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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

July 2013: 

Overstay Enforcement: 

Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning 
for a Biometric Air Exit Program: 

GAO-13-683: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-683, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a 
temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are 
individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then 
overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary 
responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to 
address overstays. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS’s actions to 
identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen
these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to 
address them. DHS has also reported taking further actions to address 
overstays. 

GAO was asked to review DHS’s progress since April 2011. This report
addresses (1) DHS’s efforts to review its records to identify potential
overstays, (2) the extent to which DHS’s changes in its systems or
processes have improved data on potential overstays and DHS’s ability to
report overstay rates, and (3) the extent to which DHS has made 
progress toward establishing a biometric exit system. GAO analyzed
DHS overstay data and documents-—such as those related to the overstay
identification processes and biometric exit plans—-and interviewed 
relevant DHS officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Since April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken 
action to address a backlog of potential overstay records that GAO 
previously identified. Specifically, DHS reviewed such records to 
identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched 
arrival records—those without corresponding departure records—remain 
in DHS’s system. GAO had previously reported that, as of January 2011, 
DHS had a backlog of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that had 
not been reviewed through automated or manual processes. DHS tracks 
arrivals and departures and closes records for individuals with 
matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records 
indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In 2011, DHS 
reviewed this backlog of 1.6 million records, closed about 863,000 
records, and removed them from the backlog. As new unmatched arrival 
records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all of these new 
records for national security and public safety concerns. As of June 
2013, DHS’s unmatched arrival records totaled more than 1 million. 

DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential 
overstays and report overstay rates, but the effect of these 
improvements is not yet known. Further, DHS continues to face 
challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. DHS has streamlined 
connections among databases used to identify potential overstays. 
However, these improvements do not address some underlying data 
quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Federal law 
requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessor 
has not regularly done so since 1994. In April 2011, GAO reported that 
DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because 
DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay 
data. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified 
that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. However, DHS 
has not assessed or documented improvements in the reliability of data 
used to develop overstay estimates, in accordance with federal 
internal control standards. Without such a documented assessment to 
ensure the reliability of these data, decision makers would not have 
the information needed to use these data for policy-making purposes. 

Developing and implementing a biometric exit capability to collect 
biometric data, such as fingerprints, which is required by federal 
law, has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. In May 2012, DHS 
internally reported recommendations to support the planning for a 
biometric exit capability at airports-—DHS’s priority for biometric 
exit capabilities—-that could also be implemented at seaports in the 
future; however, as of June 2013, DHS's planning did not address a 
biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. DHS officials stated 
that the department’s goal is to develop information and report to 
Congress about the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options 
before the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle. Standard practices for 
project management state that time frames should be documented as part 
of the planning process; however, DHS has a high-level plan for a 
biometric air exit capability, and it does not clearly define the 
steps, time frames, and milestones needed to develop and implement an 
evaluation framework, as recommended in DHS’s May 2012 report. Without 
robust planning that includes time frames and milestones, DHS does not 
have reasonable assurance that it will meet its time frame for 
developing and implementing an evaluation framework. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DHS assess and document the reliability of its 
data, and establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air 
exit evaluation framework. DHS concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-683]. For more 
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or 
gamblerr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS Continually Reviews Records of Potential Overstays, but a 
Significant Number of Unmatched Arrival Records Remain: 

DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data to Identify 
Potential Overstays, but the Effect of These Improvements Is Not Yet 
Known: 

DHS Faces Long-standing Challenges and Uncertain Time Frames in 
Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Airports: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Overstay 
Enforcement Actions: 

Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 
System: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Overstays: 

Table 2: Key Federal Databases Used for Identifying Overstays: 

Table 3: Results of DHS's Summer 2011 Review of Nonpriority Records of 
Potential Overstays Identified as National Security and Public Safety 
Threats, as of March 2013: 

Table 4: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Counterterrorism and 
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Processing of Records of Potential 
In-Country Overstays from Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012 (Rounded to the 
Nearest Hundred): 

Table 5: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Admission Class, as 
of November 2012: 

Figure 2: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Transportation 
Mode, as of November 2012: 

Figure 3: Amount of Time Elapsed since Travelers Were Expected to 
Depart the United States, as of November 2012, Based on Analysis of 
Unmatched Arrival Records: 

Figure 4: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 
System: 

Figure 5: Outcomes of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Overstay 
Investigations Not Resulting in Arrest, Fiscal Years 2004-2012: 

Figure 6: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Reported 
Percentage of Homeland Security Investigations Field Office 
Investigative Hours Dedicated to Overstay Investigations, Fiscal Years 
2005-2012: 

Abbreviations: 

ADIS: Arrival and Departure Information System: 

ATS: Automated Targeting System: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CLAIMS: Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3: 

CTCEU: Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

ERO: Enforcement and Removal Operations: 

HSI: Homeland Security Investigations: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

IDENT: Automated Biometric Identification System: 

OAU: Overstay Analysis Unit: 

OBIM: Office of Biometric Identity Management: 

S&T: Science and Technology Directorate: 

SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System: 

US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
Program: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 30, 2013: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Candice S. Miller: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Susan Collins: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar: 
House of Representatives: 

Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a 
temporary basis either with a visa or, in some cases, as visitors who 
were allowed to enter without a visa.[Footnote 1] Overstays are 
individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary 
basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. 
[Footnote 2] We have previously reported that most overstays are 
likely motivated by economic opportunities to stay in the United 
States beyond their authorized periods of admission.[Footnote 3] 
However, overstays could pose homeland security concerns--for example, 
5 of the 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers were overstays. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility 
for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. 
Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, 
among other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to the 
United States to determine their admissibility to the country and 
screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine their 
eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for 
enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is 
primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. Within ICE's Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI) directorate, the Overstay Analysis Unit 
is responsible for reviewing records of potential overstays and 
providing the results of these reviews to ICE's Counterterrorism and 
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), which is responsible for 
initiating overstay investigations. Since 2004, DHS has collected 
biometric data, such as fingerprints, from travelers as part of an 
effort to comply with legislative requirements to track nonimmigrants' 
entry into and exit from the United States.[Footnote 4] To do so, the 
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), within DHS's National 
Protection and Programs Directorate, manages the Arrival and Departure 
Information System (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and 
departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays, 
and the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which 
maintains biometric information that DHS collects from nonimmigrants 
upon their entry into the United States.[Footnote 5] 

In April 2011, we reported on DHS's actions to identify and take 
actions to address overstays and made recommendations to the 
department to strengthen those efforts.[Footnote 6] DHS concurred with 
our recommendations and has taken or is taking steps to address them, 
as discussed later in this report. In addition, we have issued a 
number of reports since 2004 on DHS's collection of biometric data 
from nonimmigrants upon their entry into the United States, as well as 
the department's efforts to collect biometric data to track their exit 
from the country. Relying on some of this work conducted from 2007 
through 2010, we made recommendations to DHS to improve planning for 
and implementation of a biometric exit system.[Footnote 7] DHS 
generally concurred with our recommendations in these reports and has 
taken action to address a number of them, as also discussed later in 
this report. In addition to taking actions in response to the 
recommendations we have made, since April 2011, DHS has reported 
taking other actions to strengthen its processes for identifying and 
taking enforcement action against overstays, such as enhancing its use 
of biographic data to identify overstays and developing plans to 
capture biometric data as part of departure records to comply with 
federal law.[Footnote 8] 

You asked us to review actions taken by DHS to identify and address 
potential overstays since our April 2011 report. This report addresses 
(1) DHS's efforts to review records that are maintained in its 
databases to identify potential overstays, (2) the extent to which 
DHS's changes in its systems or processes have improved data on 
potential overstays and DHS's ability to report overstay rates, and 
(3) the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing and 
implementing a biometric exit system. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed documentation on DHS's 
processes to review records of potential overstays and improve 
overstay identification, such as ICE's standard operating procedures 
for reviewing records of potential overstays. Specifically, we 
analyzed the results of DHS's 2011 review of a backlog of records of 
potential overstays that we identified and reported on in April 2011. 
We also analyzed the 1.2 million records from ADIS, as of November 
2012, that represent data on individuals for whom ADIS has a record of 
arrival but for whom DHS has no record of departure (unmatched arrival 
records) at that time.[Footnote 9] This was the most recent date for 
which DHS had compiled these records at the time we began our review. 
To analyze the reliability of these data on the prior backlog, as well 
as DHS's unmatched arrival records as of November 2012, we reviewed 
documentation regarding the databases used to collect these data and 
interviewed DHS officials familiar with the data. We determined that 
the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To address the second objective, we analyzed documentation on changes 
to DHS component agency systems, such as ADIS, to enhance the use of 
biographic information to identify overstays, and we interviewed DHS 
officials to discuss the expected results of these changes. We also 
analyzed agreements between the United States and Canada to exchange 
entry and exit data as part of the Beyond the Border initiative, 
through which entry into one country is treated as exit from the 
other, and interviewed DHS and Canada Border Services Agency officials 
responsible for overseeing the initiative. We also collected all 
available data on the results of the Beyond the Border pilot phase, 
which occurred from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. To 
analyze the reliability of these data, we reviewed documentation 
related to the exchange of these data and interviewed OBIM, CBP, and 
DHS Office of Policy officials familiar with the data. We determined 
that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also 
conducted interviews with ICE and DHS Office of Policy officials 
regarding the department's plans to calculate and report overstay 
rates using the data available in its component agency systems and 
evaluated those plans based on statutory requirements and standards 
for internal control.[Footnote 10] We also evaluated those plans 
against guidance for designing evaluations and assessing the 
reliability of computer-processed data.[Footnote 11] 

To address the third objective, we reviewed statutory requirements for 
a biometric exit system and analyzed DHS documents, including a May 
2012 report on the status of efforts to implement biometric exit 
capabilities at airports that was based on analysis that DHS's Science 
and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducted. We compared the status of 
DHS's efforts against statutory requirements and standard practices 
for project management.[Footnote 12] We also interviewed DHS Office of 
Policy and S&T officials regarding DHS's plans for addressing 
recommendations in the department's May 2012 report and other ongoing 
efforts to develop a biometric exit system. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to July 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Process for Gaining Admission to the United States: 

Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a 
temporary basis.[Footnote 13] Generally, nonimmigrants wishing to 
visit the United States gain permission to apply for admission to the 
country through one of two ways. First, those eligible for the Visa 
Waiver Program apply online to establish eligibility to travel under 
the program prior to departing for the United States.[Footnote 14] 
Second, those not eligible for the Visa Waiver Program and not 
otherwise exempt from the visa requirement must obtain a visa from a 
U.S. consular office overseas.[Footnote 15] Upon arriving at a port of 
entry, nonimmigrants must undergo inspection by CBP officers, who 
determine whether or not they may be admitted into the United States. 
If CBP determines a nonimmigrant is admissible, he or she is granted 
an authorized period of admission. This period may be for a specific 
length of time, which CBP designates by assigning a specific "admit 
until" date, or for as long as the nonimmigrant maintains a particular 
status. For example, in general, foreign students are eligible to 
remain in the United States for "duration of status," meaning as long 
as they are enrolled in and attending a qualified education program or 
engaging in authorized practical training following completion of 
studies. 

An overstay is a nonimmigrant who is legally admitted to the United 
States for an authorized period but remains in the country illegally 
after that period expired without obtaining an extension of stay or a 
change of status or meeting other specific conditions, such as 
claiming asylum.[Footnote 16] This includes a nonimmigrant admitted 
for duration of status who fails to maintain that status, such as a 
student who is no longer pursuing a full course of study at an 
approved educational institution or engaging in authorized practical 
training following completion of studies. In-country overstays refer 
to nonimmigrants who have exceeded their authorized periods of 
admission and remain in the United States without lawful status, while 
out-of-country overstays refer to individuals who have departed the 
United States but who, on the basis of arrival and departure 
information, stayed beyond their authorized periods of admission. 
Federal law establishes consequences for foreign nationals who 
overstay their authorized periods of admission.[Footnote 17] 

Federal Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities Related to Overstay 
Identification and Enforcement: 

Three DHS components and offices--CBP, ICE, and OBIM--are primarily 
responsible for taking action to identify and address overstays, as 
shown in table 1. In addition, the Department of State is responsible 
for ensuring that individuals who have previously overstayed and are 
ineligible for a visa do not receive one when applying for a visa to 
the United States at consular offices overseas. 

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Overstays: 

Federal agency: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 
Overall role: Executes policies and procedures at ports of entry for 
the screening of travelers and merchandise entering the United States; 
Overstay responsibilities: Determines nonimmigrant admissibility based 
in part on previous overstay violations and provides an admit until 
date, by which time the individual must leave the country to avoid 
overstaying, or admits an individual for duration of status; Collects 
biographic and biometric information to document nonimmigrant entry 
into the country and biographic information to document nonimmigrant 
exit from the country; Responsible for implementing a biometric exit 
program. 

Federal agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); Overstay Analysis Unit (OAU); 
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU); HSI field 
offices; 
Overall role: HSI: Investigate a range of domestic and international 
activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, 
within, and out of the United States; 
Overstay responsibilities: OAU: Identifies overstays by matching 
arrival and departure data and performing overstay analysis previously 
performed by the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (US-VISIT) program[A]; CTCEU: Identifies overstays, 
including potential national security risks and out of status 
students, and then assigns leads for further investigation by field 
offices; HSI field offices: Investigate overstay cases and determine 
appropriate action to be taken, including initiating administrative 
procedures to remove an individual from the country, if appropriate. 

Federal agency: ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO); 
Overall role: ERO: Identifies and apprehends aliens who are subject to 
removal from the country, detains these individuals when necessary, 
and removes them from the United States; 
Overstay responsibilities: ERO: Contributes indirectly to overstay 
efforts through various programs, such as the Criminal Alien Program 
and the Fugitive Operations Support Center.[B] Responsible for the 
removal of deportable aliens from the United States. 

Federal agency: National Protection and Programs Directorate-Office of 
Biometric Identity Management; 
Overall role: Stores biometric identities and matches them against 
derogatory information; 
Overstay responsibilities: Manages the Automated Biometric 
Identification System and the Arrival and Departure Information System 
as previously performed by US-VISIT; Conducts recurrent matching 
against derogatory information and provides other biometric expertise 
and services. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

[A] DHS initiated US-VISIT in 2003 to develop a comprehensive entry 
and exit system to collect biometric data from aliens traveling 
through U.S. ports of entry. In March 2013, DHS realigned US-VISIT's 
overstay analysis function into ICE. 

[B] The Criminal Alien Program identifies, processes, and removes 
criminal aliens incarcerated throughout the United States, focusing on 
those that pose a risk to public safety. The Fugitive Operations 
Support Center operates under the National Fugitive Operations Program 
and reviews certain records of potential overstays generated by CTCEU 
to determine if any pertain to individuals that meet ERO's enforcement 
priorities. 

[End of table] 

Federal agencies use various databases to determine whether 
nonimmigrants have potentially overstayed their authorized periods of 
admission to the United States. As shown in table 2, several 
databases, in particular, provide key information on foreign 
nationals' arrival in and departure from the United States, foreign 
nationals' applications to change status once in the United States, 
and the status of foreign students. 

Table 2: Key Federal Databases Used for Identifying Overstays: 

Database: Arrival and Departure Information System; 
Agency responsible for managing the database: Office of Biometric 
Identity Management; 
Information maintained in the database related to overstays: 
Nonimmigrant arrival and departure information, the date until which 
an individual may remain in the United States, and various other 
information (e.g., the address where the individual will reside in the 
United States). 

Database: Automated Biometric Identification System; 
Agency responsible for managing the database: Office of Biometric 
Identity Management; 
Information maintained in the database related to overstays: Biometric 
information collected from nonimmigrants upon their entry into the 
United States (i.e., fingerprints and photographs). 

Database: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System; 
Agency responsible for managing the database: U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement; 
Information maintained in the database related to overstays: 
Information about nonimmigrant foreign students and their programs of 
study and exchange visitors in the United States. 

Database: Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3 
(CLAIMS); Electronic Immigration System (ELIS); 
Agency responsible for managing the database: U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services; 
Information maintained in the database related to overstays: Status of 
foreign nationals' petitions for extensions of stay or changes of 
immigration status (e.g., to convert from a tourist to a student). 
CLAIMS and ELIS both maintain data on applications to extend or change 
nonimmigrant status, and CLAIMS also maintains data on applications 
for work authorization or for lawful permanent resident status. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

Note: In addition to the systems mentioned in this table, which we 
discuss later in this report, CBP's TECS system is used at ports of 
entry to verify traveler information and contains lookouts--electronic 
alerts--for certain individuals (e.g., overstays). TECS also 
interfaces with other agencies' databases to share this information. 

[End of table] 

Process for Identifying Overstays: 

ICE primarily analyzes biographic entry and exit data collected at 
land, air, and sea ports of entry to identify potential overstays. ICE 
identifies both in-country and out-of-country overstays by analyzing 
and comparing biographic data maintained in ADIS against information 
in other databases to find matches that demonstrate that a 
nonimmigrant may have, for instance, departed the country or filed an 
application to change status and thus is not an overstay. In 
particular, ICE analysts use ADIS to identify arrival records for 
which the subject's admit until date has passed and for whom DHS does 
not have a corresponding departure record (unmatched arrival records), 
which may indicate that the subject of the record is an in-country 
overstay.[Footnote 18] For these records of potential overstays, ICE 
analysts conduct automated searches, such as searching for immigration 
benefit application information through U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. ICE analysts also determine whether the subject 
of the record meets ICE's overstay enforcement priorities based on 
national security and public safety criteria. ICE prioritizes 
investigation of overstay leads based on the perceived risk each lead 
is likely to pose to national security and public safety as determined 
by threat analysis. In order to prioritize investigation of overstay 
leads, ICE uses an automated system to assign each overstay lead a 
priority ranking based on threat intelligence information. For the 
records that meet ICE's overstay enforcement priorities, ICE analysts 
then conduct manual searches of other databases to determine, for 
example, if the individual applied for refugee or asylum status. For 
these priority records, if ICE analysts are unable to identify 
evidence of a departure or a change in status, they search for the 
nonimmigrant's current U.S. address, and if they are able to identify 
an address, they send the lead to the relevant ICE HSI field office 
for investigation. 

For cases in which ICE's analysis shows that a nonimmigrant visa 
holder departed the United States after the admit until date--an out-
of-country overstay--and the departure was more than 90 days after the 
nonimmigrant's authorized period of admission expired, ICE creates a 
lookout that CBP officers at ports of entry and State Department 
officials at overseas consulates can access to determine whether that 
nonimmigrant is eligible for readmission at ports of entry or can 
receive a new visa upon application at a U.S. consulate. 

Comprehensive Biometric Entry and Exit System: 

Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an 
integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals.[Footnote 
19] Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data 
Management Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an 
integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals that would 
provide access to and integrate foreign national arrival and departure 
data that are authorized or required to be created or collected under 
law and are in an electronic format in certain databases, such as 
those used at ports of entry and consular offices.[Footnote 20] In 
2003, DHS initiated the US-VISIT program to develop a comprehensive 
entry and exit system to collect biometric data from aliens traveling 
through United States ports of entry. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the 
first step of this program by collecting biometric data on aliens 
entering the United States at 115 airports and 14 sea ports. The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full 
implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system 
that matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon 
their arrival in and departure from the United States.[Footnote 21] 

Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS's efforts to 
implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in February 
and August 2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and 
justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration 
projects and that it had not developed a complete schedule for 
biometric exit implementation.[Footnote 22] In September 2008, we 
further reported that DHS was unlikely to meet its timeline for 
implementing an air exit system with biometric indicators, such as 
fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of several unresolved issues, 
such as opposition to the department's published plan by the airline 
industry.[Footnote 23] In November 2009, we found that DHS had not 
adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking 
the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive 
exit solution.[Footnote 24] In our prior reports, we have made 
recommendations intended to help ensure that biometric exit was 
planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and 
efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations. DHS 
has implemented or taken actions to implement some of these 
recommendations; however, DHS has not addressed others. For example, 
in March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was adopting 
procedures to comply with the nine scheduling practices we recommended 
in our November 2009 report and has conducted training on our 
scheduling methodology. However, DHS did not implement our February 
2007 recommendations to (1) report to Congress on US-VISIT program 
risks associated with not fully satisfying legislative conditions, 
such as compliance with Office of Management and Budget capital 
planning and investment control guidance, and (2) limit planned 
expenditures for program management-related activities until such 
investments are economically justified and have well-defined plans. 
[Footnote 25] 

DHS Continually Reviews Records of Potential Overstays, but a 
Significant Number of Unmatched Arrival Records Remain: 

DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Records of Potential Overstays 
in 2011: 

DHS reviewed a backlog of records of potential overstays that we 
previously identified in April 2011.[Footnote 26] DHS uses ADIS to 
match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close 
records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records 
because either (1) the individual departed prior to the end of his or 
her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an overstay, 
or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her authorized 
period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country overstay. 
Unmatched arrival records--those records in ADIS that do not have 
corresponding departure records--remain open and indicate that those 
individuals are potential in-country overstays.[Footnote 27] In April 
2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog 
of 1.6 million unmatched arrival records that DHS had not reviewed 
through automated or manual processes. This backlog included prior 
nonpriority overstay leads that had not been reviewed, nonpriority 
leads that continued to accrue on a daily basis, and leads generated 
in error as a result of CBP system changes.[Footnote 28] DHS officials 
attributed this backlog to resource constraints and US-VISIT's focus 
on reviewing leads that met ICE's priorities. 

In the summer of 2011, DHS completed a review of these 1.6 million 
records against various national security and law enforcement 
databases to determine if the subjects of these records had already 
left the United States and to help identify if the subjects posed any 
potential national security or public safety threats. As a result, DHS 
closed approximately 863,000 records for individuals who had departed, 
were in status, or had adjusted status, and removed them from the 
backlog by conducting additional automated checks. Second, DHS 
reviewed the remaining 757,000 records against national security and 
law enforcement databases to identify potential national security or 
public safety threats. As part of this national security and public 
safety review, DHS also reviewed approximately 82,000 additional 
records identified by CTCEU that were unresolved or had not yet 
undergone full review because they did not meet ICE's enforcement 
priorities (a total of approximately 839,000 combined records). As a 
result of these reviews, DHS reprioritized 1,901 of the 839,000 
records because the subjects of the records could pose national 
security or public safety concerns and provided them to CTCEU for 
further review and consideration for enforcement action. Table 3 
describes how CTCEU resolved these leads. 

Table 3: Results of DHS's Summer 2011 Review of Nonpriority Records of 
Potential Overstays Identified as National Security and Public Safety 
Threats, as of March 2013: 

Outcome: Individual had departed the United States; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 711 records (37.4 percent). 

Outcome: Records forwarded to ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations 
(ERO) as potential public safety threats[A]; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 481 records (25.3 percent). 

Outcome: Individual was in status (e.g., the subject filed a timely 
application to change his or her status or extend his or her 
authorized period of admission in the United States); 
Number of records (percentage of total): 302 records (15.9 percent). 

Outcome: Individual could not be located[B]; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 266 records (14.0 percent). 

Outcome: Individual was arrested; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 9 records (0.5 percent). 

Outcome: Other[C]; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 132 records (6.9 percent). 

Outcome: Total; 
Number of records (percentage of total): 1,901 records (100 percent). 

Source: ICE CTCEU. 

[A] CTCEU refers information on nonpriority potential overstays to 
ICE's ERO, which is responsible for identifying and apprehending 
aliens who are subject to removal from the country, detaining these 
individuals when necessary, and removing aliens subject to removal 
from the United States. ERO personnel may encounter overstays in the 
course of their work but they do not directly focus on overstay 
enforcement. 

[B] An ICE contractor's system automatically queries these records 
against various databases on a weekly basis for new information 
relating to the location of the suspected overstay. If such 
information is identified, CTCEU will reopen the investigation. 

[C] Other includes the following outcomes: (1) ICE determined that 
information indicating a possible national security or public safety 
threat was false (73 leads, 3.8 percent); (2) the subject of the lead 
was in removal proceedings, previously arrested, or the subject of an 
investigation (43 leads, 2.3 percent); (3) the lead is open for 
continuous review (13 leads, 0.7 percent); and (4) the subject of the 
lead is the subject of an ongoing investigation at an ICE Homeland 
Security Investigations field office (3 leads, 0.2 percent). 

[End of table] 

According to our analysis of DHS documentation, since completing this 
review of the backlog of records of potential overstays in the summer 
of 2011, as new records have accrued, DHS has continued to review all 
records of potential overstays through national security and law 
enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of 
whether the subjects of the records meet ICE's priorities for 
enforcement action. DHS also regularly rereviews these records using 
various national security and law enforcement databases to identify 
new information on individuals who were not previously identified as 
threats. 

ICE's continual review of records of potential overstays enables it to 
prioritize and investigate individuals who pose a potential national 
security or public safety threat; however, most records of potential 
overstays do not result in enforcement action because they do not meet 
HSI's overstay enforcement priorities. CTCEU provides those records 
that do not meet HSI's overstay enforcement priorities for possible 
investigation to ICE's ERO for review to determine if the subjects of 
these records could be within the scope of one of ERO's programs. For 
example, ERO oversees the Criminal Alien Program, which seeks to 
identify, arrest, and remove priority aliens who are incarcerated 
within federal, state, and local prisons and jails. According to ERO 
officials, upon receiving records from CTCEU, ERO may also determine 
through this program that the subject of the record has committed a 
crime and is incarcerated or at large. In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 
the number of nonpriority records of potential overstays sent to ERO 
(more than 420,000) was almost three times the number of priority 
records that CTCEU reviewed for potential homeland security 
investigations (about 147,000) (see appendix I for additional data on 
ICE's enforcement actions). According to ERO officials, ERO does not 
initiate investigations of records of potential overstays it receives 
unless there is evidence at the time ERO receives the record that the 
subject meets ERO's priorities.[Footnote 29] ERO officials stated that 
few records of potential overstays have met ERO's priorities. 

In April 2011, we found that ICE was assessing funding and resources 
needed to shift more overstay enforcement responsibilities to ERO, but 
ICE had not established a time frame for completing that assessment. 
We recommended that ICE establish a target time frame for completing 
the assessment and use the results to inform its decision on whether 
to assign ERO additional responsibility for overstay enforcement. DHS 
concurred with our recommendation and took action to address it. In 
June 2011, ICE conducted a pilot study and completed its assessment 
later that year in which it concluded that significant resources would 
be required to establish ERO teams dedicated to enforcement against 
overstays. As a result, ICE did not change ERO's overstay enforcement 
responsibilities. 

DHS Has More than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records That Do Not Meet 
Enforcement Priorities: 

Since DHS conducted its review of the previous backlog in 2011, 
additional unmatched arrival records have accrued, and as of June 
2013, DHS has more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS 
(that is, arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of 
departure or status change), which do not meet ICE's enforcement 
priorities. Some of these individuals are overstays, while others have 
either departed or changed immigration status without an ADIS record 
of their departure or status change. For example, the individual may 
have departed via a land port of entry without providing a record of 
departure or the individual may have applied for immigration benefits 
using a different name that does not match the ADIS arrival record. 
DHS conducts ongoing automated reviews of these records to rule out 
potential national security or public safety threats should updated 
information become available. In certain circumstances, such as when a 
record of a potential overstay meets one of ICE's enforcement 
priorities, DHS also manually searches additional databases to locate 
evidence of a departure or change of status. However, DHS's automated 
reviews have not produced evidence that the subjects of these 1 
million unmatched arrival records meet its enforcement priorities. 
Thus, DHS has not manually reviewed them and does not plan to take 
enforcement action against these individuals. Until such evidence 
becomes available, DHS will continue to maintain this set of unmatched 
records. 

In November 2012, DHS's set of unmatched arrival records not manually 
reviewed totaled approximately 1.2 million records, and we analyzed 
data on these records to assess trends by admission class (e.g., 
tourist or temporary agricultural worker), mode of travel (i.e., air, 
land, or sea), and time elapsed since the travelers were expected to 
leave the country.[Footnote 30] Our analysis of the records by 
admission class shows that 44 percent of the unmatched arrival records 
were nonimmigrants who traveled to the United States on a tourist 
visa, while 43 percent were tourists admitted to the country under the 
Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our analysis of unmatched 
arrival records by admission class. 

Figure 1: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Admission Class, as 
of November 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

B-2 visa–visitor for pleasure: 44%; 
Visa Waiver (tourist): 43%; 
B-1 visa–visitor for business: 4%; 
Visa Waiver (business): 3%; 
H-2B visa–temporary nonagricultural worker: 1%; 
H-2A visa–temporary agricultural worker: 1%; 
Other: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of Biometric Identity 
Management. 

Note: Other includes nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary 
workers with specialty occupations and spouses and children of 
temporary workers. The nonimmigrant classes established by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act generally refer to aliens with no 
intention of abandoning their foreign residences, and they are each 
given specific designations according to regulation. The B-1 and B-2 
designations refer to nonimmigrants who are visiting the United States 
temporarily for business or pleasure, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(B). The H-2B designation refers to nonimmigrants who are 
coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary, 
nonagricultural service or labor if unemployed persons capable of 
performing such service or labor cannot be found in the United States, 
and the H-2A designation refers to nonimmigrants who are coming 
temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or 
services of a temporary or seasonal nature. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b). For a listing and descriptions of all 
nonimmigrant classes, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 
214.1(a)(1)-(2) for the corresponding designations. These data do not 
include records of nonimmigrants who are admitted for duration of 
status, such as students. 

[End of figure] 

With regard to mode of travel, our analysis of the 1.2 million 
unmatched arrival records from November 2012 indicates that most of 
the records were for air arrivals (64 percent), and roughly one-third 
were for land arrivals (32 percent). The remaining 4 percent of the 
records were for arrivals by sea. Figure 2 presents the results of 
this analysis. DHS has reported a similar distribution for modes of 
travel for nonimmigrants arriving in fiscal years 2010 and 2011--
roughly one-third by land and two-thirds by other modes, which would 
include air and sea arrivals.[Footnote 31] 

Figure 2: Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Transportation 
Mode, as of November 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Air: 64%; 
Land: 32%; 
Sea: 4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of Biometric Identity 
Management. 

[End of figure] 

We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has 
elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on 
travelers' admit until date. Figure 3 presents our analysis of the 
amount of time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the admit until 
date. The average amount of time elapsed for the unmatched arrival 
records we analyzed was 2.7 years. Our analysis indicates that the 
majority of unmatched arrival records correspond to travelers who were 
expected to depart within the past 2 years. According to DHS 
officials, this may reflect that overstays are more likely to depart 
the United States as time proceeds. For example, the overstays may 
choose to return to their countries of origin. 

Figure 3: Amount of Time Elapsed since Travelers Were Expected to 
Depart the United States, as of November 2012, Based on Analysis of 
Unmatched Arrival Records: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Time elapsed: Less than 1 year: 32.2%. 

Time elapsed: 1 year but less than 2: 33.4%. 

Time elapsed: 2 years but less than 3: 11.5%. 

Time elapsed: 3 years but less than 4: 5.2%. 

Time elapsed: 4 years but less than 5: 4.1%. 

Time elapsed: 5 years but less than 6: 5.6%. 

Time elapsed: 6 years but less than 7: 6.2%. 

Time elapsed: 7 years but less than 8: 1.8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Office of Biometric Identity 
Management. 

[End of figure] 

DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data to Identify 
Potential Overstays, but the Effect of These Improvements Is Not Yet 
Known: 

DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data 
among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays: 

Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on 
potential overstays. In April 2011, we found that DHS's efforts to 
identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and 
we identified various challenges to DHS's efforts to identify 
potential overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure 
data from nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of 
entry, and the lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads 
sent to HSI field offices for investigation.[Footnote 32] Since that 
time, DHS has taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing 
records to identify potential overstays, including (1) streamlining 
connections among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays 
and (2) collecting information from the Canadian government about 
those exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern 
land ports of entry. 

First, DHS has taken steps to improve connections among its component 
agencies' databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce 
the need for manual exchanges of data. For example: 

* In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and a U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services database, the Computer-Linked 
Application Information Management System 3 (CLAIMS), to enable 
automatic transfers of immigration status or benefits information from 
CLAIMS to ADIS. For example, this enhancement has enabled CLAIMS to 
automatically provide data to ADIS when an individual files a work 
authorization application form with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, and CLAIMS also provides data to ADIS daily on whether an 
application is pending, approved, or denied. 

* In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and IDENT. 
This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to improve 
the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For example, 
when an individual provides a fingerprint as part of an application 
for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services or a visa from the State Department, or when apprehended by 
law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity information, including a 
fingerprint identification number, for that individual to ADIS. This 
additional source of data is intended to help allow ADIS to more 
effectively match the individual's entry record with a change of 
status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival records. 

* Beginning in April 2013, ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to ADIS on 
a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against departure 
records and determine whether student visa holders who have ended 
their course of study departed in accordance with the terms of their 
stay.[Footnote 33] Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data 
from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials, 
these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently 
include all SEVIS data--particularly data on "no show" students who 
failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being 
admitted into the United States. 

* Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of records of 
potential overstays between ADIS and CBP's Automated Targeting System 
(ATS), a CBP system used to improve the collection, use, analysis, and 
dissemination of information on terrorism and other violations of 
United States laws. This exchange is intended to allow DHS to more 
efficiently (1) transfer data between the systems for the purpose of 
identifying national security and public safety concerns, and (2) use 
matching algorithms in ATS that differ from those in ADIS to close 
additional records for individuals who departed. 

Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to 
collect additional data to strengthen the identification of potential 
overstays. In October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency 
began exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at 
selected land ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes 
a departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian 
entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. We found in April 
2011 that DHS faced challenges in its ability to identify overstays 
because of unreliable collection of departure data at land ports of 
entry.[Footnote 34] The Beyond the Border Initiative would help 
address those challenges by providing a new source of data on 
travelers departing the United States at land ports on the northern 
border. In the pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the Canada Border 
Services Agency on third-country nationals at four of the five largest 
ports of entry on the northern border.[Footnote 35] These data covered 
entries from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS's 
analysis of the 413,222 records received through the pilot showed that 
DHS was able to match 97.4 percent of Canadian entry records to a U.S. 
entry record in ADIS. DHS was able to use Canadian entry records to 
verify the departure of approximately 11,400 subjects prior to the end 
of their authorized period of admission who would otherwise have been 
thought to be potential overstays. DHS determined that roughly 4,300 
subjects with indeterminate status (meaning that DHS lacked exit 
records for those individuals) had left the United States after their 
authorized period of admission, meaning that they had overstayed while 
in the United States and are now considered out-of-country overstays. 

DHS plans to expand this effort to collect data from additional ports 
of entry and to share data on additional types of travelers. 
Specifically, according to DHS officials, as of June 30, 2013, DHS 
began exchanging data for third-country nationals at all automated 
ports of entry along the northern border.[Footnote 36] During this 
phase of the initiative, in accordance with the agreement between the 
United States and Canada, DHS also plans to begin using these data for 
operational purposes (e.g., taking enforcement action against 
overstays, such as working with the State Department to have their 
visas revoked or imposing bars on readmission to the country based on 
the length of time they remained in the country unlawfully).[Footnote 
37] After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange data on all travelers, 
including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all automated ports of entry 
along the northern border. Both DHS and Canadian officials with whom 
we spoke stated that the initiative is proceeding on schedule. 

The Beyond the Border initiative provides DHS with additional data 
that should enable it to close out potential overstay leads for 
individuals who depart across the northern border; however, according 
to DHS and CBP officials, the southern land border poses unique 
challenges that make an approach similar to Beyond the Border 
difficult to implement there. Mexican entry procedures differ from 
those in Canada. For example, according to DHS officials, at some 
border crossings, Mexican officials may not collect entry data until 
travelers reach a station located miles past the border. Therefore, 
Mexican border authorities may not collect information on every 
traveler entering Mexico. In addition, according to DHS officials, 
Mexican information technology systems may be less compatible with 
U.S. systems than are the Canadian systems. DHS is conducting informal 
outreach to the Mexican government regarding the potential to share 
entry data in the future, but according to DHS officials, such a 
program would be years away. 

DHS Continues to Face Limitations in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates 
and Has Not Assessed and Documented Improvements in Reliability: 

Since 1994, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported 
annual overstay rates to Congress because of concerns about the 
reliability of the department's overstay data. According to statute, 
DHS is to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical 
estimates of the number of aliens from each country in each 
nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an authorized period of 
admission that expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for 
which the report is made.[Footnote 38] Overstay rates are among the 
statutory criteria that determine a participant's termination from the 
Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 39] Therefore, we have previously 
concluded that reliable and valid estimates of the number of overstays 
are important to manage the program.[Footnote 40] In April 2011, we 
reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not 
reported overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient 
confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated 
at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably 
report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute.[Footnote 41] 

In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that 
DHS plans to report overstay estimates by December 2013.[Footnote 42] 
However, as of June 2013, DHS has not made a final determination for 
how it plans to calculate, report, and characterize the limitations of 
these data. For example, according to officials from ICE and DHS's 
Office of Policy, the department has calculated preliminary overstay 
estimates for fiscal year 2012 and the first half of fiscal year 2013 
for all travelers and classes of admission at all air, land and sea 
ports of entry. DHS has also calculated overstay rates by country for 
these time periods by determining the number of overstays (in-country 
plus out-of-country) divided by the total number of confirmed 
nonimmigrants arrivals (who were expected to depart during the 
identified period). However, the department is still in the process of 
determining what methodology it will use to generate the data it plans 
to report by the end of the year. In addition, DHS officials stated 
that the department has not yet determined whether to report data from 
fiscal year 2012 or fiscal year 2013, and whether to report certain 
overstay data publicly. 

Moreover, DHS continues to face challenges in ensuring the reliability 
of its overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in 
overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates, such as 
weaknesses in departure data. We recommended that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security explore cost-effective actions necessary to further 
improve, validate, and test the reliability of overstay data.[Footnote 
43] DHS concurred with this recommendation and has explored actions to 
improve overstay data, as discussed above, but has not yet validated 
or tested their reliability. According to DHS Office of Policy 
officials, the department is better positioned than in the past to 
describe the limitations in the overstay data. However, challenges to 
reporting reliable overstay estimates remain. Although DHS has 
improved connections among its various databases used to help identify 
potential overstays, these improvements do not address some of the 
underlying data quality and reliability issues we previously 
identified. For example, in April 2011, we found that DHS faced 
challenges in collecting accurate and complete information from 
nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry. 
The Beyond the Border initiative is intended to help address this 
issue by collecting proxy data on individuals exiting from the United 
States at northern border ports of entry; however, DHS has not yet 
identified mechanisms for collecting data on individuals exiting 
through southern border ports of entry. 

Further, inaccuracies in passenger data provided by air carriers may 
lead to incorrect records of potential overstays if passengers' 
departures are not accurately recorded. For example, according to CBP 
officials, CBP learned in early 2011 that some carriers were 
inadvertently transmitting passenger data without properly recording 
the passengers' departure after DHS noticed an increase in the number 
of potential overstays. According to these officials, the issue was 
resolved in April 2011, but because of the errors in the data, an 
unknown number of those passengers were incorrectly identified as 
potential overstays. Moreover, DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials 
stated that, prior to the April 2013 improvements between ADIS and 
SEVIS, ADIS was receiving limited information on foreign students; 
therefore, the overstay estimates prior to April 2013 do not fully 
account for the extent to which foreign students in the United States 
were in legal status in the country. These limitations in overstay 
data may affect DHS's ability to report reliable overstay estimates 
unless resolved. Estimates of in-country overstays are based on ADIS's 
identification of unmatched arrival records for individuals who were 
expected to depart during a given year. As discussed earlier in this 
report, DHS does not manually review all unmatched arrival records in 
ADIS because many do not meet ICE's enforcement priorities. Therefore, 
the reliability of data in ADIS may affect the accuracy of year-end 
overstay statistics. 

DHS has documented the results of receiving new departure data in the 
pilot phase of the Beyond the Border initiative to demonstrate how DHS 
may be able to close out more records of potential overstays in the 
future. However, DHS has not assessed and documented how its changes 
to database connections have improved the reliability of its data for 
the purposes of reporting overstay rate calculations and has not 
analyzed the incremental improvements that database changes have made 
in data quality. According to DHS Office of Policy and ICE officials, 
DHS has not conducted such an analysis because it is difficult to pull 
such data from ADIS. DHS has not maintained a separate, mirrored 
system of ADIS and must therefore pull data directly from the live 
ADIS system--a resource-intensive process that can take several 
months. However, there may be other cost-effective ways to assess data 
improvements, such as conducting quantitative analyses of the number 
of records closed as a result of the improvements in connections among 
databases. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 
program managers need operational data to determine whether they are 
meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use 
of resources. The standards also require that all transactions be 
clearly documented in a manner that is complete and accurate in order 
to be useful for managers and others involved in evaluating 
operations.[Footnote 44] Additionally, GAO's methodology transfer 
paper on the logic of program evaluation designs, which describes key 
issues in evaluating federal programs, states that the basic 
components of an evaluation design include identifying information 
sources and measures, data collection methods, and an assessment of 
study limitations, among other things.[Footnote 45] Moreover, GAO's 
standards for assessing computer-processed data, which can provide a 
framework for assessing DHS's computer-processed overstay data, states 
that care should be taken to ensure that collected data are sufficient 
and appropriate. Data may not be sufficiently reliable if (1) 
significant errors or incompleteness exists in some of or all the key 
data elements, and (2) using the data would probably lead to an 
incorrect or unintentional message.[Footnote 46] Without an assessment 
and documentation of improvements in the reliability of the data used 
to develop overstay estimates and any remaining limitations in how the 
data can be used, decision makers will not have the information needed 
to use these data for policy-making purposes. 

DHS Faces Long-standing Challenges and Uncertain Time Frames in 
Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Airports: 

DHS has not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement 
a biometric exit capability, but has planning efforts under way to 
report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle on 
the costs and benefits of such a capability at airports and seaports. 
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act required 
DHS to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an 
automated biometric entry and exit system at air, sea, and land ports 
of entry. However, development and implementation of a biometric exit 
capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. With regard to 
an exit capability at airports, in an October 2010 memo, DHS 
identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to determine 
how and when to implement a biometric solution: (1) the methods of 
collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through 
air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not 
allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate 
biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure 
gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the 
point of departure, including determining what personnel should be 
responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports. With 
regard to an exit capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we 
reported that according to DHS officials, for various reasons, a 
biometric exit capability could not be implemented without incurring a 
major impact on land facilities.[Footnote 47] As a result, as of April 
2013, according to DHS officials, the department's planning efforts 
focus on developing a biometric exit capability for airports, with the 
potential for a similar solution to be implemented at seaports, and 
DHS's planning documents, as of June 2013, do not address plans for a 
biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. 

According to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 
2010 continue to affect the department's ability to implement a 
biometric air exit system. For example, in 2009, DHS conducted pilot 
programs for biometric air exit capabilities in airport scenarios. 
[Footnote 48] In August 2010, we found that there were limitations 
with the pilot programs--for example, the pilot programs did not 
operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements 
identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs-
-that hindered DHS's ability to inform decision making for a long-term 
air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of 
information on air exit's operational impacts.[Footnote 49] According 
to DHS officials, the department's approach to planning for biometric 
air exit since that time has been partly in response to our 
recommendation that DHS identify additional sources for the 
operational impacts of air exit not addressed in the pilot programs' 
evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air exit decision 
making and planning. Figure 4 depicts a timeline of DHS's efforts to 
develop a biometric exit capability and key findings from our prior 
reports. 

Figure 4: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 
System: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Move mouse over the blue shaded text boxes to get more information on 
GAO’s findings and recommendation, click on text box to open the
referenced GAO report. For an accessible and printable version of this 
graphic please see appendix II. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component 
agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit. 
[Footnote 50] In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of 
S&T's analysis of previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of 
available technologies, and the report made recommendations to support 
the planning and development of a biometric air exit capability. 
[Footnote 51] In that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks 
to implement an effective biometric air exit system were available. In 
addition, DHS's report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and 
technologies--for example, online check-in, self-service, and 
paperless technology--could support more cost-effective ways to screen 
travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when 
developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated 
that there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the 
extent that U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary 
systems that may be difficult to update to incorporate new 
technologies. Furthermore, DHS reported in May 2012 that significant 
questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of current 
biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or 
matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively integrating biometrics 
into the air departure processes (e.g., collecting biometric scans as 
passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the additional 
value biometric air exit would provide compared with the current 
biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a 
biometric air exit capability. The report included nine 
recommendations to help inform DHS's planning for biometric air exit, 
such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and objectives for 
biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, among other 
things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in addition to 
biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is 
economically justified.[Footnote 52] 

DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address 
these recommendations by May 2014; however, according to DHS Office of 
Policy and S&T officials, the department does not expect to fully 
address these recommendations by then. In particular, DHS officials 
stated that it has been difficult coordinating with airlines and 
airports, which have expressed reluctance about biometric air exit 
because of concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. 
To address these concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting 
information from airlines and airports regarding their operations. In 
addition, DHS officials stated that the department's efforts to date 
have been hindered by insufficient funding. However, in fiscal year 
2012, DHS requested that Congress release funds allocated to the 
biometric exit program and funds being withheld pending the full 
implementation of a biometric exit system so that these funds could be 
applied to DHS's efforts to enhance the biographic exit system. In its 
fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T, DHS requested funding for a 
joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex project. Apex 
projects are crosscutting, multidisciplinary efforts requested by DHS 
components that are high-priority projects intended to solve problems 
of strategic operational importance. According to DHS's fiscal year 
2014 budget justification, the Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex 
project will develop tools to model and simulate air entry and exit 
operational processes. Using these tools, DHS intends to develop, 
test, pilot, and evaluate candidate solutions. As of April 2013, DHS 
Policy and S&T officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and 
objectives for a biometric air exit system in the near future and are 
making plans for future scenario-based testing. 

Although DHS's May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to 
address the report's recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told 
us that the department's current goal is to develop information about 
options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for 
the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional 
benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced 
biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air 
exit. However, DHS has not yet developed an evaluation framework, as 
recommended in its May 2012 report, to determine how the department 
will evaluate the benefits and costs of a biometric air exit system 
and compare it with a biographic exit system. According to DHS 
officials, the department needs to finalize goals and objectives for 
biometric air exit before it can develop such a framework, and in 
April 2013 these officials told us that the department plans to 
finalize these elements in the near future. However, DHS does not have 
time frames for when it will subsequently be able to develop and 
implement an evaluation framework to support the assessment it plans 
to provide to Congress. 

According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, 
which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and 
objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the 
planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and 
milestones needed to achieve those results.[Footnote 53] In fall 2012, 
DHS developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, 
which it updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify 
the tasks needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For 
example, the plan does not include a step for developing the 
methodology for comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data 
against those for collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS's 
May 2012 report. Furthermore, the time frames in this plan are not 
accurate as of June 2013 because DHS is behind schedule on some of the 
tasks and has not updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For 
example, DHS had planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric 
air exit options in August 2013; however, according to DHS officials, 
the department now plans to begin such testing in early 2014. A senior 
official from DHS's Office of Policy told us that DHS has not kept the 
plan up to date because of the transition of responsibilities within 
DHS; specifically, in March 2013, pursuant to the explanatory 
statement for DHS's 2013 appropriation, DHS established an office 
within CBP that is responsible for coordinating DHS's entry and exit 
policies and operations.[Footnote 54] This transition was in process 
as of June 2013, and CBP plans to establish an integrated project team 
in July 2013 that will be responsible for more detailed planning for 
the department's biometric air exit efforts. Without robust planning 
that includes up-to-date time frames and milestones to develop and 
implement an evaluation framework for its assessment of biometric air 
exit benefits and costs, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that 
it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress as planned for 
the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle. 

DHS Policy and S&T officials agreed that setting time frames and 
milestones is important to ensure timely development and 
implementation of the evaluation framework in accordance with DHS's 
May 2012 recommendations. According to DHS officials, implementation 
of a biometric air exit system will depend on the results of 
discussions between the department and Congress after the department 
provides this assessment of options for biometric air exit. Any delays 
in providing the assessment to Congress could further affect 
implementation of a biometric air exit system, and without reasonable 
assurance when DHS will be able to provide this assessment to 
Congress, it remains unclear when DHS will make progress toward 
addressing the statutory requirements for a biometric exit system. 

Conclusions: 

Addressing the large number of foreign visitors who have entered the 
United States legally but then overstayed has been a long-standing 
challenge. Given the government's finite resources for addressing 
overstays, and competing priorities, reliable data and analysis are of 
particular importance to both DHS and Congress. Without clear 
assessment and reporting of the extent to which the reliability of the 
data used to develop overstay estimates has improved and any remaining 
limitations in how the data can be used, decision makers may not have 
complete information needed to use these data for policy-making 
purposes. Furthermore, DHS has faced long-standing challenges in 
making progress toward meeting the statutory requirement for biometric 
exit capabilities since 2004. DHS plans to provide Congress with an 
assessment of the benefits and costs of various options for pursuing a 
biometric exit system at airports, but without robust planning that 
includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an 
evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable 
assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress 
for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any 
delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect 
possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address 
statutory requirements. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help improve confidence in the quality of overstay data that DHS 
plans to report in December 2013 in accordance with statutory 
reporting requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security direct relevant DHS components to assess and document the 
extent to which the reliability of the data used to develop any 
overstay estimates has improved and any remaining limitations in how 
the data can be used. 

To provide reasonable assurance of when DHS will be able provide an 
assessment of the benefits and costs of biometric air exit options to 
Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing 
an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department's 
assessment of biometric air exit options. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of State 
for their review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are 
summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred 
with our two recommendations and described actions under way or 
planned to address them. Regarding our first recommendation, that DHS 
assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data 
used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining 
limitations in how the data can be used, DHS indicated that it is 
establishing a working group that will include representation from DHS 
component agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and 
analyzing entry and exit data and that this working group will be 
functional by January 31, 2014. According to DHS, the component 
agencies that oversee information systems used to identify overstays 
will be responsible for the data captured in their respective systems, 
and the working group will be responsible for aggregating information 
across components regarding the validity of the data and defining any 
limitations to the use of the data. DHS estimated that completion of 
an initial evaluation of the data would occur by July 31, 2014. To 
fully address our recommendation, DHS should assess the reliability 
of, and document any remaining limitations in, any overstay data that 
the department may report. Regarding our second recommendation, that 
DHS establish time frames and milestones for developing and 
implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the 
department's assessment of biometric air exit options, DHS indicated 
that CBP and S&T will finalize the goals and objectives for biometric 
air exit by January 31, 2014, and that these goals and objectives will 
be used in the development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects 
to have completed by June 30, 2014. These actions, when fully 
implemented, should help address the intent of our recommendations. 
DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

The Department of State did not have formal comments on our draft 
report, but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional 
committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have questions on matters discussed in this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Overstay 
Enforcement Actions: 

In April 2011, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), a component within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), takes actions to address a small portion of the 
estimated overstay population because of, among other things, 
competing priorities. In particular, ICE's Counterterrorism and 
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), within the Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI) directorate, prioritizes in-country overstay 
leads based on various factors that consider the potential risks 
overstays may pose to national security and public safety, and HSI 
field offices investigate those leads that CTCEU identifies as 
priorities. 

As it reviews leads for potential overstays, CTCEU closes records for 
nonimmigrants that have either left the country or changed their 
status, identifies nonpriority records for processing by ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, and sends records that do not have 
a viable address to contractors to continually monitor for new address 
information. CTCEU assigns valid, high-priority overstay leads to HSI 
field office agents within their respective geographical areas of 
responsibility for mandatory investigation. From fiscal years 2004 
through 2012, CTCEU processed over 2.2 million records of potential 
overstays and sent about 44,500 leads to HSI field offices for 
investigation. Table 4 provides information related to the records of 
potential overstays that CTCEU has processed from fiscal years 2004 
through 2012 (our April 2011 report included the data from fiscal 
years 2004 through 2010). Out of the approximately 44,500 leads sent 
to HSI field offices over this period of time, approximately 9,000 
(about 20 percent) resulted in arrests. 

Table 4: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Counterterrorism and 
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Processing of Records of Potential 
In-Country Overstays from Fiscal Years 2004 to 2012 (Rounded to the 
Nearest Hundred): 

Status of leads: Records imported; 
2004: 261,600; 
2005: 198,600; 
2006: 168,500; 
2007: 197,300; 
2008: 155,600; 
2009: 198,300; 
2010: 193,300; 
2011: 390,200; 
2012: 497,500; 
Total: 2,260,900. 

Status of leads: Closed records; 
2004: 239,500; 
2005: 180,900; 
2006: 148,200; 
2007: 166,400; 
2008: 104,600; 
2009: 101,100; 
2010: 103,900; 
2011: 169,000; 
2012: 233,400; 
Total: 1,447,000. 

Status of leads: Nonpriority records of potential overstays sent to 
Enforcement and Removal Operations; 
2004: 13,900; 
2005: 13,000; 
2006: 15,800; 
2007: 25,100; 
2008: 46,000; 
2009: 85,600; 
2010: 79,700; 
2011: 199,200; 
2012: 221,900; 
Total: 700, 200. 

Status of leads: Viable leads assigned to Homeland Security 
Investigations field offices for investigation; 
2004: 7,600; 
2005: 4,600; 
2006: 4,300; 
2007: 5,700; 
2008: 5,000; 
2009: 6,100; 
2010: 5,400; 
2011: 3,000; 
2012: 2,800; 
Total: 44,500. 

Status of leads: Nonviable leads sent to contractor for continual 
monitoring; 
2004: 700; 
2005: 300; 
2006: 300; 
2007: 200; 
2008: 100; 
2009: 6,000; 
2010: 4,900; 
2011: 3,000; 
2012: 4,400; 
Total: 19,900. 

Source: CTCEU LeadTrac data on overstay leads. 

[End of table] 

In April 2011, we reported that overstay investigations that do not 
lead to an arrest result in one of three outcomes: (1) evidence is 
uncovered indicating that the suspected overstay departed the United 
States, (2) evidence is uncovered indicating that the subject of the 
investigation is in-status (e.g., the subject filed a timely 
application with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to 
change his or her status or extend his or her authorized period of 
admission in the United States), or (3) investigators exhaust all 
investigative leads and cannot locate the suspected overstay. If the 
evidence of departure shows that the individual departed after his or 
her authorized admit until date (i.e., the individual is an out-of-
country overstay), the individual could be subject to administrative 
enforcement actions including restrictions on readmission to the 
United States. Figure 5 shows the outcomes of CTCEU investigations 
from fiscal years 2004 through 2012 that did not result in arrest (our 
April 2011 report included the data from fiscal years 2004 through 
2010). 

Figure 5: Outcomes of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) Overstay 
Investigations Not Resulting in Arrest, Fiscal Years 2004-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Departed, individual has departed the United States: 32%; 9,886; 

In status, individual filed a timely application to adjust his or her 
authorized admission into the United States: 32%; 9,865; 

All leads exhausted, despite taking investigative steps, agents cannot 
locate individual: 36%; 11,082. 

Source: GAO analysis of CTCEU data. 

Note: Data presented in this table include outcomes of CTCEU 
investigations of suspected visa overstays, Visa Waiver Program 
overstays, National Security Entry-Exit Registration System overstays, 
and out-of-status students. The National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System was a program that required certain visitors or 
nonimmigrants to register with DHS for national security reasons. DHS 
ended this program on April 27, 2011. 

[End of figure] 

As we reported in April 2011, ICE has reported allocating a small 
percentage of its resources in terms of investigative work hours to 
overstay investigations. For this report, we found that, from fiscal 
years 2005 through 2012, ICE reported devoting from 1.8 to 3.4 percent 
of its total HSI field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay 
investigations, as shown in figure 6 (our April 2011 report included 
the data from fiscal years 2006 through 2010). 

Figure 6: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Reported 
Percentage of Homeland Security Investigations Field Office 
Investigative Hours Dedicated to Overstay Investigations, Fiscal Years 
2005-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 7,521; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 150. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 7,587; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 262. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 7,748; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 248. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 8,077; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 285. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 8,139; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 283. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 8,906; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 305. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 10,164; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 185. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to overstay cases: 10,450; 
Field office investigative hours dedicated to other categories of 
investigations: 187. 

Source: GAO analysis of ICE data. 

Note: Data in this figure do not account for all categories of 
investigations that may result in enforcement actions against 
overstays. For example, these data do not include document or benefit 
fraud investigations, which include school fraud investigations that 
may identify out-of-status students. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit 
System: 

Table 5 lists events in DHS's efforts to develop a biometric exit 
capability and key findings from our prior reports (see interactive 
figure 4) and includes the figure's rollover information. 

Table 5: Timeline of Events Related to Biometric Entry and Exit System: 

Date: September 1996; 
Event: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 required an automated system to record and then match the 
departure of every foreign national from the United States to the 
individual's arrival record. 

Date: June 2000; 
Event: The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 
Improvement Act of 2000 required implementation of an integrated entry 
and exit data system for foreign nationals. 

Date: April 2003; 
Event: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated the United 
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 
program to develop a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system. 

Date: June 2003; 
Event: GAO issued a report entitled Information Technology: Homeland 
Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning. 
GAO findings: 
GAO reported that DHS's initial plan for an entry-exit system did not 
provide sufficient information about specific system capabilities, 
benefits, and costs; 
Recommendation: 
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that 
future expenditure plans fully disclose what entry-exit system 
capabilities and benefits are to be delivered, by when, and at what 
cost, and how the department intends to manage the acquisition to 
provide reasonable assurance that these system capability, benefit, 
schedule, and cost commitments will be met; 
Status: Closed-implemented; 
The fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan disclosed planned system 
capabilities, expected benefits, and estimated schedules and costs. 
More specifically, the expenditure plan identified capabilities for 
various US-VISIT projects, such as the capability to receive and store 
10-print finger scans captured by U.S. consulates. Additionally, the 
expenditure plan identified benefits, such as reduced information gaps 
and enhanced immigration and border enforcement. Furthermore, the 
expenditure plan provided time frames, such as the deployment of the 
10-print pilot to 10 air locations in late 2007. Moreover, the 
expenditure plan provided meaningful cost information for some of its 
projects; 
GAO citation: 
GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry 
Exit System Expenditure Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-563]; (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 
2003). 

Date: January 2004; 
Event: US-VISIT began collecting biometric data on aliens entering the 
United States at 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry. 

Date: December 2004; 
Event: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
required a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated 
biometric entry and exit system. 

Date: February 2005; 
Event: 
Event: GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: Some Progress 
Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology Program; 
GAO findings: 
GAO reported that changing facts and circumstances introduced 
additional risk to US-VISIT's delivery of promised capabilities and 
benefits on time and within budget; 
Recommendation: 
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to ensure that 
the US-VISIT program director reassesses plans for deploying an exit 
capability to ensure that the scope of the exit pilot program provides 
for adequate evaluation of alternative solutions and better ensures 
that the exit solution selected is in the best interest of the program; 
Status: Closed-implemented; 
The fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan stated that DHS reassessed its 
exit plans, described a new strategy for deploying biometric exit 
capabilities at air and sea ports of entry, and noted the absence of 
near-term biometric options for land ports of entry. DHS also shut 
down the exit pilots (and demonstration projects) that this 
recommendation was intended to address; 
GAO citation: 
GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain 
on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-202]; (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005). 

Date: October 2005; 
Event: US-VISIT began collecting biometric data on aliens entering the 
United States at all ports of entry. 

Date: August 2007; 
Event: GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor 
and Immigrant Status Program's Long-standing Lack of Strategic 
Direction and Management Controls Need to Be Addressed; 
GAO findings: 
GAO reported that DHS continued to propose spending tens of millions 
of dollars on US-VISIT exit projects that were not well defined, 
planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks; 
Recommendation: 
In this report, GAO reiterated prior recommendations regarding the US-
VISIT program and further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security report to the department's authorization and appropriations 
committees on its reasons for not fully addressing its expenditure 
plan legislative conditions and our prior recommendations; 
Status: Closed-not implemented; 
US-VISIT program officials told GAO that they had periodically briefed 
their authorization and appropriation committees on program-related 
issues, including reasons for not having fully satisfied all 
expenditure plan legislative conditions and GAO's prior 
recommendations. However, documentation of these congressional 
briefings provided by US-VISIT does not indicate that the program's 
reasons for not fully addressing expenditure plan legislative 
conditions or our open recommendations were discussed. As of August 
2011, DHS officials had yet to provide evidence of discussions with 
the congressional committees regarding the topics of this 
recommendation, and GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented; 
GAO citation: 
GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program's 
Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Need 
to be Addressed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1065]; 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2007). 

Date: 2009; 
Event: DHS operated two biometric air exit pilots from May 2009 until 
July 2009, and DHS submitted its evaluation report for these pilots to 
Congress in October 2009. 

Date: November 2009; 
Event: GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT 
Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and 
Reliable Schedule Needed; 
GAO findings: 
GAO reported that the US-VISIT program office had not adopted an 
integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking work toward 
a comprehensive exit solution; 
Recommendation: 
GAO recommended that the US-VISIT program director develop and 
maintain an integrated master schedule for the exit system project in 
accordance with nine scheduling practices discussed in the report; 
Status: Open; 
In March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was adopting 
procedures to comply with the nine scheduling practices GAO 
recommended and has conducted training on our scheduling methodology; 
GAO citation: 
GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of 
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]; (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 
2009). 

Date: August 2010; 
Event: GAO issued a report entitled Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot 
Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options; 
GAO findings: 
GAO reported that DHS would need to leverage other sources of 
information to develop a biometric air exit solution given limitations 
in DHS's biometric air exit pilot programs; 
Recommendation: 
GAO recommend that the US-VISIT program director identify additional 
sources for the operational impacts of air exit not addressed in the 
pilots' evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air exit 
decision making and planning; 
Status: Open; 
In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of the DHS Science 
and Technology Directorate's (S&T) analysis of previous US-VISIT air 
exit pilot programs and assessment of available biometric 
technologies. The report also discussed DHS's plans to take steps that 
have the potential to result in additional information sources to 
assess the operational impacts of a biometric air exit capability. 
However, the report also cited significant remaining questions, such 
as those regarding the comparative value of adding a biometric 
capability to the existing air exit process and the overall value and 
cost of a biometric air exit capability. As of April 2013, officials 
from DHS's Office of Policy and S&T stated that they are making plans 
for future scenario-based testing and are conducting outreach and 
soliciting information from airlines and airports regarding their 
operations; 
GAO citation: 
GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860]; (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 
2010). 

Date: 2011; 
Event: DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component 
agencies, to research long-term options for biometric exit. 

Date: May 2012; 
Event: DHS reported internally on the results of S&T's analysis and 
made recommendations to support the planning and development of a 
biometric air exit capability. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

July 18, 2013: 
Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-13-683, "Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions 
Needed to Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air 
Exit Program" 

Dear Ms. Gambler: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

DHS is pleased to note GAO's positive recognition of the Department's 
efforts to reduce a backlog of previously identified potential 
overstay records related to foreign visitors who have entered the 
United States legally but then overstayed their authorized period of 
admission. DHS also appreciates GAO's acknowledgment of actions 
already completed or underway to improve data on potential overstays. 
DHS remains committed to strengthening and building upon existing 
capabilities to better identify and report on potential overstays.
The draft report contained two recommendations, with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation 1: To help improve confidence in the quality of 
overstay data that DHS plans to report in December 2013 in accordance 
with statutory reporting requirements, direct relevant DHS components 
to assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data 
used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining 
limitations in how the data can be used. 

Response: Concur. In order to meet its legislative mandate and improve 
overstay enforcement; DHS will create a new working group to reassess 
its requirements, capabilities, and risks. Given the reassignment of 
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) responsibilities to multiple Components and the ongoing 
evaluation of new technologies for biometric measurement of exits, the 
assessment of the reliability of potential overstay data has become 
more complex. 

As the lead agency for overstay enforcement, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement's (ICE's) National Security Investigations 
Division will chair the working group and be responsible for 
aggregating the requirements needed to provide assurance that DHS has 
a reasonable capability to identify potential visa overstays. 

Other members of the group will include those Components responsible 
for collecting, recording, and analyzing entry and exit data. Each 
Component will assess its capabilities against identified requirements 
and provide a risk analysis for any gaps in coverage. For those 
members of the working group that own an information system used to 
identify visa overstays, that Component will be responsible for 
documenting their processes, justifying resources required to generate 
potential overstay data, information assurance, architecture, 
engineering, operations, and system development. 

The working group will be charged with aggregating the risk to the 
validity of the data, monitoring the effectiveness of the system, 
identifying evolving needs, and defining any limits to the use of the 
data. Estimated Completion Dates (ECDs): Working group fully 
functional by January 31, 2014; Completion of initial evaluation of 
data by July 31, 2014. 

Recommendation 2: Establish time frames and milestones for developing 
and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the 
Department's assessment of biometric air exit options. 

Response: Concur. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) Office 
of Field Operations (OFO) and the Department's Science and Technology 
Directorate will finalize the goals and objectives for biometric exit 
by January 31, 2014, which will establish the Biometric Air Exit 
Evaluation Framework and implementation plan. Using the biometric air 
exit goals and objectives, CBP OFO will establish the current 
performance of exit processes and categorize performance parameters 
that will be used to monitor improvements introduced by a biometric 
exit solution. The Evaluation Framework will employ a rigorous 
methodology to include process, outcome, and cost components. ECD: 
June 30, 2014. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on 
this draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant 
Director), Susan Baker, Frances A. Cook, Alana Finley, Eric Hauswirth, 
Richard Hung, Lara Miklozek, Amanda Miller, Anthony Moran, Karl 
Seifert, and Ashley D. Vaughan made significant contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa include 
citizens of Canada and the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and 
certain residents of other adjacent islands, such as the Bahamas) 
under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program 
participants. This program allows nationals from certain countries to 
apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors for 
business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. 
consulate abroad. Currently, there are 37 participants in the program. 

[2] In this report, we include out-of-status students--student visa 
holders who fail to meet certain requirements, such as enrolling in a 
qualified education program--in our definition of overstays. In 
general, foreign students remain in status and therefore eligible to 
stay in the United States under their student visas as long as they 
are enrolled in and attending a qualified education program or 
engaging in authorized practical training following completion of 
studies. 

[3] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland 
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-458T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2008). 

[4] See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1365a, 1365b. 

[5] IDENT also contains fingerprints collected by the Department of 
State to establish and verify the identities of visa applicants. Both 
the Overstay Analysis Unit and OBIM were formerly part of the U.S. 
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) 
within DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate. DHS 
initiated US-VISIT in 2003 to develop a comprehensive entry and exit 
system to collect biometric data from aliens traveling through U.S. 
ports of entry. Pursuant to the fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriations 
act and its accompanying explanatory statement, DHS realigned US-
VISIT's overstay analysis function into ICE and created OBIM effective 
March 27, 2013. 

[6] GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, 
Assessing, and Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would 
Have Costs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2011). 

[7] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 
2010), and Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Program's Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management 
Controls Needs to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1065] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 
2007). 

[8] 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d). 

[9] Through ADIS, DHS has identified these records as potential 
overstays, but as of November 2012, DHS had not conducted manual 
searches through DHS and other databases to determine whether there 
might be evidence of departure or change of status in other databases. 
DHS's processes for reviewing records of potential overstays are 
discussed in more detail later in this report and in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. 

[10] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[11] GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2012), and Assessing the Reliability of Computer Processed Data, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-680G] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2009). 

[12] Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton Square, PA: 
2013). 

[13] Temporary visitors to the United States generally are referred to 
as nonimmigrants. For a listing and descriptions of nonimmigrant 
categories, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 
214.1(a)(1)-(2). 

[14] Nonimmigrants eligible for the Visa Waiver Program who seek 
admission to the United States at a land port of entry do not apply 
online to establish eligibility. 

[15] In certain circumstances, citizens of Canada and the British 
Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent 
islands, such as the Bahamas) traveling to the United States as 
nonimmigrants do not require a visa. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(a)-(f). 

[16] Although overstays are sometimes referred to as visa overstays, 
we do not use that term in this report for two reasons. First, many 
nonimmigrants, such as those who enter using the Visa Waiver Program, 
are allowed admission into the United States for a specific period of 
time without visas and may overstay their authorized period of 
admission. Second, nonimmigrants can overstay an authorized period of 
admission set by a CBP officer at the border without necessarily 
overstaying the period of their visas because their authorized period 
of admission may be shorter than the period of their visas. 

[17] Nonimmigrants who overstay their authorized periods of admission 
are subject to removal from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(1)(B)-(C). Federal law provides additional sanctions against 
those who overstay their lawful period of admission, including a 
temporary or permanent bar on readmission to the country, depending on 
the length of overstay, and ineligibility for future admission under 
the Visa Waiver Program. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)-(C), 
1187(a)(7). The visas of nonimmigrants who overstay become void after 
the conclusion of their authorized period of stay, and the State 
Department will not issue them a new visa if they are subject to a 
statutory bar on readmission, unless DHS grants a waiver; if the 
length of overstay is not sufficient to trigger one of the bars on 
readmission and they are not otherwise ineligible for a visa, they may 
be able to obtain a new visa and CBP may readmit them to the country, 
if they are not otherwise inadmissible at the time they apply for 
readmission at a port of entry. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1202(g), 1201, 
1182(a), 1225(b); 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)-(c). 

[18] ADIS may not record arrivals for travelers from Canada or Mexico 
who present certain documents upon arrival--for example, travelers 
with a Canadian legal permanent resident card--and therefore, these 
individuals may not be identified through the process described here 
for identifying potential overstays. 

[19] Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-558 
to 59. 

[20] 8 U.S.C. § 1365a(b)(1). 

[21] 8 U.S.C. § 1365b. 

[22] In February 2007 and August 2007, among other things, we found 
that DHS had proposed spending millions of dollars on continuing 
operations that had known limitations and that the investments were 
disproportionately directed toward management-related activities. See 
GAO, Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-278], (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007) and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1065]. 

[23] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve 
Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate 
Program Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-967] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2008). 

[24] GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages 
of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2009). 

[25] In response to our recommendation that DHS report to Congress on 
US-VISIT program risks, DHS did not provide us with evidence that it 
had reported this information to Congress. Regarding our 
recommendation that DHS limit planned expenditures for US-VISIT 
management-related activities, DHS did not complete an economic 
justification of its program management investments or define a 
detailed set of actions, milestones, and measures that would link its 
program management activities to program outcomes. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. 

[27] Enforcement actions for in-country and out-of-country overstays 
differ in that the focus of enforcement against in-country overstays 
is to remove them from the country if they pose a threat, whereas 
enforcement against out-of-country overstays is to prevent possible 
readmission to the United States. 

[28] ICE prioritizes potential overstay leads for possible 
investigation. The specific criteria ICE uses to rank the priority 
level of overstay leads are determined triannually based on current 
threat information by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel, an 
interagency panel of intelligence experts assembled by ICE for the 
purpose of determining these criteria. CBP system changes had resulted 
in multiple arrival and departure records being inadvertently created 
for a single individual. 

[29] ERO prioritizes the apprehension, arrest, and removal of 
convicted criminals; those who pose a threat to national security; 
fugitives; and recent border entrants. 

[30] Travelers from Canada or Mexico who present certain documents 
upon arrival may not be included in this data set because their 
arrivals may not be recorded in ADIS. For example, the arrivals of 
Canadian legal permanent residents who travel with a Canadian legal 
permanent resident card are not recorded in ADIS. Additionally, this 
set of unmatched arrival records does not include individuals admitted 
for duration of status, such as students. 

[31] DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Nonimmigrant Admissions to 
the United States: 2011, (Washington, D.C.: July 2012). These data are 
limited to nonimmigrants for whom CBP maintains arrival/departure 
forms (I-94/I-94W). Mexican nationals with border crossing cards (when 
traveling within the border zone for a limited duration) and tourists 
and business travelers from Canada are generally not required to 
provide arrival/departure forms to CBP. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. 

[33] SEVIS contains biographical and other information for 
nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors. 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. 

[35] These ports were Pacific Highway (Blaine, Washington), Peace Arch 
(Blaine, Washington), Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (Lewiston, New York), 
and Rainbow Bridge (Niagara Falls, New York). For the purposes of this 
pilot, third-country nationals are individuals who are not citizens of 
Canada or citizens or nationals of the United States. The pilot phase 
included the exchange of biographic data on permanent residents of 
Canada and lawful permanent residents of the United States. 

[36] For the purposes of the Beyond the Border initiative, an 
automated port of entry refers to a port of entry on the shared Canada-
U.S. land border with a primary processing capacity to capture 
traveler (land, ferry, and pedestrian) passage as an electronic 
record. This does not include large cruise vessels deemed to be sea 
crossings under the laws of Canada and the United States. 

[37] Since these data include only individuals who have departed the 
United States, all of the overstays identified would be out-of-country 
overstays. 

[38] 8 U.S.C. § 1376(b). 

[39] See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(f). A country must be terminated from the 
Visa Waiver Program if that country's disqualification rate for the 
most recent fiscal year for which data are available was more than 3.5 
percent. The disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal 
year of (1) those nationals of the country who were admitted as 
nonimmigrant visitors and violated the terms of their admission--this 
would include overstays--and (2) the number of foreign nationals who 
were denied admission upon arrival in the United States, as it 
compares with the total number of nationals of that country who 
applied for admission as nonimmigrant visitors during the same time 
period. According to the statute, the country must be terminated at 
the beginning of the second fiscal year following the fiscal year in 
which the determination of the disqualification rate was made. 

[40] GAO, Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need 
Improvement, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/PEMD-95-20] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995). 

[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-411]. 

[42] See testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of 
Homeland Security, before the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2013. 

[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-967]. 

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G]. 

[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-680G]. 

[47] GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces, Strategic, 
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 6, 2006). 

[48] In April 2008, DHS announced its intention to implement biometric 
exit verification at air and sea ports of entry in a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (73 Fed. Reg. 22065 (Apr. 24, 2008)). Under this 
notice, commercial air and sea carriers would be responsible for 
developing and deploying the capability to collect the biometrics from 
departing travelers and transmit them to DHS. Subsequent to the rule 
making notice, on September 30, 2008, the Consolidated Security, 
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, was 
enacted, which directed DHS to test two scenarios for an air exit 
solution. (Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008).) The 
act prohibited DHS from obligating any US-VISIT funds provided in the 
act for the implementation of an air exit solution until the 
department provided a report to the Senate and House Committees on 
Appropriations on pilot tests for the solution that addressed two 
scenarios: CBP collects biometric exit data at airport departure 
gates; and airlines collect and transmit such data. DHS submitted its 
Air Exit Pilots Evaluation Report to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in October 2009. 

[49] GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 
Understanding of Air Exit Options, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-860] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 
2010). 

[50] In our previous reviews of DHS's efforts to pursue biometric exit 
capabilities, DHS's plans have approached development of a biometric 
exit system through a phased approach that involved conducting pilots 
to inform eventual planning for long-term solutions. Different pilots 
were created to inform solutions at air/seaports and land ports. See 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. As of April 2013, 
the department's planning efforts are focused on developing a 
biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar 
solution to be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS officials. 

[51] DHS, DHS Biometric Air Exit: Analysis, Recommendations and Next 
Steps, (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). 

[52] The report recommended that DHS take the following actions: (1) 
develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit, (2) 
leverage improvements in passenger facilitation and biometric 
technology to support a concept of operations, (3) use developmental 
scenario testing instead of pilot programs to validate a concept of 
operations, (4) establish collaborative relationships with airports 
and airlines, (5) use operational tests to validate performance and 
cost estimates, (6) develop an evaluation framework for biometric air 
exit, (7) employ a holistic approach to assess the costs and benefits 
of comprehensive biometric entry and exit processes, (8) determine 
whether biometric air exit is economically justified, and (9) 
incrementally deploy biometric air exit to airports where it is cost-
effective to do so. 

[53] Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management 
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton Square, PA: 
2013). We have used A Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge to provide criteria in previous reports, including GAO, 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: State Should Better Assure the 
Effective Use of Program Authorities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-83] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 
2012). 

[54] See Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2013, 159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar. 
11, 2013). 

[End of section] 

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