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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

December 2013: 

Telecommunications: 

GSA Needs to Share and Prioritize Lessons Learned to Avoid Future 
Transition Delays: 

GAO-14-63: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-63, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to 
the telecommunications services and solutions needed to meet their 
mission requirements. As agencies’ telecommunications needs have 
evolved, so too have GSA’s contracts to help support them. Its latest 
contracts, signed in 2007 and collectively called Networx, provide 
transport; Internet protocol; wireless; and management and application 
services, among others. In fiscal year 2012, agencies spent over $1.4 
billion on Networx services. However, the transition from the previous 
telecommunications contracts, known as FTS2001, has not been easy, 
taking almost 3 years longer than planned. 

GAO’s objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the 
delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences due to 
the delay, and (2) to what extent GSA is documenting and applying 
lessons learned as it prepares for the next telecommunications 
contract transition. GAO examined lessons learned activities and 
supporting documents, cost and missed savings estimates, performed 
case studies at two agencies with large delays, and interviewed agency 
and service provider officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Complex acquisition processes and weaknesses in project planning 
contributed to the delays experienced on the Networx transition, 
resulting in cost increases and missed savings. In particular, the 
complexity of the acquisition process was related to duplicative 
contract vehicles, the large number of service options, and changes 
related to the process for ensuring fair competition among service 
providers, among others. These issues were reported by the General 
Services Administration (GSA) to have been compounded by a decline in 
contracting and technical expertise within the agencies. GAO has 
identified skills gaps in the federal workforce as a government-wide 
high-risk area and highlighted the need for agencies to work with the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to close them. Weaknesses in 
agencies’ project planning also contributed to the delays. For 
example, agencies tended to transition easier items first, to 
demonstrate progress, before they transitioned items that needed a 
long lead time such as data networks and international services. As a 
result of the delays, GSA’s estimated cost to complete the transition 
increased by $66.4 million, 44 percent over the baseline estimate. In 
addition to the extra transition costs, agencies may have paid more 
for similar services by staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer than 
planned. Specifically, in April 2010, GSA estimated that agencies 
could have saved 28.4 percent of their spending on FTS2001 by using 
Networx contracts instead. Based on this rate of savings, GAO 
estimates that agencies could have saved about $329 million if they 
had transitioned to Networx on time. 

The extent to which GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned in 
preparation for the next telecommunications transition varies. GSA has 
fully or partially satisfied five of six key practices necessary for a 
robust lessons learned process (see table). To its credit, GSA has 
collected, analyzed, and validated lessons learned from the Networx 
transition. However, it has not fully shared these lessons with its 
customer agencies or prioritized them to ensure that resources are 
applied to areas with the greatest return on investment. GSA plans to 
finalize its next telecommunications acquisition strategy in December 
2013 and begin the next transition when it awards new contracts in 
February 2017. Fully addressing key lessons learned practices should 
help GSA and agencies better plan for and execute the next 
telecommunications transition. 

Table: Extent to which GSA Satisfied Lessons Learned Key Practices 

Practice: Collecting information; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Analyzing the information collected to identify lessons that 
lead to recommendations; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Validating the accuracy and applicability of lessons to 
other projects; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Archiving the lessons; 
Satisfied? GSA has partially satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Sharing and disseminating lessons
Satisfied? GSA has partially satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Prioritizing and applying lessons learned
Satisfied? GSA has not satisfied the criteria. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of table] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that, in preparing for the next transition, GSA, in 
coordination with OPM, examine potential government-wide expertise 
shortfalls, and that it provide agencies guidance on project planning 
and fully archive, share, and prioritize lessons learned. GSA and OPM 
agreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

View GAO-14-63. For more information, contact Carol R. Cha at (202) 
512-4456 or chac@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Complex Acquisition Process and Weaknesses in Project Planning 
Contributed to Networx Transition Delays, Resulting in Increased Costs 
and Missed Savings: 

GSA Documented Lessons Learned but Has Not Effectively Archived, 
Shared, and Applied Them: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the General Service Administration: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Social Security Administration: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: FTS2001-to-Networx Roles and Responsibilities: 

Table 2: Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise Contractors: 

Table 3: Planned and Actual FTS2001 Contract Expiration: 

Table 4: Change in Networx Transition Program Cost Estimates as a 
Result of Delays (dollars in millions): 

Table 5: Description of Lessons Learned Key Practices: 

Table 6: Extent to which GSA Satisfied the Lessons Learned Key 
Practices: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: FTS2001 and Networx Contracts Periods of Performance and 
Transition Period: 

Figure 2: Increase in Transition Period: 

Figure 3: Percent FTS2001 Inventory Disconnected between December 2010 
and February 2013: 

Figure 4: GSA's Analysis of Potential Savings: 

Abbreviations: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 5, 2013: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 

Chairman: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
United States Senate: 

The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for ensuring 
that federal agencies have access to the telecommunications services 
and solutions that they need to meet their mission requirements. As 
agencies' telecommunications needs have evolved, so too have GSA's 
contracts to help support their needs. Currently, contracts 
established in 2007 and collectively known as Networx provide voice 
and data communications transport services, Internet protocol 
services, wireless and satellite services, information security, and 
management and application services. GSA reports that in fiscal year 
2012, agencies spent over $1.4 billion on Networx services. However, 
this evolution has not been easy. The latest transition, from the 
previous telecommunications contracts known as FTS2001 to Networx, 
took almost 3 years longer than planned. 

At your request, we conducted a study of the Networx program. Our 
specific objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to 
the delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences 
the federal government experienced as a result of the delayed 
transition, and (2) to what extent GSA is documenting and applying 
lessons learned as it prepares for the next telecommunications 
contract transition. 

To identify causes for the delay, we assessed key documentation, 
including transition project plans, management reports, and lessons 
learned results from GSA and two case study agencies, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We 
selected the case study agencies based on the extent of their delays 
in transitioning and their spending on telecommunications. To 
determine the consequences of the delay, we compared GSA's latest 
transition cost estimates with its 2004 cost estimate, and assessed 
its April 2010 analysis of the federal government's potential savings 
resulting from transitioning from FTS2001 to Networx. To assess the 
reliability of the cost data, we tested them to identify obvious 
problems with completeness and accuracy, and interviewed knowledgeable 
agency officials about the systems and processes in place to collect 
and verify the data. On the basis of these steps, we determined these 
data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. To 
assess the extent to which GSA is identifying and applying lessons 
learned, we compared GSA's lessons learned process and supporting 
documentation with leading practices. We also interviewed GSA, SSA, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) officials, and representatives from all of the FTS2001 and 
Networx contractors. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to December 
2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More 
details about the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

Background: 

GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to 
the telecommunications services and solutions that they need to meet 
mission requirements. The organization responsible for carrying out 
these duties is the Integrated Technology Services Office within GSA's 
Federal Acquisition Service. Within the Integrated Technology Services 
Office, the Office of Network Services Programs develops and manages 
programs for federal civilian and military agencies that are intended 
to deliver cost-effective administrative and technical support for 
telecommunications and network services. To provide cost savings to 
agencies, GSA aggregates requirements and develops government-wide 
contracts. 

Networx Provides Contract Vehicles for Agencies to Acquire 
Telecommunications Services: 

Networx is the latest in a series of programs GSA has offered to 
agencies to provide telecommunications services. It is the successor 
to the FTS2001 program, which began in the late 1990s. FTS2001 was 
composed of two large contracts, one awarded to Sprint in December 
1998 and one awarded to MCI in January 1999. The program also included 
contracts that had been awarded to local telecommunications 
contractors for selected metropolitan areas. GSA allowed the local 
telecommunications contractors to also offer long distance services on 
the FTS2001 contracts. These contracts were termed "crossover 
contracts," and were with AT&T and Qwest, among others. 

In 2003, GSA, in conjunction with a group of senior federal 
information technology officials known as the Interagency Management 
Council, developed a successor program--Networx--to replace the 
FTS2001 contracts. Networx was to provide agencies with traditional 
and emerging services to meet current and future requirements. 

GSA identified several goals for the program, including several that 
were specific to the transition from FTS2001 to Networx. The goals for 
the transition included: 

* minimizing service impact, 

* transitioning telecommunications services before the FTS2001 
contracts expired, 

* expediting the availability of new services, and: 

* minimizing transition expenses. 

GSA's, the Interagency Management Council's, and other key 
participants' roles and responsibilities in carrying out the 
transition from FTS2001 to Networx are described in table 1. 

Table 1: FTS2001-to-Networx Roles and Responsibilities: 

Transition stakeholder: Interagency Management Council; 
Responsibilities: The Interagency Management Council was established in 
1992 to provide a forum and focal point for agency participation in 
planning and overseeing GSA's telecommunications service. It is 
composed of senior executives representing 14 Cabinet-level departments 
and several other agencies. The council's meetings have been suspended 
while GSA considers how it should be structured for the next 
telecommunications transition. 

Transition stakeholder: Transition Working Group; 
Responsibilities: A subgroup of the Interagency Management Council, 
the Transition Working Group was established in May 2004 to conduct 
collective planning and coordination activities related to the 
transition; to develop a consensus on common transition issues that 
affect multiple agencies; to develop guidance and processes for 
acquiring, validating, and maintaining customer agency services 
inventories; and to develop guidance for customer agency planning, 
preparation, and execution of transition. The Transition Working Group 
was composed of one representative from each of the Interagency 
Management Council member agencies. 

Transition stakeholder: GSA; 
Responsibilities: GSA, in conjunction with the Transition Working 
Group and agencies' transition managers, developed and disseminated 
strategic guidance and governmentwide plans. Its responsibilities 
included monitoring the transition; enforcing compliance with the 
government's transition responsibilities in the Networx contracts; 
managing the overall operation of the Transition Coordination Center; 
providing guidance and assistance to agencies for the transition; 
monitoring Networx contractors' performance during the transition; 
and providing program management and control for the transition, 
including maintaining the master schedule for transition. The Office 
of Network Services Programs, within GSA's Integrated Technology 
Services Office, manages the Networx contracts. 

Transition stakeholder: Agencies; 
Responsibilities: Agencies were responsible for coordinating 
transition efforts with the incumbent and Networx contractors to 
ensure that existing services under FTS2001 were disconnected and that 
new services were ordered. GSA and the Interagency Management Council 
requested that each of the customer agencies appoint a transition 
manager and establish a transition team to manage the agency's 
internal transition planning, preparation, and execution efforts and 
to be responsible for interfacing with GSA, the Interagency Management 
Council, and officials within the agency. 

Transition stakeholder: OMB; 
Responsibilities: OMB, in conjunction with GSA, provided 
governmentwide interpretation and direction for agency implementation 
and use of the Networx Program. Further, OMB received briefings from 
the Office of Network Services Programs to keep track of agencies' 
transition progress. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of table] 

In 2007, GSA made multiple awards of task-and delivery-order contracts 
[Footnote 1] to five vendors under this program as vehicles for 
agencies to procure telecommunications services. These contract 
vehicles are known as Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise. 
Networx Universal contracts were awarded to AT&T, Verizon Business 
Services,[Footnote 2] and CenturyLink[Footnote 3] in March 2007. In 
May 2007, Networx Enterprise contracts were awarded to these three 
vendors as well as to Level 3 Communications and Sprint Nextel 
Corporation.[Footnote 4] Table 2 lists the contractors for each of the 
Networx contracts. 

Table 2: Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise Contractors: 

Contract: Networx Universal; 
Contractors: AT&T; Verizon Business Services; CenturyLink. 

Contract: Networx Enterprise; 
Contractors: AT&T; Verizon Business Services; CenturyLink; Level 3 
Communications; Sprint Nextel Corporation. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of table] 

Both contract vehicles offer voice and data services; wireless 
services; management and application services, such as video and audio 
conferencing; security services, including intrusion detection and 
prevention; and land mobile radio service. The Networx Enterprise 
contract offers services similar to those of Networx Universal, but 
with less extensive geographic coverage and service requirements than 
the Networx Universal contract. Mobile and fixed satellite services 
are unique to the Universal contracts, while certain access services 
are unique to the Enterprise contacts. 

Once GSA awarded the Networx contracts, agencies could begin their 
transition from FTS2001 to Networx. Prior to executing their 
transition, agencies were to have validated their baseline service 
inventory. Then they were to select a Networx contract (Universal or 
Enterprise). Next, agencies were to select the contractor to provide 
the services using the fair opportunity process required by law and 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. This process requires agencies to 
provide all contractors a fair opportunity to be considered for each 
order in excess of $3,000 that is to be issued under a multiple-award 
task-or delivery-order contract.[Footnote 5] After selecting their 
contract and contractor, agencies were to submit transition and 
disconnect orders to their FTS2001 contractors. 

Transition to Networx Was Delayed and Required Extension of Existing 
Contracts: 

According to the original contract terms, the FTS2001 contracts were 
set to expire in December 2006 and January 2007, and according to 
GSA's April 2005 Networx Acquisition Plan, the agency planned to award 
replacement contracts in May 2006. However, GSA was delayed in 
finalizing the Networx contracts, and therefore negotiated sole-source 
contracts, termed FTS2001 bridge contracts, with Sprint and MCI in 
July and August 2006. These bridge contracts extended the terms of the 
original FTS2001 contracts until the ends of May 2010 and June 2010, 
respectively. In addition, in February 2009, GSA established a FTS2001 
bridge contract with AT&T until June 2010. 

According to GSA's August 2008 transition plan, agencies were to 
complete their transition of services from FTS2001 to Networx or an 
alternative by June 2010. However, the majority of agencies had not 
transitioned their services by that time. Therefore, to allow 
additional time, GSA extended the bridge contracts with Sprint until 
May 2011 and with Verizon and AT&T until June 2011. In May 2010, it 
also extended the Qwest crossover contract until May 2011. 

By the end of June 2011, however, only 61 out of 158 agencies had 
completed their transitions, and only 42 percent of the value of 
FTS2001 services had been transitioned to Networx. To extend the time 
again for agencies to transition, GSA established contracts, termed 
FTS2001 continuity bridge contracts, with Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and 
Qwest (doing business as CenturyLink). These contracts expired in 
February and March 2013, 33 months later than planned in August 2008. 

Figure 1 illustrates the FTS2001 contract extensions, the Networx 
contracts' period of performance, and the amount of time the federal 
government took to transition services from the FTS2001 contracts. 

Figure 1: FTS2001 and Networx Contracts Periods of Performance and 
Transition Period: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Transition Period: March 2007-March 2013. 

FTS 2001 Contracts: 

Sprint: 
December 2006-May 2011: Sprint Bridge Contract; 
May 2011-February 2013: Sprint Continuity Bridge. 

Verizon (MCI): 
January 2007-June 2011: Verizon Bridge Contract; 
June 2011-March 2013: Verizon Continuity Bridge. 

AT&T Crossover: 
February 2009-June 2011: AT&T Bridge Contract; 
June 2011-March 2013: AT&T Continuity Bridge. 

Qwest Crossover: 
May 2010-May 2011: Qwest Crossover Extension; 
May 2011-February 2013: CenturyLink (Qwest) Continuity
Bridge. 

Networx Universal Contracts: 
March 2007-March 2017. 

Networx Enterprise Contracts: 
June 2007-May 2017. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of figure] 

See table 3 for a comparison of GSA's 2008 plan with the actual end of 
the FTS2001 contracts. 

Table 3: Planned and Actual FTS2001 Contract Expiration: 

Transition start; 
GSA 2008 plan: March 2007; 
Actual: March 2007. 

FTS2001 Contract expiration; 
GSA 2008 plan: June 2010; 
Actual: March 2013. 

Time to transition; 
GSA 2008 plan: 39 months; 
Actual: 72 months; 
Delay: 33 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of table] 

The growth in the time it took to complete the transition is 
illustrated in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Increase in Transition Period: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timeline] 

As of 2008: March 2007-June 2010: 39 months. 

As of 2010: March 2007-June 2011: 51 months. 

As of 2011: March 2007-March 2013: 72 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of figure] 

Networx transition progress reports emphasized the delay. Each month 
from December 2010 through December 2011, except February 2011, GSA 
reported on the progress of the Networx transition to OMB officials. 
Reports included (1) the percentage of the total baseline inventory of 
FTS2001 services (about 5 million items) that had been disconnected, 
and (2) the percentage of the peak value of FTS2001 services (about 
$1.1 billion) that had been disconnected. A service inventory item 
could range from a single calling card or a simple voice service to a 
complex call routing system or a unique solution designed to meet a 
single complex requirement. See figure 3 for a comparison of the 
progress as measured by percentage of items disconnected and 
percentage of peak value of FTS2001 services. 

Figure 3: Percent FTS2001 Inventory Disconnected between December 2010 
and February 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Date: December 10, 2010; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 72%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 27%. 

Date: January 21, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 79%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 25%. 

Date: March 18, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 82%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 37%. 

Date: April 29, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 85%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 40%. 

Date: May 13, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 85%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 40%. 

Date: June 24, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 88%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 42%. 

Date: July 22, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 89%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 43%. 

Date: August 19, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 90%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 42%. 

Date: September 30, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 92%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 45%. 

Date: October 28, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 93%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 60%. 

Date: November 25, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 93%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 63%. 

Date: December 9, 2011; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 94%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 63%. 

Date: May 31, 2012; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 98%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 68%. 

Date: November 23, 2012; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 99%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 81%. 

Date: February 28 2013; 
Percentage inventory items disconnected: 100%; 
Percentage inventory value disconnected: 88%. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

Note: GSA officials reported that they did not provide a briefing to 
OMB in February 2011 because of scheduling conflicts. GSA officials 
also reported that transition progress briefings were less frequent 
after 2011 because OMB and GSA were instead meeting with individual 
agencies about their transition delays. 

[End of figure] 

Planning for the Transition to the Next Telecommunications Contract: 

GSA has begun planning the next telecommunications acquisition, known 
as NS2020. A new group, the NS2020 Interagency Advisory Panel, was 
established in December 2012 to collaborate in addressing technical, 
acquisition, financial, policy, and other matters related to the 
development of the NS2020 strategy. The Office of Network Services 
Programs has drafted an acquisition strategy, which it plans to 
finalize by the end of 2013. 

The Networx contracts are planned to expire in March and May of 2017; 
as of September 2013, GSA plans to award the next set of contracts in 
February 2017. However, according to agency officials, there is a high 
risk that this milestone will not be achieved. GSA expects that it 
will take 3 years to transition all of the services from Networx. 
Therefore, the Networx contracts are already planned to be extended at 
least 3 years, into 2020. Office of Network Services Programs 
officials stated that the additional time is needed to incorporate 
lessons learned from the FTS2001-to-Networx transition into the next 
transition strategy. 

Prior GAO Reports on Telecommunications Transition: 

We have previously reported on GSA's efforts to transition 
telecommunications services from one set of contracts to another. In 
March 2001, we reported on challenges federal agencies faced in 
transitioning to FTS2001 from its predecessor program.[Footnote 6] 
Specifically, we reported that several factors contributed to 
transition delays, including that the FTS2001 contractors did not 
provide GSA with the management data it needed to manage and measure 
the complex transition process; GSA was not able to rapidly add all 
the services to the FTS2001 contracts required by agencies to complete 
their transitions; customer agencies were slow to order FTS2001 
services; FTS2001 contractors had staffing shortfalls and turnover on 
account teams, as well as billing and procedural problems, which 
impaired their support of agency transition activities; and local 
exchange carriers had problems delivering facilities and services on 
time to the FTS2001 contractors. We also noted that as the transition 
progressed, trends suggested that the final services to be 
transitioned were the most time-consuming. Specifically, the 
transition of switched data services--primarily large agency data 
communications networks using frame relay or asynchronous transfer 
mode technologies--was lagging significantly. We concluded that until 
it addressed the outstanding issues impeding transition and 
expeditiously completed the transition, GSA would be unable to achieve 
its basic goals for ensuring the best service and maximizing 
competition. We recommended GSA obtain usable and complete management 
information and track and report the status of disconnects and 
transition progress. We also made recommendations focused on 
identifying and resolving billing issues. GSA agreed and implemented 
our recommendations. 

In June 2006, we reported on GSA's and selected agencies' FTS2001-to-
Networx transition planning efforts, and found that they were 
generally planning to employ sound transition planning practices. 
[Footnote 7] The practices included, among other things, establishing 
a structured management approach; identifying the resources, including 
human capital, that the transition effort will require; and developing 
a transition plan. We recommended, among other things, that GSA 
provide guidance to its customer agencies that reflects all of the 
sound transition planning practices. GSA agreed and implemented our 
recommendation. 

In February 2007, we reported on GSA's estimate of the amount of 
funding needed to meet its transition-related commitments, and found 
that the agency's analysis was not sufficiently accurate, 
comprehensive, documented, or validated, as called for by best 
practices.[Footnote 8] We recommended that GSA establish a cost 
estimation policy that reflects best practices, and revise the 
transition cost estimate using best practices. GSA implemented our 
recommendations. 

In June 2008, we reported on the extent to which six selected customer 
agencies were following sound transition planning practices.[Footnote 
9] We found that the agencies were generally implementing the 
practices, but three of them had not fully implemented some of the key 
components of the practices and were not planning to do so. For 
example, one agency was using key project management processes in its 
transition planning efforts, and five planned to use them. Regarding 
identifying human capital needs, two agencies had identified their 
resource needs, and three had plans to identify them. One of the 
agencies did not plan to identify its human capital needs. We made 
recommendations to those agencies that had not implemented key 
practice components and did not plan to do so, focused on addressing 
the gaps in transition planning. The agencies implemented some but not 
all of our recommendations. 

Complex Acquisition Process and Weaknesses in Project Planning 
Contributed to Networx Transition Delays, Resulting in Increased Costs 
and Missed Savings: 

Several factors contributed to delays in transitioning from FTS2001 to 
Networx. In particular, the complex Networx acquisition process 
compounded by a reported lack of telecommunications and contracting 
expertise within the agencies contributed to delays. Weaknesses in 
project management also contributed to the delays. As a result of the 
delays, GSA experienced increased costs, and agencies missed savings. 

Complex Acquisition Process Compounded by Limited Agency Expertise: 

The complexity of the acquisition process was related to duplicative 
and overlapping contract vehicles, the large number of potential 
service options for a given requirement, and challenges related to 
implementing the fair opportunity process,[Footnote 10] among others. 
The complexity was compounded by limited contract and technical 
expertise at some agencies. 

Duplicative and overlapping contract vehicles. According to GSA's 
analysis, the establishment of two Networx contract vehicles--
Universal and Enterprise--created confusion with customer agencies and 
added administrative cost for GSA. The two-contract-vehicle strategy 
was intended to address Networx program goals to provide all services 
that were available under FTS2001, as well as to provide access to a 
greater number of competing vendors that would provide new, enhanced 
services and emerging technologies. The Universal vehicle was intended 
to focus on the first of these goals, while the Enterprise vehicle was 
to focus more on the second. However, because of industry 
consolidation by the time the contracts were awarded, the strategy was 
not as effective as had been envisioned. Specifically, three of the 
five contractors awarded Enterprise contracts were also awarded 
Universal contracts, and most services are provided on both contracts. 
Having two vehicles essentially doubled GSA's management and support 
responsibilities, and significant overlap existed with the two 
contracts. GSA agreed that the Universal/Enterprise construct should 
not be repeated in the follow-on NS2020 program. 

Decoupled contract services. According to GSA and some service 
providers, another key factor that contributed to delays was that 
agencies could not purchase multiple services bundled[Footnote 11] 
into a single item on the Networx contracts. Specifically, Networx 
contracts did not permit this type of bundling, as the FTS2001 
contracts had. Instead, the Networx contracts offered services by 
detailed contract line items in order to allow agencies to more 
accurately identify and maintain inventories of the services they were 
purchasing. Agencies were expected to map their existing FTS2001 
services to the individual services on Networx, using a tool called 
the Networx Unit Pricer. To facilitate this, agencies were expected to 
use the Networx Unit Pricer to compare unit prices at the line-item 
level across the Networx Universal and Enterprise contractors and, 
where available, the FTS2001 contracts. However, the growth in the 
number of services offered (54 on Networx compared with 26 on FTS2001) 
and the number of contract line items (about 5,100 in the original 
contracts), including some that vary by location and bandwidth, led to 
a number of different potential service options for any given 
requirement. 

To address this challenge, many agencies developed statements of work 
to request proposals from the contractors instead of using the Networx 
Unit Pricer. However, GSA had expected that the vast majority of 
orders would be placed using the Networx Unit Pricer and would not 
require the development of statements of work. Thus, this process 
added to GSA's planned workload, requiring GSA to review the 
statements of work to determine if the requirements were within the 
scope of the Networx contracts and assist in ordering them. If the 
requirements were not in the scope of the contracts, additional time 
was required to modify the contracts. (This extra work, for example, 
resulted in the number of contract line items increasing from 5,100 to 
13,400 as of June 2011.) 

Challenges related to the fair opportunity process. Finally, according 
to GSA, agencies experienced challenges in implementing the fair 
opportunity process because of a lack of clear guidance on changes 
that were made to the process after GSA awarded the contract vehicles. 
At the time the Networx contracts were awarded, potential contractors 
could protest (i.e., contest) the issuance of an order only when an 
order increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract 
under which the order was issued. However, soon after the Networx 
transition was under way, changes were made to the procurement 
statutes that resulted in agencies needing to take more measures than 
in the past. Specifically, the statutes were modified to allow 
protests of the issuance or proposed issuance of task or delivery 
orders above $10 million (not just on the grounds that the order 
increases the scope, period or maximum value of the contract under 
which it was issued). In addition, the new statutes required 
additional measures in giving all contractors a fair opportunity to be 
considered for orders over $5 million. In addition to lacking clear 
guidance, according to GSA's analysis, because agencies previously 
relied on GSA to provide expertise on contract processes and 
procedures, several agencies lacked expertise in the fair opportunity 
process. To GSA's credit, once aware of this issue, it responded by 
providing guidance; however, according to GSA, its guidance was 
sometimes inconsistent and created confusion. GSA officials agreed 
that different organizations within GSA, such as acquisition support 
or the help desk, provided oral guidance to customer agencies that was 
inconsistent. 

According to GSA's analysis, a decline in telecommunications technical 
and contracting expertise in the federal government contributed to 
some agencies' inability to efficiently identify and contract for 
Networx solutions for their requirements. In particular, customer 
agencies requested GSA's assistance in developing a statement of work 
and conducting the fair opportunity process. Moreover, according to 
the analysis, customer agencies are concerned that the shortage of 
telecommunications specialists will get worse because there are not 
enough to replace experienced workers nearing retirement. Further, 
since February 2011, we have identified gaps in the skills of the 
federal workforce as a high-risk area that threatens the government's 
ability to effectively address national issues. We have noted that 
agencies should work with the Office of Personnel Management, the 
central human resources agency for the federal government, to pursue a 
strategic, government-wide approach to addressing these critical 
skills gaps. GSA has yet to fully study this issue, and agreed that 
understanding expertise shortfalls would be useful for future 
transition planning purposes; however, it has not established a plan 
to do so. As we previously reported, sound transition planning 
practices include ensuring that personnel with the right skills are in 
place to support the transition effort.[Footnote 12] These skills 
include contract expertise, legal expertise, asset management, and 
program management. Identifying current and projected shortfalls in 
critical telecommunication specialist roles early in the process of 
planning the next transition could better position GSA to assist 
customer agencies and help avoid future delays. 

Customer Agencies' Weak Project Planning and Execution Issues: 

Another key factor that contributed to delays was weak project 
planning. According to sound transition practices, a transition such 
as the one from FTS2001 to Networx should be approached as a critical 
project.[Footnote 13] Accordingly, agencies should develop a project 
management plan as the primary document that defines how the 
transition is to be executed and controlled, as called for by leading 
project management practices.[Footnote 14] As we previously reported, 
a transition project management plan should include, among other 
things, a time line of all activities that need to be completed, 
taking into account priorities relative to the agency's mission-
critical systems, contingency plans, and identified risks. Moreover, 
transition plans should be updated on an ongoing basis to reflect the 
current status of the project and allow for reporting progress. 

However, neither of our case study agencies had a current transition 
project management plan or an integrated transition time line. 
Although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had established a project 
management plan in February 2008, it had not established an integrated 
transition time line, and had not updated the plan to reflect the 
current status and endpoint of the project. Instead, it managed and 
tracked individual transition projects separately. For example, it 
used a spreadsheet to track the installation of Multiprotocol Label 
Switching[Footnote 15] circuits at 868 sites. However, as of June 
2012, according to a GSA report, only about 49 percent of the Corps's 
transition had been completed. Using an integrated transition time 
line and having an updated project management plan that included plans 
for addressing the issues it experienced with its local vendors might 
have helped the Corps identify and schedule sites that needed a longer 
lead time to upgrade. According to Corps officials, the transition was 
complete in March 2013. 

In addition, SSA had prepared a transition project management plan by 
June 2008, but it had not established an integrated transition time 
line, nor had it updated its plan since then. SSA's transition was 
divided into five components, and agency officials reported that three 
of the components were complete by March 2011, but that the two most 
complex components were not complete as of September 2013. While they 
had received contractor plans and schedules for the incomplete 
components, they had not updated these plans into one integrated 
transition project management plan. According to SSA officials, it was 
not feasible to integrate the schedules because of their complexity 
and scope. As of September 2013, SSA had yet to finish disconnecting 
its FTS2001 services. It has established Networx sole-source task 
orders[Footnote 16] to maintain the services until April 2014, while 
it completes its transition. 

We cannot generalize about project planning at all agencies based on 
what we found at SSA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, 
government-wide, agencies tended to transition easier items before 
they transitioned more complex items. For example, they transitioned 
items such as calling cards or simple switched voice services first, 
which demonstrated progress, before they transitioned complex, higher 
cost, items that needed a long lead time such as data networks and 
international services. This was reflected in the transition progress 
reports discussed earlier in this report. For example, as illustrated 
in figure 3, in June 2011, 88 percent of FTS2001 service inventory 
items had been disconnected, yet the value of the disconnected items 
was only 42 percent of the value of the inventory. By planning to 
transition time-consuming services earlier in the project, agencies 
could have reduced or avoided delays incurred. 

In planning their next telecommunications transitions, agencies could 
avoid delays by approaching the process as a critical project and 
establishing transition plans that include detailed time lines that 
take into account priorities relative to their mission-critical 
systems, contingency plans, and identified risks and are updated to 
reflect the current status and endpoint of the transition. 

In addition to weaknesses in project planning, our case study agencies 
described problems executing their transitions. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers officials stated that the biggest factor contributing to 
their delays was related to installing new services at field sites. 
Specifically, they said that installation required additional work by 
the local telecommunications vendors, but that the local vendors were 
not always cooperative. According to the officials, the local vendors 
did not have an incentive to make the upgrades, and would therefore 
refuse to install the additional facilities or would quote excessive 
prices for the installation. 

Similarly, SSA described problems related to Networx contractors' 
performance in executing its contracts. SSA is working to resolve the 
problems, and as previously mentioned, expects to complete its 
transition by April 2014. 

GSA Experienced Increased Costs, and Agencies Missed Savings: 

One result of the delayed transition to Networx was an increase in the 
cost of making the transition. Specifically, GSA estimated that the 
transition cost increased by $66.4 million, or 44 percent, over the 
$151.5 million planned in 2004. This included increases in the costs 
for contractor support, as well as costs for GSA program management, 
which were not included in the 2004 estimate. For example, GSA's 
updated 2010 estimate showed an increase from $35 million to $87.3 
million for contractor support through fiscal year 2013 (a $52.3 
million increase) due to the slower-than-expected transition. In 
addition, in March 2013 GSA estimated program management costs, such 
as GSA staff and support systems, for the period from June 2010--when 
the transition had been planned to end as of 2008--through March 2013, 
when the FTS2001 contracts expired. These additional costs were 
estimated at $18.1 million. Table 4 shows the estimated change in 
transition costs. 

Table 4: Change in Networx Transition Program Cost Estimates as a 
Result of Delays (dollars in millions): 

Cost element: Contractor support; 
2004 estimate: $35.0 million; 
Updated estimate: $87.3 million; 
Difference: $52.3 million. 

Cost element: Nonrecurring charges; 
2004 estimate: $62.4 million; 
Updated estimate: $58.4 million; 
Difference: -$4.0 million. 

Cost element: Other transition-related costs; 
2004 estimate: $54.1 million; 
Updated estimate: $54.1 million; 
Difference: 0.0. 

Cost element: GSA program management staff; 
2004 estimate: not included; 
Updated estimate: $10.3 million; 
Difference: $10.3 million. 

Cost element: GSA program support systems; 
2004 estimate: not included; 
Updated estimate: $7.8 million; 
Difference: $7.8 million. 

Cost element: Total cost; 
2004 estimate: $151.5 million; 
Updated estimate: $217.9 million; 
Difference: $66.4 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

Note: The updated estimate includes December 2010 actual and projected 
costs for transition contractor support through fiscal year 2013, 
nonrecurring charges, and other related costs; and GSA's March 2013 
estimates for its program management and support systems costs for the 
period June 2010 through March 2013. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the added transition costs incurred as a result of the 
delays, agencies likely paid about $329 million more for similar 
services by staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer. According to 
GSA's most recent analysis, in April 2010, the rate of savings 
agencies could achieve through a move to Networx was 28.4 percent. 
Agencies spent about $1.2 billion on FTS2001 services between July 
2010 and March 2013, the period in which transition delays occurred. 
Applying GSA's calculated savings rate to the amount spent on FTS2001 
services, we estimate that agencies could have saved about $329 
million. 

GSA Documented Lessons Learned but Has Not Effectively Archived, 
Shared, and Applied Them: 

The use of lessons learned is a principal component of an 
organizational culture committed to a continuous improvement, which 
serves to communicate acquired knowledge more effectively and to 
ensure that beneficial information is factored into planning, work 
processes, and activities. Lessons learned provide a powerful method 
of sharing good ideas for improving work processes, quality, and cost-
effectiveness. 

We have identified six key practices that can be used to identify and 
apply lessons learned. They include (1) collecting information, (2) 
analyzing the information collected to identify lessons that lead to 
recommendations, (3) validating the accuracy and applicability of 
lessons to other projects, (4) archiving the lessons, (5) sharing and 
disseminating lessons, and (6) deciding to invest resources to apply 
lessons learned. Table 5 provides a description of each of these 
lessons learned key practices.[Footnote 17] 

Table 5: Description of Lessons Learned Key Practices: 

Practice: Collect information; 
Description: Capture data through activities such as project 
critiques, written forms, interviews of participants, and direct 
observation. 

Practice: Analyze the information collected to identify lessons that 
lead to recommendations; 
Description: Analyze information collected to determine root causes 
and identify appropriate actions, and result in lessons that lead to 
recommendations. 

Practice: Validate the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other 
projects; 
Description: Verify the accuracy of lessons and their applicability to 
other projects. 

Practice: Archive the lessons; 
Description: Store lessons in a manner--such as in an electronic 
database--that allows users to perform information searches using key 
words and functional categories. The database should also provide a 
logical system for organizing information that is easily retrievable 
and made available to any requester. In addition, archiving should be 
done on an ongoing basis to avoid becoming cumbersome and irrelevant. 

Practice: Share and disseminate lessons; 
Description: Disseminate lessons learned through a variety of 
communication media, such as briefings, bulletins, reports, e-mails, 
Web sites, database entries, the revision of work process or 
procedures, and training. For example, lessons can be disseminated 
through automated delivery or by having a user search the database. 

Practice: Prioritize and apply lessons learned; 
Description: Management determines whether to commit resources to a 
particular lesson. The decision focuses efforts on determining the 
most important issues on which to apply limited resources. Issues are 
prioritized by rank from most important to least important in order to 
determine where the greatest impact will be. Under a benefit-cost 
analysis, some recommendations coming out of the lessons-learned 
process may simply be too costly to implement. 

Source: GAO and Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook. 

[End of table] 

GSA collected, analyzed, and validated lessons learned, and partially 
archived and shared them. However, it has yet to prioritize and apply 
lessons learned. Table 6 summarizes the extent to which GSA satisfied 
the lessons learned key practices. 

Table 6: Extent to which GSA Satisfied the Lessons Learned Key 
Practices: 

Practice: Collect information; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Analyze the information collected to identify lessons that 
lead to recommendations; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Validate the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other 
projects; 
Satisfied? GSA satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Archive the lessons; 
Satisfied? GSA has partially satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Share and disseminate lessons; 
Satisfied? GSA has partially satisfied the criteria. 

Practice: Prioritize and apply lessons learned; 
Satisfied? GSA has not satisfied the criteria. 

Source: GAO Analysis of GSA data. 

[End of table] 

GSA collected information. GSA collected information during meetings 
with agencies, vendors, and GSA employees from June 2009 until 
November 2010. It also collected information through a study conducted 
by Deloitte Consulting from March 2011 through September 2011. The 
study included 92 interviews with 117 stakeholders, including GSA 
personnel, customer agencies, vendors, and OMB officials. In addition, 
Noblis, a contractor that provided GSA project management services, 
provided GSA a lessons-learned report. The report was a critique of 
the program, based on the contractor's experiences supporting it. 

GSA analyzed the information collected and identified lessons that led 
to recommendations. The Deloitte study resulted in a July 2012 report 
that identified 27 lessons learned and made 94 recommendations. The 
lessons and associated recommendations were arranged by strategic 
themes, such as acquisition efficiency, tailored customer service, 
operational efficiency, customer partnership, and aggregated 
requirements. According to the study, one of the lessons learned was 
that agencies found it difficult to make fair opportunity decisions, a 
mandatory component of which is price, using the Networx Unit Pricer 
tool. This lesson learned resulted in recommendations that GSA should 
simplify contract structure, pricing, and communication. In addition, 
the report included a recommendation that GSA should consider making 
fair opportunity decisions for some agencies as part of the original 
contract award. 

GSA validated the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other 
projects. GSA validated the lessons learned at meetings held in 2012 
between GSA officials and government stakeholders. For example, in 
September 2012, GSA discussed the lessons learned with agency chief 
information officers, who verified their accuracy and applicability. 
In addition, in December 2012, GSA officials discussed lessons learned 
with the NS2020 Interagency Advisory Panel. GSA officials also 
reported that they conducted individual meetings and teleconferences 
about lessons learned with agency executives from the Departments of 
Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. 

GSA partially archived lessons. Specifically, GSA established a 
Networx transition lessons-learned database, which according to the 
Federal Acquisition Service Acting Commissioner's May 2010 statement 
before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, was 
intended to be used to collect lessons learned from the transition and 
efficiently analyze and easily report them. The database includes 
fields for title, functional category, identification number, 
description, submission date, and recommendation. As of May 2013, it 
included 38 records, 5 of which have associated recommendations. 
However, the database has not been updated since November 2010 and 
does not include any of the information from GSA's July 2012 lessons-
learned report. For example, the database was not updated with 
information about the need for network services expertise that was 
described in the July 2012 lessons-learned report. GSA officials 
explained that they had not considered it practical to update the 
database with the detail that is in the report. Nonetheless, GSA could 
populate its database with enough information about each of the 
lessons learned to allow those responsible for planning and 
implementing the next telecommunications transition to search the 
database and access key information about the lessons. Moreover, 
updating the database on an ongoing basis would help ensure that the 
process is not cumbersome and new information is readily available to 
stakeholders when the next telecommunications transition begins. 

GSA partially shared and disseminated lessons learned. GSA shared 
briefings of lessons learned with agencies and OMB. However, its July 
2012 lessons-learned report is designated "for official use only," and 
GSA has not made the information in it readily available to agencies 
and other transition stakeholders. According to GSA officials, the 
report is designated this way because the agency does not want 
attribution of the interview responses discussed in the report to be 
disclosed. Further, access to the report is controlled by the NS2020 
program manager. GSA officials reported that they intend to only share 
the lessons learned with program managers and contracting officers who 
will be developing the acquisition plans for the next 
telecommunications acquisition. While we agree that it is important to 
respect the potentially sensitive result of disclosing attribution, 
such information would not need to be disclosed in the lessons-learned 
database. 

By making information on lessons learned readily available to 
stakeholders through a database that is updated on an ongoing basis, 
GSA would enhance the efforts of those responsible for the next 
transition and their ability to avoid the recurrence of past mistakes. 

GSA has yet to prioritize and apply its lessons learned. It has not 
established a process for determining the most important issues to 
which to apply limited resources. Specifically, neither its lessons-
learned management plan nor its lessons-learned process 
analysis[Footnote 18] discusses how the agency has prioritized or 
plans to prioritize lessons learned by importance in order to 
determine which lessons it will invest limited resources in 
addressing. Also, while the draft NS2020 strategic plan stated that it 
incorporated 63 of 94 recommendations, it does not describe how it was 
determined which ones to incorporate. GSA officials stated that they 
plan to incorporate the remaining recommendations in other NS2020 
strategic planning documentation and have already begun investing 
resources to apply lessons learned. For example, GSA is investigating 
improvements in the Networx contract modification life-cycle process 
and improving Office of Network Services Programs support systems. 
However, GSA officials agreed that they did not have a plan for 
prioritizing its lessons learned. Moreover, GSA has yet to fully apply 
lessons learned to its next transition because it is still in the 
process of developing its next transition strategy. GSA plans to 
finalize the NS2020 strategic plan by the end of 2013 and then develop 
its acquisition plans. According to its lessons-learned management 
plan, each program manager responsible for an acquisition plan is to 
check to ensure that the lessons captured in the July 2012 report have 
been applied. Until it determines which lessons learned are the most 
important and the order in which to apply them, GSA lacks assurance 
that it is using its limited resources to address the lessons that 
would provide the most benefit for the cost. 

Conclusions: 

Given that the federal government invests at least $1.4 billion in 
telecommunications services annually, GSA has an important role to 
play in assisting agencies in acquiring these services in an efficient 
and cost-effective manner. However, the complexity of the process for 
transitioning to Networx, which was compounded by a decline in 
telecommunications expertise at the agencies as well as weaknesses in 
project planning, contributed to delays in agencies' transition to 
Networx. This in turn resulted in increased transition costs, missed 
savings, and delays in implementing new technologies. To its credit, 
GSA has studied the Networx transition and documented lessons learned. 
In light of the complexity of telecommunications services and the 
transition process, studying potential government-wide shortfalls in 
telecommunications expertise and providing agencies with additional 
guidance on transition project planning could help ensure that the 
next telecommunications transition proceeds more smoothly. In 
addition, it is important for GSA to effectively apply lessons learned 
from Networx to future transitions. In particular, ensuring that the 
agency's lessons-learned database is fully populated and that these 
lessons are prioritized and applied to future transitions will assist 
GSA and agencies in planning and executing the next telecommunications 
transition. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve planning and execution of the next telecommunications 
transition, we recommend that the Administrator of General Services 
take the following actions: 

* in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, examine 
potential government-wide telecommunications expertise shortfalls and 
use the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach, and: 

* ensure that project planning guidance to agencies on the future 
transition calls for establishing transition plans with detailed time 
lines that take into account priorities relative to agencies' mission-
critical systems, contingency plans, and identified risks, and are 
updated to reflect the current status and endpoint of the transition. 

In addition, we recommend the Administrator take the following three 
actions related to GSA's lessons-learned process: 

* populate and maintain on an ongoing basis the agency's transition 
lessons-learned database with the lessons GSA has identified and make 
it available for user searches by those involved in developing the 
next transition strategy; 

* prioritize the lessons, taking into particular consideration the 
factors we reported as contributing to delays, and determine the 
resources needed to apply them; and: 

* ensure that the lessons are applied, based on priority and available 
resources, to the next transition strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of our report to GSA, the Office of Personnel 
Management, SSA, the Department of Defense, and OMB. 

In written comments, GSA stated that it agrees with our findings and 
recommendations and will take appropriate action. The letter is 
reproduced in appendix II. 

A Senior Analyst from the Office of Personnel Management's office of 
Internal Oversight and Compliance responded via e-mail that the agency 
concurred with the recommendation and is prepared to support GSA in 
its efforts to examine the potential telecommunications expertise 
shortfalls discussed in the report. 

In written comments, SSA stated that it did not agree that our 
statement that agencies tended to transition easier items first to 
demonstrate progress before they transitioned items that needed a long 
lead time applied to SSA. Specifically, the agency stated that it did 
not delay the transition of more complex requirements to demonstrate 
progress on simpler requirements and that it had begun its overall 
transition activities concurrently. We do not dispute this statement 
regarding SSA. Instead, our concern was with the agency's lack of an 
integrated transition time line. Our point about transitioning easier 
items before more complex ones applied across the government but not 
necessarily to each individual agency. SSA's letter is reproduced in 
appendix III. 

An official from the DOD Inspector General's Office of Communications 
and Congressional Liaison responded via e-mail that department had no 
comments on our draft report. In addition, a Paralegal Specialist from 
OMB's General Counsel Office responded via e-mail that the agency had 
no comments at this time on our draft report. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time we will send copies to other 
interested congressional committees; the Administrator of General 
Services; the Secretaries of the Department of Defense and the Army; 
the Administrator of the Social Security Administration, and the 
Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of 
Personnel Management. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. 

Signed by: 

Carol R. Cha: 
Director: 
Information Technology Acquisition Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the 
delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences the 
federal government experienced as a result of the delayed transition, 
and (2) to what extent the General Services Administration (GSA) is 
documenting and applying lessons learned as it prepares for the next 
telecommunications contract transition. 

To identify factors contributing to transition delays, we analyzed key 
GSA Networx programmatic documentation, including various management 
briefings and reports, transition plans and status reviews, and 
program risk logs. We also assessed GSA's lessons-learned 
documentation, including Deloitte Consulting's September 2011 Lessons 
Learned Report, and GSA's July 2012 Network Services Programs Lessons 
Learned Report and September 2012 Networx Lessons Learned Report, 
which were based on Deloitte's study. Deloitte Consulting analyzed 
stakeholder feedback on the Networx transition, and GSA incorporated 
the results of the study into its reports. In addition, we analyzed 
relevant statutes, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and GSA 
guidance about the fair opportunity process to understand its impact 
on the transition. 

To help address the first objective, we also selected two agencies--
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) --for case study review, based on the extent of 
delay in transitioning and the amount spent on telecommunications. 
Specifically, as of November 2012, these two agencies had the most 
FTS2001 services remaining to be disconnected. The Army Corps of 
Engineers had about 16 percent of its services remaining and SSA had 
about 9 percent of its services remaining. In addition, according to 
GSA documentation, in fiscal year 2011, SSA had the third-highest 
spending (behind the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security) on 
FTS2001 and Networx, which was about $121 million, while the Corps 
spent about $15 million (the 12th-highest spending). Although the 
results from these two agencies may not be generalized to all 
agencies, they provide examples of the factors contributing to the 
delay in transitioning and the consequences thereof. 

We relied on our past work on the FTS2000-to-FTS2001 transition and 
FTS2001-to-Networx transition, as well as on project planning and 
management, to identify transition project best practices.[Footnote 
19] We compared SSA's and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' transition 
plans with key best practices. We also assessed their project status 
and risk reports, and analyzed SSA's contractor performance reports 
for one of its transition component projects. 

To identify consequences occurring as a result of the delays, we 
determined the extent to which GSA incurred additional costs and the 
extent to which agencies missed savings. Specifically, we compared 
GSA's latest transition cost estimates with its 2004 cost estimate. We 
also assessed GSA's April 2010 analysis of the federal government's 
potential savings resulting from transitioning from FTS2001 to 
Networx. (Figure 4 illustrates GSA's analysis.) Specifically, GSA 
calculated that agencies could save 28.4 percent of the cost of 
FTS2001 services by moving those services to Networx. For example, 
using this savings rate, it determined that in January 2010, agencies 
could have saved $22.4 million that month. To assess the 
reasonableness of GSA's savings rate calculation, we conducted a 
detailed walkthrough of the formula, analysis, and supporting 
documentation with GSA Networx Program officials. From this exercise, 
we determined GSA's estimated savings rate to be sufficiently reliable 
for the purpose of this audit. 

Figure 4: GSA's Analysis of Potential Savings: 

[REfer to PDF for image: illustration] 

FTS2001 Services: 
multiplied by: 
Networx Service Prices: 
equals: 
Networx Cost. 

FTS2001 Services: 
multiplied by: 
FTS2001 Service Prices: 
equals: 
FTS2001 Cost. 

Networx Cost and FTS2001 Cost are: 

Estimated Savings Rate by Service: 
multiplied by: 
FTS2001 Spending by Service: 
equals: 
Total Potential Savings. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

[End of figure] 

To calculate savings agencies may have missed by remaining on FTS2001 
after the transition was to be complete (i.e., as of July 2010), we 
applied the 28.4 percent savings rate to total agency spending on 
FTS2001 services between July 2010 and March 2013, as reported by GSA. 

To assess the reliability of the cost data, we tested the data to 
identify obvious problems with completeness or accuracy and 
interviewed GSA Networx Services Program officials about the data, the 
automated systems used to collect them, and processes in place to 
verify them. For the purposes of our report, we determined that the 
cost data were sufficiently reliable. We did not test the adequacy of 
GSA's cost accounting systems. Our evaluation of these cost data was 
based on what we were told by GSA and the information the agency could 
provide. 

We also reviewed government-wide plans that involved the use of 
Networx to determine the extent to which delays contributed to non-
financial consequences. Specifically, we assessed documentation on the 
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) plans for implementing the 
Trusted Internet Connection relative to the progress of the Networx 
transition. 

To determine the extent to which GSA is documenting and applying 
lessons learned, we compared GSA's lessons learned process with key 
activities we previously identified as best practices. These key 
practices are discussed in a September 2012 GAO report, Federal Real 
Property Security: Interagency Security Committee Should Implement a 
Lessons Learned Process, and in the U.S. Army's Lessons Learned 
Center's Establishing a Lessons Learned Program: Observations, 
Insights, and Lessons.[Footnote 20] We compared GSA's lessons-learned 
documentation, including its lessons-learned reports, lessons-learned 
management plan, lessons-learned database, and lessons-learned process 
analysis with these key practices. Based on our analysis, we assessed 
whether GSA satisfied, partially satisfied, or had not satisfied the 
key practices. "Satisfied" means GSA provided complete evidence that 
satisfied the entire criteria. "Partially satisfied" means GSA 
provided evidence that satisfied a portion of the criteria. "Not 
satisfied" means GSA provided no evidence that satisfies any of the 
criteria. 

For both objectives, we met with GSA, OMB, SSA, and U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers officials, and representatives from all of the FTS2001 and 
Networx contractors, including Sprint, Verizon, AT&T, CenturyLink, and 
Level 3 Communications. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to December 
2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

The Administrator: 
U.S. General Services Administration: 
1800 F Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20405: 
Telephone: (202) 501-0800: 
Fax: (202) 219-1243: 

November 18, 2013: 

The Honorable Gene L. Dodaro: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Dodaro: 

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report, "GSA Needs to 
Share and Prioritize Lessons Learned to Avoid Future Transition 
Delays" (GAO-14-63). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
recommends that GSA examine potential Governmentwide expertise 
shortfalls, and that it provide agencies guidance on project planning 
and fully archive, share, and prioritize lessons learned. 

We agree with the findings and the recommendations in the draft report 
and will take appropriate action. The recommendations include: 

* examine potential Governmentwide telecommunication expertise 
shortfalls and use the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach; 

* ensure that project planning guidance to agencies on the future 
transition calls for establishing transition plans with detailed 
timelines that take into account priorities relative to agencies' 
mission-critical systems, contingency plans, and identified risks, and 
are updated to reflect the current status and endpoint of the 
transition; 

* populate and maintain on an ongoing basis the agency's transition 
lessons learned database with the lessons GSA has identified and make 
it available for user searches by those involved in developing the 
next transition strategy; 

* prioritize the lessons, taking into particular consideration the 
factors GAO reported as contributing to delays, and determine the 
resources needed to apply them; and; 

* ensure that the lessons are applied, based on priority and available 
resources, to the next transition strategy. 

If you have any additional questions or concerns, please do not 
hesitate to contact me at (202) 501-0800 or Ms. Lisa Austin, Acting 
Associate Administrator, Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental 
Affairs, at (202) 501-0563. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Dan Tangherlini: 
Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Social Security Administration: 

Social Security: 
Office of the Commissioner: 
Social Security Administration: 
Baltimore, MD 21235-0001: 

November 18, 2013: 

Ms. Carol R. Cha: 
Director, Information Technology Acquisition Management Issues: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Cha: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report, 
"Telecommunications: GSA Needs to Share and Prioritize Lessons Learned 
to Avoid Future Transition Delays" (GAO-14-63). We have enclosed our 
response to the audit report contents. 

If you have any questions, please contact me at (410) 966-9014. Your 
staff may contact Gary S. Hatcher, Senior Advisor for Records 
Management and Audit Liaison Staff, at (410) 965-0680. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Katherine Thornton: 
Deputy Chief of Staff: 

Enclosure: 

Comments On The Government Accountability Office Draft Report, 
"Telecommunications: GSA Needs To Share And Prioritize Lessons Learned 
To Avoid Future Transition Delays" (Gao-14-63): 

General Comments: 

When discussing the transition to Networx, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) states, "agencies tended to transition 
easier items first, to demonstrate progress, before they transitioned
items that needed a long lead time .... " (see the Highlights page). 
GAO makes a similar statement on page 18. 

We do not agree with the statement for our specific transition 
activities. In the report, GAO acknowledges we had multiple 
telecommunications requirements packages that could not be bundled 
into one competition. We did not delay the transition of more complex 
requirements to "demonstrate progress" on simpler requirements. We 
began our overall transition activities concurrently. The completion 
of "simpler" sets of requirements occurred first because they 
contained simpler requirements that took less time. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Winter (Assistant 
Director), Melina Asencio, Virginia Chanley, Cheryl Dottermusch, 
Franklin Jackson, Lee McCracken, Jena Sinkfield, and Jack Wang made 
key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] A task-order contract is a contract for services that does not 
specify a firm quantity of services (other than a minimum or maximum 
quantity) to be procured. Rather, it provides for the issuance of 
orders for the performance of tasks during the period of the contract. 
A delivery-order contract is a contract for supplies that does not 
specify a firm quantity of supplies (other than a minimum or maximum 
quantity) to be procured. Rather, it provides for the issuance or 
orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract. 

[2] MCI, one of the original FTS2001 contractors, merged with Verizon 
to form Verizon Business Services in January 2006. 

[3] The original contract was with Qwest Government Services. Qwest 
merged with CenturyLink, Inc., in April 2011. 

[4] Sprint Corporation, one of the original FTS2001 contractors, 
merged with Nextel Communications, Inc., to form Sprint Nextel 
Corporation in August 2005. 

[5] 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 4106(c); 48 C.F.R. § 
16.505(b). 

[6] GAO, FTS2001: Transition Challenges Jeopardize Program Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-289] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2001). 

[7] GAO, Telecommunications: Full Adoption of Sound Transition 
Planning Practices by GSA and Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-476] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006). 

[8] GAO, Telecommunications: GSA Has Accumulated Adequate Funding for 
Transition to New Contracts but Needs Cost Estimation Policy, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-268] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 23, 2007). 

[9] GAO, Telecommunications: Agencies Are Generally Following Sound 
Transition Planning Practices, and GSA Is Taking Action to Resolve 
Challenges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-759] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2008). 

[10] As discussed earlier, the fair opportunity process requires 
agencies to provide all contractors awarded multiple-award task-or 
delivery-order contracts, such as the Networx contracts, a fair 
opportunity to be considered for each order in excess of $3,000 issued 
under one of the contracts. 

[11] Bundled services are not the same as a bundled contract. A 
bundled contract is a contract where the requirements for supplies or 
services, previously provided or performed under separate smaller 
contracts, were consolidated into a solicitation for a single contract 
that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-476] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-759]. We identified the 
practices through research of telecommunications transitions 
literature and interviews with those with experience in 
telecommunications transitions, including industry experts, 
telecommunications vendors, and private sector companies. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-476] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-759]. 

[14] Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fourth Edition, Project Management 
Institute, Inc. (PMI), 2008. Copyright and all rights reserved. 
Software Engineering Institute/Carnegie Mellon, Capability Maturity 
Model Integration® (CMMI®) for Acquisition, Version 1.3, CMU/SEI-2010-
TR-032 (Pittsburgh, Pa., November 2010). 

[15] Multiprotocol Label Switching is a network routing protocol that 
is based on switching through the use of tag labels. 

[16] An exception to the fair opportunity process allows a task order 
to be issued on a sole-source basis in the interest of economy and 
efficiency if it is a logical follow-on to an order already issued 
under the contract, provided that all awardees were given a fair 
opportunity to be considered for the original order. 

[17] GAO, Federal Real Property Security: Interagency Security 
Committee Should Implement a Lessons Learned Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-901] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 
2012). We identified the lessons learned practices primarily using our 
previous work reported in GAO, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for 
Sharing Lessons Learned, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-195] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 
2002) and a report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, 
Establishing a Lessons Learned Program: Observations, Insights, and 
Lessons (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: June 2011). The practices we 
identified are based on research, interviews, and experience. 

[18] In July 2013, GSA analyzed its lessons-learned activities 
relative to the key lessons-learned practices we identified. 

[19] GAO, FTS2001: Transition Challenges Jeopardize Program Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-289] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2001); Telecommunications: Full Adoption of Sound Transition 
Planning Practices by GSA and Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-476] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006); Telecommunications: Agencies Are 
Generally Following Sound Transition Planning Practices, and GSA Is 
Taking Action to Resolve Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-759] (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 
2008); and GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, exposure draft, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 
2012). 

[20] GAO, Federal Real Property Security: Interagency Security 
Committee Should Implement A Lessons Learned Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-901] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 
2012) and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Establishing a Lessons 
Learned Program: Observations, Insights, and Lessons (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: June 2011). 

[End of section] 

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