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entitled 'Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP 
Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct' which 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

December 2012: 

Border Security: 

Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk 
of Employee Corruption and Misconduct: 

GAO-13-59: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-59, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

CBP-—a component within the Department of Homeland Security—-is 
responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel 
and trade. Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal 
organizations are seeking to target CBP employees with bribes to 
facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, aliens, and other 
contraband across the southwest U.S. border, in particular. CBP IA is 
responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP’s workforce, programs, 
and operations; and CBP components implement integrity initiatives. 
GAO was asked to review CBP’s efforts to ensure the integrity of its 
workforce. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and allegations 
against CBP employees for corruption or misconduct, (2) CBP’s 
implementation of integrity-related controls, and (3) CBP’s strategy 
for its integrity programs. GAO analyzed arrest and allegation data 
since fiscal year 2005 and 2006, respectively, reviewed integrity-
related policies and procedures, and interviewed CBP officials in 
headquarters and at four locations along the southwest border selected 
for geographic location, among other factors. 

What GAO Found: 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of 
CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 
2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per 
fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to 
misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of 
misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence 
from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 
current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for 
corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and 
drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, 
the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 
2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials 
have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that 
these cases have on agencywide integrity. 

CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee 
corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background 
investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers 
and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic 
reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does 
not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its 
screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph 
examination) provided the information used to determine which 
applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such 
data is consistent with internal control standards and could better 
position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening 
tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for 
incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed 
the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet 
fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on 
incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional 
supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs 
associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various 
frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could 
better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its 
goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and 
agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality 
assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by 
internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following 
procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic 
background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have 
performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not 
provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality 
assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent 
to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. 

CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal 
Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA 
began drafting a strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated 
the agency has not set target timelines for completing and 
implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been 
significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in 
acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrity-related 
activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program 
management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward 
the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, track and maintain data 
on sources of information used to determine which applicants are 
unsuitable for hire, assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program to incumbent officers and agents, consistently conduct quality 
assurance reviews, and set timelines for completing and implementing a 
comprehensive integrity strategy. DHS concurred and reported taking 
steps to address the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-59]. For more 
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or 
gamblerr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Majority of Arrests Against CBP Employees Are Related to 
Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred At Locations Along the 
Southwest Border: 

CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better 
Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent Employees: 

An Agencywide Strategy and Lessons Learned Analyses Could Help Guide 
CBP Integrity-Related Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: CBP's Definitions and Examples of Misconduct and Corruption: 

Table 2: Number of CBP Employees Arrested or Indicted for Corruption-
Related Activities, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012: 

Table 3: Number of Incidents of Arrests of CBP Employees for 
Misconduct, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012: 

Table 4: Overview of Classes of Allegations of Corruption or 
Misconduct: 

Table 5: Total Allegations Compared with Total Number of CBPOs and 
BPAs, Fiscal Years 2006-2011: 

Table 6: Technical Results of Polygraph Examinations, January 2008 to 
August 2012: 

Table 7: Key OFO and USBP Integrity-Related Controls: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: CBPO and BPA Workforce Population Data, Fiscal Years 2006-
2011: 

Abbreviations: 

AMSCO: Analytical Management Systems and Control Office: 

BI: background investigation: 

BPA: U.S. Border Patrol agent: 

CAD: Credibility Assessment Division: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CBPO: U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

IA: Office of Internal Affairs: 

IPCC: Integrity Integrated Planning and Coordination Committee: 

ISMS: Integrated Security Management System: 

JIC: Joint Intake Center: 

OFO: Office of Field Operations: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

PSD: Personnel Security Division: 

SSBI: single scope background investigation: 

USB: PU.S. Border Patrol: 

[End of section] 

December 4, 2012: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn: 
Ranking Member: 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations have 
increasingly sought to target U.S. law enforcement personnel with 
bribes and other inducements to facilitate their illicit transport of 
drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the U.S. southwest 
border.[Footnote 1] U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for securing 
U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade. Specifically, 
officers from CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO)[Footnote 2] are 
responsible for securing the border at U.S. ports of entry, while 
CBP's U.S. Border Patrol agents (BPA) are responsible for securing the 
national border between the ports of entry.[Footnote 3] CBP's Office 
of Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for promoting the integrity of 
CBP's workforce, programs, and operations. For the purposes of our 
report, integrity issues include acts of corruption such as accepting 
cash bribes and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband or 
inadmissible aliens into the country, as well as other criminal 
activities or misconduct such as drug or alcohol abuse.[Footnote 4] 

DHS officials have testified that CBP's increased hiring of officers 
and agents since fiscal year 2006 has amplified the incentives and 
opportunities for attempted corruption of the CBP workforce through 
bribery, infiltration, or other means.[Footnote 5] From fiscal years 
2006 through 2011, the number of CBP officers (CBPOs) and BPAs along 
the southwest border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. Moreover, DHS 
officials have stated that drug-trafficking organizations are 
attempting to infiltrate the CBP workforce through conspired hiring 
operations and aggressive targeting of incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In 
fiscal year 2012, CBP allocated approximately $166 million for 
integrity programs. 

You asked us to review CBP's efforts to ensure the integrity of its 
workforce, and particularly for CBPOs and BPAs stationed along the 
southwest U.S. border. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and 
allegations against CBP employees accused of corruption or misconduct-
related activities, (2) CBP's implementation of integrity-related 
controls to prevent and detect employee corruption and misconduct, and 
(3) CBP's strategy for implementing its integrity programs. 

To examine data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees 
accused of corruption or misconduct issues, we analyzed data on 144 
CBP employees arrested or indicted from fiscal years 2005 through 
fiscal year 2012 for alleged corruption activities. We also analyzed 
data on allegations of corruption and misconduct made against CBP 
employees from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.[Footnote 6] For both 
arrest and allegation data, these are the time periods for which the 
most complete and reliable data were available. In particular, we 
analyzed variations in both sets of data across CBP components and 
geographic regions. To assess the reliability of these data, we (1) 
performed electronic data testing and looked for obvious errors in 
accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in place to 
ensure their accuracy. In addition, we interviewed CBP officials to 
gain their perspectives on these data. We determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To evaluate CBP's implementation of integrity-related controls to 
prevent and detect employee misconduct and corruption, we analyzed 
relevant laws such as the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010, which 
requires, by January 2013, that all CBPO and BPA applicants receive 
polygraph examinations before they are hired.[Footnote 7] We also 
reviewed documentation on CBP's preemployment screening practices and 
their results--including background investigations and polygraph 
examinations--and relevant data and documentation on the random drug 
testing program and the periodic reinvestigation process for incumbent 
officers and agents. In particular, we evaluated CBP IA data on the 
technical results of polygraph examinations from January 2008 through 
August 2012.[Footnote 8] To assess the reliability of these data, we 
(1) performed electronic data testing and looked for obvious errors in 
accuracy and completeness and (2) interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in place to 
ensure their accuracy. We determined that these data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we examined CBP 
IA's quality assurance program for its Personnel Security Division 
(PSD),[Footnote 9] including interviewing PSD officials who are 
responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent officer or 
agent is suitable for hire or continued employment.[Footnote 10] We 
compared CBP's integrity-related controls, as applicable, with 
standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government 
[Footnote 11] and standard practices from the Project Management 
Institute.[Footnote 12] Furthermore, we conducted visits to four 
locations along the southwest U.S. border to observe the 
implementation of various integrity-related controls and obtain 
perspectives from CBP officials at these locations on the 
implementation of integrity-related controls.[Footnote 13] We selected 
these locations on the basis of a variety of factors, including the 
colocation of CBP IA with OFO offices and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
sectors along the southwest border and the number of allegations 
against or arrests of CBP employees for corruption or misconduct. 
[Footnote 14] Because we selected a nonprobability sample of locations 
to visit, the information we obtained from these visits cannot be 
generalized to all field locations. However, observations obtained 
from these visits provided us with a greater understanding of CBP's 
integrity-related initiatives. 

To evaluate CBP's integrity strategy, including how the agency 
incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption 
cases, we reviewed CBP strategic planning documents and other policy 
statements on integrity initiatives. In particular, we analyzed these 
documents against the requirements set forth in CBP's Fiscal Year 2009-
2014 Strategic Plan.[Footnote 15] In addition, we analyzed all 
available postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies 
that may have enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related 
activities, against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed 
CBP officials in Washington, D.C., as well as during our site visits, 
regarding CBP's integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP is 
using lessons learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to 
guide changes in policies and procedures, as appropriate. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December 
2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
presents more details about our scope and methodology. 

Background: 

CBP is the largest uniformed law enforcement agency in the United 
States, with approximately 21,400 BPAs patrolling between the nation's 
ports of entry and more than 20,000 CBPOs stationed at air, land, and 
seaports nationwide at the end of fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 16] On 
the U.S. southwest border, there are about 5,500 CBPOs and 18,000 BPAs 
as of the end of fiscal year 2011. CBPOs, based within OFO, are 
responsible for processing immigration documentation of passengers and 
pedestrians and inspecting vehicles and cargo at U.S. ports of entry. 
BPAs are based within the USBP and are responsible for enforcing 
immigration laws across the territory in between the ports of entry 
and at checkpoints located inside the U.S. border. Together, CBPOs and 
BPAs are responsible for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of 
persons and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass 
destruction, across the border. 

Hiring Process for CBPOs and BPAs: 

U.S. citizens interested in becoming CBPOs or BPAs must successfully 
complete all steps of the CBP hiring process, which includes an online 
application, a cognitive exam, fingerprint collection, financial 
disclosure, a structured interview, fitness tests, medical 
examinations, a polygraph examination, a background investigation, and 
a drug test. CBP IA's PSD manages the personnel security program by 
initiating and adjudicating preemployment investigations for CBP 
applicants, which aim to ensure that the candidates are reliable, 
trustworthy, and loyal to the United States, and therefore suitable 
for employment. In addition, CBP IA's Credibility Assessment Division 
(CAD) is responsible for administering the polygraph examinations, 
interviewing applicants, and collecting any admissions that an 
applicant may reveal including past criminal behavior or misconduct. 
Human Resource Management is responsible for making the hiring 
decisions based on the final suitability determination from CBP IA 
(this includes PSD's overall assessment of the polygraph examination 
and background investigation), as well as the applicant's successful 
completion of the other steps in the hiring process. 

The number of CBP employees increased from 43,545 in fiscal year 2006 
to 60,591 as of August 2012. During this time period, both OFO and 
USBP experienced a hiring surge and received increased appropriations 
to fund additional hiring of CBPOs and BPAs.[Footnote 17] The majority 
of the newly hired CBPOs and BPAs were assigned to the southwest 
border. In particular, during this time period, their total numbers 
along the southwest border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. As of 
fiscal year 2011, 57 percent of the CBPOs and BPA were stationed along 
the southwest border. Figure 1 provides additional details. 

Figure 1: CBPO and BPA Workforce Population Data, Fiscal Years 2006-
2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Personnel: 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 30,380; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 15,792; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 2,341. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 33,377; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 18,276; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 4,746. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 37,275; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 20,586; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 5,036. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 41,458; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 23,068; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 5,171. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 41,245; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 23,012; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 1,100. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Total Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and Patrol Agents 
(BPAs) onboard agencywide: 42,026; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs onboard assigned to the southwest border: 24,057; 
Total CBPOs and BPAs hired during the fiscal year and assigned to the 
southwest border: 2,012. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 

[End of figure] 

Process for Reporting Allegations against CBP Employees: 

Allegations against CBP employees for misconduct, corruption, or other 
issues can be reported through various mechanisms. CBP IA, in 
partnership with the Office of Professional Responsibility--an office 
within DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement--accepts 
allegations through the Joint Intake Center (JIC). JIC is CBP's 
central clearinghouse for receiving, processing, and tracking all 
allegations of misconduct involving personnel and contractors employed 
by CBP. Staffed jointly by CBP IA and the Office of Professional 
Responsibility, JIC is responsible for receiving, documenting, and 
routing misconduct allegations to the appropriate investigative entity 
for review to determine whether the allegation can be substantiated. 
CBP employees or the general public may report allegations to JIC's 
hotline by e-mail or telephone, to local CBP IA field offices, the DHS 
Office of Inspector General, or the other law enforcement agencies. 
Anonymous allegations are also received, documented, and subjected to 
further inquiry. 

The Majority of Arrests against CBP Employees Are Related to 
Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred at Locations along the 
Southwest Border: 

According to CBP's data, incidents of arrests of CBP employees from 
fiscal years 2005 through 2012 represent less than 1 percent of the 
entire CBP workforce per fiscal year.[Footnote 18] During this time 
period, 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted 
for corruption--the majority of which were stationed along the 
southwest border. In addition, there were 2,170 reported incidents of 
arrests for misconduct.[Footnote 19] Allegations against CBPOs and 
BPAs as a percentage of total on-board personnel remained relatively 
constant from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 and ranged from serious 
offenses such as facilitating drug smuggling across the border to 
administrative delinquencies such as losing an official badge. The 
majority of allegations made against OFO and USBP employees during 
this time period were against officers and agents stationed on the 
southwest U.S. border. 

The Majority of Arrests of CBP Employees since Fiscal Year 2005 Are 
Related to Alleged Misconduct Activities: 

CBP data indicate that from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, 
the majority of arrests since fiscal year 2005 are related to alleged 
misconduct activities. A total of 144 current or former CBP employees 
were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, there were 
2,170 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. In both cases, 
each represents less than 1 percent of the entire CBP workforce per 
fiscal year. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, out of 42,409 CBP 
employees, 27 were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, 
during this time period, there were 190 reported incidents of arrests 
for misconduct. As of August 2012, when CBP's workforce increased to 
60,591, 11 CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption, and 
there were 336 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. CBP IA 
defines delinquent activity as either corruption or misconduct. 
Corruption involves the misuse or abuse of the employee's position, 
whereas misconduct may not necessarily involve delinquent behavior 
that is related to the execution of official duties. CBP further 
categorizes the delinquent behavior into the following categories: (1) 
non-mission-compromising misconduct, (2) mission-related misconduct, 
(3) corruption, and (4) mission-compromising corruption. The first 
category is the only one that is unrelated to the execution of the CBP 
employee's official duties or authority, and the majority of the 
incidents of arrests for misconduct (2,153 out of 2,170) since fiscal 
year 2005 fall in this category. Examples include domestic violence 
and driving under the influence while off duty. Table 1 provides CBP 
IA's definitions of the two types of delinquent activity and examples 
of each category. 

Table 1: CBP's Definitions and Examples of Misconduct and Corruption: 

Misconduct: Non-mission-compromising misconduct; 
Delinquency unrelated to the execution of official duties or one's 
official authority as a federal law enforcement officer; 
* Driving under the influence/driving while intoxicated; 
* Domestic violence. 

Misconduct: Mission-related misconduct; 
Delinquency related to the execution of official duties or one's 
official authority as a federal law enforcement officer; 
* Civil rights violations; 
* False imprisonment. 

Corruption: Corruption; 
Delinquency for personal gain that involved the misuse or abuse of the 
knowledge, access, or authority granted by virtue of official position; 
* Theft of government property/funds; 
* Fraud; 
* Querying personal associates in a government database. 

Corruption: Mission-compromising corruption; 
Delinquency for personal gain that involved the misuse or abuse of the 
knowledge, access, or authority granted by virtue of official position 
which also violated or facilitated the violation of the laws that CBP 
enforces; 
* Alien harboring; 
* Allowing loads of narcotics through a port of entry or checkpoint; 
* Selling immigration documents. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP documentation. 

[End of table] 

From fiscal years 2005 through 2012, a total of 144 employees were 
arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, including the 
smuggling of aliens or drugs, and 125 have been convicted.[Footnote 
20] About 65 percent (93 of 144 arrests) were employees stationed 
along the southwest border. Our review of documentation on these cases 
indicates that 103 of the 144 cases were for mission-compromising 
corruption activities, which are the most severe offenses, such as 
drug or alien smuggling, bribery, and allowing illegal cargo into the 
United States. Forty-one of the 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted 
were charged with other corruption-related activities. According to 
CBP IA, this category is less severe than mission-compromising 
corruption and includes offenses such as the theft of government 
property and querying personal associates in a government database for 
purposes other than official business. Table 2 provides a breakdown of 
these arrests by fiscal year. 

Table 2: Number of CBP Employees Arrested or Indicted for Corruption-
Related Activities, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012: 

Fiscal year: Mission-compromising corruption; 
2005: 23; 
2006: 11; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 18; 
2009: 19; 
2010: 8; 
2011: 10; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 103. 

Fiscal year: Corruption; 
2005: 4; 
2006: 3; 
2007: 0; 
2008: 3; 
2009: 10; 
2010: 10; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 6; 
Total: 41. 

Fiscal year: Corruption subtotal; 
2005: 27; 
2006: 14; 
2007: 8; 
2008: 21; 
2009: 29; 
2010: 18; 
2011: 15; 
2012: 12; 
Total: 144. 

CBP workforce population (as of August 2012): 
2005: 42,409; 
2006: 43,545; 
2007: 47,606; 
2008: 52,543; 
2009: 58,600; 
2010: 58,724; 
2011: 59,820; 
2012: 60,591. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data. 

Note: Data on CBP employee arrests or indictments are from fiscal year 
2005 through 2012. Data on the CBP workforce population for fiscal 
year 2012 are as of August 2012. 

[End of table] 

Table 3 outlines the number of incidents of arrests of CBP employees 
for misconduct for fiscal years 2005 through 2012. 

Table 3: Number of Incidents of Arrests of CBP Employees for 
Misconduct, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012: 

Fiscal year: Mission-related misconduct; 
2005: 2; 
2006: 1; 
2007: 1; 
2008: 1; 
2009: 3; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 6; 
2012: 2; 
Total: 17. 

Fiscal year: Non-mission compromising misconduct; 
2005: 188; 
2006: 227; 
2007: 225; 
2008: 285; 
2009: 290; 
2010: 303; 
2011: 301; 
2012: 334; 
Total: 2,153. 

Fiscal year: Misconduct subtotal; 
2005: 190; 
2006: 228; 
2007: 226; 
2008: 286; 
2009: 293; 
2010: 304; 
2011: 307; 
2012: 336; 
Total: 2,170. 

CBP workforce population (as of August 2012): 
[Empty]; 
2005: 42,409; 
2006: 43,545; 
2007: 47,606; 
2008: 52,543; 
2009: 58,600; 
2010: 58,724; 
2011: 59,820; 
2012: 60,591. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data. 

Note: Data on the number of incidents of arrests of CBP employees are 
from fiscal year 2005 through 2012. Data on the CBP workforce 
population for fiscal year 2012 are as of August 2012. 

[End of table] 

Although the total number of corruption convictions (125) is less than 
1 percent when compared with CBP's workforce population by fiscal 
year, CBP officials stated that they are concerned about the negative 
impact employee corruption cases have on agencywide integrity. For 
example, the Acting Commissioner of CBP testified that no act of 
corruption within the agency can or will be tolerated and that acts of 
corruption compromise CBP's ability to achieve its mission to secure 
America's borders against all threats while facilitating and 
expediting legal travel and trade.[Footnote 21] In particular, there 
have been a number of cases in which individuals, known as 
infiltrators, pursued employment at CBP solely to engage in mission-
compromising activity. For example, in 2007, a CBPO in El Paso, Texas, 
was arrested at her duty station at the Paso Del Norte Bridge for 
conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States from June 2003 
to July 2007, and was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in 
prison. OFO reported that she may have sought employment with CBP to 
facilitate drug smuggling. CBP officials view this case as an example 
of the potential impact of corruption--if the officer had succeeded in 
facilitating the importation of 5,000 pounds of marijuana per month, 
this would amount to a total of 240,000 pounds over 4 years with a 
retail value of $288 million dollars. In another case, a former BPA 
previously stationed in Comstock, Texas, was arrested in 2008 for 
conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, more than 1,000 
kilograms of marijuana. The agent was convicted in 2009 and sentenced 
to 15 years in prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. CBP is also 
concerned about employees who may not be infiltrators, but began 
engaging in corruption-related activities after joining the agency. 
For example, CBP IA officials stated that some employees may have 
experienced personal hardships after being hired, such as financial 
challenges, which made them vulnerable to accepting bribes to engage 
in corrupt activity. In addition, some employees arrested for 
corruption had no prior disciplinary actions at the time of their 
arrests. 

Allegations against CBPOs and BPAs as a Percentage of Total Onboard 
Personnel Remained Relatively Constant from Fiscal Years 2006 through 
2011: 

According to our analysis of CBP data, from fiscal years 2006 through 
2011, a total of 32,290 allegations were made against CBP employees; 
90 percent (29,204) were made against CBPOs and BPAs.[Footnote 22] CBP 
IA categorizes allegations of misconduct or corruption by varying 
levels of severity. For example, allegations may range from serious 
offenses such as facilitating drug smuggling across the border to 
administrative delinquencies such as losing a badge. CBP allegations 
of corruption or misconduct are sorted into differing classes 
depending on the severity of the allegation and whether there is 
potential for federal prosecution. As table 4 indicates, class 1 
allegations comprise the more severe allegations that could lead to 
federal prosecution, such as drug smuggling or bribery, with classes 
2, 3, and 4 representing decreasing levels of severity. 

Table 4: Overview of Classes of Allegations of Corruption or 
Misconduct: 

Classes of allegations: 

Class 1: Criminal (potential federal prosecution); 
Examples: 
* Drug smuggling; 
* Alien smuggling; 
* Perjury; 
* Bribery. 

Class 2: Other criminal or serious misconduct; 
Examples: 
* Conflict of interest-association with known criminals/illegal aliens; 
* Detainee/alien abuse (sexual or physical); 
* Driving under the influence/driving while intoxicated; 
* Domestic violence. 

Class 3: Lesser administrative violation; 
Examples: 
* Misuse of credentials/position; 
* Misuse of government database (e.g.; querying personal associates). 

Class 4: Information for management; 
Examples: 
* Lost badge/credential (first offense); 
* Arrest/conviction of family member. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP documentation. 

Note: Allegations may be reclassified if new information develops 
during the review of an allegation (e.g., smuggling of a very small 
amount of drugs may result in a class 2 rather than a class 1 
allegation). 

[End of table] 

Information for management may include notifications such as reporting 
a lost badge or an arrest of an employee's family member. CBP 
management will take this information into consideration but may 
determine that the action does not warrant referring the case for 
further disciplinary action. 

Table 5 depicts the number of allegations against CBPOs and BPAs from 
fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Allegations made against OFO and BP 
employees as a percentage of the total OFO and USBP workforce remained 
constant from 12 percent to 14 percent over fiscal years 2006 to 2011. 

Table 5: Total Allegations Compared with Total Number of CBPOs and 
BPAs, Fiscal Years 2006-2011: 

Allegations against CBPOs and BPAs: 
2006: 3,554; 
2007: 4,343; 
2008: 4,459; 
2009: 5,352; 
2010: 5,746; 
2011: 5,750. 

CBPOs and BPAs onboard: 
2006: 30,380; 
2007: 33,377; 
2008: 37,275; 
2009: 41,458; 
2010: 41,245; 
2011: 42,026. 

Percentage of allegations per number of CBPOs and BPAs (rounded): 
2006: 12; 
2007: 13; 
2008: 12; 
2009: 13; 
2010: 14; 
2011: 14. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data. 

[End of table] 

Similar to the arrest data, of the total number of allegations made 
against OFO and USBP employees from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 
2011--29,204 total allegations--the majority of these allegations were 
made against officers and agents stationed on the southwest U.S. 
border. Specifically, there were approximately 19,905 total 
allegations against CBPOs and BPAs stationed on the southwest border--
about 68 percent of total allegations. Approximately 57 percent of all 
CBPOs and BPAs are stationed along the southwest border. By 
comparison, during this time period, there were 9,299 allegations made 
against officers and agents across the rest of CBP's ports of entry 
and sectors. According to a senior CBP IA official who is responsible 
for tracking and maintaining CBP allegations data, it is possible that 
the southwest border region received more allegations, in part, 
because CBP assigned more employees to the region, many of whom were 
new, relatively less experienced agents from the hiring increases from 
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, or were employees on detail to the 
southwest border region. During this same period, the number of 
officers and agents and BPAs along the southwest border increased from 
15,792 to 24,057. In addition, in each fiscal year from 2006 through 
2011, more allegations were made against USBP employees than OFO 
employees along the southwest border--allegations against BPAs were 
about 32 percent higher, on average, than those against CBPOs. 

CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better 
Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent Employees: 

CBP employs integrity-related controls to mitigate the risk of 
corruption and misconduct for both applicants and incumbent officers 
and agents, such as polygraph examinations and random drug testing, 
respectively. However, CBP does not maintain or track data on which 
screening tools provided the information that contributed to 
applicants being deemed unsuitable for hire, making it difficult for 
CBP to assess the relative effectiveness of these screening tools. In 
addition, an assessment of the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program to incumbent officers and agents, and consistent 
implementation of its quality assurance review program for background 
investigations and periodic reinvestigations, could strengthen CBP's 
integrity-related controls. OFO and USBP have also implemented 
controls to help detect and prevent corruption and misconduct; 
however, additional actions could help improve the effectiveness of 
OFO's integrity officers. 

CBP Employs Controls to Mitigate the Risk of Hiring Potentially 
Corrupt Officers and Agents, but Does Not Track Data That Can Help 
Determine the Relative Effectiveness of Screening Tools: 

CBP has two key controls to screen applicants for CBPO and BPA 
positions during the hiring process--background investigations and 
polygraph examinations. Background investigations involve, among other 
things, a personal interview; a 10-year background check; and an 
examination of an applicant's criminal, credit, and financial history, 
according to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. 
[Footnote 23] Polygraph examinations consist of a preinterview, the 
examination, and a postexamination interview. The Anti-Border 
Corruption Act of 2010 requires that, as of January 2013, all CBPO and 
BPA applicants receive polygraph examinations before they are hired. 
[Footnote 24] CBP IA officials stated that the agency met the mandated 
polygraph requirement in October 2012--90 days before the deadline. 

PSD considers multiple factors, or a combination thereof, to determine 
whether an applicant is suitable for employment. PSD officials stated 
that suitability determinations are based on three adjudication 
phases: (1) after PSD verifies that each applicant's forms are 
complete and conducts preliminary law enforcement database and credit 
checks, (2) after CAD reports the technical results of the polygraph 
examinations to PSD, and (3) after the completion of the background 
investigation.[Footnote 25] PSD is responsible for adjudicating the 
final polygraph examination results, as well as reviewing any other 
information that may be used in determining whether or not applicants 
are suitable for employment. If, after the final adjudication, there 
is no derogatory information affecting an applicant's suitability, PSD 
forwards the final favorable adjudication decision to Human Resources 
Management, which completes the remainder of the required steps in the 
hiring process. 

Regarding polygraph examinations, CAD has maintained data on the 
number of polygraph examinations that it administers and the technical 
results of those examinations since January 2008.[Footnote 26] CAD 
officials stated that an applicant technically fails the polygraph 
examination by receiving a "significant response" on the test or using 
countermeasures to deceive the test, which is an indicator of 
deception and results in PSD making a determination that an applicant 
is unsuitable for hire.[Footnote 27] Alternatively, an applicant can 
technically pass the polygraph examination, but admit to past criminal 
behavior (e.g., admitting to frequent and recent illegal narcotics 
usage) that would likely render the applicant unsuitable for CBP 
employment when PSD adjudicates a complete record of CAD's polygraph 
examination and associated interviews.[Footnote 28] Table 6 provides 
our analysis of CAD's data on the 11,149 polygraph examinations 
administered since 2008, and the technical results of those 
examinations. 

Table 6: Technical Results of Polygraph Examinations, January 2008 to 
August 2012: 

Fiscal year: 2008 (January through September); 
Total tests conducted: 505; 
Failed tests[A]: 158; 
Failure rate: 31%; 
Passed tests: 292; 
Passed rate: 58%; 
Inconclusive: 55; 
Inconclusive rate: 11%. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Total tests conducted: 2,047; 
Failed tests[A]: 733; 
Failure rate: 36%; 
Passed tests: 1,031; 
Passed rate: 50%; 
Inconclusive: 283; 
Inconclusive rate: 14%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Total tests conducted: 2,069; 
Failed tests[A]: 975; 
Failure rate: 47%; 
Passed tests: 907; 
Passed rate: 44%; 
Inconclusive: 187; 
Inconclusive rate: 9%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Total tests conducted: 2,688; 
Failed tests[A]: 1,361; 
Failure rate: 51%; 
Passed tests: 978; 
Passed rate: 36%; 
Inconclusive: 349; 
Inconclusive rate: 13%. 

Fiscal year: 2012 (through August 7, 2012); 
Total tests conducted: 3,840; 
Failed tests[A]: 1,917; 
Failure rate: 50%; 
Passed tests: 1,255; 
Passed rate: 33%; 
Inconclusive: 668; 
Inconclusive rate: 17%. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Total tests conducted: 11,149; 
Failed tests[A]: 5,144; 
Failure rate: 46%; 
Passed tests: 4,463; 
Passed rate: 40%; 
Inconclusive: 1,542; 
Inconclusive rate: 14%. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data. 

Note: Of the 11,149 examinations, 859 were retests (i.e., an applicant 
had to retake the examination usually because of an initial 
inconclusive result.) Retest results were proportionally similar to 
the results for all polygraph examinations. 

[A] Failed test refers to a test with a significant response and/or a 
no opinion or no opinion-counter measure. "No opinion" means that no 
exam was administered or no viable exam could be collected (usually 
because of an applicant not appearing for a scheduled exam). A "no 
opinion-counter measure" represents an attempt by the applicant to 
deceive the exam. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the technical examination results, CAD maintains 
documentation on admissions that applicants reveal during the 
polygraph examination process. Applicants have admitted to a range of 
criminal activity from plans to gain employment with the agency in 
order to further illicit activities, such as drug smuggling to 
excessive illegal drug use. For example, one applicant admitted that 
his brother-in-law, a known Mexican drug smuggler, asked him to use 
employment with CBP to facilitate cocaine smuggling. Another applicant 
admitted to using marijuana 9,000 times, including the night before 
the polygraph examination; cocaine 30 to 40 times; hallucinogenic 
mushrooms 15 times; and ecstasy about 50 times. CBP IA officials 
stated that admissions such as these highlight the importance of the 
polygraph examination to help identify these types of behaviors in 
applicants before they are hired for CBP employment. CBP IA officials 
stated that the polygraph examination is the key investigative tool in 
the agency's integrity program because it can help identify whether 
applicants have misled background investigators regarding previous 
criminal histories or misconduct issues. 

PSD is responsible for maintaining data on its final suitability 
determinations--whether or not it determines that applicants are 
suitable for hire. However, CBP IA does not have a mechanism to track 
and maintain data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background 
information or polygraph examination) provided the information that 
PSD used to determine that applicants were not suitable for hire, 
making it difficult for CBP IA to assess the relative effectiveness of 
its various screening tools. For example, if 100 applicants 
technically pass a polygraph examination, but 60 of these applicants 
are ultimately found unsuitable for hire, CBP IA does not have data to 
indicate if the applicants were found unsuitable based on admissions 
during the polygraph examination, derogatory information collected by 
background investigators, a combination of this information, or on the 
basis of other screening tools. PSD officials stated that they do not 
have the data needed to assess the effectiveness of screening tools 
because of limitations in PSD's information management system, the 
Integrated Security Management System (ISMS), which is not designed to 
collect data on the source of the information (e.g., background 
information, polygraph examination) and the results used to determine 
whether an applicant is deemed suitable for hire.[Footnote 29] CBP 
IA's Assistant Commissioner and other senior staff stated that 
maintaining these data on an ongoing basis would be useful in managing 
CBP IA's programs. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 
program managers need operational data to determine whether they are 
meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use 
of resources. Moreover, the standards state that pertinent information 
should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time 
frame that permits managers to perform their duties efficiently. The 
standards also require that all transactions be clearly documented in 
a manner that is complete and accurate in order to be useful for 
managers and others involved in evaluating operations.[Footnote 30] 
Maintaining and tracking data on which screening tools provide 
information that contributes to PSD determining that an applicant is 
not suitable for hire could better position CBP IA to gauge the 
effectiveness of each tool and the extent to which the tools are 
meeting their intended goals for screening applicants for hire. 

CBP Has Tools for Screening Incumbent Officers and Agents: 

CBP has two key controls for incumbent employees--random drug testing 
and periodic reinvestigations--to ensure the continued integrity of 
the CBPOs and BPAs. CBP is required to conduct random drug tests on an 
annual basis for at least 10 percent of the employees in designated 
positions,[Footnote 31] including CBPOs and BPAs, to help ensure 
employees who hold positions in the area of law enforcement or public 
trust refrain from the use of illegal drugs while on or off duty. 
[Footnote 32] According to CBP data for fiscal years 2009 through 
2011, more than 99 percent of the 15,565 random drug tests conducted 
on CBP employees were negative. CBP officials stated that actions 
against those with positive results ranged from voluntary resignation 
to removal. In September 2012, Human Resource Management officials 
told us that DHS was in the process of reviewing drug-free workplace 
programs across the department and that CBP was coordinating with 
DHS's drug-free workforce program. Changes under consideration for 
DHS's program include eliminating the 2-hour advance notice that 
employees currently receive before they are required to provide a 
urinalysis sample, which human resource officials stated could help 
reduce the possibility of CBP employees potentially engaging in 
efforts to dilute the results of the tests. 

In addition, CBP policy states that all CBPOs and BPAs are subject to 
a reinvestigation every 5 years to ensure continued suitability for 
employment.[Footnote 33] According to CBP IA officials, 
reinvestigations are a key control for monitoring incumbent officers 
and agents, particularly for those employees who were hired in the 
past without a polygraph examination.[Footnote 34] CBP IA officials 
stated that they conducted few periodic reinvestigations during fiscal 
years 2006 to 2010 because resources were focused on meeting mandated 
hiring goals.[Footnote 35] Thus, CBP IA accumulated a backlog of 
15,197 periodic reinvestigations as of 2010. To help address this 
backlog, the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 required CBP to 
initiate all outstanding periodic reinvestigations within 180 days of 
the enactment of the law, or July 3, 2011.[Footnote 36] As of 
September 2012, CBP IA had initiated 100 percent, and had completed 99 
percent (15,027 of 15,197) of the outstanding reinvestigations from 
the backlog. According to CBP IA officials, 13,968 of the 
reinvestigations that were completed as of September 2012 have been 
adjudicated favorably, and CBP officials stated that they had referred 
three additional cases to the Office of Labor and Employee Relations 
for possible disciplinary action.[Footnote 37] CBP IA data indicate, 
however, that about 62 percent of the favorably adjudicated 
reinvestigations initially identified some type of issue, such as 
criminal or dishonest conduct or illegal drug use, which required 
further review during the adjudication process. According to CBP IA 
officials, PSD adjudicators mitigated these issues and determined that 
they did not warrant any referrals to labor and employee relations 
officials for disciplinary actions. 

CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Expanding Its Polygraph 
Program to Incumbent Officers and Agents: 

CBP IA officials stated that they are considering implementing a 
polygraph requirement for incumbent employees; however, CBP has not 
yet assessed the feasibility of expanding the program beyond 
applicants. In May 2012, CBP's Acting Deputy Commissioner testified 
that the agency is considering whether and how to subject incumbent 
officers and agents to polygraph examinations.[Footnote 38] CBP IA 
officials and supervisory CBPOs and BPAs that we interviewed at all 
four of the locations we visited expressed concerns about the 
suitability of the officers and agents hired during the surges because 
most of these officers and agents did not take a polygraph 
examination. CBP IA's Assistant Commissioner also stated that he 
supports a periodic polygraph requirement for incumbent officers 
because of the breadth and volume of derogatory information that 
applicants have provided during the polygraph examinations. The 
Assistant Commissioner and other senior CBP officials stated that they 
have begun to consider various factors related to expanding polygraph 
examinations to incumbent officers and agents in CBP. However, CBP has 
not yet fully assessed the costs and benefits of implementing 
polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, as well as 
other factors that may affect the agency's efforts to expand the 
program. For example: 

* Costs. In September 2012, CBP IA officials told us that they had not 
fully examined the costs associated with different options for 
expanding the polygraph examination requirement to incumbent 
employees. To test 5 percent of current eligible law enforcement 
employees (about 45,000 officer and agents), for example, equates to 
2,250 polygraph examinations annually, according to CBP IA. Testing 20 
percent of eligible employees each year, by comparison, equates to 
9,000 polygraph examinations annually. CBP IA preliminarily identified 
some costs based on the average cost per polygraph examination (about 
$800); however, it has not completed analyses of other costs 
associated with testing incumbent employees, including those 
associated with mission support specialists, adjudicators, and 
supervisors who would need to be hired and trained to conduct the 
examinations. In October 2012, CBP IA officials stated that there 
would be further costs associated with training polygraph examiners--
approximately $250,000 per examiner. CBP has not determined the full 
costs associated with expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent 
employees to help assess the feasibility of various options for 
expansion. 

* Authority and ability to polygraph incumbents. According to OPM 
requirements, to conduct polygraph examinations on current employees, 
CBP would need to request and obtain approval from OPM. As of 
September 2012, CBP had not yet sought approval from OPM to conduct 
polygraph examinations on incumbent employees because CBP's senior 
leadership had not completed internal discussions about how and when 
to seek this approval. In addition, CBP officials identified other 
factors that the agency has not yet assessed, which could affect the 
feasibility of conducting polygraph examinations on incumbent 
employees. These factors include the need to assess how the agency 
will use the results of incumbent employees' polygraphs and whether 
these options are subject to negotiation with the labor unions that 
represent CBPOs and BPAs. For example, according to CBP officials, it 
might be necessary to negotiate with the unions as to what 
disciplinary action could be taken based on the possible outcomes of 
the examination, including the test results themselves and any 
admissions of illegal activity or misconduct made by the employee 
during the examination. 

* Frequency or number of polygraph examinations to be conducted. 
According to the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner, the agency has 
identified possible options for how frequently to implement polygraph 
examinations for incumbent employees or for what population to conduct 
the examinations. For example, possible options include conducting 
polygraph examinations on a random sample of incumbent employees each 
year (e.g., 5 percent or 20 percent of eligible employees each year), 
or conducting the examinations based on reasonable suspicion of 
finding derogatory information. CBP IA officials stated that testing 
incumbent employees on a random basis could have a deterrent effect by 
causing some employees to cease their corrupt behavior, and dissuading 
other employees from becoming involved in corrupt behavior. Although 
CBP has identified possible options for how frequently to implement 
polygraph examinations for incumbent employees or for what population 
to conduct the examinations, CBP officials stated that they have not 
assessed the feasibility of implementing these options, particularly 
in light of their relative costs and benefits. 

Standard practices for project management call for the feasibility of 
programs to be considered early on.[Footnote 39] Moreover, standard 
practices for project management state that specific desired outcomes 
or results should be conceptualized, defined, and documented as part 
of a road map.[Footnote 40] 

CBP has not fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program to incumbent officers and agents, in accordance with standard 
practices for project management, including assessing all of the 
associated costs and benefits, options for how the agency will use the 
results of the examinations, and the trade-offs associated with 
testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. In 
October 2012, the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner stated that the agency 
has begun to discuss options with senior agency officials for 
expanding its polygraph program. He and other senior CBP IA officials 
acknowledged that his office had not yet fully assessed the various 
factors that might affect the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program and agreed that such an assessment would be useful in 
discussions with CBP senior management. Assessing the feasibility of 
expanding periodic polygraphs early on in its planning efforts, 
consistent with standard practices, could help CBP determine how to 
best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls over 
incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. 

CBP IA Could Benefit from Implementing Its Quality Assurance Program 
for Initial Background and Periodic Reinvestigations: 

A senior PSD official stated that PSD has not implemented a quality 
assurance program at the level desired because it has prioritized its 
resources in recent years to address hiring goals and the mandated 
requirements to clear the backlog of reinvestigations.[Footnote 41] 
PSD established a quality assurance program in 2008 to help ensure 
that proper policies and procedures are followed during the course of 
the preemployment background investigations and incumbent employee 
reinvestigations. As part of this program, PSD is to (1) review, on a 
monthly basis, no more than 5 percent of all completed investigations 
to ensure the quality and timeliness of the investigations and to 
identify any deficiencies in the investigation process, and (2) report 
the findings or deficiencies in a standardized checklist so that 
corrective action can be taken, if necessary. As of September 2012, 
PSD officials stated that they have not consistently completed the 
monthly checks, as required by the quality assurance program, because 
they have prioritized their resources to screen applicants to meet 
CBP's hiring goals. PSD officials stated that they have performed some 
of the required checks since 2008. However, PSD officials could not 
provide data on how many checks were conducted or when the checks were 
conducted because they did not retain the results of the checks on the 
required checklists. In addition, CBP IA officials stated that they 
had performed 16 quality reviews on an ad hoc basis outside of the 
monthly checks from fiscal years 2008 through 2010. CBP IA documented 
the results of these ad hoc checks, which did not identify significant 
deficiencies according to officials. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides 
guidance on the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of controls 
and ensuring that the findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved and evaluated within established time frames so that 
all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters have been 
brought to management's attention. The standards also state that all 
transactions and other significant events need to be clearly 
documented, and the documentation should be readily available for 
examination. Senior CBP IA officials stated that a quality assurance 
program is an integral part of their overall applicant screening 
efforts, and they stated that it is critical for CBP IA to identify 
and leverage resources to ensure that the quality assurance program is 
fully implemented on a consistent basis. Without a quality review 
program that is implemented and documented on a consistent basis, it 
is difficult to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, 
exist in the investigation and adjudication process and whether 
individuals that are unsuitable for employment are attempting to find 
employment with CBP. As a result, it is difficult for CBP to provide 
reasonable assurance that cases have been investigated and adjudicated 
properly and that corruption risk to the agency is mitigated 
accordingly. 

OFO and USBP Have Developed Integrity-Related Controls; OFO Could 
Benefit from Clarifying the Roles and Responsibilities of Its 
Integrity Officers: 

In addition to CBP's screening tools for applicants and incumbent 
employees, OFO and USBP have developed controls to help mitigate the 
risk of potential CBPO and BPA corruption and misconduct (see table 
7).[Footnote 42] For example, OFO has been able to use upgraded 
technology at ports of entry to help prevent and detect possible 
officer misconduct and to monitor officers' activities while on duty. 
USBP established a policy that limits the use of portable electronic 
devices while on duty to mitigate the risks of agents potentially 
organizing illegal border crossings. 

Table 7: Key OFO and USBP Integrity-Related Controls: 

OFO: 
Analytical Management Systems and Control Office (AMSCO): AMSCO, 
established in 2009, analyzes border crossing and other system data to 
help identify normal patterns of behavior versus anomalies that may be 
indicative of integrity issues. According to CBP officials, data from 
AMSCO have proved beneficial in ongoing corruption investigations and 
also assist in the development of potential leads against possible 
corrupt CBP employees. In addition, AMSCO has been useful in 
identifying additional training needs or system adjustments for CBPOs; 
USBP: 
AMSCO: In 2012, USBP assigned two agents to AMSCO to learn from OFO 
and develop, as feasible, similar testing of available USBP data. 

OFO: 
Red Flag: Computerized system that sends electronic alerts via 
handheld devices to CBP supervisors at ports of entry if individual 
officers have potentially not followed standard policies. As of August 
2012, Red Flag technology has been implemented at 12 ports of entry 
along the southwest border, and OFO officials stated that they plan to 
extend the technology to other ports in fiscal year 2013; 
USBP: 
Portable electronic devices: BPAs are allowed limited use of personal 
electronic devices while on duty if usage does not interfere with 
official business. The policy also prohibits sensitive information on 
personal global positioning systems without supervisory approval and 
discourages the use of wireless communications, other than sector 
communications systems, to transmit official business. USBP instituted 
this policy to help mitigate the risks that BPAs alone on patrol could 
organize illegal border crossings or smuggling activities. 

OFO: 
Unscheduled lane rotations: During primary inspection at land ports, 
OFO's first-line supervisors may require CBPOs to change lane 
assignments immediately and without the officers' prior knowledge to 
help mitigate the risk of officers having previously informed drug or 
human smugglers of the lane in which they would be working; 
USBP: 
Agent assignment restrictions: USBP trainees are prohibited from being 
initially assigned within a 100-mile radius of their preemployment 
home of record based on a USBP analysis of former USBP employees who 
have been arrested for alleged corruption, which concluded that 75 
percent of these individuals had been assigned near their 
preemployment home of record and therefore placed in an environment 
where they were more likely to face pressure from friends and family 
to engage in illicit activities such as smuggling. 

OFO: 
Unscheduled work locations: Advanced details about employee work 
locations are withheld to mitigate risk of officers coordinating 
illegal activity more easily with those individuals who are seeking to 
smuggle illicit goods or aliens into the country. 

Source: GAO analysis of OFO and USBP information. 

[End of table] 

Senior USBP officials stated that its agents operate in an environment 
that does not lend itself to the types of technological controls, such 
as Red Flag, that OFO has implemented at the ports of entry, which are 
more confined and predictable environments than Border Patrol 
environments. For example, BPAs are required to patrol miles of 
terrain that may be inaccessible to radio coverage by supervisors at 
the sector offices. CBPOs operate in more controlled space at U.S. 
ports of entry as opposed to the open terrain across USBP sectors. 
Nevertheless, USBP officials stated that they are working with AMSCO 
and CBP IA to identify innovative ways that technology might be used 
to assist USBP in mitigating the risk of corruption along the border. 

In addition, in 2009, OFO established the integrity officer position 
to provide an additional control within the individual field offices. 
As of August 2012, there were 19 integrity officers across OFO's 20 
field offices; there were 5 officers across the 4 field offices on the 
southwest border. Integrity officers monitor integrity-related 
controls, including the Red Flag system and video surveillance 
cameras. Integrity officers also perform data analyses and provide 
operational support to criminal and administrative investigations 
against OFO employees. However, CBP IA officials stated that OFO has 
not consistently coordinated the integrity officer program with CBP 
IA, which is the designated lead for all integrity-related matters 
within CBP. According to a CBP directive, entities within CBP, such as 
OFO, that are engaged in integrity-related activities must coordinate 
with CBP IA to ensure organizational awareness and prevent 
investigative conflicts.[Footnote 43] CBP IA officials stated that 
although they are aware of the Integrity Officer program, they 
expressed concerns that the roles and responsibilities of these 
officers may not be clearly articulated and thus could result in 
potential problems, such as jeopardizing ongoing investigations. 

In August 2012, CBP's Acting Commissioner testified that integrity 
officers participate in local corruption task forces, committees, and 
working groups, and collaborate with various federal law enforcement 
agencies to provide assistance in operational inquiries, research, and 
analysis to assist in the detection and deterrence of corruption and 
misconduct.[Footnote 44] OFO's documentation on integrity officers' 
duties does not provide specific details about how they are to provide 
assistance to the investigative entities. The documentation states 
that they are to "assist with operational inquiries" and serve as 
technical experts on matters related to "inspections, intelligence, 
analysis, examination and enforcement" activities. However, there are 
differences in how the integrity officers have interpreted OFO's 
guidance on their roles and responsibilities, including the definition 
of assisting with operational inquiries. For example, in our meetings 
with 4 of the integrity officers along the southwest border, we found 
that 3 defined their role to include active participation in 
investigations of allegations of misconduct and corruption against OFO 
employees. At one location we visited, the integrity officer stated 
that he had created an online social media profile under an assumed 
name to connect with CBP employees at his port of entry, one of whom 
was under investigation--an activity that the OFO Program Manager, 
senior OFO officials, and CBP IA officials acknowledged was beyond the 
scope of the intended role of the integrity officer position. Further, 
one integrity officer indicated that his role includes a right to 
"fully investigate" CBP employees, while another interpreted his role 
to be limited to conducting data analysis. 

CBP IA officials stated that integrity officers are not authorized to 
conduct investigations nor are they trained to do so. Differences in 
integrity officers' activities across field locations could be 
justified given the variances at each port of entry. CBP IA officials 
expressed concerns, however, that the integrity officers may be 
overstepping their roles by inserting themselves into ongoing 
investigations, which could potentially disrupt or jeopardize ongoing 
investigations because they could unknowingly compromise the 
independence of an investigation or interview. OFO's Acting Assistant 
Commissioner and the integrity officer program manager acknowledged 
that it would be useful to further clarify integrity officers' duties 
to avoid any conflicts with ongoing investigations and ensure that the 
officers were approaching their duties more consistently. Clear roles 
and responsibilities for integrity officers developed in consultation 
with key stakeholders such as CBP IA, and a mechanism that monitors 
the implementation of those roles and responsibilities, could help OFO 
ensure that the program is operating effectively and, in particular, 
in coordination with the appropriate stakeholders like CBP IA. 

An Agencywide Strategy and Lessons Learned Analyses Could Help Guide 
CBP Integrity-Related Efforts: 

CBP has not developed a comprehensive integrity strategy to encompass 
all CBP components' initiatives. Further, CBP has not completed some 
postcorruption analyses on employees convicted of corruption since 
October 2004, missing opportunities to gain lessons learned to enhance 
policies, procedures, and controls. 

CBP Is Developing an Integrity Strategy, but Does Not Have Target 
Timelines for Its Completion and Implementation: 

CBP has not completed an integrity strategy that encompasses the 
activities of CBP components that have integrity initiatives under 
way, including CBP IA, OFO, and USBP, as called for in the CBP Fiscal 
Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan.[Footnote 45] Specifically, CBP's 
Strategic Plan states that it will deploy a comprehensive integrity 
strategy that integrates prevention, detection, and investigation. 
Further, a 2008 CBP directive states that CBP IA is responsible for 
developing and implementing CBP's comprehensive integrity strategy to 
prevent, detect, and investigate all threats to the integrity of CBP. 
[Footnote 46] We have previously reported that developing effective 
strategies can help ensure successful implementation of agencywide 
undertakings where multiple entities are involved, such as CBP 
integrity-related efforts.[Footnote 47] Elements of an effective 
strategy include, among others, (1) identifying the purpose, scope, 
and particular problems and threats the strategy is directed toward; 
(2) establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, 
priorities, timelines, and performance measures; (3) defining costs, 
benefits, and resource and investment needs; and (4) delineating roles 
and responsibilities.[Footnote 48] 

CBP has efforts under way to help coordinate the various components' 
integrity-related initiatives, but these efforts have not fully 
addressed the elements of a comprehensive integrity strategy that 
integrates prevention, detection, and investigative initiatives for 
all CBP components. First, CBP IA developed a fiscal year 2010-2015 
strategic implementation plan to guide its programs that aim to 
prevent, detect, and respond to corruption in CBP's workforce. While 
CBP IA's implementation plan sets goals and objectives and assigning 
roles and responsibilities for CBP IA's programs, it does not address 
the goals or resources necessary across other components. Second, CBP 
convened the Integrity Integrated Policy Coordination Committee (IPCC) 
in March 2011 to provide a forum to discuss integrity-related issues 
among representative members from CBP component agencies and other 
stakeholders.[Footnote 49] IPCC provides recommendations to CBP's 
Commissioner to improve integrity programs and initiatives, but does 
not have the authority provided to CBP IA in the 2008 directive to 
implement an agencywide integrity strategy or assign roles and 
responsibilities nor has it defined resource and investment needs for 
a comprehensive integrity strategy. Last, at the component level, USBP 
established an Integrity Advisory Committee in 2008 to disseminate 
integrity and ethics information throughout the sectors and provide 
recommendations to help combat corruption and promote integrity within 
the workforce. In addition, USBP established local committees in 
selected sectors, including along the southwest border, to establish 
training and guidance to help BPAs and reinforce concepts such as 
professional behavior and ethical decision making. OFO established an 
Integrity Committee to review misconduct and corruption data related 
to OFO employees, identify potential trends, and develop integrity 
initiatives to address any concerns. Although CBP IA has a strategic 
implementation plan for its activities and officials told us that 
these integrity coordination committees have been useful as forums for 
sharing information about the components' respective integrity-related 
initiatives, CBP has not yet developed and deployed an agencywide 
integrity strategy. 

During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting an integrity 
strategy for approval by the components and CBP's senior management, 
in accordance with CBP's Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. CBP IA 
officials stated that a comprehensive strategy is important because it 
would help guide CBP integrity efforts and can, in turn, lead to 
specific objectives and activities, better allocation and management 
of resources, and clarification of roles and responsibilities. A 2011 
workforce integrity study commissioned by CBP recommended that CBP 
develop a comprehensive integrity strategy and concluded that without 
such a strategy, there is potential for inconsistent efforts, 
conflicting roles and responsibilities, and unintended redundancies. 
[Footnote 50] However, CBP IA's Assistant Commissioner stated that, as 
of September 2012, his office had not developed timelines for 
completing and implementing the agencywide integrity strategy and has 
not been able to finalize the draft, in accordance with the Fiscal 
Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. He indicated that there has been 
significant cultural resistance among some CBP component entities in 
acknowledging CBP IA's authority and responsibility for overseeing the 
implementation of all CBP integrity-related activities. Program 
management standards state that successful execution of any program 
includes developing plans that include a timeline for program 
deliverables.[Footnote 51] Without target timelines, it will be 
difficult for CBP to monitor progress made toward the development and 
implementation of an agencywide strategy. Further, it is too soon for 
us to determine if the final strategy will meet the key elements of an 
effective strategy that encompasses CBP-wide integrity stakeholders' 
goals, milestones, performance measures, resource needs, and roles and 
responsibilities. A strategy that includes these elements could help 
better position CBP to provide oversight and coordination of integrity 
initiatives occurring across the agency. 

CBP Has Not Yet Completed Analyses of Prior Cases of Corruption: 

CBP has not completed some analyses of some cases in which CBPOs and 
BPAs were convicted of corruption-related charges. Such analyses could 
provide CBP with information to better identify corruption or 
misconduct risks to the workforce or modify existing policies, 
procedures, and controls to better detect or prevent possible corrupt 
activities on the part of CBPOs and BPAs. In 2007, OFO directed 
relevant managers to complete postcorruption analysis reports for each 
employee convicted for corruption. In 2011, USBP began requiring that 
these reports be completed after the conviction of any USBP employee 
for corruption. The reports are to include information such as how the 
employee committed the corrupt activity, and provide, among other 
things, recommendations on how USBP and OFO could improve policies, 
procedures, and controls to prevent or detect similar corruption in 
the future. For example, according to an OFO Director, several reports 
stated that the use of personal cell phones helped facilitate and 
coordinate drug smuggling efforts. As a result of these analyses, OFO 
implemented a restriction on the use of personal cell phones while on 
duty. 

As of October 2012, OFO has completed about 66 percent of the total 
postcorruption analysis reports on OFO employees convicted since 
October 2004 (47 of 71 total convictions). OFO's Incident Management 
Division Director stated that OFO had not completed the remaining 
reports because some convictions occurred prior to the 2007 OFO 
directive or because the convictions had not been published on CBP 
IA's internal website--a point that informs OFO when it has 30 days to 
complete the report.[Footnote 52] USBP has completed about 4 percent 
of postcorruption analysis reports on USBP employees convicted since 
October 2004 (2 of 45 total convictions). USBP was instructed to 
complete postcorruption analysis reports in August 2011, and USBP 
officials stated that the agency does not have plans to complete 
analyses for convictions before August 2011 because CBP IA is 
reviewing these cases as part of a study to analyze behavioral traits 
among corrupt employees. However, CBP IA's study does not substitute 
for postcorruption analysis reports because for this study, CBP IA 
researchers are exploring the convicted employees' thinking and 
behavior to gain insights into the motives behind the betrayal of 
trust, how the activity originated, and how they carried out the 
illegal activity. The postcorruption reports, however, may go beyond 
this type of analysis and also may aim to identify deficiencies in 
port or sector processes that may have fostered or permitted 
corruption and to produce recommendations specific to enhancing USBP 
policies, procedures, or controls. A USBP Deputy Chief acknowledged 
that completing the remaining reports could be beneficial to 
understanding any trends or patterns of behavior among BPAs convicted 
of corruption. In some cases, OFO and USBP officials stated that it 
may be difficult to complete postcorruption analysis reports for older 
convictions, as witnesses and other information on the corruption-
related activities may no longer be available. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides 
guidance on the importance of identifying and analyzing risks, and 
using that information to make decisions.[Footnote 53] These standards 
address various aspects of internal control that should be continuous, 
built-in components of organizational operations. One internal control 
standard, risk assessment, calls for identifying and analyzing risks 
that agencies face from internal and external sources and deciding 
what actions should be taken to manage these risks. The standards 
indicate that conditions governing risk continually change and 
periodic updates are required to ensure that risk information, such as 
vulnerabilities in the program, remains current and relevant. 
Information collected through periodic reviews, as well as daily 
operations, can inform the analysis and assessment of risk. Complete 
and timely information from postcorruption analysis reports of all 
convictions could assist USBP and OFO management in obtaining and 
sharing lessons learned to enhance integrity-related policies, 
procedures, and controls throughout CBP. 

Conclusions: 

Data indicate that the overwhelming majority of CBP employees adhere 
to the agency's integrity standards; however, a small minority have 
been convicted of engaging in corruption due, in part, to the 
increasing pressure from drug-trafficking and other transnational 
criminal organizations that are targeting CBPOs and BPAs, particularly 
along the southwest U.S. border. The Acting Commissioner of CBP 
testified that no act of corruption within the agency can or will be 
tolerated and that acts of corruption compromise CBP's ability to 
achieve its mission to secure America's borders against all threats 
while facilitating and expediting legal travel and trade. Strategic 
and continuous monitoring of operational vulnerabilities is important 
given the shifting tactics of drug-trafficking organizations seeking 
to infiltrate the agency. Therefore, CBP has taken steps to mitigate 
the risk of misconduct and corruption among incoming CBPOs and BPAs by 
implementing controls during the preemployment screening process. 
However, tracking and maintaining data on the results of its screening 
tools for applicants, a feasibility assessment for potential expansion 
of polygraph requirements, and a robust quality assurance program for 
background investigations and periodic reinvestigations that ensures 
reviews are consistently conducted and documented could better 
position CBP to mitigate risk of employee corruption. In addition, 
clear roles and responsibilities for OFO's integrity officers 
developed in coordination with appropriate stakeholders such as CBP IA 
could help CBP ensure that the program is operating effectively. 
Moreover, establishing a target time frame for completing a 
comprehensive integrity strategy could help CBP ensure sufficient 
progress toward its development and implementation. In addition, 
completed, postcorruption analysis reports of former CBP employees who 
have been arrested for corruption could better position CBP to 
implement any lessons learned from these cases. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance CBP's efforts to mitigate the risk of corruption and 
misconduct among CBPOs and BPAs, we recommend that the CBP 
commissioner take the following seven actions: 

* develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on the sources of 
information (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination 
admissions) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are not 
suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its 
applicant screening tools; 

* assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to 
incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs and benefits, 
options for how the agency will use the results of the examinations, 
and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and 
agents at various frequencies; 

* conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA's adjudications of 
background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, as required 
in PSD's quality assurance program; 

* establish a process to fully document, as required, any deficiencies 
identified through PSD's quality assurance reviews; 

* develop detailed guidance within OFO on the roles and 
responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with 
appropriate stakeholders such as CBP IA; 

* set target timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive 
integrity strategy; and, 

* complete OFO and USBP postcorruption analysis reports for all CBPOs 
and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related activities, to 
the extent that information is available. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 
DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in 
appendix II. DHS concurred with all seven recommendations and 
described actions under way or plans to address them. DHS also 
discussed concerns it had with periodically polygraphing incumbent law 
enforcement officers. 

With regard to our first recommendation, DHS concurred and indicated 
that by March 31, 2013, CBP expects to collect data on the impact of 
the polygraph examination regarding the outcome of CBP applicant 
suitability adjudications and undertake steps to ensure data 
reliability across various CBP personnel security databases. 

With regard to the second recommendation, while DHS concurred, it 
reported possible adverse impacts associated with periodically 
polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers. Specifically, DHS 
noted that doing so could adversely affect CBP resources without 
additional resources to implement the requirement. While we understand 
DHS's concerns, we did not recommend that CBP expand its polygraph 
program to incumbent employees; rather, we recommended that CBP assess 
the feasibility of expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent CBPOs 
and BPAs. Thus, concerns such as these could be considered in 
conducting its feasibility assessment. As we reported, assessing the 
feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs early on in its planning 
efforts could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of 
strengthening integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and 
BPAs. In addition, DHS noted that expanding the polygraph program to 
incumbent employees would be contingent on approval from OPM and may 
encounter resistance from unions representing CBP's employees who may 
view it as a potential change to the conditions of their employment. 
As noted in the report, these are important factors CBP could consider 
in assessing the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program. 

With regard to the other five recommendations, DHS concurred and 
indicated that CBP will work to strengthen its current quality 
assurance processes and develop a process to document deficiencies 
identified through quality reviews; develop detailed guidance on the 
duties, roles, and responsibilities of integrity officers; complete a 
comprehensive integrity strategy; and develop postcorruption analysis 
reports for any convictions that do not currently have such reports. 
DHS estimates that it will complete these steps by July 31, 2013. The 
actions that DHS has planned or under way should help address the 
intent of the recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its issue date. If you or your staff have any questions about 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Acting Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To examine data on arrests of and allegations against U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) employees accused of corruption or misconduct 
issues, we analyzed data on 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted 
from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012 for corruption 
activities. We also analyzed data on allegations of corruption and 
misconduct against CBP employees from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. 
For both arrest and allegation data, these are the time periods for 
which the most complete data were available. In particular, we 
analyzed variations in both sets of data across CBP components and 
geographic region. To assess the reliability of these data, we (1) 
performed electronic data testing and looked for obvious errors in 
accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in place to 
ensure their accuracy. We determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we interviewed 
officials from CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Office of Field 
Operations (OFO), United States Border Patrol (USBP), and CBP's Human 
Resource Management, and Labor and Employee Relations, to gain their 
perspectives on these data on CBP employee corruption and misconduct. 

To evaluate CBP's implementation of integrity-related controls to 
prevent and detect employee misconduct and corruption, we analyzed 
relevant laws such as the Anti-Corruption Border Act of 2010, which 
requires, by January 2013, that all CBP officer (CBPO) and U.S. Border 
Patrol Agent (BPA) applicants receive polygraph examinations before 
they are hired.[Footnote 54] We also reviewed documentation on CBP's 
preemployment screening practices and their results--including 
background investigations and polygraph examinations--and relevant 
data and documentation on the random drug testing program and the 
periodic reinvestigation process for incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In 
particular, we evaluated CBP IA data on the technical results of 
polygraph examinations from January 2008 through August 2012. To 
assess the reliability of the technical results of the polygraph data, 
we (1) performed electronic data testing and looked for obvious errors 
in accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in place to 
ensure their accuracy. We determined that these data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we examined CBP 
IA's quality assurance program for its Personnel Security Division 
(PSD),[Footnote 55] including interviewing PSD officials who are 
responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent officer or 
agent is suitable for hire or continued employment.[Footnote 56] We 
also analyzed Human Resource Management's random drug testing data for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the time period for which the most 
complete data were available, and examined the results of those 
mandated periodic reinvestigations that CBP IA had completed as of 
September 2012. To assess the reliability of these data, we conducted 
tests for accuracy and interviewed officials responsible for managing 
the drug testing and reinvestigation programs and found that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. 

We compared CBP's integrity-related controls, as applicable, against 
recommended controls in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government[Footnote 57] and standard practices from the Project 
Management Institute.[Footnote 58] Furthermore, we conducted site 
visits to four locations along the southwest U.S. border to observe 
the implementation of various integrity-related controls and obtain 
perspectives from CBP IA, OFO, and USBP officials at these locations 
on the implementation of integrity-related controls. We conducted 
these visits in El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; San Diego, California; 
and, Tucson, Arizona. We selected these locations on the basis of a 
variety of factors, including the colocation of CBP IA with OFO 
offices and USBP sectors along the southwest border and the number of 
allegations against or arrests of CBP employees for corruption or 
misconduct. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of sites, the 
information we obtained from these interviews and visits cannot be 
generalized to all OFO, USBP, and CBP IA field locations. However, 
observations obtained from these visits provided us with a greater 
understanding of CBP's integrity-related initiatives. 

To evaluate CBP's integrity strategy, including how the agency 
incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption 
cases, we reviewed documentation on integrity initiatives from CBP IA, 
OFO, and USBP, as well as from the Integrity Integrated Planning and 
Coordination Committee (IPCC), which CBP convened in 2011 as a forum 
to discuss integrity-related issues and ideas and to share standard 
practices among the members. In particular, we analyzed these 
documents against the requirements set forth in the CBP Fiscal Year 
2009-2014 Strategic Plan.[Footnote 59] In addition, we analyzed all 
available postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies 
that may have enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related 
activities, against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed 
officials in Washington, D.C., from the Office of Policy and Planning, 
CBP IA, USBP, OFO, and IPCC, as well as officials during our site 
visits, regarding CBP's integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP 
is using lessons learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to 
guide changes in policies and procedures, as appropriate.[Footnote 60] 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December 
2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

November 27, 2012: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-13-59, "Border Security: Additional Actions 
Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee 
Corruption and Misconduct". 

Dear Ms. Gambler: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

DHS is pleased that GAO recognizes U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection's (CBP's) efforts to deter corruption and ensure the 
integrity of its workforce. Any act of employee corruption interferes 
with the Agency's mission to secure the Nation's borders against all 
threats and facilitate legitimate travel and trade. We appreciate the 
acknowledgment that CBP is proactively working to address the negative 
impact of mission-compromising corruption on Agency-wide integrity. 

As the draft report acknowledges, CBP conducts various integrity 
programs, such as background investigations, periodic 
reinvestigations, and polygraphs, which are vital to CBP's goal of 
employing and retaining employees of the highest caliber. For Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2012, CBP opened roughly 15,000 background investigations 
for applicants, more than 10,000 periodic reinvestigations for 
employees, and performed almost 5,000 polygraph exams. The draft 
report appropriately underscores the critical value of these programs 
and identities opportunity for strengthening their effectiveness. 

CBP's research and analysis programs give CBP crucial insight, which 
may be leveraged when making decisions on the suitability of 
candidates for employment or detection of misconduct by on-board 
employees and aids in deterring potential corruption among its 
existing employees. The CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA) Integrity 
Programs Division (IPD) is studying whether there are any common 
traits found in the background investigations of employees who engage 
in corruption or misconduct and the effect of an employee being 
stationed for duty in their hometown. This research is also used for 
developing and administering integrity-related training. 

GAO's recommendations include having CBP IA undertake additional 
duties and responsibilities not currently performed such as 
periodically polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers. While 
DHS agrees these operations can he strengthened, we note these 
additional duties could adversely impact Personnel Security Division 
(PSD) and Credibility Assessment Division (CAD) resources if the new 
requirements are implemented without additional resources to 
accomplish them. Between August 2006 and December 2008, mandated 
hiring surges doubled the size of the Border Patrol (BP) from roughly 
10,000 Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) to just over 20.000 13PAs, but 
additional resources were not dedicated to CBP IA's PSD and CAD. As a 
result. CAD polygraph and PSD intake and adjudicative resources were 
significantly impacted. An additional hiring surge of 1,000 BPAs and 
350 CBP officers during the second half of FY 2011 also resulted in 
further strain. 

The draft report contained seven recommendations with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the CBP 
Commissioner: 

Recommendation 1: Develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on 
the sources of information (e.g., background investigation or 
polygraph examinations) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are 
not suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its 
applicant screening tools. 

Response: Concur. CBP IA will collect data relative to the impact of 
the polygraph examination on the outcome of CBP applicant suitability 
adjudications. To ensure the reliability of the polygraph data 
collected. CBP is creating a "bridge" between the DHS Integrated 
Security Management System (ISMS), which is PSD's official system of 
record and prescribed system for all DHS Component use, and the IA 
Security Management Assessment Risk Tool, an integrated database and 
workflow management tool being employed by CAD. This undertaking will 
transmit CAI)-related data to ISMS. thereby ensuring congruency 
between the related data in the systems. Estimated Completion Date 
(ECD): March 31, 2013 

Recommendation 2: Assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program to incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs 
and benefits, options for how the agency will use the results of the 
examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent 
officers and agents at various frequencies. 

Response: Concur. CBP IA will work with the DHS Office of the 
Secretary, the DHS Office of Chief Human Capital Officer, the DHS 
Office of the Chief Security Officer, and the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) to explore the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 
program to incumbent law enforcement officers, including Customs and 
Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) and BPAs. CBP anticipates 
resistance to this proposal from the unions representing our employees 
who are collective bargaining unit members. Initiating a polygraph 
exam for incumbent employees may be viewed as a change to the 
conditions of employment, and the unions may resist this change. CBP 
Labor Relations and the Office of Chief Counsel are exploring these 
issues. and will be part of ongoing meetings to move this proposal 
forward. 

Authorization from OPM is also required to conduct polygraph 
examinations of employees who are in competitive service appointments 
with CBP. OPM requires that a proposal to test any competitive service 
employees be endorsed at the department level, and that the CBP 
polygraph program adhere to federal standards for polygraph 
examinations. These standards include a biennial inspection of the CBP 
polygraph program by the National Center for Credibility Assessment, 
Quality Assurance Program, which reviews the administrative and field 
operations of the program for compliance with 118 federally 
established criteria. CBP complies with all of these requirements and 
a final report detailing those operations was sent to OPM on March 18. 
2011, and a successful rating of the program is required as a 
condition for the renewal of polygraph authority. If the concept is 
approved, CBP will create an implementation plan with milestones 
identified. ECD: September 30, 2013. 

Recommendation 3: Conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA's 
adjudications of background investigations and periodic 
re-investigations, as required by PSD's quality assurance program. 

Response: Concur. CBP IA-PSD will work to strengthen current Quality 
Assurance processes to verify the accuracy of the data collected, 
which will reinforce CBP's overall efforts to ensure reliability. 
Strengthening measures will include applying the expertise of current 
PSD staff to perform Quality Assurance reviews, providing objective 
feedback regarding the suitability/security review process and 
efficiencies, review of final adjudicative products, and 
implementation of best practices. The process will also entail 
reviewing cases to ensure compliance with applicable Executive Orders, 
Regulations, and DNS and CBP policies and procedures. ECD: February 
28, 2013. 

Recommendation 4: Establish a process to fully document, as required. 
any deficiencies identified through PSD's quality assurance reviews. 

Response: Concur. CBP IA-PSD will develop a process to document all 
deficiencies identified during Quality Assurance reviews, Reviewers 
will be required to complete a Quality Assurance Worksheet for each 
case to document the results. PSD will then develop a summary of any 
noted deficiencies for additional corrective action as deemed 
appropriate. CBP will determine whether there is a need for additional 
training or revised written guidance and/or operating procedures to 
address the documented deficiencies. ECD: February 28, 2013. 

Recommendation 5: Develop detailed guidance within OF0 on the roles 
and responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with the 
appropriate stakeholders, such as CBP IA. 

Response: Concur. CBP's Office of Field Operations' (OPO's) Incident 
Management Office will meet with the OFO Integrity Committee — 
composed of representatives from CLIP IA, Office of Border Patrol 
(OBP), Labor and Employee Relations, and OFO — to develop detailed 
guidance on duties, roles, and responsibilities for Integrity 
Officers. ECD: June 30, 2013. 

Recommendation 6: Set target timelines for completing and implementing 
a comprehensive integrity strategy. 

Response: Concur. CRP's Office of Policy and Planning (OPP) has 
prepared an initial plan of action and milestones for developing the 
recommended strategy, and efforts to implement it are currently 
underway. CBP OPP intends to use, in part, the existing CUP LA 
Integrity Strategy as a baseline for the CUP Comprehensive Integrity 
Strategy. CBP IA circulated the existing Integrity Strategy to the 
Integrity Integrated Planning and Coordination Cell (IPCC) for review 
and comment in September 2012. 

The Integrity IPCC plans to convene in late 2012 to review comments on 
the IA Integrity Strategy and will develop an initial blueprint for 
the new comprehensive strategic document on the basis of the outcomes 
of this meeting. Additionally, CBP OPP and CBP IA will collaborate to 
determine ways both GAO's and the Homeland Security Institute's 
recommendations will contribute to defining a more clear direction for 
Integrity IPCC goals and objectives. These collective efforts will 
dictate the primary direction of the CLIP Comprehensive Integrity 
Strategy, which CBP OPP believes will be completed within 4 months of 
identifying agency mission priorities. ECD: March 31, 2013. 

Recommendation 7: Complete OFO and BP post-corruption analysis reports 
for all CBPOs and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related 
activities, to the extent that information is available. 

Response: Concur. CBP OFO and OBP will develop post-corruption 
analysis (PCA) reports for any convictions that do not currently have 
PCA reports. OBP and OFO understand the importance of these reports 
and value the information that can be derived from them. For cases 
which the necessary information to complete a full PCA report is not 
available, we will prepare modified reports, as appropriate. ECD: July 
31, 2013. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant 
Director; David Alexander; Nanette J. Barton; Frances Cook; Wendy Dye; 
David Greyer; Jackson Hufnagle; Wendy Johnson; Otis S. Martin; and 
Linda Miller made significant contributions to the work. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The southwest U.S. border includes areas within the states of 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. 

[2] OFO, which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner, oversees nearly 
28,000 employees who are responsible for providing security at U.S. 
ports of entry. A port of entry is a location by which individuals and 
merchandise may seek legal entry into the United States. There are 329 
air, sea, and land ports in the United States; there are 25 land 
ports, in particular, along the southwest border. 

[3] Officers and agents are responsible for apprehending individuals 
attempting to enter the United States illegally and stemming the flow 
of illegal drugs and other illicit contraband across the border, among 
other things. 

[4] We developed this definition on the basis of an analysis of data 
and documentation from CBP IA, as well as through interviews with CBP 
IA and law enforcement officials who investigate allegations of 
employee misconduct and corruption. We also discussed our definition 
with these officials to ensure that it was a reasonable interpretation 
and consistent with CBP policy. 

[5] See Statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery 
and Intergovernmental Affairs, Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2011, and 
Statement of Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department 
of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Government 
Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Report, House of Representatives. Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012. Statement of James F. Tomsheck, Assistant 
Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local and Sector 
Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Senate. Washington, D.C.:Mar. 11, 2010. 

[6] These data on allegations include what is available through CBP's 
Joint Intake Center (JIC), which is a central clearinghouse for 
allegations of misconduct involving personnel and contractors employed 
by CBP. Allegations reported to the DHS Office of Inspector General, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement agencies 
may not be represented in JIC's data. According to CBP IA officials, 
if they become aware of an allegation against a CBP employee from 
another source, they create a record in JIC for tracking purposes. 

[7] Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011). 

[8] CBP began conducting polygraph examinations for some CBP employees 
in January 2008. 

[9] PSD, within CBP IA, manages the personnel security and suitability 
program by initiating and adjudicating preemployment investigations 
for CBP applicants and contractors. PSD also conducts and adjudicates 
periodic reinvestigations and issues security clearances for CBP 
employees. 

[10] With a favorable suitability determination, an applicant can be 
hired, if all other requirements are met. The suitability 
determination is a process that subjects applicants' and employees' 
personal conduct to evaluation throughout their careers. Title 5, Code 
of Federal Regulations Part 731, establishes factors that are used to 
make a determination of suitability. 

[11] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[12] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management, second edition © (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 

[13] We conducted site visits in El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; San 
Diego, California; and, Tucson, Arizona. 

[14] Border Patrol sectors are further divided into stations, and each 
station is responsible for operations within a specific area of the 
sector. There are nine sectors along the southwest border. 

[15] U.S.Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, 
Legal Trade: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 
Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2009. 

[16] In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that 
Border Patrol was to maintain an active duty presence of not less than 
21,370 agents protecting the border of the United States. Department 
of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, div. B, 
tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 
Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011). 

[17] For example, CBP received funds to support 1,000 additional 
Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2006, 1,500 in fiscal year 2007, 
3,000 in fiscal year 2008, and 1,100 in fiscal year 2010, among other 
increases. CBP also received funds for an additional 450 CBP officers 
in fiscal year 2007, 200 in fiscal year 2008, and 859 in fiscal year 
2009, among other increases. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 41-42 
(2005) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 106-699, at 125, 128 (2006) (Conf. 
Rep.); Explanatory Statement, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, 
bk. 1, div. E., at 1028 (2008); Explanatory Statement, Consolidated 
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2009, div. D, at 627 (2008); H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 110 (2009) 
(Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 111-298, at 62-63 (2009) (Conf. Rep.); 
Pub. L. No. 111-230, tit. I, 124 Stat. 2485, 2485 (2010); H.R. Rep. 
No. 112-331, at 956-57 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). 

[18] CBP collects data on incidents of arrests, indictments, 
citations, and detainments; for purposes of brevity, we refer to all 
four categories as "incidents of arrests." According to CBP IA 
officials, the term "detainments" refers to instances such as those 
where individuals are intoxicated in public and detained at local 
facilities until they become sober but do not have an arrest on their 
record. 

[19] CBP does not count the number of employees who have been arrested 
for misconduct, but rather counts the number of incidents of arrests 
for misconduct (i.e. one employee may have multiple incidents of 
arrests for misconduct). For corruption, we have reported the number 
of employees arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities. 
Not all arrests result in convictions or disciplinary actions. 

[20] As of October 2012, 9 were acquitted or had their cases 
dismissed, 2 were declined for prosecution, and 8 cases were pending 
or in pretrial diversion. Of the 125 convictions, 109 were the result 
of guilty pleas. 

[21] See Statement of David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, before the Subcommittee on Government 
Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. 
Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012. 

[22] We analyzed allegation data provided by the JIC--CBP's central 
clearinghouse for receiving, processing, and tracking all allegations 
of misconduct involving personnel and contractors employed by CBP. 
Allegations reported to the DHS Office of Inspector General, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement agencies may 
not be represented in the data that are collected by JIC. 

[23] On the basis of the sensitivity of the position for which an 
individual is applying, CBP IA's personnel security officials initiate 
either a single scope background investigation or a background 
investigation. The single scope background investigation is required 
for positions designated as Critical Sensitive National Security. It 
covers up to 10 years and includes a personal interview and review of 
the following: employment history, education, residences, references, 
local law enforcement records, court records, records of former 
spouse(s), records of spouse or current cohabitant, credit records, 
and other law enforcement and military records, as applicable. The 
background investigation is a review of up to 5 years and consists of 
a personal interview and an examination of the same documents as the 
single scope background investigation. OPM has delegated authority to 
CBP to conduct background investigations and make employment 
suitability determinations for all CBP applicants, contractors, and 
employees. OPM derives its authority to conduct background 
investigations from the Executive Order 10450; Executive Order 12968; 
and Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, parts 731, 732, and 736. 

[24] Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011). 

[25] Historically, CAD initiated the examinations after the background 
investigations were completed. As of June 2012, CBP began 
administering polygraph examinations to all new applicants before 
background investigations are initiated to help rule out unsuitable 
candidates before expending additional PSD time and resources on 
costly background investigations. According to CBP IA, the average 
cost of a polygraph examination is $800, whereas the average cost of a 
background investigation is about $3,000. 

[26] CAD administers the polygraph examination program, which includes 
(1) a pre-examination interview with the applicant, (2) the 
examination itself, and (3) a postexamination interview. CAD provides 
a final polygraph examination report to PSD for final adjudication. 

[27] Polygraph examinations result in a "significant response" when 
the applicant displays a physiological response to a question and is 
ultimately unable to resolve the issue in spite of additional probing 
during the examination process. 

[28] CBP IA defines an admission statement to include any one of the 
following types of information provided by an applicant: (1) admitting 
to behavior outside of his self-interest, (2) providing information 
that was not previously known, (3) admitting to behavior that is 
relevant to issues that CBP tests, and/or (4) admitting information 
that was not relevant to determining suitability for employment. 

[29] PSD uses DHS's Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to 
track data on its adjudications. CBP IA began using ISMS, as required 
by DHS, in fiscal year 2010. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[31] Human Resources Management administers the CBP Federal Drug Free 
Workplace Program as is mandated by Executive Order 12564. Tested 
designated positions include sensitive federal positions in the area 
of law enforcement and public trust such as CBPOs and BPAs. 

[32] CBP also conducts urinalysis tests based on reasonable suspicion 
or in the aftermath of an accident or in other instances. Grounds for 
reasonable suspicion tests include, among other things, observable 
phenomena, such as direct observation of drug use or possession and/or 
the physical symptoms of being under the influence of a drug, a 
pattern of abnormal conduct or erratic behavior, or an arrest or 
conviction for a drug-related offense. CBP conducted five reasonable 
suspicion tests from fiscal years 2009 to 2011. 

[33] CBP policies allows for reinvestigations to be initiated outside 
of the standard 5-year cycle. As of July 2012, CBP has not conducted 
any periodic reinvestigations outside of the normal cycle, according 
to CBP IA officials. 

[34] As of October 2012, CBP requires all incoming CBPO and BPA 
applicants to receive a polygraph examination. However, PSD began 
screening some applicants with a polygraph examination beginning in 
2008. 

[35] In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that 
the Border Patrol was to maintain an active duty presence of no fewer 
than 21,370 agents protecting the border of the United States. 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2011, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 
112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011). 

[36] Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011). 

[37] The Office of Labor and Employee Relations is the authority 
within CBP for management of labor and employee relations activities. 

[38] Statement of Thomas Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. 
House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2012. 

[39] See GAO, Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS 
and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 
Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 
2009). 

[40] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management, second edition© (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 

[41] CAD adheres to a separate quality assurance program that is 
administered by the National Center for Credibility Assessment, which 
evaluates CAD's compliance with established policies and procedures 
for polygraph programs within the federal government. 

[42] OFO and BP have also developed various policies, musters, 
training courses, and other documents outlining officers' and agents' 
integrity-related responsibilities related to accessing U.S. 
government law enforcement systems, inappropriate associations with 
known or suspected criminals, processing of family or close 
associates, among other things. 

[43] CBP Directive 2130-016. 

[44] See Statement of David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, before the Subcommittee on Government 
Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. 
Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012. 

[45] U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, 
Legal Trade: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 
Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2009. 

[46] CBP Directive 2130-016. 

[47] GAO, Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability 
Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-645] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010) and GAO, National Capital Region: 2010 Strategic Plan is 
Generally Consistent with Characteristics of Effective Strategies, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-276T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 7, 2011). 

[48] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004). Another element of effective strategies that we identified was 
integration and implementation, which addresses how a strategy relates 
to other strategies' goals, objectives, and activities, and to 
subordinate levels of government and their plans to implement the 
strategy. We determined that this element was not relevant to the 
scope of our review, which was limited to CBP's integrity programs and 
strategy and not its integration with integrity activities of other 
DHS components. 

[49] CBP convened the IPCC in 2011 as a forum to discuss integrity-
related issues and ideas and to share best practices among the 
members. IPCC is responsible for facilitating integrity-related 
operations of individual offices within CBP as a deliberative body. In 
particular, IPCC was tasked with making recommendations to address the 
results of an integrity study conducted by the Homeland Security 
Studies and Analysis Institute. The IPCC is composed of 
representatives from CBP IA, OFO, USBP, Human Resources Management, 
and Labor and Employee Relations, among others. See Homeland Security 
Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Workforce Integrity Study. Dec. 15, 2011. 

[50] Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Workforce Integrity Study. Dec. 15, 2011. 

[51] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management, second edition © (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 

[52] CBP's "Trust Betrayed" internal website lists examples of 
behavior that CBP states betrays the conduct expected of employees, 
and includes details of criminal prosecutions. 

[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[54] Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011). 

[55] PSD, within CBP IA, manages the personnel security and 
suitability program by initiating and adjudicating preemployment 
investigations for CBP applicants and contractors. PSD also conducts 
and adjudicates periodic reinvestigations and issues security 
clearances for CBP employees. 

[56] With a favorable suitability determination, an applicant can be 
hired, if all other requirements are met. The suitability 
determination is a process that subjects applicants' and employees' 
personal conduct to evaluation throughout their careers. Title 5, Code 
of Federal Regulations Part 731, establishes factors that are used to 
make a determination of suitability. 

[57] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

[58] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program 
Management, second edition © (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 

[59] U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, 
Legal Trade: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 
Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2009. 

[60] CBP's Office of Policy and Planning is headed by an Executive 
Director and provides oversight of CBP policy and aligns policies 
across the various CBP components. 

[End of section] 

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