This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-13-681 entitled 'Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources Abroad Align with Priorities' which was released on October 25, 2013. This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: Report to Congressional Requesters: September 2013: Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources Abroad Align with Priorities: GAO-13-681: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-13-681, a report to congressional requesters. Why GAO Did This Study: Combating terrorism is a governmentwide effort, to which DHS contributes. In such efforts abroad, DHS partners with the Department of State (State)—-the lead agency at U.S. missions. DHS deploys resources abroad to carry out programs and build capacity within its areas of expertise—border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement. GAO was asked to examine DHS’s efforts abroad to combat terrorism. This report answers the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions and what, if any, factors have affected contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities? GAO analyzed DHS expenditures for fiscal years 2008-2012, personnel data for May 2013 and documents, such as national strategies and management directives. GAO also interviewed DHS and State officials in headquarters and 10 countries, selected on the basis of factors such as the size of DHS’s presence. The results from site visits cannot be generalized but provided insights. GAO also surveyed DHS and State personnel in all 57 U.S. missions where DHS has a presence. What GAO Found: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out a variety of programs and activities abroad within its areas of expertise that could have the effect of thwarting terrorists and their plots while also combating other categories of transnational crime, and DHS expended approximately $451 million on programs and activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. For example, through the Visa Security Program, DHS has deployed personnel abroad to help prevent the issuance of visas to people who might pose a threat. As of May 2013, DHS has stationed about 1,800 employees in almost 80 countries to conduct these and other activities. In addition, DHS has delivered training and technical assistance in areas such as border and aviation security to officials from about 180 countries to enhance partner nations’ security capacities. GAO identified five types of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates), 12 factors that support DHS’ s ability to contribute, and a range of challenges and impacts related to DHS contributions. On the basis of surveys of DHS and State officials abroad, GAO found that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions GAO identified, including building relationships, identifying threats, and sharing information. The factors GAO identified that facilitated DHS’s ability to contribute fell into two general categories: (1) facilitating a collaborative climate and (2) leveraging resources and clarifying roles and responsibilities. GAO also identified a variety of challenges, including DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with personnel abroad and partners at U.S. missions understanding of DHS’s role. Fewer than half of respondents identified any challenge as moderate or significant. For impacts arising from these challenges, less than one-third of respondents identified them as causing a significant or moderate impact. DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment, but has not established mechanisms to ensure that resource use abroad aligns with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. DHS has a stated objective to improve alignment across the department, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement mechanisms to help ensure achievement of their objectives. Although DHS conducted a onetime review of the department’s international footprint and created a departmentwide international engagement plan, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—- which are made at the individual component level-—align with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, DHS (1) has not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) does not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data. Strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data could provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions and help achieve its objective to improve organizational alignment across components. What GAO Recommends: GAO recommends that DHS establish (1) department-wide strategic priorities, (2) an institutionalized mechanism to review resource alignment abroad, and (3) a method to collect reliable and comparable cost data for resources abroad. DHS concurred with these recommendations. View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-681]. For more information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-9627 MaurerD@gao.gov or Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 JohnsonCM@gao.gov. [End of section] Contents: Letter: Background: DHS Conducts Mission Activities and Capacity Building Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism: DHS and State Identified Five Key DHS Contributions to U.S. Missions and Multiple Factors and Challenges That Affected Contributions: DHS Has Acted to Enhance Department-wide Alignment, but Could Have Better Assurance That Resources Abroad Support Highest Priorities: Conclusions: Recommendations for Executive Action: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3: Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by Component: Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts: Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: Tables: Table 1: Examples of Department of Homeland Security Component Mission Responsibilities Related to Combating Terrorism Abroad: Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Programs and Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism: Table 3: Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components within Our Review: Table 4: Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, by Component, May 2013: Table 5: Data for Figure 1, Countries Participating in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Training or Technical Assistance that Can Help Combat Terrorism in Fiscal Year 2012: Table 6: Expenditure Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs (OIA) and Components within Our Review: Table 7: Full-Time-Equivalent Employee (FTE) Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and FTEs Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review: Figures: Figure 1: Countries Participating in Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components within Our Review, Fiscal Year 2012: Figure 2: Expenditures Abroad from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012: Figure 3: Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time- Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review: Figure 4: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: Figure 5: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions' Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Indicating Them as Very Important: Figure 6: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions' Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Indicating Them as Very Important: Figure 7: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Deputy Chiefs of Mission as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals: Figure 8: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attachés as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to DHS's Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals: Figure 9: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Impact: Figure 10: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact: Figure 11: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: Figure 12: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Responding that DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: Figure 13: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Challenge: Figure 14: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Challenge: Figure 15: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Impact: Figure 16: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact: Abbreviations: CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: CSCS: Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program: DCM: deputy chief of mission: DHS: Department of Homeland Security: FTE: Full-Time-Equivalent Employee: ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: ICS: Integrated Country Strategy: ICASS: International Cooperative Administrative Support Services: MRR: Mission Resource Request: OIA: Office of International Affairs: QHSR: Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: TSA: Transportation Security Administration: USCG: United States Coast Guard: USCI: SU.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: USSS: United States Secret Service: [End of section] GAO: United States Government Accountability Office: 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548: September 25, 2013: The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: Chairman: Committee on Homeland Security: House of Representatives: The Honorable Jeff Duncan: Chairman: Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: Committee on Homeland Security: House of Representatives: The Honorable Peter T. King: Chairman: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: Committee on Homeland Security: House of Representatives: The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid, coordinated, and effective effort that uses the resources of the entire government to mitigate threats to national and homeland security.[Footnote 1] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--with its specific knowledge and skills in border, maritime, and aviation security; immigration; and law enforcement, among other areas-- contributes to the U.S. government's efforts to combat terrorism. In pursuit of this objective, DHS seeks to identify security vulnerabilities and interdict threats at the earliest possible point with the aim of making the nation's physical borders the last, not the first, line of defense. Side bar: Combating Terrorism: There is no common definition for combating terrorism throughout the homeland security and national security enterprises. For the purpose of this report, the term combating terrorism is used to refer to any action that may have the effect of thwarting terrorists and their plots, whether designed specifically for that purpose or not. In the DHS context, this typically involves bringing to bear a range of knowledge, skills, and authorities related to border, maritime, and aviation security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others, to limit the movement of people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas. Source: GAO analysis of DHS missions. [End of side bar] The Department of State (State) leads U.S. diplomatic efforts and has established U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates) in foreign nations.[Footnote 2] One aim of these U.S. missions is to enhance national security by strengthening the relationship between the United States and other nations. State--through the U.S. missions-- coordinates most U.S. international efforts. Therefore, U.S. missions are uniquely positioned to provide leadership, resources, and knowledge to U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, in collaboration with various other U.S. government agencies working abroad, including DHS, as well as with foreign partners. One current priority of DHS leadership is better aligning its efforts across the department with the aim of strengthening effectiveness, improving decision making to address shared issues--such as managing international affairs and combating terrorism --and prioritizing resource use in an era of fiscal constraint. In this context, you asked us to examine DHS's efforts to combat terrorism abroad and how DHS's resource use abroad aligns with other U.S. efforts, including those carried out by U.S. missions. This report answers the following questions: 1. What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to help combat terrorism? 2. How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions' efforts to combat terrorism, and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? 3. To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities? To address our questions, we reviewed key government-wide strategies related to combating terrorism, including the May 2010 National Security Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. We reviewed documentation such as DHS's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and DHS component documentation describing goals, objectives, and operations for DHS programs abroad. [Footnote 3] We also interviewed officials with responsibility for programs and activities abroad in DHS and component headquarters offices for the six operational components that have missions related to combating terrorism--U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). In addition, we interviewed officials in DHS's Office of International Affairs (OIA) and DHS's Office of Policy-Counterterrorism division, who have department-level responsibilities for DHS's deployments abroad and counterterrorism policy, respectively. We reviewed documentation about State programs and activities on which DHS collaborates and interviewed officials in Department of State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Consular Affairs, because DHS coordinates and collaborates with them in its activities abroad. We also reviewed our prior work on specific programs related to activities DHS carries out abroad, such as container security, visa security, and foreign airport assessments.[Footnote 4] In addition, we reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS Office of Inspector General officials responsible for a 2008 report that made a number of recommendations designed to enhance DHS's management of international affairs.[Footnote 5] To address the first question, we first developed an operational definition of combating terrorism, using information from government- wide strategy documents and from interviews with DHS officials with responsibility for programs abroad that have a nexus with counterterrorism and antiterrorism efforts. We then identified the programs and activities DHS carries out abroad that met that definition and verified the list of programs and activities with officials in DHS OIA and the six operational components in our review. Because many of DHS's missions involve carrying out the same set of activities with multifaceted purposes--such as facilitating legitimate trade and travel while countering threats to the homeland--we determined it would not be possible to isolate expenditures for combating terrorism-related activities abroad from other DHS activities abroad. Instead, we collected from each component in our review expenditures for all activities conducted abroad for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. We collected data on full-time-equivalent employees (FTE) from DHS's Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator report for May 2013, the most recent month available at the time of our work.[Footnote 6] We reviewed the expenditure and FTE data provided for reasonableness and discussed the actions taken to help ensure its reliability with knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the expenditure and FTE data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting general information about DHS expenditures abroad and the number of FTEs by country for a specific point in time. We also collected, from each of the six operational components in our review, information on training and technical assistance activities. Because of challenges such as inconsistent data definitions, we determined that there were not sufficiently reliable and comparable data to allow us to report expenditures specific to training and technical assistance abroad, but information could be reported about the foreign nation whose officials have received the training and technical assistance. Side bar: Key Mission Management and DHS Positions in U.S. Diplomatic Missions: Chief of mission: Usually called an ambassador, the chief of mission is in charge of all executive branch activities and operations and fully responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. executive branch employees in the country, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. Deputy chief of mission (DCM): The second in command of a U.S. diplomatic mission is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission Country team: Made up of leading federal personnel at a U.S. diplomatic mission, the country team is headed by the chief of mission. The country team generally includes the heads of all embassy sections and of each U.S. government agency in the U.S. mission, including DHS attachés, among others. DHS attaché: This official represents DHS to host nation counterparts and foreign diplomats accredited to the host nation, and acts as the departmental interlocutor and in-country DHS representative. In many cases, the attaché’s duties are in addition to other DHS component duties at the mission, and the official is informally called a dual- hat attaché. Source: GAO analysis of Departments of State and Homeland Security documents. [End of side bar] To address the second question, we visited U.S. missions in 10 countries where one or more DHS components had FTEs stationed. We selected the locations based on a range of factors, including the nature and scope of DHS presence abroad; indicators of terrorist activities; and logistical concerns, such as security and the opportunity to leverage resources. At these locations we conducted interviews with DHS officials and State officials about the opportunities for and the quality of collaboration between DHS and other federal partners. The results from our visits to these 10 countries cannot be generalized; however, the interviews provided insights into how DHS contributes to U.S. missions' combating terrorism efforts, what is working well, and any barriers to effective contributions. We conducted two surveys to collect information about the kinds of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions, the factors that were important to facilitate DHS's contributions in the U.S. mission environment, challenges DHS and the U.S. missions faced facilitating DHS's contributions, and the impacts of any such challenges. We administered one survey to all DHS attachés and the other to all deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) at all U.S. missions where DHS has permanently stationed FTEs in the embassies--57 U.S. missions in total.[Footnote 7] The overall response rate to the surveys was 82 percent for DHS attachés and 72 percent for DCMs. To address the third question, we analyzed prescriptions in the February 2010 QHSR for maturing the department. These prescriptions include improving organizational alignment--particularly among operational components--and enhancing programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for control activities--that is, policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms--to enforce management's directives.[Footnote 8] In this respect, we evaluated the extent to which DHS had control activities to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. To do this, we reviewed documentation, such as DHS's Management Directive describing roles and responsibilities for DHS's international affairs. In addition, we interviewed officials in OIA and the six DHS components in our review about the extent to which they undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and organizational alignment across the set of resources and efforts DHS deploys abroad. We also interviewed officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy about how DHS and government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use decisions. For more information on our scope and methodology, see appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Background: DHS's Strategic Framework and Efforts Abroad to Combat Terrorism: DHS conducts four main types of efforts abroad that can help to combat terrorism by thwarting terrorists and their plots before they reach the homeland: * deploying programs and activities abroad--especially screening and targeting programs, along with select immigration benefit processing-- to help interdict people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas sooner in the trade, travel, and immigration cycles; * working with and sharing information with international and federal partners to help counter terrorism and other international crime; * working alongside foreign officials to support them in assessing their own security vulnerabilities and implementing mitigating actions; and: * helping other nations strengthen their security infrastructure by providing training and consultations, conducting assessments, or providing equipment.[Footnote 9] DHS's Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Terrorism and International Affairs: DHS component agencies and offices have primary responsibility for conducting activities that correspond with their particular missions, including those that help to combat terrorism.[Footnote 10] As shown in table 1, six operational components in our review have mission responsibilities in border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement that contribute to DHS's efforts to combat terrorism. DHS components are generally responsible for making operational decisions--such as how to allocate resources, both domestically and abroad--to meet component and DHS mission needs. Table 1: Examples of Department of Homeland Security Component Mission Responsibilities Related to Combating Terrorism Abroad: Component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders, CBP has mission responsibilities related to preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for investigating a wide range of domestic and international activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, within, and out of the United States, ICE has mission responsibilities related to combating worldwide criminal enterprises that seek to exploit the United State's legitimate trade, travel and financial systems and enforcing U.S. customs and immigration laws, regulations, and policies. Component: Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing U.S. transportation systems, TSA has mission responsibilities related to ensuring the security of U.S.-bound flights and trains. Component: U.S. Coast Guard (USGC); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for safeguarding U.S. maritime interests and homeland security efforts in the maritime domain, USCG has mission responsibilities related to examining port facilities and U.S.-bound commercial vessels, coordinating maritime information sharing efforts, and promoting domain awareness in the maritime environment.a. Component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for overseeing lawful immigration to the United States, USCIS has mission responsibilities related to strengthening the security and integrity of the immigration system. Component: U.S. Secret Service (USSS); Knowledge and skills related to combating terrorism abroad: As the federal agency with primary responsibility for safeguarding the U.S. financial infrastructure and payment systems and for protecting U.S. leaders and high profile events, USSS has mission responsibilities related to combating transnational criminal enterprises seeking to exploit U.S. financial institutions and operations, investigating money laundering activities, cyber-related crimes, counterfeiting of U.S. currency and obligations as well as conducting security operations around the world. Source: GAO analysis of agency missions. [A] Maritime domain awareness is the understanding by stakeholders involved in maritime security of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. [End of table] DHS's counterterrorism efforts are coordinated by DHS's Counterterrorism Coordinator through its Counterterrorism Advisory Board. The board is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Policy and the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis and also includes component heads. According to Office of Policy officials responsible for working with the board, it meets weekly to discuss and develop plans and strategies related to counterterrorism. The Office of Policy, through the Counterterrorism Policy Office, also coordinates DHS participation in White House and interagency policy planning meetings related to counterterrorism. OIA is also a member of the Counterterrorism Advisory Board. DHS's OIA has primary responsibility for coordinating all aspects of department international affairs, but does not have operational oversight of component activities. In August 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed the DHS International Affairs Management Directive. Consistent with the Management Directive, the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, in coordination with the heads of DHS's operational and support components, establishes strategies, plans, and appropriate activities for DHS to develop foreign partner security capabilities and international cooperative programs that align with DHS strategic planning documents. The Secretary of Homeland Security has testified that to achieve its mission more effectively, it is important that DHS both identify and operate as "One DHS" in pursuit of its overarching homeland security missions. To that end, OIA is responsible for developing, coordinating, and executing departmental international policy, including reviewing departmental positions on international matters, negotiating agreements, developing policy and programs, interacting with foreign officials, and working with DHS personnel abroad. Although operational decision making and resource use are generally the purview of the individual components and offices, OIA is responsible for reviewing component requests to State for international deployments. DHS Collaboration with State and Other Federal Partners Abroad: Two White House strategies outline government-wide goals for promoting national security and combating terrorism at the highest level--the May 2010 National Security Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The National Security Strategy articulates a strategic approach for advancing U.S. interests, including security, economy, and values. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses more specifically on one of the National Security Strategy's priorities--disrupting, dismantling, and defeating terrorist networks.[Footnote 11] Both national strategies call for a whole-of-government approach to help secure the nation and combat terrorism. They each also call for contributions that are in line with DHS activities abroad--carrying out programs to limit the movement of people and goods that pose a threat to the homeland and helping other nations build capacity to detect, deter, and capture such people and goods to limit their global movement. DHS coordinates its efforts abroad to combat terrorism with State and other federal partners. State is the federal agency responsible for coordinating and supervising efforts led out of U.S. missions--like combating international terrorism--in collaboration with various other U.S. government agencies working abroad, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and DHS, as well as foreign partners that are facing terrorist threats. When conducting efforts abroad, DHS operates under the authority of the chief of mission (typically an ambassador). Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. missions and have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country, with some exceptions, like personnel under the Department of Defense's Combatant Commanders.[Footnote 12] The staffing levels of a U.S. mission are determined by the chief of mission through the National Security Decision Directive-38 process. [Footnote 13] This directive, issued by the President, authorizes the chief of mission to determine the size, composition, or mandate of personnel operating at the U.S. mission. DHS also collaborates with State and other federal partners that provide the funding to support personnel who make the contributions. For example, many of the activities to build capacity and provide training abroad are funded through State programs. In some cases, DHS also collaborates to share information, knowledge, and skills, where appropriate, with other federal personnel operating abroad--for example, contributing border security expertise in Department of Defense capacity-building efforts or sharing information with other law enforcement personnel stationed at the same diplomatic U.S. mission. At each U.S. mission, State requires mission management to lead, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, two processes to identify strategies, priorities, and programming needs for the efforts that are to be carried out through the mission--including combating terrorism. The first--the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)--is a multi-year plan that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. It is a single overarching strategy, completed every 3 years, that encapsulates government-wide policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them. The second is the Mission Resource Request (MRR), which is a budget document that explains and justifies the resources required to achieve a given mission's highest foreign policy and management objectives, as drawn from the ICS. The MRR is submitted annually. DHS Conducts Mission Activities and Capacity Building Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism: The DHS components within our review carry out programs and activities abroad within their areas of expertise--border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others-- that are designed to limit the movement of people and goods that could pose a threat to the homeland before they reach the United States. They also deliver training and technical assistance designed to enhance partner nations' ability to limit such movement globally. According to our analysis of expenditure data and FTE data provided to us by DHS, DHS OIA and the components within our review spent approximately $451 million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012 and had about 1,800 FTEs stationed abroad in almost 80 countries as of May 2013.[Footnote 14] DHS Carries Out a Variety of Programs and Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism: DHS conducts certain programs and mission activities abroad to prevent people and goods that would pose a threat from reaching the homeland. Table 2 details the mission activities falling within the definition of combating terrorism used in this report--that is, they have the potential to thwart terrorists and their plots whether designed specifically for that purpose or not. Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Programs and Activities Abroad That Can Help Combat Terrorism: Program/initiative: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Container Security Initiative; Description: The Container Security Initiative is a bilateral government partnership program through which CBP officers stationed at foreign seaports identify U.S.-bound shipments at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction or other terrorist contraband. See 6 U.S.C. § 945. Program/initiative: CBP Pre-inspection and Preclearance Programs; Description: Through its pre-inspection and preclearance programs, CBP makes admissibility decisions abroad at last points of departure for the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7), 19 U.S.C. § 1629. See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.1, 235.5; 19 C.F.R. §§ 148.22, 162.6, 162.8; Under pre-inspection, CBP officers make passenger admissibility decisions abroad, but the inspection of accompanying goods, baggage, and passenger vehicles takes place upon arrival in the United States; Preclearance is the process by which CBP officers stationed abroad inspect and make admissibility decisions about passengers and their accompanying goods or baggage heading to the United States before they leave a foreign port. CBP officers retain the authority to inspect these passengers and their accompanying goods or baggage after arriving in the United States should inspection be warranted. Program/initiative: CBP Immigration Advisory Program; Description: Through its Immigration Advisory Program, CBP partners with foreign governments and air carriers to identify and prevent high- risk, improperly-documented travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, though Immigration Advisory Program officers themselves may not exercise U.S. immigrations and customs authority in the host country. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7). For example, if a traveler would likely be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States on terrorism-related grounds (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), an Immigration Advisory Program officer will make a "no board" recommendation to the air carrier and host government that may result in the air carrier not permitting a traveler to board a flight to the United States. Immigration Advisory Program officers have established working relationships with foreign law enforcement and counterterrorism officials and facilitated a direct link and real-time communication among foreign counterparts, the U.S. mission, and CBP's National Targeting Center. Program/initiative: CBP Secure Freight Initiative; Description: The Secure Freight Initiative is a pilot program intended to test the feasibility of scanning all containers bound for the United States before they are loaded onto vessels at foreign seaports. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 981-82. As required by statute, DHS established pilot projects at a small group of strategic seaports. As of 2013, Secure Freight Initiative protocols are in effect in only one location. Program/initiative: CBP Air Cargo Advance Screening Pilot; Description: Participants in CBP's Air Cargo Advance Screening pilot submit specified data elements as early as possible before cargo is loaded onto an aircraft (i.e., at a point earlier than current regulations require) to more readily identify high-risk cargo for additional screening prior to departing from foreign airports to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. 2071 note. See also 19 C.F.R. § 122.48a. Program/initiative: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa Security Program; Description: ICE deploys personnel to U.S. embassies and consulates to assist in the administration and enforcement of U.S. immigration policy by, among other things, conducting security reviews of visa applications, initiating investigations, and coordinating with other law enforcement entities. See 6 U.S.C. § 236. Program/initiative: ICE Investigations Abroad; Description: ICE's Homeland Security Investigations directorate investigates a wide range of domestic and international activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, within and out of the United States. Sometimes these investigations are conducted in partnership with Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, which are composed of vetted foreign prosecutors and law enforcement, customs, immigration and intelligence officials who help make sure that ICE investigations are in compliance with host country laws, agreements, and treaties. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)-(3), 1357, 1446; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1589a, 1701. Program/initiative: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Foreign Airport Assessments; Description: TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and as considered appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44907. Program/initiative: TSA Air Carrier Assessments; Description: TSA conducts assessments of U.S. and foreign air carriers that service the United States from foreign airports to ensure that air carriers certified or permitted to operate to, from, or within the United States meet applicable security requirements, including those set forth in an air carrier's TSA-approved security program. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903, 44906; see also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3, 1546.3. Program/initiative: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) International Port Security Program; Description: The International Port Security Program's primary goal is to reduce the risk of terrorism to the nation and its maritime transportation system. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70108-09. The International Port Security program assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in the overseas ports of U.S. maritime trading partners or countries deemed as possibly posing a security risk to international maritime commerce by visiting these countries, sponsoring foreign port threat assessments, and monitoring other security information about them. Program/initiative: USCG Port State Control Examinations; Description: USCG officials examine foreign vessels entering U.S. waters that have departed foreign ports to determine if they comply with international safety and security conventions. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. pt. 104 (establishing security measures for certain vessels calling at U.S. ports). Although these examinations are usually conducted on foreign vessels that have entered, or are about to enter, U.S. ports, USCG units in Europe and Asia also occasionally examine foreign commercial vessels that plan to trade in the United States. Program/initiative: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Immigration Benefits Processing; Description: When processing applications for immigration benefits, USCIS officers conduct fraud reviews and perform national security vetting, including background identity and security checks and watchlist screening. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1446 (requiring the investigation and examination of applications for naturalization). These reviews and vetting serve to verify information provided in the benefit requests and identify any potential national security concerns. If applicants for immigration benefits are identified by USCIS as known or suspected terrorists, officers put these cases through an additional review process where specially-trained officers vet and deconflict information of national security concern; with appropriate law enforcement or intelligence officials. In addition to sharing information with U.S. agencies, DHS has bilateral information sharing agreements with other countries, and is able to mitigate risks by sharing critical information with these partners. Program/initiative: U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Investigations Abroad; Description: USSS pursues criminal investigations targeting transnational criminal enterprises engaged in high-consequence cyber related crimes, counterfeiting of U.S. obligations, and money- laundering operations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 3056. Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO work and program documentation with verification by DHS officials. [End of table] Within its areas of expertise, DHS also provides training and technical assistance activities--often at the request of and in coordination with other federal partners such as State or the Department of Defense--which are designed to help other nations build capacity and address vulnerabilities in order to limit the movement of people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas. Figure 1 shows that in fiscal year 2012, the DHS components in our review conducted training and technical assistance to help combat terrorism with partners from about 180 countries.[Footnote 15] See appendix II for data associated with figure 1. Figure 1: Countries Participating in Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components within Our Review, Fiscal Year 2012: [Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustrated world map] Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, table 5. Countries depicted in the following categories: Participated in 1 activity (27); Participated in 2-5 activities (88); Participated in 6-10 activities (40); Participated in 10+ training activities (23). Source: GAO analysis of DHS’s component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012; Map Resources (map). [End of figure] Table 3 provides additional detail about the types of training and technical assistance that each DHS component in our review provided in fiscal year 2012 to help combat terrorism abroad. Combined, TSA's and ICE's efforts to help foreign partners build capacity and address vulnerabilities in transportation security, transnational crime, and immigration and customs enforcement account for more than half of total foreign partner participation in training and technical assistance activities. Table 3: Training or Technical Assistance That Can Help Combat Terrorism from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components within Our Review: Component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve border security. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics such as fraudulent documents; port security; and international air cargo, rail, seaport, border, and X-ray interdiction. Technical assistance included border security consultations and seaport assessments. Component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners combat international crime, including terrorism. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics such as cross-border financial investigations, which included sessions on combating terrorist financing; fraudulent document detection; and analyzing trade data to identify transactions that may warrant investigation for money laundering or other trade- related crimes, which have been used to finance terrorism. Technical assistance included advising foreign governments on cross-border financial investigations and providing biometric collection equipment to foreign governments to enroll and identify known or suspected terrorists and other individuals of interest in collaboration with U.S. partners. Component: Transportation Security Administration; Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve aviation security. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics including cargo security, preventive security measures, airport security management, access controls, checkpoint layout design, screening techniques, and improvised explosive device mitigation. Technical assistance included security assessments of airports that are a last point of departure to the United States and air carriers flying routes to the United States from last point of departure airports. Component: U.S. Coast Guard; Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners improve port security and the enforcement of maritime law. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics including port security; risk assessment; cruise ship security; and maritime law enforcement, which can include sessions on security and combating terrorism. Technical assistance included security assessments of foreign ports. Component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners develop and strengthen their own immigration controls and systems. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics such as detecting fraudulent documents and impostors, interviewing techniques, and combating immigration fraud and trafficking. Technical assistance included advising foreign partners on how to develop and strengthen their immigration controls. Component: U.S. Secret Service (USSS); Training and technical assistance activities description: Training and technical assistance aimed to help foreign partners protect government leaders and financial infrastructure. Fiscal year 2012 trainings focused on topics including investigative techniques for combating counterfeiting of U.S. obligations, transnational organized crime, and conducting cyber investigations. USSS also provided briefings on terrorism trends and tactics to foreign partners through its Critical Protective Analysis Group. The briefings covered how attacks were planned and executed, the perpetrators, and weapons used. Source: GAO analysis of component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012, program documentation, and interviews with component officials. [End of table] DHS OIA and Components in Our Review Spent about $451 Million in Fiscal Year 2012 and Have about 1,800 Full-Time-Equivalent Employees Abroad: According to our analysis of expenditure data provided to us by DHS OIA and the components within our review, DHS spent approximately $451 million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. Some but not all of these expenditures were dedicated to combating terrorism.[Footnote 16] The budget for these expenditures comes from various sources, including annual appropriations, user fees collected, and interagency reimbursements. Expenditures increased from about $391 million to about $451 million over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, as shown in figure 2. In pursuit of their different mission goals, each DHS component in our review conducts different activities abroad and tracks related expenditures accordingly. Although each DHS component in our review generally included salary and benefits, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS),[Footnote 17] Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (CSCS),[Footnote 18] travel, and operating costs in their data for expenditures abroad,[Footnote 19] some components included additional expenditures. For example, CBP includes expenditures in direct support of the Immigration Advisory Program and preclearance activities abroad, while other components do not include expenditures in direct support of programs and activities abroad. Appendix III shows the various elements included in each component's expenditure data. Figure 2: Expenditures Abroad from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] Dollars adjusted for inflation: Fiscal year: 2008; U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $194.5 million; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: $75.9 million; Transportation Security Administration: $13.5 million; U.S. Coast Guard: $38.6 million; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: $36.3 million; U.S. Secret Service: $31.9 million. Fiscal year: 2009; U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $187.0 million; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: $89.6 million; Transportation Security Administration: $18.9 million; U.S. Coast Guard: $38.7 million; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: $40.6 million; U.S. Secret Service: $32.2 million; DHS Office of International Affairs: $1.3 million. Fiscal year: 2010; U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $195.2 million; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: $113.8 million; Transportation Security Administration: $19.6 million; U.S. Coast Guard: $42.4 million; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: $41.4 million; U.S. Secret Service: $33.3 million; DHS Office of International Affairs: $13.8 million. Fiscal year: 2011; U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $186.5 million; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: $121.2 million; Transportation Security Administration: $22.7 million; U.S. Coast Guard: $43.5 million; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: $40.6 million; U.S. Secret Service: $34.1 million; DHS Office of International Affairs: $17.3 million. Fiscal year: 2012; U.S. Customs and Border Protection: $187.0 million; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: $117.0 million; Transportation Security Administration: $25.2 million; U.S. Coast Guard: $43.6 million; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: $38.7 million; U.S. Secret Service: $33.4 million; DHS Office of International Affairs: $6.1 million. Source: GAO analysis of DHS component expenditure data for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Note: Figure 2 includes DHS OIA, CBP, ICE, and USCG expenditures that are reimbursed by State and the Department of Defense. DHS OIA expenditure data are not available for fiscal year 2008. [End of figure] From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, CBP consistently accounted for 40 to 50 percent of DHS expenditures abroad, which was generally due to the high number of FTEs dedicated to CBP airport preclearance and port security programs. Preclearance countries--Aruba, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland--account for more than 500 of the nearly 700 CBP FTEs abroad. These countries also account for about $117 million of CBP's $187 million fiscal year 2012 expenditures abroad. About $49 million of these expenditures were funded by user fees. In some cases, DHS's expenditures abroad are reimbursed by State and the Department of Defense. For example: * State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program and Regional Strategic Initiative provide funding for DHS training and technical assistance activities abroad that can help combat terrorism.[Footnote 20] * The Department of Defense and State provide funding for USCG personnel who fill positions in their programs abroad, including those that can help combat terrorism. * State provides funding for all DHS personnel and activities in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2012, State provided about $13 million that largely supported CBP, ICE, and TSA efforts to share intelligence with other federal partners and target illicit activities such as fraudulent visa applications and human smuggling; transportation of drugs, weapons, and precursor material for improvised explosive devices; and illicit use of nontraditional money transfer networks. Figure 3 shows expenditures abroad by country and component in fiscal year 2012, as well as the locations of DHS FTEs stationed abroad as of May 2013. In fiscal year 2012, DHS expenditures were highest in the following five countries: Canada, Mexico, Bahrain, Germany, and the Bahamas. These expenditures were generally associated with high numbers of FTEs in each country. In Canada and Mexico, expenditures supported a range of efforts to expedite the legitimate cross-border flow of people, goods, and services and to interdict and prevent the illicit cross-border flows of people, weapons, drugs, and currency. In Bahrain, Germany, and the Bahamas, expenditures were primarily dedicated to force protection of U.S. naval vessels (which is reimbursed by the Department of Defense), aviation security efforts, and preclearance efforts, respectively. See appendix II for data associated with figure 3. Figure 3: Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time- Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review: [Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustrated world map] Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, tables 6 and 7. Countries depicted on the map in the following categories: $1-$500,000 (25); $500,001-$2,000,000 (25); $2,000,001-$5,000,000 (26); $5,000,000+ (18). Source: GAO analysis of DHS component expenditure data for fiscal year 2012, and DHS overseas personnel and activities locator report, July 2013; Map Resources (map). Note: Figure 3 includes DHS Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and United States Coast Guard expenditures and FTEs that are reimbursed by State and the Department of Defense. DHS OIA expenditure data are not available for fiscal year 2008. Also, in fiscal year 2012, DHS components within our review expended about $29 million for activities abroad that they do not attribute to an individual country and therefore are not included in figure 3. These expenditures included approximately $3 million for work with Department of Defense combatant commands, $26 million for expenses in direct support of programs and activities abroad, $400,000 for USCG Far East Activities and Marine Inspection Detachment Unit and $13,000 for CBP multicountry activities. Data on FTEs abroad are self-reported by components, and may capture some personnel on travel duty in addition to permanently deployed FTEs. [End of figure] According to DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning data, as of May 2013, DHS OIA and the six DHS operational components in our review had approximately 1,800 FTEs in almost 80 countries to help combat terrorism and achieve other mission goals.[Footnote 21] Employees include DHS and component attachés, program personnel, and locally employed staff.[Footnote 22] Some DHS employees also travel regionally and from the United States on a more temporary basis to conduct capacity-building activities. Table 4 shows the breakdown of FTEs by component for May 2013. Table 4: Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review, by Component, May 2013: Component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Federal FTEs: 613; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 85; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 44. Component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Federal FTEs: 218; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 148; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 48. Component: Transportation Security Administration; Federal FTEs: 63; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 26; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 24. Component: U.S. Coast Guard; Federal FTEs: 391; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 0; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 29. Component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Federal FTEs: 71; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 108; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 24. Component: U.S. Secret Service; Federal FTEs: 62; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 30; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 21. Component: DHS Office of International Affairs; Federal FTEs: 4; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 3; Number of countries FTEs stationed: 5. Component: Total; Federal FTEs: 1422; Locally-employed staff FTEs: 400. Source: DHS Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator report, May 2013. Note: A country can have more than one FTE. The total number of countries with FTEs stationed is 76. [End of table] DHS and State Identified Five Key DHS Contributions to U.S. Missions and Multiple Factors and Challenges That Affected Contributions: On the basis of two surveys and interviews conducted with embassy personnel, we found that DHS has made contributions to U.S. missions in five key areas. We also identified 12 factors that facilitated DHS's contributions to U.S. missions' combating terrorism goals. A majority of DCMs and DHS attachés responding to our surveys reported that the factors we identified were significantly or moderately important. They most frequently identified as very important a set of factors that relate to supporting a climate of collaboration at the embassy. We also identified a variety of challenges DHS and other personnel in the U.S. missions have faced. Although many of the DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing these challenges to some degree, our survey results indicate that a majority did not experience the challenges or their impacts as significant. Mission Management Reported That DHS Has Made Valuable Contributions to Combating Terrorism Efforts: Using State's and DHS's goals, along with interviews conducted with DHS and State headquarters offices and interviews with embassy personnel, we identified five specific types of contributions DHS might make to a U.S. mission's combating terrorism goals. As shown in figure 4, according to our survey results, the majority of the 41 DCM respondents indicated that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions we identified. Figure 4: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Contribution: Building and leveraging relationships with host government counterparts; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 25; Moderately contributed: 11; Minimally contributed: 3; Has not contributed: 1; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Working with host governments to address identified threats and vulnerabilities; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 21; Moderately contributed: 12; Minimally contributed: 5; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Sharing information with other federal partners about indicators of terrorist activities or threats; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 20; Moderately contributed: 13; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 3; Do not know/no answer: 0. Contribution: Working with host governments to identify security infrastructure vulnerabilities; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 19; Moderately contributed: 13; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 3. Contribution: Successful negotiation of homeland security sharing agreements with host governments; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 13; Moderately contributed: 9; Minimally contributed: 5; Has not contributed: 9; Do not know/no answer: 5. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] It is important to note that in some cases, DHS does not have the opportunity to make certain types of contributions. For example, the opportunity to negotiate bilateral information-sharing agreements may not exist in some locations, while other locations may not engage in any capacity building. Similarly, one DCM survey respondent noted that DHS does not have primary responsibility for combating terrorism- related activities at the embassy but plays an important supporting role and has negotiated memorandums of understanding with host government officials on immigration and customs enforcement. Another respondent said that although DHS has not negotiated formal agreements, it has improved counterterrorism cooperation with the host government through informal understandings and relationships. As with our survey, DCMs we interviewed during our site visits also noted important contributions DHS has made to their mission's combating terrorism goals in a variety of ways. For example, one DCM pointed to progress a DHS-affiliated law enforcement group had made to foreign partners' ability to combat international crime. Another DCM said that DHS brought new networks of contacts to the table and leveraged relationships with host country partners, including one recent substantial contribution to a major nonproliferation effort. An ambassador we interviewed stated that CBP has facilitated numerous weapons and other illicit material seizures, including improvised explosive device precursor materials. Certain Factors Facilitate Use of DHS Knowledge and Skills: By reviewing our prior work on interagency collaboration, along with information collected in our interviews with agency officials, we identified 12 factors that could facilitate DHS's ability to contribute to U.S. missions' combating terrorism efforts.[Footnote 23] DCMs and DHS attachés we surveyed provided information about the extent to which they believe the factors we identified are important for DHS to be able to contribute its knowledge and skills. Figures 5 and 6 show the complete list of factors we identified and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attaché respondents to our survey identified them as important. Overall, a majority of respondents to both surveys reported that nearly all of the factors we identified were very or moderately important to facilitating DHS's contributions to U.S. missions' combating terrorism efforts. Figure 5: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions' Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Indicating Them as Very Important: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Factor: U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 39; Moderately important: 1; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: A culture of cooperation and informal information sharing exists; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 39; Moderately important: 0; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: U.S. mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational cultures; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 35; Moderately important: 5; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Division of roles and responsibilities is respected; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 35; Moderately important: 5; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Routine formal mechanisms for information sharing exist; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 34; Moderately important: 4; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Roles and responsibilities for ongoing combating terrorism- related activities are clearly defined; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 31; Moderately important: 7; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 1; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: DHS regularly provides information to U.S. mission management on what it can offer; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 26; Moderately important: 10; Somewhat important: 4; Not important: 1; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: DHS participates in developing U.S. mission strategic goals; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 24; Moderately important: 11; Somewhat important: 5; Not important: 1; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Objectives for specific projects are explicitly defined in advance; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 22; Moderately important: 13; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 3. Factor: Roles and responsibilities for specific projects are clearly defined; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 21; Moderately important: 14; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 3. Factor: DHS has a single point of contact for U.S. mission management; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 19; Moderately important: 9; Somewhat important: 6; Not important: 7; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Policies and procedures for specific projects are defined in writing; Number of DCMs responding: Very important: 17; Moderately important: 13; Somewhat important: 7; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 3. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] Figure 6: Factors That Can Facilitate the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Diplomatic Missions' Combating Terrorism Efforts, in Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Indicating Them as Very Important: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Factor: U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 41; Moderately important: 6; Somewhat important: 0; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Roles and responsibilities for specific projects are clearly defined; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 39; Moderately important: 6; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: A culture of cooperation and informal information sharing exists; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 38; Moderately important: 8; Somewhat important: 0; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: DHS regularly provides information to U.S. mission management on what it can offer; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 37; Moderately important: 8; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 1; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Routine formal mechanisms for information sharing exist; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 33; Moderately important: 9; Somewhat important: 5; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Division of roles and responsibilities is respected; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 32; Moderately important: 13; Somewhat important: 2; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Objectives for specific projects are explicitly defined in advance; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 32; Moderately important: 12; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 1. Factor: Roles and responsibilities for ongoing combating terrorism- related activities are clearly defined; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 30; Moderately important: 16; Somewhat important: 1; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: Policies and procedures for specific projects are defined in writing; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 29; Moderately important: 10; Somewhat important: 7; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 1; Factor: U.S. mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational cultures; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 28; Moderately important: 14; Somewhat important: 5; Not important: 0; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: DHS participates in developing U.S. mission strategic goals; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 27; Moderately important: 16; Somewhat important: 3; Not important: 1; Do not know/no answer: 0. Factor: DHS has a single point of contact for U.S. mission management; Number of DHS attachés responding: Very important: 27; Moderately important: 7; Somewhat important: 5; Not important: 8; Do not know/no answer: 0. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] The 12 factors we identified generally fall into two categories: (1) efforts to foster a collaborative climate, and (2) mechanisms to leverage resources and clarify roles and responsibilities. Fostering a Collaborative Climate: As we reported in September 2012, one of the key considerations in developing interagency collaborative mechanisms is whether the participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward collaboration. Another of these key features is bridging organizational cultures. We reported that different agencies participating in any collaborative mechanism bring diverse organizational cultures to it. To address these differences, we have found that it is important to establish ways to operate across agency boundaries, by, for example, developing common terminology and compatible policies and procedures, and fostering open lines of communication.[Footnote 24] Three of the factors we identified--the 3 that were most commonly selected as very important by DCM survey respondents--related to fostering an organizational culture that supports collaborative behaviors--(1) U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors, (2) U.S. mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational cultures, and (3) a culture of cooperation and informal information sharing exists. U.S. mission management promoting collaborative behaviors was most frequently identified as very important by both DCMs and DHS attachés. All 47 DHS attaché respondents identified it as very or moderately important, as did 40 out of 41 DCMs. A culture of cooperation and informal information was the second most frequently reported as very important for DCMs and third for DHS Attachés. Echoing our survey results, officials we interviewed at one U.S. mission we visited reported a strong collaborative relationship between DHS and other federal partners, and attributed it, at least in part, to the "tone at the top"--including both rewarding collaborative behaviors and discouraging failure to collaborate. At another U.S. mission we visited, an official noted that the DCM had forbidden the use of acronyms in interagency meetings, which had the effect of helping to ensure that use of specialized vocabulary did not unintentionally exclude participants from collaborative discussions. This official at this embassy noted that the action may seem simple but was nevertheless a critical signal to all the federal personnel at the embassy that the management valued collaborative action. Another related factor a majority of DHS attaché and DCM respondents-- 33 of 47 and 34 of 40, respectively--identified as very important is having routine formal mechanisms for information sharing. One such mechanism U.S. missions use to facilitate effective contribution of DHS skills and expertise is law enforcement working groups focused on counterterrorism or security issues. Working groups, which are routine, formal meetings of diverse agency personnel with similar goals or functions, provide an opportunity for parties carrying out ongoing activities to share information and avoid conflicts. At two U.S. missions we visited, officials we interviewed pointed to the working groups as an essential collaboration mechanism. Leveraging Resources and Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities: Our October 2005 work on practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration called for agencies to address needs by leveraging resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 25] Among the factors we identified that relate to this is DHS's participation in developing U.S. mission strategic goals, and 35 of 41 DCMs and 43 of 47 DHS attachés responded that the factor was very or moderately important in facilitating DHS's contributions. With some exceptions, such as military activities, federal activities abroad are conducted through the embassies under the authority of the chief of mission. DHS receives funding from State for a number of its training and technical assistance programs abroad, through programs like the Regional Strategic Initiative and the Antiterrorism Assistance program. For State, funding decisions are based in part on the product of planning processes undertaken at each individual U.S. mission. Therefore, the ability for DHS and State to share information about both strategic and programming decisions, particularly through U.S. mission planning processes, is an important element in DHS's ability to make the maximum possible contribution to U.S. mission efforts. During our fieldwork we saw variation in the extent to and manner in which U.S. mission management integrated DHS into planning processes. In addition, open-ended comments on our survey reflected some frustrations with DHS integration--though these concerns did not appear to be pervasive or systemic. We visited two missions where officials expressed positive remarks about DHS's opportunities to collaborate with its federal partners in the respective U.S. mission. In both of these missions, the DCM stressed to us the importance of fully integrating the DHS attaché into U.S. mission strategic planning. At these same two U.S. missions, the DHS attachés said they make a focused effort to ensure that the other federal partners understand the roles and responsibilities of DHS and all of its components--whether or not their personnel are stationed at the embassy. At another U.S. mission we visited, the DCM told us that the DHS attaché had an opportunity to participate in a strategic planning process and was later able to comment on the final product. However, this DHS attaché told us that he did not fully understand the purpose of the planning meeting he attended nor did he believe he had been provided encouragement or channels for further participation beyond the single meeting. At this U.S. mission, DHS personnel reported frustrations about limits on their ability to contribute, while U.S. mission management raised questions about DHS's value to their mission. At another U.S. mission with border security concerns, DHS officials said the embassy's border working group had not been addressing DHS priorities or activities. According to the DHS officials, the embassy was not encouraging a "whole-of-government" approach that recognizes the value of DHS contributions. Although few DCMs and DHS attachés reported that DHS does not participate in helping to develop U.S. mission strategic goals, some respondents discussed issues in open-ended comments with DHS's integration and clarity of roles within U.S. missions. For example, in open-ended survey responses, one DCM said DHS personnel are individually cooperative, but internal stove-piping limits DHS's ability to contribute. Another DCM commented that DHS is organized and deployed in a manner that limits its ability to bring its knowledge and skills to bear. Survey Respondents Reported Facing Some Challenges, but Few Indicated Impacts Were Significant: We identified 14 potential challenges that could hinder the contribution of DHS knowledge and skills abroad to combating terrorism efforts. Fewer than half of respondents identified any of the challenges as moderate or significant challenges. In most cases, more than two-thirds said the challenges were minimal or did not apply to them. Figures 7 and 8 show the top 5 (or 6 in case of a tie for fifth place) most frequently identified challenges that DCMs and DHS attachés identified as representing some level of challenge-- significant, moderate, or minimal--ranked by frequency. See appendix IV for a list of all 14 challenges and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing them. Figure 7: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Deputy Chiefs of Mission as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Challenge: DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and leveraging personnel abroad; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 10; Minimal challenge: 12; Not a challenge in my mission: 6; Do not know/no answer: 6. Challenge: U.S. relationship with host government; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 6; Moderate challenge: 4; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: U.S. mission understanding of DHS role; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 0; Moderate challenge: 7; Minimal challenge: 19; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: Number of DHS personnel available; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 9; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 13; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: Organizational culture may create barriers to effective relationship; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 2; Moderate challenge: 10; Minimal challenge: 13; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: Availability of U.S. mission resources for DHS-related programs; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 6; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 14; Do not know/no answer: 2. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. [End of figure] Figure 8: Challenges Most Frequently Identified by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Attachés as Presenting Some Level of Challenge to DHS's Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Challenge: U.S. mission understanding of DHS role; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 8; Moderate challenge: 13; Minimal challenge: 17; Not a challenge in my mission: 8; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and leveraging personnel abroad; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 11; Minimal challenge: 19; Not a challenge in my mission: 9; Do not know/no answer: 3. Challenge: Number of DHS personnel available; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 13; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 8; Do not know/no answer: 5. Challenge: Availability of U.S. mission resources for DHS-related programs; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 17; Minimal challenge: 11; Not a challenge in my mission: 12; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: U.S. mission relationship with host government; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 9; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 1. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. [End of figure] Some survey respondents elaborated, in written comments, about issues with DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and leveraging personnel abroad.[Footnote 26] For example, one DHS respondent stated that DHS domestic management, through contact with foreign embassies in the United States, has come into conflict with DHS operations in country. A DCM respondent indicated that when issues arise, they often originate from insufficient coordination with DHS domestic management, with State, and with DHS in the field. Another DCM respondent indicated that DHS domestic management regularly gets involved in international affairs without informing DHS field office or embassy management. In addition, a DCM respondent indicated that challenges come primarily from the U.S. side (rather than DHS personnel at the embassy). In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned that sometimes miscommunication or misalignment between DHS domestic management and embassies causes problems. For example, at one U.S. mission we visited, the DCM and DHS personnel described an instance in which DHS domestic operations took down a communication link used by transnational criminals in the country without consulting anyone at the embassy, including DHS personnel. However, DHS's law enforcement partners were monitoring the link for more strategic purposes and the action negatively affected their operation--an outcome that DHS personnel at the embassy could have alerted them to had they been consulted. Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which the availability of U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for contributions of DHS knowledge and skills is a challenge. For example, one DCM respondent indicated that the embassy is an old facility that is not sized adequately to house all the federal agencies and space restrictions affect the U.S. mission's ability to accommodate DHS's presence. In addition, at two sites we visited, officials indicated that space is scarce, especially given rapidly growing needs, so making room for DHS staff, or any other federal stakeholder, is challenging and requires a strong cost-benefit case. In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned constrained or unpredictable budgets hampering planning and the ability to dedicate resources to DHS programs or personnel. One DHS survey respondent commented that with little to no budget, it is difficult to build contacts with foreign partners, effectively communicate meeting outcomes, and develop long term strategic plans. Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which U.S. mission understanding of DHS's role is a challenge. For example, one DHS respondent commented that in larger embassies the mission of counterterrorism is focused on other agencies, and DHS sometimes does not have the opportunity to discuss what it can offer. Another DHS respondent indicated that other mission personnel do not understand exactly the role of DHS and how it contributes to mission-related objectives. We also surveyed DCMs and DHS attachés about the extent to which the challenges they have experienced have affected DHS's ability to contribute--for example, by creating conflicts, missed opportunities, project delays, or unnecessary overlap. As shown in figures 9 and 10, for all impacts that might have arisen from the identified challenges, more than two-thirds of respondents said the impact was minimal or did not affect them. Figure 9: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Impact: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Impact: Lack of coordination to avoid duplication and overlap; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 3; Minimal impact: 19; Has not occurred: 18; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: Lack of coordination to ensure resources for highest priorities; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 13; Has not occurred: 22; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: DHS headquarters actions conflicted with U.S. mission operations; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 4; Moderate impact: 8; Minimal impact: 5; Has not occurred: 21; Do not know/no answer: 3. Impact: DHS headquarters actions created public affairs issues; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 9; Has not occurred: 24; Do not know/no answer: 1. Impact: Missed opportunities for DHS to contribute; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 0; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 10; Has not occurred: 20; Do not know/no answer: 4. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Notes: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] Figure 10: Impact as a Result of Challenges on Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Impact: Lack of coordination to avoid duplication and overlap; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 11; Minimal impact: 14; Has not occurred: 19; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: Implementation delays; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 5; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 12; Has not occurred: 17; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: Lack of coordination to ensure resources for highest priorities; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 16; Has not occurred: 22; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: Ineffective pursuit of strategic goals; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 3; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 14; Has not occurred: 23; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: DHS headquarters actions conflicted with U.S. mission operations; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 2; Moderate impact: 4; Minimal impact: 13; Has not occurred: 24; Do not know/no answer: 4. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey, but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] DHS Has Acted to Enhance Department-wide Alignment, but Could Have Better Assurance That Resources Abroad Support Highest Priorities: DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource use abroad--including establishing an intradepartmental governance board, reviewing the department's international footprint, and creating a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad--which are made at the individual component level--effectively, efficiently, and consistently align with department-wide strategic priorities. DHS Has Taken Some Actions to Enhance Department-wide Organizational and Programmatic Alignment across Its Resource Deployment Abroad: DHS's QHSR calls for a specific focus on strengthening the homeland security enterprise, in part by maturing the department. According to the QHSR, critical aspects of maturing the department include (1) improved organizational alignment--particularly among DHS headquarters components--(2) enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions; and (3) more efficient and effective management processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structures. To that end, DHS and OIA have taken three actions related to its resource use abroad since 2010. * Establishment of the DHS International Governance Board in August 2012. The board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and composed of heads of international affairs from the DHS components. The board provides a formal organizational mechanism for the component heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate crosscutting policy issues related to international engagement. According to OIA officials, since its establishment, the board has met monthly to discuss and resolve issues like designating DHS attachés, expanding criminal history information sharing for law enforcement, responding to a new presidential directive that calls for interagency collaboration to enhance security capacity around the globe, and coordinating with State on DHS's presence abroad. For example, in May 2013 the group considered who should be designated the DHS attaché in a country where two components had recently established offices. * Review of the DHS international footprint. Over the period spanning 2011 and early 2012, DHS reviewed the department's international footprint--the complete set of resources and efforts DHS had deployed abroad--with the intention of enhancing organizational and programmatic alignment. This "footprint review" was led by OIA, in coordination with component heads, and it evaluated the placement of resources on the basis of the QHSR's five strategic missions, cost, and potential for engagement with host nations.[Footnote 27] In at least one case, according to OIA officials, this resulted in components reducing FTEs in one country and increasing them in another--generally in response to the potential to achieve key strategic priorities by strengthening engagement in the country where they increased the resources and to realize cost savings. * Creation of an international engagement plan. In March 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed DHS's first International Engagement Plan. To promote common international objectives and priorities across the department, the plan maps key activities abroad to DHS's five strategic missions. It also includes specific strategies in separate international engagement plans for various regions of the world including Canada; Mexico; Latin America and the Caribbean; Europe; the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; and Asia Pacific. [Footnote 28] Each regional international engagement plan discusses DHS interests, challenges and opportunities, and strategic objectives, among other things. For example, the plan on Mexico states that the flow of goods and people through the Western Hemisphere and across the United States border, particularly those flows originating in or transiting through Mexico, represent both the most significant challenges and the best opportunities for DHS. DHS Has Not Established Mechanisms to Help Ensure Department-wide Organizational and Programmatic Alignment in Its Resource Use Abroad: Although a stated goal of DHS's QHSR is to strengthen the homeland security enterprise and mature the department through improved organizational alignment across the components and programmatic alignment to homeland security missions, DHS has not established mechanisms to help provide assurance of alignment of its resource use abroad with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, it (1) has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities to guide organizational and programmatic alignment; (2) does not have an institutionalized mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities;[Footnote 29] and (3) does not have the means to produce reliable, comparable cost data to support analysis of organizational and programmatic alignment in its department-wide resource use abroad. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms to enforce management's directives--for example, to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. In addition, the standards call for agencies to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, is performed continually, and is ingrained in the agency's operations. Finally, the standards say that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be available to help an agency achieve its objectives.[Footnote 30] DHS Has Not Established Specific Department-wide Strategic Priorities: Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is decentralized, it has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities--such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals--for resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision making. DHS is tasked with a variety of responsibilities that are not directly aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. In the course of efforts to secure the homeland, some activities focus more broadly on transnational crime such as narcotics and human smuggling, money laundering, and immigration fraud that could be, in some cases, enablers for terrorist networks. In addition, the QHSR notes that DHS's missions are multifaceted by nature, and efforts to fulfill them also involve promoting legitimate trade, travel, and immigration. DHS's International Engagement Plan links the five QHSR missions to the kinds of activities that DHS conducts abroad. In this way, it helps ensure programmatic alignment to homeland security missions at a high level. However, it does not establish specific priorities to help guide resource decision making. For example, our analysis of DHS's International Engagement Plan found that although there were goals listed for each region, there was no ordering of priorities by region, by source of terrorism, by function, or by goal (e.g., combating international terrorism). Because the plan covers all mission activities described within the QHSR without clear, specific priorities, it does not convey information about what might be most important when deciding how to deploy scarce resources. The lack of specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use abroad also creates limitations in DHS's ability to help ensure alignment of its priorities and abilities with government-wide efforts. Officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy and in OIA stated that DHS's highest priority for resource use abroad is prevention of attacks on the homeland. Focusing on preventing attacks on the homeland is consistent with the National Security Strategy's and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism's calls for the use of homeland security tools to promote national security and counter terrorism. However, DHS's Office of Counterterrorism Policy officials told us that because the regional plans within DHS's International Engagement Plan covers all countries with which DHS engages, from Canada to Afghanistan, the plan does not represent a clear priority focus on countries with factors that represent more immediate threats to the homeland. They noted that in their engagement with the White House and other federal partners for government-wide counterterrorism efforts, DHS's International Engagement Plan--because it covers all DHS missions, not just counterterrorism--does not help them demonstrate DHS's counterterrorism priorities within its overall international engagement. According to OIA officials, the International Engagement Plan lays out in one place for the first time all of DHS's international activities in an effort to improve organizational and programmatic resource alignment. However, they acknowledged that it does not necessarily serve to identify a clear set of priorities and principles that would help to guide future resource decisions. Instead, it represents more of a compendium of the many activities and priorities each of the contributing components and offices within DHS already had planned or under way. They noted that having a crosscutting view of all the activities and goals across the international footprint is a significant step forward for the department. They also said that more clarity on strategic priorities in future iterations would help ensure better organizational and programmatic alignment, but current priorities are largely determined independently by each component, and the department has not established a routine and crosscutting process for clarifying department-wide priorities. Specific strategic priorities would provide DHS critical information to guide resource trade-off decisions and ensure that resources are directed to the highest homeland security priorities across the department and government-wide. DHS Does Not Have an Institutionalized Mechanism to Monitor Organizational and Programmatic Alignment: Although OIA conducted a one-time exercise to evaluate the department's international footprint to try to bring it into better organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS has not established a routine or ingrained process that would continually assess the alignment between strategic goals and resource decisions. Each of the operational components we interviewed described different rationales and methods for deciding where and how many resources to deploy around the world. OIA officials acknowledged the need for mechanisms--such as the footprint review--to be conducted routinely in order to meet the goal of facilitating enhanced organizational and programmatic alignment. They also said the development of an institutionalized mechanism that includes department-wide methods and metrics that were meaningful to all of the components would help provide coherent strategic overlay to give the department better assurance of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities. These OIA officials added that they would like to enhance the rigor of the footprint review process and implement it on a routine basis, but have not done so because of resource limitations and competing priorities. Officials noted that ensuring a coherent department-wide approach to resource use abroad is an important goal. However, they said the first review was a major undertaking. They stated they have not devised an approach for implementing a routine, ingrained process with department-wide methods and metrics. Given that DHS's components make individual decisions about resource deployment abroad, an institutionalized mechanism--whether it is enhancement and institutionalization of the footprint review or another control activity--to help routinely monitor and adjust organizational and programmatic alignment across the department would provide DHS better assurance that its strategic priorities translate to resource use decisions on an ongoing basis to support the QHSR's goals. DHS Does Not Have Comparable Cost Data to Help Inform Resource Trade- off Decisions: DHS does not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common across the department. To achieve the organizational and programmatic alignment called for by the QHSR, it is important for decision makers at the component level to have information that helps promote such alignment on an ongoing basis and during routine monitoring activities.[Footnote 31] However, each of the components tracks its international expenditures differently, and according to OIA officials, the effort to collect comparable information that reliably informs management decision making has been challenging.[Footnote 32] According to OIA officials, a standardized reporting framework for the costs of conducting activities abroad--for example, salaries, housing, and fees paid to embassies to cover certain administrative and security costs--across the department could enable OIA to identify best practices that could lead to cost savings in international deployments and enhance the ability to assess the outcomes and cost-effectiveness of programs and activities carried out abroad. A framework to help capture comparable cost data department-wide could provide with DHS critical information to make informed resource trade-off decisions and increase cost efficiency. Conclusions: Combating terrorism is a government-wide responsibility, which requires contributions from departments and agencies across the U.S. government. DHS and its components have made meaningful contributions by carrying out key homeland security activities abroad and through international engagement that helps other nations strengthen their security functions, making it harder for terrorists to operate globally. Although the operational decisions to deploy resources abroad are generally made by individual DHS components, DHS's QHSR calls for efforts to mature the department through improved organizational and programmatic alignment around specific mission objectives like international engagement and combating terrorism. DHS has made some progress toward such alignment across its international footprint with recent actions it has taken--like completing an international footprint review that provided the department with an opportunity to help ensure that resources deployed abroad are devoted to the highest department- and government-wide priorities. However, the one-time review has not been established as an institutional process to help ensure alignment between priorities and resource decisions on an ongoing basis. Therefore, DHS does not have full assurance that department-wide priorities translate to resource-tradeoff decisions at the component level. Moreover, there are limitations that hamper DHS's ability to consider two key factors for resource trade-off decisions-- strategic priorities and cost. Although DHS's International Engagement Plan describes how programmatic activities abroad align with the five missions outlined in the QHSR, these documents do not establish clear and specific strategic priorities for resource deployment abroad. In addition, without a common framework for tracking international expenditures across the department, DHS is limited in its ability to make informed resource trade-off decisions. An institutionalized process for a routine strategic review of DHS's international footprint, supported by clear and specific priorities to inform trade- offs and a framework to capture comparable and reliable cost data across the department could help provide better assurance of organizational and programmatic alignment. Recommendations for Executive Action: In order to help ensure that DHS's resource use abroad aligns with the highest department-wide and U.S. government-wide priorities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: * establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad; * establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department's resource use abroad with the highest department- wide and government-wide strategic priorities; and: * establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resource use abroad. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: We provided a draft of this report to DHS and received written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix V. We also provided a draft of this report to State and the Departments of Defense and Justice, which did not provide written comments. DHS and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with all three recommendations, noting that it will take steps to implement them. With respect to the first recommendation, DHS stated that it will shape its International Engagement Plan into a more specific, comprehensive, and strategic plan for resource allocation abroad across the Department's international organizations, with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2014. Regarding the second recommendation, DHS stated that it will develop a methodology and system for tracking newly identified strategic priorities and objectives that meet DHS and U.S. Government-wide priorities related to counterterrorism, with an estimated completion date of September 30, 2014. Finally, for the third recommendation, DHS stated that it will establish a working group to focus on a Department-wide system to capture individual component expenditure data and represent the information in a cohesive, comparable manner, with an estimated completion date of September 30, 2014. We believe these actions, if fully implemented, will address the intent of our recommendations. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General; selected congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please contact Dave Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Signed by: David C. Maurer Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team: Signed by: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. Director, International Affairs and Trade Team: [End of section] Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions' efforts to combat terrorism and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities? To define the scope of activities and resources to be included in this performance audit, we reviewed and analyzed key government-wide strategies related to combating terrorism--the May 2010 National Security Strategy and the July 2011 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. We also reviewed DHS documents designed to establish its mission and goals such as the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), DHS's Strategic Plan FY2012-2016, and DHS's Performance and Accountability Report 2011-2013. Additionally, we reviewed DHS program documentation related to activities established in those documents. We also reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS Office of Inspector General officials responsible for a 2008 report that made a number of recommendations designed to enhance DHS's management of international affairs.[Footnote 33] We also interviewed officials in DHS Office of International Affairs (OIA) and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS's Office of Policy about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Department of State's (State) Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of their coordination between their efforts and DHS efforts abroad, because these bureaus have efforts that involved collaboration with DHS abroad. On the basis of those document reviews and interviews, we determined that the DHS operational components with mission activities most relevant for a review of DHS efforts abroad to combat terrorism included U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). To identify the programs and activities that DHS has to help combat terrorism abroad, on the basis of our interviews with the DHS components and offices and the State bureau officials, we established a definition of combating terrorism for the purposes of identifying and collecting data on programs and activities: Any DHS program or activity that in the course of its normal operation may have the effect of thwarting terrorists or their plots whether designed solely and specifically for that purpose or not. Using that definition and through reviews of our prior work and DHS program documentation, we independently identified the list of programs and activities that constitute DHS's efforts to combat terrorism abroad. We then verified the list with DHS officials responsible for various programs, refining it, as appropriate. To identify resources used abroad in support of these programs and activities, we asked DHS to provide expenditure and related data. On the basis of our interviews with OIA and budget officials from the six DHS operational components in our review, we determined that because DHS's missions involve carrying out activities for multifaceted purposes, it would not be possible to isolate expenditures abroad for combating terrorism from expenditures abroad to carry out other mission activities. Therefore, we asked OIA and the six operational components in our review to provide data separately on all expenditures abroad, as well as data specific to training and technical assistance activities that met our definition for combating terrorism, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. For the 5 years of expenditure data, we checked for consistency and reasonableness and discussed data reliability controls with OIA and each component office that provided it to determine how the data were collected and what controls were in place to help ensure its accuracy, among other things. We found that because of the differences in missions and methods for tracking expenditure data, the data sets provided by the components had some variations in the elements included in the data sets and limitations in the ability to isolate expenditures by country. In these cases, we attempted to harmonize the data definitions across the component data sets and worked with DHS component officials to agree on methods for estimating expenditures by country. For example, the individual country break-down of travel costs in USCIS's Refugee Affairs Division was not consistently tracked separately by country, because the program's activities commonly involved multicountry trips. To obtain travel costs for this program, USCIS joined three different sets of data: obligations, itineraries, and the central bill account for travel reimbursements. In fiscal year 2012, there were approximately 500 international travel authorizations. Of these, about 400 were for a single country. For the remaining multicountry itineraries, USCIS calculated expenditures by country by using the number of days spent in each country to calculate a percentage and divide the total itinerary cost. For example, on a $10,000 trip visiting country A for 4 days and country B for 6 days, expenditures would be calculated as $4,000 in country A and $6,000 in country B. We noted any remaining differences among component expenditure data sets, as necessary (see also appendix III). On the basis of our discussions with knowledgeable DHS officials and the actions we took, we found that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing a general estimate of expenditures abroad for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with the additional information provided. The full- time-equivalent employees (FTE) stationed abroad are monitored at DHS through its Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator, which is maintained by DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. The locator is updated monthly with self-reported data from the components, which may capture some personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs. We collected these data for May 2013, the most recent month for which DHS was able to provide the data during the period of our study. On the basis of discussions about the system and relevant control activities with the responsible officials, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting FTEs abroad during the specified month in which they were collected. For the data we gathered on training and technical assistance activities for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, we attempted to obtain the number of personnel and expenditures dedicated to staff who conducted training and technical assistance on a temporary basis, but some components were unable to provide data for multiple fiscal years, and we encountered numerous challenges, such as inconsistent data definitions and lack of confidence by DHS officials in the accuracy or completeness of the data. As a result, we did not include this information in our report. However, we determined that information the six DHS operational components in our review were able to provide was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting the foreign nation whose officials received DHS-delivered training and technical assistance. We made this determination on the basis of checks for reasonableness and discussions with responsible DHS officials about the steps taken to help ensure accuracy of the data. To examine how DHS has contributed to U.S. missions' efforts to combat terrorism and the factors that have facilitated or hampered those contributions, we reviewed documentation about DHS's component activities abroad and State programs and activities on which DHS collaborates. We also relied on our interviews with agency officials and web-based surveys of deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where DHS components were stationed in the embassy. We interviewed officials from DHS OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy with DHS's Office of Policy; the six operational DHS operational components; and the State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and coordination with State. We visited 10 U.S. missions where FTEs from one or more DHS components were stationed. During these visits, we interviewed officials from DHS, generally including the DHS attaché and other senior DHS officials at the U.S. mission. We also interviewed State officials, including the DCM at each mission and other senior officials with responsibility for programs abroad that involve coordination or collaboration with DHS. On the basis of advice from State and DHS personnel at each U.S. mission, as well as availability and relevance, we also interviewed some officials from the Departments of Defense and Justice that may collaborate with DHS abroad. We conducted a total of 70 interviews. During these interviews, we asked questions and gathered specific examples of how DHS works abroad with federal partners under the authority of the chief of mission to help support government-wide efforts to combat terrorism. To provide balance and diversity, we selected the 10 U.S. mission sites based on a range of factors, including: * the nature and scope of DHS's presence abroad--for example, the number of components represented and the size of the overall DHS deployment; * indicators of terrorism risk--specifically we considered (1) inclusion in CBP's Aliens from Special Interest Countries,[Footnote 34] (2) State's country reports on terrorism, (3) designation as a terrorist safe haven, and (4) advice from DHS and State subject matter experts; * safety, security, and related logistical concerns--based on State advice; and: * the opportunity to leverage resources.[Footnote 35] We visited Mexico City, Mexico; Panama City, Panama; Buenos Aries, Argentina; Manila, the Philippines; Tokyo, Japan; Jakarta, Indonesia; Singapore; Amman, Jordan; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Abu Dhabi and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The results from our visits to these 10 countries cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided insights on how DHS contributes to U.S. mission combating terrorism efforts, what is working well, and any barriers to effective contribution. We analyzed the responses to our interviews about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities with State and DHS officials at headquarters and with federal officials in the first 3 of the 10 site visits, to identify types of knowledge and skill contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions and any challenges and impacts DHS and its federal partners have encountered. We also relied on this set of interviews to identify factors that helped to facilitate DHS contributions in the U.S. mission environment. Because a U.S. mission is an inherently interagency environment, in addition to the interview responses, we considered the practices and considerations for promoting effective interagency collaboration outlined in two prior GAO reports when identifying factors that facilitate DHS's ability to contribute its knowledge and skills. [Footnote 36] We used this analysis to develop two web-based surveys to be administered to all DCMs and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where one or more DHS components had FTEs stationed in the embassy. We identified all DCMs and DHS attachés meeting this definition from lists provided to us by State for DCMs and DHS OIA for DHS attachés. Our final survey populations included DCMs and DHS attachés in 57 U.S. missions. We selected DCMs to provide a perspective from State because the DCM supervises department heads within the U.S. mission and handles many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. We selected DHS attachés to provide a perspective from DHS because these officials act as the in-country representatives for DHS. We conducted survey pretests with five DHS attachés and three DCMs, a mix of officials with whom we had already met and with whom we had never discussed the purpose of our evaluation. During the pretests, we worked with the respondents to ensure the clarity and appropriateness of the language and questions in the survey. We also discussed with respondents the comprehensiveness of the lists we had developed--DHS contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts. On the basis of pretest feedback, we further refined our analysis of these items. In addition, to provide further assurance that our analysis was comprehensive in identifying DHS contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts, we included in our survey questionnaires open- ended questions that allowed respondents to provide additional information about these items. We administered the surveys between April 16, and July 19, 2013, to DCMs and DHS attachés in the 57 U.S. missions. We sent follow-up e- mail messages on April 24, 2013, May 1, 2013, and May 13, 2013, to those who had not yet completed the survey. Overall, we received responses from 41 DCMs and 47 DHS attachés, yielding a response rate of 72 percent and 82 percent, respectively. We ran comparative tests on the responses for factors, challenges, and impacts on the responses provided by DCMs and DHS attachés, and found no significant differences between the two groups. Additionally, in the survey we asked both groups to identify which facilitation factors were important, and in separate questions asked them to identify which were in place and operating effectively. We checked the responses for the factors most frequently identified as important against the factors in place and operating effectively and found no meaningful systematic trends indicating that any single factor was not in place across the embassies we surveyed. Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. In addition to pretesting our survey questionnaires as already mentioned, we worked with our social science survey specialists to design the questionnaire, and the questionnaires went through internal reviews with independent survey experts. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. Since this was a web-based questionnaire, respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database, minimizing error. See appendix IV for survey results for contributions, challenges, and impacts. To evaluate the extent to which DHS has taken action to align its resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities, we analyzed DHS's QHSR, in particular its prescriptions for maturing the department. These prescriptions include improving organizational alignment--particularly among operational components-- enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions, and more efficient and effective management processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structure. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for control activities--that is policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms--to enforce management's directives.[Footnote 37] In this respect, we evaluated the extent to which DHS had control activities in place to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. To evaluate the extent to which DHS had mechanisms in place designed to provide reasonable assurance of achieving its stated goal of department-wide organizational and programmatic alignment in the allocation and deployment of resources abroad, we reviewed documentation such as DHS's Management Directive that describes roles and responsibility for managing international affairs. We also interviewed officials in OIA, the six DHS components in our review, and DHS's Office of Policy about how decisions to deploy resources abroad are made and the extent to which they undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and organizational alignment across the complete set of resources and efforts DHS deploys abroad. We also interviewed officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS's Office of Policy about how DHS and government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use decisions. We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. [End of section] Appendix II: Training or Technical Assistance and Expenditure Data for Figures 1 and 3: Table 5 shows the number of training or technical assistance activities provided by components, by country in fiscal year 2012. Table 5: Data for Figure 1, Countries Participating in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Training or Technical Assistance that Can Help Combat Terrorism in Fiscal Year 2012: Country: Afghanistan; CBP: 3; ICE: 5; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 9. Country: Albania; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 5. Country: Algeria; CBP: 2; ICE: 3; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Angola; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Anguilla; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Antigua and Barbuda; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Argentina; CBP: 1; ICE: 6; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 9. Country: Armenia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Aruba; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 5; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Australia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 5; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 4; DHS Total: 10. Country: Austria; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 3. Country: Azerbaijan; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Bahamas; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 15; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 19. Country: Bahrain; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Bangladesh; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Barbados; CBP: 3; ICE: 2; TSA: 4; USCG: 3; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 12. Country: Belarus; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Belgium; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 2. Country: Belize; CBP: 5; ICE: 1; TSA: 6; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 14. Country: Benin; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Bermuda; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Bolivia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Bonaire; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Botswana; CBP: 5; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Brazil; CBP: 0; ICE: 3; TSA: 10; USCG: 3; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 18. Country: Brunei; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Bulgaria; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 3; DHS Total: 4. Country: Burkina Faso; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Burma; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Cambodia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 3; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Cameroon; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Canada; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 25; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 26. Country: Cape Verde; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Cayman Islands; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Chile; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: China; CBP: 2; ICE: 2; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 1; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 8. Country: Colombia; CBP: 2; ICE: 11; TSA: 6; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 22. Country: Cook Islands; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Costa Rica; CBP: 10; ICE: 3; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 17. Country: Croatia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 1. Country: Cuba; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 7; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 8. Country: Curaçao; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Cyprus; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Czech Republic; CBP: 1; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 4. Country: Democratic Republic of Congo; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Denmark; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Djibouti; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Dominica; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Dominican Republic; CBP: 1; ICE: 5; TSA: 7; USCG: 5; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 18. Country: Ecuador; CBP: 0; ICE: 4; TSA: 4; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 10. Country: Egypt; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: El Salvador; CBP: 5; ICE: 3; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 11. Country: Estonia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 3; DHS Total: 3. Country: Ethiopia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Federated States of Micronesia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 7; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Fiji; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 3; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Finland; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 1. Country: France; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 4; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 3; DHS Total: 7. Country: Gabon; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Gambia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Georgia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 3. Country: Germany; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 5. Country: Ghana; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Greece; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 6. Country: Grenada; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Guadeloupe; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Guatemala; CBP: 5; ICE: 4; TSA: 2; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 13. Country: Guinea; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Guyana; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 4; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 9. Country: Haiti; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 10; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 12. Country: Honduras; CBP: 3; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 10. Country: Hong Konga; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 3. Country: Hungary; CBP: 8; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 9. Country: Iceland; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 2. Country: India; CBP: 3; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Indonesia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Iraq; CBP: 3; ICE: 2; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 8. Country: Ireland; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 5. Country: Israel; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 2. Country: Italy; CBP: 2; ICE: 0; TSA: 7; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 11. Country: Ivory Coast; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Jamaica; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 5; USCG: 5; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 12. Country: Japan; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 15; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 15. Country: Jordan; CBP: 0; ICE: 3; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Kazakhstan; CBP: 1; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 2. Country: Kenya; CBP: 1; ICE: 2; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Kiribati; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Kosovo; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Kuwait; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 5; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Kyrgyzstan; CBP: 2; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Laos; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Latvia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 2. Country: Lebanon; CBP: 3; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Lesotho; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Liberia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Libya; CBP: 2; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Liechtenstein; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Lithuania; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 1. Country: Luxembourg; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Macedonia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Madagascar; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Malaysia; CBP: 0; ICE: 3; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 6. Country: Maldives; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Malta; CBP: 1; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 4. Country: Marshall Islands; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Mauritania; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Mauritius; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Mexico; CBP: 12; ICE: 8; TSA: 53; USCG: 3; USCIS: 2; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 78. Country: Moldova; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 4. Country: Monaco; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Montenegro; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Morocco; CBP: 1; ICE: 11; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 13. Country: Mozambique; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 4; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Namibia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Nepal; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Netherlands; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 1. Country: New Zealand; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Nicaragua; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Nigeria; CBP: 0; ICE: 4; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Norway; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Oman; CBP: 5; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Pakistan; CBP: 0; ICE: 6; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 8. Country: Palau; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Panama; CBP: 14; ICE: 7; TSA: 4; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 27. Country: Papua New Guinea; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Paraguay; CBP: 0; ICE: 8; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 9. Country: Peru; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 5; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 10. Country: Philippines; CBP: 2; ICE: 4; TSA: 3; USCG: 2; USCIS: 1; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 13. Country: Poland; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 4. Country: Portugal; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 3. Country: Qatar; CBP: 1; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Republic of Congo; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Romania; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 3; DHS Total: 4. Country: Russia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 5. Country: Saint Kitts and Nevis; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Saint Lucia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 5; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Saint Maarten; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Samoa; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 2; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Saudi Arabia; CBP: 1; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Senegal; CBP: 0; ICE: 3; TSA: 1; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 6. Country: Serbia; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Sierra Leone; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Singapore; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Slovak Republic; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 4. Country: Slovenia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 1. Country: South Africa; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 4; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 10. Country: South Korea; CBP: 1; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 4. Country: Spain; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 3; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 4. Country: Suriname; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 5; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Swaziland; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Sweden; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Switzerland; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 5; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 7. Country: Taiwanb; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 1; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 5. Country: Tajikistan; CBP: 3; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Tanzania; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 6; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 8. Country: Thailand; CBP: 1; ICE: 1; TSA: 3; USCG: 6; USCIS: 4; USSS: 2; DHS Total: 17. Country: Timor Leste; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Togo; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Tonga; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Trinidad and Tobago; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 4; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 7. Country: Tunisia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Turkey; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 3; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 8. Country: Turks and Caicos Islands; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: United Arab Emirates; CBP: 3; ICE: 3; TSA: 3; USCG: 1; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 10. Country: Ukraine; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: United Kingdom; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 6; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 1; DHS Total: 7. Country: Uruguay; CBP: 0; ICE: 3; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Uzbekistan; CBP: 2; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 3. Country: Venezuela; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Vietnam; CBP: 1; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 2; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 4. Country: Virgin Islands (British); CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 1; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Yemen; CBP: 0; ICE: 2; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 2. Country: Zambia; CBP: 0; ICE: 1; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; DHS Total: 1. Country: Total Foreign Participation; CBP: 131; ICE: 218; TSA: 390; USCG: 125; USCIS: 13; USSS: 68; DHS Total: 945. Legend: CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection; ICE = U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TSA = Transportation Security Administration; USCG = U.S. Coast Guard; USCIS = U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service; USSS = U.S. Secret Service: Source: GAO analysis of component training and technical assistance data for fiscal year 2012. [A] Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters. [B] Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country. [End of table] Table 6: Expenditure Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and Full-Time-Equivalent Employees (FTE) Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs (OIA) and Components within Our Review: Dollars in thousands: Country: Afghanistan; CBP: $2,267; ICE: $6,453; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: $4,128; DHS Total: $12,848. Country: Argentina; CBP: $578; ICE: $2,107; TSA: $593; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,278. Country: Aruba; CBP: $3,764; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,764. Country: Australia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: $596; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: $833; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,428. Country: Austria; CBP: 0; ICE: $2,151; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $791; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,942. Country: Bahamas; CBP: $13,391; ICE: $329; TSA: $640; USCG: $1,790; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $16,150. Country: Bahrain; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $22,444; USCIS: $17; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $22,461. Country: Bangladesh; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1. Country: Barbados; CBP: $616; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $251; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $867. Country: Belgium; CBP: $2,013; ICE: $1,821; TSA: $806; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: $304; DHS Total: $4,945. Country: Belize; CBP: $4; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $5. Country: Bermuda; CBP: $4,476; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,476. Country: Brazil; CBP: $1,391; ICE: $1,909; TSA: $227; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: $1,622; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $5,148. Country: Bulgaria; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: $1,298; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,298. Country: Cambodia; CBP: 0; ICE: $162; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $162. Country: Cameroon; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $11; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $11. Country: Canada; CBP: $85,628; ICE: $5,193; TSA: $830; USCG: $641; USCIS: $80; USSS: $2,507; OIA: $277; DHS Total: $95,156. Country: China; CBP: $1,824; ICE: $3,595; TSA: $836; USCG: $91; USCIS: $2,608; USSS: $1,547; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $10,500. Country: Colombia; CBP: $425; ICE: $5,150; TSA: 0; USCG: $576; USCIS: $1; USSS: $1,317; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $7,470. Country: Costa Rica; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $225; USCIS: $9; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $235. Country: Cuba; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $640; USCIS: $1,304; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,943. Country: Curacao; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $191; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $191. Country: Denmark; CBP: 0; ICE: $974; TSA: 0; USCG: $10; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $984. Country: Djibouti; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $114; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $114. Country: Dominican Republic; CBP: $981; ICE: $1,770; TSA: 0; USCG: $307; USCIS: $612; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,670. Country: Ecuador; CBP: $148; ICE: $3,156; TSA: 0; USCG: $154; USCIS: $63; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,521. Country: Egypt; CBP: $418; ICE: $1,142; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $150; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,709. Country: El Salvador; CBP: 0; ICE: $1,703; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $667; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,370. Country: Estonia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: $927; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $927. Country: Ethiopia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $353; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $353. Country: France; CBP: $1,392; ICE: $2,467; TSA: $631; USCG: 0; USCIS: $23; USSS: $3,895; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $8,408. Country: Gabon; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $21; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $21. Country: Georgia; CBP: $122; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $154; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $275. Country: Germany; CBP: $2,320; ICE: $3,529; TSA: $7,832; USCG: $1,993; USCIS: $1,508; USSS: $2,283; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $19,465. Country: Ghana; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $688; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $688. Country: Greece; CBP: 0; ICE: $970; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1,349; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,319. Country: Guatemala; CBP: 0; ICE: $1,561; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1,209; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,770. Country: Haiti; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $374; USCIS: $1,068; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,443. Country: Honduras; CBP: $170; ICE: $1,541; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $461; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,173. Country: Hong Kong[A]; CBP: $2,001; ICE: $2,935; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,936. Country: Iceland; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $103; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $103. Country: India; CBP: $533; ICE: $1,135; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1,754; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,422. Country: Indonesia; CBP: 0; ICE: $839; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $839. Country: Iraq; CBP: $2,510; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $484; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,995. Country: Ireland; CBP: $9,233; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $9,233. Country: Israel; CBP: $29; ICE: $2,041; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,070. Country: Italy; CBP: $2,268; ICE: $2,599; TSA: $636; USCG: $306; USCIS: $3,227; USSS: $3,317; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $12,352. Country: Jamaica; CBP: $668; ICE: $1,884; TSA: 0; USCG: $250; USCIS: $503; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,305. Country: Japan; CBP: $3,570; ICE: $1,805; TSA: $636; USCG: $2,278; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $8,290. Country: Jordan; CBP: 0; ICE: $1,086; TSA: $484; USCG: 0; USCIS: $943; USSS: $295; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,807. Country: Kenya; CBP: $508; ICE: $48; TSA: $613; USCG: 0; USCIS: $1,001; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,170. Country: Kuwait; CBP: $495; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $48; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $543. Country: Lebanon; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $353; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $353. Country: Liberia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $510; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $510. Country: Malaysia; CBP: $668; ICE: $401; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $869; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,938. Country: Malta; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $154; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $154. Country: Mexico; CBP: $3,468; ICE: $15,592; TSA: $367; USCG: $530; USCIS: $4,462; USSS: $1,073; OIA: $174; DHS Total: $25,667. Country: Morocco; CBP: 0; ICE: $870; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $870. Country: Nepal; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $552; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $552. Country: Netherlands; CBP: $1,646; ICE: $1,205; TSA: $743; USCG: $5,803; USCIS: 0; USSS: $364; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $9,761. Country: Oman; CBP: $289; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $289. Country: Pakistan; CBP: $144; ICE: $1,660; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,803. Country: Panama; CBP: $1,454; ICE: $3,257; TSA: 0; USCG: $262; USCIS: $456; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $5,428. Country: Peru; CBP: $164; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $631; USSS: $1,652; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $2,447. Country: Philippines; CBP: 0; ICE: $3,053; TSA: $541; USCG: 0; USCIS: $969; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,563. Country: Poland; CBP: $2; ICE: 0; TSA: $902; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $904. Country: Portugal; CBP: $254; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $254. Country: Qatar; CBP: $274; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $274. Country: Romania; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $5; USSS: $1,357; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,362. Country: Russia; CBP: 0; ICE: $1,207; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $2,374; USSS: $485; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,067. Country: Rwanda; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $67; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $67. Country: Saudi Arabia; CBP: 0; ICE: $3,057; TSA: 0; USCG: $631; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $3,688. Country: Senegal; CBP: 0; ICE: $981; TSA: $257; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,239. Country: Singapore; CBP: $1,541; ICE: $2,331; TSA: $4,289; USCG: $1,708; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $9,868. Country: Slovakia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $8; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $8. Country: South Africa; CBP: $667; ICE: $2,088; TSA: $508; USCG: 0; USCIS: $366; USSS: $1,247; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,875. Country: South Korea; CBP: $1,128; ICE: $2,020; TSA: 0; USCG: $204; USCIS: $790; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,141. Country: Spain; CBP: $1,621; ICE: $1,804; TSA: $426; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: $513; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,364. Country: Sri Lanka; CBP: $460; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $460. Country: Sweden; CBP: $195; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $154; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $348. Country: Switzerland; CBP: 0; ICE: $57; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $36; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $93. Country: Taiwan[B]; CBP: $1,437; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,437. Country: Tanzania; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $35; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $35. Country: Thailand; CBP: $697; ICE: $2,491; TSA: $471; USCG: 0; USCIS: $3,054; USSS: $1,185; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $7,897. Country: Trinidad and Tobago; CBP: $368; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: $154; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $521. Country: Tunisia; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $310; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $310. Country: Turkey; CBP: $103; ICE: $34; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $657; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $794. Country: U.S. Virgin Islands; CBP: $10; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1. Country: Uganda; CBP: 0; ICE: 0; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: $257; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $257. Country: United Arab Emirates; CBP: $534; ICE: $2,9920; TSA: $746; USCG: 0; USCIS: $8; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $4,280. Country: United Kingdom; CBP: $4,324; ICE: $4,355; TSA: $614; USCG: $132; USCIS: $705; USSS: $2,651; OIA: $594; DHS Total: $13,376. Country: Venezuela; CBP: 0; ICE: $1,180; TSA: 0; USCG: $132; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $1,312. Country: Vietnam; CBP: 0; ICE: $823; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $823. Country: Yemen; CBP: 0; ICE: $859; TSA: 0; USCG: 0; USCIS: 0; USSS: 0; OIA: 0; DHS Total: $859. Country: Total DHS Expenditures[C]; CBP: $187,040; ICE: $114,373; TSA: $25,225; USCG: $43,579; USCIS: $38,728; USSS: $33,395; OIA: $5,477; DHS Total: $421,802. Legend: CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection; ICE = U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; TSA = Transportation Security Administration; USCG = U.S. Coast Guard; USCIS = U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service; USSS = U.S. Secret Service: Source: GAO analysis of component overseas expenditure data for fiscal year 2012. [A] Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters. [B] Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country. [C] Expenditures by country do not sum precisely with Total DHS Expenditures due to rounding. [End of table] Table 7: Full-Time-Equivalent Employee (FTE) Data for Figure 3, Expenditures Abroad in Fiscal Year 2012 and FTEs Abroad in May 2013 for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of International Affairs and Components within Our Review: Country: Afghanistan; Total DHS FTEs: 25. Country: Argentina; Total DHS FTEs: 13. Country: Aruba; Total DHS FTEs: 18. Country: Australia; Total DHS FTEs: 3. Country: Austria; Total DHS FTEs: 9. Country: Bahamas; Total DHS FTEs: 62. Country: Bahrain; Total DHS FTEs: 270. Country: Barbados; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Belgium; Total DHS FTEs: 10. Country: Bermuda; Total DHS FTEs: 16. Country: Brazil; Total DHS FTEs: 15. Country: Bulgaria; Total DHS FTEs: 4. Country: Cambodia; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Canada; Total DHS FTEs: 430. Country: China; Total DHS FTEs: 33. Country: Colombia; Total DHS FTEs: 26. Country: Costa Rica; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Cuba; Total DHS FTEs: 11. Country: Denmark; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Dominican Republic; Total DHS FTEs: 16. Country: Ecuador; Total DHS FTEs: 11. Country: Egypt; Total DHS FTEs: 9. Country: El Salvador; Total DHS FTEs: 11. Country: Estonia; Total DHS FTEs: 4. Country: France; Total DHS FTEs: 19. Country: Georgia; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Germany; Total DHS FTEs: 79. Country: Ghana; Total DHS FTEs: 4. Country: Greece; Total DHS FTEs: 11. Country: Guatemala; Total DHS FTEs: 14. Country: Haiti; Total DHS FTEs: 8. Country: Honduras; Total DHS FTEs: 12. Country: Hong Kong[A]; Total DHS FTEs: 19. Country: India; Total DHS FTEs: 19. Country: Indonesia; Total DHS FTEs: 5. Country: Ireland; Total DHS FTEs: 36. Country: Israel; Total DHS FTEs: 8. Country: Italy; Total DHS FTEs: 47. Country: Jamaica; Total DHS FTEs: 14. Country: Japan; Total DHS FTEs: 35. Country: Jordan; Total DHS FTEs: 9. Country: Kenya; Total DHS FTEs: 11. Country: Kuwait; Total DHS FTEs: 3. Country: Liberia; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Malaysia; Total DHS FTEs: 4. Country: Malta; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Mexico; Total DHS FTEs: 104. Country: Morocco; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Netherlands; Total DHS FTEs: 44. Country: Netherlands Antilles; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Oman; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Pakistan; Total DHS FTEs: 16. Country: Panama; Total DHS FTEs: 15. Country: Peru; Total DHS FTEs: 8. Country: Philippines; Total DHS FTEs: 24. Country: Poland; Total DHS FTEs: 3. Country: Portugal; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: Romania; Total DHS FTEs: 6. Country: Russia; Total DHS FTEs: 13. Country: Saudi Arabia; Total DHS FTEs: 9. Country: Senegal; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Singapore; Total DHS FTEs: 35. Country: South Africa; Total DHS FTEs: 18. Country: South Korea; Total DHS FTEs: 22. Country: Spain; Total DHS FTEs: 16. Country: Sri Lanka; Total DHS FTEs: 3. Country: Sweden; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Taiwan[B]; Total DHS FTEs: 9. Country: Thailand; Total DHS FTEs: 44. Country: Trinidad and Tobago; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Turkey; Total DHS FTEs: 1. Country: United Arab Emirates; Total DHS FTEs: 14. Country: United Kingdom; Total DHS FTEs: 33. Country: Venezuela; Total DHS FTEs: 3. Country: Vietnam; Total DHS FTEs: 5. Country: Yemen; Total DHS FTEs: 2. Country: Total DHS; Total DHS FTEs: 1,820. Source: GAO analysis of DHS FTE data, as of May 2013. [A] Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters. [B] Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country. [End of table] [End of section] Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by Component: Component/Office: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Elements of expenditures included: CBP Office of International Affairs expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (CSCS), guard services, medical, and Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO) expenditures by foreign post. In Kuwait, Office of International Affairs includes charges for personal service contractor moves. In Iraq, operating costs include travel, supplies, equipment, and training. CBP Office of Border Patrol expenditure elements include personnel costs and travel expenditures by foreign country. In Mexico and Canada, Office of Border Patrol also includes program costs such as various program and operating costs. CBP Office of Field Operations expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, ICASS, CSCS, guard services, medical, DTSPO, and training by foreign post. For the Immigration Advisory Program and Preclearance programs, Office of Field Operations also includes headquarters costs. For the Container Security Initiative, they also include charges for relocations, central circuits, travel, Container Security Initiative/ICE agent support, and other central expenses (information technology services and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts, but do not break these costs down by foreign post. Component/Office: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Elements of expenditures included: ICE's overseas expenditure elements by foreign post include salary and benefits, operating costs, dependent's educational allowances, operational travel, permanent change of station moves (PCS), Department of State's ICASS and CSCS charges for FY09-FY12, and purchase cards. ICE's overseas expenditure elements also include Department of State's ICASS and CSCS charges for FY08, which cannot be broken down by foreign post. Component/Office: Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Elements of expenditures included: TSA expenditure elements include payroll, travel, ICASS charges, embassy expenses, and CSCS by foreign post. Component/Office: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); Elements of expenditures included: USCG expenditure elements include personnel costs, operating expenses, CSCS charges, and ICASS by foreign post. Component/Office: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); Elements of expenditures included: USCIS expenditure elements include payroll, general expenses, CSCS, ICASS, and travel by foreign post. USCIS also includes expenditures for total ICASS overhead costs in support of foreign posts. Component/Office: U.S. Secret Service (USSS); Elements of expenditures included: USSS expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, travel, communications and rents, guard services, medical, permanent change of station moves, supplies, equipment, building and maintenance, contractual services, Department of State support services, physical examinations, ICASS, and training expenses by foreign post. USSS's overseas expenditure elements also include other central expenses (such as information technology services, CSCS, and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts), which cannot be broken down by foreign post. Component/Office: Office of International Affairs (OIA); Elements of expenditures included: DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, ICASS, operating costs, guard services, medical, and DTSPO by individual country for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 data is unavailable. DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements also include CSCS, but those expenditures are not broken down by individual country. Source: GAO analysis of component data on expenditures abroad. [End of table] [End of section] Appendix IV: Complete Survey Results for Contributions, Challenges, and Impacts: Figure 11 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, how much, if at all, has DHS contributed to your mission's combating terrorism goals? Figure 11: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Responding That DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Contribution: Building and leveraging relationships with host government counterparts to help strengthen the U.S. mission’s overall relationship with host governments; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 25; Moderately contributed: 11; Minimally contributed: 3; Has not contributed: 1; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Working with host governments to address identified threats and vulnerabilities; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 21; Moderately contributed: 12; Minimally contributed: 5; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Sharing information with other federal partners operating under chief of mission authority about indicators of terrorist activities or threats discovered in the course of in-country activities; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 20; Moderately contributed: 13; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 3; Do not know/no answer: 0. Contribution: Working with host governments to identify security infrastructure vulnerabilities; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 19; Moderately contributed: 13; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 3. Contribution: Successful negotiation of homeland security-related agreements with host governments; Number of DCMs responding: Significantly contributed: 13; Moderately contributed: 9; Minimally contributed: 5; Has not contributed: 9; Do not know/no answer: 5. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Notes: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] Figure 12 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, how much, if at all, has DHS contributed in the following ways to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché? Figure 12: Types of Contributions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Has Made to U.S. Diplomatic Missions in the Last 24 Months, In Order of Frequency of DHS Attachés Responding that DHS Has Made a Significant or Moderate Contribution: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Contribution: Building and leveraging relationships with host government counterparts to help strengthen the U.S. mission’s overall relationship with host governments; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significantly contributed: 31; Moderately contributed: 12; Minimally contributed: 3; Has not contributed: 0; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Sharing information with other federal partners operating under chief of mission authority about indicators of terrorist activities or threats discovered in the course of in-country activities; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significantly contributed: 30; Moderately contributed: 13; Minimally contributed: 1; Has not contributed: 1; Do not know/no answer: 2. Contribution: Working with host governments to address identified threats and vulnerabilities; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significantly contributed: 31; Moderately contributed: 11; Minimally contributed: 2; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 1. Contribution: Working with host governments to identify security infrastructure vulnerabilities; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significantly contributed: 31; Moderately contributed: 8; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 2; Do not know/no answer: 2. Contribution: Successful negotiation of homeland security sharing agreements with host governments; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significantly contributed: 21; Moderately contributed: 9; Minimally contributed: 4; Has not contributed: 7; Do not know/no answer: 6. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. [End of figure] Figure 13 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS's ability to contribute its knowledge and skills to your mission's combating terrorism goals? Figure 13: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Challenge: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Challenge: The extent to which DHS domestic management and DHS domestic counterparts sufficiently coordinate with and leverage the knowledge and interagency relationships built by DHS personnel stationed abroad; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 10; Minimal challenge: 12; Not a challenge in my mission: 6; Do not know/no answer: 6. Challenge: The extent to which a collaborative relationship exists between the U.S. government and the host government; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 6; Moderate challenge: 4; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which U.S. mission management and federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority understand roles, responsibilities, and missions for each of DHS’s various components; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 0; Moderate challenge: 7; Minimal challenge: 19; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS makes the appropriate number of personnel available-—by placing them in country or facilitating sufficient temporary duty (TDY)—-to meet U.S. mission needs; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 9; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 13; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which DHS’s organizational culture may create barriers to effective relationship building with the U.S. mission country team and other federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 2; Moderate challenge: 10; Minimal challenge: 13; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The availability of U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for contributions of DHS knowledge and skills to address combating terrorism goals; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 6; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 14; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel are prepared to work effectively in an international environment; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 8; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 17; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS and other federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority have policies and procedures that may create barriers to effective collaboration; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 7; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 17; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel made an effort to share their goals and priorities with U.S. mission management and other federal partners operating under chief of mission authority; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 6; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 20; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel understand U.S. mission strategic goals; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 0; Moderate challenge: 5; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 22; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS makes personnel with the appropriate knowledge and skills available-—by placing them in country or facilitating sufficient TDY—-to meet U.S. mission needs; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 0; Moderate challenge: 8; Minimal challenge: 11; Not a challenge in my mission: 21; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which DHS and U.S. mission goals align; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 4; Minimal challenge: 13; Not a challenge in my mission: 23; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel understand and respect the chief of mission authority structure; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 5; Minimal challenge: 10; Not a challenge in my mission: 25; Do not know/no answer: 0. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel are able to get visas in a timely fashion to allow them to work in the U.S. mission; Number of DCMs responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 3; Minimal challenge: 8; Not a challenge in my mission: 29; Do not know/no answer: 0. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. [End of figure] Figure 14 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS's ability to contribute its knowledge and skills to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché? Figure 14: Challenges to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Ability to Contribute Its Knowledge and Skills to Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Challenge: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Challenge: The extent to which U.S. mission management and federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority understand roles, responsibilities, and missions for each of DHS’s various components; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 8; Moderate challenge: 11; Minimal challenge: 17; Not a challenge in my mission: 8; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which DHS domestic management and DHS domestic counterparts sufficiently coordinate with and leverage the knowledge and interagency relationships built by DHS personnel stationed abroad; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 11; Minimal challenge: 19; Not a challenge in my mission: 9; Do not know/no answer: 3. Challenge: The extent to which DHS makes the appropriate number of personnel available-—by placing them in country or facilitating sufficient temporary duty (TDY)-—to meet U.S. mission needs; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 13; Minimal challenge: 14; Not a challenge in my mission: 8; Do not know/no answer: 5. Challenge: The availability of U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for contributions of DHS knowledge and skills to address combating terrorism goals; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 5; Moderate challenge: 17; Minimal challenge: 11; Not a challenge in my mission: 12; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which a collaborative relationship exists between the U.S. government and the host government; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 7; Moderate challenge: 9; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 15; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which other federal partners operating under chief of mission authority make an effort to share their goals and priorities with DHS; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 6; Moderate challenge: 9; Minimal challenge: 13; Not a challenge in my mission: 18; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which DHS makes personnel with the appropriate knowledge and skills available-—by placing them in country or facilitating sufficient TDY—-to meet U.S. mission needs; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 4; Moderate challenge: 7; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 14; Do not know/no answer: 6. Challenge: The extent to which U.S. mission strategic goals related to combating terrorism are clear to DHS personnel; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 0; Moderate challenge: 4; Minimal challenge: 22; Not a challenge in my mission: 19; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which DHS and U.S. mission goals align; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 8; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 20; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which DHS and other federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority have policies and procedures that may create barriers to effective collaboration; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 2; Moderate challenge: 8; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 19; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel are able to operate effectively under chief of mission authority while reporting to management in DHS headquarters; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 2; Moderate challenge: 5; Minimal challenge: 16; Not a challenge in my mission: 21; Do not know/no answer: 2. Challenge: The extent to which the U.S. mission's organizational culture may create barriers for DHS officials' ability to build effective relationships with federal partners operating under chief of mission authority; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 4; Moderate challenge: 4; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 22; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel are prepared to work effectively in an international environment; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 1; Moderate challenge: 6; Minimal challenge: 15; Not a challenge in my mission: 24; Do not know/no answer: 1. Challenge: The extent to which DHS personnel are able to get visas in a timely fashion to allow them to work in the U.S. mission; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant challenge: 3; Moderate challenge: 5; Minimal challenge: 8; Not a challenge in my mission: 27; Do not know/no answer: 4. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] Figure 15 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS's contributions to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals? Figure 15: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of Deputy Chiefs of Mission Reporting Some Level of Impact: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Impact: Federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority have not coordinated initiatives to avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 3; Minimal impact: 19; Has not occurred: 18; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: Federal agencies operating under chief of mission authority have not coordinated initiatives to ensure that resources were directed to the highest-priority needs; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 13; Has not occurred: 22; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: DHS headquarters actions have come into conflict with mission operations or projects; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 4; Moderate impact: 8; Minimal impact: 5; Has not occurred: 21; Do not know/no answer: 3. Impact: The U.S. mission has missed opportunities to effectively leverage DHS knowledge and skills; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 0; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 10; Has not occurred: 20; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS headquarters actions in country have resulted in public affairs issues for the U.S. mission; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 9; Has not occurred: 23; Do not know/no answer: 1. Impact: DHS headquarters operations have come into conflict with DHS operations in country; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 0; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 9; Has not occurred: 20; Do not know/no answer: 7. Impact: The implementation of planned projects and initiatives has been significantly delayed; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 2; Minimal impact: 11; Has not occurred: 23; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS actions in country damaged relationships with the host government; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 2; Moderate impact: 3; Minimal impact: 8; Has not occurred: 27; Do not know/no answer: 1. Impact: DHS actions in country have resulted in public affairs issues for the U.S. mission; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 3; Minimal impact: 8; Has not occurred: 29; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: DHS actions in country have come into conflict with U.S. mission operations or projects; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 0; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 6; Has not occurred: 30; Do not know/no answer: 0. Impact: DHS presence in country has been counterproductive to U.S. mission of combating terrorism goals; Number of DCMs responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 0; Minimal impact: 6; Has not occurred: 34; Do not know/no answer: 0. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Notes: The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is the second in command of a U.S. mission and is always a career Foreign Service Officer. The DCM supervises department heads within the mission, and deals with many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. Forty-one DCMs responded to the survey but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] Figure 16 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS's contributions to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals? Figure 16: Impacts as a Result of Challenges on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Contributions to U.S. Government-wide Combating Terrorism Goals, Ranked by Frequency of DHS Attachés Reporting Some Level of Impact: [Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] Impact: DHS and other federal agencies have not coordinated initiatives to avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 11; Minimal impact: 14; Has not occurred: 19; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: DHS and other federal agencies have not coordinated initiatives to ensure that resources were directed to the highest- priority needs; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 16; Has not occurred: 22; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: The implementation of planned projects and initiatives has been significantly delayed; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 5; Moderate impact: 6; Minimal impact: 12; Has not occurred: 17; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS personnel at the U.S. mission have not been able to effectively pursue DHS strategic goals; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 3; Moderate impact: 5; Minimal impact: 14; Has not occurred: 23; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: DHS headquarters actions have come into conflict with U.S. mission operations or projects; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 2; Moderate impact: 4; Minimal impact: 13; Has not occurred: 24; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS actions in country have come into conflict with the operations of other federal partners operating under chief of mission authority; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 1; Moderate impact: 7; Minimal impact: 10; Has not occurred: 27; Do not know/no answer: 2. Impact: DHS headquarters operations have come into conflict with DHS operations in country; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 4; Moderate impact: 1; Minimal impact: 12; Has not occurred: 26; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS personnel have not been able to build effective relationships with host government counterparts; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 5; Moderate impact: 0; Minimal impact: 12; Has not occurred: 25; Do not know/no answer: 4. Impact: DHS has missed opportunities to contribute its knowledge and skills to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 0; Moderate impact: 8; Minimal impact: 8; Has not occurred: 25; Do not know/no answer: 6. Impact: DHS headquarters actions have resulted in public affairs issues for the U.S. mission; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 2; Moderate impact: 3; Minimal impact: 7; Has not occurred: 32; Do not know/no answer: 3. Impact: DHS actions in country have resulted in public affairs issues for the U.S. mission; Number of DHS attachés responding: Significant impact: 2; Moderate impact: 0; Minimal impact: 7; Has not occurred: 35; Do not know/no answer: 3. Source: GAO analysis of survey data. Note: Forty-seven DHS attachés responded to the survey but in some cases not all respondents answered every item, so total respondents for a specific item may vary. [End of figure] [End of section] Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Washington, DC 20528: September 17, 20l3: David C. Maurer: Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team: U.S. Government Accountability Office: 441 G Street, NW: Washington, DC 20548: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. Director, International Affairs and Trade Team: U.S. Government Accountability Office: 441 G Street, NW: Washington, DC 20548: Re: Draft Report GAO-13-681 , "Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources Abroad Align with Priorities" Dear Messrs. Maurer and Johnson: Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. DHS is pleased to note GAO's positive recognition of Department and Component efforts abroad to help other nations strengthen their security functions and make it harder for terrorists to operate globally. DHS has made a significant investment in international engagement through the presence in over 75 countries of DHS personnel and the cultivation of relationships with international organizations such as the World Customs Organization, International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the International Maritime Organization. Effective global engagement is vital to achieving homeland security. DHS is committed to continuing to strengthen its international set of activities and partnerships, ranging from information sharing to capacity building, through the work the Department and its many partners do every day. The draft report contained three recommendations with which the Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security: Recommendation 1: Establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad. Response: Concur. The DHS Office of Policy's Office of International Affairs (OIA) has taken significant steps toward meeting this objective by drafting and publishing in 2013 the first International Engagement Plan (lEP). OIA is in the process of taking the next step in shaping this document to be a more specific, comprehensive, and strategic plan for resource allocation abroad across the Department's international organizations. OIA will begin the review of the current IEP this fall and will transform the document into more of a strategic tool to help determine Department-wide resource priorities. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): March 31, 2014. Recommendation 2: Establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department's resource use abroad with the highest department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Response: Concur. The current IEP aligns with the five DHS missions outlined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) document. The QHSR is presently under review by the Department, with an estimated completion date of early Fiscal Year 2014. Concurrent with the revision of the IEP, orA will develop a methodology and system for tracking the newly identified strategic priorities and objectives that meet DHS and U.S. Government-wide priorities related to counterterrorism. The priorities will align with the 2013 QHSR review. ECD: September 30, 2014. Recommendation 3: Establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resources use abroad. Response: Concur. Through the International Governance Board, OIA will immediately establish a working group to focus on a Department-wide system to capture individual Component expenditure data and represent the information in a cohesive, comparable manner. OIA will work with all DHS Components, including with the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer, to ensure data are consistent and reliable. ECD: September 30, 2014. Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. Sincerely, Signed by: Jim H. Crumpacker: Director: Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: [End of section] Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: GAO Contacts: David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the contacts named above, Adam Hoffman and Jason Bair, Assistant Directors; Chloe Brown; Marc Castellano; and Kathryn Godfrey made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Josh Diosomito; Lorraine Ettaro; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon Hunt; Thomas Lombardi; Alicia Loucks; Erin O'Brien; Anthony Pordes; and Christine San. [End of section] Footnotes: [1] The National Strategy for Counterterrorism supports the National Security Strategy, which lays out an approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism sets out the approach to one of the President's top national security priorities--disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. It also acknowledges the need to counter other transnational terrorist networks. See White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: June 2011) and White House, National Security Strategy (Washington D.C.: May 2010). [2] The State Department operates more than 270 diplomatic offices-- embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic posts--worldwide to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world. For the purposes of this report, a U.S. mission refers to the entire diplomatic representation in a given country, including the embassy, as well as all other diplomatic offices, staff, and assets. [3] Pursuant to section 707 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to conduct a review of the homeland security of the nation--referred to as a quadrennial homeland security review--beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter. See 6 U.S.C. § 347. In each quadrennial review, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, among other things, "delineate and update, as appropriate, the national homeland security strategy," and "outline and prioritize the full range of the critical homeland security mission areas of the nation." [4] For example, see GAO, Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Address Challenges and Potential Vulnerabilities Related to Securing Inbound Air Cargo, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-632] (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012), and Border Security: DHS's Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-315] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011). [5] DHS Office of Inspector General, Management of Department of Homeland Security International Activities and Interests, OIG-08-71 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008). [6] The Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator is maintained by DHS's Office of Operations and Coordination Planning and updated through self-reported data from the components on a monthly basis. [7] This population excluded countries where DHS's only FTE presence was to carry out a specific programmatic activity outside of the embassies and consulates--such as CBP's Container Security Initiative, which operates out of the ports--and did not routinely participate in the country team. [8] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). [9] In general, DHS does not have specific statutory authority to provide training and technical assistance abroad directly and does not receive appropriations specific to this purpose. Rather, any assistance DHS provides abroad is typically at the request of and in coordination with other federal partners such as the Department of Defense and the Department of State. [10] DHS is made up of eight operational components--CBP, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, ICE, USSS, TSA, USCG, and USCIS--along with a number of headquarters offices, including, among others, the Office of Policy, which houses OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy. Each of the operational components has at least some FTEs stationed abroad. However, not all carry out missions that fall within the combating terrorism definition for this report. A few of the headquarters offices, such as the National Protection and Programs Directorate, may also assign FTEs to be stationed abroad to carry out specific program objectives. [11] In addition to these broad strategies, the National Counterterrorism Center, which coordinates interagency counterterrorism efforts on behalf of the White House National Security Staff, has developed regional and threat-specific counterterrorism strategies. The mission of the National Counterterrorism Center is to lead the U.S. effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing threats, sharing that information with U.S. partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. See 50 U.S.C. § 3056. [12] See 22 U.S.C. § 3927. [13] Consistent with National Security Decision Directive-38, dated June 2, 1982, agencies with staff operating under authority of chiefs of mission will ensure that, in coordination with State, the chief of mission approves any proposed changes to the size, composition, or mandate of the agencies' staffing elements at the post before they are made. See also 22 U.S.C. § 3927a. [14] All DHS expenditures abroad have been adjusted for inflation and are stated in fiscal year 2012 dollars. [15] Although the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have included it as a separate country because whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and shall apply to Taiwan. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, Taiwan is included as a country. Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, but we have included it in this report as a separate country because it is an economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters. [16] Because DHS missions are multifaceted and often serve dual purposes, like limiting threats to the homeland while facilitating legitimate activities, DHS and its components do not track personnel and expenditures for combating terrorism separately from other activities. Therefore, we obtained data from DHS and its components for all expenditures and FTEs abroad. [17] ICASS is an interagency system established by State in 1997 for distributing the cost of administrative services at foreign posts. It seeks to provide quality services at the lowest cost while ensuring that each agency bears the cost of its presence abroad. [18] CSCS is a program established by State to distribute the cost of embassy construction costs amongst agencies with a presence abroad. It seeks to fund construction of new, secure foreign posts and provide an incentive for all departments and agencies to assign only the number of staff needed to accomplish their missions abroad. [19] We define operating costs to include expenditures such as facilities or space, rent or lease, vehicles, supplies, equipment, and utilities. [20] The Antiterrorism Assistance program serves as the primary provider of U.S. government antiterrorism training and equipment to law enforcement agencies of partner nations. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa- 2349aa-10. This program helps partner nations to deal effectively with security challenges within their borders, to defend against threats to national and regional stability, and to deter terrorist operations across borders and regions. The Regional Strategic Initiative seeks to build regional cooperation to constrain terrorist activities. Under the authority of the chief of mission, it brings embassy officials and military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies together to collectively assess the threats, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies and action plans. [21] The DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning maintains the Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator, which tracks all DHS personnel deployed abroad. The locator is updated monthly with self- reported data from the components, which may capture some personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs. [22] U.S. missions are staffed by both federal and locally employed staff. Locally employed staff are individuals who are hired locally to work at U.S. missions, and whose salaries and benefits are paid for out of a specific post's budget. Costs for locally employed staff, who do not receive the same benefits and allowances as U.S. direct-hire staff, are often significantly less than for direct-hire staff. [23] GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012), and Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). These reports describe specific practices and considerations to help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. We analyzed the application of these practices and considerations to DHS's ability to contribute to U.S. missions' combating terrorism efforts and included key concepts and principles in the survey language as applicable. [24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]. [25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. [26] Throughout this discussion, for the purposes of this report, the term DHS domestic management means operational and policy decision makers who are not stationed abroad that may be acting on behalf of DHS or any of its components. [27] The QHSR lays out five key missions--(1) Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security, (2) Securing Our Borders, (3) Enforcing and Administering Immigration Laws, (4) Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and (5) Ensuring Resilience to Disasters. [28] The International Engagement Plan also includes a section on the Visa Waiver Program, which currently allows eligible nationals from 37 countries to travel to the United States visa-free for up to 90 days for business or tourism. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (authorizing establishment of a visa waiver program). [29] Institutionalization translates an organization's code of conduct, mission, policies, vision, and strategic plans into action guidelines applicable to its daily activities. It aims at integrating fundamental values and objectives into the organization's culture and structure. [30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. [31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. [32] We and the component budget offices encountered similar challenges producing cost data for this report. Although we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to report a general estimate of expenditures for programs and activities abroad, in many cases it took months to produce the expenditure data and some components reported to us that meeting the request was difficult. After attempting to collect separate expenditure data for training and technical assistance expenditures, we ultimately determined that sufficiently reliable data were not available. [33] DHS Office of Inspector General, Management of Department of Homeland Security International Activities and Interests, OIG-08-71 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008). [34] CBP has identified 35 countries and two territories as special interest countries. For any person taken into custody at the border from one of the countries or territories, agents are required to undertake specific measures. [35] We coordinated with two other GAO engagement teams who were also conducting international travel to arrange for them to conduct interviews with DCMs and key DHS officials in five of the countries we visited. [36] GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012), and Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). These reports describe specific practices and considerations to help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. We analyzed the application of these practices and considerations to DHS's ability to contribute to U.S. missions' combating terrorism efforts and included key concepts and principles in the survey language as applicable. 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