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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

April 2013: 

Emergency Alerting: 

Capabilities Have Improved, but Additional Guidance and Testing Are 
Needed: 

GAO-13-375: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-375, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

An effective system to alert the public during emergencies can help 
reduce property damage and save lives. In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS 
with the goal of integrating the nation’s EAS and other public-
alerting systems into a comprehensive alerting system. In 2009, GAO 
reported on long-standing weaknesses with EAS and FEMA’s limited 
progress in implementing IPAWS. Subsequently, FEMA and FCC conducted 
the first-ever nationwide EAS test in November 2011. GAO was asked to 
review recent efforts to implement IPAWS and improve EAS. GAO 
examined: (1) how IPAWS capabilities have changed since 2009 and what 
barriers, if any, affect its implementation and (2) results of the 
nationwide EAS test and federal efforts to address identified 
weaknesses. GAO reviewed FEMA, FCC, and other documentation, and 
interviewed industry stakeholders and alerting authorities from six 
locations that were selected because they have public-alerting systems 
in addition to EAS and experienced problems during the nationwide EAS 
test. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken 
actions to improve the capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and 
Warning System (IPAWS) and to increase federal, state, and local 
capabilities to alert the public, but barriers remain to fully 
implementing an integrated system. Specifically, IPAWS has the 
capability to receive and authenticate Internet-based alerts from 
federal, state, and local public authorities and disseminate them to 
the public through multiple systems. For example, since January 2012, 
public-alerting authorities can disseminate Emergency Alert System 
(EAS) messages through IPAWS to television and radio stations. 
Beginning in April 2012, alerting authorities have used IPAWS to 
transmit alerts via the Commercial Mobile Alert System interface to 
disseminate text-like messages to mobile phones. FEMA also adopted 
alert standards and increased coordination efforts with multiple 
stakeholders. Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an 
integrated system, state and local alerting authorities we contacted 
cited a need for more guidance from FEMA on how to integrate and test 
IPAWS capabilities with their existing alerting systems. For example, 
an official with a state alerting authority said that additional 
guidance from FEMA is needed to determine what systems and policies 
should be put in place before integrating and testing IPAWS with other 
public alerting systems in the state’s 128 counties and cities. In the 
absence of sufficient guidance from FEMA, states we contacted are 
reluctant to fully implement IPAWS. This reluctance decreases the 
capability for an integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting 
system. 

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required all EAS 
participants (e.g., broadcast radio and television, cable operators, 
satellite radio and television service providers, and wireline video-
service providers) to submit a report to FCC by December 27, 2011, on 
the results of the nationwide EAS test. As of January 2013, 61 percent 
of broadcasters and cable operators had submitted the required report. 
Of those, 82 percent reported receiving the nationwide test alert, and 
61 percent reported successfully retransmitting the alert to other 
stations, as required. Broadcasters’ and cable operators’ reception of 
the alert varied by state, from 6 percent in Oregon to 100 percent in 
Delaware. Key reasons for reception or retransmission difficulties 
included poor audio quality, outdated broadcaster-monitoring 
assignments, and equipment failure. For example, poor audio quality of 
the test alert resulted in some broadcasters’ receiving a garbled and 
degraded audio message and others’ receiving a duplicate alert that 
caused equipment to malfunction. According to FEMA officials, the poor 
audio quality is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a 
dedicated satellite network that will become fully operational by fall 
2013. However, at the time of our review, FEMA and FCC had taken few 
steps to address other problems identified in the nationwide test. 
Furthermore, while FCC rules call for periodic nationwide EAS testing, 
it is uncertain when the next test will occur. Without a strategy for 
regular nationwide testing of the relay distribution system, including 
developing milestones and timeframes and reporting on after-action 
plans, there is no assurance that EAS would work as intended should 
the President need to activate it to communicate with the American 
people. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FEMA work in conjunction with FCC to establish 
guidance for states to fully implement and test IPAWS components and 
implement a strategy for regular nationwide EAS testing. In response, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations and provided examples of actions aimed at addressing 
the recommendations. DHS, FCC, and the Department of Commerce also 
provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as 
appropriate. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-375]. For more 
information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 
goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

IPAWS Capabilities Have Improved, but Barriers to Implementation Exist: 

Most Reporting EAS Participants Received and Retransmitted the Test 
Alert, but Federal Efforts to Address Identified Weaknesses Are 
Limited: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: FEMA's Progress Addressing Responsibilities of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order No. 13407: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal Communications Commission: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
Form a Comprehensive Public-Alerting System under Executive Order No. 
13407 (2006): 

Table 2: State and Local Interviews: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Flowchart for National-Level Alerts: 

Figure 2: National-Level EAS and Current IPAWS Architecture: 

Figure 3: Percentage of Broadcasters and Cable Operators by State That 
Received the Nationwide EAS Test Alert: 

Abbreviations: 

AMBER: America's Missing Broadcast Emergency Response: 

CAP: Common Alerting Protocol: 

CMAS: Commercial Mobile Alert System: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

EAS: Emergency Alert System: 

FCC: Federal Communications Commission: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

HazCollect: All Hazards Emergency Message Collection System: 

IPAWS: Integrated Public Alert and Warning System: 

NEMA: National Emergency Management Association: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

PEP: primary entry point: 

WARN Act: Warning, Alert, Response, Network Act: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 24, 2013: 

The Honorable Bill Shuster: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Lou Barletta: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
Management: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jeff Denham: 
House of Representatives: 

Effective public emergency alerts via various telecommunications modes 
are critical in major events such as natural disaster, terrorist 
attack, or war. A reliable and comprehensive system to alert Americans 
during emergencies can help save lives and reduce damages and 
hardship. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a national public 
warning system that requires broadcasters, cable operators, and other 
communications service providers to provide the President with 
communications capability to address the American people during a 
national emergency. 

Although EAS was originally designed to alert the public via radios 
and televisions, in June 2006, an executive order directed the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to modernize the nation's public-
alerting systems to ensure the capability of distributing alerts 
though a variety of telecommunications devices beyond broadcast media. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS is 
responsible for modernizing EAS and implementing the Integrated Public 
Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended to integrate EAS 
and other public-alerting systems into a larger network to form a 
comprehensive public-alerting system. In September 2009, we reported 
that EAS exhibited long-standing weaknesses that limit its 
effectiveness and that FEMA had made little progress in implementing 
IPAWS.[Footnote 1] In November 2011, FEMA, in conjunction with the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), conducted the first-ever 
nationwide test of EAS, which revealed that some portions of the 
system did not work as intended. Building on our previous work, you 
asked us to provide information on recent efforts to implement IPAWS 
and improve EAS. We examined (1) how the capabilities of IPAWS have 
changed since 2009 and what barriers, if any, are affecting its 
implementation and (2) the results of the nationwide EAS test and 
federal efforts under way to address identified weaknesses. 

To meet these objectives, we examined federal agency data and reports 
since 2009, including FEMA's inventory and evaluation of public-
alerting systems; the IPAWS program management plan; nationwide EAS 
test data and preliminary reports; and various agency orders and 
rules. To determine the reliability of the data used in this report, 
we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials 
about their processes for reviewing the data and ensuring their 
accuracy. We found the agency data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our review. We met with officials from FCC, FEMA, DHS, and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to 
understand the agencies' progress in implementing IPAWS and efforts to 
address weaknesses identified from the nationwide EAS test. For both 
objectives, we also met with representatives from industry trade 
groups, including radio and television broadcasters, cable operators, 
and wireless service providers, and an organization representing 
individuals with disabilities. In six locations--California, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia--we 
interviewed state and local alerting authorities, state emergency-
communication-committee chairs, the state broadcasters association, 
and selected local broadcasters. We selected these states and the 
District of Columbia because, among other things, they have additional 
public-alerting systems other than EAS, and some have the ability to 
provide alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited English. 
The selected states also experienced problems during the nationwide 
EAS test. Results from our review of the selected states and 
localities are not generalizable. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A more 
detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology appears 
in appendix I. 

Background: 

EAS serves as the nation's primary alerting system. It provides the 
President the capability to issue alerts and communicate to the public 
in response to emergencies. It was built on a structure conceived in 
the 1950s when over-the-air broadcasting was the best-available 
technology for widely disseminating emergency alerts. EAS has been 
upgraded numerous times since then, including in 2005 to include 
digital broadcast television as well as satellite radio and 
television. EAS was further expanded to include Internet-protocol-
based television in 2007. 

FEMA, in partnership with FCC and NOAA, is responsible for operating 
and maintaining EAS at the federal level. NOAA's National Weather 
Service and state and local alerting authorities, in conjunction with 
local radio and television stations, can also use EAS to disseminate 
emergency messages, including weather warnings, America's Missing: 
Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts,[Footnote 2] and other 
public emergency communications, targeted to specific regional and 
local areas and independent from a presidential alert. 

Presidential EAS alerts, also known as national-level alerts, use a 
hierarchical broadcast-based distribution system to relay emergency 
messages, as shown in figure 1. As the entry point for national-level 
EAS messages, FEMA is responsible for distributing such alerts to 
National Primary stations, often referred to as primary entry point 
(PEP) stations.[Footnote 3] Broadcasts of national-level alerts are 
relayed by the PEP stations across the country to radio and television 
stations that rebroadcast the audio and visual message to other 
broadcast stations, cable systems, and other EAS participants[Footnote 
4] until all participants have been alerted. This retransmission of 
alerts from EAS participant to EAS participant is commonly referred to 
as a "daisy chain" distribution system. 

Figure 1: Flowchart for National-Level Alerts: 

[Refer PDF for image: illustration] 

President/senior officials: issues emergency alert: 

EAS phone lines: 
FEMA operations center: Use national-level EAS encoders to seize 
commercial radio/TV paths for President in real time: 
Communication via telephone: 
* Sirius XM Radio: 
- Radio broadcast to Satellite radios; 
* National Public Radio (NPR) satellite network: 
- Radio broadcast to radios. 

EAS phone lines (with limited satellite): 
Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations: 
Radio broadcast to Daisy Chain. 

Daisy Chain: 

State and local officials/National Weather Service: issues emergency 
alert: 
Communication via telephone to TV stations/cable TV operators; 
Radio broadcast to radio stations. 

TV stations/cable TV operators: 
Television broadcast to television sets; cable TV boxes. 

Radio stations: 
Radio broadcast to radios, Radio Stations, TV stations/cable TV 
operators. 

Radio stations: 
Radio broadcast to radios. 

TV stations/cable TV operators: 
Television broadcast to television sets; cable TV boxes. 

Source: FEMA and GAO. 

[End of figure] 

While FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national-level, 
FCC adopts, administers, and enforces rules governing EAS and the EAS 
participants. FCC rules require EAS participants to install FCC-
certified equipment and transmit all national-level alerts; EAS 
participants can also voluntarily transmit alerts generated by the 
National Weather Service or state and local alerting authorities. EAS 
participants, through their State Emergency Communications 
Committee,[Footnote 5] may maintain state EAS plans that contain 
procedures for the distribution of national-level alerts as well as 
other voluntary alerts generated by state and local alerting 
authorities and the National Weather Service.[Footnote 6] State EAS 
plans describe the EAS relay network of each state, including the 
monitoring assignments of EAS participants for all national-level and 
other alerts. 

On November 9, 2011, FEMA conducted the first-ever nationwide test of 
the national-level EAS in response to our prior reports noting the 
lack of EAS testing. FEMA conducted the test in conjunction with FCC. 
In conducting the test, FEMA initiated a national-level alert to be 
distributed through the EAS daisy chain to EAS participants, which 
include about 26,000 broadcasters, cable operators, and other EAS 
participants. To obtain information on the results of the test, FCC 
directed all EAS participants to report either electronically or via 
paper report by December 27, 2011, on whether they received and 
retransmitted the alert. Although December 27, 2011, was the deadline, 
FCC continued to accept paper reports from EAS participants past the 
deadline. 

In addition to EAS, state and local alerting authorities may own and 
operate other warning systems, such as emergency telephone 
notification systems, sirens, and electronic highway billboards, to 
provide public emergency information. Additionally, NOAA provides 
alerts through the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards system, which is a 
network of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather information, 
including warnings, watches, and forecasts directly from the nearest 
National Weather Service office. 

In 2004, FEMA initiated IPAWS to integrate EAS and other public-
alerting systems into a larger, more comprehensive public-alerting 
system. In June 2006, the President issued Executive Order No. 13407, 
entitled Public Alert and Warning System, adopting a policy that the 
United States have a comprehensive, integrated alerting system. The 
order directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to "ensure an orderly 
and effective transition" from current capabilities to a more 
coordinated and integrated system and details the responsibilities of 
the Secretary in meeting the President's directive.[Footnote 7] As 
shown in table 1, the executive order established 10 responsibilities 
for the Secretary of Homeland Security. It is FEMA's intention that 
IPAWS be the programmatic mechanism to carry out the executive order. 

Table 1: Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
Form a Comprehensive Public-Alerting System under Executive Order No. 
13407 (2006): 

Responsibilities: 

1. Inventory, evaluate, and assess the capabilities and integration 
with the public alert and warning system of federal, state, 
territorial, tribal, and local public-alert and warning resources. 

2. Establish or adopt, as appropriate, common alerting and warning 
protocols, standards, terminology, and operating procedures for the 
public-alert and warning system to enable interoperability and the 
secure delivery of coordinated messages to the American people through 
as many communication pathways as practicable, taking into account FCC 
rules, as provided by law. 

3. Ensure the capability to adapt the distribution and content of 
communications based on geographic location, risks, or personal user 
preferences, as appropriate. 

4. Include in the public-alert and warning system the capability to 
alert and warn all Americans, including those with disabilities and 
those without an understanding of the English language. 

5. Through cooperation with the owners and operators of communication 
facilities, maintain, protect, and if necessary, restore communication 
facilities and capabilities necessary for the public-alert and warning 
system. 

6. Ensure the conduct of training, tests, and exercises for the public-
alert and warning system. 

7. Ensure the conduct of public education efforts. 

8. Consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the private sector, 
including communications media organizations, and federal, state, 
territorial, tribal, and local governmental authorities, including 
emergency response providers, as appropriate. 

9. Administer the EAS as a critical component of the public-alert and 
warning system. 

10. Ensure that under all conditions the President of the United 
States can alert and warn the American people. 

Source: Executive Order No. 13407. 

[End of table] 

In addition, in 2006, the Warning, Alert, Response Network Act (WARN 
Act)[Footnote 8] was enacted, which required FCC to adopt relevant 
technical standards, protocols, procedures, and other technical 
requirements to enable commercial mobile service providers (e.g., 
wireless providers) to issue emergency alerts.[Footnote 9] The act 
required FCC to establish an advisory panel called the Commercial 
Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee to recommend technical 
specifications and protocols to govern wireless service providers 
participation in emergency alerting.[Footnote 10] In 2008, following 
public notice and opportunity for public comment as required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act,[Footnote 11] FCC adopted many of the 
committee's recommendations for wireless providers to transmit alerts 
and began developing the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS), 
[Footnote 12] in conjunction with FEMA.[Footnote 13] 

We previously reported several factors that limited EAS effectiveness 
and delayed IPAWS implementation.[Footnote 14] For example, in 2009, 
we reported that a lack of redundancy and testing and gaps in 
coverage, including capabilities to reach individuals with 
disabilities and non-English speakers, significantly limited EAS 
reliability and efficiency. We also reported in 2009 that IPAWS 
program implementation had stalled, as state and local governments 
were forging ahead with their own alerting systems. We made several 
recommendations to FEMA to improve program management and enhance 
transparency about the progress toward achieving an integrated public-
alerting system. FEMA implemented all our recommendations, including 
periodically reporting on the status of implementing IPAWS to 
congressional committees and subcommittees.[Footnote 15] 

IPAWS Capabilities Have Improved, but Barriers to Implementation Exist: 

FEMA has Increased Federal, State, and Local Alerting Capabilities 
Since 2009: 

Since we reported on these issues in 2009, FEMA has taken actions to 
improve IPAWS capabilities. In particular, FEMA implemented a federal 
alert aggregator in 2010, called the IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency 
Networks,[Footnote 16] which has increased alerting capabilities for 
authorities at the federal, state, and local level.[Footnote 17] The 
alert aggregator is capable of receiving and authenticating alerts 
from public-alerting authorities and routing them to various public-
alerting systems. As of January 2013, 93 public-alerting 
authorities,[Footnote 18] including those in at least 35 states, have 
gone through the necessary authentication steps with FEMA to use IPAWS 
and an additional 110 alerting authorities have applications in 
process.[Footnote 19] Authorized public-alerting authorities may use 
IPAWS-compatible software to compose and transmit alerts via the 
Internet to the alert aggregator using a common standard, called the 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP).[Footnote 20] According to FEMA, once 
the alert aggregator verifies the credentials of the message, an alert 
may be distributed to the public through multiple alerting systems, 
[Footnote 21] which make up the components of IPAWS, as follows: 

* EAS. As of January 2012, public-alerting authorities can disseminate 
CAP-formatted EAS alerts through the alert aggregator to television 
and radio stations.[Footnote 22] As of June 30, 2012, FCC required EAS 
participants (i.e., radio and television broadcasters, cable 
operators) to have in place CAP-compatible equipment and monitor the 
IPAWS EAS feed so they can retrieve and retransmit Internet-based EAS 
alerts. State and local alerting authorities' use of IPAWS to send EAS 
alerts is voluntary and as of January 2013, no public-alerting 
authorities had used IPAWS to send an EAS alert. However, according to 
FEMA, state and local alerting authorities had sent 81 EAS test 
messages via the alert aggregator between January 2012 and January 
2013. 

* All-Hazards Emergency Message Collection System (HazCollect). NOAA's 
HazCollect system connected to IPAWS in September 2012, and enables 
federal, state, and local alerting authorities to send non-weather 
emergency messages through IPAWS to the National Weather Service's 
alerting systems, including NOAA Weather Radio's nationwide network of 
radio stations.[Footnote 23] Examples of non-weather emergency message 
events can include wildfires, hazardous materials releases, terrorist 
incidents, AMBER alerts, and public health emergencies. According to 
FEMA, EAS participants generally monitor the NOAA Weather Radio 
directly for emergency alerts. As a result, IPAWS with HazCollect 
provides an alternate means for EAS participants to receive non-
weather alerts from local alerting authorities, increasing the number 
of alerting channels and enhancing the likelihood that the public will 
receive timely alerts. According to FEMA, 22 NOAA Weather Radio 
messages had been sent via the alert aggregator as of January 2013. 

* CMAS. Starting in April 2012, public-alerting authorities can use 
IPAWS to transmit alerts via the CMAS interface to disseminate mobile 
alerts, which are geo-targeted, text-like messages to mobile phones. 
[Footnote 24] These alerts are limited to 90 characters and emit a 
unique ring tone and vibration cadence, which is intended to, among 
other things, improve capabilities for notifying individuals with 
disabilities during an emergency. This new capability is designed to 
relay presidential (or national-level), AMBER, and imminent threat 
alerts to mobile phones using cell technology that is not subject to 
the congestion typically experienced on wireless networks during times 
of emergency.[Footnote 25] Most imminent threat alerts are issued by 
the National Weather Service, which began sending severe weather-
related alerts to all regions of the country in June 2012. According 
to FEMA, as of January 2013, the National Weather Service had sent 
2,667 weather alerts via CMAS. An additional 3 imminent threat alerts 
had been sent from one state related to Hurricane Sandy and 17 AMBER 
alerts had been sent from the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children.[Footnote 26] While CMAS became operational in 
April 2012, participation by wireless carriers is optional under the 
WARN Act.[Footnote 27] Nevertheless, according to CTIA--The Wireless 
Association, all of the major wireless carriers have agreed to 
participate.[Footnote 28] Some carriers may still be rolling out CMAS 
capabilities and not all cell phones are yet capable of receiving 
alerts, according to CTIA. Some state and local alerting authorities 
we contacted raised concerns about the degree of granularity for geo-
targeting these alerts, which we discuss later in this report. 

* Internet services. As of September 2012, Internet web services 
(e.g., Google Public Alerts) and software application developers can 
retrieve and redistribute IPAWS alerts to the public through their own 
services, such as websites, mobile phone applications, email, and text 
messaging. To do so, an alert redistribution service must complete a 
memorandum of agreement with FEMA, which then grants them access to 
the IPAWS Public Alerts Feed from the alert aggregator. 

* State and local alerting systems. According to FEMA, existing state 
or locally owned and operated public-alerting systems--such as sirens 
and emergency telephone notification systems--may also be configured 
to receive alerts from IPAWS. 

FEMA views the new capabilities for public-alerting authorities to 
distribute CAP-formatted messages through the federal alert aggregator 
as an added capability, not a replacement, to the traditional national-
level alert (i.e., EAS daisy chain relay distribution system). As a 
result, FEMA officials said they anticipate maintaining both systems 
into the foreseeable future as parallel alerting systems, as shown in 
figure 2. FEMA officials also told us that discussions with the White 
House are ongoing to determine use of IPAWS during a presidential 
alert; however, at the time of our report, FEMA officials said a 
national-level alert would not be disseminated through the federal 
alert aggregator.[Footnote 29] 

Figure 2: National-Level EAS and Current IPAWS Architecture: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

National-level Emergency Alert System (EAS) (using live audio message 
via EAS phone lines and satellite): 
President of the United States to: 
FEMA operations center to: 
* PEP stations; 
* NPR; 
* Satellite television and radio operators, to: 
All radio and television. 

IPAWS architecture: 

Alerting authorities (using IPAWS compliant CAP message via internet): 
Local; 
State; 
Territorial; 
Tribal; 
Federal. 

IPAWS (alert aggregator): 

Alert disseminators (public alert systems): 
* Emergency Alert System (EAS); 
American people (how alert is disseminated): All radio and television; 
* Commercial Mobile Alert Service (CMAS); 
American people (how alert is disseminated): Wireless emergency
alerts capable cellphones; 
* NOAA HazCollect; 
American people (how alert is disseminated): NOAA Weather Radio; 
* Internet services; 
American people (how alert is disseminated): Web applications, 
websites, social media, etc. 
* State and local alert systems: 
American people (how alert is disseminated): Sirens, emergency telephone
notification systems, etc. 

Source: FEMA and GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to creating the alert aggregator, FEMA has taken other 
actions to implement the IPAWS program and address directives in 
Executive Order No. 13407. Specific examples include: 

* Expanded and modernized PEP stations. To increase direct coverage of 
a presidential alert and address executive order directives to augment 
infrastructure for the public alert and warning system, FEMA has 
expanded the number of PEP stations from 34 in 2009 (directly covering 
about 67 percent of the American population) to 65 in 2012 (directly 
covering about 85 percent of the American population), according to 
FEMA officials. FEMA plans to further expand and modernize this 
network, with the goal of having a total of 77 PEP stations 
operational by fall 2013, providing direct coverage to over 90 percent 
of the American population.[Footnote 30] FEMA officials said they have 
also added satellite connectivity in 50 PEP stations, with the goal of 
a fully operational, dedicated PEP satellite network to all 77 
stations by fall 2013. According to FEMA officials, once operational, 
this network will be the primary connection between FEMA and the PEP 
stations in the event of a presidential alert; the traditional 
telephone-based distribution network will provide a redundant backup 
connection. 

* Adopted CAP standard. To address directives in the executive order 
that DHS develop alert standards and protocols, FEMA formally adopted 
CAP in September 2010. CAP can be used as a single input to activate 
multiple warning systems, and is capable of geographic targeting and 
multilingual messaging. According to a survey FEMA conducted of more 
than 3,300 public-alerting authorities in the United States from 
January 2010 through December 2011, 64 percent of the sites responding 
used CAP and had IPAWS-compatible Products in place at the time of the 
survey.[Footnote 31] Most public-alerting authorities we contacted are 
moving toward adoption of CAP; however, some are still in the process 
of implementing new software to interface with IPAWS or are waiting 
for vendors to provide upgrades to their existing systems. In 
addition, representatives from the broadcast industry told us, based 
on experience, that the vast majority of broadcasters are able to 
receive CAP-formatted alerts, as required by FCC rules. 

* Developed IPAWS training and webinars. Executive Order No. 13407 
directs DHS to conduct training for the public alert and warning 
system. To address this directive, FEMA developed an independent 
training course for alerting authorities on IPAWS capabilities, which 
has been available online since December 2011. The goal of the course 
is to provide public-alerting authorities with increased awareness of 
the benefits of using IPAWS for public warnings; skills to draft more 
appropriate, effective, and accessible warning messages; and best 
practices in the effective use of CAP to reach all members of their 
communities. In addition, the IPAWS program office conducts monthly 
webinars for developers and alerting practitioners. 

* Conducted outreach to partners. Since 2009, the IPAWS program office 
has made efforts to improve communication and outreach to stakeholders 
at all levels, according to FEMA officials. Executive Order No. 13407 
directs FEMA to consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the private 
sector, as well as provide public education on IPAWS. Some government 
and private stakeholders told us that FEMA's communication and 
coordination efforts have improved significantly since 2009, although 
improvements could still be made, especially in educating the public, 
as discussed below. According to FEMA officials, the IPAWS program 
office works to engage federal entities; state, local, tribal, and 
territorial alerting authorities; private sector industry; non-profit 
and advocacy groups; and the American people through working groups 
and roundtables, conferences, demonstrations, trainings and webinars, 
Congressional briefings, and the IPAWS Web site, among other 
mechanisms. 

For a complete list of actions FEMA has taken to address Executive 
Order No. 13407, see appendix II. 

Barriers Remain to Fully Implementing and Using IPAWS: 

Although FEMA has taken important steps to advance an integrated 
alerting system, barriers exist that may impede IPAWS implementation 
at the state and local level. Specifically, public-alerting 
authorities we contacted, as well as representatives from national 
trade industry groups, identified five main barriers at the state and 
local level. These barriers include (1) insufficient guidance on how 
states should fully implement IPAWS; (2) inability of state and local 
alerting authorities to test all IPAWS components; (3) CMAS geo-
targeting and character limitations; (4) inadequate public outreach on 
IPAWS capabilities; and (5) limited resources at the federal, state, 
and local level to fully implement IPAWS. 

* Insufficient guidance to fully implement IPAWS. While most state and 
local alerting authorities we contacted, including representatives 
from the National Emergency Management Association,[Footnote 32] said 
they are moving toward implementing IPAWS, some are reluctant to fully 
implement the system, citing a need for more information and 
additional guidance from FEMA.[Footnote 33] Specifically, while 
current IPAWS training exists to instruct public-alerting authorities 
on, among other things, how to draft an appropriate IPAWS alert, state 
and local alerting authorities we contacted said additional guidance 
is needed on integrating and operating IPAWS with existing state and 
local public-alerting systems in their states. For example, officials 
in one state said that while they are prepared to use IPAWS, they have 
not yet integrated their state and local alerting systems with IPAWS, 
citing a need for additional guidance from FEMA and communication 
within the state to determine what systems and policies should be put 
in place to integrate IPAWS with public-alerting systems in the 
state's 128 counties and cities. Although Executive Order No. 13407 
directs DHS to ensure interoperability and the delivery of coordinated 
public messages through multiple communication pathways, we found that 
none of our selected states had yet integrated their alerting systems 
with IPAWS for state or local level alerting, although according to 
FEMA, the alerting authorities had gone through the necessary steps to 
become authenticated IPAWS originators. Since IPAWS is still in the 
early stages of its deployment, officials said that there are no 
examples of how to effectively implement IPAWS at the state and local 
level. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA officials noted 
that they are involved in efforts to conduct case studies with public-
alerting authorities in Nebraska and Nevada to provide examples of 
effectively implementing IPAWS at the state level. FEMA officials said 
they are working with state and local alerting authorities as well as 
system developers and vendors, to address some notable challenges 
related to implementing IPAWS, including how states can manage IPAWS 
capabilities within their respective states.Nevertheless, in the 
absence of additional FEMA guidance, some states are reluctant to 
fully implement IPAWS, a reluctance that decreases the capability for 
an integrated, interoperable, and nationwide alerting system. 

* Inability of state and local alerting authorities to test all IPAWS 
components. Some officials from state and local alerting authorities 
we contacted were also reluctant to use IPAWS because procedures for 
them to test all IPAWS components do not exist. As a result, they 
cannot assess the system's reliability or effectiveness. For example, 
while there are procedures for public-alerting authorities to test EAS 
alerts via IPAWS, currently, the only way state and local alerting 
authorities could potentially test CMAS is to send a live alert, which 
is not permissible under FCC rules. Although FCC's CMAS rules allow 
FEMA to test the system, according to FCC officials, these testing 
procedures do not extend to state and local alerting authorities that 
wish to use CMAS. As a result, FEMA officials told us they are working 
with FCC and other stakeholders to elevate the importance of 
clarifying rules for public-alerting partners, especially as it 
relates to how state and local alerting authorities can test mobile 
alerts using IPAWS. Although FCC officials told us in January 2013 
that it was premature to review the CMAS rules, FCC subsequently said 
it plans to have one of its federal advisory committees, the 
Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council, 
review the CMAS rules, including those related to testing procedures. 
[Footnote 34] However, until FEMA and FCC develop procedures for state 
and local alerting authorities to test all IPAWS components, the state 
and local authorities have no assurances that emergency alerts will be 
effectively distributed and therefore may be unlikely to use the 
untested IPAWS components. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
FCC noted that while state and local alerting authorities have 
expressed a desire to test CMAS capabilities, wireless industry 
stakeholders have consistently raised concerns about their doing so. 

* CMAS geo-targeting and character limitations.[Footnote 35] Adopted 
in April 2008, FCC rules dictate the technical standards and protocols 
governing CMAS and require alerts to be (1) sent to areas no larger 
than the county level and (2) limited to 90 characters.[Footnote 36] 
Several state and local alerting authorities we spoke with raised 
concerns about the possibility of over alerting the public with mobile 
alerts since the alerts may not geo-target the specific area affected. 
The 90-character message limitations of these alerts were also raised 
as a challenge by FEMA and other alerting authorities to sending out 
clear and accurate alerts, as alerts may not contain enough 
information to be useful. For example, according to officials in one 
state, the National Weather Service issued a flash flood warning via 
CMAS that was distributed throughout a large county, which is roughly 
the size of the state of Connecticut, when only one small area of the 
county was affected. According to state officials, some citizens were 
confused when they received this alert as they were not located in the 
affected area, and there was very little information contained in the 
90-character alert to clarify the specific area affected. In addition, 
an evacuation notice accompanied the flash flood warning, and the 
local emergency management authority was unprepared when citizens 
called them for additional information.[Footnote 37] Officials stated 
that some citizens might ignore or opt out of future mobile alerts if 
they received previous alerts that were not applicable to them. The 
Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee,[Footnote 38] which 
recommended technical standards and protocols for CMAS in 
2007,[Footnote 39] recommended reviewing and updating its 
recommendations periodically based on advances in technology and 
experiences in deployment, especially related to geo-
targeting.[Footnote 40] As previously mentioned, FCC plans to have a 
federal advisory committee review the CMAS rules, including those 
related to geo-targeting and character limits. Technological 
advancements and experiences in using the system since 2008 may 
warrant a review on a more specific level of geo-targeting and 
expanded character limits for mobile alerts than was previously 
possible. Such changes to CMAS could make state and local authorities 
more likely to use these alerts and the public less likely to opt out 
of the service. 

* Insufficient public outreach. According to federal, state, and local 
officials we contacted, the public is generally unaware of IPAWS 
capabilities, especially alerts sent to mobile phones. Although FEMA 
officials told us that a training course to educate the public is 
under development, FEMA has conducted limited outreach to date to 
inform the general public about IPAWS alerts and capabilities beyond 
information on the FEMA website. Executive Order No. 13407 directs DHS 
to provide public education on using, accessing, and responding to the 
public alert and warning system. Because of limited public outreach, 
some state and local alerting authorities expressed concern that the 
public may ignore or opt out of receiving IPAWS alerts, even though 
these alerts may provide important, life-saving information. While 
FEMA has made efforts to improve outreach efforts with IPAWS 
stakeholders since 2009, FEMA officials said they have limited 
resources and experience in educating the general public on IPAWS. In 
previous work, we identified key practices for planning a consumer 
education campaign, including (1) defining goals and objectives; (2) 
analyzing the situation; (3) identifying stakeholders; (4) identifying 
resources; (5) researching target audiences; (6) developing 
consistent, clear messages; (7) identifying credible messenger(s); (8) 
designing media mix; and (9) establishing metrics to measure success. 
[Footnote 41] Public outreach that includes these key practices could 
help ensure that the public is better informed about IPAWS 
capabilities. 

* Limited resources to implement IPAWS. While there is no charge to 
send messages through IPAWS, there are underlying costs to purchasing 
the software and equipment needed to integrate with IPAWS, costs that 
state and local public alerting authorities said can act as a barrier 
to implementation in difficult financial times.[Footnote 42] According 
to the FEMA survey of public alerting authorities, decreased revenues 
and a lack of grant funding at all levels of government were reported 
as primary reasons for authorities' inability to purchase and sustain 
alerting systems.[Footnote 43] In addition, the FEMA survey found that 
while most state-level alerting authorities reported having full-time 
staff, many local authorities might only have part-time or volunteer 
staff and very limited budgets. 

In addition to these barriers, there are some long-standing weaknesses 
that continue to limit the effectiveness of the national-level EAS 
since we last reported on this topic in 2009, including a lack of 
redundancy in how national-level EAS messages are disseminated to the 
public.[Footnote 44] FEMA is making progress in increasing redundancy 
between the FEMA operations center and designated PEP stations through 
its deployment of a PEP satellite network. However, FEMA continues to 
rely solely on radio and television broadcast for a national-level EAS 
alert because the national-level EAS is not currently integrated with 
IPAWS capabilities. As a result, FEMA lacks alternative means of 
reaching EAS participants should a point in the daisy chain 
distribution system fail. Moreover, large portions of the population 
would likely not be reached by a national-level alert--specifically 
all those who are not watching television or listening to the radio at 
the time of the alert. Executive Order No. 13407 directs DHS to ensure 
presidential alerting capabilities under all conditions and enable 
delivery of coordinated messages to the American people through as 
many communication pathways as practicable. In addition, while 
Executive Order No. 13407 specifies that the public-alerting system 
should provide warnings to non-English speakers and individuals with 
disabilities, it remains difficult for a national-level alert to reach 
these distinct segments of the population. While the President has 
never initiated a national-level alert, according to FEMA, such an 
alert would be provided in English and only through radio and 
television broadcasts, which may not be accessible to individuals with 
disabilities.[Footnote 45] For example, according to the National 
Council on Disability, most disaster warnings broadcast via radio and 
television may not be accessible to people with hearing or vision 
disabilities.[Footnote 46] IPAWS, which can transmit CAP-formatted 
messages to specialized alerting devices for individuals with 
disabilities and in non-English languages, could help address some of 
these limitations if it were integrated with the national-level EAS. 

Most Reporting EAS Participants Received and Retransmitted the Test 
Alert, but Federal Efforts to Address Identified Weaknesses Are 
Limited: 

Results of the Nationwide EAS Test: 

Our analysis of FCC data found that approximately 82 percent of 
reporting broadcasters (radio and television) and cable operators 
received the November 2011 nationwide test alert.[Footnote 47] 
Although FEMA has been working to implement IPAWS, the November 2011 
nationwide EAS test used the traditional national-level alert system 
(i.e., EAS daisy-chain relay distribution system) and did not include 
new IPAWS capabilities.[Footnote 48] Broadcasters' and cable 
operators' reception of the test alert varied widely by state. As 
shown in figure 3, the reception of the alert ranged from 
approximately 6 percent (in Oregon) to 100 percent (in Delaware) among 
the states. FCC, FEMA, broadcasters, and state alerting authorities in 
Oregon attributed the low reception rate to the absence of a PEP 
station in the state at the time of the test.[Footnote 49] Without a 
PEP station, broadcasters and cable operators in Oregon were directed 
to monitor a Portland-based public radio station, which reported 
receiving poor audio quality of the alert from its designated 
monitoring source--the National Public Radio satellite network. 

Figure 3: Percentage of Broadcasters and Cable Operators by State That 
Received the Nationwide EAS Test Alert: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Alabama: 30%; 
Arizona: 91%; 
Arkansas: 92%; 
California: 94%; 
Colorado: 85%; 
Connecticut: 87%; 
Delaware: 200%; 
District of Columbia: 97%; 
Florida: 87%; 
Georgia: 87%; 
Hawaii: 94%; 
Idaho: 51%; 
Illinois: 85%; 
Indiana: 89%; 
Iowa: 90%; 
Kansas: 83%; 
Kentucky: 90%; 
Louisiana: 88%; 
Maine: 93%; 
Maryland: 90%; 
Massachusetts: 87%; 
Michigan: 86%; 
Minnesota: 87%; 
Mississippi: 86%; 
Missouri: 74%; 
Montana: 85%; 
Nebraska: 87%; 
Nevada: 93%; 
New Hampshire: 95%; 
New Jersey: 95%; 
New Mexico: 12%; 
New York: 92%; 
North Carolina: 69%; 
North Dakota: 57%; 
Ohio: 89%; 
Oklahoma: 57%; 
Oregon: 6%; 
Pennsylvania: 82%; 
Rhode Island: 97%; 
South Carolina: 94%; 
South Dakota: 90%; 
Tennessee: 87%; 
Texas: 90%; 
Utah: 96%; 
Vermont: 92%; 
Virginia: 91%; 
Washington: 87%; 
West Virginia: 80%; 
Wisconsin: 93%; 
Wyoming: 81%. 

Source: GAO analysis of FCC data. 

Note: This figure represents broadcasters' and cable operators' 
reception rates by state and does not include reception rates from 
U.S. territories. Additionally, FCC excused Alaska from the nationwide 
EAS test because of severe weather at the time of the test. 

[End of figure] 

Once EAS participants received the national-level test alert, they 
were required to retransmit the audio signal to other EAS 
participants, as designated in state EAS plans, for the daisy chain 
distribution system to work. Our analysis of FCC data found that 61 
percent of reporting broadcasters and cable operators were able to 
retransmit the alert to stations that were designated to monitor the 
retransmitting station. The retransmission rate of the test alert by 
broadcasters and cable operators also varied widely among the states 
ranging from approximately 4 percent (in Oregon) to 88 percent (in New 
Jersey). FCC does not know the potential percentage of the American 
people who did not receive the alert because, officials noted, the 
nationwide EAS test was designed to assess EAS performance rather than 
to determine the percentage of public receipt of the test. Therefore, 
it is unknown what percentage of the American people failed to receive 
the test. 

Key reasons for EAS participants' failure to receive and retransmit 
the national-level test alert included (1) PEP station reception 
failure, (2) poor audio quality, (3) shortened test length, (4) 
outdated monitoring assignments, and (5) equipment failure. 

* PEP station reception failure. FEMA reported that 3 of the 63 PEP 
stations were unable to receive and retransmit the alert due to 
technical reasons. These PEP stations were located in New Mexico, 
Alabama, and American Samoa. Failures at those stations significantly 
contributed to low national-level alert reception rates in those 
states and that territory. In particular, our analysis of FCC data 
found that nearly 90 percent of broadcasters in New Mexico, almost 70 
percent of broadcasters in Alabama, and 100 percent of broadcasters in 
American Samoa failed to receive the national-level alert. According 
to FEMA, connectivity issues with the specialized EAS equipment used 
at the PEP stations were the reasons for the failure. As previously 
mentioned, FEMA plans to modernize PEP stations with a dedicated 
satellite network, and officials expect this dedicated network to 
provide more reliable connection to the PEP stations when fully 
operational by fall 2013. 

* Poor audio quality. FCC also reported that poor audio quality of the 
national-level alert signal resulted in problems ranging from some 
broadcasters' receiving a garbled and degraded audio message to 
others' receiving a duplicate alert tone that caused equipment to 
malfunction. These audio problems resulted in some stations' being 
unable to retransmit the test alert. According to FEMA, the reported 
poor audio quality was due, in part, to a feedback loop that occurred 
when equipment at a single PEP station rebroadcasted the original 
message back to FEMA. This audio message was then transmitted by FEMA 
over the original audio message, degrading the audio. Therefore, fewer 
stations were able to receive, and thus retransmit, the alert to their 
designated station(s). EAS participants we met with consistently 
stated that the poor audio quality during the nationwide EAS test was 
a significant problem. For example, state and local alerting 
authorities, broadcaster associations, and individual broadcast 
stations we contacted stated that connectivity and audio problems 
occurred during the nationwide test. Officials from one state 
broadcasters association said that broadcasters in their state only 
received 10 seconds of the national-level alert signal with only five 
or six words of the message and then 20 seconds of dead air for the 
remainder of the test. They also stated that problems with the audio 
resulted in the alerts not being retransmitted to other stations in 
their state. 

* Shortened test length. The nationwide EAS test was originally 
scheduled to last 3 minutes, but was shortened to 30 seconds. 
According to an industry trade association, the announcement to change 
the test length came about 2 weeks prior to the test. Because of the 
shortened test length, some broadcasters and cable operators were 
unable to receive or retransmit the national-level alert. According to 
FEMA, the test was shortened to mitigate concerns from the cable 
industry that the public who could not hear the audio portion of the 
test would be unable to tell if the alert was a test or a real alert 
solely from the television screen display. More specifically, FCC 
instructed broadcasters to use an on-screen slide just before the test 
to announce that the following message would be a test and not an 
actual alert. However, according to officials from an industry trade 
association, some EAS participants, namely some cable operators, were 
unable to provide this background screen during the nationwide test. 
In these cases, since FCC chose to use a live alert code to resemble 
an actual nationwide test, there was no visual cue that a test was 
taking place. There was concern that this could adversely affect some 
segments of the public, especially individuals who were unable to hear 
the audio portion indicating a test was taking place. According to 
representatives from industry trade associations, use of a test code 
for future nationwide EAS tests could help ensure that all segments of 
the population understand that a nationwide test, rather than an 
actual national emergency, is taking place. 

* Outdated monitoring assignments. FCC noted that some state EAS plans 
that designate the monitoring assignments are outdated and its review 
of the EAS test results revealed some confusion among some EAS 
participants of monitoring assignments. We found that as of February 
2013, out of 33 state and District of Columbia EAS plans available on 
FCC's website, 16 state plans were dated 2009 or earlier, with 3 of 
these plans dated in the 1990s. Additionally, 18 state plans were not 
available on FCC's website with the link to one website leading to 
information completely unrelated to the state.[Footnote 50] FEMA 
reported that if monitoring assignments in the state EAS plans are not 
followed or the state EAS plans are not up-to-date, EAS participants 
may not receive and relay the messages. According to FEMA, several EAS 
participants reported not being able to receive the national-level 
alert from their assigned sources, and as a result, they were unable 
to relay the alert. 

* Equipment failures. Because of specific equipment failures, some 
broadcasters could not receive or retransmit the national-level alert. 
FCC reported that approximately 5 percent of EAS participants 
responding to its data collection effort reported that hardware, 
equipment, or configuration problems precluded them from receiving the 
national-level alert. 

Limited Federal Efforts to Address Identified Issues: 

At the time of our review, FCC and FEMA had taken limited steps to 
address problems identified in the nationwide EAS test. According to 
FEMA officials, the poor audio quality that was experienced during the 
test is being addressed, in part, with the deployment of a dedicated 
PEP satellite network, but the remaining issues have yet to be 
resolved. FEMA officials told us that it will take a combination of 
FCC rulemaking, developing best practices, and correcting technical 
issues to address the problems that were identified during the 
nationwide test, but implementing some of these actions could likely 
take years. According to FCC officials, a working group, in 
coordination with FEMA, has been examining these issues, but neither 
agency could identify progress made by the group more than a year 
after the test. In commenting on a draft of this report, FCC told us 
it issued its final report on the results of the nationwide EAS test 
on April 12, 2013.[Footnote 51] According to FCC officials, one of the 
reasons for the delay in issuing a final report on the test result was 
their effort to collect more data from EAS participants. FCC continued 
to accept paper reports on the test results from EAS participants for 
about a year after the test was conducted, despite the December 27, 
2011 deadline for electronically submitting the test results. EAS 
participants and state and local alerting authorities we contacted 
said that they were not aware of FCC taking any actions to address 
identified issues, and as a result, their ability to make improvements 
and prepare for future tests is limited. Concerning future tests, FCC 
rules require a nationwide EAS test to be conducted periodically, 
[Footnote 52] but it is uncertain when the next test will occur. FEMA 
officials told us that they are continuing to work with FCC in 
determining corrective actions from the test results and will not hold 
another test until corrective actions are complete. As we have 
previously reported, regular nationwide EAS testing is essential to 
ensure that the system will work as intended during an emergency. 
[Footnote 53] 

FCC recognizes that outdated state EAS plans contributed to some of 
the reception and retransmission problems during the EAS test, and is 
being more proactive in requesting states to submit updated plans. FCC 
officials stated that updating state EAS plans would be valuable to 
ensure that the monitoring assignments for the broadcast stations 
remain accurate when a national-level alert is activated. However, as 
of October 2012, FCC has received 7 of 50 updated state EAS plans. 
[Footnote 54] Officials stated that they would continue to ask state 
emergency communications committees to submit updated EAS plans to 
review, but that FCC has no authority to require the filing of EAS 
plans. As a result, FCC is unable to fully verify that states are 
keeping EAS monitoring assignments up to date. In addition, some EAS 
participants we spoke with are waiting for more guidance from FCC, 
including anticipated changes in rules governing EAS. For example, FCC 
officials told us that they plan to issue a notice of proposed 
rulemaking sometime in 2013 seeking comment on issues identified from 
the nationwide EAS test. 

EAS participants and state and local alerting authorities we spoke 
with stated that there are several actions that FCC, in conjunction 
with FEMA, could take that would assist EAS participants in preparing, 
conducting, and reporting on future nationwide EAS test alerts. These 
actions include (1) issuing an after-action plan to help identify and 
address problems that occurred during the test, (2) conducting regular 
and frequent testing of EAS to ensure the system works as intended, 
and (3) providing guidance to update state EAS plans to incorporate 
IPAWS (e.g., guidance could be EAS plan templates, best practices, 
good examples). 

Conclusions: 

FEMA has made progress since 2009 in developing a more comprehensive, 
integrated nationwide public-alerting system. FEMA has improved the 
capabilities of IPAWS by bringing the IPAWS alert aggregator online 
and integrating it with multiple alerting systems, including 
HazCollect and CMAS. However, for IPAWS to become fully operational, 
several areas of concern need to be addressed. In particular, 
additional guidance for state and local alerting authorities on 
specific steps to integrate and test their public-alerting systems 
with IPAWS components would help to provide assurance on the 
interoperability and effectiveness of IPAWS and facilitate its 
implementation. Furthermore, according to public-alerting authorities 
we contacted, without additional guidance on IPAWS implementation and 
consideration of CMAS rules, state and local alerting authorities we 
contacted were reluctant to fully integrate their systems with IPAWS 
and rely on IPAWS as a comprehensive public-alerting system. In 
addition, a concerted effort to educate state and local governments, 
the private sector, and the American people on the functions of the 
public-alerting system is necessary to inform them on how to access, 
use, and respond to emergency alert messages. Using key practices for 
conducting a public education campaign--such as defining goals and 
objectives, identifying stakeholders and resources, and developing 
clear and consistent messages--could enable FEMA, which has limited 
experience educating the general public on IPAWS, to more effectively 
and efficiently inform the American people on how to access and 
respond to potentially life-saving emergency alerts. 

FEMA has also expanded the number of PEP stations and enhanced 
satellite connectivity to improve direct coverage and dependability of 
the national-level EAS. However, as long as the national-level EAS 
remains independent from IPAWS, portions of the population, including 
individuals with disabilities and non-English speakers, will be less 
likely to receive or fully understand presidential alerts disseminated 
only through the EAS daisy chain. If integrated, CMAS, in particular, 
is capable of providing alerts in different formats, including 
emitting unique ring tone and vibration cadences for those who have 
hearing or visual impairments, which would increase the likelihood 
that individuals with disabilities could be informed that a national-
level alert is being issued. Furthermore, integrating EAS into IPAWS 
would provide system redundancy for national-level alerts. 

FEMA and FCC held the first-ever test of the national-level EAS in 
November 2011, an important step. However, the results of the 
nationwide EAS test--which a number of EAS participants could not 
effectively receive or retransmit--show that the reliability of the 
traditional EAS system remains questionable. At the time of our 
review, we found that FEMA and FCC had taken limited steps to address 
problems identified by EAS participants. In addition, some state EAS 
plans and monitoring assignments are outdated, in part, because state 
emergency communications committees are waiting for more guidance from 
FCC, including changes in rules governing EAS. Although states are not 
required to update and submit state EAS plans, FCC could help 
facilitate the process by providing additional guidance. Finally, 
while FCC rules call for periodic nationwide EAS testing, FCC and FEMA 
currently have not scheduled another nationwide test. Without ongoing, 
regular nationwide testing of the relay distribution system, there is 
no assurance the EAS would work should the President need to activate 
it to communicate with the American people. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that IPAWS is fully functional and capable of distributing 
alerts through multiple pathways as intended, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to 
take the following four actions: 

* In conjunction with FCC, establish guidance (e.g., procedures, best 
practices) that will assist participating state and local alerting 
authorities to fully implement and test IPAWS components and ensure 
integration and interoperability. 

* In conjunction with FCC and NOAA, conduct coordinated outreach to 
educate the American public on IPAWS capabilities, especially CMAS. 

* Develop a plan to disseminate a national-level alert via IPAWS to 
increase redundancy and communicate presidential alerts through 
multiple pathways. 

* In conjunction with FCC, develop and implement a strategy for 
regularly testing the national-level EAS, including examining the need: 

* for a national test code, developing milestones and time frames, 
improving data collection efforts, and reporting on after-action plans. 

To ensure that CMAS is effectively used and that the EAS relay 
distribution network is capable of reliably communicating national-
level alerts, we recommend that the Chairman of FCC, in conjunction 
with FEMA, take the following two actions: 

* Review and update rules governing CMAS, including those related to 
geo-targeting, character limitations, and testing procedures. 

* Provide states with additional guidance (e.g., templates of EAS 
plan) to facilitate completion of updated state EAS plans that include 
IPAWS-compatible equipment. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FCC, and the Department of 
Commerce for their review and comment. In response, DHS concurred with 
all of the report's recommendations to improve IPAWS capabilities. In 
its written comments, DHS provided examples of actions FEMA will 
undertake to address the recommendations. For example, DHS noted that 
FEMA intends to create toolkits for state and local alerting 
authorities that will include alerting and governance best practices, 
technology requirements, and operation and usage information on IPAWS. 
Regarding efforts to improve nationwide EAS testing, DHS indicated 
that FEMA plans to work with federal partners, including FCC, to 
create a national test code, develop milestones and timeframes for 
future testing, improve data collection efforts, and report on after-
action plans. See appendix III for written comments from DHS. 

In commenting on the draft report, FCC did not state whether it agreed 
or disagreed with the report's recommendations. FCC noted that it 
issued a final report on the results of the nationwide EAS test on 
April 12, 2013, and we believe the report includes potential actions 
that could address our recommendations in the future. For example, the 
April 2013 report includes recommendations for FCC to commence a 
rulemaking proceeding on state EAS plans and to encourage the groups 
that typically develop state EAS plans to ensure that the plans 
contain accurate EAS monitoring assignments. Other recommendations in 
FCC's April 2013 report include commencing a rulemaking proceeding to 
examine equipment-performance issues during activation of a test, and 
developing a new Nationwide EAS Test Reporting System database to 
improve filing electronic data from EAS participants. FCC stated that 
it will conduct a review of CMAS rules, as we recommended in this 
report, and also noted that it will work with FEMA to develop a 
strategy for regular testing of EAS. See appendix IV for written 
comments from FCC. 

The Department of Commerce provided technical comments from its 
component agency NOAA, and we incorporated them as appropriated. In 
the comments, NOAA stated that it believes our report does an accurate 
job in assessing the nationwide EAS test results and the current state 
of IPAWS. With respect to our recommendation on conducting outreach, 
NOAA believes the outreach should be conducted in conjunction with FCC 
and NOAA, and we made the suggested revision. 

In addition to written comments, DHS and FCC provided technical 
comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed upon with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 
30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of 
this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, and the Chairman of FCC. In addition, the report is 
available at no charge on our website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Mark Goldstein: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report provides information on federal efforts to integrate 
various public-alerting systems and modernize the Emergency Alert 
System (EAS). Specifically, the report examines (1) how the 
capabilities of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) 
have changed since 2009 and what barriers, if any, are affecting its 
implementation and (2) the results of the nationwide EAS test and 
federal efforts under way to address identified weaknesses. 

To obtain information on both objectives of this report, we 
interviewed officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Department of 
Homeland Security, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA). We spoke with representatives from national trade industry 
groups, including the National Emergency Management Association, 
National Association of Broadcasters, National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association, CTIA-The Wireless Association, and 
National Alliance of State Broadcasters Associations, to obtain 
stakeholders' perspective on the results of the first nationwide EAS 
test and federal efforts to implement IPAWS. We also spoke with 
representatives from the satellite industry (DIRECTV), an EAS 
equipment manufacturer (Monroe Electronics), and the National Council 
on Disability to gather their views on IPAWS implementation and the 
nationwide EAS test. We conducted interviews with selected state and 
local alerting authorities, state emergency-communication-committee 
chairs, state broadcasting associations, and selected local 
broadcasters. We nonstatistically selected a sample of six locations--
California, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia--to obtain information from state and local officials on any 
barriers to implementing IPAWS and potential remedies for addressing 
any identified barriers, as well as to determine any problems 
associated with the nationwide EAS test. We selected these states and 
locality because some had (1) other public-alerting systems, in 
addition to the EAS; (2) alerting systems that are capable of 
providing alerts for individuals with disabilities and limited 
English; and (3) experienced a breakdown of test alert dissemination 
during the nationwide EAS test. We also selected these states and 
localities because some had been authenticated to be an IPAWS-alerting 
authority and they were geographically diverse. To obtain a regional 
perspective on implementing IPAWS and testing the EAS, we also spoke 
with officials from FEMA regional offices. Because we conducted 
targeted interviews, our results are not generalizable to all states 
and localities. Table 1 provides more detailed information on the 
state and localities we selected and the entities we interviewed. 

Table 2: State and Local Interviews: 

State/Locality: California; 
Public alerting authorities: 
* California Emergency Management Agency; 
* Office of Emergency Services, Humboldt County Sheriff's Office; 
* County of San Diego Office of Emergency Services; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: California 
Broadcasters Association; 
FEMA regional office: Region IX. 

State/Locality: District of Columbia; 
Public alerting authorities: District of Columbia Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management Agency; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: WTOP-FM; 
FEMA regional office: Region III. 

State/Locality: Kentucky; 
Public alerting authorities: 
* Kentucky Division of Emergency Management; 
* Daviess County Emergency Management Office; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: Kentucky 
Broadcasters Association; 
FEMA regional office: Region IV. 

State/Locality: Oklahoma; 
Public alerting authorities: 
* Oklahoma Department of Emergency Management; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: 
* Oklahoma Association of Broadcasters; 
* KTUL-FM; 
* Clear Channel Radio in Oklahoma City; 
FEMA regional office: Region VI. 

State/Locality: Oregon; 
Public alerting authorities: 
* Oregon Office of Emergency Management; 
* Portland Bureau of Emergency Management; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: Oregon 
Association of Broadcasters; 
FEMA regional office: Region X. 

State/Locality: Wisconsin; 
Public alerting authorities: 
Wisconsin Emergency Management; 
State association of broadcasters and local broadcasters: 
* Wisconsin Broadcasters Association; 
* WISC-TV; 
* Wisconsin Educational Communications Board; 
FEMA regional office: Region V[A]. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] We were unable to interview FEMA officials in Region V, despite 
our attempt to contact them. 

[End of table] 

To obtain information on how the capabilities of IPAWS have changed 
since 2009 and what barriers, if any, affect its implementation, we 
also reviewed and analyzed agency documents and literature since 2009. 
We reviewed documents on IPAWS program planning, including the 2010 
IPAWS program management plan, and assessed actions that have been 
taken to determine if systems and standards are operational. We also 
attended a number of IPAWS webinars to obtain training and information 
that are provided to public-alerting authorities. We reviewed FEMA's 
IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report, which surveyed 3,314 
state, territorial, tribal, and local emergency management agencies to 
analyze gaps between existing public-alerting capabilities and IPAWS 
and includes recommendations for IPAWS integration. The survey was 
conducted mostly by telephone with structured questionnaires over a 2-
year period from January 2010 through December 2011 and specific 
procedures were followed to identify emergency management personnel 
for the sites at each level. We assessed the survey's methodology and 
determined that the estimates from it that we cite are sufficiently 
valid for use in our report. Specifically, we assessed the survey 
methodology against the Office of Management and Budget's Standards 
and Guidelines for Statistical Surveys. We did not otherwise verify, 
however, the findings and conclusions from the report. 

To obtain information on the results of the nationwide EAS test and 
federal efforts to address any identified weaknesses, we reviewed and 
analyzed agency data and documents. Specifically, we examined FCC's 
and FEMA's preliminary reports on the nationwide EAS test results; FCC 
orders and rules on EAS; FCC's website on the nationwide EAS test; 
FEMA's EAS Best Practices Guide; and briefing documents from FEMA and 
NOAA. We analyzed FCC's data from EAS participants to determine the 
percentage of radio and television broadcasters and cable operators 
that received and retransmitted the national-level alert on a 
statewide basis. We analyzed FCC's data for 49 states; we did not 
include Alaska since it was excused from the nationwide test because 
of severe weather conditions. To determine the reliability of the data 
used in this report, we reviewed relevant documentation and 
interviewed agency officials about their processes for reviewing the 
data and ensuring their accuracy. We also ensured that FCC data were 
sufficiently reliable for our review. We reviewed and analyzed state 
EAS plans that were posted on FCC's website to determine if the 
state's EAS plans were current. We interviewed FCC officials to 
confirm that the information on FCC's website is current. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 through April 2013, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: FEMA's Progress Addressing Responsibilities of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security under Executive Order No. 13407: 

Responsibilities: Inventory and assess existing alert infrastructure; 
Status/progress/timeline: Issued the IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation 
Assessment Report in January 2012. This report surveyed and assessed 
public-alerting authorities in the United States between 2009 and 2011. 

Responsibilities: Develop alert standards and; 
Protocols; 
Status/progress/timeline: Formally adopted the Commercial Mobile 
Alerting System (CMAS) Specification in December 2009. Formally 
adopted the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) standard for IPAWS in 
September 2010. 

Responsibilities: Geo-targeted, risk-based alerts[A]; 
Status/progress/timeline: Implemented CMAS. Wireless carriers began 
issuing geo-targeted CMAS alerts in April 2012; NOAA started sending 
geo-targeted CMAS messages in June 2012. 

Responsibilities: Alerts for non-English speakers and the disabled; 
Status/progress/timeline: Hosted biannual roundtables for industry 
experts, federal agencies, and advocacy organizations representing 
Americans with access and functional needs to discuss emergency 
alerting. Shared lessons learned and best practices for communicating 
to Americans with access and functional needs through the EAS to FCC. 
For example, encouraged FCC to consider EAS rule changes or 
clarifications for broadcasters with regard to: (1) display size, 
color, background contrast, and speed of text crawl during EAS alert 
and (2) use of a test code for future nationwide testing of EAS. 

Responsibilities: Augment infrastructure; 
Status/progress/timeline: Expanded the number of primary entry point 
(PEP) stations to 65 total--31 PEP stations were either modernized or 
built since 2009. Anticipates a total of 77 PEP stations by fall 2013 
directly covering 90 percent of the American people. Added satellite 
connectivity in 50 PEP stations. Integrated NOAA alerting systems to 
allow public-alerting authorities to send non-weather emergency 
messages through HazCollect; allowed NOAA to send mobile alerts 
beginning 2012. 

Responsibilities: Conduct training and testing; 
Status/progress/timeline: Released IPAWS online training for public-
alerting authorities in December 2011. Hosts monthly webinars for 
developers and alerting practitioners. Conducted two statewide EAS 
tests in Alaska in January 2010 and 2011; conducted the first 
nationwide EAS test on November 9, 2011. Conducted CMAS test in New 
York City in December 2011. Conducts a required monthly test of CMAS 
on the third Wednesday of each month. 

Responsibilities: Provide public education on uses and access to the 
public alert and warning system; 
Status/progress/timeline: Maintains a public website on IPAWS. 

Responsibilities: Consult, coordinate, and cooperate with private 
sector; 
Status/progress/timeline: Hosts monthly webinars for developers and 
alerting practitioners; Participated in federal working groups and 
roundtables; Participates in industry conferences, demonstrations, and 
panels. 

Responsibilities: Administer EAS as component of public alert and 
warning system; 
Status/progress/timeline: Acts as executive agent for EAS, maintaining 
the PEP stations. 

Responsibilities: Ensure presidential alert and warning capability 
under all conditions; 
Status/progress/timeline: Maintains EAS and PEP stations; Deploying a 
dedicated PEP satellite network. 

Source: GAO analysis of Exec. Order No. 13407 and FEMA. 

[A] Ensure the capability to distribute alerts on the basis of 
geographic location, risks, or personal user preferences. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

April 12, 2013: 

Mark Goldstein: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-13-375, "Emergency Alerting: Capabilities Have 
Improved but Additional Guidance and Testing Are Needed" 

Dear Mr. Goldstein: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's recognition of progress made 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to improve National 
Continuity Programs Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) 
capabilities over the past three and a half years. We appreciate that 
GAO recognizes our initiatives to refine and enhance an effective, 
reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive system to alert and 
warn the American people. 

The draft report contained four recommendations, with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator: 

Recommendation 1: In conjunction with the FCC, establish guidance 
(e.g., procedures, best practices) that will assist participating 
state and local alerting authorities to fully implement and test [PAWS 
components and ensure integration and interoperability. 

Response: Concur. FEMA recognizes the Federal Communications 
Commission's (FCC's) rule-making role and will continue to work with 
the FCC and other federal partners to assist state and local alerting 
authorities to implement and test [PAWS. FEMA will leverage existing 
resources and create toolkits for alerting authorities. These toolkits 
will address alerting and governance best practices, technology 
requirements, and IPAWS operation and usage, as well as testing, 
exercises, and training. The toolkits will contain instructions 
describing qualification of an authorized IPAWS alerting authority, 
advice on how to build and strengthen relationships with the private 
sector and other alerting partners, and information resources to help 
educate the public about alerts and warnings. FEMA strives to work 
with all stakeholders, including the FCC, to ensure IPAWS integration 
and interoperability. 
Estimated Completion Date: To Be Determined. 

Recommendation 2: Conduct outreach to educate the American public on 
IPAWS capabilities, especially CMAS. 

Response: Concur. FEMA will collaborate closely with federal, state, 
local, non-profit and advocacy organizations, the private sector, and 
the media to accelerate our efforts to ensure the American public 
understands how IPAWS functions and how to respond to alerts and 
warnings from public safety officials. Since Wireless Emergency Alerts 
(WEAs) sent through the IPAWS Commercial Mobile Alerting System (CMAS) 
interface are of particular interest to the American public, our 
educational campaigns will focus primarily on WEAs. 

To date, in addition to conducting substantial educational outreach to 
the public, FEMA has: 

* Distributed a State Toolkit for Alerting Authorities around the 
country that contains coordinates messaging on WEAs, talking points 
for background on WEAs and local media interviews, templates for a 
state press release, a blog, WEA Fact Sheet, and FAQ document. 

* Created a brief on-line course for the public, titled "IPAWS and the 
American People." 

* Wrote a series of informational fact sheets about IPAWS initiatives, 
programs, and systems, tailored for several specific audiences. 

* Participated in strategically selected conferences and events, 
providing presentations, workshops, and end-to-end technical 
demonstrations about IPAWS. 

* Developed and updated relevant information on the IPAWS Website. 

* Developed and released a 5-minute comprehensive IPAWS overview video 
and linked it to the IPAWS Website homepage. 

* Arranged national, regional, and local media interviews for radio, 
wire services, TV and newspapers on WEAs, including the Weather 
Channel, Associated Press, The New York Times, Congressional 
Quarterly, NBC-5 television in Dallas, Texas, Federal News Radio, WTOP 
radio in Washington, DC, various dot.com sites, and specialty press 
such as Emergency Management Magazine. 

* Issued (Twitter) tweets and several press releases about possible 
WEAs during recent severe weather events. These tweets and press 
releases included links to the WEA FAQs on READY.gov. 

* Posted a video on the FEMA Assistant Administrator for FEMA's 
National Continuity Programs Website educating the public about WEAs 
and how to prepare for hurricanes. 

In the future, in addition to continuing current initiatives, FEMA 
plans to: 

* Create a comprehensive toolkit to address alerting and governance 
best practices, technology requirements, IPAWS operation and usage, 
and testing, training, and exercises. The toolkit will offer 
assistance and instructions on how to qualify to be an authorized 
IPAWS alerting authority, advice on how to build and strengthen 
relationships with private-sector and other alerting partners, and 
resources for educating the public about alerts and warnings. 

* Work with federal partners (e.g., FCC, NOAA, DOJ) and the Ad Council 
to create and disseminate Public Service Announcements nationwide. 

* Work with state partners to develop education campaigns in their 
states that incorporate their own resources, as well as IPAWS and 
Ready.gov. 

* Engage the media and provide the information they need to produce 
accurate, interesting, and positive [PAWS and WEA news coverage. 

Estimated Completion Date: To Be Determined. 

Recommendation 3: Develop a plan to disseminate a national-level alert 
via IPAWS to increase redundancy and communicate presidential alerts 
through multiple pathways. 

Response: Concur. The national-level EAS was established in 1995 to 
provide a reliable pathway for the President to communicate with the 
American public in extreme situations. The national-level EAS is a 
contingency program for the President when other forms of 
communications are not reliable or available. FEMA administers and 
manages the PEP program to support national-level EAS capabilities 
through hardened, resilient radio stations. Current operations allow a 
national-level alert to be initiated via [PAWS over multiple pathways 
directing citizens to the "National EAS" as a robust, resilient 
capability to survive all hazards. Distributing the Presidential 
message over multiple pathways will require coordinating and 
identifying additional operational requirements with The White House.
Estimated Completion Date: To Be Determined. 

Recommendation 4: In conjunction with FCC, develop and implement a 
strategy for regularly testing the national-level EAS, including 
examining the need for a national test code, developing milestones and 
timeframes, improving data collection efforts, and reporting on after-
action plans. 

Response: Concur. FEMA looks forward to continued collaboration with 
the FCC using the 2011 national-level EAS test plan as a foundation to 
develop and implement a strategy for regular future national-level EAS 
testing. FEMA will also work with federal partners, including the 
Executive Office of the President and the FCC, to create a national 
test code, develop milestones and timeframes, improve data collection 
efforts, and report on after-action plans. 
Estimated Completion Date: To He Determined. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Federal Communications Commission: 

Federal Communications Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20554: 

April 12, 2013: 

Mark Goldstein: 
Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Goldstein: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review GAO's draft report on 
Emergency Alerting. The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 
specific comments to various parts of the draft report are in the 
attached table. 

We would like to update you on a few matters that are discussed in the 
draft report. First, the draft GAO report notes that the FCC has not 
issued an "official" report on the results of the November 9, 2011 
Nationwide EAS Test. On April 12, 2013, the FCC's Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) released its final report on the 
test. See Strengthening the Emergency Alert System (EAS): Lessons 
Learned from the Nationwide EAS Test, April 2013 (attached). The 
report describes the work of the FCC, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and other EAS stakeholders in planning and preparing for 
the test and summarizes the results of the test. As FCC 
representatives reported to GAO, the Bureau concludes that the 
November 9, 2011 test was generally successful in that it demonstrated 
that the national EAS, when activated, performs as designed. As 
expected, the test also uncovered several problems that impeded the 
ability of some EAS Participants to receive and/or retransmit the 
Emergency Action Notification (EAN) code, the code used to activate 
the national EAS. The Bureau's report includes several recommendations 
that will help to ensure that the EAS continues to serve as a reliable 
and effective method for the President as well as state and local 
governments to send timely and accurate emergency alerts to the 
American public. 

The draft GAO report recommends that the Chairman of the FCC provide 
states with additional guidance (e.g., templates of EAS plan) to 
facilitate completion of updated state EAS plans that include 
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS)-compatible equipment.
As discussed in its report, the Bureau has recommended that the 
Commission commence a rulemaking proceeding on state EAS plans as well 
as other issues. In addition, the Bureau has recommended that the 
Commission encourage State Emergency Communications Committees,
the groups that typically develop state EAS plans, to review and 
update their current plans to ensure that they contain accurate EAS 
monitoring assignments. The FCC plans to take action to implement both 
of these recommendations in the near future. 

The draft report also recommends that the Commission review and update 
its Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) (formerly known as Commercial 
Mobile Alert System (CMAS)) rules. The FCC plans to conduct such a 
review in the near future. As FCC representatives explained during the 
exit interview and in the attached comments, the FCC plans to task its 
recently rechartered Communications Security, Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (CSRIC) with review of these rules and to 
recommend any changes to FCC rules as necessary. CSRIC is a federal 
advisory committee comprised of representatives from Federal, state 
and local governments, the communications industry and non-profit 
organizations and is tasked with advising the FCC on actions it can 
take to ensure the security, reliability and interoperability of 
communications systems, including public safety, telecommunications 
and media communications. The FCC believes this approach is 
appropriate given the voluntary nature of the program. Unlike EAS, 
where broadcasters and other EAS Participants are required to receive 
and transmit national EAS alerts, under the Warning Alert and Response 
Network Act, commercial wireless provider participation in WEA is 
voluntary. This means wireless carriers can elect to participate in 
whole, in part or not at all. In addition, those carriers that 
originally elected to participate may withdraw their participation. In 
light of this, the FCC's approach with WEA has been to encourage 
government alert originators, FEMA, and the wireless industry to 
develop consensus-based solutions for WEA. This is the approach the 
FCC took in adopting the original rules in 2008. Under this approach, 
the FCC would first ask the CSRIC to conduct a review and develop 
consensus-based recommendations for actions the Commission should take 
to improve the WEA rules. The Commission can then consider those 
recommendations in deciding appropriate action, including a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking. We believe this multi-stakeholder approach will 
yield positive results that not only will encourage state and local 
government alert originators to participate in FEMA's IPAWS, but also 
will encourage more commercial wireless carriers, including those that 
are smaller or that serve rural communities, to elect to participate 
in the program and send timely and accurate alerts to their 
subscribers. 

Finally, the FCC looks forward to continuing its work with FEMA on 
outreach to state and local government agencies and the public on 
IPAWS capabilities and to develop a strategy for regular testing of 
the EAS. The FCC also will continue to support FEMA as it develops a 
plan to disseminate national-level alerts via IPAWS. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David S. Turetsky: 
Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Mark Goldstein (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant 
Director; Andy Clinton; Jean Cook; Bert Japikse; Delwen Jones; 
Jennifer Kim; Josh Ormond; Carl Ramirez; Jerry Sandau; and Andrew 
Stavisky made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and Coordination 
Necessary for Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and 
Warning System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). 

[2] The AMBER Alert Program is a voluntary collaboration among law-
enforcement agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the 
wireless industry to activate an urgent bulletin in the most serious 
child-abduction cases. 

[3] PEP stations are usually private or commercial radio stations, but 
FEMA also designated some satellite providers as PEP stations, such as 
SiriusXM Satellite and National Public Radio's Satellite System News 
Advisory Channel. 

[4] EAS participants are entities required under FCC rules to comply 
with EAS rules and include radio and television broadcast stations, 
wired and wireless cable television systems, direct broadcast 
satellite service providers, satellite digital audio radio service 
providers, and wireline video systems. 47 C.F.R. § 11.2 (d). 

[5] State Emergency Communications Committees are groups in each state 
that are comprised of radio and television broadcasters, cable 
companies, and state alerting authorities. 

[6] 47 C.F.R. § 11.21. 

[7] Exec. Order No. 13407, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,975. 

[8] The WARN Act was enacted as title VI of the Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 602, 120 
Stat. 1,884, 1,936 (2006), codified at 47 U.S.C. ch. 11. 

[9] 47 U.S.C. § 1201. 

[10] 47 U.S.C. § 1202. 

[11] 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 

[12] FCC recently released an order amending Part 10 of the FCC rules 
to change references from "Commercial Mobile Alert System" and "CMAS" 
to "Wireless Emergency Alerts" and "WEA." In the Matter of Commercial 
Mobile Alert System, PS Docket No. 07-287, (PSHSB, Feb. 25, 2013). 

[13] In the Matter of the Commercial Mobile Alert System, 23 FCC Rcd. 
6144 (2008), reconsidered, clarified and corrected, 23 FCC Rcd. 11,669 
(2008), with errata, 23 FCC Rcd.12,561 (2008) 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834] and GAO, 
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has 
Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be 
Challenging, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

[15] Information on the specific actions FEMA took to implement our 
recommendations is available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834]. 

[16] Throughout this report, we refer to IPAWS Open Platform for 
Emergency Networks simply as IPAWS. 

[17] U.S. territories and tribal governments can also use the federal 
aggregator for public alerting. 

[18] According to a survey FEMA conducted from January 2010 through 
December 2011, more than 3,300 public-alerting authorities existed in 
the United States at that time. 

[19] FEMA requires alerting authorities to take specific steps to 
become authorized alert originators. A federal, state, local, tribal 
or territorial alerting authority can become an authorized alert 
originator by (1) selecting IPAWS compatible software, (2) applying 
for a memorandum of agreement with FEMA, (3) applying for public-
alerting permissions, and (4) completing IPAWS web-based training. Use 
of IPAWS for federal, state, and local authorities is voluntary, and 
there is no cost to send messages through IPAWS, although there may be 
costs associated with acquiring IPAWS-compatible software. 

[20] CAP is an open, non-proprietary digital message format that is 
compatible with multiple applications and telecommunications methods. 

[21] The various alerting systems either receive a pushed message--
meaning data is sent by the server to the user--or poll for a message 
from the alert aggregator--meaning data is pulled from the server by 
the user. 

[22] According to FEMA, the IPAWS EAS Atom Feed came online on 
September 2011. FEMA began processing applications for IPAWS public 
alerting authorities in June 2011 and FEMA began posting weekly tests 
to the IPAWS EAS Internet feed in January 2012. To access the IPAWS 
EAS feed, public-alerting authorities need Internet connectivity, 
appropriate equipment (CAP EAS Encoder/Decoder) and software, and must 
complete FEMA's authentication steps to become an authorized user of 
IPAWS. 

[23] Other National Weather Service dissemination systems include the 
NOAA Weather Wire Service, Emergency Managers Weather Information 
Network, National Weather Service Websites, Internet feeds, and others. 

[24] CMAS is a partnership between FEMA, FCC, and wireless carriers to 
enhance public safety. The rules for CMAS are published at 47 C.F.R. 
ch. I, subchapter A, pt.10. In December 2009, FEMA formally adopted 
the CMAS Interface Specification, which defined the interface between 
the federal alert aggregator gateway and the commercial service 
provider gateways. This initiated a 28-month period during which 
participating commercial mobile service providers needed to develop, 
test, and deploy their portion of CMAS. 

[25] Cell phone users may opt out of receiving imminent threat and 
AMBER alerts, but may not opt out of receiving presidential alerts. 

[26] The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is a 
nonprofit organization whose mission is to serve as the nation's 
resource on the issues of missing and sexually exploited children. 

[27] 47 U.S.C. §1201 (b)(2). 

[28] CTIA is an international non-profit organization that represents 
the wireless communications industry. Membership in the association 
includes wireless carriers and their suppliers, as well as providers 
and manufacturers of wireless data services and products. 

[29] In addition, FEMA officials said there are additional challenges 
to sending a national-level alert directly to EAS participant stations 
through both IPAWS and the traditional system. Specifically, 
uncertainty exists regarding technical malfunctions that could occur 
with equipment if EAS participant stations simultaneously received an 
alert both through the PEP stations via the traditional daisy chain 
and the alert aggregator. FEMA officials said that until these 
technical issues are resolved, FEMA would not distribute a CAP-
formatted national-level alert to EAS participant stations through 
IPAWS. 

[30] Although roughly 10 percent of the population will not be covered 
by a PEP station, the public may also be reached by other EAS 
participants (e.g., satellite TV providers). Information on the 
specific areas of the country that have PEP station coverage is 
available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.fema.gov/primary-entry-point-stations]. 

[31] FEMA, IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Assessment Report, December 
2011. See appendix I for a description of the survey used to produce 
the inventory. 

[32] The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) is a non-
partisan, non-profit association dedicated to enhancing public safety 
by improving the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from all emergencies, disasters, and threats to our nation's 
security. NEMA is the professional association of and for emergency 
management directors from all 50 states, 8 U.S. territories, and the 
District of Columbia. 

[33] According to FEMA, system developers and vendors conduct the 
technical integration of the alerting systems. FEMA is continuing to 
provide ongoing support to the developer community via webinars and 
published guides. 

[34] FCC re-chartered the Communications Security, Reliability and 
Interoperability Council, which is comprised of representatives from 
federal, state, tribal and local governments, various sectors of the 
communications industry, and non-profit organizations. Public Notice, 
DA 13-173 (Feb. 12, 2013), 2013 Westlaw 519, 447. The Council advises 
FCC on actions the Commission can take to promote the security, 
reliability, and interoperability of communications systems. At the 
time of our report, FCC had not published what items the Council would 
be reviewing. 

[35] CMAS enables government officials to target emergency alerts to 
specific geographic areas through cell towers (e.g., lower Manhattan), 
which pushes the information to dedicated receivers in CMAS-enabled 
mobile devices. 

[36] 47 C.F.R. §§ 10.430 and 10.450. FCC rules do not preclude 
participating wireless carriers from targeting geographic areas more 
granular than at the county level. 

[37] According to FEMA, some specific phone models improperly 
displayed an evacuation notice with the flash-flood warning because of 
phone-programming error. FEMA said it does not edit or restrict the 
content or targeting of messages sent through IPAWS, as long as the 
target zone is within the bounds of the public-alerting authorities' 
jurisdiction, as indicated when applying for IPAWS authentication. 

[38] The committee was chaired by the FCC chairman and included 42 
other members, representing stakeholders in all levels of government 
and the private sector. 

[39] In the Matter of the Commercial Mobile Alert System, 22 FCC Rcd. 
21,975 (2007). 

[40] FCC officials noted that both the geo-targeting and message 
length rules were a consensus-based product of a government and 
industry advisory committee in which FEMA and NOAA participated and 
that the rules were adopted pursuant to a notice and opportunity for 
comment rulemaking. 

[41] GAO, Digital Television Transition: Increased Federal Planning 
and Risk Management Could Further Facilitate the DTV Transition, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-43] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2007). 

[42] According to FEMA, funding from the Homeland Security Grant 
Program and the Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program may be used to 
enhance existing or establish new alert and warning programs. 

[43] FEMA, IPAWS Inventory & Evaluation Assessment Report, December 
2011. 

[44] In 2007 and 2009, we reported that a lack of alternative means, 
or lack of redundancy, in reaching EAS participants should its primary 
connection fail, makes the EAS daisy chain prone to failure. See 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834]. 

[45] FCC officials noted that nothing in FCC's rules precludes 
transmission of non-English alerts. Alerts sent via IPAWS are provided 
in any language the alerting authorities can use when developing a CAP-
formatted alert message. 

[46] National Council on Disability, Effective Emergency Management: 
Making Improvements for Communities and People with Disabilities (Aug. 
12, 2009). 

[47] FCC required that EAS participants report to FCC on whether they 
received the test alert, but many did not do so. As of January 2013, 
we found that about 61 percent of broadcasters and cable operators had 
submitted the report as required. Our analysis is based on 
broadcasters and cable operators that submitted information to FCC 
that we determined usable for our reporting purposes. 

[48] As previously mentioned, these systems are not integrated, and 
FEMA is in discussions with the White House to determine the use of 
IPAWS during a presidential alert. 

[49] Since that time, as part of FEMA's PEP Station Expansion and 
Modernization Program, a PEP station in Oregon became operational in 
December 2012. 

[50] According to FCC, some state emergency communication committees 
maintain their state plans as official use only documents and do not 
post them on the Internet. 

[51] FCC, Strengthening the Emergency Alert System (EAS): Lessons 
Learned from the Nationwide EAS Test, April 2013. The report can be 
found at [hyperlink, 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch//DOC-320152A1.pdf]. 

[52] In the Matter of Review of the Emergency Alert System, 26 FCC 
Rcd. 1,460, 1,479 (2011). According to FCC rules, EAS testing is to be 
conducted no more frequently than annually. 

[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834]. 

[54] An EAS plan is also prepared for the District of Columbia and 
some territories. 

[End of section] 

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