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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

November 2012: 

Security Assistance: 

DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional 
Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management 

GAO-13-84: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-84, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Congress appropriated approximately $18.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 
for various security cooperation and assistance programs that supply 
military equipment and training to more than 100 partner countries. 
Amid concerns that traditional security assistance programs were too 
slow, Congress established several new programs in recent years. DSCA 
oversees the security assistance process, with key functions in 
agreement development, acquisition, and equipment delivery performed 
by U.S. military departments. DOD has undertaken a variety of 
management reforms since 2010 to improve the security assistance 
process. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD reforms address 
implementation challenges faced by security cooperation officials and 
(2) DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness 
of security assistance. GAO analyzed DOD data and performance 
measures, conducted focus groups and interviews with security 
cooperation officials at all six geographic combatant commands, and 
interviewed SCO staff for 17 countries. 

What GAO Found: 

Security cooperation officials report three major types of challenges—-
training and workforce structure, defining partner country 
requirements, and obtaining acquisition and delivery status 
information-—in conducting assistance programs. Ongoing Department of 
Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that DOD security cooperation 
officials reported in meeting staff training needs and achieving the 
optimum workforce structure. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA) has also initiated efforts to respond to challenges in 
developing assistance requests resulting from the limited expertise of 
partner countries and U.S. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
staff in identifying country assistance requirements and the equipment 
that can meet them. However, according to DOD security cooperation 
officials, information gaps in the acquisition and delivery phases of 
the security assistance process continue to hinder the effectiveness 
of U.S. assistance. Nearly all of GAO’s focus groups and interviews 
reported persistent difficulties obtaining information on the status 
of security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information 
systems are difficult to access and contain limited information. DOD’s 
existing delivery tracking system provides only limited data on the 
status of equipment deliveries because partner country agents and DOD 
agencies are not entering the needed data into the system. Without 
advance notice of deliveries, SCO staff have been unable to ensure 
that addresses were correct and that partner countries were ready to 
receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased 
costs. DOD is developing a new information system to address 
information gaps, but it is not expected to be fully implemented until 
2020. 

Figure: DSCA’s Security Assistance Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Assistance request; 
Agreement development; 
Acquisition; 
Delivery; 
Case closure. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA documents. 

[End of figure] 

DSCA data indicate that DOD has improved timeliness in the initial 
phases of the security assistance process, but these data provide 
limited information on other phases. The average number of days spent 
developing a security assistance agreement has improved from an 
average of 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year 
2011. However, assessing the timeliness of the whole security 
assistance process is difficult because DSCA has limited timeliness 
measures for later phases, which often comprise the most time-
consuming activities. For example, DSCA has not established a 
performance measure to assess the timeliness of acquisition, which can 
take years. In addition, DSCA does not consistently measure delivery 
performance against estimated delivery dates. Without such performance 
measures, DSCA cannot assess historical trends or the extent to which 
reforms impact the timeliness of the security assistance process. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish procedures 
to ensure that DOD agencies enter needed acquisition and delivery 
status data into security assistance information systems and (2) 
establish performance measures to assess timeliness for additional 
phases of the security assistance process. DOD concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-84]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 
johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Reforms Address Many Challenges, but More Comprehensive 
Acquisition and Delivery Information Is Needed: 

DSCA Data Indicate Improved Timeliness in the Initial Phases of the 
Security Assistance Process, but Provide Limited Information on Other 
Phases: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Agency Comments and Our 
Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Challenges Identified by Geographic Combatant Command 
Security Cooperation Officials: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of BPC Programs Administered by DSCA: 

Table 2: Average Days for Agreement Development for Sample Afghanistan 
and Iraq BPC, Other BPC, and FMF Programs (Fiscal Years 2007-2011): 

Table 3: Ontime Completion of Security Assistance Agreements by Type, 
Fiscal Year 2011: 

Table 4: Challenges within DOD’s Purview to Implementing Security 
Assistance Programs that Were Identified by Combatant Command 
Officials: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Acting Entities and Steps in FMS and Pseudo-FMS Processes: 

Figure 2: Percentage of Intermediate and Final Delivery Points 
Containing Data for Sample Deliveries Originating in Fiscal Years 2007-
2011: 

Figure 3: Average Days Spent in Agreement Development (FY2007-FY2011): 

Figure 4: Open Supply Discrepancy Reports Greater than 1 Year Old, 
Fiscal Years 2007-2011: 

Abbreviations: 

BPC: building partner capacity: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 

EFTS: Enhanced Freight Tracking System: 

FMF: Foreign Military Financing: 

FMS: Foreign Military Sales: 

SCO: Security Cooperation Organization: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 16, 2012 

Congressional Committees: 

U.S. national security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of 
our efforts to help foreign partners and allies build their own 
security capacity. As part of these efforts, Congress appropriated 
$18.75 billion[Footnote 1] in fiscal year 2012 for various security 
cooperation and assistance programs that supply military equipment and 
training to more than 100 partner countries.[Footnote 2] However, 
traditional security assistance programs such as Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS)[Footnote 3] and Foreign Military Financing (FMF),[Footnote 
4] while beneficial, have been criticized as being too slow and 
cumbersome to meet needs for training and equipping foreign forces for 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. In recent years 
Congress has expanded the number of funding mechanisms and programs to 
build partner capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) oversees program administration for 
both traditional and newer programs and has undertaken a series of 
internal reform efforts to address concerns about the timeliness of 
security assistance. In addition, the Secretary of Defense convened a 
Security Cooperation Reform Task Force in fiscal year 2010, which made 
additional recommendations for reform. In response to a Senate Armed 
Services Committee mandate[Footnote 5] to review DSCA’s program 
implementation processes, this report assesses the extent to which (1) 
DOD reforms address challenges that security cooperation officials 
face in implementing assistance programs and (2) DSCA performance 
measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security 
assistance. While DOD and the Department of State (State) manage other 
U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, our report 
addresses only those programs where DSCA plays a role.[Footnote 6] 

To identify ongoing and planned DOD security cooperation reforms, we 
reviewed a DOD task force report,[Footnote 7] analyzed its 
recommendations, and discussed reform efforts with DSCA officials. To 
identify challenges that DOD officials face in implementing security 
cooperation programs, we convened focus groups and conducted 
interviews of security cooperation officials in all six geographic 
combatant commands.[Footnote 8] We also conducted interviews with 
staff at Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) — DOD officials 
located in a foreign country who manage DOD security cooperation 
programs under the guidance of the combatant command— for 17 
countries. We selected these countries based on geographic 
representation, the value of U.S.-funded security assistance the 
country received from 2006 to 2010, and other factors. We excluded 
International Military Education and Training in order to focus on 
equipment and equipment-associated training and because we had 
recently issued a report specifically assessing International Military 
Education and Training.[Footnote 9] To assess the extent to which DSCA 
performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of 
security assistance, we reviewed DSCA performance measures and 
discussed them with DSCA officials and implementing agency officials. 
We reviewed the first three quarterly management reports of 
performance measures for fiscal year 2012 to assess the extent that 
DSCA has performance measures that can be used to assess timeliness. 
Where sample data permitted, we also analyzed DOD data to assess 
performance trends. Appendix I provides further details on our scope 
and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through 
November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The United States provides military equipment and training to partner 
countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the 
U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services 
on their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also 
provides grants to some foreign partners through the FMF program to 
fund the partner’s purchase of materiel and services through the 
process used for FMS. In this report, we refer to FMS, FMF, and other 
State Department programs implemented by DOD as “traditional” security 
assistance programs. In recent years, Congress has expanded the number 
of security cooperation programs to include several new programs with 
funds appropriated to DOD, as well as administered and implemented by 
DOD, that focus on building partner capacity (BPC). See table 1 for 
descriptions of the BPC programs included in our report. 

Table 1: Summary of BPC Programs Administered by DSCA 

Program and fiscal year established: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; 
2005; 
Summary: Funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense to provide 
assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, including for the 
training, equipping, and maintenance of Afghanistan’s security forces. 

Program and fiscal year established: Iraq Security Forces Fund; 2005; 
Summary: Funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense to provide 
assistance to the security forces of Iraq, including for the training, 
equipping, and maintenance of Iraq’s security forces. 

Program and fiscal year established: Coalition Support Fund; 2002; 
Summary: The Coalition Support Fund’s Coalition Readiness Support 
Program is used to provide specialized training, procure supplies and 
specialized equipment, and loan such equipment and supplies on a 
nonreimbursable basis to coalition forces supporting U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan. 

Program and fiscal year established: Section 1206 Global Train and 
Equip; 2006; 
Summary: Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to $350 million 
each year, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to build 
the capacity of foreign military forces of a country in order for that 
country to conduct counterterrorist operations or to support military 
and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a 
participant. 

Program and fiscal year established: Pakistan Counterinsurgency 
Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund; 2009; 
Summary: The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund is appropriated to the 
Secretary of Defense. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund 
is appropriated to the Secretary of State but may be transferred to 
the Secretary of Defense. Both funds provide assistance for Pakistan’s 
security forces to bolster their counterinsurgency efforts. 

Program and fiscal year established: Global Security Contingency Fund; 
2012; 
Summary: The Global Security Contingency Fund provides assistance to 
enhance the capabilities of a foreign country’s military and security 
forces to conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and 
counterterrorism operations; and participate in or support military, 
stability, or peace support operations consistent with U.S. foreign 
policy and national security interests. 

Sources: GAO analysis of public laws and DOD documents. 

[End of section] 

DSCA oversees program administration for both traditional programs and 
newer BPC programs. DSCA establishes security assistance procedures 
and systems, provides training, and guides the activities of 
implementing agencies.[Footnote 10] Implementing agencies of the 
military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—are responsible for 
preparing, processing, and executing the vast majority of security 
assistance agreements.[Footnote 11] While these implementing agencies 
maintain their own unique systems and procedures, DSCA provides 
overall guidance through the Security Assistance Management Manual and 
associated policy memos. DSCA provides education and training to 
security cooperation officials through its Defense Institute of 
Security Assistance Management. 

Both the traditional and BPC programs that DSCA administers use the 
FMS process to provide security assistance, but, as shown in figure 1, 
some roles, responsibilities, and actors differ. In contrast to 
traditional programs, under the BPC programs, the United States 
consults with the partner country, but takes lead in identifying 
partner requirements and funds, obtains, and delivers equipment on the 
partner’s behalf. The form of the FMS process used to implement BPC 
programs is referred to as the “pseudo-FMS” process. While the many 
steps of the FMS and pseudo-FMS processes can be grouped in different 
ways, they fall into five general phases: assistance request, 
agreement development, acquisition, delivery, and case closure. See 
figure 1 for a summary of selected entities and their roles in these 
phases of the FMS and pseudo-FMS processes. 

Figure 1: Acting Entities and Steps in FMS and Pseudo-FMS Processes 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

FMS for tradition programs: 

Assistance request: 
* Partner country identifies requirements and drafts letter of request 
with input from U.S. combatant commands, security cooperation 
organizations, and implementing agencies; 
Agreement development: 
* Implementing agency prepares security assistance agreement with 
input from partner country; 
* DSCA and implementing agency obtain needed U.S. approvals and,
when authorized by State, DSCA notifies Congress of proposed cases if 
required; 
* DSCA reviews security assistance agreement and authorizes 
implementing agency to forward it to partner country for acceptance; 
Acquisition: 
* Implementing agency manages contracting or requisition of equipment 
and services specified in signed agreement; 

Delivery: 
* Partner country provides equipment delivery addresses; 
* Partner country may use freight forwarder or pay to use the U.S. 
military transportation system; 
Case closure: 
* An FMS case may be closed when all materiel has been delivered, all 
ordered services have been performed, and no new orders exist or are 
forthcoming; 
* Partner country requests case closure; 
* Implementing agency certifies case for closure and residual funds 
are made available for re-use. 

Pseudo-FMS for BPC programs: 

Assistance request: 
* U.S. combatant commands and in-country security cooperation 
organizations identify requirements and draft memorandum of request 
with input from U.S. implementing agencies and partner countries; 
Agreement development: 
* Implementing agency prepares security assistance agreement; 
* DSCA obtains needed U.S. approvals; State Department approves each 
security assistance agreement; 
* DOD notifies Congress of proposed programs; 
* DSCA approves final security assistance agreements and implementing 
agency accepts the offer; 
Acquisition: 
* Implementing agency manages contracting or requisition of equipment 
and services specified in signed agreement; 
Delivery: 
* In-country U.S. security cooperation organization provides equipment 
delivery addresses; 
* Transportation is provided through the U.S. military transportation 
system or other U.S. government-procured transportation; 
Case closure: 
* Implementing agency initiates case closure and certifies case for
closure. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA documents. 

Note: This summary of the FMS and pseudo-FMS processes does not 
encompass all steps and actors that may be involved, such as 
technology releasability reviews that may be required for sensitive 
equipment. 

[End of figure] 

* Assistance Request. During the assistance request phase, in 
traditional FMS, the partner country identifies its requirements 
(needed materiel or services) and documents them in a formal letter of 
request. Implementing agencies as well as SCOs and officials at DOD’s 
six geographic combatant commands may provide input to the assistance 
request. In the pseudo-FMS process, SCOs and combatant commands 
consult with partner countries and take the lead in identifying 
partner country requirements and drafting the request, sometimes with 
input from the partner country. 

* Agreement Development. During the agreement development phase, the 
implementing agency enters the letter of request[Footnote 12] into the 
Defense Security Assistance Management System, a DSCA information 
system used by all implementing agencies to process letters of request 
and produce security assistance agreements. DSCA reviews the draft 
agreement and coordinates with the State Department before sending any 
congressional notifications that, for the traditional FMS process, may 
be required based on the dollar value or sensitivity of the potential 
sale but for pseudo-FMS are required for all programs. When approvals 
are in place, DSCA conducts a final quality assurance review and State 
performs a final review. In traditional FMS, DSCA authorizes the 
implementing agency to send the agreement to the partner country for 
acceptance; in the pseudo-FMS process, the implementing agency accepts 
the agreement on behalf of the combatant command. 

* Acquisition. During the acquisition phase, implementing agencies 
requisition from existing supply or procure equipment and services 
using the same procedures they use to supply the U.S. military. The 
process is the same for both FMS and pseudo-FMS. Case managers at 
implementing agencies monitor acquisitions and enter status 
information into their data systems. Unlike the single information 
system used to develop agreements, the information systems used in the 
acquisition phase are not common across implementing agencies. 
However, DSCA has created a web-based overlay, the Security 
Cooperation Information Portal, which imports some of the information 
available in implementing agency data systems and is accessible over 
the Internet by security cooperation and partner country officials. 

* Delivery. In the traditional FMS process, the partner country takes 
custody of materiel in the United States and is responsible for 
arranging delivery. The partner country may pay to use the U.S. 
military transportation system, but often uses its own freight 
forwarder—an authorized agent responsible for managing shipment to the 
final destination. If shipments are incomplete or otherwise deficient, 
the partner country may file a supply discrepancy report to seek 
redress. All BPC program shipments use the U.S. military 
transportation system or other U.S. government-procured 
transportation, with the SCO responsible for providing the delivery 
address, ensuring foreign customs requirements can be met, jointly 
checking shipments for completeness with the partner country, and 
preparing any needed supply discrepancy reports. Implementing agencies 
are responsible for conducting BPC deliveries and confirming that SCOs 
are ready to receive a planned delivery. For both FMS and pseudo-FMS 
processes, DOD uses the Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS), a 
secure web-based application accessible within the Security 
Cooperation Information Portal designed to provide visibility of the 
security assistance distribution system. 

* Case Closure. An FMS case is a candidate for closure when all 
materiel has been delivered, all ordered services have been performed, 
no new orders exist or are forthcoming, and the partner has not 
requested the case be kept open. At case closure, any remaining case 
funds may be made available to the country for further use. Pseudo-FMS 
cases may be submitted for closure as soon as supply and services are 
complete. 

DOD has undertaken internal improvement efforts designed to address 
challenges in implementing security cooperation and security 
assistance programs and improving timeliness of U.S. efforts. DSCA has 
also undertaken improvements recommended by its internal improvement 
program, begun in 2008, which has reviewed DSCA and implementing 
agency processes.[Footnote 13] In fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of 
Defense initiated a comprehensive review of DOD’s internal processes. 
The results of the task force review led to recommendations focusing 
on areas for improvement including: identification of partner 
requirements; acquisition and transportation; and training, education, 
and workforce development. DOD and DSCA have initiated a variety of 
efforts to implement the recommendations, and a follow-up task force 
report describes the status of action on the recommendations. In focus 
groups we conducted in 2012 at all six combatant commands[Footnote 14] 
and interviews with the officials at SCOs in 17 countries, security 
cooperation officials reported three types of challenges: (1) 
optimizing training and workforce structure, (2) defining partner 
country requirements, and (3) obtaining information on the acquisition 
and delivery status of assistance agreements. 

DOD Reforms Address Many Challenges, but More Comprehensive 
Acquisition and Delivery Information Is Needed: 

DSCA has undertaken reforms to address challenges associated with (1) 
training and workforce structure, (2) defining partner country 
requirements, and (3) obtaining information on the acquisition and 
delivery status of assistance agreements.15 While ongoing reforms are 
addressing the first two challenges in the short term, reforms to 
address information system gaps are more long-term focused and are 
expected to take years to complete. 

DOD Reforms Are Addressing Training and Workforce Challenges: 

Security cooperation officials reported that the existing training and 
workforce structure presented a challenge to successfully implementing 
security assistance. Specifically, focus groups at four of the six 
combatant commands indicated that training or staffing of SCOs was 
insufficient, limiting SCO effectiveness as they develop assistance 
requests, build relationships in-country, and track assistance 
agreements through to delivery. These focus group participants and 
officials at the SCOs and military departments reported that they felt 
a number of changes were needed, such as including more training on 
newer security cooperation authorities, providing additional refresher 
courses, and ensuring that security cooperation officers meet with 
their military department points of contact as part of their 
predeployment training for their SCO assignments. In addition, 
according to focus groups and interviews we conducted with SCOs, SCOs 
were insufficiently staffed or rotations in the field were not long 
enough. For example, some SCOs reported having only one security 
cooperation officer, and rotations sometimes lasted only 1 year, which 
was often less than the cycle time to develop and execute a security 
assistance agreement. Focus group participants said a lack of 
institutional memory in these SCOs created challenges for new officers 
who must assume responsibility for ongoing security cooperation 
efforts. 

DSCA has initiated a number of reforms designed to address training 
and workforce structure challenges previously identified by DOD and 
raised again during our focus groups and interviews. DOD recognized 
the need for improved training and workforce management as early as 
2009, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense included efforts to improve 
security cooperation training in his top 10 Office of Management and 
Budget high-priority performance goals for 2010 and 2011. DSCA is 
developing several courses to address reported gaps in knowledge and 
to increase the percentage of the security cooperation workforce that 
receives training. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
declared in 2009 that DSCA must plan to educate 95 percent of the 
security cooperation workforce by the end of fiscal year 2011. As of 
September 2012, DSCA has consistently reported that this goal has been 
met or exceeded since it was first achieved in June 2011. DSCA and the 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management are currently 
identifying key positions in the security cooperation community and 
developing improved procedures to help ensure the selection of well-
qualified candidates for those positions. 

In addition to monitoring the percentage of people trained, DOD has 
reforms underway to address concerns about the content of the training 
for, and the staffing of, security cooperation positions. In 2011, 
DOD’s Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management began 
expanding a required course for DOD personnel responsible for security 
assistance and security cooperation management in overseas positions 
such as at SCOs, combatant commands, and Defense Attaché Offices. 
Furthermore, the course now includes information that security 
cooperation personnel identified as important, such as a section on 
BPC programs. As of September 2012, the Institute reported that 
students found the initial expansion of the required course better 
covered the planning and execution of the wide variety of security 
cooperation programs. The course changes are now complete and, 
beginning in October 2012, the Institute plans to offer the final 
expanded course. As a result of changes to this course, security 
cooperation officers are now able to meet—in person and by video-
teleconference—with the DOD points of contact they will work with to 
implement security cooperation programs once they are in the field. In 
addition, these new course offerings introduce the topic of security 
cooperation to U.S. government officials who interact with partner 
countries but do not necessarily work on security cooperation programs. 

In addition to improvements to course offerings, DSCA has created 
additional resources for security cooperation officials. In April 
2012, DSCA added a new chapter devoted specifically to building 
partner capacity to the Security Assistance Management Manual. DSCA 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy have created a 
tool kit which provides points of contact and implementation guidance 
for each assistance program. Mandatory training for security 
cooperation officers includes a review of this tool kit. 

DOD Reforms Are Responding to Challenges Defining Partner Country 
Requirements: 

Focus group participants in five of six combatant commands and 
officials at 9 of the 17 SCOs noted challenges in identifying and 
defining partner country assistance requirements.[Footnote 16] These 
officials noted that partner countries did not have enough experience 
or expertise to identify their requirements or develop an assistance 
request that DOD can act upon. Further, focus groups at four of the 
six combatant commands reported that SCOs lacked the experience or 
capacity necessary to identify equipment to match the partner 
country’s requirements. For example, officials in two focus groups 
reported that some SCOs lacked staff with expertise to develop either 
traditional or BPC assistance requests. 

Since 2009, DOD has initiated reforms to improve the process of 
developing assistance requests intended to reduce implementation 
delays and improve the effectiveness of assistance to partner 
countries. DOD reforms include developing new training courses and 
providing in-country advisors to help country officials identify short-
term and long-term requirements and strategies to meet those 
requirements. DOD has also reformed its own processes for defining 
requirements to improve long-term effectiveness of security 
cooperation programs and provide short-term solutions for meeting 
requirements using assistance requests. For example, beginning in 
2011, DOD issued new policies and guidance to help combatant commands 
and implementing agencies plan for, and better develop, security 
assistance requests. Also in 2011, DSCA established a strategic 
planning support group to assist combatant commands with early 
identification and resolution of issues related to capability 
requirements and certain types of assistance requests. In addition, 
DSCA established Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams whose 
purpose is to help the combatant commands, partner countries, and 
security cooperation officers identify and refine a partner country’s 
requirements. These teams are available for both traditional and BPC 
programs upon request by combatant commands. DSCA noted that these 
teams would be particularly useful when a security cooperation officer 
lacks experience or familiarity with the type of equipment in 
question. DSCA provided pilot teams for Bulgaria, Iraq, and Uzbekistan 
and, after the pilot was determined to be successful, sent teams to 
assist Armenia, the Philippines, and again Iraq. The pilot teams 
produced 34 assistance letters of request, including some for FMF 
programs. 

DOD Efforts Underway Will Not Provide Comprehensive Information on 
Acquisition and Delivery Status until 2020: 

DOD officials participating in focus groups at all six combatant 
commands and officials at 16 of the 17 SCOs we interviewed reported 
difficulties obtaining information from DSCA and the implementing 
agencies of the military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on 
the status of assistance agreements throughout the security assistance 
process. These officials reported that obtaining information on 
acquisition and delivery status was particularly problematic. 
According to DSCA’s Security Assistance Management Manual, in order to 
facilitate information sharing regarding assistance agreement status, 
the implementing agencies must communicate frequently with DSCA, the 
combatant commands, and the security cooperation officers, as well as 
with other entities involved in executing security assistance 
programs.[Footnote 17] However, focus group participants at the 
commands and the security cooperation officers we interviewed reported 
a number of problems obtaining the information they need in order to 
implement security assistance programs throughout the process. 
Specifically, they reported that: 

* DSCA and implementing agency information systems were difficult to 
access; 

* implementing agency information systems often did not contain 
current information; 

* these systems often did not contain the specific type of information 
the officials needed; 

* implementing agencies generally did not proactively provide the 
information that was available; 

* shipping documentation was often missing or inadequate; and; 

* deliveries arrived when the SCOs did not expect them. 

Security cooperation officials we interviewed reported examples of 
this lack of information delaying assistance, increasing costs, or 
negatively affecting their ability to keep partner countries and 
senior officers at the combatant commands informed about the progress 
of the assistance agreements. For example, security cooperation 
officers at four SCOs reported that equipment was held by the partner 
country’s customs agency because the delivery lacked proper 
documentation or proper address labels, and additional customs fees 
were incurred while the security cooperation officers found the 
missing information. Security cooperation officers in two SCOs noted 
instances where shipments were warehoused in a customs office for 2 
years because they had no addresses or were improperly addressed. 
Security cooperation officers in three SCO reported discovering 
equipment at ports and airports that had arrived without advance 
notice. 

In addition to receiving reports of challenges encountered by 
officials using the various DOD information systems, we analyzed the 
extent to which data were available in the delivery tracking 
information system. DOD has created an information system intended to 
provide a single, consolidated, authoritative source for security 
assistance shipment information tracking. However, we found that DOD 
is not ensuring that entities charged with carrying out deliveries are 
fully providing data for this system. The Security Assistance 
Management Manual recommends that SCOs use the EFTS to maintain 
awareness of incoming shipments to the partner country when the items 
are shipped using the U.S. Defense Transportation System. EFTS, 
accessible through the Security Cooperation Information Portal, 
collects, processes, and integrates transportation information 
generated by the military services, Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. 
Transportation Command, participating carriers, freight forwarders, 
and partner countries—all of which can play a role in the equipment 
delivery process and in populating the information systems. 

However, EFTS is not currently populated with sufficient information 
to provide transit visibility. The system currently provides 
information regarding when cargo leaves the supply source for most 
security assistance deliveries, but we found that information 
availability decreases as deliveries transit through intermediate 
points and on to final destinations. EFTS provides limited information 
documenting, for example, the date a shipment departs the United 
States and arrives at a port in the recipient country. In addition, 
the system documents about 1 percent of the dates that equipment 
arrived at the in-country final destination. Figure 2 provides 
percentages of fields in EFTS for which participating entities 
provided data, based on a sample of FMF deliveries, for fiscal years 
2007-2011. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Intermediate and Final Delivery Points 
Containing Data for Sample Deliveries Originating in Fiscal Years 2007-
2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Intermediate and Final Delivery Points: Date of arrival at U.S. 
shipping location; 
Deliveries with data populated: 62%; 
Deliveries lacking data: 38%. 

Intermediate and Final Delivery Points: Date of departure from U.S. 
shipping location; 
Deliveries with data populated: 6%; 
Deliveries lacking data: 94%. 

Intermediate and Final Delivery Points: Date of arrival at initial 
delivery location; 
Deliveries with data populated: 41%; 
Deliveries lacking data: 59%. 

Intermediate and Final Delivery Points: Date of departure from initial 
delivery location; 
Deliveries with data populated: 49%; 
Deliveries lacking data: 51%. 

Intermediate and Final Delivery Points: Date of receipt at in country 
final destination; 
Deliveries with data populated: 1%; 
Deliveries lacking data: 99%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data. 

[End of figure] 

The lack of data in EFTS is caused by inconsistent participation by 
the entities executing deliveries, which need to provide the data that 
would populate the system. Equipment deliveries for traditional 
security assistance programs are often executed by partner country 
freight forwarders. According to DOD officials, some freight 
forwarders have been reluctant to participate in EFTS and must be 
directed by the partner country to do so, possibly requiring a change 
to the freight forwarder’s contract with the partner country. Although 
DSCA can issue guidance to freight forwarders, according to DSCA 
officials, it has no authority to require them to follow the guidance. 
The 2008 DSCA memo announcing the introduction of EFTS notes that the 
success of the program relies greatly on the participation of partner 
countries and their freight forwarders, and DSCA officials have since 
discussed ways to encourage freight forwarders to participate in the 
EFTS system and report final shipments. DSCA officials have 
acknowledged that there is still work to be done to address challenges 
in implementing EFTS. 

DOD has reforms underway for additional information systems to address 
the lack of information across the process. In an effort to develop 
more complete, comparable, and detailed data on security assistance 
agreement execution, DSCA is developing a new electronic system, the 
Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to aggregate data from the 
separate computer management systems used by DOD’s implementing 
agencies and standardize the handling of security assistance 
agreements regardless of the assigned military service. The system is 
intended to improve visibility on the acquisition and later phases of 
the security assistance process. Agency leaders have noted that the Army
’s Security Assistance Enterprise Management Resource system has 
already contributed to significantly increased management visibility 
across the entire security assistance process for Army-implemented 
assistance agreements and will bolster efforts to make similar 
management tools available across implementing agencies, particularly 
once incorporated into the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution. 

The Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution is intended to be a long-
term solution to information management challenges. DSCA officials 
expect to provide the system to one of the implementing agencies in 
2015 and plan to complete system implementation in 2020, when the 
remaining two implementing agencies will have access to the system. 
DSCA has also initiated reforms intended to increase visibility for 
specific phases of the process. For example, in 2010, DSCA undertook 
an effort to improve the quality of the documentation included with 
each shipment. As a result, the Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management issued a training guide in 2012 to improve the 
accuracy of addresses on shipments. Furthermore, to address problems 
with the agreement development phase, DSCA is working with the Defense 
Contracting Management Agency to develop a way to make contract 
information available to FMS customers via the Security Cooperation 
Information Portal. The stated goal is to allow customers to search 
for the information as well as to create reports containing contract 
information that can be sent to a range of FMS customers. The training 
and workforce structure reforms discussed earlier may also address 
some of the reported challenges regarding information accessibility. 

DSCA Data Indicate Improved Timeliness in the Initial Phases of the 
Security Assistance Process, but Provide Limited Information on Other 
Phases: 

DSCA has collected data that show improved timeliness in processing 
security assistance requests and developing security assistance 
agreements. However, assessing the timeliness of the entire security 
assistance process is difficult, because DSCA lacks timeliness 
performance measures for the other phases and for the overall 
process.[Footnote 18] For example, the agency does not measure the 
timeliness of assistance acquisition, delivery, and case closure, 
which usually comprise the most time-consuming activities. 

DSCA Collects Information from Implementing Agencies to Monitor 
Performance across the Security Assistance Process: 

According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance 
over time.[Footnote 19] Furthermore, the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, as amended, requires agencies to develop 
performance measures, monitor progress on achieving goals, and report 
on their progress in their annual performance reports.[Footnote 20] 
Our previous work has noted that the lack of clear, measurable goals 
makes it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to-
day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended mission.[Footnote 21] 

DSCA has access to many security assistance management systems that 
implementing agencies use and maintain to manage the security 
assistance process. DSCA routinely extracts selected information from 
these systems to oversee the process and has established some 
performance measures to assess timeliness in various phases. 

DOD Has Improved Request Processing Time, but DSCA Cannot Measure All 
Time Spent Developing Assistance Requests: 

Assistance Request: 

DSCA data indicate improvements in the timeliness of assistance 
request processing. In the assistance request phase, DSCA measures the 
number of security assistance requests and the time spent processing 
them after they are received. DSCA measures processing time as the 
number of days from the time a request is formally received until it 
is “complete,” or ready for the agreement development phase. According 
to DSCA data, the number of days necessary for processing assistance 
requests once they are formally received has improved from about 22 
days in fiscal year 2008 to about 13 days in fiscal year 2011. 

While DOD has improved its response to the formal request, a partner 
country or combatant command’s perspective of the time required to 
develop security assistance requests may be different from the portion 
of that time under the oversight of DSCA. A significant amount of time 
devoted to the development of assistance requests takes place before 
the customer submits an assistance request to an implementing agency 
or DSCA. For example, U.S. officials such as combatant command and SCO 
staff as well as experts on relevant defense equipment may work 
intensively with partner country officials before the request is 
officially submitted. 

DOD Has Improved the Timeliness of Agreement Development: 

Agreement Development: 

DSCA data show that implementing agencies have reduced the time spent 
during the agreement development phase of the security assistance 
process. DSCA uses a single data system to collect detailed 
information from implementing agencies on the time required to develop 
security assistance agreements.[Footnote 22] This information allows 
common performance measurement that provides a basis for focused 
reforms to reduce process times in this phase. Aggregate DSCA data for 
all agreements indicate a reduction in the average, or mean, number of 
days for an assistance agreement to be fully developed and offered to 
partner countries from 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in 
fiscal year 2011, with a fiscal year 2009 low of 103 days (see figure 
3). 

Figure 3: Average Days Spent in Agreement Development (FY2007-FY2011): 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Average Days: 124. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Average Days: 117. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Average Days: 103. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Average Days: 113. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Average Days: 109. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, sample DSCA data we analyzed indicate that agreement 
development is faster for BPC programs than the traditional FMF 
security assistance program for the 17 countries in our sample. 
[Footnote 23] During fiscal years 2007 through 2011, FMF security 
assistance agreement development for our 17 sample countries took an 
average of 89 days, whereas agreement development for BPC programs in 
sample countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan took an average of 76 
days. Agreement development for BPC assistance projects in Afghanistan 
and Iraq was faster still-—36 days on average. See table 2. 

Table 2: Average Days for Agreement Development for Sample Afghanistan 
and Iraq BPC, Other BPC, and FMF Programs (Fiscal Years 2007-2011) 

Program: Afghanistan- and Iraq-related BPC program agreements; 
Average number of days: 36. 

Program: Other BPC program agreements; 
Average number of days: 76. 

Program: Traditional (FMF) program agreements; 
Average number of days: 89. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data. 

[End of table] 

DOD officials we interviewed suggested several factors that may be 
contributing to the faster agreement development time for Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and other BPC programs in our sample. For example, funding for 
BPC programs may need to be obligated more quickly than traditional 
security assistance funding;[Footnote 24] intensive management offices 
for Afghanistan and Iraq help expedite agreement development for those 
partner countries; and DOD’s combatant command for the region 
including Iraq and Afghanistan has created a task force to enhance 
communication of command priorities. Furthermore, our analysis of 
sample data did not indicate that the improved timeliness in 
developing BPC security assistance agreements decreased the timeliness 
of developing FMF agreements for our sample countries. We found that 
the time spent developing FMF agreements in our selected countries 
decreased slightly from over 100 days in fiscal year 2007 to less than 
90 days in fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 25] 

Despite reducing the time spent in the agreement development phase, 
implementing agencies have not consistently met DSCA’s established 
timeliness goal. In 2010, DSCA defined this goal as providing security 
assistance agreements to customers on or before the anticipated offer 
date for at least 85 percent of agreements. The anticipated offer date 
is the target date by which the implementing agency is to complete 
agreement development and offer the agreement for acceptance.[Footnote 
26] As shown in table 3, DSCA data indicate that in fiscal year 2011, 
implementing agencies met DSCA’s timeliness goal for BPC agreements, 
88 percent of which were completed by the anticipated offer date. For 
traditional agreements, the implementing agencies fell short of this 
goal, regardless of the complexity of the agreement. 

Table 3: On-time Completion of Security Assistance Agreements by Type, 
Fiscal Year 2011: 

Agreement type: Traditional (in order of complexity): Group A; 
Time allotted to complete agreement: 75 days 
Percentage of agreements completed on time [Target: 85 percent]: 80%. 

Agreement type: Traditional (in order of complexity): Group B; 
Time allotted to complete agreement: 120 days 
Percentage of agreements completed on time [Target: 85 percent]: 72%. 

Agreement type: Traditional (in order of complexity): Group C; 
Time allotted to complete agreement: more than 121 days 
Percentage of agreements completed on time [Target: 85 percent]: 64%. 

Agreement type: BPC; 
Group D 
Time allotted to complete agreement: 75 days 
Percentage of agreements completed on time [Target: 85 percent]: 88%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data. 

[End of table] 

DSCA Does Not Measure Acquisition Timeliness: 

Acquisition: 

In the acquisition phase of the security assistance process, DSCA has 
not established performance measures to assess timeliness of 
acquisitions, which are carried out by the implementing agencies. This 
phase, from when implementing agencies begin to make acquisitions 
needed for finalized security assistance agreements until such 
activities are completed and equipment is ready to ship, is often the 
longest phase of the process. DSCA data indicate that acquisitions 
that required DOD to award a contract in fiscal year 2011 took between 
376 and 1,085 days, but there are limited common data sources across 
implementing agencies for assessing acquisition performance and 
documenting trends.[Footnote 27] DOD’s implementing agencies manage 
acquisitions with several unique electronic systems, each of which 
allows for various status updates and reporting.[Footnote 28] However, 
we have previously reported that although the systems may provide 
performance information within each implementing agency, the 
information is not comparable across agencies, thus reducing its value 
to DSCA for overall oversight.[Footnote 29] DSCA plans for the 
Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution to include information from 
all implementing agencies and improve DSCA’s ability to monitor 
acquisition activities across agencies. This new system is intended to 
be fully implemented in 2020. 

DSCA Does Not Measure Delivery Timeliness: 

Delivery: 

DSCA does not measure the timeliness of all security assistance 
deliveries. Furthermore, DSCA does not consistently record either the 
original target delivery dates or the actual delivery dates required 
to determine delivery timeliness. DSCA monitors and reports one 
timeliness target that is common across implementing agencies. 
According to this target, estimated delivery dates for major 
assistance items, established by implementing agencies, should be met 
for 95 percent or more of these cases.[Footnote 30] However, the 
usefulness of this measure for assessing or noting improvement in 
performance is limited. First, it does not cover all security 
assistance agreements. Rather, it is used only for major equipment 
items and excludes all BPC deliveries. Second, estimated delivery 
dates may be extended in some circumstances. For example, DSCA 
officials have noted that implementing agencies frequently change 
these dates when it is determined that the original commitments cannot 
be met. Therefore, the measure monitors timeliness against the most 
recently updated estimated delivery date, not the original date. 

The Security Cooperation Information Portal includes a data field for 
an estimated date by which all security assistance materiel and 
services contained in an agreement are envisioned to be delivered, as 
well as a field for the actual date. Implementing agencies update the 
estimated date when schedules change, rather than maintaining the 
original date. Furthermore, while DSCA cannot compel partner nations 
to provide actual receipt information for all traditional security 
assistance deliveries, and U.S. SCO staff are required to record the 
actual receipt date of BPC deliveries, they rarely do.[Footnote 31] As 
a result, DSCA does not always have information regarding the actual 
receipt dates of security assistance deliveries. Without original 
estimated delivery dates and actual delivery receipt dates, DSCA 
cannot fully assess the timeliness of deliveries. Furthermore, DSCA 
cannot assess historical delivery timeliness performance to identify 
challenges to be addressed or report improvements achieved through 
reform efforts. 

Learning that there is a problem with equipment that has been 
delivered is often the only indication of delivery DSCA receives from 
partner countries that use freight forwarders. If a partner country 
identifies delivery errors, such as equipment that is missing or 
damaged upon receipt, it may file a supply discrepancy report to 
request restitution. It is then the implementing agencies’ 
responsibility, along with the DOD or commercial source of the item in 
question, to address the complaints. DSCA does have a performance 
measure related to adjudication of supply discrepancy reports—the 
number of reports that have not been addressed within 1 year. 
[Footnote 32] According to DSCA data, DSCA has reduced the number of 
reports that have taken more than 1 year to address, as shown in 
figure 4. 

Figure 4: Open Supply Discrepancy Reports Greater than 1 Year Old, 
Fiscal Years 2007-2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Fiscal year 2007,Q1; 
Number of reports: 866. 

Fiscal year 2007,Q2; 
Number of reports: 987. 

Fiscal year 2007,Q3; 
Number of reports: 995. 

Fiscal year 2007,Q4; 
Number of reports: 942. 

Fiscal year 2008,Q1; 
Number of reports: 815. 

Fiscal year 2008,Q2; 
Number of reports: 901. 

Fiscal year 2008,Q3; 
Number of reports: 997. 

Fiscal year 2008,Q4; 
Number of reports: 1,053. 

Fiscal year 2009,Q1; 
Number of reports: 985. 

Fiscal year 2009,Q2; 
Number of reports: 891. 

Fiscal year 2009,Q3; 
Number of reports: 730. 

Fiscal year 2009,Q4; 
Number of reports: 615. 

Fiscal year 2010,Q1; 
Number of reports: 611. 

Fiscal year 2010,Q2; 
Number of reports: 624. 

Fiscal year 2010,Q3; 
Number of reports: 475. 

Fiscal year 2010,Q4; 
Number of reports: 438. 

Fiscal year 2011,Q1; 
Number of reports: 463. 

Fiscal year 2011,Q2; 
Number of reports: 466. 

Fiscal year 2011,Q3; 
Number of reports: 390. 

Fiscal year 2011,Q4; 
Number of reports: 425. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data. 

DSCA Does Not Measure Timeliness of Case Closure: 

Case Closure: 

DSCA does not measure the time required to close a case—the last phase 
of the security assistance process—and therefore cannot assess the 
extent to which closures are performed in a timely fashion. Closing 
inactive security assistance cases allows residual funds associated 
with those projects to be re-purposed. Officials from the U.S. Africa 
Command noted that even relatively small amounts of residual funds can 
be very helpful to some partner countries. Focus group participants at 
five of six combatant commands noted that closure of completed 
security assistance cases takes too long and may take years. DSCA 
tracks the number of cases closed, but not the time required to close 
them. In addition, DSCA officials noted that the individual 
implementing agencies track other case closure performance measures, 
but DSCA does not incorporate those performance measures into their 
oversight of the security assistance process. 

Conclusions: 

Increasing global threats to U.S. interests abroad make the timely 
provision of U.S. assistance in building foreign partner capacity to 
address transnational threats vital to U.S. national security. 
Congress has created new programs to build partner capacity, and DOD 
has in turn created new procedures to implement those programs. DOD 
has recognized a number of challenges to managing its efforts to build 
foreign partner capacity and has ongoing reforms to address challenges 
associated with personnel training and workforce structure and with 
defining partner country needs. While DOD’s reforms are addressing 
several challenges, existing information systems are not consistently 
populated with needed data. A lack of timely and accurate information 
for partners, combatant commands, and SCO staff on agreement and 
delivery status can delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding 
equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships 
with partner countries. Without performance measures to monitor 
timeliness across all phases of the security assistance process—-
particularly acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which comprise 
some of the most time-consuming activities—-DSCA cannot assess the 
results of reforms or inform Congress of their progress. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the ability of combatant command and SCO officials to 
obtain information on the acquisition and delivery status of 
assistance agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
establish procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies are populating 
security assistance information systems with complete data. 

To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and efficiency of the 
security assistance process, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense take the following actions: 

* establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the 
acquisition phase of the security assistance process; 

* establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the 
delivery phase of the security assistance process; and; 

* establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the case 
closure phase of the security assistance process. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense for comment. State elected not to provide comments on the 
draft report; DSCA concurred with the report’s recommendations. DSCA 
stated that it would work with military departments to ensure that 
information systems are populated with acquisition and delivery status 
data and continue to promote the use of the EFTS. In addition, DSCA 
stated that it will work with the military departments to assess 
timeliness during the acquisition phase; establish performance 
measures for the delivery phase and encourage adherence to reporting 
in-country deliveries; and establish performance measures to assess 
the timeliness of case closure. DOD also provided technical comments, 
which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director: 
International Affairs & Trade: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

In response to a Senate Armed Service Committee mandate to review the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) program implementation 
processes, this report assesses the extent to which (1) Department of 
Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that security cooperation 
officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2) DSCA 
performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of 
security assistance. 

To describe the phases and participants in the traditional Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) process and the pseudo-FMS process used for newer 
programs, we reviewed and summarized the Security Assistance 
Management Manual description of these processes and DSCA flow charts 
that illustrate the FMS process at varying levels of detail. We also 
met with DSCA officials and reviewed system documentation describing 
the functions of DSCA information systems. Our summary of the FMS and 
pseudo-FMS processes does not encompass all steps and actors that may 
be involved, such as technology releasability reviews that may be 
required for sensitive equipment. To describe newer building 
partnership capacity programs (BPC), we reviewed summaries of those 
programs in the Security Assistance Management Manual, previous GAO 
reports and appropriations and authorizing legislation creating the 
programs. Our review focuses on those security cooperation programs 
where DSCA plays a role, and it does not assess other security 
assistance programs implemented by the State Department or most DOD 
counternarcotics programs. 

To assess the extent to which ongoing DOD security cooperation reforms 
address challenges that security cooperation officials face in 
implementing assistance programs, we compared security assistance 
implementation challenges to DOD reforms that are currently planned or 
in progress. To identify ongoing reform efforts, we reviewed the 
Security Cooperation Reform Phase I Report and analyzed its 
recommendations to identify those that required action by DSCA. To 
verify our analysis of DSCA’s role in addressing the recommendations, 
we met with the director and deputy director of the Security 
Cooperation Reform Task Force and DSCA officials who participated in 
the Task Force or are involved in addressing the recommendations. We 
also met with DSCA’s Acting Chief Performance Officer and the Manager 
of DSCA’s Continuous Process Improvement Program to identify and 
describe DSCA-directed internal process reviews and requested and 
received documentation of these efforts. 

To identify challenges to the implementation of security assistance, 
we conducted focus groups or interviews with security cooperation 
officials in the six geographic combatant commands and interviewed 
security cooperation officers in Security Cooperation Organizations 
(SCOs) in 17 countries. These officers manage DOD security cooperation 
programs under the guidance of the combatant commands. To select the 
17 countries, we obtained data from DSCA regarding total value of 
transactions per fiscal year from 2006 to 2010 for each country 
benefiting from seven U.S. government-funded programs administered by 
DSCA: Foreign Military Financing; Section 1206; Peacekeeping 
Operations and the Global Peace Operations Initiative; Iraq Security 
Forces Fund; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; Pakistan 
Counterinsurgency Fund; and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 
Fund. We did not include the Global Security Contingency Fund as part 
of our data analysis because it was newly authorized in fiscal year 
2012. We excluded International Military Education and Training in 
order to focus on equipment and equipment-associated training and 
because we had recently issued a report specifically assessing 
International Military Education and Training.[Footnote 33] 

We then selected three countries from each of the combatant commands 
for inclusion in our review based on those countries that received 
both the highest volume of assistance and received the widest 
diversity of programs. For Northern Command, however, we selected the 
only two countries within the combatant command’s area of 
responsibility, Mexico and the Bahamas, which benefited from one of 
these programs. For the remaining five geographic combatant commands, 
countries included in our review were: Africa Command: Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, and Tunisia; Central Command: Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Pakistan; European Command: Albania, Romania, and Ukraine; Pacific 
Command: Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines; and Southern 
Command: Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. 

Using questions tailored slightly for individual countries where 
appropriate, we interviewed the staff of SCOs in these 17 countries. 
We also interviewed officials at the military departments, and in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense to further clarify these challenges 
and their effects. In addition, at the recommendation of security 
cooperation officials we interviewed at the combatant commands and 
DSCA, we also interviewed the staff of SCOs of two additional 
countries, Georgia and Yemen. These two SCOs each had experience with 
a specific program, the Coalition Readiness Support Program in Georgia 
and the new Global Security Contingency Fund program in Yemen. 

Using a single facilitator and common set of questions, we conducted 
eight focus groups with more than 50 security cooperation officials at 
all geographic combatant commands except Northern Command. We 
conducted at least one focus group in each command and two in Pacific 
Command, Central Command, and Africa Command. For Northern Command, we 
conducted the discussion as a phone interview due to the small number 
of officials involved but used the same questions that we used with 
the focus groups. The focus group questions asked security cooperation 
officials to describe challenges they experienced in each phase of the 
security assistance process. For these sessions, we divided the 
process into: creating a case (beginning with the development of a 
letter or memorandum of request and ending with the finalization of a 
letter of offer and acceptance); approvals (including disclosure 
notification, technology transfer, Congressional notifications, and 
State Department concurrence); executing a case (including procurement 
or provision from DOD stock); delivery and case closure, and 
postdelivery sustainment in the form of training and spares. We 
requested that combatant commands identify focus group participants 
who would be able to speak about their experience implementing 
security cooperation at the combatant command as well as having 
responsibility for one or more of the 17 countries selected for SCO 
interviews. During the focus groups, the GAO facilitator wrote 
comments as they were made so that all focus group participants could 
see them and other GAO staff took notes documenting the discussion. No 
audio recordings were made. 

GAO staff then consolidated the notes from each session and two GAO 
staff members independently summarized the challenges and common 
themes identified by each focus group and the Northern Command 
interview. The two independent staff members then met to resolve any 
discrepancies and agreed to a common set of 65 distinct challenges to 
the implementation of U.S. government-funded programs raised in the 
focus group discussions and the Northern Command interview. For 
additional analyses of the challenges, we counted which challenges 
were raised by more than one geographic combatant command. We then 
conducted a second round of coding. Two staff members independently 
analyzed the challenges and identified those that were within DSCA’s 
purview and identified themes under which these challenges could be 
grouped. The two coders met to resolve any discrepancies and 
identified 20 challenges within DSCA’s purview that were raised by 
more than one geographic combatant command. The coders grouped the 
challenges according to categories; along with 2 other challenges that 
did not fit these categories.[Footnote 34] Additional challenges fall 
under the authority of government agencies other than DSCA, and others 
fall beyond the U.S. government’s control. The focus group and 
interview results are not generalizable to all recipient countries but 
represent the experiences of security cooperation officials in all 
combatant commands for the countries with the highest transaction 
values. We also reviewed interviews with the SCOs to further document 
the challenges identified by focus group participants. 

To determine the availability of data on the status of deliveries in 
process, we requested data on all deliveries from fiscal years 2007 to 
2011 for the 17 countries and BPC programs in our sample from DOD’s 
Enhanced Freight Tracking System. We then analyzed the extent to which 
data in the system were populated for key milestones in the delivery 
process from origin to final destination. 

To identify the extent to which DSCA performance measures indicate 
improvement in the timeliness of security assistance, we reviewed DSCA 
performance measures reported at DSCA’s Security Cooperation Business 
Forum and the discussion of these measures reflected in the minutes of 
these quarterly meetings. We met with DSCA officials and implementing 
agency officials to further understand these measures and the systems 
that implementing agencies have in place to track and report data to 
DSCA. We also inquired of DSCA’s acting Chief Performance Officer 
whether there were any other performance measures routinely compiled 
for senior management review. We reviewed the additional measures 
provided and determined that these did not assess timeliness. We 
reviewed the first three quarterly forum reports for fiscal year 2012 
to identify the current performance measures that exist for the five 
phases of the FMS process we identified in order to determine whether 
DSCA has data in that phase on the time required to complete it, and 
performance measures to assess the timeliness of the phase. We then 
analyzed these data and measures to assess the extent that DSCA has 
performance measures that can be used to assess timeliness. 

To determine the timeliness of the phases of the security assistance 
process, we summarized existing DSCA data reporting and performed 
additional analyses of DSCA source data. We also performed an 
independent analysis of the number of days spent by DSCA and 
implementing agencies developing security assistance agreements based 
on security assistance requests received from the 17 partner countries 
in our sample and for BPC programs for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 
For this analysis we used data from the DSCA’s Defense Security 
Assistance Management System. The system contains information 
regarding key milestone dates that can be used to assess timeliness of 
some aspects of the security assistance process. We determined the 
DSCA performance metrics and data were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes by undertaking data reliability steps including reviewing 
system usage and documentation guidance; interviewing knowledgeable 
agency officials; conducting electronic and manual data testing to 
identify missing data, outliers, and obvious errors; and by reviewing 
internal controls. To determine the time to develop an agreement, we 
calculated the number of days between the date listed for “Customer 
Request Complete” and “Document Sent,” in accordance with DSCA’s 
method of measuring processing time from the time when a letter of 
request is complete until the release of the security assistance 
agreement to partner countries for signature. Using these data, we 
analyzed the time frames to develop agreements for BPC programs and 
traditional programs for the 17 sample countries. The results of our 
analysis may differ from overall DSCA timeliness metrics due to 
factors such as the type of equipment and training requested by sample 
partner countries and the quality of the assistance request submitted. 
The results of our work for the BPC programs and 17 countries in our 
sample are not generalizable to all countries receiving assistance. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through 
November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Challenges Identified by Geographic Combatant Command 
Security Cooperation Officials: 

Between April and June 2012, GAO conducted eight focus groups with 50 
security cooperation officials at all geographic combatant commands 
except Northern Command. For Northern Command, we conducted the 
discussion as an interview in June due to the small number of 
officials involved but used the same questions as for the focus 
groups. GAO analyzed the results and identified 65 distinct challenges 
to implementing security assistance programs, 20 of which were raised 
in two or more of the six commands and are within DOD’s purview. GAO 
grouped these 20 challenges into four categories: U.S. training and 
workforce structure; U.S. ability to define partner country 
requirements; information on assistance security agreement status; and 
other challenges. 

Table 4: Challenges within DOD’s Purview to Implementing Security 
Assistance Programs that Were Identified by Combatant Command 
Officials. 

U.S. training and workforce structure: 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 1. SCOs do not have sufficient staffing, limiting their 
effectiveness as they produce proposals, build relationships in-
country, and track cases through to delivery. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 2. SCOs do not have sufficient training. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

U.S. ability to define partner country needs: 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 3. SCOs do not adequately define requirements when 
assisting with the preparation of letters or memorandums of request. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 4. Senior U.S. officials who are not Foreign Military Sales 
experts (such as Defense Attachés) do not understand the process and 
may create unrealistic partner country expectations. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Information on assistance security agreement status: 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 5. The Theater Security Cooperation Management Information 
System currently provides an insufficient common operating picture of 
all security cooperation activities. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 6. The Security Cooperation Information Portal is not user 
friendly and requires training partner countries may not have 
received/have access to. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 7. The Security Cooperation Information Portal is not user 
friendly and requires training U.S. personnel may not have received. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 8. DSCA staff are insufficiently responsive to requests for 
detailed information or for reliable resources for such information. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 9. Implementing agency processes and systems vary, which 
requires additional work by combatant command staff. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 10. Combatant commands lack sufficient information about 
the letter of request case history, such as access to a copy of the 
letter for reference. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 11. Inaccurate cost estimates lead to the cancellation or 
reductions in scope of a case. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 12. Combatant commands lack sufficient updates regarding 
DSCA and the implementing agencies’ development of letters of offer 
and acceptance. [Check]; 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 13. Combatant commands have insufficient information on the 
status of cases in execution. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 14. There is limited ability to track equipment shipments. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 15. U.S. and partner countries communication and planning 
for equipment delivery are insufficient. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 16. Items are delivered to the wrong address. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]; 

Challenge: 17. Deliveries arrive without advance notice. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Empty]. 

Challenge: 18. Deliveries do not have sufficient customs and other 
shipping documentation. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Empty]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Other challenges: 

Challenge: 19. Case closure is too slow and residual funds that could 
be used to fill additional requirements are left unused. 
Africa Command: [Check]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Check]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Check]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Challenge: 20. Small dollar value cases receive insufficient attention. 
Africa Command: [Empty]; 
Central Command: [Check]; 
European Command: [Empty]; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
Pacific Command: [Empty]; 
Southern Command: [Check]. 

Source: GAO analysis of focus group results. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 
201 12th Street South Ste 203: 
Arlington, VA 22202-5408: 

November 8, 2012: 

Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

Attached is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the October 
10, 2012, Government Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report. GAO-13-
84, "Security Assistance: DoD's Ongoing Reform Address Some 
Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance 
Program Management” (GAO Code 320878) for your review and 
consideration. 

DoD has reviewed the report and concurs with all the recommendations. 
However, we found some areas that were not technically accurate and 
have attached our comments. 

If you have any additional questions or need clarification on the 
technical comments, please contact Mr. Kidd Manville at (703) 604-6594 
or kidd.manville@dsca.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

William E. Landay III: 
Vice Admiral, USN: 
Director: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated October 10, 2012: 
GAO-13-84 (GAO Code 320878): 

"Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, 
But Additional Information Is Needed To Further Enhance Program 
Management" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: To improve the ability of combatant command and
U.S. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) officials to obtain 
information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance 
agreements, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish 
procedures to help ensure that DoD agencies are populating security 
assistance information systems with complete data. 

DoD Response: Concur, DSCA will work with each of the Military
Departments to determine procedures for ensuring that information 
systems are populated with acquisition and delivery status data. DSCA 
is collaborating with Defense Contract Management Agency and U.S. 
Army's Acquisition Contracting Command to extract acquisition data of 
assistance agreements from their systems to the Security Cooperation 
Information Portal (SCIP). DSCA will continue to promote the use of 
the Enhanced Freight Tracking System (EFTS) to our partner nations and 
encourage their freight forwarders to export transportation data to
EFTS. DSCA will also research more efficient ways for Security 
Cooperation Organizations to report delivery receipts in EFTS. 

Recommendation 2: To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and 
efficiency of the security assistance process, the GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense to establish a performance measure to assess 
timeliness for the acquisition phase of the security assistance 
process. 

DoD Response: Concur. DSCA will work with the Military Departments to 
develop performance measures to assess timeliness during the 
acquisition phase of case execution. DSCA will use its various 
business forums to establish this measurement and track the 
performance. 

Recommendation 3: To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and 
efficiency of the security assistance process, the GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense to establish a performance measure to assess 
timeliness for the delivery phase of the security assistance process. 

DoD Response: Concur. DSCA will establish performance measures to 
assess timeliness of the delivery phase of the security assistance 
process. DSCA will collaborate with Military Departments and U.S. 
Transportation Command to encourage adherence to reporting in-country 
deliveries. DSCA will continue to promote the use of the Enhanced 
Freight Tracking System (EFTS) to our partner nations and encourage 
their freight forwarders to export transportation data to EFTS. DSCA 
will also research more efficient ways for Security Cooperation
Organizations to report delivery receipts in EFTS. 

Recommendation 4: To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and 
efficiency of the security assistance process, the GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense to establish a performance measure to assess 
timeliness for case closure phase of the security assistance process. 

DoD Response: Concur. DSCA will establish appropriate performance 
measures to assess timeliness for the case closure phase and will work 
with the Military Departments to encourage adherence. DSCA will use 
its various business forums to establish this measurement and track 
the performance. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, James B. Michels, Assistant 
Director; Kathryn Bolduc; Martin DeAlteriis; Karen Deans; Katherine 
Forsyth; Mary Moutsos; Michael Silver; and Michael Simon made key 
contributions to this report. C. Etana Finkler provided additional 
technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548]. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2012. 

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide 
Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-556]. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 
2012. 

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and 
Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-359]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 8, 2012. 

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Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-89]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 17, 2011. 

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Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-123]. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 
2011. 

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Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-860SU]. Washington, D.C: May 9, 
2012. 

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Pakistani Security Forces in the Western Frontier Needs to Be 
Improved. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-156R]. 
Washington, D.C: February 15, 2011. 

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Be Improved. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-952]. 
Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2010. 

Persian Gulf: U.S. Agencies Need to Improve Licensing Data and to 
Document Reviews of Arms Transfers for U.S. Foreign Policy and 
National Security Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-918]. Washington, D.C: September 
20, 2010. 

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Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 
Assistance Programs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431]. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 
2010. 

Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls 
for Exported Items and Information for Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-454]. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-806]. Washington, D.C.: 
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Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition 
Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. [hyperlink, 
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-416R]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2007. 

Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign 
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[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Table 1 for a summary of programs discussed in this report. 
This appropriated total does not include amounts that are authorized 
from other accounts for security assistance and cooperation programs, 
such as the Section 1206 program, Coalition Readiness Support Program, 
and Global Security Contingency Fund. 

[2] According to DOD, security cooperation is the more encompassing 
term and includes security assistance as one of its components. “
Security cooperation” consists of activities undertaken by DOD to 
encourage and enable international partners to work with the United 
States to achieve strategic objectives, including international 
armaments cooperation, security assistance activities, and provision 
of U.S. peacetime and contingency access to host nations. “Security 
assistance” refers to the group of programs by which the United States 
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-
related services in furtherance of national policies and objectives. 
See DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to 
Security Cooperation, October 24, 2008. 

[3] Foreign partners using FMS purchase equipment and services using 
their own funds. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 2751 et seq.) authorizes the sale of defense articles and 
defense services to eligible foreign countries under the FMS program. 
Although DOD implements FMS, the Secretary of State is responsible for 
the continuous supervision and general direction of security 
assistance programs, including FMS. 

[4] FMF provides financial assistance in the form of credits or 
guarantees to U.S. allies to purchase military equipment, services, 
and training from the United States. Recipient countries can use the 
assistance to purchase items from the U.S. military departments 
through the FMS process or directly from private U.S. companies. 

[5] See S. Rep. No. 112-26 (June 22, 2011) accompanying S.1253, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. 

[6] For example, DSCA implements a small portion of DOD’s 
counternarcotics program and a portion of State’s Peacekeeping 
Operations programs, for which $383.8 million was appropriated in 
fiscal year 2012 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (Pub. L. 
No 112-74), to provide assistance to enhance the capacity of foreign 
civilian security forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. 

[7] DOD Security Cooperation Reform Task Force, Phase I Report, July 
2011. 

[8] The geographic combatant commands are the U.S. Northern Command, 
which includes North America and parts of the Caribbean, Southern 
Command (Central and South America, and parts of the Caribbean), 
European Command (Europe, Russia, Greenland, and Israel), Central 
Command (the Middle East and southwest Asia), Africa Command (Africa, 
excluding Egypt), and Pacific Command (the Pacific Ocean, East and 
South Asia, and Australia). Combatant commands may also be functional 
rather than geographic in nature, such as the Special Operations 
Command. For the purposes of this report, “combatant commands” refers 
only to the geographic combatant commands. 

[9] GAO, International Military Education and Training: Agencies 
Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-123] (Washington, D.C.: 
October 2011). 

[10] To recover the cost of administering FMS, DOD applies a surcharge 
to each FMS agreement. As of November 1, 2012, the surcharge was 3.5 
percent of the value of the sale. 

[11] The lead agencies within the military departments are the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation, 
Navy International Programs Office, and the Air Force Deputy Under 
Secretary for International Affairs. Additional implementing agencies 
include the Missile Defense Agency, National Security Agency, and 
Defense Logistics Agency. 

[12] In pseudo-FMS, the letter of request is referred to as a 
memorandum of request. 

[13] DSCA conducts a quarterly forum where senior officials from DSCA, 
industry associations, partner nation groups, military departments, 
and others in DOD discuss issues in security assistance management, 
propose improvements, and present and review performance data. 

[14] See appendix I for a description of focus group methodology. We 
conducted focus groups at five of the combatant commands and an 
interview at Northern Command due to the small number of countries and 
officials involved in security cooperation at the command. This 
interview used the same questions and we used the same method of 
analysis for the results as for the focus groups at the other 
combatant commands. For the purposes of the report we refer to focus 
groups at all six combatant commands. 

[15] See appendix II for a complete list of challenges identified by 
two or more combatant commands and within DOD’s purview. For the 
purposes of this report, we focused on those challenges which lie 
within DOD’s purview and did not address those challenges identified 
as beyond DOD’s control, such as delays in partner country 
decisionmaking and approvals. SCOs and focus groups also reported that 
they perceive delays in implementation due to slowness of State 
Department approval of funding and the time required for State 
Department and congressional reviews and notifications. 

[16] These challenges are consistent with the 2011 DOD security 
cooperation reform task force findings, which reported that “not all 
U.S. allies and partners possess the institutions, training, and 
equipment required to tackle the security challenges facing them, or 
to cooperate viably with U.S. forces in a coalition or multinational 
operating environment.” 

[17] The manual uses many terms to describe the entities involved in 
the security assistance process. In this instance, the manual mentions 
the implementing agencies must communicate frequently with a list of 
entities, one of which is the “requesting authority.” It also states 
that the combatant commands often perform the role of the requesting 
authority within DOD. For the purpose of this report, we will refer to 
the requesting authority as the combatant commands. See DSCA 5105.38-M 
at C15.1.3.8 and C15.1.3.6. 

[18] We have previously commented on DSCA’s limited ability to obtain 
information to effectively administer and oversee the security 
assistance process in GAO, Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales 
Program Needs Better Controls for Exported Items and Information for 
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-454] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2009). 

[19] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[20] Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended by the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.111-352. 

[21] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 
2004). 

[22] Information regarding key security assistance milestones is 
collected in the Defense Security Assistance Management System. 

[23] We analyzed data on agreement development performance for DSCA-
administered BPC and traditional FMF security assistance programs for 
a judgmental sample of 17 countries. See appendix I for more details. 

[24] Several BPC programs are funded with appropriations that are 
generally available for obligation only 1 or 2 years, so the funds 
must be obligated within a shorter timeframe. Funds for traditional 
FMF programs do not have such time constraints. 

[25] The results of our analysis may differ from overall DSCA 
timeliness metrics due to factors such as the type of equipment and 
training requested by sample partner countries and the quality of the 
assistance requests submitted. 

[26] Implementing agencies use DSCA policy guidance to assign an 
anticipated offer date to each agreement depending on its type and 
complexity. 

[27] As opposed to agreements that require awarding a contract, the 
time to provide items from DOD stock is typically between 40 days and 
8 months. Furthermore, according to DSCA officials, acquisition 
activities for BPC programs can also be faster than the overall 
average, but DSCA does not have data on acquisition time specific to 
BPC programs. 

[28] The Army has recently developed the Security Assistance 
Enterprise Management Resource which is currently focused on tracking 
security assistance case performance for Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and coalition partners, but the Army plans to expand this tool to 
allow for the tracking of all security assistance cases in both 
agreement development and execution phases. 

[29] GAO, Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better 
Controls for Exported Items and Information for Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-454] (Washington, D.C.: May 2009). 

[30] Definitions of “major” vary by implementing agency, but generally 
reflect the relative size of the sale or sensitivity of the equipment. 

[31] We have previously reported that weaknesses in the security 
assistance shipment verification process leave security assistance 
articles vulnerable to loss, diversion, or misuse. GAO, Defense 
Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for 
Exported Items and Information for Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-454] (Washington, D.C.: May 2009). 

[32] While DSCA notes improved performance in resolving customer-
identified equipment delivery problems, DSCA does not track the 
frequency with which delivery problems arise. Data reported at the 
August 2010 session of DSCA’s quarterly management forum noted that 
supply discrepancy reports had been submitted for only 1.8 percent of 
total shipments in the previous 5 years. A suggestion to institute a 
performance measure noting the proportion of DSCA shipments that 
generate supply discrepancy reports had been proposed to the forum as 
early as 2007, but had not been implemented. 

[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-123]. 

[34] See appendix II for a complete list of the 20 challenges 
identified by more than two combatant commands. 

[End of section] 

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