students may not be complying with ICE's 
regulatory requirement.[Footnote 32] Specifically, we found 35 cases 
in which students with degrees in fields such as economics, liberal 
arts, and psychology were working in food service and the SEVIS record 
did not include information as to how the employment was related to 
their field of study. We also found 9 cases in which students with 
degrees in fields such as computer science, engineering, and 
international studies were working in retail without an explanation 
included in the SEVIS record. However, we also found a case in which 
the student's SEVIS record indicated that the individual, who had a 
degree in music, was working for a restaurant, but the employment 
remark field described the student's employment as being a member of 
the restaurant's house band. Developing and distributing guidance to 
DSOs with options on how to determine whether a job is related to the 
foreign student's area of study and requiring DSOs to provide 
information in SEVIS to show that they took steps to help ensure that 
the work is related could help provide ICE with the information it 
could use to oversee OPT requirements. 

Limits on unemployment. ICE has set forth limits on unemployment in 
its OPT-related regulations. Specifically, 12-month post-completion 
OPT students may not exceed 90 days of accrued unemployment during 
their authorized employment period, and 17-month STEM extension post-
completion OPT students may not exceed 120 days of unemployment (which 
includes any unemployment accrued during the initial 12-month OPT 
period). These unemployment limits were added to the ICE regulations 
in April 2008 to clarify that, if a student accumulates too much 
unemployment while remaining in the country under the OPT employment 
benefit, the student has violated his or her status. Although ICE 
policy provides instruction on how a student and DSO may report and 
record dates of employment or unemployment, ICE regulations and policy 
do not specifically require foreign students to report to their DSOs 
when they begin working or DSOs to enter those corresponding dates in 
SEVIS. Furthermore, SEVP's policy specifically states that DHS 
maintains responsibility for determining whether a student has 
violated his or her status by exceeding the permissible limit on 
authorized unemployment. Federal internal control standards state that 
federal agencies should, among other things, design and document 
internal control activities to help ensure compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations.[Footnote 33] The dates on which authorization 
for employment from USCIS begins and ends are included in students' 
SEVIS records; however, ICE does not have a mechanism to capture the 
date on which a student who was granted authorization actually started 
working or data on periods when a student is unemployed. According to 
SEVP officials and 12 DSOs with whom we spoke, it can be difficult for 
a DSO to maintain contact with students approved for OPT, particularly 
if a student engaged in post-completion OPT is no longer attending 
classes at the school and works off-campus for up to more than 2 years 
in another city or state. However, ICE's regulations state that when a 
DSO recommends a student for OPT, the school--which includes its DSOs--
assumes the added responsibility for maintaining the SEVIS record of 
that student for the entire period of authorized OPT.[Footnote 34] 
SEVP officials also stated that ICE's ability to oversee foreign 
students' unemployment time using SEVIS may be limited because the 
system does not systematically capture information from DSOs that may 
be used to calculate the accumulation of unemployment time. However, 
SEVP officials stated that SEVIS could be used to identify foreign 
students on post-completion OPT who have not had an employer listed 
for more than 90 or 120 days. According to SEVP officials, this 
mechanism would allow SEVP to track the initial unemployment of a 
student seeking work after receiving OPT employment authorization. As 
a result of not having complete data on foreign students' initial 
employment dates or any subsequent unemployment dates, SEVP officials 
stated that they have not fully enforced these regulatory limits on 
unemployment. Requiring students to report to DSOs, and DSOs to record 
in SEVIS, students' initial date of employment and any periods of 
unemployment could better position ICE to be able to oversee program 
requirements. 

Foreign students approved for OPT, especially those approved for the 
two post-completion types of OPT, are allowed to remain in the United 
States after the completion of their studies to pursue employment yet 
remain on a student visa with the understanding that they are 
complying with OPT requirements. Without consistent information on 
where students are employed and when students begin employment, ICE is 
not positioned to oversee these requirements. 

ICE Does Not Monitor whether Foreign Students' Authorized Employment 
Complies with ICE Regulations: 

ICE has not developed mechanisms to consistently monitor whether 
schools and DSOs recommend OPT for foreign students and whether USCIS 
authorizes employment for foreign students that is permitted under ICE 
regulations. ICE requires DSOs to ensure students are eligible for the 
requested type and time of OPT prior to recommending it. After 
receiving the DSOs' recommendation, students apply for and may receive 
employment authorization with USCIS. Through this process, DSOs and 
USCIS are to provide information on foreign students' type and period 
of OPT in SEVIS. However, ICE does not monitor whether DSOs and 
foreign students are complying with requirements that students (1) 
have been in their program of study for at least 1 academic year prior 
to receiving authorization and (2) complete their OPT within certain 
time frames established by the type of OPT.[Footnote 35] 

One full academic year requirement. As previously mentioned, ICE 
requires that OPT be authorized only for a student who has been 
lawfully enrolled on a full-time basis in a SEVP-certified college, 
university, conservatory, or seminary for 1 full academic year in 
order to ensure that those seeking OPT employment are primarily in the 
United States on student visas to pursue their education.[Footnote 36] 
However, ICE regulations and policy do not define and SEVP has not 
provided OPT-specific guidance to DSOs on what constitutes 1 full 
academic year for SEVP-certified schools. According to SEVP officials, 
ICE has not developed or provided specific guidance because the 
various types of programs have different academic schedules and any 
guidance may not apply universally to all schools. However, SEVP 
officials stated that they use definitions from the Department of 
Education when fielding DSOs' questions on this issue. In November 
2013, SEVP drafted and released for comment guidance regarding annual 
vacations that includes these Department of Education definitions of 
how much time typically constitutes 1 full academic year.[Footnote 37] 
However, this draft guidance does not directly apply to the regulatory 
requirement of completing 1 full academic year to be eligible for OPT. 
Because ICE's OPT-related regulations and policy do not define 1 full 
academic year for the various types of programs and schedules for SEVP-
certified schools, DSOs and USCIS may not be clear as to how the 
Department of Education's definitions specifically apply to approving 
and authorizing employment for foreign students seeking OPT. 
Therefore, students may be engaging in OPT without having completed 
the required time in their programs. Our analysis of SEVIS records as 
of August 2013 indicates that DSOs marked 556 students' records as not 
meeting the requirement of having completed 1 full academic year prior 
to engaging in OPT.[Footnote 38] Further, according to our analysis of 
time between the program start date to employment start date for 
students authorized for OPT, 1,446 additional students have not been 
enrolled in their program for at least 8 months (what we consider to 
be 1 academic year based on SEVP officials' estimates) prior to 
beginning OPT. On the basis of our two analyses, over 2,000 foreign 
students approved for OPT may not have met the requirement of having 
completed 1 full academic year. According to SEVP officials, this 
requirement applies only once to a foreign student. For instance, if a 
student was previously in the United States on another visa in which 
he or she could attend school, the time spent in an educational 
program would count toward the 1 full academic year requirement. Also, 
according to SEVP officials, a student may have met the requirement 
thorough a combination of enrollment in a previous program and his or 
her current program of study. However, ICE regulations and policy do 
not specifically list this type of exemption. Furthermore, SEVP's 
guidance to DSOs specifically states that there is no exemption to the 
requirement that a student have been enrolled for 1 full academic 
year. Furthermore, federal internal control standards state that 
federal agencies should design and document guidance that would help 
to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.[Footnote 
39] Developing and providing guidance to DSOs and USCIS on what 
constitutes 1 full academic year and how to apply this definition to 
recommending and authorizing OPT could help ICE better ensure that 
foreign students meet eligibility requirements for OPT. 

Time frames for post-completion OPT. ICE regulations state that 
foreign students may be authorized for 12 months of OPT employment, 
which must be completed within 14 months following the completion of 
their program.[Footnote 40] Students engaged in the STEM extension are 
granted an additional one-time 17-month period of OPT employment, for 
a total of 29 months of total approved employment. This STEM extension 
must be applied directly following the end of the initially approved 
12-month post-completion OPT and be completed in 31 months following 
the completion of his or her program. Our analysis of SEVIS student 
record data as of August 2013 shows that 9 percent of student records 
have authorized post-completion OPT employment dates that exceed the 
regulatory limits of total approved OPT and 8 percent of student 
records will not complete their OPT employment by the regulatory 
limits of 14 or 31 months, as shown in table 5.[Footnote 41] 

Table 5: Student Records for Optional Practical Training (OPT) 
Students' Dates of Educational Program and Employment, as of August 
2013: 

Post-completion OPT: 

12-month post-completion; 
Records with OPT start: and end dates exceeding limit: (12 months or 
17 months): 8,996; (9 percent); 
Records with program end: and OPT end dates exceeding limit: (14 
months or 31 months): 8,107; (8 percent). 

17-month science, technology, engineering, and mathematics extension; 
Records with OPT start: and end dates exceeding limit: (12 months or 
17 months): 2,416; (10 percent); 
Records with program end: and OPT end dates exceeding limit: (14 
months or 31 months): 2,411; (10 percent). 

Total;: 
Records with OPT start: and end dates exceeding limit: (12 months or 
17 months): 11,412; (9 percent); 
Records with program end: and OPT end dates exceeding limit: (14 
months or 31 months): 10,518; (8 percent). 

Source: GAO analysis of Student and Exchange Visitor Information 
System (SEVIS) student record data for OPT, as of August 2013. 

[End of table] 

Furthermore, our analysis shows 10 percent of students engaged in 17-
month STEM extension OPT had work approvals that exceeded the 17 
months allowed by ICE regulations and policy, and 10 percent of 
students would not complete their OPT within 31 months from the end of 
their program. According to SEVP officials, these extended periods of 
OPT may be explained by students' using the cap-gap extension to 
extend employment authorization through the fiscal year while 
petitions filed on their behalf for a nonimmigrant employment visa are 
pending.[Footnote 42] SEVP officials stated that if a foreign student 
was approved for the cap-gap extension, the student's SEVIS record 
should indicate such approval and the employment end date would be 
adjusted to include the extension. This approval, and subsequent 
extension, may cause the student's employment authorization dates to 
potentially exceed the 12- or 17-month limits. However, our analysis 
of the SEVIS records shows that those students, included in table 5, 
who have periods of employment authorization exceeding regulatory and 
policy limits for OPT, did not have approval for the cap-gap extension. 

Although SEVIS shows a student's current OPT approval, the system does 
not display students' past OPT approvals (previous pre-completion, for 
example) for the purpose of determining if a student has exceeded 
total limits on accrued work authorization. According to SEVP and 
USCIS officials, both rely on DSOs to track a student's total amount 
of OPT and to recommend the appropriate amount of OPT for students 
depending on previously accrued OPT so as not to exceed regulatory 
limits. According to USCIS officials, it may check previous employment 
authorization applications by searching in CLAIMS or the Central Index 
System for an individual's name; however, it relies on DSOs to 
recommend the allowed amount of OPT.[Footnote 43] Without developing 
and implementing a mechanism to monitor available information 
collected in SEVIS to determine total amounts of approved OPT over the 
course of students' duration of stay, ICE does not have reasonable 
assurance that DSOs are implementing and students are complying with 
the regulatory limits on accrued employment approval. For example, 
students who may have engaged in the full amount of allowed OPT may 
leave the country, reapply to another school at the same education 
level, enter the country under a new I-20 and SEVIS identification 
number, enroll in a program for 1 academic year, and apply for OPT 
with the new program. 

Foreign students approved for OPT are allowed to work in the United 
States while maintaining their student visa status in order to 
supplement their education with practical training with the 
understanding that these students, and the schools and DSOs that have 
responsibility for these students, are complying with certain OPT 
requirements. Federal internal control standards state that agencies 
should design controls, including policies and procedures, to ensure 
that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal 
operations.[Footnote 44] Developing and implementing a mechanism to 
monitor available information collected in SEVIS about OPT that DSOs 
recommend and USCIS authorizes for foreign students could better 
position ICE to help ensure that foreign students do not exceed 
regulatory limits on the amount of time students are approved for work. 

Conclusions: 

OPT, which is an employment benefit, provides certain eligible foreign 
students with the opportunity to seek temporary work to gain practical 
experience in their major areas of study during and after completing 
an academic program. A foreign student in post-completion OPT, in 
particular, is not required to leave the United States following 
graduation and can remain in the United States for the entire post-
completion OPT period. Effective oversight of schools that recommend 
and foreign students who are approved for OPT entails identifying and 
assessing any potential risks, including opportunities for criminal 
exploitation, and being in a position to mitigate them. ICE has taken 
initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools; 
however, ICE has not analyzed available information to identify and 
assess potential risks specific to OPT posed by schools and foreign 
students. Identifying and assessing OPT-specific risks based on 
various factors, including risk information from CTCEU, could better 
position ICE to determine actions to help prevent OPT-related 
noncompliance and fraud and to address such noncompliance and fraud 
when they occur. 

Moreover, ICE could take steps to improve its ability to help ensure 
that foreign students working under OPT are complying with OPT 
requirements and thereby maintaining their legal status in the United 
States. By consistently collecting information in SEVIS that indicates 
foreign students' employers, how employment is related to these 
students' studies, initial date of employment, and any dates of 
unemployment, ICE could better position itself to oversee the OPT 
requirements that foreign students are actively working in areas 
related to their studies and not exceeding limits on unemployment. 
Furthermore, by monitoring through analysis other OPT information, ICE 
could better ensure that schools and DSOs recommend OPT for foreign 
students and USCIS authorizes employment for foreign students that is 
permissible under ICE regulations. By collecting the appropriate 
information in SEVIS and monitoring such information for compliance, 
ICE may better position itself to determine whether foreign students 
approved for OPT are maintaining their legal student visa status while 
supplementing their education with employment directly related to 
their areas of study in the United States. Moreover, having more 
complete data in SEVIS on foreign students working under OPT could 
help strengthen ICE's efforts to identify and assess potential risks 
to OPT. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen ICE's efforts to develop and implement a process to 
identify and assess risks in SEVP, we recommend that the Director of 
ICE direct SEVP, in coordination with CTCEU, to identify and assess 
potential risks in OPT, including obtaining and assessing relevant 
information from CTCEU and ICE field offices. 

To better ensure DSOs' and students' compliance with OPT requirements, 
and strengthen efforts to identify and assess potential risks in OPT, 
we recommend that the Director of ICE direct SEVP to take the 
following five actions: [Footnote 45] 

* require that pre-completion and 12-month post-completion OPT 
students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, students' employer 
information, including the employer's name and address; 

* develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to determine whether 
a job is related to a student's area of study and require DSOs to 
provide information in SEVIS to show that they took steps, based on 
this guidance, to help ensure that the student's work is related to 
the area of study; 

* require that students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, 
students' initial date of employment and any periods of unemployment; 

* develop and provide guidance to DSOs and USCIS on how much time 
constitutes 1 full academic year for the purposes of recommending and 
authorizing OPT; and: 

* develop and implement a mechanism to monitor available information 
in SEVIS to determine if foreign students are accruing more OPT than 
allowed by ICE regulations. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of State 
for their review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are 
reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS concurred with our six 
recommendations and described actions under way or planned to address 
them. For example, DHS indicated that, as part of ongoing efforts to 
develop an overall risk management program, SEVP will work with CTCEU 
in developing factors to identify risks for schools and students 
associated with OPT. Also, DHS noted that the functionality to track 
OPT employment information, including the employer's name and address, 
dates of employment, and any periods of unemployment, have been 
incorporated into SEVIS and that the software that includes the 
required data fields is scheduled to be released in 2014. In addition, 
DHS indicated that SEVP will issue guidance to assist DSOs in 
collecting information on students' employment for reporting in SEVIS 
and to clarify what periods of enrollment qualify as 1 full academic 
year. These and other actions noted in DHS's written comments should 
help address the intent of our recommendations. DHS also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

The Department of State did not have formal comments on our draft 
report. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until thirty 
days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, and appropriate 
congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report examines the extent to which the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with 
optional practical training (OPT), and (2) collected information and 
developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with 
OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States. 

To determine the extent to which DHS's Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) has identified and assessed risks in ICE's Student 
and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) specifically related to OPT, we 
analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed 
officials from DHS and its relevant components, including U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and ICE. In particular, 
we analyzed ICE and SEVP documentation, such as standard operating 
procedures, policy statements, and guidance for agency officials and 
designated school officials (DSO), to determine how ICE's processes 
identify and assess risk related to OPT in SEVP. 

In addition, to evaluate the extent to which ICE has identified and 
assessed risks related to OPT, we collected and evaluated information 
on SEVP compliance and watch lists that contain schools that SEVP has 
identified as potentially noncompliant or fraudulent and previous 
cases of OPT-related fraud through obtaining and analyzing documents 
and interviewing investigators from ICE's Counterterrorism and 
Compliance Enforcement Unit (CTCEU). Also, we analyzed documentation 
CTCEU officials provided regarding risks and vulnerabilities they have 
identified in OPT-related policies, procedures, and regulations during 
the course of their work. In addition, we analyzed ICE news bulletins 
from January 2008 to November 2013 to help determine the magnitude of 
previous cases of fraud and evaluated information provided by CTCEU on 
criminal investigations related to school or student noncompliance or 
fraud involving OPT. Moreover, we collected and analyzed Student and 
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) data on schools that had 
at least one foreign student approved for OPT, as of August 2013, to 
identify examples of schools that pose a potential risk for fraud or 
noncompliance involving OPT using a risk indicator identified by 
CTCEU. Also, we interviewed officials from CTCEU and investigators 
from 7 of ICE's 26 Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) field 
offices. Specifically, we conducted telephone interviews with ICE 
field offices located in Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Los 
Angeles and San Francisco, California; Newark, New Jersey; and New 
York, New York. We also conducted a telephone interview with an 
official from the ICE resident agent in charge field office in 
Charleston, West Virginia, which is under the supervision of the ICE 
field office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We selected these 
locations based on the following criteria: (1) CTCEU officials 
identified the ICE field office as having previous or ongoing 
experience with school fraud and (2) SEVP identified the ICE field 
office as currently investigating a school in SEVP's compliance case 
log. As we did not select a probability sample of ICE field offices to 
interview, the results of these interviews cannot be projected to all 
of ICE's 26 field offices. While the information we obtained from 
officials at these locations cannot be generalized, the interviews 
provided us with the perspectives of ICE officials responsible for 
conducting school and student fraud investigations, including their 
views on the management and oversight SEVP has established for schools 
and students involved in OPT and any challenges ICE field offices have 
faced in their investigations. We also evaluated the extent to which 
ICE's practices were consistent with DHS's 2010 Policy for Integrated 
Risk Management and 2011 Risk Management Fundamentals.[Footnote 46] 

To determine the extent to which ICE has collected information and 
developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with 
OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States, 
we also analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed 
officials from DHS and its components. As part of our effort to 
evaluate these processes that SEVP uses to manage and oversee students 
approved for OPT, we reviewed applicable regulations, such as those 
governing nonimmigrant visa classes and schools recommending students 
engaging in OPT.[Footnote 47] In addition, we reviewed SEVP's internal 
policy and guidance documents specifically concerning management and 
oversight of OPT. We compared these policies with criteria established 
in regulations, as well as with criteria in Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government. 

We analyzed data from SEVIS to identify nonimmigrant foreign students 
under F and M visas who were authorized by USCIS to engage in OPT as 
of August 2013. We assessed the reliability of these data by (1) 
reviewing existing documentation on the controls in the system and the 
policies for ensuring data reliability; (2) interviewing agency 
officials about the data's sources, the system's controls, and any 
quality assurance steps performed after data are entered into the 
system; and (3) testing the data for missing data, outliers, or 
obvious errors. We identified several limitations to the data 
resulting from ICE's process by which schools' DSOs are responsible 
for data entry and updates. SEVIS is used by schools to apply for and 
receive SEVP certification, as well as for DSOs to keep records of 
individual students who enter the United States on F and M visas. 
Although SEVP officials may make edits to a student's SEVIS record in 
some cases, all data or information entries on students are the 
responsibility of DSOs. Therefore, data elements that are not required 
may be missing or invalidly entered. For example, entries for schools' 
physical locations may not be valid U.S. postal addresses. 
Furthermore, some SEVIS records may be duplicated because of students 
changing from one type of OPT to another. However, we were able to 
address this issue with duplicates by removing the record that was 
less accurate and up to date. While we identified such limitations, we 
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for providing descriptive 
information on the population of SEVP-certified schools that have 
recommended OPT and of foreign students engaged in OPT. We also found 
the data to be sufficiently reliable for analyzing student records for 
compliance with certain regulatory and policy requirements. We focused 
our analysis on several SEVIS fields related to management and 
oversight of foreign students engaged in OPT: (1) employer name and 
location, (2) remarks and comments on employment, and (3) dates of 
program of study and authorized OPT employment. 

We also analyzed student records for which an employer name was 
included and belonged in industries such as food service and retail, 
industries in which CTCEU officials were concerned about the potential 
of students working in unrelated jobs. We analyzed a sample of 158 
student records in which the employer name field indicated the student 
worked in select food service or retail industries. This is a select 
sample and is not representative of all records indicating a student 
is working in the food service or retail industries. We identified 
this sample by searching the SEVIS data of foreign students authorized 
to engage in OPT as of August 2013 for employers names with key words 
such as "restaurant," "café," "coffee," "pizza," and "burger," as well 
as for select retailers. This search returned 207 student records, 
which we reviewed and subsequently made the determination to exclude 
49 records based on the employer name including one of these search 
terms but belonging to a business outside of the food service or 
retail industries. For example, we excluded an employer that is a 
printing company with the word "café" in its name. From the sample of 
158, we determined that 44 student records did not include additional 
employment information in the SEVIS employment comment or employment 
remark fields that explained how the job was related to the field of 
study and the records did not indicate a potentially related degree. 

In addition to document and data collection and analysis, we 
interviewed SEVP officials to evaluate the extent to which their 
program has implemented controls related to OPT. We met with senior 
officials from SEVP, including SEVP's Deputy Director, and management 
and staff for the five of seven branches involved in managing OPT--
School Certification, Policy, Analysis and Operations Center, Field 
Representative Program, and Systems Management. We met with officials 
from CTCEU to understand the criminal enforcement perspective of 
managing and overseeing OPT. We interviewed USCIS officials to 
determine the extent to which USCIS has implemented processes for 
ensuring eligibility of students applying for employment authorization 
under OPT. In addition, we analyzed USCIS's Computer-Linked 
Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS) data on OPT 
adjudication results from fiscal years 2008 to 2013.[Footnote 48] To 
assess the reliability of the CLAIMS data on foreign student OPT 
adjudications, we interviewed agency officials responsible for 
managing the data about the data's sources and the system's controls. 
We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for providing 
descriptive information on the number of employment authorization 
applications and approvals for foreign students engaged in OPT. 
Furthermore, we interviewed 11 DSOs, and received a written response 
from 1 DSO, who are employed by schools in Washington, D.C., and 
surrounding areas on their roles and responsibilities related to 
foreign students seeking or authorized for OPT and on any challenges 
in the management and oversight of these foreign students. We selected 
these officials because, as of July 2013, they composed a group of 
representatives from SEVP-certified schools of various types and sizes 
in the Washington, D.C., region that meets regularly with SEVP to 
discuss matters such as SEVIS and SEVP policy and requirements. As we 
did not select a probability sample of DSOs to interview, the 
information we obtained from these school officials cannot be 
generalized. The interviews provided us with the perspectives of DSOs 
responsible for overseeing students engaged in OPT. Further, we 
interviewed officials from NAFSA: Association of International 
Educators to discuss the organization's views on OPT, including the 
involvement of DSOs in OPT.[Footnote 49] 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to February 
2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, D.C. 20528: 

February 12, 2014: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-356, "Student and Exchange Visitor Program: 
DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students 
with Employment Authorization" 

Dear Ms. Gambler: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

DHS is pleased to note GAO's positive recognition of the Department's 
efforts to develop and implement processes to identifY and address 
risks within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), such as developing 
preliminary indicators for certified schools and recovering missing 
documentation from school files. The draft report contained six
recommendations with which the Department concurs. Specifically, GAO 
recommended that the Director of ICE direct SEVP to: 

Recommendation 1: In coordination with the Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), identify and assess potential risks in 
[optional practical training] OPT, including obtaining and assessing 
relevant information from CTCEU and ICE field offices. 

Response: Concur. As part of ongoing efforts of SEVP, ICE is 
developing an overall risk management program focusing on identifying 
schools that may pose a risk. SEVP will work with CTCEU in developing 
factors to identifY risks for schools and students associated with 
OPT. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2014. 

Recommendation 2: Require that pre-completion and 12-month post-
completion OPT students report to Designated School Officials (DSOs), 
and record in Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 
students' employer information, including the employer's name and 
address. 

Response: Concur. The functionality to track OPT employment 
information, including the employer's name and address, dates of 
employment, and any periods of unemployment, have already been 
incorporated into SEVIS. The software that includes the required data 
fields is scheduled to be released in 2014. ECD: January 31, 2015. 

Recommendation 3: Develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to 
determine whether a job is related to a student's area of study and 
require DSOs to provide information in SEVIS to show that they took 
steps, based on this guidance, to help ensure that the student's work 
is related to the area of study. 

Response: Concur. SEVP will develop and distribute guidance to address 
this recommendation. Specifically, SEVP will develop information 
requirements and internal controls for both the DSO and SEVP 
personnel. ECD: September 30, 2014. 

Recommendation 4: Require that students report to DSOs, and DSOs 
record in SEVIS, students' initial date of employment and any period 
of unemployment. 

Response: Concur. Regulation at 8 CFR 214.2(f) (12) (i) requires such 
reporting by students and designated school officials. In addition, 8 
CFR 214.3(g)(2)(ii) explicitly requires schools to report changes in 
an F-l student's personal information or employer information within 
21 days of the change if the student is authorized by U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) to engage in a 17-month extension of 
OPT. SEVP will issue guidance to clarify the importance of the 
reporting obligations in order for students to maintain lawful 
nonimmigrant student status. It is expected that the guidance will 
assist DSOs in collecting this information for reporting in SEVIS.
ECD: January 31, 2015. 

Recommendation 5: Develop and provide guidance to DSOs and USCIS on 
how much time constitutes 1 full academic year for the purposes of 
recommending and authorizing OPT. 

Response: Concur. SEVP will provide guidance clarifying what periods 
of enrollment qualifY as - one full academic year for purposes of 
recommending and authorizing OPT. ECD: September 30, 2014. 

Recommendation 6: Develop and implement a mechanism to monitor available
information in SEVIS to determine if foreign students are accruing 
more OPT than allowed by ICE regulations. 

Response: Concur. SEVP will implement operational procedures to 
conduct periodic queries on the basis of maximum OPT eligibility time 
periods to identifY F-1 students who may have exceeded their OPT 
eligibility. SEVP will then coordinate with USCIS for follow-up on 
individual student cases. ECD: September 30, 2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant 
Director; Jennifer Bryant; Frances Cook; Lorraine Ettaro; Cynthia 
Grant; Kirsten Lauber; Elizabeth Luke; Lara Miklozek; Linda Miller; 
and Juan Tapia-Videla made significant contributions to this work. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country 
legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized 
periods of admission. In this report, we include out-of-status 
students--student visa holders who fail to meet certain requirements, 
such as enrolling in a qualified education program or engaging in 
authorized practical training following completion of studies--in our 
definition of overstays. Foreign students are allowed 60 days after 
the completion of their academic program or OPT to prepare for 
departure from the United States. For more information, see GAO, 
Overstays Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data 
and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-683] (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 
2013). 

[2] SEVP was created in conjunction with DHS's formation on March 1, 
2003. SEVP's funding comes from fees paid by schools and foreign 
students approved for the program. F visas are for foreign students 
pursuing academic studies at a college, university, or other academic 
institution, or in an accredited language training program; M visas 
are for foreign students pursuing studies at an established vocational 
or other recognized nonacademic institution. The Department of State 
manages nonimmigrant exchange visitors in the J visa classification. J 
visas enable foreign nationals to come to the United States to teach, 
study, conduct research, demonstrate special skills, or receive on-the-
job training for periods ranging from a few weeks to several years. 

[3] In May 2007, ICE and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) agreed that authority for F and M student policy and 
regulations resides with ICE, and that USCIS retains authority for 
interpreting statutes and regulations with regard to applications by F 
and M foreign students for employment authorization. In addition, 
USCIS agreed to coordinate with ICE to ensure that F and M foreign 
student policies are carried out consistently within DHS, and ICE 
agreed to consult with USCIS before finalizing policies and 
regulations governing F and M foreign students. 

[4] SEVP strategic plan framework (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2011). 

[5] DSOs are school employees who must be citizens of the United 
States or lawful permanent residents and whose offices must be located 
on the campus of their schools. In addition, ICE requires DSOs to be 
familiar with the regulations governing foreign students, including 
those approved for OPT. To that end, DSOs must attest that they intend 
to comply with ICE's rules and regulations specifying their 
responsibilities, with these attestations providing that willful 
misstatements constitute perjury. 

[6] GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, 
Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would 
Have Costs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2011). 

[7] GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to Assess 
Risks and Strengthen Oversight Functions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-572] (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2012). 

[8] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Policy for Integrated Risk 
Management (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010), and DHS Risk Management 
Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2011). 

[9] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

[10] CLAIMS 3 is a legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service case 
management system utilized by USCIS. CLAIMS 3 includes data and 
information on the status of foreign nationals' applications for 
extensions of stay and a variety of immigration applications and 
petitions (e.g., to convert from a tourist to a student). CLAIMS 3 
also maintains data on applications for work authorization. 

[11] We interviewed officials from ICE's HSI field offices in Atlanta, 
Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; New York, New 
York; and Los Angeles and San Francisco, California. We also 
interviewed officials from ICE's HSI field office in Charleston, West 
Virginia, which is under the supervision of the field office in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

[12] NAFSA was founded in 1948 as the National Association of Foreign 
Student Advisers to promote the professional development of U.S. 
college and university officials responsible for assisting and 
advising foreign students. In 1990, NAFSA changed its name to NAFSA: 
Association of International Educators to reflect its expanded 
mission. NAFSA's mission is to serve international educators, 
including international student advisers and DSOs, and their 
institutions and organizations, by establishing principles of good 
practice, providing professional learning and development 
opportunities, providing networking opportunities, and advocating for 
international education. 

[13] The Form I-20 is a Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant 
Student Status for Academic and Language Students or Vocational 
Students. 

[14] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f). 

[15] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(M); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(m). 

[16] For example, H-1B visas allow foreign citizens to come to the 
United States to perform temporary work in specialty occupations. A 
specialty occupation is defined as one requiring theoretical and 
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and 
the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher (or its equivalent) in 
the field of specialty. H-2A and H-2B visas respectively allow foreign 
citizens to come to the United States to perform temporary or seasonal 
agricultural and nonagricultural work. 

[17] A port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, 
airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are 
assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and 
enforce customs laws. 

[18] 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(10), (m)(14); SEVP Policy Guidance 1004-03. 

[19] Foreign students on an M visa may engage in OPT only after 
completion of their course of study and for a total of no more than 6 
months. 

[20] Foreign students on an F visa who are not enrolled in English 
language training programs also may engage in curricular practical 
training. Curricular practical training must be an integral part of an 
established curriculum and is defined as alternative work/study, 
internship, cooperative education, or any other type of required 
internship or practicum that is offered by sponsoring employers 
through cooperative agreements with the school. Unlike OPT, curricular 
practical training does not require employment authorization from 
USCIS, and exceptions to the 1 academic year requirement can be made 
for students enrolled in graduate studies that require immediate 
participation in curricular practical training. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 
(f)(10)(i). 

[21] Students approved for either 12-month post-completion OPT or 17-
month STEM extension post-completion OPT can have their student status 
and employment authorization automatically extended if they are the 
beneficiaries of an H-1B petition for temporary employment in a 
specialty occupation. The employment authorization extension generally 
lasts until October 1 of the fiscal year for which the H-1B visa is 
being requested or until the petition is rejected, denied, or revoked, 
whichever comes first. This extension is referred to as the cap-gap 
extension. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(vi). 

[22] See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(11) for OPT application 
requirements. 

[23] This DHS list sets forth eligible courses of study based on the 
Classification of Instructional Programs codes developed by the U.S. 
Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics. 

[24] As of December 3, 2013, the filing fee for Form I-765 was $380. 

[25] 8 C.F.R. 214.2(f)(11)(iii). 

[26] DHS deemed specific details about the threshold as sensitive; 
therefore, we did not include them in this report. 

[27] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Policy for Integrated Risk 
Management (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). 

[28] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Management 
Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2011). 

[29] ICE regulations state that students authorized for OPT are 
required to report interruptions in employment to DSOs and that DSOs 
are responsible for updating student records to reflect these reported 
changes, but they do not specifically require the reporting of 
employment start and end dates. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(f)(12)(i), 
214.3(g)(2)(ii). 

[30] Extending Period of Optional Practical Training by 17 Months for 
F-1 Nonimmigrant Students With STEM Degrees and Expanding Cap-Gap 
Relief for All F-1 Students With Pending H-1B Petitions, 73 Fed. Reg. 
18,944 (Apr. 8, 2008). 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[32] CTCEU officials stated that many students engaged in OPT are 
working in food service or retail. We looked at a sample of 158 
student records, selected based on whether the employer name was 
included and that it indicated employment in select food service or 
retail industries. This is a select sample and is not representative 
of all records indicating a student is working in the food service or 
retail industries. From this sample, we determined that 44 student 
records did not include additional employment information in the SEVIS 
employment comment or employment remark fields to explain why the job 
was related to the field of study or that the student's field of study 
was not considered to be directly related to either food service or 
retail. Appendix I presents more details about our methodology. 

[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[34] ICE's regulations and policy do not require schools and DSOs to 
recommend OPT to all eligible foreign students who apply; schools have 
the discretion as to whether or not to recommend foreign students for 
OPT. 

[35] DHS deemed information on actions it could take related to 
foreign students' school transfers as sensitive; therefore, we did not 
include this information in this report. 

[36] Students in English language training programs are not eligible 
for OPT, and M visa students are eligible for OPT only upon completion 
of their course of study. 

[37] The Department of Education defines an academic year as the 
amount of time a student must complete each year, and the time period 
in which the student is expected to complete it, as defined by the 
school. For example, the school's academic year may be made up of a 
fall and spring semester, during which a full-time undergraduate 
student is expected to complete at least 24 semester hours over the 
course of 30 weeks of instruction time. Academic years may change from 
school to school and from program to program; however, two semesters 
typically span approximately 8 to 9 months of the year. 

[38] SEVIS has a field for which the DSO may indicate that the student 
has or has not met the 1 full academic year requirement by marking 
"Yes" or "No." This field is not compulsory, and a DSO is not required 
to mark "Yes" prior to recommending OPT. According to our analysis, 
25,070 student records did not indicate whether the student had or had 
not met the 1-full-academic year requirement. 

[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].  

[40] M visa students may be authorized up to 6 months of post-
completion OPT and are not eligible for pre-completion or an extension 
of OPT. 

[41] According to SEVP's guidance to DSOs, this 14-month limit 
provides a 2-month buffer to allow time for USCIS's adjudication of 
the student's application for employment authorization. However, if 
the application and adjudication time takes 3 months from the end of 
the student's program, the student should be approved for 11 months of 
OPT. USCIS standard operating procedures for adjudicating employment 
authorization applications explain how previously approved OPT should 
affect eligibility for additional OPT. According to SEVP's guidance 
and USCIS's procedures, if the student engaged in pre-completion part-
time OPT employment for 12 months (which would equate to 6 months of 
full-time OPT), the student should be approved for 6 months of post-
completion OPT. 

[42] 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(vi) states that the lawful status and any 
post completion or STEM OPT employment authorization of an F student 
who is the beneficiary of an H-1B petition and request for change of 
status shall be automatically extended until October 1 of the fiscal 
year for which such H-1B visa is being requested, which is referred to 
as the cap-gap extension. This automatic extension of lawful status 
and OPT employment authorization is to immediately terminate upon the 
rejection, denial, or revocation of the H-1B petition filed on such 
student's behalf. 

[43] USCIS maintains the Central Index System, a database system 
originally developed by the predecessor Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. The Central Index System contains information on the status 
of applicants/petitioners seeking immigration benefits, including 
aliens who have been issued employment authorization documents. 

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].  

[45] DHS deemed information on actions it could take related to 
foreign students' school transfers as sensitive; therefore, we did not 
include this information in this report. 

[46] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Policy for Integrated Risk 
Management (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010), and DHS Risk Management 
Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2011). 

[47] The regulations governing nonimmigrant classes and OPT are found 
in 8 C.F.R. pt. 214. 

[48] CLAIMS 3 is a legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service case 
management system utilized by USCIS. CLAIMS 3 includes data and 
information on the status of foreign nationals' applications for 
extensions of stay and a variety of immigration applications and 
petitions (e.g., to convert from a tourist to a student). CLAIMS 3 
also maintains data on applications for work authorization. 

[49] NAFSA was founded in 1948 as the National Association of Foreign 
Student Advisers to promote the professional development of U.S. 
college and university officials responsible for assisting and 
advising foreign students. NAFSA's mission is to serve international 
educators, international student advisers, and DSOs and their 
institutions and organizations, by establishing principles of good 
practice, providing professional learning and development 
opportunities, providing networking opportunities, and advocating for 
international education. 

[End of section] 

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