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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 
Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives: 

March 2013: 

Security Assistance: 

Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's 
Security Forces: 

GAO-13-289: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-289, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House 
of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Following Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and war between 
Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, U.S. agencies increased their 
allocations of security assistance for Lebanon from $3 million in 2005 
to about $28 million in 2006. This assistance included training and 
equipment funded and implemented by State or DOD for the Lebanese 
Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces of Lebanon. However, 
questions remain regarding the effectiveness of security assistance as 
a tool of U.S. policy in Lebanon, including concerns about the 
influence of foreign actors, primarily Syria and Iran, and extremist 
militant groups operating in Lebanon. 

GAO was asked to review U.S. security assistance to Lebanon. GAO’s 
review, covering fiscal years 2007 through 2012, assessed the extent 
to which the U.S. government (1) adjusted its strategic goals and 
security assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance 
programs for Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the 
effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon. GAO reviewed 
budgetary data and planning documents and interviewed U.S. and 
Lebanese government officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, Florida; and 
Beirut, Lebanon. 

What GAO Found: 

The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 
2007 and adjusted security assistance in response to political and 
security conditions. Since 2007, U.S. strategic goals for Lebanon have 
been to support the nation as a stable, secure, and independent 
democracy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. policy priorities include 
supporting the Government of Lebanon in establishing stability and 
security against internal threats from militant extremists and the 
influence of Iran and Syria. U.S. programs to help achieve these 
priorities include Foreign Military Financing, International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE), Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism 
Financing, Export Control and Related Border Security, and Section 
1206 and 1207 authorities. While strategic goals have not changed, 
program implementation has changed to meet conditions on the ground, 
according to U.S. officials. For example, the Department of State 
(State) delayed committing Foreign Military Financing funds to Lebanon 
for 3 months in 2010, following an exchange of fire between the 
Lebanese Armed Forces and Israeli forces. 

U.S. agencies allocated over $925 million for security assistance 
programs for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012; State has 
disbursed and the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed the 
majority of the funds. 

Figure: Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2007: $324,569,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: $32,463,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $22,1699,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $144,392,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $99,813,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $104,414,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

To date, State has evaluated only one of its security assistance 
programs for Lebanon, the INCLE program; neither State nor DOD has 
completed plans or established time frames to evaluate the other 
programs. State’s evaluation policy requires that certain programs be 
evaluated periodically. Without such evaluations, State and DOD have 
little objective evidence to show that the programs have been 
effective or what the proper mix of programs should be. Evaluations 
can be facilitated through appropriate performance measurement. 
However, GAO and other agencies have previously reported deficiencies 
in how agencies measure program performance. For example, GAO found in 
2011 that the IMET program evaluation efforts had few of the elements 
commonly accepted as appropriate for measuring performance. State and 
DOD are undertaking efforts to develop better performance indicators. 

What GAO Recommends: 

State and DOD should complete plans with milestone dates to evaluate 
security assistance programs in Lebanon and develop better performance 
indicators to facilitate evaluation. State and DOD concurred. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-289]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 
johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The United States Has Kept Strategic Goals for Lebanon Constant Since 
2007 and Adjusted Security Assistance in Response to Political and 
Security Conditions: 

U.S. Agencies Allocated Over $925 Million in Security Assistance for 
Lebanon during Fiscal Years 2007-2012 and Have Disbursed or Committed 
Most of the Funds: 

U.S. Agencies Have Done Little Evaluation of Security Assistance 
Programs in Lebanon: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Status of Funds for U.S. Security Assistance Programs for 
Lebanon: 

Appendix III: Selected Security Equipment and Services Provided to 
Lebanon by the U.S. Government and Other Governments: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of State: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Selected U.S. Security Assistance Programs: 

Table 2: International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, 
Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Table 3: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs (NADR): Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Table 4: NADR: Counterterrosim Financing Program, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Table 5: NADR: Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Table 6: Section 1207 Train and Equip Authority, Fiscal Year 2007-2012: 

Table 7: Selected Security Equipment or Service Provided by the United 
States to Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Table 8: Selected Security Equipment or Funding Provided by Other 
Countries to Lebanon: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Lebanon and Its Neighbors: 

Figure 2: Timeline of Selected Political Events in Lebanon: 

Figure 3: Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012: 

Figure 4: Total U.S. Security Assistance for Lebanon by Program for 
Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Figure 5: Status of Foreign Military Financing Fund for Lebanon, 
Fiscal Years2007-2012: 

Figure 6: Status of INCLE Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Figure 7: Status of Section 1206 Authority Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012: 

Abbreviations: 

DFAS: Defense Financing and Accounting Service: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 

EXBS: Export Control and Related Border Security: 

IMET: International Military Education and Training: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

ISF: Internal Security Forces: 

LAF: Lebanese Armed Forces: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs: 

State: Department of State: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 19, 2013: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Madam Chairman: 

Lebanon is a religiously diverse country transitioning toward 
independence and democratic consolidation after a 15-year civil war 
and subsequent occupation by Syrian and Israeli forces. Lebanon is 
home to the militant group Hezbollah, which is also a member of the 
Lebanese government. Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 
and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the 
United States significantly increased assistance for Lebanon, for the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). In 
2005, U.S. agencies allocated about $3 million in U.S. security 
assistance for Lebanon but the next year allocated almost $28 million 
in security assistance.[Footnote 1] In 2010, the LAF fired on Israeli 
Defense Forces along Lebanon's and Israel's shared border. A member of 
Congress raised concerns about U.S. assistance to Lebanon in the wake 
of this clash. 

In response to your request that we review U.S. security assistance to 
Lebanon, we assessed the extent to which the U.S. government, from 
fiscal years 2007 through 2012, (1) adjusted its strategic goals and 
security assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance 
programs for Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the 
effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon. To address 
these objectives, we analyzed Department of State (State) and 
Department of Defense (DOD) documents, such as the Mission Strategic 
and Resource Plans for Lebanon, program plans and guidance, 
congressional budget justifications, and other relevant documents. We 
obtained funding data from State and DOD on programs that provide 
security assistance to Lebanon. We also interviewed State and DOD 
officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, Lebanon, and DOD officials 
in Tampa, Florida. Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of our 
scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Lebanon is a small, religiously diverse country on the Mediterranean 
Sea that borders Israel and Syria. (See figure 1.) 

Figure 1: Map of Lebanon and Its Neighbors: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map] 

Source: GAO; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Religious tensions among Lebanon's Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, 
and Shiite Muslims, among others, along with an influx of Palestinian 
refugees into Lebanon, have fueled Lebanon's internal strife and 
conflicts with its neighbors. During the civil war between 1975 and 
1990, both Syrian and Israeli forces occupied the country. In the 
midst of the civil war and Israel's continued occupation of southern 
Lebanon, Hezbollah emerged in Lebanon as a powerful Islamic militant 
group. Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah, funded by Iran and designated 
by the United States and Israel as a terrorist organization, pursued 
its military campaign against Israeli forces occupying Lebanon while 
also participating in Lebanon's political system. In 2000, Israeli 
forces withdrew from southern Lebanon. In 2005, with pressure from the 
international community, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon following 
the assassination of Lebanon's prime minister. The subsequent 
parliamentary elections that year resulted in a member of Hezbollah 
holding a cabinet position for the first time. In the summer of 2006, 
Hezbollah and Israel entered into a month-long conflict that ended 
with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 
by both the Israeli and Lebanese governments.[Footnote 2] The 
resolution called for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 
parallel with the deployment of Lebanese and United Nations forces and 
the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, among other things. 
Since 2011, instability in neighboring Syria may have exacerbated 
sectarian conflict within Lebanon. See figure 2 for a timeline of 
selected political events in Lebanon. 

Figure 2: Timeline of Selected Political Events in Lebanon: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

October 1990: 
Civil War Ends. 

May 2000: 
Israel withdraws from Lebanon. 

April 2005: 
Syria withdraws from Lebanon. 

July-August 2006: 
Israeli-Hezbollah War. 

May-September 2007: 
LAF siege of Palestinian refugee camp. 

August 2010: 
Skirmish between Israel and LAF along border. 

October 2012: 
ISF Security Chief Assassinated: 

Source: GAO analysis of public information. 

[End of figure] 

The United States has provided Lebanon with assistance, such as 
emergency humanitarian aid during the civil war and training for 
military forces under the International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program. The United States and Lebanon have 
historically enjoyed a good relationship in part because of cultural 
and religious ties, a large Lebanese-American community in the United 
States, and the pro-Western orientation of Lebanon, particularly 
during the Cold War. Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the 
2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, the United States increased its security 
assistance to Lebanon. The United States provided assistance to the 
LAF, which is generally responsible for providing border security, 
counterterrorism, and national defense, and to the ISF, or police 
force, which is generally responsible for maintaining law and order in 
Lebanon. The fiscal year 2006 appropriations marked the first time 
since 1984 that U.S. agencies allocated Foreign Military Financing 
grants to help modernize and equip the LAF. Since then, the United 
States has provided security assistance to Lebanon through the Foreign 
Military Financing program; IMET; International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement (INCLE) program; the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, 
Demining, and Related (NADR) programs; and Section 1206 and Section 
1207 authorities for training and equipping foreign militaries and 
security forces and for reconstruction, stabilization, and security 
activities in foreign countries, respectively. The NADR security 
assistance for Lebanon has been provided through three programs: 
Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, and Export 
Control and Related Border Security (EXBS). Table 1 describes these 
security assistance programs. In addition, to these security 
assistance programs, U.S. Special Forces units have provided 
specialized training to LAF Special Forces units, according to agency 
officials. 

Table 1: Selected U.S. Security Assistance Programs: 

Program: Foreign Military Financing[A]; 
Description: Provides grants and loans to foreign governments for the 
acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training; 
Implementing agency: DOD. 

Program: International Military Education and Training (IMET); 
Description: Provides training, such as technical and professional 
military education, on a grant basis to students from allied and 
friendly nations; 
Implementing agency: DOD. 

Program: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); 
Description: Supports country and global programs critical to combating 
transnational crime and illicit threats, including efforts against 
terrorist networks in the illegal drug trade and illicit enterprises; 
Implementing agency: State. 

Program: NADR - Antiterrorism Assistance; 
Description: Trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel 
from friendly governments in police procedures that deal with 
terrorism; 
Implementing agency: State. 

Program: NADR - Counterterrorism Financing; 
Description: Provides training for law enforcement officials, 
prosecutors and judges, among others, in specific elements of money 
laundering and terrorist financing crimes; 
Implementing agency: State. 

Program: NADR - Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS); 
Description: Assesses countries' export control systems and provides a 
variety of assistance to help countries develop and improve their 
strategic trade and related border control systems; 
Implementing agency: State. 

Program: Section 1206 authority; 
Description: Trains and equips foreign military and nonmilitary 
maritime forces to conduct counterterrorist operations or support 
military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed services are 
a participant; 
Implementing agency: DOD and State. 

Program: Section 1207 authority[B]; 
Description: Provides for reconstruction, stabilization, and security 
activities in foreign countries; 
Implementing agency: State. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD information. 

[A] Foreign Military Financing can fund the transfer of services or 
equipment through either Direct Commercial Sales or Foreign Military 
Sales. 

[B] Section 1207 authority expired on September 30, 2010. 

[End of table] 

The United States Has Kept Strategic Goals for Lebanon Constant Since 
2007 and Adjusted Security Assistance in Response to Political and 
Security Conditions: 

The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 
2007. These goals include supporting the Government of Lebanon in 
establishing stability and security against internal threats from 
militant extremists and countering destabilizing influences. U.S. 
agencies have adjusted security assistance in response to Lebanon's 
political and security conditions. For example, State and DOD have 
delayed releasing funds and limited the types of equipment provided. 
Both agencies have also implemented additional assistance programs 
since fiscal year 2007. 

U.S. Strategic Goals Are to Support a Stable, Secure, and Independent 
Lebanese Government: 

Since 2007, U.S strategic goals for Lebanon have been to support the 
nation as a stable, secure, and independent democracy. According to 
DOD and State officials, the overarching priorities for Lebanon remain 
focused on supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability and 
countering the influence of Syria and Iran. Security-related goals for 
Lebanon focus on counterterrorism and regional stability or internal 
security.[Footnote 3] Programs activities seek to support development 
of the LAF and the ISF as the only legitimate providers of Lebanon's 
security. The goals and objectives of the individual security 
assistance programs are intended to support the U.S. strategic goals 
and overarching priorities, as the following examples illustrate: 

* Goals for the Foreign Military Financing, IMET, and 1206 programs in 
Lebanon since the departure of Syrian forces are to bolster the 
capability of the LAF, nurture the bilateral military relationship 
between the United States and the LAF, and continue encouraging 
establishment of a stable, legal, and pro-U.S. civil government. 

* Goals for the INCLE police training program are (1) to build 
Lebanon's operational capacity to combat crime, and prevent and 
respond to terror attacks; and (2) to assist Lebanon in developing the 
ISF into a competent, professional, and democratic police force with 
the necessary training, equipment, and institutional capacity to 
enforce the rule of law in Lebanon, cement sovereign Lebanese 
government control over its territory, and protect the Lebanese people. 

* Goals for the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Lebanon are to 
develop and build the Lebanese government's capacities in border 
security, mid-and senior-level leadership development, and 
counterterrorism investigations. 

* Goals for the Counterterrorism Financing Program are to deny 
terrorists access to money, resources, and support. 

* Goals for EXBS in Lebanon focus on strengthening the capability of 
Lebanese enforcement agencies to effectively control cross-border 
trade in strategic goods. 

* Goals for the 1207 program were to strengthen Lebanon's internal 
security forces after armed conflicts in 2006 and 2007. 

State and DOD Have Adjusted Implementation of Security Assistance 
Programs to Meet Conditions on the Ground: 

The goals and objectives of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon have 
continued to focus on supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability 
and countering the influences of Syria and Iran. However, according to 
State and DOD officials, the agencies have changed how they implement 
programs based on changes in the political and security situation, for 
example, by delaying the release of funds or limiting the types of 
equipment provided. In one instance, State delayed committing fiscal 
year 2010 Foreign Military Financing funds as a result of an incident 
on August 3, 2010, in which the LAF opened fire on an Israeli Defense 
Force unit engaged in routine maintenance along the Blue Line, 
[Footnote 4] alleging that it had crossed into Lebanese territory. Two 
Lebanese soldiers, a journalist, and an Israeli officer were killed. 
According to State, in response to concerns raised by a member of 
Congress, State delayed committing $100 million of fiscal year 2010 
Foreign Military Financing funds for Lebanon, citing the need to 
determine whether equipment that the United States provided to the LAF 
was used against Israel. According to a State official, State 
committed the funds in November 2010 after consulting with the member 
of Congress. 

In addition, according to State officials, State and DOD decided to 
place a temporary hold on lethal assistance to the LAF in January 
2011, after the collapse of Prime Minister Saad Hariri's government. 
In March 2012, the agencies decided to lift the hold on lethal 
assistance based on the Mikati government's adherence to key 
international obligations to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon[Footnote 
5] and United Nations Security Council Resolution. 

The U.S. government has also implemented new security assistance 
programs in Lebanon since fiscal year 2007 in response to changing 
security assistance needs, according to State officials. For example, 
State began implementing the EXBS program in Lebanon in fiscal year 
2009--after State performed an assessment to identify deficiencies in 
the country's ability to detect and interdict weapons of mass 
destruction and advanced conventional weapons, according to officials 
of State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. 
State determined that Lebanon did not have a comprehensive system to 
regulate trade in strategic goods and technologies for the purpose of 
preventing the proliferation of such weapons, and lacked the necessary 
legal and institutional elements to manage strategic trade consistent 
with international standards. In addition, in fiscal year 2010, 
State's Bureau of Counterterrorism began implementing its 
Counterterrorism Financing program in Lebanon. According to bureau 
officials, the goals of the program are to build the foreign capacity 
of the Government of Lebanon to develop laws and regulations to deny 
terrorists access to funds. 

State has also changed the focus of some of the security assistance 
programs. For example, the INCLE police training program is no longer 
providing basic training to cadets, according to the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The bureau turned 
the basic training over to the ISF as of July 2012 and is providing 
leadership and management training. The bureau is working with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration to develop specialized training to increase the ISF's 
investigatory skills, according to U.S. embassy officials. The bureau 
is also expanding its community policing program, according to bureau 
officials. In addition, State's Bureau for Counterterrorism has 
changed the focus of its antiterrorism training, according to 
officials of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security whom we interviewed 
in Lebanon. They explained that when the program began in 2007, it 
focused on training Lebanese security details to protect national 
leaders. The trained protection details have demonstrated a mastery of 
the skills for which they were trained. As a result, the Bureau for 
Counterterrorism and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security consider the 
protection mission to be complete and since 2010 has shifted its focus 
to border security, management and leadership, and counterterrorism 
investigations, according to the Diplomatic Security officials. 
Finally, while there have been no major changes to the EXBS program in 
Lebanon, U.S. embassy officials stated that the United States has 
increased the program's emphasis on convincing the government to 
change its export control laws. 

U.S. Agencies Allocated Over $925 Million in Security Assistance for 
Lebanon during Fiscal Years 2007-2012 and Have Disbursed or Committed 
Most of the Funds: 

U.S. agencies have allocated over $925 million in security assistance 
for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, with funds varying by 
year and program. The majority of funds--69 percent--was from the 
Foreign Military Financing program, though State and DOD also utilized 
seven other programs. State has disbursed the majority of funds it 
allocated for each fiscal year, while DOD has committed the majority 
of funds for Foreign Military Financing. 

Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon Varied by Year: 

In order to help achieve U.S. strategic goals, State and DOD have 
allocated more than $925 million in security assistance for Lebanon's 
LAF and ISF from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. This funding peaked 
in fiscal year 2007 at about $323 million, declined in fiscal year 
2008 to about $32 million, and has fluctuated from fiscal years 2009 
through 2012. (See figure 3.) 

Figure 3: Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
FMF: $224,800,000; 
INCLE: $62,000,000; 
Section 1206: $30,397,000; 
All other programs: $7,372,000; 
Total: $324,569,000. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
FMF: $6,943,000; 
INCLE: $496,000; 
Section 1206: $15,120,000; 
All other programs: $9,904,000; 
Total: $32,463,000. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
FMF: $159,700,000; 
INCLE: $6,000,000; 
Section 1206: $49,240,000; 
All other programs: $6,759,000; 
Total: $221,699,000. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
FMF: $100,000,000; 
INCLE: $20,000,000; 
Section 1206: $16,582,000; 
All other programs: $7,810,000; 
Total: $144,392,000. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
FMF: $74,850,000; 
INCLE: $19,500,000; 
Section 1206: $0; 
All other programs: $5,463,000; 
Total: $99,813,000. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
FMF: $75,000,000; 
INCLE: $24,000,000; 
Section 1206: $0; 
All other programs: $5,414,000; 
Total: $104,414,000. 

Total 2007-2012: 
FMF: $641,293,000; 
INCLE: $131,996,000; 
Section 1206: $111,339,000; 
All other programs: $42,722,000; 
Total: $927,350,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

In fiscal year 2007, the $325 million allocated for security 
assistance for Lebanon followed the 2006 war between Hezbollah and 
Israel and assisted Lebanon in fulfilling its obligations under the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. This funding level 
represented a significant increase over fiscal year 2006, when U.S. 
security assistance for Lebanon totaled only about $28 million. 
[Footnote 6] See appendix II for information on allocation, 
obligation, and disbursement or commitment of security assistance for 
Lebanon by program and year. 

U.S. Agencies Allocated the Majority of Security Assistance through 
the Foreign Military Financing Program and Used Seven Other Programs: 

U.S. agencies allocated the majority (approximately 69 percent, or 
$641 million) of security assistance for Lebanon from fiscal years 
2007 through 2012 through the Foreign Military Financing program, 
which provides grants and loans to the Lebanese Armed Forces to 
purchase U.S. equipment, services, and training. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of U.S. security assistance allocated for Lebanon by 
program. 

Figure 4: Total U.S. Security Assistance for Lebanon by Program for 
Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Foreign Military Financing: 69%; $641,293,000; 
INCLE: 14%; $131,996,000; 
Section 1206: 12%; $111,339,000; 
All other programs: 5%; $42,722,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: The "all other programs" grouping includes IMET, Antiterrorism 
Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, EXBS, and Section 1207. 

[End of figure] 

The Foreign Military Financing program funded the purchase of various 
equipment and services. For example, Lebanon received trucks, truck 
tractors, trailers, ambulances, cargo-troop carriers, and armament 
vehicles through the Foreign Military Financing program. Other 
equipment purchased through the Foreign Military Financing program 
included helicopters, ships, radios, and spare parts. Appendix III 
presents selected equipment and services provided to Lebanon by the 
U.S. government and by other governments from fiscal years 2007 
through 2012. 

U.S. Agencies Disbursed or Committed the Majority of Funds: 

Generally, State disbursed the majority of funds allocated during the 
same fiscal year for security assistance programs providing funds for 
Lebanon, and DOD committed the majority of Foreign Military Financing 
funds for Lebanon.[Footnote 7] See appendix II for additional 
information on allocation, obligation, and disbursement or commitment 
of security assistance for Lebanon by program and year. Specifically, 
State disbursed about 78 percent of total allocations from fiscal 
years 2007 through 2012 for the IMET, INCLE, Antiterrorism Assistance, 
Counterterrorism Financing, and EXBS programs and the Section 1206 and 
1207 authorities. Although State has disbursed the majority of these 
allocated funds, State has not disbursed some funds allocated for the 
INCLE and Antiterrorism Assistance programs for fiscal years 2007 
through 2011. According to State officials, some obligated funds are 
waiting to be disbursed and all of the unobligated funds are no longer 
available for obligation. DOD has committed 87 percent of Foreign 
Military Financing funds for Lebanon for fiscal years 2007 through 
2012. 

U.S. Agencies Have Done Little Evaluation of Security Assistance 
Programs in Lebanon: 

As of February 2013, U.S. agencies had evaluated only the INCLE police 
training program for Lebanon and did not have firm plans to evaluate 
the other six ongoing security assistance programs.[Footnote 8] 
State's evaluation policy requires periodic evaluations of certain 
programs, consistent with standards established in U.S. law. 
Evaluations can be facilitated by collecting data on appropriate 
performance indicators. However, we and other audit agencies have 
previously reported deficiencies in how State and DOD measure program 
performance. For example, we found in 2011 that the IMET program 
evaluation efforts had few of the elements commonly accepted as 
appropriate for measuring progress and did not objectively measure how 
IMET contributes to long-term desired outcomes.[Footnote 9] We have 
also reported deficiencies in how DOD defined performance measures for 
the 1206 program.[Footnote 10] In response to those reports, State and 
DOD concurred with our recommendations and described agency efforts to 
develop better performance measures. 

State Policy Requires Periodic Evaluations of Certain Programs: 

State's evaluation policy, which is partly based on the Government 
Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010,[Footnote 11] 
requires that all large programs, projects, and activities be 
evaluated at least once in their lifetime or every 5 years, whichever 
is less.[Footnote 12] According to State, the 2010 act strengthened 
the mandate to evaluate programs, requiring agencies to include a 
discussion of evaluations in their strategic plans and performance 
reports. State established its evaluation policy in February 2012 in 
part to comply with the requirements of this act. In addition, 
according to State, the policy supports State's goal of connecting 
evaluation to its investments in diplomacy and development to ensure 
that they align with the agency's overarching strategic goals and 
objectives. State's evaluation guidance requires each bureau to 
evaluate two to four projects, programs, or activities over a 24-month 
period beginning with fiscal year 2012, depending on the size, scope, 
and complexity of the programs being evaluated and the availability of 
funding. State's evaluation policy also requires all bureaus to 
complete a bureau evaluation plan and to update it annually. State 
requires the bureaus' plans to align with evaluation policy guidance 
and to assist each bureau in assessing the extent to which its efforts 
contribute to achieving its intermediate objectives and, by extension, 
its longer-term goals. 

Program Evaluations Can Be Facilitated by Performance Measures: 

Program evaluations are individual systematic studies conducted 
periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a program is 
working. As a key component of effective program management, 
evaluations assess how well a program is working and help managers 
make informed decisions about current and future programming.[Footnote 
13] An evaluation provides an overall assessment of whether a program 
works and identifies adjustments that may improve its results. 
Depending on their focus, evaluations may examine aspects of program 
operations (such as in a process evaluation) or factors in the program 
environment that may impede or contribute to its success. Program 
evaluations may systematically compare the effectiveness of 
alternative programs aimed at the same objective. Types of evaluation 
include process (or implementation), outcome, and impact evaluations, 
as well as cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. 

Performance measurement, by contrast, is the ongoing monitoring and 
reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward pre-
established goals. Performance measurement is typically conducted by 
program or agency officials and focuses on whether a program has 
achieved its objectives, expressed as measurable performance 
indicators. As indicators of progress toward goals, performance 
measures can inform overall program evaluations. Program evaluations 
typically examine a broader range of information on program 
performance and its context than is feasible to monitor on an ongoing 
basis.[Footnote 14] Both forms of assessment--program evaluation and 
performance measurement--aim to support resource allocation and other 
policy decisions to improve service delivery and program 
effectiveness. But performance measurement, because of its ongoing 
nature, can serve as an early warning system to management and as a 
vehicle for improving accountability to the public. 

State Has Evaluated One Security Assistance Program in Lebanon: 

As of February 2013, U.S. agencies had evaluated only one of their 
security assistance programs in Lebanon. The Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs contracted with an external 
organization to conduct an evaluation of the INCLE police training 
program for the ISF. The evaluation was conducted between November 
2010 and May 2011. The bureau commissioned the evaluation to establish 
the relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of the 
program from 2008 through 2010. The evaluation covered five training 
courses, and the evaluation team collected data by means of focus 
groups, semistructured interviews, structured observation, learning 
tests, field cluster research, and document review. 

The INCLE police training evaluation demonstrated the importance of 
conducting a program evaluation. According to the evaluation, the 
training was effective, with clear evidence that the ISF trainees had 
both learned and been able to retain the core knowledge taught in all 
five courses. The program also succeeded in reaching ISF personnel 
from throughout the country. The evaluation further determined that 
the training program made a relevant contribution to international 
donor assistance to the ISF. However, the evaluation concluded that 
the program did not reach its principal stated objective in the 
program period. The evaluation found no evidence to suggest that the 
performance of the ISF had systematically improved as a result of the 
training program. The evaluation also concluded that, although 
trainees learned and retained knowledge successfully, they were 
generally not able to apply the skills taught by the program in their 
daily duties. The evaluation identified the failure to apply skills as 
the key impediment to program effectiveness and attributed the failure 
to a flaw in the program design, which failed to sufficiently engage 
the ISF in the inception stage to clarify objectives and secure broad 
consensus on program goals. Moreover, the design of the training was 
not informed by a systematic assessment of the ISF's training needs. 

The final evaluation report included five recommendations to the 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
including a joint recommendation with the ISF, and two additional 
recommendations for the ISF. The recommendations included a number of 
subcomponents. The report recommended that the bureau take the 
following actions: 

* continue the training based on renewed program consensus; 

* closely coordinate program transition with ISF on the operational 
level; 

* expand senior leadership training; 

* strengthen internal capacity for program design and management; and: 

* in addition to quantitative performance measures, design meaningful 
qualitative performance indicators in cooperation with the ISF to 
provide relevant and timely progress information throughout the 
program period. 

The evaluation report also outlined steps to transition the training 
program to full ISF control. Bureau officials stated that the bureau 
has adopted many of the report's recommendations, including the 
transition of one course to full ISF control in July 2012, the 
creation of a training coordination process for INL and other donors 
to maximize synergies and avoid duplication of effort, and the 
creation of a strategic planning cell within the ISF to coordinate 
directly with the bureau and other donors. 

DOD Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of the Section 1206 Program in 
Lebanon: 

Although the Section 1206 program in Lebanon has not been evaluated, 
DOD--under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--
is implementing a new assessment process for the Section 1206 program. 
The objectives of the assessment process are to: 

* measure implementation of Section 1206 programs to build partner 
capacity, 

* assess quality and timeliness of program implementation, 

* measure the impact of programs, and: 

* estimate return on investment. 

DOD is implementing this new process in part to respond to our 2010 
recommendation that DOD develop and implement specific plans to 
monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on Section 1206 project 
outcomes and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives.[Footnote 15] 
DOD conducted a pilot test of its assessment process of 
counterterrorism-oriented Section 1206 programs in the Philippines and 
stability operations-oriented Section 1206 programs in Georgia in 
2012. DOD also assessed Section 1206 programs in Djibouti, Tunisia, 
and Poland from March through June 2012. DOD officials stated in 
December 2012 that they were not able to assess the program in Lebanon 
because of the security situation, but they plan to include Lebanon as 
soon as the security situation permits. 

Although DOD has not evaluated the effectiveness of the 1206 program 
or any other security assistance programs in Lebanon in which it 
participates, it conducts various types of assessments of the LAF. For 
example, since 2010, the U.S. Central Command and the LAF have 
participated in reviews--known as joint capabilities reviews--to 
assess the progress of the LAF based on eight broad critical 
capabilities. The critical capabilities--for example, Land and Border 
Defense and Security--are linked to the broad strategic goals 
described in State's Mission Strategic and Resource Plans for Lebanon 
(now Mission Resource Requests), according to DOD Central Command 
officials.[Footnote 16] The joint capabilities reviews include 
milestone dates from 2013 through 2015. The U.S. Central Command also 
conducts annual assessments linked to the Theater Campaign Plan for 
Lebanon.[Footnote 17] These assessments grade the LAF on desired 
outcomes and make recommendations for course corrections. According to 
the DOD Central Command officials, the assessments are organized by 
lines of effort, such as defeating violent extremist organizations and 
building partner capacity. These lines of effort are not linked to 
specific security assistance programs, however. 

State Has Not Completed Plans or Established Time Frames to Evaluate 
the Effectiveness of the Remaining Security Assistance Programs in 
Lebanon: 

Although bureau evaluation plans were due in May 2012, State bureaus 
responsible for security assistance programs were at varying stages of 
implementing State's evaluation policy at the time of this report. For 
example, State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is 
responsible for the Foreign Military Financing and IMET programs, 
created an evaluation plan for fiscal year 2013 which does not include 
an evaluation of the programs in Lebanon, according to a bureau 
official. 

State's Bureau of Counterterrorism, which manages the Counterterrorism 
Financing program and--along with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security--
is responsible for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, created an 
evaluation plan for fiscal year 2013, according to a Bureau of 
Counterterrorism official. This plan does not include an evaluation of 
the programs[Footnote 18] in Lebanon. The Bureau of Counterterrorism 
will evaluate the Antiterrorism Assistance programs for two other 
partner nations, Bangladesh and Morocco. According to a Bureau of 
Counterterrorism official, the bureau will consider the Antiterrorism 
Assistance Program in Lebanon for the next tranche of evaluations 
beginning in fiscal year 2014. 

State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which 
implements the EXBS program, submitted its bureau evaluation plan on 
April 10, 2012. The plan, which covers fiscal years 2012 through 2015, 
does not include an evaluation of the EXBS program. The bureau does 
periodically assess the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
components of a country's strategic trade control systems using a 419-
point assessment methodology. The bureau conducted such an assessment 
for Lebanon in 2010, according to bureau officials. However, according 
to the bureau's evaluation plan, the assessments do not assess 
enforcement capacity to the extent preferred and may not fully satisfy 
the intent of State's evaluation policy. The bureau is working with 
the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources to determine how to 
integrate the assessment methodology into program evaluations that 
would meet State's evaluation policy. The bureau may evaluate EXBS 
within the fiscal years 2013 to 2016 time frame. 

Although State bureaus are at varying stages of developing their 
evaluation plans, State has developed department-wide guidance for 
standardizing the way it measures the effectiveness of its programs 
and has entered into contracts with five contractors for monitoring 
and evaluation services, according to State officials. State bureaus 
can use these contracts to evaluate their programs. 

Past Deficiencies Reported in Agencies' Performance Measurement May 
Inhibit Program Evaluation: 

We have reported previous deficiencies in performance measurement of 
State's and DOD's security assistance programs, and these deficiencies 
may inhibit agencies' ability to conduct program evaluations. As we 
have previously reported, performance measurement of State and DOD 
security assistance programs exhibited several deficiencies, including 
a lack of specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented performance 
indicators. 

* In 2008, we reported that State did not systematically assess the 
outcomes of the Antiterrorism Assistance program and, as a result, 
could not determine the effectiveness of this program.[Footnote 19] 
More recently, a 2012 State Office of Inspector General assessment of 
the antiterrorism programs in certain countries reported that the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance 
could not determine the Antiterrorism Assistance program's 
effectiveness in part because they had not developed specific, 
measurable, and outcome-oriented program objectives.[Footnote 20] 

* In 2011, we reported that State's and DOD's ability to assess IMET's 
effectiveness was limited by several weaknesses in program monitoring 
and evaluation, including the lack of a performance plan for IMET that 
explained how the program was expected to achieve its goals and how 
progress could be assessed through performance measures and targets. 
[Footnote 21] 

* In 2010, we reported that DOD and State had incorporated little 
monitoring and evaluation into the Section 1206 program and had not 
consistently defined performance measures for Section 1206 projects. 
[Footnote 22] 

Although Facing Challenges, State and DOD Are Continuing Efforts to 
Improve Performance Measurement: 

According to State and DOD officials, assessing the impacts of 
security assistance programs is challenging, but they continue to seek 
improvements in performance measurement. For example, officials of the 
Bureaus of Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Security stated that it is 
an enormous task to come up with concrete, meaningful performance 
indicators for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, which addresses 
aviation security, investigations, and response techniques. In 
addition, officials at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut stated that State 
and DOD are struggling to develop specific, measurable performance 
indicators and still have a long way to go. DOD officials stated that 
developing metrics to measure the results of security assistance 
programs in Lebanon is difficult. The officials stated that some 
indicators may be subjective and difficult to quantify--for example, 
U.S. influence in building relationships or the willingness of the LAF 
to fight. Furthermore, they said that it is difficult to quantify what 
would have happened in the absence of U.S. assistance. 

Because the agencies do not have specific, measurable, and outcome-
oriented performance indicators, U.S. officials have cited anecdotal 
evidence that they believe demonstrates the effectiveness of U.S. 
security assistance programs in Lebanon. For example, some officials 
have cited the LAF's success in taking control of a Palestinian 
refugee camp from Al-Qaeda-inspired militants as an indication of the 
impact of the assistance. The United States provided ammunition and 
other supplies to assist the LAF during the 3-month engagement. As 
other indications of effectiveness, U.S. officials also mentioned the 
LAF's actions in arresting members of a Shiite clan involved in 
kidnappings, the professionalism demonstrated by LAF Special Forces 
units in training exercises, and increases in drug seizures. However, 
the use of only positive anecdotal evidence does not provide 
sufficient context and scope to help officials judge the effectiveness 
of these programs. 

State and DOD officials described agency efforts to improve 
performance measurement. For example, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is shifting from reporting 
output measures, such as numbers of students trained, to outcome 
measures, according to bureau officials. The bureau plans to collect 
more accurate performance metrics that focus on measuring the impact 
of the INCLE police training program in Lebanon. The bureau also plans 
to consider such factors as the quality of the officers and the extent 
to which women are integrated into the ISF, according to bureau 
officials. Moreover, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs is working with the ISF to improve the performance 
indicators in the ISF's strategic plan, according to officials at the 
U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The current plan includes some output 
measures, such as number of traffic stops made by police. Embassy 
officials also stated that they are working with the LAF to develop a 
military cooperation plan that will include performance measures. In 
addition, according to DOD Central Command officials, efforts are 
under way to develop a new framework for its annual assessments of the 
LAF that will include improved performance measures. The new framework 
will examine the effects of DOD efforts in Lebanon. 

Conclusions: 

Since 2007, U.S. agencies have allocated almost $1 billion in security 
assistance for Lebanon, supporting its efforts to build a stable, 
secure, and independent democracy following the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces and the Israeli-Hezbollah war. U.S. security assistance for 
Lebanon has presented certain risks because of the influence wielded 
by the militant group Hezbollah, which is now a member of the Lebanese 
government. Ensuring that U.S. security assistance for Lebanon is 
effective in achieving U.S. strategic goals is now more important than 
ever--to help Lebanon resist the influence of Iran, which funds 
Hezbollah, and to withstand the potential spillover of conflict in 
Syria. 

Program evaluation and performance measurement are key management 
tools to ensure that U.S. security assistance is effective in 
achieving U.S. strategic goals. However, the U.S government has 
evaluated the effectiveness of only one security assistance program in 
Lebanon, a program to which it allocated about 14 percent of the 
nearly $1 billion in security assistance allocations since 2007. 
Neither State nor DOD has completed plans or time frames to evaluate 
the remaining six ongoing U.S. security assistance programs in 
Lebanon. Without evaluations of all of its security assistance 
programs in Lebanon, the U.S. government cannot show that the programs 
have been effective in achieving their specific objectives or that 
they constitute the best mix of security assistance for Lebanon to 
support U.S. strategic goals for the country. Moreover, because State 
and DOD currently measure program effectiveness using performance 
indicators that are not specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented, 
program measurement cannot facilitate evaluations. While State and DOD 
officials described general agency efforts to develop better 
performance indicators, they have not yet produced plans with specific 
time frames for completing their efforts. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance the U.S. government's ability to determine if security 
assistance programs in Lebanon have been effective in achieving their 
specific objectives and that they constitute the best mix of security 
assistance to support U.S. strategic goals for the country, and to 
help State and DOD track progress toward established goals for 
Lebanon, we recommend that: 

1. the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, complete plans to evaluate the effectiveness of security 
assistance programs in Lebanon, including milestone dates for 
implementing the plans; 

2. the Secretary of State develop performance indicators for State's 
security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, 
measurable, and outcome-oriented; and: 

3. the Secretary of Defense develop performance indicators for DOD's 
security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, 
measurable, and outcome-oriented. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOD for comment. State 
and DOD provided written comments which are reprinted in appendixes IV 
and V, respectively. State also provided technical comments, which we 
have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In their comments, 
State and DOD generally concurred with the report's findings and 
recommendations. 

In its written comments, State said that it recognized that a robust, 
coordinated, and targeted evaluation function is essential to its 
ability to measure and monitor program performance; make decisions for 
programmatic adjustments and changes; document program impact; 
identify best practices and lessons learned; help assess return on 
investment; provide inputs for policy, planning, and budget decisions; 
and assure accountability to the American people. State said that 
Lebanon is a good example of a security assistance program that 
involves complex program goals and therefore requires a carefully 
designed evaluation framework. State noted, however, that the 
qualitative versus quantitative nature of security assistance makes 
formal evaluation of such programs a unique challenge. State said 
that, short of formal program evaluation relative to Lebanon, it 
relies on feedback from other sources, such as periodic Joint 
Capabilities Reviews involving the LAF and the U.S. government; 
Mission Resource Requests from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut; and 
capability assessments from the U.S. Central Command. We agree that 
these reviews may provide useful input but are limited because they 
are not linked to specific security assistance programs and do not 
substitute for formal evaluations, which State agreed would improve 
its ability to determine the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance. 

In its written comments, DOD stated that it would coordinate with 
State to evaluate the effectiveness of Lebanon's security forces with 
clear metrics that can be evaluated and communicated back to Congress. 
DOD also agreed to improve assessment and evaluation metrics 
established to measure the results of assistance provided under 
Section 1206 and Section 1207 authority. DOD commented that the draft 
report did not consider current DOD evaluating programs that utilize 
key baseline documents, such as the Joint Capabilities Review. The 
draft report, however, acknowledged that DOD assesses the capabilities 
of the LAF in other types of assessments but stated that, while these 
are useful, they do not provide the program-specific evaluation that 
is needed to ensure that U.S. security assistance is effective in 
achieving U.S. strategic goals. DOD's 2012 implementation guidance for 
assessing Section 1206 programs also recognizes this limitation of 
other types of assessments. This guidance states that DOD must be able 
to demonstrate the return on investment that Section 1206 training and 
equipment provide to DOD and to the U.S. government, and that the 
assessments are a means for DOD leadership to determine which types of 
programs are more successful and which partner nations make 
demonstrable progress toward the objectives of the Section 1206 
programs. 

DOD also stated that, in the future, it requests that GAO extend it 
the courtesy of a formal out brief prior to releasing the draft report 
to the Congress. We acknowledge the importance of holding exit 
meetings with agency officials. As such, our protocol is to offer an 
exit meeting with agency officials after our data collection and 
analysis are complete. We requested an exit with DOD on January 28, 
2013. However, due to the limited availability of the designated DOD 
policy official with oversight of U.S. efforts in Lebanon and a 
subsequent change in the designated official, we were not able to hold 
the exit meeting until February 15, 2013. DOD was provided a draft of 
the report in advance of the exit meeting. DOD's technical comments 
provided at this meeting were incorporated in the report, as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees and the Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, the 
report is available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We assessed the extent to which the U.S. government, from fiscal years 
2007 through 2012, (1) adjusted its strategic goals and security 
assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance programs for 
Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of 
security assistance programs in Lebanon. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has adjusted its 
strategic goals and security assistance programs in Lebanon, we 
reviewed documents from the Department of State (State) and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal years 2007 through 2012, 
including Mission Strategic and Resource Plans for Lebanon, 
congressional budget justifications, country plans, and other relevant 
documents. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials from State and 
DOD. At State headquarters in Washington, D.C., we spoke with 
officials from the Bureaus of Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International 
Security and Nonproliferation, and Political-Military Affairs, and 
from the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources. Within DOD, we 
met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Washington, D.C., area, as 
well as officials of the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special 
Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. In addition, we met with U.S. 
officials and officials of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese 
Internal Security Forces at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government funded security 
assistance programs for Lebanon Armed Forces and Lebanese Internal 
Security Forces from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, we analyzed 
budget and funding data from State and DOD. Recognizing that different 
agencies and bureaus may use slightly different accounting terms, we 
provided State with the definitions from GAO's A Glossary of Terms 
Used in the Federal Budget Process (GAO-05-734SP) and requested that 
it provide the relevant data according to those definitions. State 
provided data on the status of allocations, obligations, unobligated 
balances, and disbursements as of September 30, 2012, for funding 
accounts that supported security assistance in Lebanon: International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; International Military 
Education and Training; Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs; and the Section 1206 and Section 1207 authorities. 
State collected the data directly from each bureau if it was a State-
implemented account. However, because Foreign Military Financing funds 
are budgeted and tracked in a different way than other foreign 
assistance accounts, DOD provided us with data on allocations and 
commitments. All data pertain to overt activities and are nominal 
numbers that have not been adjusted for inflation. We also discussed 
the types and amounts of assistance provided with various officials of 
the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces. 
To assess the reliability of the data provided, we requested and 
reviewed information from officials from each agency regarding the 
agency's underlying financial data system or systems and the checks, 
controls, and reviews used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of 
the data provided. We determined that the data provided were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has evaluated the 
effectiveness of its security assistance programs in Lebanon, we 
reviewed relevant State and DOD documents, including an independent 
evaluation of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs' police training program in Lebanon, DOD's Section 
1206 Assessment Handbook, and various State and DOD program and 
country assessments. We also examined State evaluation guidelines, 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
evaluation guidance, various bureau evaluation plans, and other 
documents. Furthermore, we reviewed relevant GAO reports, including 
those that discussed how agencies measure program performance. We also 
reviewed special GAO publications on performance measurement and 
evaluation. In addition, we interviewed officials from State and DOD 
in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and 
DOD officials at the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations 
Command in Tampa, Florida. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Status of Funds for U.S. Security Assistance Programs for 
Lebanon: 

This appendix provides additional information on Department of State 
(State) and Department of Defense (DOD) programs used to provide 
security assistance to Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. 
State and DOD utilized eight programs to provide more than $925 
million in security assistance to Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 
through 2012. The majority of security assistance (95 percent) was 
provided through three programs: Foreign Military Financing, 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and the 
Section 1206 authority. Specifically, this appendix provides 
additional information on the Foreign Military Financing, INCLE, and 
the Section 1206 authority such as selected equipment and training 
provided and the status of funds including allocation, obligation, and 
commitment or disbursement of funds for the other five programs. 

Foreign Military Financing: 

Foreign Military Financing Background: 

State administers Foreign Military Financing funding, with significant 
input from embassies, DOD, and the regional military commands. DOD’s 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency executes the program. Foreign 
Military Financing provides grants and loans to foreign governments and
international organizations for the acquisition of U.S. defense
equipment, services, and training. 

This funding is available for obligation for 1 year and is considered 
obligated upon apportionment based on annual appropriations bill 
language.[Footnote 24] Once the period of availability for new 
obligations expires, the funds are available for an additional 5 years
to liquidate obligations.[Footnote 25] The funds remain entirely 
within the U.S. government until the point at which payments are made 
to defense companies for goods and services rendered. 

Figure 5: Status of Foreign Military Financing Funds to Lebanon, Fiscal 
Year 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Allocated: $224,800,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $2,355,000; 
Committed: $222,445,000. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Allocated: $6,943,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $0; 
Committed: $6,943,000. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Allocated: $159,700,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $0; 
Committed: $159,700,000. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Allocated: $100,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $401,000; 
Committed: $99,599,000. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Allocated: $74,850,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $2,978,000; 
Committed: $71,872,000. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Allocated: $75,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Uncommitted: $0; 
Committed: $75,000,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: We are not able to present data on Foreign Military Financing 
for Lebanon in the same way as the other programs because its funds 
are budgeted and tracked in a different way than the other program 
funds and the system that is used does not track information 
consistent with the way we are presenting the data for the other 
programs. For the purposes of this report, “uncommitted” amounts 
represent Foreign Military Financing obligations not yet committed for 
expenditure and “committed” amounts include funding that has been 
committed but not yet disbursed, as well as Foreign Military Financing
funding that has been disbursed to a case. 

[End of figure] 

[End of fact sheet] 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

INCLE Background: 

State administers the INCLE program and uses it to assist the
Government of Lebanon in developing its law enforcement and
judicial capacity. These funds are generally available for obligation 
for 2 years. Once the period of availability for new obligations 
expires, the funds are available for an additional 5 years to liquidate
the obligations.[Footnote 26] The period of availability for 
obligations of INCLE funds may be extended for an additional 4 years 
in certain cases.[Footnote 27] 

From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, State allocated a total of $130 
million in INCLE funds for Lebanon. While most of the allocated funds 
have been obligated, about 40 percent of total allocated funds from 
fiscal years 2007 through 2012 have been disbursed (see figure 6). 
According to State, fiscal year 2007 marked the first allocation of 
INCLE funds for Lebanon. In Lebanon, the INCLE program has funded the 
construction of a police station building and the purchase of riot 
helmets and batons, pistols, and police vehicles, among other 
equipment. In addition, the INCLE program has funded training and
technical assistance to the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, 
including, for example, courses in community policing. 

Figure 6: Status of INCLE Funds to Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Allocated: $62,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $272,000; 
Unliquidated obligations: $5,351,000; 
Disbursed: $56,377,000. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Allocated: $496,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $496,000. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Allocated: $6,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,000; 
Unliquidated obligations: $44,000; 
Disbursed: $5,955,000. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Allocated: $20,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $7,428,000; 
Disbursed: $12,572,000. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Allocated: $19,500,000; 
Unobligated balance: $20,000; 
Unliquidated obligations: $16,095,000; 
Disbursed: $3,385,000. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Allocated: $24,000,000; 
Unobligated balance: $13,672,000; 
Unliquidated obligations: $10,003,000; 
Disbursed: $325,000. 
                  
Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal years 2007, 
2009, and 2011 are no longer available for obligation. 

[End of figure] 

[End of fact sheet] 

Section 1206 Authority: 

Section 1206 Background: 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as 
amended, established the authority for Section 1206 programs to train 
and equip foreign national military and nonmilitary maritime forces, 
such as coast guards, to conduct counterterrorist operations or to 
support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed 
forces are a participant.[Footnote 28] 

State and DOD jointly administer Section 1206 assistance. Funded
from the DOD operations and maintenance accounts, Section 1206 funds 
remain available for 1 year for obligation. Once the period of 
availability for new obligations expires, the funds are available for 
an additional 5 years to liquidate the obligations.[Footnote 29] 

From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, DOD allocated a total of $111 
million through the Section 1206 program for Lebanon (see figure 7). 
State reported that all allocated funds from fiscal years 2007 through 
2012 have been obligated and disbursed. 

For Lebanon, Section 1206 funding has provided vehicle spare parts, 
ammunition, and other basic supplies to the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF). In particular, equipment provided under Section 1206 was used 
to restock the LAF arsenal with basic ammunition after the 2007 siege 
at Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and to begin to build the 
LAF’s first secure communications system. 

Figure 7: Status of Section 1206 Authority Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal 
Years 2007-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Allocated: $30,397,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $30,397,000. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Allocated: $15,120,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $15,120,000. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Allocated: $49,240,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $49,240,000. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Allocated: $16,582,000; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $16,582,000. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Allocated: $0; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Allocated: $0; 
Unobligated balance: $0; 
Unliquidated obligations: $0; 
Disbursed: $0. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of fact sheet] 

Additional Programs Providing Security Assistance to Lebanon: 

Background: 

In addition to the Foreign Military Financing, INCLE, and Section
1206 programs, State and DOD provided security assistance to Lebanon 
through five other programs: Antiterrorism Assistance, International 
Military Education and Training, Section 1207 Train and Equip, Export 
Control and Related Border Security, and Counterterrorism Financing. 
See tables 2 through 6 for details on allocation, obligation, and 
disbursement of funds by these programs for security assistance for 
Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. 

Table 2: International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, 
Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Allocated: 
FY2007: $872,000; 
FY2008: $1,408,000; 
FY2009: $2,137,000; 
FY2010: $2,406,000; 
FY2011: $2,497,000; 
FY2012: $2,364,000. 

Unobligated balance: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Unliquidated obligations: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $56,000; 
FY2009: $160,000; 
FY2010: $219,000; 
FY2011: $437,000; 
FY2012: $1,901,000. 

Disbursed: 
FY2007: $872,000; 
FY2008: $1,352,000; 
FY2009: $1,977,000; 
FY2010: $2,187,000; 
FY2011: $2,060,000; 
FY2012: $463,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: State’s Bureau for Political-Military Affairs manages the IMET 
budget with input from DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
which implements the program. IMET funds are generally available for 
obligation for 1 year and are available for expenditure for an 
additional 5 years after the end of their period of availability for 
obligation. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs (NADR): Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Allocated: 
FY2007: $6,500,000; 
FY2008: $3,646,000; 
FY2009: $3,714,000; 
FY2010: $4,604,000; 
FY2011: $2,000,000; 
FY2012: $2,000,000. 

Unobligated balance: 
FY2007: $90,000; 
FY2008: $66,000; 
FY2009: $16,000; 
FY2010: $24,000; 
FY2011: $140,000; 
FY2012: $802,000. 

Unliquidated obligations: 
FY2007: $562,000; 
FY2008: $417,000; 
FY2009: $758,000; 
FY2010: $628,000; 
FY2011: $584,000; 
FY2012: $1,186,000. 

Disbursed: 
FY2007: $5,848,000; 
FY2008: $3,162,000; 
FY2009: $2,940,000; 
FY2010: $3,953,000; 
FY2011: $1,276,000; 
FY2012: $12,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Notes: NADR funding supports the Antiterrorism Assistance program, 
which is managed and implemented by State with some implementation by 
a broader set of agencies. Antiterrorism Assistance funds are 
generally available for obligation for 2 years. All NADR obligations 
continue to be available for expenditure for an additional 5 years 
after the end of their period of availability for obligation. 

According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal years 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, and 2011 are no longer available for obligation. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: NADR: Counterterrosim Financing Program, Fiscal Years 2007-
2012: 

Allocated: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $166,000
FY2012: $0. 

Unobligated balance: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Unliquidated obligations: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $166,000; 
FY2012: $0. 

Disbursed: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: NADR funding supports the Counterterrorism Financing program, 
which is managed and implemented by State with some implementation by 
a broader set of agencies. Counterterrorism Financing funds are 
generally available for obligation for 2 years. All NADR obligations 
continue to be available for expenditure for an additional 5 years 
after the end of their period of availability for obligation. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: NADR: Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Allocated: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $400,000; 
FY2010: $800,000; 
FY2011: $800,000; 
FY2012: $1,050,000. 

Unobligated balance: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $2,000; 
FY2012: $583,000. 

Unliquidated obligations: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $2,000; 
FY2011: $395,000; 
FY2012: $94,000. 

Disbursed: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $0; 
FY2009: $400,000; 
FY2010: $798,000; 
FY2011: $403,000; 
FY2012: $373,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Notes: NADR funding supports the EXBS program, which is managed and 
implemented by State with some implementation by a broader set of 
agencies. EXBS funds are generally available for obligation for 2 
years. All NADR obligations continue to be available for expenditure 
for an additional 5 years after the end of their period of 
availability of availability. 

According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal year 2011 are not 
available for obligation. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Section 1207 Train and Equip Authority, Fiscal Year 2007-2012: 

Allocated: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $4,850,000; 
FY2009: $508,000; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Unobligated balance: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $1,120,000; 
FY2009: $508,000; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Unliquidated obligations: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $147,000; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Disbursed: 
FY2007: $0; 
FY2008: $3,583,000; 
FY2009: $0; 
FY2010: $0; 
FY2011: $0; 
FY2012: $0. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Notes: While funded through DOD, Section 1207 funds were transferred 
to State for management. 

The authority for Section 1207 expired at the end of fiscal year 2010. 
When Section 1207 funds were transferred to State, they became "no 
year" money and will remain available until expended. 

[End of table] 

[End of fact sheet] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Selected Security Equipment and Services Provided to 
Lebanon by the U.S. Government and Other Governments: 

Table 7 presents selected security equipment and services provided by 
the United States to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) through the 
Foreign Military Financing and Section 1206 programs from fiscal years 
2007 through 2012. According to data provided by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, 78 cases[Footnote 23] were approved for Lebanon 
during this time frame and ranged in value from $18,000 to $38.2 
million. The defense articles or services are listed in descending 
order based on the total estimated case value as reported by the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Table 8 presents selected 
security equipment or funding provided by countries other than the 
United States to the LAF, as reported by the LAF. Countries are listed 
in descending order based on the estimated value of security 
assistance provided. 

Table 7: Selected Security Equipment or Service Provided by the United 
States to Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012: 

Defense article or service in selected cases: High-mobility multi-
purpose wheeled vehicles; 
Description: Provision includes trucks, ambulances, cargo troop 
carriers, armament vehicles, trailers, and tractors; 
Total estimated value: $38.2 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Coastal security crafts; 
Description: Provision of ships to monitor and patrol territorial 
waters; 
Total estimated value: $36.6 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Signal equipment; 
Description: Communications equipment including radios and training; 
Total estimated value: $31.7 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Trunked radio system; 
Description: Handheld and fixed radio installations and training; 
Total estimated value: $30.9 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Caravan aircraft; 
Description: One Caravan aircraft, including missiles; 
Total estimated value: $27.8 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Spare parts and follow-on 
support; 
Description: Spare parts and follow-on support for tactical vehicle 
and communications equipment; 
Total estimated value: $23.5 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Ammunition; 
Description: Ammunition cartridges, components, and publications; 
Total estimated value: $20.6 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Training; 
Description: Security Assistance Team Training; 
Total estimated value: $18.6 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Helicopter spare parts; 
Description: Spare parts for UH-1H helicopters, including communication 
equipment support; 
Total estimated value: $16.2 million. 

Defense article or service in selected cases: Ammunition; 
Description: Ammunition cartridges, publications; 
Total estimated value: $15.2 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Security Cooperation Agency data. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Selected Security Equipment or Funding Provided by Other 
Countries to Lebanon: 

Donor country: United Arab Emirates; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Puma and Gazelle Helicopters; 
* M60-A3 tanks; 
* Trucks, vehicles and boats; 
* Body armor; 
* Tactical radios; 
Estimated value: $150 million. 

Donor country: Saudi Arabia; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Cash; 
* Civilian vehicles; 
* Ammunition; 
Estimated value: $65 million (cash); $2.3 million (equipment). 

Donor country: Qatar; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Helicopters; 
* Vehicles; 
* Spare parts; 
Estimated value: $38.3 million. 

Donor country: Eight other countries or entities, combined[A]; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Logistics support and equipment; 
Estimated value: $21 million. 

Donor country: Poland; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Small arms; 
* Ammunition; 
Estimated value: $20.9 million. 

Donor country: Germany; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Naval radars and equipment; 
* Patrol boats; 
* Vehicle and thermal cameras; 
Estimated value: $12 million. 

Donor country: France; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Body armor; 
* Sniper rifles and ammunition; 
Estimated value: $10.8 million. 

Donor country: Italy; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Excess defense articles such as vehicles, spare parts; 
Estimated value: $3 million. 

Donor country: United Kingdom; 
Defense article or funding: 
* Anti-riot equipment; 
* Explosive ordnance disposal system; 
Estimated value: $2.7 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of LAF information. 

[A] The other countries or entities include China, the Czech Republic, 
the European Union, Greece, Holland, Kuwait, Malaysia, and the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Comptroller: 
1969 Dyess Avenue: 
Charleston, SC 29405: 

March 5, 2013: 

Dr. Loren Yager: 
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Dr. Yager: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Security 
Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of U.S. Aid 
to Lebanon's Security Forces" GAO Job Code 320918. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Todd Gobeille, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Political and 
Military Affairs at (202) 663-1271. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: 
GAO — Charles M. Johnson: 
PM — Andrew J. Shapiro: 
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Security Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness
of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces (GAO-13-289, GAO Code 320918): 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft 
report entitled "Security Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine 
Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces." 

As noted in the report, U.S. security assistance programs serve 
several important goals, including assisting the Government of Lebanon 
to establish sovereignty and counter extremists. More specifically, 
the U.S. designed the Lebanese security assistance program to advance 
U.S. foreign policy goals of promoting Lebanon's stability; implement 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1559 and 1701; 
counter terrorism; and advance the extension of Lebanese government 
control throughout the country — especially in the south, along the 
border, and in Palestinian refugee camps. While the Department agrees 
with the GAO's finding that evaluations would improve our ability to 
determine the effectiveness of our security assistance, the 
qualitative versus quantitative nature of security assistance makes 
formal evaluation of such programs a unique challenge. Lebanon is a 
good example wherein our security assistance program involves complex 
program goals, and thereby requires a carefully designed evaluation 
framework. 

Short of formal program evaluation relative to Lebanon, we rely on 
feedback from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and DoD implementers to 
shape Department-provided military assistance. The GAO report notes 
that the LAF conducts periodic Joint Capabilities Reviews (JCR) with 
the U.S. Government, to include the Department of State. These reviews 
provide critical assessments of Lebanese security capabilities. The 
Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) leverages these 
assessments, along with Mission Resource Requests from Embassy Beirut 
and capability assessments from U.S. Central Command, to support 
security assistance funding allocations for FMF each year. 
Additionally, the Department completes an annual Performance Plan and 
Report of all its programs in Lebanon, and many of the Department's 
individual assistance programs have evaluation criteria and indicators 
built into their implementing mechanisms. In short, the Department 
uses all available information to inform the direction of our civilian 
and military assistance programs. We believe that these reviews 
provide a limited, but significant, evaluative role in determining the 
effectiveness of our assistance. 

With respect to the Department's Evaluation Policy, State, as the lead 
institution for the conduct of American diplomacy, is committed to 
using performance management best practices, including where feasible, 
program evaluation, to achieve the most effective U.S. foreign policy 
outcomes and greater accountability to our primary stakeholders. The 
assistance we provide to Lebanon's security forces is no exception. We 
recognize that a robust, coordinated and targeted evaluation function 
is essential to the ability of the Department to measure and monitor 
program performance; make decisions for programmatic adjustments and 
changes; document program impact; identify best practices and lessons 
learned; help assess return on investment; provide inputs for policy, 
planning and budget decisions; and assure accountability to the 
American people. 

The Department established its evaluation policy in February 2012, and 
as the report points out, the PM Bureau is developing a global 
monitoring and evaluation plan to cover its programs. The FMF and IMET 
accounts managed by the PM Bureau, and implemented by DoD, provided 
over $6.4 billion in assistance to 138 countries in FY 2012 alone. 
Given the scope of our activities, anticipated size of our global 
evaluation efforts, and the need to secure resources in order to 
conduct evaluations, the PM Bureau has committed to begin these 
activities in FY 2014. Although we are still in the process of 
developing a multi-year monitoring and evaluation plan, we recognize 
Lebanon as an eligible evaluation target, in accordance with State 
policy. This plan will include performance indicators that are 
specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented. 

The Department appreciates the GAO's recommendations for enhancing our 
assistance programs in Lebanon, concurs with the recommendations 
suggested, and will continue to improve program evaluation efforts. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Under Secretary of Defense: 
Policy: 
2000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C.20301-2000: 

Mr. Charles Johnson, Jr.
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, 
GAO -12-289, "Security Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine 
Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces," dated 
February 5, 2013 (GAO Code 320918). Thank you for the opportunity to 
provide comments on the GAO draft report. 

The Department of Defense generally concurs in the recommendations of 
the report, as explained in the enclosed comments. In the future, we 
request that the GAO extend to us the courtesy of a formal out brief 
prior to releasing the draft report to the Congress. The FOC for the 
following is the undersigned. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Matthew J. Spence: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Middle East}: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated February 5, 2013: 
GAO-12-289 (GAO Code 320918): 

Security Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of 
U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces: 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, complete plans to evaluate the effectiveness of 
security assistance programs in Lebanon, including milestone dates for 
implementing the plans. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense {DoD) will coordinate 
with the Department of State to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Lebanon's security forces with clear metrics that can be evaluated and 
communicated back to Congress. 

Recommendation 3: Secretary of Defense develop performance indicators 
for DoD's security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, 
measurable, and outcome-oriented. 

DoD Response: Concur. DoD will improve assessment and evaluation 
metrics as suggested by the report, including reviewing metrics 
established to measure the results of assistance provided under 
Section 1206 and Section 1207 authority. The GAO report noted the 
difficulty of creating performance indicators that effectively measure 
DoD's security assistance programs. Part of the difficulty in 
establishing these indicators is due to force protection restrictions 
on U.S. military personnel, limiting engagement with the Lebanese 
Armed Forces {LAF). DoD will work with the Department of State to 
address these limitations. Not indicated in the GAO Report are DoD's 
current evaluating programs that utilize key baseline documents like 
the Joint Capabilities Review. The Office of Defense Cooperation (DM) 
and others also routinely assess and evaluate security assistance 
programs in a holistic context. As a result, the performance of the 
LAF has improved as demonstrated by their ability to prevent civil war 
in Syria from spreading into Lebanon. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jeff Phillips (Assistant 
Director); Jenna Beveridge; Teakoe S. Coleman; David Dayton; and La 
Verne Tharpes made key contributions to this report. Martin de 
Alteriis, Grace Lui, and Jeremy Sebest provided additional technical 
assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to State and DOD officials, there is no consensus about 
whether some funding accounts that support security cooperation or 
security sector reform should be labeled "assistance." For the 
purposes of this report, however, we consider those accounts that 
funded overt security-related activities in Lebanon to be security 
assistance. Specifically, these funding accounts include Foreign 
Military Financing; International Military Education and Training; 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Section 1206 authority; 
and Section 1207 authority. 

[2] S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1701 (2006). 

[3] According to State, U.S. goals support the implementation of 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution, 
adopted on August 11, 2006, includes a statement emphasizing the 
importance of the extension of the control of the Government of 
Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. According to State, full 
implementation of the resolution is a key priority for the United 
States. 

[4] The Blue Line is the line of Israeli withdrawal recognized by the 
United Nations in 2000 and is not the Israeli-Lebanese border. 

[5] The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is an independent judicial 
organization composed of Lebanese and international judges. Its 
primary mandate is to hold trials for the people accused of carrying 
out the attack on February 14, 2005, which killed 23 people, including 
the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and injured many 
others. 

[6] Of the $325 million in security assistance allocated in fiscal 
year 2007, roughly $280 million was allocated from supplemental 
appropriations. Fiscal year 2009 security assistance allocations also 
included funding allocated from supplemental appropriations. 
Appropriations for subsequent fiscal years support the continuation of 
these efforts, albeit at lower levels. 

[7] Foreign Military Financing funds are budgeted and tracked in a 
different way than the other foreign assistance accounts in this 
report. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense 
Financing and Accounting Service (DFAS) are responsible for the 
financial systems that account for Foreign Military Financing funds, 
as well as for tracking the implementation and expenditure of those 
funds. Furthermore, DSCA's system can only track Foreign Military 
Financing uncommitted and committed amounts, not unliquidated 
obligations or disbursements. DFAS tracks disbursements using the 
Defense Integrated Finance System; however, there is no direct link 
between the DSCA and DFAS systems. As a result, DSCA was not able to 
provide data on unliquidated obligations or disbursements but did 
provide us with data on Foreign Military Financing allocations and 
commitments for Lebanon. 

[8] The six other ongoing programs are the Foreign Military Financing, 
IMET, Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, EXBS 
program, and 1206 programs. Section 1207 authority expired on 
September 31, 2010. 

[9] GAO, International Military Education and Training: Agencies 
Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-123] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 27, 2011). 

[10] GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve 
Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 
and 1207 Assistance Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 
2010). 

[11] The act requires agencies to develop objective, quantifiable, and 
measurable goals and report progress against those goals. Pub. L. No. 
111-352, 124 Stat. 3866. 

[12] State defines the "lifetime" of a large program, project, or 
activity as the implementation period of that program, project, or 
activity, and defines "large" in terms of dollar value or the size of 
staff resources devoted to the effort. Under this policy, individual 
bureaus may use other criteria as well and are responsible for 
determining the selection, timing, process, and manner of evaluation 
for specific programs, projects, and activities. 

[13] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[14] GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and 
Relationships, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-646SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2011). 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431]. 

[16] These mission-level plans document the overarching foreign policy 
basis for U.S. embassy and consulate activities for the budget year 
and beyond. 

[17] The Theater Campaign Plans are intended to organize and align 
operations, activities, events, and investments in time, space, and 
purpose to achieve strategic effect rather than operational effect. 

[18] The training provided by the Counterterrorism Financing program 
is expected to be completed prior to September 30, 2015, according to 
State officials. End-of-course evaluations completed by students will 
be submitted to State after completion of the training. The Bureau of 
Counterterrorism also reviews assessments conducted by the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut and by other organizations for information to help 
develop programs, integrate them with efforts by other countries, and 
provide indicators of Lebanon's progress. 

[19] GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism 
Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of 
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

[20] Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of 
the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries under the Bureaus 
of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs, AUD/MERO-
12-29 (Washington, D.C.: April 2012). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-123]. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431]. 

[23] Cases can include more than one item or service; case value 
refers to the total value for all items and services listed with a 
unique case identifier. 

[24] Annual appropriations for Foreign Military Financing generally 
have contained language stating that Foreign Military Financing funds 
shall be obligated upon apportionment. For the most recent 
appropriations containing this language, see the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, December 23, 2011. 

[25] Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications. 

[26] Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications. 

[27] Pursuant to authority generally provided in the annual Department 
of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
certain funds that have been deobligated remain available for 
obligation for an additional 4 years from the date on which the 
availability of such funds would otherwise expire if the funds were 
initially obligated before they would have expired. 

[28] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, § 1206. 

[29] Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications. 

[End of section] 

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