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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

January 2013: 

Army Networks: 

Size and Scope of Modernization Investment Merit Increased Oversight: 

GAO-13-179: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-179, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an 
information network-—sensors, software, and radios—-to give soldiers 
the exact information they need, when they need it, in any 
environment. Such a network is expected to improve situational 
awareness and decision making in combat. Under its network 
modernization strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process 
intended to leverage industry technology solutions. The Army estimates 
that it will require about $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013. As requested, 
this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Army’s network 
strategy and agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, 
security, and readiness; and (2) the Army’s strategy faces other risks 
and challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed key documents, 
observed testing activities, and interviewed acquisition officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army has taken a number of steps to begin executing its network 
strategy and agile process, including establishing a baseline network 
architecture for Army communications. The Army’s agile process 
involves seven phases and three decision points to allow officials to 
quickly evaluate emerging networking technologies to determine if they 
address capability gaps and can be deployed to the field. However, the 
network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet executed 
one full cycle of the agile process. The Army’s strategy addresses 
some aspects of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, 
but as implementation is still under way, data for assessing progress 
are not available at this time. Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to 
spend billions of dollars netting together dozens of disparate systems 
to form a network that is intended to enhance warfighter effectiveness 
and survivability. Specifically, the Army has identified that over $3 
billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for 
investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of 
the Army’s most costly investments. To help determine that 
technologies meet prescribed levels of technical maturity, the Army 
has established a laboratory-based screening process for evaluating 
technologies, and those that show promise move to evaluations in a 
realistic environment with soldiers and testers. To help provide 
security and information assurance, the Army is working with 
contractors and the National Security Agency to obtain appropriate 
certifications prior to fielding new networking technologies. 
Furthermore, the Army is attempting to align the procurement and 
fielding of networking systems with the relatively fixed schedules for 
equipping and training units before they are deployed. The challenge 
will be to ensure that the equipment being sent to the field has been 
thoroughly demonstrated and that fielding decisions are not made 
solely to accommodate deployment cycles. 

The overall scope and cost of the Army’s new network strategy, as well 
as other factors unique to the strategy, present significant risks and 
challenges and deserve high-level oversight attention by both the Army 
and the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, the Army wants to 
field smaller quantities with greater frequency to be able to take 
advantage of new and improved capabilities as they become available, 
thus avoiding long-term procurements of outdated technology and 
potentially helping to realize savings in development, testing, and 
maintenance costs. However, the Army is still weighing funding and 
contracting options that would allow it to accomplish this goal while 
adhering to established acquisition and budget processes that may 
require long lead time to acquire these technologies. DOD guidance 
calls for measuring actual contributions of information technology 
portfolios, which includes the Army network, against established 
outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability 
and allow for adjustments in the mix of portfolio investments. Senior 
DOD officials provided extensive input on the soundness of individual 
network components and the schedule for fielding equipment and have 
offered that future evaluations in an operational environment present 
a good opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the network. 
However, the Army and DOD have not yet fully defined quantifiable 
network performance measures or plans to periodically review and 
evaluate the actual effectiveness of new Army network capabilities. 
Inadequate oversight of the portfolio could put the investment at 
risk. Finally, budget justification and other planning materials for 
network equipment-—over 50 research and development and procurement 
budget elements—-are not organized to provide insight into the budget 
for and affordability of the entire network. Given the magnitude and 
financial commitment envisioned, a consolidated reporting and 
budgeting framework could yield more consistency and clarity in the 
justifications for Army network initiatives and facilitate 
congressional oversight. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To help ensure adequate oversight, GAO recommends that the Secretary 
of Defense (1) define quantifiable outcome-based performance metrics 
for network equipment; (2) develop a plan for future network 
evaluations to determine if those measures have been met; and (3) 
evaluate fielded network performance and make recommendations for 
adjustments, as necessary. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of 
Defense consolidate Army tactical network budget elements and 
justifications into a single area of the Army budget submittal. DOD 
generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it has 
initiated actions to address several of the challenges identified in 
the report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-179]. For more 
information, contact Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or 
martinb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Army Moving Ahead but Its Network Strategy Is Still Evolving: 

Army's Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face Other 
Risks and Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Army Mission Command Essential Capabilities: 

Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network Capability Gaps and 
Descriptions: 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2013 Requested Funding for Network-Enabled 
Mission Command: 

Table 2: Capability Set 13 Systems: 

Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Agile Process: 

Figure 2: Army Force Generation Model: 

Abbreviations: 

COE: Common Operating Environment: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DP: Decision Point: 

IT: Information Technology: 

JIIM: Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational: 

NIE: Network Integration Evaluation: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

USD(AT&L): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 10, 2013: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Adam Smith: 
House of Representatives: 

For nearly two decades, the Army has had various initiatives under way 
to improve situational awareness and enhance the decision making of 
soldiers and commanders through the increased use of information 
technology. While these initiatives resulted in some capability 
advancements in the Army's network capabilities, they fell far short 
of their objectives, resulting in what the Army believes is a loosely 
coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, and services as 
opposed to a networked system of weapons and other equipment. The Army 
is now implementing a new agile process, through which it will seek to 
leverage industry solutions with less systems development by the Army 
in modernizing its tactical network to give soldiers the exact 
information they need, when they need it, in any environment. Under 
this process, the Army plans to field smaller quantities more 
frequently, allowing it to procure and field new and improved 
capabilities as they become available. Army officials believe this 
would allow the Army to avoid long-term procurements of outdated 
technology and potentially help realize savings in development, 
testing, and maintenance costs. Army leadership has identified the 
network as the service's number one modernization priority and 
estimates that it will require $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013 funding for 
its network initiatives. 

Because of the network's importance, the ambitious nature of the 
current network modernization strategy, and the department's track 
record with system acquisitions over the past decade, you asked us to 
examine various elements of the new process the Army is using to 
acquire network capabilities. As agreed with committee staff, we will 
address issues related to the acquisition process, evaluation of new 
and current network capabilities, and current plans to purchase radios 
and other communications equipment in phases. In this first report, we 
address (1) the extent to which the Army's network modernization 
strategy and agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, 
security, and readiness; and (2) other risks and challenges facing 
implementation of the Army's network strategy and agile process. 

To conduct this work, we reviewed the Army's approach to modernizing 
network equipment and evaluated it against DOD policies and best 
practices. We observed testing, visited laboratory facilities, 
interviewed acquisition and test officials, and analyzed key 
documentation. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is 
included in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January 2013 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Over the last two decades, the Army began transforming its warfighting 
capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex set of 
potential threats with smaller, adaptable, more agile and deployable 
brigade combat teams. The Army wanted the force components--soldiers, 
platforms, weapons, and sensors--to be "net-centric," that is, closely 
linked and able to operate seamlessly together. The Army took initial 
steps toward transformation through its Digitization program in the 
1990s by installing computers, software, and interfaces to 
communications systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and 
other vehicles in selected units that enable both in-theater and 
higher commands to share battlefield data with lower-level units. 

About 10 years ago, the Army envisioned the Future Combat System as 
the culminating stage in the Army's ongoing transformation to a 
lighter, more agile and capable force. Future Combat System was a 
large and complex development effort to provide a networked family of 
weapons and other systems for the future force. Ultimately, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) issued an acquisition decision memorandum that canceled the 
Future Combat System development effort. Subsequently, the Army 
established the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team program to 
demonstrate, among other things, improved network technology and 
sensors that had been part of the Future Combat System. However, faced 
with disappointing test results and high costs, DOD directed the Army 
to cease these developmental efforts, eventually canceling the program 
in February 2011. 

Over the last decade, most network improvements fielded by the Army 
were focused on supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and were 
expensive and time consuming. The Army's development and fielding 
efforts for network technologies were not well synchronized. Funding 
and timelines for network-related programs were rarely, if ever, 
aligned. Capabilities were fielded piecemeal and integration with 
existing technology was largely the responsibility of the user. 
Current battle command network components were developed to address a 
range of capabilities and have resulted in what the Army believes is a 
loosely coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, services, 
and transport (i.e., the means of moving information). The decade of 
conflict also provided the Army with a set of "lessons learned" that 
have shaped the adoption of the new approach intended to accelerate 
the introduction of advanced information technology capabilities to 
the warfighter, especially those engaged at the tactical edge (i.e., 
the forward battle lines). In December 2011, Army leaders finalized 
the Network-enabled Mission Command Initial Capabilities Document, 
which serves as a foundational document in support of Army Network 
Modernization and describes the essential network capabilities 
required. We have included a listing of the essential network 
capabilities in appendix II. These capabilities support an Army 
mission command capability defined by a coherent network of command 
posts, aerial and ground platforms, manned and unmanned sensors, and 
dismounted soldiers that are linked by an integrated suite of mission 
command systems and connected by a robust transport layer capable of 
delivering voice, data, imagery, and video to the tactical edge. The 
Initial Capabilities Document also defined scores of capability gaps 
that exist with current Army networks. We have included a listing of 
the highest priority capability gaps in appendix III. 

The Army's network modernization strategy focuses on addressing four 
factors that Army leaders believe are at the root of the Army's 
network challenges: 

* a lack of common technical standards, 

* unsynchronized acquisition timelines, 

* no visibility at the enterprise (top) level, and: 

* test and acquisition processes that they believe result in the 
fielding of outdated technology. 

In response, the Army has fundamentally changed the way it develops, 
evaluates, tests, and delivers networked capability to its operating 
forces. The Army is shelving its inadequate, disjointed process in 
favor of an approach it calls capability set management. 

Under capability set management, the Army evaluates the current 
operational environment and then designs a suite of systems and 
equipment, a "capability set," to answer the projected requirements of 
a 1-year period. Instead of developing an ultimate capability and 
buying enough to cover the entire force, the Army plans to buy only 
what is needed for units preparing to deploy. Every year, the Army 
will integrate the next capability set, which will reflect any changes 
or advances in technology realized since the last set was fielded. The 
Army is using this approach to manage network capabilities as a 
cohesive portfolio and synchronize all supporting activities. The Army 
numbers these sets to coincide with its upcoming training and fielding 
schedule to give units ample time to (1) integrate the new 
capabilities and (2) train with the systems before deploying to 
theater. For example, network capabilities being ready for fielding in 
2013 are labeled capability set 13. 

In support of capability sets, the Army has formulated an agile 
process that will rely heavily on industry to fill those networking 
capability gaps using nondevelopmental items or commercial-off-the-
shelf options, meaning the Army will do less system development. 
[Footnote 1] The Army's agile process involves seven phases and three 
decision points intended to identify proposed solutions that can be 
evaluated for feasibility to address an identified need and can be 
deployed to the field. This approach is also designed to help the Army 
cull out network system candidates that either may not be an 
appropriate solution or may not be technically ready for evaluation. 
Figure 1 illustrates the agile process. The Army believes this process 
will allow for both large-and small-scale industry involvement that 
could lead to increased competition and lower costs. 

Figure 1: The Agile Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Phase 0: 
Define Gaps. 

Phase 1: 
Solicit potential solutions. 

DP1: Viable candidate list. 

Phase II: Candidate assessment. 

DP2: Candidates selected for evaluation. 

Phase III: Evaluation preparation. 

Phase IV: Integration rehearsal. 

Phase V: Integration evaluation. 

Phase VI: Implementation plan. 

DP3: Solution implementation decision. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

To implement this agile process, the Army sends out sources sought 
notices to attract proposed solutions to identified network capability 
gaps and evaluates each of the proposed solutions at decision points 
after key phases.[Footnote 2] The Army initially screens proposals at 
Phase I to determine which systems will proceed further into the 
process. The Army screens systems again during a laboratory validation 
in Phase II. The Army notifies contractors as to whether their systems 
will be allowed to advance to the evaluation phase, where candidate 
systems are integrated with existing network capabilities and tested 
with a full Army brigade. If the system performs well at the 
evaluation, the Army decides whether or not to buy and field it. 

Equipped with every vehicle platform currently in the Army inventory, 
the 2nd brigade, 1st armored division assigned to Brigade 
Modernization Command leads phases III to V of the process and is 
responsible for executing the Network Integration Evaluations (NIE), 
which are held semi-annually and typically last for approximately 6 
weeks.[Footnote 3] The NIEs are designed to replicate current real-
world conditions and include systems already fielded to the 
operational theater. Soldiers, combat developers, training developers, 
materiel developers, and engineers participate in each event, 
providing feedback as the evaluation progresses. NIEs provide a venue 
for operational testing of formal acquisition programs and for 
demonstrating government and industry provided systems under 
evaluation in an operational environment. Army leaders use information 
from NIEs to inform decisions on what to send to the field. With this 
large-scale and centralized testing process, the Army intends to 
validate new technology as it becomes available; select the best 
candidates for quick insertion into operational units; and refine 
tactics, techniques, and procedures very quickly to eventually relieve 
or reduce the integration burden of new equipment on operational 
forces. 

The standard operating procedure for the agile approach states that it 
is not a substitute for existing DOD acquisition policy. Rather, the 
agile process applies only to the testing, assessment, and evaluation 
during NIE events and does not address any subsequent development or 
procurement actions. Nevertheless, the standard operating procedures 
state that changes to DOD policy may be considered as the Army 
develops additional guidance for broader implementation of the agile 
process. Further, the Army believes this agile process addresses a 
portion of the information technology reform called for in Section 804 
of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, in which 
Congress directed DOD to formulate a new approach for acquiring 
information technology systems.[Footnote 4] In the meantime, the Army 
expects to comply with procurement aspects of DOD acquisition policy 
when it decides to buy systems that proceed through the agile process. 

Army Moving Ahead but Its Network Strategy Is Still Evolving: 

The Army has begun a number of initiatives intended to define a 
desired baseline network, enhance the ability of industry to develop 
networking systems, and streamline the acquisition of those systems. 
In particular, the Army is implementing a new overall network strategy 
and agile process, but details are still evolving. Through these 
initiatives, the Army has developed preliminary plans to address the 
areas of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness. However, 
the ongoing implementation of the agile process makes it difficult to 
assess potential effectiveness of the Army's preliminary plans, and 
additional data to inform such an assessment will likely not be 
available until after the Army begins fielding new network 
capabilities. The Army has identified near-term funding needs for 
network investments and established a process for screening proposed 
networking capabilities before they are tested. The Army also 
recognized the need to protect the network and its content and is 
working with the National Security Agency and vendors to ensure 
systems are certified for integration into the network. The Army is 
also attempting to align network capability fielding with its 
relatively fixed schedule for deploying forces to ensure soldiers are 
trained with new equipment prior to deployment. 

Army Executing Network Strategy and Implementing Agile Process: 

The Army is beginning to execute its network strategy and implement 
its agile process. However, the network strategy is still evolving, 
implementation has only recently started, and the Army has not yet 
executed one full cycle of the agile process. While the Army indicated 
that systems evaluated at the NIE in fiscal year 2012 and to be 
fielded in capability set 13 completed the entire agile process, some 
of those systems were not evaluated in the laboratory. A full cycle 
would include going through all phases of the process. The Army is 
using the agile process to quickly evaluate emerging networking 
capabilities. At this point, it is unclear what impact some of these 
actions will have on network modernization. The following examples 
detail steps the Army has taken to implement the new approach. 

* Since 2011, the Army has solicited proposals from both industry 
sources and existing programs of record to address recognized 
capability gaps.[Footnote 5] Industry participation in the agile 
process generally, and in the NIEs specifically, is critical to the 
success of the Army network modernization strategy. Under the agile 
process, the Army has decided to buy only one system from industry 
after having evaluated more than 100.[Footnote 6] While the Army 
anticipates contracting, as appropriate, for solutions to fill 
capability gaps, industry is making a sizable investment to take part 
in an NIE, and it remains to be seen if industry will continue to 
participate in this strategy over the longer term while purchases to 
date have been minimal. 

* The Army is learning lessons from the use of the agile process. For 
instance, the Army issued an initial sources sought notice for the 
second NIE in fiscal year 2012--NIE 12.2. Army officials stated that 
some of the gaps were too broad, which resulted in too many responses 
that were not targeted to the specific gap the Army was hoping to 
fill. Consequently, the Army issued a second, more targeted sources 
sought notice for NIE 12.2 that resulted in fewer submissions, yet 
they were better targeted to the specific gaps. 

* After the fiscal year 2012 NIEs, the Army established a baseline 
network architecture, which is essentially the logical and structural 
design of the Army's network and includes capabilities such as on-the-
move communications, battle command, and position location. This 
baseline architecture incorporates both programs of record and 
commercial technologies. This architecture provides the foundation 
upon which the Army will add future networking capabilities. The Army 
now has an expanded network design that will inform network investment 
decisions; enable the development of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures; and serve as the next baseline for future development 
efforts. Army and DOD planning documents include notional enhancements 
to the baseline architecture, which implement a number of design 
considerations that are intended to reduce capability gaps and 
mitigate risks while enhancing the capability of the brigade combat 
teams. The Army is utilizing its new agile process to evaluate systems 
that could fill identified capability gaps, enhance networking, and 
thus add to the network architecture over time. 

* The Army has screened and evaluated government and industry 
proposals in various ways and recently implemented a laboratory 
screening process, from which it accepted and subsequently forwarded 
many candidate solutions for evaluation at an upcoming NIE. The Army 
has conducted four NIEs to date and is implementing lessons learned 
from those events to improve future evaluations. For instance, past 
NIEs included systems that were immature and simply not technically 
ready for the evaluation. The Army believes that its enhanced 
screening efforts will identify systems that are not technically ready 
for the events. 

* The Army is already procuring many of the systems planned for its 
first capability set and additional procurements are pending. Based on 
testing and evaluations during prior NIEs, the Army determined the 
content of capability set 13 and began procuring this equipment this 
past October. All but one of the capability set 13 systems was 
developed through a program of record. In many cases, funding had 
already been identified for these systems. In other cases, the Army 
had to find additional funding for some equipment through 
reprogramming. Soldiers at Fort Drum, New York and Fort Polk, 
Louisiana are receiving capability set 13 equipment and have begun 
training in preparation for deployment later this year. While a 
detailed description of capability set 14 systems is not yet 
available, they will likely include many systems from capability set 
13, plus potentially other capabilities tested at recent NIEs. 

Army Network Strategy Expected to Be Very Costly Over the Long Term: 

Because the Army's network modernization effort is a portfolio and not 
a single acquisition program, the Army has not been required to 
compile an estimate of the total costs to develop and field its 
tactical network across the entire Army force structure. However, 
those costs will be substantial--at an estimated $3 billion annually, 
this level of effort could total in excess of $60 billion over a 20-
year period. For fiscal year 2013, the Army plans to invest about $3.8 
billion in its network-enabled mission command portfolio--about $1 
billion in research and development and $2.8 billion in procurement 
(see table 1). 

Table 1: Fiscal Year 2013 Requested Funding for Network-Enabled 
Mission Command: 

Then-year dollars in millions: 

Program: Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 2; 
Research and development: $2.8 million; 
Procurement: $785.9 million; 
Total: $788.7 million. 

Program: Joint Tactical Radio System Manpack Radio; 
Research and development: [Empty]; 
Procurement: $441.5 million; 
Total: $441.5 million. 

Program: Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 3; 
Research and development: $275.2 million; 
Procurement: 0; 
Total: $275.2 million. 

Program: Single Army Logistics Enterprise; 
Research and development: $120.9 million; 
Procurement: $112.7 million; 
Total: $233.6 million. 

Program: Brigade Combat Team Equipment Evaluation/NIE; 
Research and development: $214.3 million; 
Procurement: 0; 
Total: $214.3 million. 

Program: Defense Satellite Communications; 
Research and development: $5.7 million; 
Procurement: $157.2 million; 
Total: $162.9 million. 

Program: Joint Battle Command-Platform; 
Research and development: $20.8 million; 
Procurement: $141.4 million; 
Total: $162.2 million. 

Program: Nett Warrior; 
Research and development: $46.8 million; 
Procurement: $103.3 million; 
Total: $150.1 million. 

Program: Tactical Battle Command; 
Research and development: $68.3 million; 
Procurement: $52.9 million; 
Total: $121.2 million. 

Program: Mid-tier Networking Vehicular Radio; 
Research and development: $12.6 million; 
Procurement: $86.2 million; 
Total: $98.8 million. 

Program: Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 1; 
Research and development: [Empty]; 
Procurement: $98.3 million; 
Total: $98.3 million. 

Program: Joint Tactical Radio System/Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Radio; 
Research and development: [Empty]; 
Procurement: $74.0 million; 
Total: $74.0 million. 

Program: Tactical Electric Power; 
Research and development: $13.6 million; 
Procurement: $59.5 million; 
Total: $73.1 million. 

Program: Joint Tactical Radio System Rifleman Radio; 
Research and development: [Empty]; 
Procurement: $40.7 million; 
Total: $40.7 million. 

Program: Others; 
Research and development: $175.5 million; 
Procurement: $649.7 million; 
Total: $825.2 million. 

Program: Mission Command Total; 
Research and development: $956.5 million; 
Procurement: $2.8033 billion; 
Total: $3.7598 billion. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of table] 

Those investments are intended for communications transport, 
applications, and network services capabilities. Funding for 
communications transport equipment such as radios and Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical makes up a significant portion of network 
funding.[Footnote 7] 

The Army estimates a need for this level of funding to continue 
indefinitely. In planning documents, the Army assumes that its 
spending within the mission command portfolio--at least out to the 
2030s--will be about $3 billion annually for procurement plus about 
$0.5 billion to $1.0 billion for research and development.[Footnote 8] 
That level of spending would fund the fielding of full capability sets 
to four brigade combat teams per year and basic network capabilities 
to other operational forces to ensure interoperability. The Army would 
continue to roll out capability sets to initially cover all operating 
forces through the late 2020s and additional upgraded capabilities are 
expected after that. In 2013, the expected level of funding is greater 
than that provided to all but one of the nine Army equipment 
portfolios. 

As the Army prepared to buy and field the first network capability set 
in fiscal year 2013, it did not have funds to complete certain tasks. 
In June 2012, it requested a total of $139.4 million in reprogrammed 
funds from other accounts to cover unplanned costs, including vehicle 
modifications to enable network integration ($59.4 million); 
procurement of various radios and ancillary equipment ($51.3 million); 
and procurement of a variety of equipment for tactical operations 
centers ($28.7 million). Army officials have told us that funding for 
these costs in fiscal year 2014 and beyond will be accounted for in 
future Army budgets. 

As the Army gets actual cost data on procuring and fielding improved 
network capabilities, it will be in a better position to estimate 
future costs. 

Army Laboratory Expected to Validate Technologies in Relevant 
Environment, but Effectiveness Uncertain: 

Acquisition best practices and DOD policy both emphasize the need for 
the use of mature technologies in acquisition programs. Our prior work 
has found technology readiness levels to be a valuable decision-making 
tool because they can presage the likely consequences of incorporating 
a technology at a given level of maturity into a product's 
development.[Footnote 9] To date, all the sources sought notices 
issued as part of the agile process have required proposed network 
solutions to have achieved technology readiness level 6, which means a 
high-fidelity prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment, in 
order to be considered for filling a capability gap. Appendix IV 
contains a complete listing and description of technology readiness 
levels. The Army has established a screening process to validate the 
contractors' assertions regarding technology maturity. Army officials 
believe this validation process will improve upon multiple critiques 
of previous NIE activities by soldiers and testers, including the 
burdensome number of systems being evaluated, perceived military 
utility of systems, and overall performance of the network 
architecture. 

Army officials have multiple opportunities to reject a proposed 
capability based on technical maturity and other factors. Interested 
vendors are instructed to submit a detailed white-paper description of 
their proposed solutions and those solutions are evaluated on a 
variety of factors, including technical maturity, compatibility with 
the Army's network architecture, demonstration in a relevant 
environment, and ability to meet schedule and provide field support 
for testing. Successful candidate systems will then proceed to 
laboratory-based testing to determine, among other things, whether the 
system is mature enough to be fielded and supported, whether the 
system performs as intended, and whether it fits into the network 
architecture. Successful laboratory-based validation results in 
selected government and industry systems proceeding to the NIE. 

NIE 13.1, which the Army conducted in the fall of 2012, was the first 
NIE for which all systems have been subjected to the entirety of the 
agile process, including the various laboratory exercises. Army 
officials believe the rigor they have built into the agile process 
will filter out many systems that are not quite ready for the NIEs, 
thus reducing the soldier burden and improving the scores for 
individual systems and the overall network. However, the real success 
of this approach can only be determined by NIE results--particularly 
whether systems perform as advertised, how well they integrate with 
the network, and the level of military utility determined by soldiers 
and operational testers. The Army received preliminary results from 
NIE 13.1 in December 2012. 

Army Plans to Address Information Assurance and Security Issues during 
Network Integration Evaluations: 

The Army defines information assurance as the protection of systems 
and information in storage, processing, or transit from unauthorized 
access or modification; denial of service to unauthorized users; or 
the provision of service to authorized users. It also includes those 
measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats, as 
well as measures that protect and defend information and information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, 
detection, and reaction capabilities. 

The Army collaborates with the National Security Agency to ensure that 
information assurance issues are addressed early in the NIE process. 
Vendors understand that they need to secure certification from the 
National Security Agency, and the Army has a customer service advocate 
to help in this regard. To implement the certification process, 
vendors complete a product summary questionnaire, detailed proposal, 
and security evaluation, which eventually lead to a security 
certification from the National Security Agency. Vendors must also get 
certification from DOD for communications-security-related equipment. 
[Footnote 10] For over-the-air transmissions of communications-
security-related items, the NIE requires the National Security Agency 
to issue an over-the-air or interim-approval-to-operate that sets the 
parameters of how and where the testing can be performed on the 
system. After the NIE, programs of record will work with the National 
Security Agency to make sure any devices that have not completed 
National Security Agency certification complete the tasks before 
systems are fielded. 

One of the specific objectives for NIE 12.2 was to assess and evaluate 
network vulnerabilities. According to Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation officials, the Army continues to improve threat operations 
during NIEs. NIE 12.2 was the first NIE in which threat information 
operations--for example, when a mock opposition force uses electronic 
warfare tactics such as jamming and network intrusion to try and 
disrupt Army network operations--were fully integrated into the threat 
commander's allowable tactics. Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation officials also noted that an aggressive, adaptive threat 
that is intent on winning the battle is an essential component of good 
operational testing and that the Army should continue to ensure that 
future NIEs contain a robust threat force to include threat 
information warfare capabilities. 

Army Plans to Synchronize Integration of New Technology with 
Deployment of Forces: 

To achieve its tactical network objectives, the Army is changing the 
way it delivers capability to its operating forces. Previous Army 
efforts to develop and field network technologies were seldom 
coordinated. Program funding, developmental timelines, and testing for 
network-related programs were rarely, if ever, aligned. Network 
capabilities were fielded piecemeal and frequently for only one 
element of the operational force, such as at the company, battalion, 
or brigade level versus an entire brigade combat team. In the past, 
the Army has sent network systems to operational units already in 
theater, leaving soldiers to figure out how to use them, resulting in 
frustrated soldiers and ineffectively utilized systems--all of which 
had negative effects on unit readiness. 

The Army is shelving this approach in favor of capability set 
management, where it treats tactical network capability as a cohesive 
portfolio. After evaluating its current operational environment, 
identifying capability gaps, and designing a suite of systems and 
equipment to address these gaps, the Army will procure any elements of 
the set not already in the Army inventory and distribute them 
throughout a combat formation, from the brigade command post, to the 
commander on-the-move, to the dismounted soldier. Capability set 
management also diverges from the past practice of conducting limited 
user tests of individual systems. The Army plans to test the entire 
capability set to assess its collective functionality and 
interoperability, each component's individual performance and 
compliance with architectural standards, and whether the set works 
with technology already in use and can accommodate the rapid pace of 
emerging technologies. 

The Army plans to integrate fielding of the capability set with the 
Army's Force Generation process that prepares forces for deployment 
through three force pools: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available (See 
figure 2). 

Figure 2: Army Force Generation Model: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

ARFORGEN Model: 

The structured progression of readiness over time, to produce trained, 
ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in 
support of combatant commander and other Army requirements. 

Reset: 
* Reintegrate soldiers/family; 
* Manning units; 
* New equipment fielded; 
* Individual and institutional training; 
* Collective training by exception. 

Train/Ready: 
* Continue fill of unit manning; 
* Continued fielding of unit equipment; 
* Collective training; 
* Mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). 

Available: 
* Units prepared to deploy or deployed to meet combatant commanders' 
and service requirements. 

Mission execution: 
Return from deployed mission to Reset. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

Through capability set management, the Army will align program funding 
and timelines so that operational units--brigade combat teams and 
other operating units--receive an integrated network capability set 
prior to or during the train/ready phase of the Army's Force 
Generation cycle.[Footnote 11] The Army expects to buy and integrate 
the elements of capability set 13 with the existing Army network and 
later field it to eight brigade combat teams and other operating 
units. Capability sets will go only to those units in the Army's Force 
Generation queue available for deployment and will be fielded during 
the train/ready phase so that operational units are prepared when they 
land in theater. Additionally, rather than committing to purchasing 
any given system or capability in quantities sufficient to outfit the 
entire force at once, the Army will procure only what is needed by 
units entering the deployment pool. 

The NIE conducted from late May to early June of 2012 included the 
systems for capability set 13, which is composed of vehicles, network 
components, and associated equipment and software that are intended to 
deliver an integrated voice and data capability throughout the Brigade 
Combat Team. This capability set, illustrated in table 2, will field a 
foundational network baseline, which is based on the integration of 
available satellite-based communications and land radios, upon which 
future capability sets will build. 

Table 2: Capability Set 13 Systems: 

Satellite based: 

Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 2: 
Tactical Communication Node; 
Point of Presence; 
Soldier Network Extension; 
Highband Network Radio; 
Tactical Communication Node; 
Vehicle Wireless Package. 

Software: 

Blue Force Tracker 2/Joint Capability Release software; 
Multiple Mission Command system improvements through software upgrades. 

Tactical radios: 

Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit Manpack radio; 
PRC 117G radio; 
Dismounted Soldier Radio (152a or Rifleman Radio); 
Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué radio. 

Soldier networking: 

Nett Warrior. 

Other: 

Company Command Post Capability; 
Tactical Operations Center Kit; 
Command Post of the Future/Tactical Battle Command; 
Tactical Ground Reporting. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of table] 

Fielding for capability set 13 started at the beginning of fiscal year 
2013, to align with the Army's deployment cycle. This equipment will 
provide a baseline network solution until the Army's intended 
networking radio hardware and waveforms are ready for fielding. 
[Footnote 12] The Army's deployment cycle is schedule driven in that 
the operating units are expected to arrive at their destination in a 
ready and trained status at predetermined times. However, the 
technical maturity and integration of network capabilities may not 
always occur as expected. In the future, the challenge for the Army 
will be to ensure that the network equipment to be sent to operating 
units has been thoroughly demonstrated and integrated in advance, that 
fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate the deployment 
schedule, and that the process is delivering mature and militarily 
useful capabilities. 

Army's Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face Other 
Risks and Challenges: 

The Army's network strategy and agile process face several other risks 
and challenges as implementation continues. For instance, the Army is 
still weighing different funding approaches and contracting strategies 
to enable rapid production of capabilities. The Army is challenged 
with (1) the inability of some current force vehicles to accommodate 
new networking capabilities, (2) encouraging both industry and 
existing programs to implement new computing technologies and 
standards that will shape future development efforts, and (3) 
continuing other initiatives aimed at improving efficiency and 
effectiveness of the network. The network strategy also presents 
oversight challenges in that the Army has not yet (1) fully defined 
performance metrics that would allow decision makers to gauge progress 
in the portfolio and make informed investment decisions and (2) 
created a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework for the 
network portfolio. 

Army Considering a Variety of Options For Funding and Procuring New 
Network Capabilities: 

As part of the agile process, Army officials are testing and 
evaluating systems presented at the NIEs for forthcoming capability 
sets at a rapid pace. They are also striving to identify funding 
methods and contracting strategies that allow rapid procurement and 
fielding of these systems, yet are consistent with established 
acquisition regulations. The processes for procuring systems that are 
already part of a program of record are understood. Those programs go 
through various acquisition steps that include developing a 
requirement, developing and procuring systems to meet the requirement, 
and identifying funds to procure those systems through the traditional 
budgeting process. However, the processes for buying systems that are 
not already established programs is less clear due to the fact that 
items to be bought are not yet known and it can take 2 years to 
complete the budget cycle. 

The Army has identified a number of possible funding scenarios for 
systems under evaluation that are chosen for procurement after an NIE. 
One option would be to reprogram unobligated funds from other 
programs. Another option available is to procure initial quantities of 
chosen systems from a $25 million procurement fund the Army worked 
into the fiscal year 2013 budget, and obtain follow-on procurements 
through the traditional budgeting process. However, the Army seems to 
realize that the reprogramming option may not be available in all 
cases and that the $25 million procurement fund may not be sufficient. 
According to Army officials, a third option would be to allow 
continued development of the proposed capability to proceed in 
conjunction with similar efforts to develop new technologies under 
DOD's science and technology line of effort. In any event, the Army 
may face challenges given the long lead time for getting items in the 
budget (up to 2 years), and items the Army wants to buy may not be 
known at the time the budget is prepared. 

Finally, the Army is looking at various contracting strategies 
available under existing acquisition regulations to enable it to 
rapidly procure a capability. If the capability originated from a 
program of record, procurement would proceed according to the 
program's acquisition strategy. However, if the capability is not 
linked to a program of record or if multiple contractors could provide 
a comparable system, the Army will most likely look to competitively 
procure the capability, which could be time consuming. If the 
capability in question is available under a General Services 
Administration schedule, the Army could proceed to order off the 
schedule. However, the Army noted that acquiring such a capability 
without adequate evaluation and testing adds risk that it will not 
work properly in a combat environment. 

The Army is still formulating plans for funding and procuring 
networking equipment in capability sets planned for combat brigades in 
fiscal years 2014 and beyond. Planning documents we reviewed reflect 
uncertainty about the source of future funding over the next 2 years, 
noting that funding strategies could require reprogramming above 
thresholds allowable at the DOD's discretion, which would require 
congressional approval. For fiscal years 2016 and beyond, capability 
sets could be included in the fiscal years 2015-2019 planning budget 
and future budget submittals. 

Army Addressing Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling Challenges of Heavy 
Forces: 

A number of the Army's current fleet of combat and tactical vehicles--
the Abrams, Bradley, and Paladin--have reached or exceeded their size, 
weight, power, and cooling limit. The Army is managing upgrades to 
these vehicles based on technical advances, cost benefit analyses, and 
alignment with vehicle modernization opportunities. These vehicles 
will receive moderate capability improvements, or interim solutions, 
until modernized vehicles are available to receive full network 
capabilities. Operational needs and changes to combat vehicle 
modernization plans have led the Army to focus on initially fielding 
its new network capabilities to infantry and Stryker brigades. 
[Footnote 13] 

The integration and fielding of network capabilities to the heavy 
brigades cannot occur until the heavy combat vehicles are network-
ready. The Abrams and Bradley upgrades are expected to begin 
production in fiscal year 2017 and the Paladin upgrade program started 
developmental testing in May 2011 with its first production delivery 
scheduled for June 2015. According to the Army, the Stryker, 
particularly the Double V-Hull variant, has proven protection and 
size, weight, and power capacities to accept some of the capability 
set 13 network-related equipment. Under the capability set management 
process, the Army will complete some initial Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team network modernization two years faster than originally planned. 
The Army is also developing a new ground combat vehicle and a joint 
light tactical vehicle. The challenge for the Army will be to align 
new network technologies with the upgraded and newly procured vehicles 
in a cost effective and efficient manner. 

Army Focusing on Having Industry and Programs of Record Implement 
Common Operating Environment: 

A key component of the Army's tactical network development strategy is 
to establish technical standards to guide the computing environment. 
The Army has defined and begun to implement a set of computing 
technologies and standards to which the network, all applications, and 
all network systems must comply. The Army believes this Common 
Operating Environment (COE) will reduce development time, lower costs, 
improve interoperability, and ease system maintenance. The value of 
having a COE is that industry will know in advance the standards to 
which it must build solutions, cutting acquisition timelines and, 
possibly, cost. The COE is expected to reduce the complexities of 
configuration, support, and training, making integration of new 
capabilities with existing technology much easier and faster. 

The COE, which includes the current network architecture, is intended 
to reduce duplication and redundancy. For example, rather than asking 
for proposals to provide a new network capability that complies with 
various standards and interfaces, the Army would specify that the new 
capability should assume that certain capabilities already reside 
within the network. One of the key issues stemming from this 
initiative is how and when to get current programs of record, which 
number in the hundreds, to fully implement the COE. The initial 
implementation of this convergence has already begun and the Army's 
goal is to ensure full implementation by all programs in 5 years. The 
Army has already acknowledged some challenges it will face in getting 
current programs of record to fully implement the COE, including: 

* Securing funding--COE convergence is an unfunded requirement at 
present; 

* Managing up front and transition costs, which are expected to be 
high; 

* Aligning implementation to lessen potential for disruption to 
schedule and cost of Army acquisition programs; 

* Aligning requirements and acquisition processes; and: 

* Revising current testing methodologies to help facilitate the 
desired pace of technological change. 

Technical standardization is necessary to speed development and 
fielding of new capabilities. The COE provides industry the parameters 
within which Army technology (hardware and applications) must fit. The 
Army also mandated a single mode for transmission of information, 
regardless of format; text, voice, video, signal, or other type of 
data. That mode of transmission--which is called "everything over 
Internet protocol"--brings the Army in line with commercial-sector 
norms and expands the possibility of using commercial-off-the-shelf, 
or near-commercial-off-the-shelf solutions, especially for hardware, 
such as radios. Pre-existing standards and nonproprietary Internet 
protocol and waveforms will enable industry to develop products more 
quickly than previously possible. In addition, technology built to 
common standards will make the testing process simpler, and 
integration with existing systems and software, including those of 
U.S. allies, much easier and faster. However, a drawback to the 
"everything over Internet protocol" policy is that such a policy makes 
Army networks more vulnerable to widely-proliferating, Internet-based 
attacks. 

If implemented properly, COE could facilitate improved efficiency for 
the Army's network development effort including lower costs, lower 
risks, and improved performance. However, COE implementation also 
represents a potential bottleneck or chokepoint if the challenges 
discussed above are not addressed in an effective and timely manner by 
the Army. 

Army Is Pursuing Other Network Initiatives to Improve Efficiency and 
Effectiveness: 

Over the next several years, to improve efficiency and effectiveness, 
the Army plans to pursue a number of network improvement initiatives 
such as consolidating several separate sensor networks; consolidating 
a number of network planning, monitoring, and other tools; moving 
toward a single set of network tools; and improving the efficiency of 
command posts because commanders need a converged voice, data, 
imagery, and video transport system capability that is reliable and 
secure in a cyber and electronic warfare environment. The Army has 
also started an initiative to identify and manage the costs--including 
operating and support costs--of the Army tactical network. Each of 
these initiatives could be challenging in that it is expected to 
impact multiple components of the emerging network at the same time 
that the Army is proceeding with integration and fielding. 

* The Army has identified benefits of taking several existing but 
separate sensor networks and consolidating their capabilities for 
improved efficiency and effectiveness. These networks have separate 
operation centers and employ many different satellites. As a result, 
according to the Army, there is inefficient network utilization and 
limited operational utility. The goal is to consolidate to far fewer 
operational centers and to employ fewer satellites. Among other 
benefits, the consolidation is expected to provide more 
responsiveness, agility, and quality of service. This initiative will 
begin soon and initial parts of the consolidation will be demonstrated 
in NIE 13.2. 

* The Army has identified a need to consolidate various network 
planning, monitoring, and other tools for better efficiency and 
effectiveness. Currently, network operations tools such as network 
planning, monitoring, and loading devices reside in many individual 
network systems and each are used independently. The consolidation 
initiative will move toward the use of a single set of network tools 
that can deal with issues throughout the network. According to the 
Army, the potential benefits include more network visibility and 
reduced cost and complexity. As the Army identifies opportunities to 
use common tools, officials will adjust the network architecture. The 
Army plans to evaluate the converged tools at forthcoming NIEs. 

* Another Army initiative involves the integration of existing and new 
elements of command posts, which are made up of many different systems 
and subsystems. Currently, most of the command post elements are not 
integrated, resulting in inefficiencies for the network as a whole. 
This initiative is to incrementally integrate the current command post 
systems and other systems demonstrated at NIEs. As a part of that 
demonstration, the command post architecture will be examined closely 
and standardization implemented wherever possible. The Army will also 
develop new command post operational procedures as well as training 
materials and processes. As it moves forward, the Army plans to 
evaluate the updated command posts at the NIEs. 

* The initiative, called Resourcing the Portfolio, is to identify and 
manage the costs of the Army network enterprise in various ways. 
During the recent capability portfolio review, the Army looked at the 
operating and support requirements and funding for the various mission 
command systems and found that the projected annual costs would be far 
beyond the current expected funding levels. Those additional costs, 
coupled with the expected costs of future NIEs, capability set 
fielding, and the other new initiatives would have to be appropriately 
addressed in the fiscal years 2014-2018 budget planning deliberations. 
At the same time, the Army wants to find ways to reduce the operating 
and support costs of the various systems that are already in the 
current network as well as those expected to be introduced in coming 
years. 

Information and Insights from NIEs and Consolidated Budgeting Could 
Benefit DOD and Congressional Oversight: 

In February 2011, USD(AT&L) designated the Army Tactical Network as a 
special interest portfolio consisting of a set of acquisitions. As 
part of this special designation, the USD(AT&L) directed the Army to 
provide a comprehensive network acquisition strategy to ensure the 
alignment, adaptation, and synchronization of acquisition efforts, 
including network integration and testing. The USD(AT&L) directed the 
Overarching Integrated Product Team Chair for Network to provide 
periodic portfolio reviews. According to USD(AT&L) officials, the 
Chair for Network conducted an initial review in 2011 of the Army's 
proposed network architecture and its strategy for acquiring, 
integrating, and fielding the network. In that review and subsequent 
collaboration with the Army, the USD(AT&L) officials and staff have 
(1) provided extensive technical input on the soundness of individual 
network components and whether they are in sync with the rest of the 
capability set and the existing network as a whole, and (2) reviewed 
the acquisition schedules of all the network programs of record within 
the capability set to ensure that they are properly aligned. Also, 
USD(AT&L) officials and staff have provided input as part of 
acquisition milestone reviews for major programs that are a part of 
the Army network. 

DOD has also issued guidance for the measurement of outcomes from IT 
investment portfolios, which would include the network portfolio. 
DOD's directive, issued in 2005, calls for responsible authorities to 
"measure actual contributions of the portfolio against established 
outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability as 
well as to support adjustments to the mix of portfolio investments, as 
necessary."[Footnote 14] The Army and DOD consider the fielding of 
capability set 13 as the initial output from the Army's network 
modernization portfolio but have yet to fully define outcome-based 
performance measures to evaluate the actual contributions of the 
capability set. The Army and USD(AT&L) officials point to a set of 
design considerations that drove the definition of capability set 13 
as appropriate sources for outcome-based performance measures. Those 
design considerations include (1) robust network connectivity from the 
command post down to the soldier; (2) access to unclassified, 
classified, and coalition networks; and (3) planning, configuration, 
and monitoring of the network. 

Subsequently, the expectation is that capability set 13 and the entire 
Army network will be evaluated at future NIEs. Optimally, based on 
those evaluations, the Army and USD(AT&L) would have the necessary 
information to determine how capability set 13--as fielded in 
operational units--has actually affected (1) overall network 
performance, (2) identified capability gaps, and (3) essential network 
capabilities. That could provide a basis to determine if any 
adjustments need to be made to future capability sets. However, it is 
not yet clear whether and how the NIE can provide the necessary data 
and insights on the performance of the network as a whole. To date, 
the NIEs have been focused primarily on the operational testing of 
selected major acquisition programs and the operational evaluation of 
emerging network capabilities. While USD(AT&L); Army; and Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation officials offer that the NIEs present 
a good opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the network, 
they concede that they have not designed the NIEs to fully focus on 
that task. 

Although the Army is managing its network modernization initiatives as 
a portfolio, the individual programs and initiatives are spread out 
over a variety of research and development and procurement accounts. 
Budget justification and other planning materials for these individual 
programs and initiatives focus mostly on planned activities to move 
the individual system along in the development effort and little on 
how that system may relate to the network as a whole. For the fiscal 
year 2013 request, the network portfolio was made up of over 50 
research and development and procurement budget elements. At present, 
these materials do not provide insight into the budgets and activities 
for the tactical network capability sets as a whole, which could 
stymie oversight of the Army network development and fielding by 
congressional committees. A consolidated reporting and budgeting 
framework for all of the programs that are part of the tactical 
network portfolio could yield more consistency and clarity in the 
justifications for Army network initiatives as well as facilitate 
oversight of the strategy's affordability. 

Conclusions: 

Given less-than-successful past efforts to modernize its information 
network, the Army is making a good faith effort to take a more 
realistic, lower-risk strategy to getting the capability it desires. 
Specifically, leveraging private sector innovation to quickly and 
incrementally deliver technology has advantages over the Army trying 
to define and develop an ultimate long-term solution. Yet, this 
strategy is only in its initial stages and there are a number of 
implementation challenges that lie ahead. Looking ahead, although the 
Army network strategy is more modest from a technology standpoint, it 
is still a huge transformational effort that will affect all aspects 
of Army operations. The size and scope of the Army's modernization 
investment deserves high-level oversight attention by both the Army 
and DOD. Effective oversight can reduce risk and improve outcomes. 

Regarding implementation, DOD and the Army collaborated extensively on 
the technical design of capability set 13 and the Army has proceeded 
with the procurement and fielding of those capabilities. To facilitate 
oversight of the latter phase, it is important for the Army and DOD to 
assess the actual contributions of the initial capability set to be 
fielded in fiscal year 2013 and use the results to inform future 
investments. Establishing outcome-based performance measures will 
allow the Army and DOD to assess progress of network development and 
fielding and be in a position to determine the cost-effectiveness of 
their investments in capability set 13. It will also be important for 
the Army to assess the cost effectiveness of individual initiatives 
before and during implementation. The Army and DOD are expecting a lot 
from future NIEs in terms of providing information and insights on the 
capability sets and the Army network as a whole; however, these 
officials have yet to put a plan in place to make this a reality. 
Finally, as the NIE process begins to provide the needed information 
and insights, DOD oversight would be enhanced by an Office of the 
Secretary of Defense-level review of the actual effectiveness and 
suitability of capability set 13. Such a review should consider how 
capability set 13 actually affected overall network performance, 
capability gaps, and essential network capabilities. This level of 
review would be part of the intended periodic reviews and be more 
targeted than the initial review conducted in 2011 and could help to 
ensure that available resources are managed effectively. 

It is important for the Army to take the steps necessary to ensure 
that the technologies it procures are fully mature and ready for 
integration and fielding; immature technology delivered faster still 
puts the Army at risk for less than optimum results. Considering 
nondevelopmental items or commercial-off-the-shelf options has the 
potential benefit of substantially lower development time and cost. 
However, those options may not be available to address all of the 
capability gaps, and some development investments may be needed over 
time. Also, given the realities of the federal budgeting process and 
the time commitments associated with full and open competition, it may 
not be possible to procure all emerging technologies immediately. 
However, if the Army can find a way to procure and field new 
technologies within 2 to 3 years, that is still considerably better 
than a typical development effort that in the past has taken a decade 
or longer. Industry participation may be a lynchpin to the continued 
availability of cutting edge network capabilities, but to date, Army 
procurement of new network technologies from other than programs of 
record has been very limited. The Army/industry relationship will have 
to be carefully monitored and nurtured--that should be a priority for 
both DOD and the Army. 

Regarding oversight, the Army's network investment is a dispersed 
portfolio of efforts funded in a number of places in the budget. While 
network modernization is not defined as a major acquisition program, 
it is a substantial level-of-effort investment that will encompass on 
the order of $3 billion a year indefinitely. The magnitude and 
duration of the financial commitment command attention regarding the 
affordability of the strategy. Increased congressional and DOD 
oversight of the Army network portfolio would benefit from an 
integrated budget encompassing the Army tactical network elements. 

Recommendations: 

In order to enhance oversight of Army network initiatives by the Army, 
DOD, and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Army to: 

* define an appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance 
measures to evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and 
future components under the network portfolio, and: 

* develop and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the 
necessary information and insights to determine if those performance 
measures have been met. 

As additional information is provided, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Defense identify an oversight body to: 

* determine how capability set 13--as fielded in operational units--
has actually impacted overall network performance, capability gaps, 
and essential network capabilities and make recommendations for 
adjustments, as may be necessary, and: 

* determine how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and 
militarily useful network capabilities to its operating forces and 
maintaining robust industry participation in the process. 

To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall affordability of 
this important Army initiative, we also recommend that the Secretary 
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate tactical 
network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the 
Army budget submittal. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. Of the five 
recommendations, DOD concurred with two and partially concurred with 
the three other recommendations. DOD's comments appear in appendix V. 
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as 
appropriate in the report. 

DOD concurred with our recommendations that the Army (1) define an 
appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance measures to 
evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and future 
components under the network portfolio and (2) develop and implement a 
plan for future Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs) to provide the 
necessary information and insights to determine if those performance 
measures have been met. However, DOD noted that the complexity of NIEs 
will change in the future and that those changes will result in 
outcome-based performance measures changing accordingly. DOD also 
noted that the Army, as well as other military departments and several 
major components, are working collaboratively to define the 
architecture and standards for a Joint Information Environment, which 
will help focus DOD engineering efforts on five specific operational 
capabilities, including network normalization and single security 
architecture. DOD further noted that it is defining metrics and 
associated minimum values for each capability and that the Army's 
network modernization strategy and NIEs will need to conform to the 
Joint Information Environment architecture and standards. The 
development of Joint Information Environment architecture and 
standards will be noteworthy to the extent that they enhance 
oversight, reduce risk, and improve outcomes. Regarding our 
recommendation to develop a plan to use future NIEs to provide 
information and insights into how well performance metrics have been 
met, DOD noted that NIEs are not static events and that plans will 
evolve over time. We recognize the dynamic nature of the NIEs and 
agree adjustments to the plan will be necessary and we will monitor 
the Army's progress in developing and implementing its plan in our 
continuing review of the Army's tactical network strategy. 

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations regarding an 
oversight role for the Overarching Integrated Product Team Chair for 
Network to determine (1) how capability set 13 has actually impacted 
overall network performance, capability gaps, and essential network 
capabilities; and (2) how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and 
military useful network capabilities to its operating forces and 
maintaining robust industry participation in the process. While noting 
that the specific integrated product team we referenced no longer 
exists, DOD agreed that an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level 
oversight body needs to be identified and chartered to review the Army 
system-of-systems NIEs. Such a body would provide oversight of the 
NIEs and inform the acquisition and budget processes. In response to 
DOD comments, we have modified our recommendation to reflect the need 
for an Office of the Secretary of Defense-level oversight body instead 
of the Overarching Product Team Chair for Network that no longer 
exists. DOD also agreed to work with the Army to maintain industry 
support and participation in the agile process. Because the Army is 
moving out to field capabilities, we believe that the oversight body 
needs to be established expeditiously in order to evaluate in near 
real time the results of NIE 13.1 and the initial fielding of 
capability set 13. 

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate 
network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the 
Army budget. DOD stated that this recommendation was too broad and 
unclear, noting that the complete Army Network Portfolio is broader 
than the tactical segment addressed in our report. We agreed to 
clarify and narrow the recommendation to consolidate "tactical" 
network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the 
Army budget. DOD notes that the Army has already consolidated many 
elements of the network in its Mission Command portfolio and is 
developing a structure to align all network assets. The purpose of the 
recommendation is to facilitate congressional oversight; therefore, we 
support actions by the Army to increase clarity and visibility to 
improve congressional oversight of the Army's tactical and other 
network initiatives. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Belva M. Martin: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) examine the extent to which the Army's 
agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and 
readiness; and (2) identify other risks and challenges facing 
implementation of the Army's agile process and networking in general. 

To examine the extent to which the Army's agile process addresses 
cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, we interviewed 
officials from the Army's System of Systems Integration Directorate; 
the Army Training and Doctrine Command; the Army's Program Executive 
Office for Command, Control, Communications--Tactical; the Army's 
Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and 
Sensors; Communications--Electronics Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center; Army G-8; and the Army Test and Evaluation 
Command. We also interviewed officials from the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation; the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. We 
analyzed the Army's emerging agile process and evaluated it against 
acquisition best practices, and we toured lab facilities to understand 
how the Army is validating and selecting technologies for network 
evaluations. We reviewed Army programmatic documentation to understand 
cost projections for testing and procuring network equipment under the 
new approach and we analyzed current and prior budget documentation in 
order to evaluate how the Army would resource this approach. We also 
analyzed the Army's emerging plans for ensuring networking hardware 
receives proper security certifications and reviewed the Army's 
assessments of recent testing for information assurance and network 
protection. Finally, we reviewed the Army's agile process to identify 
the fielding strategy for equipping units with emerging networking 
capabilities. 

To identify other risks and challenges, we compared the Army's agile 
process and overall networking strategy against established policies 
for managing a portfolio of capabilities. We reviewed Army decisions 
to defer network improvements to certain legacy platforms due to 
acknowledged size, weight, and power limitations. We attended test 
events and an industry day and spoke with contractor officials about 
their experiences with the agile process. We also interviewed Army 
officials to identify other networking challenges the Army is 
addressing concurrent with implementation of the agile process. 

We discussed the issues presented in this report with officials from 
the Army and the Secretary of Defense and made several changes as a 
result. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to January 2013 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Army Mission Command Essential Capabilities: 

Essential network capability: Robust Network Transport Capability; 

Description: A converged voice, data, imagery, and video transport 
layer consisting of line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight means that 
are reliable, protected, layered, secure, and defended in a cyberspace 
and electronic warfare environment. 

Essential network capability: Execute Tactical Network Operations; 

Description: Efficient and dynamic allocation of transport resources to 
maximize mission command application and service performance in all 
conditions and through all phases of operations. 

Essential network capability: Standard and Sharable Geospatial 
Foundation; 
Description: Enable all elements of the force to operate on 
the same map and support real-time coordination and collaboration. 

Essential network capability: Display/Share Relevant Tactical 
Information; 
Description: Enable the receipt and dissemination of 
essential information from dismounted soldier to all higher echelon 
command posts. 

Essential network capability: Enable Collaboration; 
Description: Sharing of ideas and situational awareness within the 
tactical, operational, and/or strategic community of interest. 

Essential network capability: Create, Communicate, and Rehearse Orders; 
Description: Collaboratively create, change, distribute and rehearse 
mission orders (voice, written, and graphical) between command posts, 
platforms, dismounted leaders, and soldiers. 

Essential network capability: Command and Control on-the-Move; 
Description: Maintain situational awareness and communications while 
away from the command post and moving on the ground or in the air. 

Essential network capability: Execute Running Estimate; 
Description: Continuously gather, track, and fuse logistic and 
intelligence and operational information to support tactical decision 
making and continuous assessments. 

Essential network capability: Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, 
and Multinational Interoperability; 
Description: Coordinate and collaborate with authenticated partners to 
exchange relevant intelligence and operational information. 

Essential network capability: Training Support; 
Description: Support live-virtual-constructive-gaming training 
environments and enhance mission rehearsals. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Highest Priority Army Network Capability Gaps and 
Descriptions: 

Capability Gap: Fusing Operations and Intelligence at the Tactical 
Edge; 
Description: Commanders and leaders engaged at the tactical edge 
have very little capability to combine local information/intelligence, 
position location information, processed sensor data and intelligence, 
and higher-level environmental information together to define 
contextual significance/implications and inform understanding, 
decisions, and actions. 

Capability Gap: Executing Command and Control On-the-Move; 
Description: Commanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum 
operations require the capability to access, filter, share, display, 
and collaborate on fused operations and intelligence information, 
while operating away from their command post, in air or ground 
platforms, and while dismounted at the tactical edge. 

Capability Gap: Building a Common Operating Picture; 
Description: Commanders and leaders…have limited capability to access, 
select, integrate, display and share relevant information (geospatially 
rectified and time stamped) from multiple sources. 

Capability Gap: Connecting Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 
Multinational (JIIM) Partners; 
Description: Commanders and leaders engaged in full spectrum 
operations have limited capability to digitally integrate JIIM 
partners during planning and execution. 

Capability Gap: Tailoring Network Transport; 
Description: Commanders and leaders lack the capability to dynamically 
adapt network architecture and resources to match network transport 
capability with the commander's priorities in support of full spectrum 
operations. 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are measures pioneered by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and adopted by 
the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine whether technologies were 
sufficiently mature to be incorporated into a weapon system. Our prior 
work has found TRLs to be a valuable decision-making tool because they 
can presage the likely consequences of incorporating a technology at a 
given level of maturity into a product development. The maturity level 
of a technology can range from paper studies (TRL 1), to prototypes 
that can be tested in a realistic environment (TRL 7), to an actual 
system that has proven itself in mission operations (TRL 9). According 
to DOD acquisition policy, a technology should have been demonstrated 
in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational 
environment (TRL 7) to be considered mature enough to use for product 
development. Best practices of leading commercial firms and successful 
DOD programs have shown that critical technologies should be mature to 
at least a TRL 7 before the start of product development. 

Table 3: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware and software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware and software: Analytical studies and demonstration of non-
scale individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware and software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of non-
scale components to show pieces will work together. Not fully 
functional or form or fit but representative of technically feasible 
approach suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" 
laboratory Integration of components; 
Hardware and software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally 
equivalent but not necessarily form and/or fit (size, weight, 
materials, etc.). Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include 
integration of several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not 
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for 
detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment; 
Hardware and software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit, 
and function. Probably includes the integration of many new components 
and realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate 
full functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in 
an aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype 
in a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware and software: Prototype. Should be form, fit, and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications; 
Hardware and software: Flight-qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental test and evaluation in the 
actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form 
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last 
"bug fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include 
using the system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware and software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational test and evaluation in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Department of Defense: 
Chief Information Officer: 
6000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-5030: 

December 21, 2012: 

Ms. Belva M. Martin: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Martin, 

This is the DoD response to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Draft Report, GAO-13-179, "Army Networks: Size and Scope of 
Modernization Investment Merit Increased Oversight," dated November 
28, 2012 (GAO Code: 121030). 

The DoD has reviewed the findings of the GAO and the draft report. We 
appreciate the efforts of the GAO staff to present objective 
viewpoints regarding Army Networks. We submit the enclosed comments to 
the GAO for consideration. 

The point of contact for GAO Code GAO-13-179 (GAO Code: 121030) is the
undersigned. I can be reached at 703-695-3901 or via email at 
randall.conway@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Robert E. Wheeler: 
Major General, USAF: 
Deputy Chief Information Officer for C4 & Information Infrastructure 
Capabilities: 

Enclosure as stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated November 28, 2012: 
GAO-13-179 (GAO Code 121030): 

"Army Networks: Size And Scope Of Modernization Investment Merit
Increased Oversight" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: In order to enhance oversight of Army Network 
initiatives by the Army, DoD, and the Congress, GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to define an 
appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance measures to 
evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 2013 and future 
components under the network portfolio. 

DoD Response: 

Concur with the GAO recommendation with the caveat that the complexity 
of the ME will change in the future; therefore, outcome-based 
performance measures will change accordingly. Each NIE is expected to 
cover a specific number of gaps in the network portfolio in order to 
be effective as the needed capabilities will change over time. 
Additionally, the Department of the Army, the other Military 
Departments and several of the major Components, are working 
collaboratively to define the architecture and standards for a Joint 
Information Environment (JIE). The JIE will help focus DoD engineering 
efforts on five specific operational capabilities: (1) Core Data 
Centers, (2) Enterprise Operations Centers, (3) Enterprise Directory 
Services, (4) Network Normalization, and (5) Single Security 
Architecture. Through Network Normalization, a current capability gap 
is being filled by providing standardized networks to increase mission 
effectiveness, improve cybersecurity, and deliver efficiencies. For 
each capability, metrics, and associated minimum values, are being 
defined. The Army's network modernization strategy and Network 
Integration Evaluations (NIE) will need to conform to the JIE 
architecture and standards for Network Normalization and Single 
Security Architecture. 

Recommendation 2: In order to enhance oversight of Army Network 
initiatives by the Army, DoD, and the Congress, GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop 
and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the necessary 
information and insights to determine if those performance measures 
have been met. 

DoD Response: 

Concur with the GAO recommendation with the caveat that NIEs are not 
static events and will address different capability gaps in the 
network portfolio over time. Since plans are developed two NIE cycles 
out to track identified capability gaps, a plan to develop and 
implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the necessary information 
and insights to determine if those performance measures have been met 
will be addressed over time. 

Recommendation 3: As additional information is provided, GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense task the Overarching 
Integrated Product Team Chair for Network to determine how capability 
set 2013--as fielded in operational units--has actually impacted 
overall network performance, capability gaps, and essential network 
capabilities and make recommendations for adjustments, as may be 
necessary. 

DoD Response: 

Partially-Concur with the GAO recommendation. There is currently no 
OIPT Chair for system of system oversight. OIPTs are system/platform 
focused and do not address end to end capabilities. OSD agrees an OSD 
level oversight body needs to be identified and charted to review the 
progress of the Army system of system NIEs which will provide 
oversight of the NIEs and inform the acquisition and budget processes. 
Additionally, the NIE was designed to quantify Systems Under 
Evaluation (SUEs) by observation and robust electronic data collection 
and analysis against the baseline network. This construct has provided 
quantifiable and objective data to inform decision makers regarding 
adjustments/fielding to the Capability Sets. Additionally, the OSD 
response to recommendation one above provides information regarding 
the Joint Information Environment will provide a construct to evaluate 
NIE progress. The February 2011 USD AT&L designation of the "Army 
Tactical Network" as a special interest portfolio refers ONLY to the 
February 3, 2011 "Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum" signed by Mr. Carter. The Overarching Integrated 
Product Team (OIPT) Chair for Networks referred only to the specific 
network components of the E-IBCT fielding effort, which has since been 
canceled, and the OIPT no longer exists. The Army has governance and 
oversight mechanisms in place to determine CS13 performance and 
potential future enhancements through the Agile Process (Department of 
the Army, Standard Operating Procedure, Agile Capabilities Life Cycle 
Process, 7 August 2012, Final v.1) and Capability Set Management Board. 

Recommendation 4: As additional information is provided, GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense task the Overarching 
Integrated Product Team Chair for Network to determine how well the 
Army is rapidly fielding mature and militarily useful network 
capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining robust industry 
participation in the process. 

DoD Response: 

Partially-Concur with the GAO recommendation. 

As stated in Recommendation 3, there is no designated Overarching 
Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Chair for Networks. The Army has 
governance and oversight mechanisms in place to monitor Capability Set 
performance and potential future enhancements through the Agile 
Capabilities Life Cycle Process (Department of the Army, Standard 
Operating Procedure, Agile Capabilities Life Cycle Process, 7 August 
2012, Final v.1) and Capability Set Management Board. 

As indicated above an OSD level oversight body will be identified and 
chartered to review the progress of the Army system of system NIEs 
which will provide oversight of the NIEs and inform the acquisition 
and budget processes. 

DoD will work with the Army on efforts in support of the Army to 
maintain industry support and participation in the Agile Capabilities 
Life Cycle Process. 

Recommendation 5: To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall 
affordability of this important Army initiative, GAO also recommends 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to 
consolidate network budget elements and justifications into a single 
area of the Army budget. 

DoD Response:
Partially concur with the GAO recommendation. 

Per teleconference with GAO on 4 December 2012, the recommendation to 
consolidate network budget elements is too broad and unclear. The Army 
recommendation to which GAO agreed is to clarify language to refer 
only to the tactical network. If the tactical network is defined on 
table 1 of the GAO report (page 7), then the Army has already 
consolidated many elements of the network in one portfolio (Mission 
Command division, HQDA G-8 Force Development). Table 1 includes 
EQUIPPING PEG Programs of Record and initiatives (e.g. NIE) and does 
not address tactical network PoRs within HDGA 0-8 not managed by G8 FDC.
The complete Army Network portfolio is broader than the tactical 
segment specifically addressed in this GAO report as it includes the 
Generating Force Enterprise activities. The Army is developing a 
structure to align all network assets that currently span across the 
warfighting, business and enterprise information environment mission 
areas, but this was not included in the scope of the report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Belva M. Martin, (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, William R. Graveline, 
Assistant Director; William C. Allbritton; Marcus C. Ferguson; 
Kristine Hassinger; Sean Seales; Robert S. Swierczek; and Paul 
Williams made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Army's agile capabilities life cycle process should not be 
confused with the Agile software development approach for Information 
Technology (IT) systems. Although they share similar practices, the 
Army's agile process is being used, at least initially, to identify 
and evaluate new networking capabilities for brigade combat teams. 

[2] The sources sought notice is a synopsis posted by a government 
agency seeking possible sources for a project. It is not a 
solicitation for work or a request for proposal. 

[3] NIEs are sequentially numbered--NIE 13.1 and 13.2 are the two 
events to be held in fiscal year 2013. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 111-84. 

[5] A program of record is an acquisition effort that has either been 
recorded as such in the programming and budgeting process or one that 
has successfully achieved formal program initiation, which typically 
means it has entered the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase of the acquisition management process. 

[6] In October 2012, the Army issued a request for proposals for a 
vehicular-mounted, software-defined radio after having evaluated 
similar systems at prior NIEs. 

[7] We are currently assessing the Army's radio and waveform 
initiatives. 

[8] The mission command portfolio consists of three distinct 
capability areas: Transport, Applications, and Network Services. The 
Warfighter Information Network--Tactical and the Joint Tactical Radio 
Systems are the primary transport programs; Tactical Battle Command, 
Joint Battle Command--Platform and Global Command Support System--Army 
are the key application programs; and communications security with key 
management infrastructure and network management are the key network 
service programs. According to Army officials, the Army integrates 
these elements into a coherent network of sensors, soldiers, 
platforms, and command posts linked by a robust transport network. 

[9] Technology readiness levels are measures pioneered by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and adopted by DOD to determine 
whether technologies were sufficiently mature to be incorporated into 
a weapon system. 

[10] DOD requires "information systems" to receive DOD Information 
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process certification with a 
Designated Accrediting Authority signature accepting risks, if any. 

[11] For example, two of the units scheduled to receive capability set 
2013 are brigades from the 10th Mountain Division located at Fort 
Drum, New York and Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

[12] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the 
frequency, modulation, type, message format, and/or transmission 
system. 

[13] A brigade combat team is the U.S. Army's basic deployable unit of 
maneuver. A Stryker Brigade Combat Team is a mechanized infantry force 
structured around the lightweight armored Stryker vehicle. 

[14] Department of Defense Directive 8115.01, Information Technology 
Portfolio Management (Oct. 10, 2005). 

[End of section] 

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