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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate: 

October 2012: 

Countering Violent Extremism: 

Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts: 

GAO-13-79: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-79, a report to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law 
enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent 
extremism-—ideologically motivated violence to further political 
goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised 
concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and 
DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1) the extent to 
which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-
related training should address to their components and state and 
local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners 
who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by 
DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the 
quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such 
as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and 
interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a 
public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 
2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is 
communicating to its components and state and local partners topics 
that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or 
funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related 
training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS’s CVE efforts, 
identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS’s 
CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though 
they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in 
CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department
’s training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or 
indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE 
national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the 
department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for 
potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its 
existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not 
identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had 
challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts 
contribute to DOJ’s responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. 
In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working 
group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that 
the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related 
training because agencies’ views differed as to what CVE-related 
training includes. 

The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that 
DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related 
was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised 
concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ 
collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-
related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77-—less than 
1 percent-—provided comments that expressed such concerns. According 
to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes 
where appropriate. DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, 
curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for 
activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI 
does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ’s United States 
Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and 
similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered 
about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-
related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less 
formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs 
chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported 
that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order 
to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. 
Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis 
could help these agencies ensure their quality. 

DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help 
improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 
2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and 
USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those 
related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In 
addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best 
practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS 
grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure 
high-quality training. Since the departments’ reviews and efforts to 
implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is 
too soon to determine their effectiveness. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related 
training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider 
soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more 
consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify 
CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility 
for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this 
recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79]. For more 
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 
larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS Has Identified CVE-Related Training Topics but DOJ Has Not, Making 
It Difficult for DOJ to Demonstrate How It Is Meeting Its CVE 
Responsibilities: 

Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related 
Training, but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure Quality of Training 
by More Consistently Soliciting Feedback: 

DOJ Has Undertaken Reviews and DHS and DOJ Have Developed Guidance to 
Improve Training Quality: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the Departments of Homeland Security
and Justice Are Developing: 

Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or Funded during Fiscal 
Years 2010 and 2011: 

Appendix IV: Types of Concerns Raised about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related 
Training: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Primary Federal Departments, Agencies, and Components to 
Which the Implementation Plan for the CVE National Strategy Assigns 
CVE-Related Responsibilities: 

Table 2: Concerns Raised in Letters Submitted to DHS and DOJ during 
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Regarding CVE-Related Training and Agency 
Perspectives: 

Table 3: Components and Offices Interviewed: 

Table 4: CVE-Related Training FBI Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Table 5: CVE-Related Training CRS Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Table 6: CVE-Related Training USAOs Provided to State and Local 
Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Table 7: CVE-Related Training DHS Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Table 8: CVE-Related Training That the SLATT Program Provided in 
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Table 9: Types of Concerns State and Local Participants Raised about 
DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training That Occurred during Fiscal Years 
2010 and 2011: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: DHS and DOJ Components and Programs That Provided CVE-
Related Training during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Abbreviations: 

ATAC: Antiterrorism Advisory Council: 

BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance: 

COPS: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services: 

CPD: Community Policing Development: 

CREST: Community Relations Executive Seminar Training: 

CRS: Community Relations Service: 

CVE: countering violent extremism: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

EOUSA: Executive Office for United States Attorneys: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FLETC: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: 

HSAC: Homeland Security Advisory Council: 

HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program: 

HVEB: Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch: 

I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 

IACP: International Association of Chiefs of Police: 

JAG: Justice Assistance Grant: 

JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force: 

MCC: Major Cities Chiefs Association: 

NCAP: National Consortium for Advanced Policing: 

NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center: 

NJTTF: National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program: 

ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

S&T: Science and Technology Directorate: 

SLATT: State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program: 

USAO: United States Attorney's Office: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 18, 2012: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

State and local law enforcement and homeland security officials, in
partnership with local community members, are the first line of defense
against the evolving threat posed by violent extremism—-ideologically
motivated violence to further political goals.[Footnote 1] In recent 
history, the United States has faced violent extremist plots by neo-
Nazis and other anti-Semitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and 
international and domestic terrorist groups. These events included the 
2009 shooting at Fort Hood in Texas, the 2010 attempted bombing at 
Times Square in New York City, and the 2011 attempt by a white 
supremacist to injure participants of a Martin Luther King, Jr., Day 
parade with an explosive device in the state of Washington. Since the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, al Qaeda and its affiliates and 
adherents, as well as other extremists, have inspired or directed an 
expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States. For example, 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, using open sources, developed a database with information 
on 210 violent Islamic extremists known to have radicalized in North 
America from 1989 through 2011 to the point of supporting violence. Of 
these individuals, 80 percent began their radicalization after the 
events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global War on
Terrorism.[Footnote 2] The United States government identifies al 
Qaeda as the preeminent terrorist threat to the country, and the 
Executive Office of the President has emphasized that the prevalence 
of particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time and new 
threats will undoubtedly arise in the future. Accordingly, the United 
States government must ensure that its approach to countering violent 
extremism (CVE) is flexible enough to address a variety of current and 
possible future threats, whether they are posed by al Qaeda or other 
groups. 

Given the critical role state and local law enforcement officers play in
CVE, it is important that they receive high-quality CVE-related 
training. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) 
have responsibility for executing several programs and activities 
related to CVE, some of which include providing or funding CVE-related 
training for state and local law enforcement officers or community 
members who partner with law enforcement. However, some community 
members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the 
quality of CVE-related training, including training that DHS and DOJ 
provide or fund. In particular, letters that individuals and advocacy 
organizations submitted to DHS and DOJ have indicated anecdotally that 
some of the individuals who provide training to state and local law 
enforcement agencies and community members misunderstand the ideology 
of violent Islamist extremism and cast aspersions on the vast majority 
of Muslim Americans who pose no threat to the United States. According 
to the implementation plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (CVE national strategy), the 
instances of federally sponsored or funded CVE and counterterrorism 
training that used offensive and inaccurate information underscored a 
need to improve CVE-related training and develop standards for such 
training. Further, according to the CVE national strategy, 
misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to 
violence can harm security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong 
direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community 
partners. 

You requested that we assess DHS and DOJ efforts to ensure the quality
of violent extremism training that the departments provide or fund for
state and local partners. Specifically, we addressed the following
questions: 

* To what extent have DHS and DOJ identified and communicated topics 
that CVE-related training addresses to their components and state and 
local partners? 

* What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners 
who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by 
DHS and DOJ? 

* What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality 
of CVE-related training? 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
provided to you. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determined 
that some of the information in the prior report was For Official Use 
Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be protected from 
public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information 
about CVE-related training that the FBI provided, including associated 
costs, and the results of a review that the FBI undertook to assess 
the quality of its counterterrorism training materials, some of which 
included CVE-related content. Although the information provided in 
this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same questions 
as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology used for both 
reports is the same. 

To address our objectives, we met with DHS and DOJ officials to 
determine how the departments define and communicate CVE-related 
training topics, and which departmental training programs were 
relevant to our review. We analyzed this information to assess the 
extent to which the departments' efforts allow them to demonstrate 
fulfillment of their CVE-related training responsibilities under the 
CVE national strategy. During these initial interviews, DHS and DOJ 
officials expressed difficulty in responding to our request for CVE-
related training materials, in part because agency officials were not 
clear on which training should be considered CVE-related. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this review, we developed a framework for what 
constitutes CVE-related training. This framework identifies three 
distinct content areas CVE-related training likely addresses: (1) 
radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3) community engagement. 
We discuss these content areas in greater detail later in this report. 
We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS and DOJ. DHS 
officials generally agreed with the content areas we identified, and 
we incorporated feedback DHS provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials 
stated that they view the framework as reasonable for the purpose of 
our review. We focused generally on training provided in fiscal years 
2010 and 2011 because "countering violent extremism" is a relatively 
nascent term. In addition, we focused on training provided to state 
and local entities because the CVE national strategy identifies CVE-
related training for these entities as a major component of the 
national CVE approach. 

For the purpose of this review, we considered training to include 
instruction, presentations, or briefings. We asked DHS and DOJ 
components to identify CVE-related offices and programs that would be 
appropriate to include in the scope of our review utilizing the 
framework for CVE-related training that we developed. We also asked 
DHS and DOJ to identify and provide all materials for any training 
that DHS and DOJ provided or funded through grant programs for state 
and local entities, including law enforcement officers and community 
members, that agencies assumed to be CVE-related based on our 
framework. We considered the training to be CVE-related if all or a 
portion of it addressed one or more of the three content areas. 
[Footnote 3] For training that we determined was CVE-related, we 
requested information on the approximate number and type of 
participants that attended each training and the estimated cost of 
providing the training.[Footnote 4] In addition, in July 2012, GAO 
conducted a web-based survey of training points of contact within 51 
state administrative agencies regarding the clarity of guidance DHS 
provides to recipients of grant funds that can be used for CVE-related 
training.[Footnote 5] Of the 51 state administrative agencies to which 
we sent a survey, 30 responded for an overall response rate of 59 
percent. On the basis of a comparison of the geographic regions and 
state populations of state administrative agencies that did and did 
not respond to our survey, we concluded that the experiences of state 
administrative agencies from some of the larger states may not be 
captured in our survey results. Nevertheless, the survey results 
provide insight into the level of clarity about DHS CVE guidance among 
grantees. 

To obtain participant perspectives about CVE-related training, two 
analysts independently reviewed 8,424 evaluations completed by 
participants of six DHS and DOJ training programs that were CVE-
related according to our framework to identify and categorize any 
complaints or concerns about this training. To identify complaints or 
concerns that were submitted to the agencies outside of course 
evaluations, we asked DHS and DOJ to identify concerns that were 
submitted to them in writing, conducted keyword searches of LexisNexis 
and Google, and interviewed representatives, including leaders, of 
advocacy groups that raised the concerns we identified through our 
searches. We also interviewed DHS and DOJ officials who oversee these 
training programs to obtain their perspectives on any concerns or 
complaints that were raised about the CVE-related training and to 
learn about any actions agencies took in response to these incidents. 

To address what actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the overall 
quality of CVE-related training, we reviewed relevant documents, 
including recently released guidance and best practices for training 
that DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed the 
counterterrorism training materials that were CVE-related according to 
our framework that the FBI determined were inappropriate as a result 
of its internal review, which the FBI undertook to identify and purge 
potentially objectionable training materials. This analysis enabled us 
to better understand the review results with regard to training 
materials that were CVE-related according to our framework, and 
provided context for the quality assurance steps the FBI has taken in 
response to the review. The FBI considers the methodology it used to 
conduct its internal review and our analysis of the training materials 
that the FBI considered objectionable to be For Official Use Only; 
therefore, we did not include that information in this report. In 
addition, we interviewed DHS and DOJ officials and inquired about 
guidance agencies adhere to when vetting or reviewing training 
materials and instructors, as well as other actions they have taken to 
ensure CVE-related training quality. Appendix I contains additional 
details on our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October 
2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis in the United States 
on the role of state and local entities in the fight against violent 
extremism. More recently, in August 2011, the White House issued the 
nation's first CVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, and in December 2011, it 
issued an implementation plan for the CVE national strategy.[Footnote 
6] The strategy leverages existing programs and structures in order to 
counter radicalization that leads to violence, rather than creating 
new programs and funding streams.[Footnote 7] The strategy highlights 
three major areas of activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and 
support to local communities that violent extremists may target, (2) 
building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing 
violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda 
while promoting U.S. ideals. The strategy also identifies the 
provision of training to federal, state, and local entities as a major 
component of the national CVE approach, and the implementation plan 
notes that the federal government will enhance CVE-related training 
offered to federal, state, and local agencies. The implementation plan 
states that this is necessary because of "a small number of instances 
of federally-sponsored or funded CVE and counterterrorism training 
that used offensive and inaccurate information."[Footnote 8] 
Accordingly, one of the objectives of the implementation plan is to 
improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous 
curricula that imparts information about violent extremism, improves 
cultural competency, and conveys best practices and lessons for 
effective community engagement and partnerships. 

The implementation plan designates federal departments, agencies, and 
components as leaders and partners regarding certain aspects of CVE, 
and DHS and DOJ have principal roles in implementing the CVE national 
strategy. Table 1 identifies the primary federal departments and 
agencies with CVE-related responsibilities and their respective 
missions. Other agencies involved in implementing the strategy include 
the Departments of the Treasury, Education, and Commerce, among others. 

Table 1: Primary Federal Departments, Agencies, and Components to 
Which the Implementation Plan for the CVE National Strategy Assigns 
CVE-Related Responsibilities: 

Department/agency: DHS; 
Implementing component: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; 
Component mission: 
* Advise DHS leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights 
and civil liberties issues; 
* Communicate with individuals and communities whose civil rights and 
civil liberties may be affected by DHS activities, informing these 
entities about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting 
appropriate attention within DHS to these entities' experiences and 
concerns; 
* Investigate and resolve civil rights and civil liberties complaints 
filed by the public; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Conduct outreach to communities and quarterly engagement roundtables 
that include CVE-related topics; 
* Implement a campus youth community engagement plan intended to 
engage young adults on the topic of violent extremism; 
* Train law enforcement officials on CVE and cultural issues. 

Department/agency: DHS; 
Implementing component: Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); 
Component mission: 
* Equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and 
information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and 
resilient[A]; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Assess the capacity of state correctional institutions to detect and 
share information regarding individuals who demonstrate behaviors 
associated with violent extremism while in the correctional system. 

Department/agency: DHS; 
Implementing component: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 
Component mission: 
* Provide assistance, training support, and leadership to help 
federal, state, tribal, and local governments and the private sector 
build the operational capabilities needed to successfully implement 
preparedness strategies; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Administer grants to fund training concerning CVE; 
* Leverage existing mechanisms to hold grantees and subgrantees 
accountable for training related to CVE that they pay for using DHS 
grant funds. 

Department/agency: DHS; 
Implementing component: Science and Technology Directorate (S&T); 
Component mission: Department/agency: 
* Strengthen America's security and resiliency by providing knowledge 
products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security 
Enterprise[B]; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Support research on CVE. 

Department/agency: DHS; 
Implementing component: Office of Policy; 
Component mission: 
* Strengthen homeland security by developing and integrating DHS-wide 
policies, planning, and programs in order to better coordinate the 
department's prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Establish a Faith-Based Community Information Sharing Working Group 
to determine how DHS can (1) better share information with faith 
communities and (2) support the development of faith-based community 
information-sharing networks. 

Department/agency: DOJ; 
Implementing component: FBI; 
Component mission: 
* Protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign 
intelligence threats; 
* Uphold and enforce the federal laws of the United States not 
exclusively assigned to another federal agency; 
* Provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, 
municipal, and international agencies and partners; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Establish the FBI CVE Coordination Office to help assess and 
leverage existing FBI efforts to better understand and counter violent 
extremism; 
* Coordinate with the National Task Force to develop CVE-specific 
education and awareness modules[C]; 
* Disseminate information about violent extremism to state and local 
entities. 

Department/agency: DOJ; 
Implementing component: United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO); 
Component mission: 
* The U.S. Attorney is the chief prosecutor for the United States in a 
particular jurisdiction in criminal law cases, and represents the 
United States in civil law cases as either the defendant or plaintiff, 
as appropriate; 
* Under the leadership of the U.S. Attorney General, USAOs investigate 
and prosecute a wide range of criminal activities, including domestic 
and international terrorism; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Coordinate CVE engagement with communities that may be targeted by 
violent extremist radicalization; 
* Raise awareness about the threat of violent extremism; 
* Facilitate partnerships to help identify and prevent radicalization 
to violence. 

Department/agency: Office of the Director of National of National 
Intelligence (ODNI); 
Implementing component: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); 
Component mission: 
* Integrate and analyze intelligence pertaining to counterterrorism 
(except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism); 
* Conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism 
activities across the U.S. government; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Expand briefings and information sharing about violent extremism 
with state and local law enforcement and government; 
* Facilitate a "train the trainer" program to increase the reach of 
CVE training; 
* Review information-sharing protocols to identify ways of increasing 
dissemination of products to state, local, and tribal authorities. 

Department/agency: Department of Defense (DOD); 
Implementing component: Not specified; 
Component mission: 
* Provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the 
security of the United States; 
Examples of CVE activities described in the implementation plan: 
* Coordinate nontraditional partners' activities within DOD (e.g., 
counterintelligence and behavioral health) to better understand how to 
identify and prevent violent extremism within the military. 

Sources: DHS, DOJ, ODNI, DOD, CVE national strategy, and the CVE 
national strategy implementation plan. 

[A] DHS defines the Homeland Security Enterprise as the federal, 
state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector 
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share 
a common national interest in the safety and security of the United 
States and the American population. 

[B] According to DHS, knowledge products could include resources such 
as standards and protocols. First responders are individuals 
responsible for protecting and preserving life, property, evidence, 
and the environment in the early stages of a terrorist attack, natural 
disaster, or other large-scale emergency. They include federal, state, 
and local governmental and nongovernmental emergency public safety, 
fire, law enforcement, emergency response, and emergency medical 
personnel. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(6) (defining "emergency response 
providers"). 

[C] The National Task Force is led by DOJ and DHS and was established 
in November 2010 to help coordinate community engagement at the 
national level. It includes all departments and agencies involved in 
relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on compiling and 
disseminating local, national, and international best practices. It is 
also responsible for connecting regionally and field-based federal 
components to the full range of federal officials involved in 
community engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and 
resource sharing. 

[End of table] 

DHS Has Identified CVE-Related Training Topics but DOJ Has Not, Making 
It Difficult for DOJ to Demonstrate How It Is Meeting Its CVE 
Responsibilities" 

The CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns both DHS and DOJ 
responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts 
and emphasizes the importance of collaboration among federal, state, 
local, and tribal government agencies in order to achieve the goals of 
the strategy. In order for DHS and DOJ components to determine the 
extent to which they are fulfilling departmental CVE-related 
responsibilities, they must be able to identify which of the training 
they conduct is CVE-related, which requires that they understand what 
constitutes CVE-related training. The DHS Counterterrorism Working 
Group, the entity responsible for leading DHS's CVE efforts under the 
direction of the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, has 
identified topics to be addressed in CVE-related training that DHS 
develops, provides, or funds. The group has also undertaken efforts to 
communicate these topics to other DHS components, state and local law 
enforcement officials, and grant recipients who may allocate DHS 
funding for CVE-related training within their states. DHS's 
communication efforts have helped DHS components and state and local 
partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related training, 
but some DHS grantees who responded to our survey reported that they 
were not clear as to what topics should be addressed in CVE-related 
training, and most indicated that it would be helpful for DHS to 
provide additional information or guidance on topics covered under 
CVE. DHS plans to undertake additional communication efforts with 
these grantees to educate them about the principal topics CVE-related 
training addresses. In contrast, DOJ has not identified topics it 
considers as CVE-related training. Consequently, DOJ is unable to 
demonstrate how it is meeting its CVE responsibilities under the CVE 
national strategy. 

DHS Has Identified Principal CVE-Related Training Topics and Made 
Efforts to Communicate Them: 

In February 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) with developing 
recommendations regarding how DHS can better support community-based 
efforts to combat violent extremism domestically, focusing on the 
issues of training, information sharing, and the adoption of community-
oriented law enforcement approaches.[Footnote 9] The council 
established the HSAC CVE Working Group to carry out this tasking, and 
the working group issued its findings in summer 2010. The HSAC CVE 
Working Group determined that CVE-related training should focus on (1) 
improving the capacity of law enforcement and other government 
personnel to communicate and collaborate with individuals from diverse 
religious, ethnic, and racial communities, and (2) promoting 
understanding of the threats facing a local community and recognizing 
behavior and indicators associated with those threats. The DHS 
Counterterrorism Working Group subsequently determined that, in order 
to support implementation of the CVE national strategy and the HSAC 
CVE Working Group findings, CVE-related training should address the 
following: violent extremism (e.g., the threat it poses), cultural 
demystification (e.g., education on culture and religion), community 
partnerships (e.g., how to build them), and community policing efforts 
(e.g., how to apply community policing efforts to CVE). According to 
the DHS Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, identifying 
these topics helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-
related training-related efforts. 

The Counterterrorism Working Group has undertaken efforts to 
communicate these topics to DHS components that contribute to DHS CVE-
related training.[Footnote 10] Toward the beginning of our review 
officials from DHS components that contributed to training in fiscal 
years 2010 and 2011 that was CVE-related according to our framework 
cited lack of clarity regarding what topics CVE-related training is to 
address; however, by August 2012, the components reported that the 
topics were clear, a fact that they attributed to these communications 
efforts. The Counterterrorism Working Group communicated CVE-related 
training topics to relevant DHS components during weekly meetings as 
well as by involving the components in the development of new CVE-
related training.[Footnote 11] For example, the Counterterrorism 
Working Group has invited relevant components to participate in 
workshops on CVE-related training, provided them with briefings and 
updates on its CVE-related training development efforts, and included 
them in review of draft CVE curricula. According to Counterterrorism 
Working Group officials, the group led a series of meetings with these 
components to communicate and review the content of multiple CVE-
related trainings the group is working to develop. According to 
officials from relevant DHS components, these communication efforts 
have helped to clarify topics CVE-related training addresses. For 
example, according to the official that leads CVE-related training 
that the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides, 
reviewing the CVE curricula under development involves ensuring that 
training topics are clear and well understood. In addition, according 
to the S&T official who oversees research on CVE that is to inform CVE-
related training content, DHS officials have clearly communicated 
topics that CVE-related training is to include during weekly meetings 
that the Counterterrorism Working Group leads involving all DHS CVE 
Working Group members. 

The Counterterrorism Working Group also communicated with state and 
local partners and associations that DHS collaborates with to achieve 
national CVE goals regarding DHS's CVE-related training topics. For 
example, according to the director of a state police academy and a 
police department lieutenant, the Counterterrorism Working Group has 
consistently consulted with them in developing training modules 
addressing CVE topics. The Counterterrorism Working Group is also 
collaborating to develop and implement CVE-related training curricula 
with the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National 
Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP), and the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).[Footnote 12] As reported by 
the official who oversees CVE-related training that the DHS Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides, such collaboration 
inherently entails discussion of topics CVE-related training is to 
address. 

DHS Is Undertaking Additional Communication to Help Ensure Grantees 
Fund CVE-Related Training That Is Consistent with the Goals of the CVE
National Strategy: 

DHS's communication efforts have helped DHS components and state and 
local partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related 
training, but our review indicates that some state administrative 
agency representatives are not clear about the principal topics CVE-
related training addresses, making it difficult for them to determine 
what CVE-related training best supports national CVE efforts. 
According to officials from FEMA, which administers DHS grant funding, 
the agency has increased grant funding available for CVE-related 
training because the Secretary of Homeland Security has identified CVE 
efforts as a priority for the department. In particular, in fiscal 
year 2011, FEMA began to allow state and local entities to use funds 
awarded through the Homeland Security Grant Program for CVE-related 
training. Further, in fiscal year 2012, FEMA explicitly stated in its 
Homeland Security Grant Program funding announcement that grantees 
could use program funds for CVE-related training, and retroactively 
allowed recipients to use program funds from prior years for CVE 
activities. In July 2012, we surveyed the 51 training points of 
contact within state administrative agencies--which are responsible 
for managing Homeland Security Grant Program funds that DHS awards--
about the extent to which they understand what is meant by CVE 
training. Of the 30 training points of contact who responded to our 
survey, 11 indicated that they were not at all clear or were somewhat 
clear on what is meant by CVE-related training. Further, 26 agreed or 
strongly agreed that it would be helpful for DHS to provide additional 
information or guidance on topics covered under CVE. As long as FEMA 
continues to make grant funding available for CVE-related training, 
but grantees do not have an understanding of what topics CVE-related 
training should address, it will be difficult for grantees to 
determine what training best supports the national CVE objective of 
improving CVE-related training and use funds appropriately toward 
those efforts. 

DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials stated that the group had 
made efforts to communicate CVE-related training topics to state 
administrative agencies, but in light of our survey results, the group 
plans to expand its efforts. In winter 2011, the Principal Deputy 
Counterterrorism Coordinator, who leads DHS CVE efforts, participated 
in a conference call with State Homeland Security Program advisers and 
staff who administer DHS grants that can be used for CVE-related 
training, during which this official highlighted DHS's CVE-related 
training efforts and associated guidance. Nonetheless, according to 
the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, some training 
points of contact may not be aware of what topics CVE-related training 
should address because the working group's coordination efforts have 
focused on state and local representatives who administer law 
enforcement training programs (e.g., at police academies), not state 
administrative agencies. The Principal Deputy Counterterrorism 
Coordinator also emphasized that DHS has focused its efforts on 
developing high-quality CVE-related training that state and local 
entities can readily access and that FEMA will pre approve as eligible 
for DHS grant funding. As a result, according to this official, 
grantees will rarely have to independently identify appropriate CVE-
related training to fund or undertake steps to ensure the quality of 
CVE-related training they fund. 

Nevertheless, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator agreed 
that our survey results revealed that it is important for DHS to 
undertake additional efforts to educate state administrative agency 
officials on the principal topics CVE-related training addresses. To 
that end, in August 2012, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism 
Coordinator held an additional meeting with more than 100 state 
administrative agency representatives and other federal, state, and 
local officials, during which the Coordinator provided information on 
DHS CVE-related training development efforts and the content of DHS's 
CVE-related training, among other things. In addition, in August 2012, 
DHS, in partnership with the FBI, launched an online portal for a 
select group of law enforcement training partners that is intended to 
provide federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and correctional 
law enforcement with access to CVE-related training materials. DHS 
aims to broaden access to the portal to trainers nationwide by the end 
of September 2012. Further, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism 
Coordinator stated that the Counterterrorism Working Group is 
developing an outreach strategy for communicating with state and local 
entities about DHS's CVE-related training efforts. Given the recency 
of these efforts, we are not able to assess their effectiveness as 
part of our review. However, they are positive steps that should 
contribute to educating state administrative agency representatives 
about CVE topics, and thereby help them to fund CVE-related training 
that is consistent with the goals of the CVE national strategy. 

DOJ Has Not Identified CVE-Related Training Topics, Which Could 
Preclude DOJ from Demonstrating How It Is Implementing the CVE 
National Strategy: 

As with DHS, the CVE national strategy implementation plan has 
identified DOJ, including the FBI, as among the federal departments 
and agencies responsible for conducting CVE-related training. However, 
DOJ has not yet identified topics that should be covered in its CVE-
related training. In addition, DOJ has not generally identified which 
of its existing training could be categorized as CVE-related training, 
thus limiting DOJ's ability to demonstrate how it is fulfilling its 
training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. 

According to senior DOJ officials, even though the department has not 
identified CVE-related training topics, they understand internally 
which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes 
either directly or indirectly to the department's training 
responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, because DOJ 
has not identified what constitutes CVE-related training, CVE-related 
efforts undertaken at the direction of the President's National 
Security Staff have been hindered, according to DHS officials who 
participated in an Interagency Policy Committee Working Group on Law 
Enforcement Training Regarding Domestic Radicalization and CVE. This 
group, which is chaired by DHS and NCTC, was formed at the direction 
of the President's National Security Staff to identify and coordinate 
CVE-related training that federal agencies deliver or fund. The 
group's principal objective was twofold: (1) to determine how agencies 
are currently developing training and (2) to identify options for 
ensuring that the Intelligence Community's current analysis of 
radicalization informs training for federal, state, local, and tribal 
officials, and that customers of this type of training receive high-
quality training and information consistent with U.S. government 
analysis.[Footnote 13] As part of this effort, the Interagency Policy 
Committee Working Group on Law Enforcement Training Regarding Domestic 
Radicalization and CVE endeavored to create an inventory of CVE-
related training that the federal government offers. However, 
according to DHS officials that participated in the working group, 
members who led this effort found it challenging to do so because 
agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes when 
providing information on their training. More specifically, according 
to one DHS official, some components found it difficult to 
differentiate between counterterrorism and CVE-related training, and 
trying to categorize training that was not developed for CVE purposes 
but that can benefit CVE can be confusing. We observed this problem 
firsthand during our review when the DOJ components that the 
department identified as potentially relevant to our work, including 
the FBI, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services could not readily respond to our 
requests for information about CVE-related training they provide or 
fund. According to these officials, they found it difficult to respond 
to our requests because DOJ has not established a definition for "CVE" 
or "CVE-related training," and therefore they were not sure what 
constitutes CVE-related training.[Footnote 14] Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) officials acknowledged that training that BJA funds 
under the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program 
could be considered CVE-related training, but they also acknowledged 
that what constitutes CVE-related training was not clear, in part 
because CVE is a relatively new term. The other DOJ components, 
however, relied upon a framework that we developed for the purpose of 
this review to determine which of their existing training was CVE-
related. 

DOJ officials also said that it would be inappropriate to label 
certain types of the department's training, such as community outreach 
training, as CVE-related because doing so would be imprecise and 
misleading. These officials explained that DOJ CVE activities include 
efforts that are specifically designed for CVE-related purposes as 
well as efforts that are not specifically designed for CVE-related 
purposes, but that may indirectly benefit the department's CVE 
efforts. For example, the DOJ Community Relations Service conducts 
outreach in communities and invites community members to assist in 
providing cultural competency training to enhance law enforcement 
officers' understanding of and sensitivity to cultural and religious 
practices of the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh American communities.[Footnote 
15] However, DOJ officials expressed concern that labeling outreach, 
or training on how to conduct outreach, as CVE-related would imply 
that these efforts are driven by security efforts when they are not. 
Nevertheless, the CVE national strategy and implementation plan 
publicly and explicitly emphasize the importance of community 
engagement in CVE efforts while recognizing that such engagement 
should focus on a full range of community concerns, and not just on 
issues such as national security. Further, the implementation plan has 
assigned DOJ responsibility for supporting national CVE-related 
training efforts. However, because DOJ has not identified what topics 
it thinks should be addressed by CVE-related training, it is difficult 
to identify which of DOJ's current training is related to CVE--either 
directly or indirectly, which also makes it difficult to determine 
whether and how DOJ is fulfilling its training responsibilities per 
the CVE national strategy. 

If departments are unclear regarding what constitutes CVE-related 
training, they will also have difficulty accounting for their CVE-
related training responsibilities. By not identifying and 
communicating CVE-related training topics to its components, DOJ is 
not able to demonstrate how it is fulfilling its CVE-related training 
responsibilities and ensure that it is carrying out its 
responsibilities as established in the CVE national strategy 
implementation plan. 

Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training,
but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure Quality of Training by More
Consistently Soliciting Feedback: 

Less than 1 percent of state and local participants in CVE-related 
training that DHS and DOJ provided or funded who provided feedback to 
the departments expressed concerns about information included in the 
course materials or that instructors presented during training. In 
addition, while DOJ generally solicits feedback from all participants 
for programs that provide formal, curriculum-based CVE-related 
training, the FBI and USAOs do not always solicit feedback for 
programs that provide less formal CVE-related training (e.g., 
presentations by guest speakers), even though such training was 
provided to about 9,900 participants in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. 
Finally, apart from the training participants, some individuals and 
advocacy organizations have raised concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-
related training. 

As previously discussed, because DHS and DOJ components were unclear 
regarding what constitutes CVE-related training, for the purposes of 
conducting this review, we developed a framework for determining which 
training may be CVE-related. Our framework identifies training as CVE-
related if it addressed one or more of the following three content 
areas: (1) radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3) community 
engagement.[Footnote 16] 

DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the 
content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group 
provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the 
framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. However, as 
previously discussed, DOJ officials do not think it is appropriate for 
DOJ to identify topics as addressed in CVE-related training.[Footnote 
17] 

We applied our framework to identify CVE-related training DOJ and DHS 
components provided to state and local entities during fiscal years 
2010 and 2011. Figure 1 presents the DOJ and DHS programs that 
provided the CVE-related training we identified, and appendix III 
provides more detailed information about the training, including the 
number of participants and associated costs. 

Figure 1: DHS and DOJ Components and Programs That Provided CVE-
Related Training during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Department of Justice:  

Bureau of Justice Assistance: 
* State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
* Community Relations Executive Seminar Training; 
* Citizens' Academy; 
* National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program; 
* National Academy.  

United States Attorneys' Offices: 

Community Relations Service. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: 
* Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 
* Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch
* State and Local Program Office. 

Source: GAO.  

[End of figure] 

State and Local Participants’ Perspectives on CVE-Related Training
Were Mostly Positive or Neutral: 

The majority of participant feedback on CVE-related training that DHS 
and DOJ provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was 
positive or neutral; a minority of participants expressed concerns 
about information included in course materials or that instructors 
presented. DHS and DOJ collected and retained feedback forms from 
8,424 of the more than 28,000 participants--including state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement officials, prison officials, and community 
members--of training they provided or funded in fiscal years 2010 and 
2011 that was CVE-related according to our framework.[Footnote 18] We 
analyzed all of these evaluations and found that the vast majority of 
participants submitted comments about the training that were positive 
or neutral. For example, participants commented that the courses were 
among the most challenging they had taken, that the instructors were 
professional and knowledgeable, or that the course materials were well 
assembled. In addition, participants stated that the training was 
informative with regard to the threat posed by, and how to best 
counter, violent extremists or provided a valuable overview of an 
extremist group. In another instance, a participant stated that the 
course was helpful in understanding the beliefs and concerns of a 
particular community. Some participants also said that the training 
would be worthwhile to provide to a broader audience, that they 
intended to share what they learned with colleagues, or that they 
would like to see the course length expanded. We also identified 77 
participant evaluations--less than 1 percent--that included comments 
that expressed concern of any sort. For example, we identified 
concerns that a training was too politically correct, as well as 
concerns that a training was one-sided, with regard to issues of 
religion and culture. The concerns the participants expressed fell 
into the following three categories: 

1. The course information or instruction was politically or culturally 
biased (54 evaluations). For example, participant comments that fell 
into this category were that the instructor had a liberal bias, and 
other comments were that the instructor too often relayed his or her 
personal views. 

2. The course information or instruction was offensive (12 
evaluations). For example, one concern raised in this category was 
that an instructor presented Islam in a negative manner, whereas 
another concern was that a guest presenter spoke disrespectfully about 
the United States. 

3. The course information was inaccurate (11 evaluations). For 
example, comments that fell into this category raised concern that an 
instructor provided misinformation about dressing norms for Middle 
Eastern women and that an instructor cited incorrect information about 
a criminal case discussed during the class. 

The concerns that were raised varied across different training 
providers and, although few, most of the concerns stemmed from the 
evaluation records documenting feedback from DOJ SLATT Program and FBI 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program participants. See appendix 
IV for additional details on the types of concerns by training 
provider. 

DOJ and DHS officials who oversee these training programs indicated 
that they review the feedback participants provide and assess if it 
warrants action. However, these officials stated that determining how 
to respond to feedback can be difficult when the feedback is 
subjective or not actionable. For example, the SLATT Program Director 
stated that if a comment simply says "one-sided information," he 
cannot take action on it because he does not know which side the 
person is referring to or what the person thinks should be changed. 
However, if there is a trend in clear feedback participants provided, 
he will take action. Further, according to SLATT and Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties officials, perceptions regarding what is 
biased vary by audience and even by the participants within a given 
audience. Therefore, DHS and DOJ officials stated that they take 
action to address participant feedback on a case-by-case basis, as 
they and their staff deem appropriate. For example, the SLATT Director 
explained that there is no specific threshold to determine whether a 
participant's comment warrants further action, but generally, if a 
similar concern has been submitted by multiple participants, over 
multiple courses, SLATT officials will review the substance of the 
comment and devise a plan to correct the issue. For example, the SLATT 
Director noted that in response to a comment that a course title did 
not reflect the material taught in the course, he suggested a change 
to the title. 

More Consistently Soliciting Feedback on Informal CVE-Related Training 
Could Provide Information to Help Ensure Its Quality: 

Most of the CVE-related training that DHS and DOJ components provided 
was formal, classroom-based or curriculum-based training, and the 
components generally solicited participant feedback for this type of 
training, which we describe above.[Footnote 19] In addition, two DOJ 
components--FBI and USAOs--also provided informal CVE-related training 
consisting of briefings and presentations at workshops, conferences, 
and other venues to about 9,900 participants in fiscal years 2010 and 
2011. However, these components did not consistently solicit 
participant feedback for this type of training, which makes it 
difficult for them to assess the quality of the training, determine 
whether the training is achieving expected outcomes, and make changes 
where appropriate. 

According to FBI officials, training that the FBI centrally 
administers--including that provided under the National Academy and 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force programs--is to adhere to the 
Kirkpatrick model to help ensure its quality.[Footnote 20] The 
standards this model prescribes require the solicitation of student 
feedback. As a result, the FBI collects feedback through evaluations 
on the formal, classroom-based courses it provides through its 
National Academy. The FBI does not require entities providing informal 
training, such as briefings and presentations during outreach, to 
solicit feedback.[Footnote 21] Specifically, officials from the FBI's 
Office of Public Affairs told us that the bureau does not solicit 
feedback on presentations, briefings, or its Citizens' Academy and 
Community Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST) outreach 
programs because doing so is not required, and the officials noted 
that the FBI does not classify these programs and activities as 
training.[Footnote 22] Officials also noted that some field offices, 
which administer the programs, do solicit feedback from participants 
although they are not required to do so. For example, 4 of 21 FBI 
field offices that provided Citizens' Academy training that was CVE-
related according to our framework collected evaluations. However, 
none of the 3 FBI field offices that provided CREST training or the 5 
FBI field offices that provided other training that was CVE-related 
according to our framework solicited feedback from course 
participants. Similarly, USAOs are not required to obtain feedback 
from recipients of training that their individual offices provide. 
According to Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys officials, USAOs do 
not typically solicit feedback from participants on the presentations 
that our framework identified as CVE-related that they provide in 
their districts, particularly with respect to threat-related briefings 
for law enforcement officials that are intended to address a 
particular area of concern for that region at a particular time. Under 
these circumstances, according to these officials, feedback may be 
less useful than it would be for curriculum-based trainings, because 
the presentation is less likely to be repeated for many different 
audiences. We identified 39 USAOs that provided or facilitated 
training that was CVE-related according to our framework, excluding 
training that was facilitated by a USAO, but provided by another 
federal entity (such as SLATT).[Footnote 23] Out of these 39 USAOs, 15 
collected feedback from CVE-related training participants. 

We have previously reported that evaluating training is important and 
that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order 
to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. 
[Footnote 24] We recognize the distinction between formal training 
programs and less formal training, such as presentations. However, the 
CREST and Citizens' Academy programs, other FBI field office 
initiatives, and USAOs collectively trained about 39 percent (about 
9,900) of all training participants in DOJ CVE-related training during 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Soliciting feedback on informal training 
could help the FBI and USAOs obtain valuable information for 
determining the extent to which these programs are yielding desired 
outcomes (e.g., whether the FBI's Citizens' Academy is projecting a 
positive image of the FBI in the communities it serves) as well as 
complying with the CVE national strategy. Such feedback could also be 
obtained without incurring significant costs. According to officials 
at a FBI field office that distributes feedback forms and the DHS 
official who oversees the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
CVE-related training, agencies can solicit feedback from training 
participants at minimal cost (e.g., the paper on which the form is 
distributed and the employee time associated with reviewing the 
forms), feedback is critical to ensure the training is communicating 
its intended messages effectively, and soliciting feedback is a 
worthwhile undertaking given the significant time and resources their 
offices invest in providing CVE-related training. 

Some Individuals and Advocacy Organizations Have Raised Some
Concerns about CVE-Related Training: 

In addition to the concerns we identified in participant evaluations, 
individuals and advocacy organizations submitted at least six letters 
of complaint to DHS, DOJ, the Executive Office of the President, and 
other federal government entities regarding 18 alleged incidents of 
biased CVE and counterterrorism training that DHS or DOJ provided or 
funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011.[Footnote 25] Representatives 
of the advocacy organizations that submitted the letters generally did 
not participate in the training that generated these concerns. Rather, 
their concerns were derived from information reported in the media and 
individuals who attended a training session and expressed concern 
about the training to the organizations. We determined that 7 of the 
alleged incidents described in five of the letters were relevant to 
this review because they pertained to CVE-related training provided to 
state and local officials and community members, not training that was 
exclusively provided to federal officials.[Footnote 26] The 7 
incidents described in these letters, some of which the media 
initially reported, articulated similar concerns as those identified 
in the participant evaluations we reviewed. That is, the allegations 
made in the letters raised concerns that course information and 
instructors were biased, offensive, or inaccurate. Table 2 summarizes 
the concerns raised in these five letters and the agency's 
perspectives about the concerns. 

Table 2: Concerns Raised in Letters Submitted to DHS and DOJ during 
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Regarding CVE-Related Training and Agency 
Perspectives: 

Training provider: FBI local-level Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF)[A]; 
Concern raised: Two letters sent to the FBI signed by 28 organizations 
alleged, among other things, that a known anti-Islamic speaker was 
invited by FBI's Virginia Tidewater JTTF to provide training to state 
and federal law enforcement officers; 
Agency perspective: According to the FBI Assistant Special Agent in 
Charge of the office that arranged the presentation, the speaker was 
brought in as an "enrichment speaker" to present his perspective on 
Islam, and the speaker did not provide formal training. According to 
this official, although no audience members voiced concern about the 
presentation, the field office will not invite the speaker to present 
in the future. 

Training provider: FBI Citizens' Academy; 
Concern raised: A letter sent to the FBI by a community member who 
attended a Seattle-based Citizens' Academy and a letter undersigned by 
18 organizations alleged that course materials compared Islamic 
religious materials to propaganda used by Nazis; 
Agency perspective: According to the Special Agent in Charge of the 
office that provided the training, the information cited in the 
concern was not part of the established course materials or 
presentation. Rather, a participant had asked the instructor a 
question by email following the class, which the instructor responded 
to in writing and this response was distributed to all course 
participants. The office no longer distributes such responses. 
According to field office officials, the instructor's response did not 
make a link between Islam and Nazism as alleged in the letter. Rather, 
according to field office officials, the instructor's response made a 
link between propaganda used in Islamism (which officials identified 
as a political ideology that can include jihad) and Nazism. 

Training provider: FBI field office; 
Concern raised: A letter sent to the FBI that was signed by 18 
organizations alleged that two FBI agents participating in an outreach 
workshop provided to community members in Seattle delivered a 
presentation to members of the East African, Muslim, Sikh, and Arab 
communities addressing terrorist groups and community members with an 
almost exclusive focus on Islamic groups. According to this letter, 
when audience members asked the agents if a photo of a figure in the 
presentation was of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a political and 
religious leader, they did not know who he was; 
Agency perspective: The Special Agent in Charge of the field office 
explained that the field office provided the presentation referred to 
in the letter at the request of a local law enforcement agency that 
specifically asked the office to provide an international terrorism 
presentation. According to the Special Agent in Charge, the 
presentation provided was a valid reflection of current intelligence 
information pertaining to the types of individuals who have engaged in 
international terrorism. However, officials stated that, moving 
forward, the office would also include information on domestic 
terrorism, which will lend itself to presenting information about a 
greater variety of terrorist groups. Officials also acknowledged that 
the agents should have been able to identify the individual in the 
photo. Following this incident, the Special Agent in Charge organized 
meetings with local advocacy organizations and individuals to discuss 
the incident. 

Training provider: FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program; 
Concern raised: A letter was submitted to the Executive Office of the 
President's Deputy National Security Advisor and a copy was also sent 
to DOJ. It was signed by 57 organizations and alleged that orientation 
material for all 4,400 members of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force 
stated that "Sunni Muslims have been prolific in spawning numerous and 
varied fundamentalist extremist terrorist organizations. Sunni core 
doctrine and end state have remained the same and they continue to 
strive for Sunni Islamic domination of the world..."; 
Agency perspective: FBI officials from the Counterterrorism Division, 
which includes the National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program, told 
us they were not familiar with this concern, and looked into it upon 
GAO's inquiring about the FBI's position on it. They found that the 
FBI Inspection Division reviewed the training material that was the 
subject of this complaint as part of its internal review of 
counterterrorism training materials, described in further detail later 
in this report, and determined that the material was consistent with 
the FBI's guiding principles for training. That is, the FBI assessed 
the materials to, among other things, conform to constitutional 
principles, adhere to the FBI's core values, be tailored to the 
intended audience, and focused to ensure message clarity. 

Training provider: FBI analyst; 
Concern raised: A letter was submitted to DOJ and signed by 18 
organizations. It alleged that an individual identified as an FBI 
analyst delivered a lecture to law enforcement officials in New York 
City in June 2011 during which the analyst asserted that the fight 
against al Qaeda is a waste compared with the threat presented by the 
ideology of Islam, and that it would be a waste of time to turn to the 
American Muslim community for assistance in finding and stopping 
radical terrorists; 
Agency perspective: According to FBI officials, the FBI analyst who 
provided this presentation did not do so on behalf of the FBI. Rather, 
according to these officials, the analyst served as an adjunct 
professor independent of the FBI, and provided the presentation in 
that independent capacity. Nonetheless, FBI officials stated that the 
information the analyst presented was taken out of context. FBI 
officials further stated that the analyst has only provided training 
on behalf of the FBI on one occasion, in April 2011. Following the 
training, the FBI determined that the analyst was not sufficiently 
effective at teaching the course, and he has not provided training on 
behalf of the FBI since that time. 

Training provider: DHS Homeland Security Grant Program recipient; 
Concern raised: A letter of concern was sent to DHS by one 
organization and alleged that DHS funds were used to pay an anti-
Islamic author $5,000 to appear at a conference in South Dakota that 
was sponsored by the South Dakota Department of Public Safety; 
Agency perspective: DHS officials verified that a grantee used DHS 
grant funds to pay the speaker to appear at a conference, and stated 
that the grantee was not aware of the speaker's controversial stature 
and was not required to obtain pre approval from DHS to use grant 
funds to hire the speaker. Once the state learned of the speaker's 
controversial stature, according to DHS officials, it ended its 
contract with the speaker as an approved training provider for the 
state. DHS explained that if the same situation were to occur again, 
in light of grant guidance DHS subsequently issued related to ensuring 
the quality of CVE-related training, it would likely require the 
grantee to repay the department the funds it used to pay the speaker, 
as spending money to hire the speaker would be inconsistent with DHS 
guidance. 

Training provider: USAO; 
Concern raised: A letter sent to DOJ by three organizations alleged 
that a USAO intelligence specialist made inaccurate and biased claims 
against Muslims during a training. For example, the letter alleged 
that the specialist asserted that American Muslims are waging a 
"Civilizational Jihad" against the United States through "civilians, 
juries, lawyers, media, academia and charities" who threaten "our 
values"; 
Agency perspective: The U.S. Attorney for the district that provided 
this training stated that upon becoming aware that there were concerns 
about the content of the slides used for the presentation, the office 
immediately discontinued providing the presentation. The U.S. Attorney 
also explained that the controversial text on the slide was a direct 
quote from an exhibit entered into evidence during a counterterrorism 
prosecution, and that the presentations slides were not intended for 
public dissemination (they were labeled sensitive), where they could 
be misinterpreted by individuals who were not privy to the context in 
which they were presented. 

Source: GAO analysis of open source information and information 
provided by DHS, DOJ, and advocacy organizations. 

[A] A JTTF is an investigative unit consisting of law enforcement and 
other specialists from federal, state, and local law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, led by DOJ and the FBI. Each of the FBI's 56 
main field offices has a task force, and additional task forces are 
located in smaller FBI offices. 

[End of table] 

DOJ Has Undertaken Reviews and DHS and DOJ Have Developed Guidance to 
Improve Training Quality: 

Although the number of concerns and complaints raised about CVE-
related training may have been small, according to DHS and DOJ 
officials, the departments have generally considered the complaints as 
serious issues that warranted action to better ensure the quality of 
future training, particularly given the negative effects that such 
incidents can have on the departments' reputations and trust with the 
communities they serve. For example, according to the DHS Principal 
Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, developing CVE-related training 
is a priority for the department because inappropriate and inaccurate 
training undermines community partnerships that are critical to 
preventing crime and negatively impacts efforts of law enforcement to 
identify legitimate behaviors and indicators of violent extremism. DOJ 
has undertaken quality reviews of existing training materials that are 
CVE-related according to our framework, and both DOJ and DHS have 
developed guidance for CVE-related training and developed other 
quality assurance mechanisms for this training. 

DOJ Components Have Undertaken Reviews of CVE-Related Training: 

DOJ components have conducted or are currently conducting internal 
reviews of their training materials, including those with topics that 
our framework identified as related to CVE, in an effort to identify 
and purge potentially objectionable materials. 

In September 2011, the FBI launched a review of all FBI 
counterterrorism training materials, including materials that were CVE-
related according to our framework. This review included approximately 
160,000 pages of training materials, and the FBI determined that less 
than one percent of the pages contained factually inaccurate or 
imprecise information or used stereotypes. 

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has also ordered a 
departmentwide review of training materials. Unlike the FBI's internal 
review, which focused on counterterrorism training materials, a 
memorandum issued by the Deputy Attorney General to heads of DOJ 
components and U.S. Attorneys in September 2011 directed them to 
carefully review all training material and presentations that their 
personnel provided. The memorandum stated components particularly 
should review training related to combating terrorism, CVE, and other 
subjects that may relate to ongoing outreach efforts in Arab, Muslim, 
Sikh, South Asian, and other communities. The purpose of the review 
was to ensure that the material and information presented are 
consistent with DOJ standards, goals, and instructions. Officials from 
the four DOJ components that we identified as having provided or 
funded CVE-related training reported that their components have 
completed, or intend to complete, the review the Deputy Attorney 
General ordered. According to DOJ officials, as of August 2012, some 
components are still reviewing relevant materials and the Deputy 
Attorney General asked components to provide any questionable training 
materials to the Deputy Attorney General's office.[Footnote 27] DOJ 
officials also told us that each DOJ component is to make its own 
determination on what materials are appropriate, but that components 
are to review all training materials, even if the components do not 
have specific plans to present the materials in the future. 

DHS and DOJ Have Developed Guidance Intended to Avoid Future 
Incidences of Biased or Otherwise Inappropriate Training: 

DHS, DOJ, and the FBI have developed guidance to avoid future 
incidences or allegations of biased or otherwise inappropriate 
training. In October 2011, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties issued Countering Violent Extremism Training Guidance & Best 
Practices (DHS CVE Guidance), which acknowledges that it is important 
for law enforcement personnel to be appropriately trained in 
understanding and detecting ideologically motivated criminal behavior 
and in working with communities and local law enforcement to counter 
domestic violent extremism.[Footnote 28] The DHS CVE guidance states 
that training must be accurate, based on current intelligence, and 
include cultural competency training. To this end, its goals are to 
help ensure that (1) trainers are experts and well regarded; (2) 
training is sensitive to constitutional values; (3) training 
facilitates further dialogue and learning; (4) training adheres to 
government standards and efforts; and (5) training and objectives are 
appropriately tailored, focused, and supported. The guidance provides 
best practices for federal, state, and local officials organizing CVE, 
cultural awareness, or counterterrorism training to adhere to in 
support of these goals. Best practices include reviewing a prospective 
trainer's résumé; reviewing the training program to ensure that it 
uses examples to demonstrate that terrorists and violent extremists 
vary in ethnicity, race, gender, and religion; and reaching out to 
sponsors of existing government training efforts for input. 

Following the release of DHS's CVE Guidance, FEMA issued an 
information bulletin to its state, local, and private sector partners 
and grantees to emphasize the importance of ensuring that all CVE-
related training is consistent with DHS and U.S. government policy. 
[Footnote 29] This bulletin referenced the DHS CVE Guidance and 
stated, among other things, that grant-funded training should avoid 
the use of hostile, stereotypical, or factually inaccurate information 
about Muslims and Islam or any community. The bulletin also emphasized 
the importance of community engagement and interaction to promote 
communities as part of the solution. According to FEMA officials, if a 
grantee were to provide CVE-related training and not follow the DHS 
CVE guidance, DHS may require that the grantee repay any grant funds 
that were spent on the training. However, several DHS grantees 
indicated that they would not necessarily know when to apply the best 
practices for ensuring the quality of CVE-related training described 
in the informational bulletin. Specifically, of the 30 Homeland 
Security Grant Program training points of contact who responded to our 
survey, 18 said that they were not at all clear or only somewhat clear 
about when to apply the principles in the FEMA bulletin. In addition, 
20 said that topics that may be covered during CVE-related training 
are not at all clear or only somewhat clear in the bulletin. As a 
result, these grantees could have difficulty in determining when to 
apply the principles. As previously discussed, the additional efforts 
DHS is undertaking to educate state administrative agency officials on 
the principal topics CVE-related training addresses could further 
enable the officials to fund training that supports the CVE national 
strategy. These survey results indicate that such educational efforts 
should help grantees more readily identify topics that may be covered 
during CVE-related training, and thus more appropriately apply DHS CVE-
related training quality assurance guidance. 

DHS is also developing additional mechanisms to ensure the quality of 
CVE-related training. Specifically, Counterterrorism Working Group 
officials told us that in June 2012 DHS established a CVE-related 
training Working Group within the department to develop a framework to 
(1) ensure that training DHS components provide meets DHS and the U.S. 
government's CVE standards; (2) ensure that grantees using grant funds 
for training utilize certified trainers; and (3) disseminate DHS 
training through agency partners, such as the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police. In July 2012, this working group 
proposed recommendations for meeting these goals in a memorandum to 
the DHS Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator. For example, the group 
recommended that the department establish and maintain a database of 
certified CVE instructors and appoint a CVE program coordinator to 
oversee the instructor vetting and training process. According to 
Counterterrorism Working Group officials, DHS is working on plans to 
implement these recommendations. As these recommendations were made 
recently and DHS has just decided to implement them, it is too early 
to assess any quality assurance impact they will have on CVE-related 
training. 

DOJ also developed guidance applicable to all training, including CVE-
related training, conducted or funded by DOJ to help ensure its 
quality. DOJ formed a working group on training issues chaired by its 
Civil Rights Division within the Attorney General's Arab-Muslim 
Engagement Advisory Group.[Footnote 30] The working group developed 
the DOJ training principles to guide DOJ's training and to ensure that 
all communities that DOJ serves are respected. In March 2012, the 
Deputy Attorney General issued a memorandum for DOJ heads of 
components and USAOs outlining guiding principles to which all 
training that DOJ conducted or funded must adhere. Specifically, it 
stated that (1) training must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution 
and DOJ values; (2) the content of training and training materials 
must be accurate, appropriately tailored, and focused; (3) trainers 
must be well qualified in the subject area and skilled in presenting 
it; (4) trainers must demonstrate the highest standards of 
professionalism; and (5) training must meet department standards. 

Also in March 2012, the FBI published The FBI's Guiding Principles 
Touchstone Document on Training. This document is intended to be 
consistent with the March 2012 Deputy Attorney General guidance, but 
elaborates on each training principle outlined in the document. The 
FBI's guidance states that training must (1) conform to constitutional 
principles and adhere to the FBI's core values; (2) be tailored to the 
intended audience, focused to ensure message clarity, and supported 
with the appropriate course materials; and (3) be reviewed, and 
trainers must be knowledgeable of applicable subject material. 

DOJ officials also told us that the department's guiding principles 
are meant to memorialize department training standards and values and 
are the group's first step for ongoing work to ensure the quality of 
future counterterrorism and CVE-related training. Although developing 
these principles marks an important first step, we were unable to 
assess the extent to which they can help ensure the quality of CVE-
related training moving forward because the review is ongoing and DOJ 
officials are in the process of planning additional efforts. 

Conclusions: 

Providing high-quality and balanced CVE-related training is a 
difficult task given the complexity and sensitivities surrounding the 
phenomenon of violent extremism. However, misinformation about the 
threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm security 
efforts by unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community 
partners. The CVE national strategy implementation plan commits the 
federal government, including DHS and DOJ, to supporting state and 
local partners in their efforts to prevent violent extremism by 
providing CVE-related training. By identifying and communicating CVE-
related training topics, DOJ could better demonstrate the extent to 
which it is fulfilling departmental CVE-related responsibilities as 
established in the implementation plan for the CVE national strategy. 
In addition, by proactively soliciting feedback from participants in 
informal CVE-related training on a more consistent basis, FBI field 
offices and USAOs could more effectively obtain information on the 
strengths and weaknesses of their presentations and briefings, and 
thus better ensure their quality. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To better enable DOJ to demonstrate the extent to which it is 
fulfilling its CVE-related training responsibilities, we recommend 
that the Deputy Attorney General identify principal topics that 
encompass CVE-related training--including training that is directly 
related to CVE or that has ancillary benefits for CVE--and communicate 
the topics to DOJ components. 

To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which CVE-
related programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying with 
the CVE national strategy, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney 
General direct USAOs and the Director of the FBI's Office of Public 
Affairs direct FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more 
consistently from participants in informal training, such as 
presentations and briefings, that covers the type of information 
addressed in the CVE national strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, 
DOJ, ODNI, and DOD for their review and comment. We received written 
comments from DHS and DOJ, which are reproduced in full in appendixes 
V and VI, respectively. DHS generally agreed with the findings in its 
comments, and DOJ agreed with one of the recommendations in this 
report, but disagreed with the other recommendation. ODNI and DOD did 
not provide written comments on the draft report. However, ODNI 
provided technical comments, as did DHS and DOJ, which we incorporated 
throughout the report as appropriate. 

In its written comments, DHS noted that the report recognizes DHS's 
efforts to develop and improve the quality of CVE training and 
identified additional efforts that the department is taking to improve 
communication with its various CVE stakeholders and to implement the 
priorities outlined in its framework for vetting CVE training. For 
example, DHS stated that it will be hosting a CVE train-the-trainer 
workshop in September 2012, and identifying trainers on its online CVE 
training portal who meet the standards included in DHS's training 
guidance and best practices. DHS also stated that it remains committed 
to improving and expanding its development of CVE resources and 
providing information about those resources to state and local 
partners. 

DOJ stated that it generally agrees with the recommendation that the 
Deputy Attorney General and the Director of FBI's Office of Public 
Affairs direct USAOs and FBI field offices to consider soliciting 
feedback more consistently from participants in informal training that 
covers the type of information addressed in the CVE national strategy. 
The department stated that it will develop a plan of action that 
describes how USAOs and FBI field offices will implement this 
recommendation. Developing such a plan should address the intent of 
our recommendations. 

DOJ, however, disagreed with the recommendation that the Deputy 
Attorney General identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related 
training and communicate those topics to DOJ components. According to 
DOJ, the CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns DOJ, 
through its USAOs, primary responsibility for expanding the scope of 
engagement and outreach events and initiatives that may have direct or 
indirect benefits for CVE; however, the plan does not assign the 
department primary responsibility for developing specific CVE-related 
training. We recognize that DOJ is not the lead agency for the 
subsection of the implementation plan related to the development of 
standardized CVE training; however, the CVE implementation plan 
nonetheless assigns DOJ as a lead or partner agency for other CVE 
training-related activities. For example, the implementation plan 
states that the FBI will lead the development of CVE-specific 
education modules and that DOJ will co-lead (1) the expansion of 
briefings about violent extremism for state and local law enforcement 
and government, and (2) the expansion of briefing efforts to raise 
community awareness about the threat of radicalization to violence. In 
addition, the implementation plan directs the FBI to develop a CVE 
Coordination Office, and according to the FBI, that office is in the 
process of developing CVE-related training. Given that DOJ has been 
identified as a lead or partner agency for several training related 
activities identified in the implementation plan, identifying CVE 
training topics could help DOJ demonstrate the extent to which it is 
fulfilling its responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. 
Identifying CVE training topics could also help the FBI determine what 
issues it should be addressing in the training that its CVE 
Coordination Office is developing, and assist the department in being 
able to publicly account for the CVE-related training that the 
department provides or funds. 

DOJ also stated in its comments that the draft report recommended that 
DOJ redefine its cultural competency training and community outreach 
efforts (which may have benefits for CVE) as "CVE." DOJ then stated 
that redefining these efforts as such would be imprecise and 
potentially counterproductive, and that labeling these efforts as CVE 
would suggest that they are driven by security efforts, when they are 
not. To clarify, the report does not include a recommendation that DOJ 
redefine or label its cultural competency training and community 
outreach efforts as CVE. Although we included these topics in the 
framework we used to identify potentially CVE-related training for the 
purpose of this review, the recommendation was that DOJ identify 
principal topics that encompass CVE-related training and communicate 
such topics to DOJ components. We defer to the department to determine 
which topics are appropriate to cover in its CVE-related training. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate
congressional committees. We will also send copies to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, this report will be 
made publicly available at no extra charge on the GAO Website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

This report answers the following questions: 

1. To what extent have the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified and communicated topics 
that countering violent extremism-related (CVE-related) training 
addresses to their components and state and local partners? 

2. What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners 
who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by 
DHS and DOJ? 

3. What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality 
of CVE-related training? 

To determine the extent to which DHS and DOJ identified and 
communicated topics that should be addressed by CVE-related training, 
we met with officials from both departments to discuss how they define 
CVE-related training, which departmental training programs were 
relevant to our review, and how the departments communicated principal 
CVE-related training topics to relevant components and state and local 
partners. We then analyzed this information to assess the extent to 
which the departments' efforts allow them to demonstrate fulfillment 
of their CVE-related training responsibilities under the CVE national 
strategy. We also met with officials from the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) who 
possess knowledge about CVE-related training and who are involved in 
interagency efforts related to CVE. More specifically, we met with 
officials from the components and offices listed in table 3. 

Table 3: Components and Offices Interviewed: 

DHS: 
Office of the Secretary, Counterterrorism Working Group; 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); 
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). 

DOJ: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): 
* Counterterrorism Division; 
* Inspection Division; 
* Office of Public Affairs; 
* Training Division; 
* National Security Branch; 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA); 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS); 
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); 
Community Relations Service (CRS); 
Office of the Deputy Attorney General. 

DOD: 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 

ODNI: 
National Counterterrorism Center. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

To obtain additional views on CVE-related training provided or funded 
by DHS or DOJ, we interviewed representatives from nine state and 
local law enforcement agencies and law enforcement representative 
organizations involved with federal CVE-related training efforts. They 
included the Minneapolis Police Department, the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the Las Vegas Sheriff's Department, the Arkansas State 
Police Program, the Dearborn Police Department, the National Sheriff's 
Association, the Major City Chief's Association, the International 
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, and the National 
Consortium for Advanced Policing. We selected these agencies and 
organizations based on their involvement with CVE-related training 
efforts and the extent to which they collaborate with DHS or DOJ on 
CVE-related training. While the views of these entities do not 
represent the views of all agencies and organizations involved in CVE-
related training, these entities were able to offer helpful 
perspectives for the purpose of this review. We also interviewed 
individuals with expertise in CVE, such as academic researchers who 
have published on CVE-related topics and researchers from 
organizations that study CVE-related topics, to obtain their views on 
topics CVE-related training should address and identify potential 
training programs to include in our review. They included individuals 
from the Georgetown University Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for 
Muslim-Christian Understanding, the RAND Corporation, the Foundation 
for Defense of Democracies, the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism.[Footnote 31] We selected these individuals 
based on the depth of their experience with, and knowledge of, CVE; 
the relevance of their publications; referrals from other 
practitioners; and to develop a sample that represented various 
sectors (e.g., academic, advocacy, etc.). They provided valuable 
insight even though the perspectives they offered are not 
generalizable. 

In addition, we obtained the views of state and local grantees 
regarding the clarity of guidance FEMA provides to recipients of grant 
funds that are eligible for CVE-related training by conducting a web-
based survey of 51 training points of contact within state 
administrative agencies.[Footnote 32] To help develop our 
questionnaire, we conducted pretests with officials from three state 
administrative agencies and made modifications to the questionnaire as 
necessary based on their input. In July 2012, we sent e-mails with 
links to our web-based questionnaire and unique login information to 
each member of our sample. Nonresponding state administrative agencies 
were sent additional e-mails, and we also made telephone calls to 
nonrespondents encouraging them to respond. Our survey closed at the 
end of July 2012. We received a total of 30 complete responses, for an 
overall response rate of 59 percent. To assess whether there are 
consistent differences between respondents and nonrespondents that 
might affect conclusions drawn based on our survey results, we 
examined the geographic regions and sizes of states of the state 
administrative agencies. We found that the state administrative 
agencies that responded to our survey come from a mix of different 
states in terms of size and region of the country. For example, state 
administrative agencies from some states with large populations, such 
as New York and Pennsylvania, responded to the survey, but state 
administrative agencies from some other states with large populations, 
such as California and Texas, did not. As a result, the experiences of 
state administrative agencies from some of the larger states may not 
be captured in our survey results. Nevertheless, the survey results 
provide insights into the level of clarity about DHS CVE-related 
guidance for other grantees. 

To obtain a better understanding of the departments' CVE-related 
training responsibilities, we requested information from DOJ and DHS 
on the approximate number and type of participants that attended 
training we determined was CVE-related and the estimated cost. We 
provide additional details on how we classified training as CVE-
related below. We assessed the reliability of the training data 
provided by interviewing agency officials familiar with the data to 
learn more about the processes used to collect, record, and analyze 
the data. For example, we found that several training providers 
collected information on the number and type of participants through 
sign-in sheets. We used these data to approximate the dollar amount 
spent by agencies on CVE-related training in appendix III.[Footnote 
33] As described above, we determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for showing general trends in attendance and spending, but 
some agencies either did not record participant data, and thus could 
not provide them; did not record participant figures and provided 
estimates of attendance based on the instructor's recall; or recorded 
participant figures, but not the participants' places of employment, 
so they could not specify how many of the attendees were from state 
and local versus federal entities. We noted these instances in our 
report. 

Identifying CVE-Related Training: 

During our initial interviews with DHS and DOJ, officials expressed 
difficulty in responding to our request for CVE-related training 
materials, in part because agency officials were not clear on which 
training should be considered CVE-related. To facilitate our request 
for course materials for CVE-related training, we developed a 
framework to classify training as CVE-related based on our review and 
analysis of information from the following sources: (1) federal 
strategies related to violent extremism, such as Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States[Footnote 
34] and its associated implementation plan;[Footnote 35] (2) DHS and 
DOJ plans, reports, or strategies that address CVE-related training 
topics such as DHS's CVE-related training Guidance and Best Practices; 
and (3) perspectives provided by individuals with CVE expertise. 
Specifically, we conducted a content analysis of our transcripts of 
interviews with experts and CVE-related documents to determine the 
current understanding of the content areas covered by CVE-related 
training and the knowledge state and local officials should possess or 
principles they should understand to effectively carry out CVE 
efforts. We then analyzed this information to identify similar themes 
and principles across the sources and grouped them together into three 
distinct content areas CVE-related training likely addresses: 

1. Radicalization addresses approaches that are based on research and 
accurate information to understanding the threat radicalization poses, 
how individuals may become radicalized, how individuals seek to 
radicalize Americans (threat of violent extremist recruitment), 
behaviors exhibited by radicalized individuals, or what works to 
prevent radicalization that results in violence. 

2. Cultural competency seeks to enhance state and local law 
enforcement's understanding of culture or religion, and civil rights 
and civil liberties, or their ability to distinguish, using 
information driven and standardized approaches, between violent 
extremism and legal behavior. 

3. Community engagement addresses ways to build effective community 
partnerships, such as through outreach, and community capacity for the 
purpose of, among other things, mitigating threats posed by violent 
extremism. 

We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS and DOJ. DHS 
Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the 
content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group 
provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the 
framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. For this 
review, we considered CVE-related training to include instruction, 
presentations, briefings, or related outreach efforts conducted, 
sponsored, promoted, or otherwise supported by DOJ, DHS, or a 
respective component, to help state, local, or tribal entities related 
to the three aforementioned content areas. 

We asked DHS and DOJ to identify and provide all course materials for 
any courses that they provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 
2011 through grant programs for state and local entities, including 
law enforcement officers and community members, assumed to be CVE-
related based on GAO's framework. We focused generally on training 
provided in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 because "countering violent 
extremism" is a relatively nascent term. In addition, we focused on 
training provided to state and local entities because the CVE national 
strategy emphasizes the importance of providing CVE-related training 
to these entities. While the FBI identified its National Academy as 
providing training that could be considered CVE-related, it did not 
identify any of its other programs as germane to our review. However, 
complaint letters raised concerns about FBI training that was CVE-
related according to our framework that was provided through two other 
FBI programs--the Citizens' Academy and the National Joint Terrorism 
Task Force. We assessed some of the training provided through these 
programs and determined the training to be CVE-related according to 
our framework. In addition, the FBI's internal review of 
counterterrorism training, which included the FBI programs within the 
scope of our review, assessed the training materials against criteria 
for CVE-related training, thereby suggesting that these programs may 
have provided training that was CVE-related. Accordingly, we requested 
course materials on these programs, as well as the Community Relations 
Executive Seminar Training Program, which is an abbreviated version of 
the Citizens' Academy. 

We received approximately 290 presentations, briefings, and course 
materials from two components within DHS and four within DOJ. In some 
cases, DHS and DOJ offices provided us only with course abstracts or 
agendas instead of the full presentations or course materials because 
(1) they contracted the training with an outside provider and did not 
retain all of the associated training materials or (2) the training 
materials were particularly voluminous and, on the basis of 
discussions with the offices, we agreed that the course abstracts or 
agendas would enable us to sufficiently determine the relevancy of the 
training to our review. In those cases, we determined CVE-relevancy 
based on the agenda or abstract alone. We reviewed these training 
materials to assess whether each of the individual courses, 
presentations, briefings, and other training-related activities 
undertaken or funded by DHS and DOJ agencies addressed one or more of 
the three content areas described above. If they addressed any of 
these content areas, we considered them CVE-related, even if the 
primary focus of the materials was not CVE-related. To ensure 
consistency in our analysis, two analysts independently reviewed the 
materials for each training and recorded their assessment of whether 
the training addressed each content area. Any discrepancies in the 
initial determinations were then discussed and reconciled. 

Identifying Concerns about CVE-Related Training: 

To determine what concerns, if any, participants raised about CVE-
related training, we reviewed course evaluations completed by 
participants of CVE-related training offered by DHS I&A, DHS Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DOJ BJA, and the FBI, and 
identified complaints or concerns about CVE-related training made 
formally in writing. We limited our analysis to training that was 
provided or funded by DHS or DOJ during fiscal years 2010 or 2011 and 
provided to a state or local entity (e.g., police department, 
community group, or fusion center).[Footnote 36] Two analysts 
independently reviewed 8,424 course evaluations from six training 
programs to consistently determine which ones included concerns or 
complaints. The analysts also assessed the nature of the concerns and 
complaints and assigned each complaint to one of three categories: (1) 
politically or culturally biased, (2) offensive, or (3) inaccurate. 
Where there were discrepancies between the analysts, they were 
resolved through supervisory review. 

To identify formally submitted or documented complaints or concerns 
participants expressed, we asked DHS and DOJ to identify those 
submitted in writing to DHS or DOJ, or articulated to DHS or DOJ 
through other means but subsequently documented by the agency, from 
fiscal years 2010 through 2011. We also conducted keyword searches 
using LexisNexis and Google to identify concerns that were raised by 
either individuals or advocacy groups that were submitted in writing 
to DHS or DOJ. In addition, we interviewed representatives, including 
leaders, of select advocacy groups that raised concerns about CVE-
related training to identify what concerns and complaints, if any, 
they submitted in writing to DHS or DOJ on behalf of training 
participants. The advocacy and civil liberties organizations we 
interviewed included the American Civil Liberties Union, the American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Council on American Islamic 
Relations, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council. We selected these 
organizations based on their leadership in raising concerns we 
identified (e.g., by virtue of being the primary signatories) and upon 
the recommendation of other advocacy groups. These interviews also 
enabled us to confirm or obtain additional views on the formally 
documented complaints DHS or DOJ provided. Through these approaches, 
we identified a total of six letters of complaint regarding 18 alleged 
incidents of biased CVE and counterterrorism training that DHS or DOJ 
provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Given that the 
scope of this review is limited to CVE-related training provided to 
state and local officials and community members, and not training that 
is exclusively provided to federal officials, we determined that 7 of 
the alleged incidents described in five of the letters were relevant 
to this review. We also interviewed relevant DHS and DOJ officials to 
obtain their perspectives on the concerns raised in the written 
complaints and information on any actions agencies took in response to 
these incidents. 

To address what actions, if any, DHS and DOJ have taken overall to 
improve the quality of CVE-related training, we interviewed DHS and 
DOJ officials responsible for providing or funding CVE-related 
training to inquire about any current or pending guidance, whether 
documented or undocumented, they adhere to when vetting training 
materials and instructors and other actions they have taken to ensure 
the quality of CVE-related training. We reviewed relevant DHS and DOJ 
documents including recently released guidance and best practices for 
training that DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed FBI 
and DOJ data from training reviews and information on how DHS and DOJ 
review and vet training curricula and instructors. Specifically, we 
analyzed the counterterrorism training materials that the FBI 
determined were inappropriate as a result of its internal review, 
which the FBI undertook to identify and purge potentially 
objectionable training materials. This analysis enabled us to better 
understand the review results with regard to training materials that 
were CVE-related under our framework, and provided context for the 
quality assurance steps FBI has taken in response to the review. To 
focus our analysis on training materials included in the FBI's review 
that were CVE-related, one analyst assessed which of these training 
materials were CVE-related, according to our framework, and if the 
materials were CVE-related, the analyst entered the FBI's observations 
and additional data about that training into a data collection form. A 
second analyst then reviewed these results. When there was 
disagreement, the two reviewers discussed the material, reached 
agreement, and modified the entries as necessary to ensure concurrence 
regarding which of the training materials included in the FBI's review 
were germane to our review. The FBI considers the methodology it used 
to conduct its internal review and our analysis of the training 
materials that the FBI considered objectionable to be For Official Use 
Only; therefore, we did not include that information in this report. 

In addition, we conducted a site visit in San Diego, California, in 
January 2012, where DHS hosted a pilot of a CVE-related course under 
development. During the site visit, we observed the pilot training, 
and interviewed DHS officials who were sponsoring the training and 
local agencies that had developed and delivered the course curriculum. 
On the basis of the information we collected, we evaluated DHS's 
adherence to its own CVE-related training guidance. We also assessed 
DHS and DOJ guidance and actions related to guidance provided by 
departmental leadership, such as DOJ training guidance issued to its 
components. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October 
2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Justice Are Developing: 

DHS is currently working with its components and relevant state and 
local entities to develop and implement CVE-focused training for state 
and local law enforcement officers, state police academy recruits, 
correctional facility officers, and new federal law enforcement 
officers. DHS's Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, who 
heads the department's CVE efforts, has testified that developing CVE-
related training is a priority for the department because 
inappropriate or inaccurate training undermines community partnerships 
and negatively affects efforts of law enforcement to identify 
legitimate behaviors and indicators of violent extremism.[Footnote 37] 
DHS has determined that CVE-related training should address: violent 
extremism (e.g., the threat it poses), cultural demystification (e.g., 
education on culture and religion), community partnerships (e.g., how 
to build them), and community policing efforts (e.g., how to apply 
community policing efforts to CVE). Accordingly, the DHS 
Counterterrorism Working Group, which is overseen by the Principal 
Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, is developing training that 
addresses these topics. These trainings include the following: 

* A continuing education CVE curriculum for frontline and executive 
state and local law enforcement that DHS is developing with the Los 
Angeles Police Department, Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), and 
the National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP).[Footnote 38] DHS 
hosted a first pilot for this course in San Diego, California, in 
January 2012 that 45 state and local law enforcement officials 
attended. The pilot consisted of 3 days of classroom instruction and 
student participation activities. According to Counterterrorism 
Working Group officials, DHS held a second pilot in the National 
Capital Region in July 2012, and a third pilot in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, in August 2012. In July 2012, DHS also presented the 
curriculum at a CVE conference it hosted in Washington, D.C., and 
according to Counterterrorism Working Group officials, the department 
is working to enhance the curriculum based on feedback that conference 
attendees provided. MCC has passed a motion to adopt the curriculum, 
which DHS aims to implement in collaboration with state and local 
partners in 2013. 

* CVE-related training modules for state police academies, which DHS 
is developing in collaboration with the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP).[Footnote 39] These training modules will be 1 
to 2 hours in length, and are intended for police recruits. DHS plans 
for police academies to introduce the modules into their training and 
to make them available online for police recruits by the end of 2012. 

* A CVE awareness training for correctional facility, probation, and 
patrol officers at the state and local levels that DHS is working to 
develop in collaboration with the Bureau of Prisons, the FBI National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Interagency Threat Assessment 
Coordination Group.[Footnote 40] Counterterrorism Working Group 
officials reported that DHS completed pilots for this training in 
Maryland in March 2012 and in California in July 2012. FEMA is also 
developing a curriculum for rural correctional facility management. 

Further, according to DHS officials, the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center has finalized a CVE-related training course that it 
integrated into its existing training for recruits. In February 2012, 
DHS hosted a symposium on the curriculum, and as of July 2012, FLETC 
had taught the curriculum to about 190 students. In addition, 
according to DHS officials, FLETC is also in the process of 
integrating aspects of the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberty's cultural competency training, which is described in detail 
in appendix III, into all new CVE curriculum and training efforts. 

Within DOJ, the FBI is also developing CVE-related training. The CVE 
national strategy implementation plan tasks FBI with establishing a 
CVE Coordination Office that will, as part of its activities, 
coordinate with the National Task Force on CVE-specific education and 
awareness modules.[Footnote 41] According to FBI officials, the FBI 
established a CVE office in January 2012, and as of August 2012, had 
assigned staff to the office and was in the process of developing CVE-
related training modules. In particular, the CVE Office developed and 
presented a CVE-related training module to FBI public affairs 
specialists and community outreach coordinators and specialists in FBI 
field offices from April through August, 2012, according to FBI 
officials. FBI officials also reported that the CVE Office is 
collaborating with the FBI Counterterrorism Division to develop a CVE-
related training module for FBI special agents and mid-and senior-
level managers that it plans to complete in December 2012 and 
implement in early 2013. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or Funded during Fiscal 
Years 2010 and 2011: 

DOJ and DHS components provided training that was CVE-related 
according to our framework to more than 28,000 state and local 
entities, including law enforcement officials, fusion center 
personnel, and community members, during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. 
That is, DOJ and DHS components provided training, including courses, 
briefings, presentations, and workshops, that addressed one or more of 
the three CVE-related training topical areas we identified: (1) the 
phenomenon of violent extremism and the threat posed by radicalization 
that leads to violence; (2) cultural competency and how to distinguish 
between criminal and constitutionally protected cultural and religious 
behaviors; and (3) how to build effective community partnerships to, 
among other things, mitigate threats posed by violent extremism. 
[Footnote 42] The majority of these trainings did not have the term 
"CVE" in their titles, a fact that DOJ and DHS officials attributed to 
CVE being a relatively new concept, or that the trainings had been 
developed for purposes other than CVE. Nonetheless, they provided some 
instruction on at least one of the three CVE-related training topics 
we identified, and thus are considered CVE-related for the purpose of 
this review. Although the CVE-related trainings that DOJ and DHS 
provided collectively addressed all three CVE-related training topics, 
the trainings more frequently addressed the phenomenon of violent 
extremism and cultural competency than community engagement. The 
specific topics addressed by each training DOJ and DHS components 
provided during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are described in the tables 
that follow. In addition, the DOJ grant-funded State and Local Anti-
Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program provided CVE-related training to 
approximately 11,000 state and local law enforcement officials. 

Within DOJ, the FBI, CRS, and U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) provided 
CVE-related training directly to state and local entities during 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011.[Footnote 43] In total, these entities 
provided CVE-related training to more than 15,000 state and local law 
enforcement and community members. More specifically, the FBI National 
Academy, the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) Program, 
select FBI field offices, CRS, and about half of USAOs (48 of 93 
offices) provided CVE-related training to law enforcement. In 
addition, the FBI's Citizens' Academy and Community Relations 
Executive Seminar Training (CREST) outreach programs provided CVE-
related training to community members. Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide more 
detailed information on these programs and trainings. 

Table 4: CVE-Related Training FBI Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Training program and description: National Academy; 
The FBI National Academy provides undergraduate and graduate courses 
through 10-week training sessions on a range of topics, such as 
terrorism, law, and leadership development. Participation is by 
invitation only, and the academy offers four sessions of courses each 
year. Three National Academy courses were provided in fiscal years 
2010 and 2011 that were CVE-related; 
Audience: Mid-to senior-level federal, state, local, and international 
law enforcement officials; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: Total across three 
trainings described below: 323. 

Training program and description: Legal Aspects of Policing in Today's 
War on Terrorism focuses on policing during the current war on 
terrorism, and is intended to provide officers with a comprehensive 
understanding of judicial and legislative trends affecting policing 
and policy development. It also emphasizes the importance of 
protecting civil liberties; 
Audience: Mid-to senior-level federal, state, local, and international 
law enforcement officials; 
CVE content areas addressed: Cultural competency; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 78. 

Training program and description: Leadership in Counterterrorism aims 
to, among other things, familiarize officers with various types of 
U.S. domestic terrorist groups and educate them on the historical 
development of violent Islamic extremism. This course is taught in a 
symposium format and includes sessions on Middle Eastern culture and 
basic Islamic beliefs[A]; 
Audience: Mid-to senior-level federal, state, local, and international 
law enforcement officials; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 83. 

Training program and description: Understanding Terrorism: Mindset, 
Methodology, and Response aims to provide students with an 
understanding of government responses to domestic terrorism. Topics 
addressed by this course include, among other things, definitions for 
terrorism and the mindset and grievances of terrorists, including 
violent extremists; 
Audience: Mid-to senior-level federal, state, local, and international 
law enforcement officials; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 162. 

Training program and description: NJTTF Program; 
The FBI has more than 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) across 
the United States, in which more than 4,000 representatives from 
state, local, and federal agencies work together to combat terrorism 
at a regional level. The NJTTF is responsible for managing the JTTF 
program and coordinating the efforts of regional task forces. It also 
provides training to task force officers and members. Three NJTTF 
courses were provided in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that were CVE-
related; 
Audience: State and local task force officers; 
campus liaison agents, who serve as an FBI resource and point of 
contact for academic institutions; and FBI personnel; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: Total across three 
trainings described below: up to 1,393. 

Training program and description: Campus Liaison Agents Conference--2-
day conference intended to, among other things, increase awareness and 
provide insight into the detection and deterrence of radicalization 
and recruitment of college students; 
Audience: Campus liaison agents, state and local officials, and other 
federal employees; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 43. 

Training program and description: JTTF Task Force Officer Orientation 
and Operations Course--course that the Combating Terrorism Center 
(CTC) at West Point, DHS, and the FBI taught that included a 4-hour 
block of instruction on CVE that addressed topics including Islamic 
culture, radicalization, and Islamism.[B]; 
Audience: State and local task force officers and members; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 672. 

Training program and description: International Terrorism Origins, 
Ideologies, and Methods Regional Courses--courses that CTC and the FBI 
taught to increase the knowledge base of counterterrorism 
practitioners. The specific topics covered in each course varied, but 
examples of topics they addressed included the origins of Islam, the 
diversity of cultures among Muslim Americans, the process by which 
individuals may be radicalized for jihad, and how extremists use the 
Internet for recruitment purposes; 
Audience: FBI personnel working on counterterrorism issues and task 
force members; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: up to 678[C]. 

Training program and description: Citizens' Academy[D]; 
Ten-session program FBI field offices teach one or two times per year 
that provides business, religious, civil, and community leaders with 
an overview of the FBI. Each field office develops its own curriculum 
addressing a range of topics, which can include a session on 
counterterrorism that addresses CVE topics. GAO reviewed the topics 
addressed at Citizens' Academy programs provided by 42 of FBI's 56 
field offices in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and these offices 
provided a total of 61 presentations related to counterterrorism. FBI 
was able to provide GAO with 56 of these presentations, 35 of which 
were CVE-related. For example, these presentations addressed various 
types of violent extremists and the threats they pose, as well as FBI 
tenets for ensuring civil rights and civil liberties when undertaking 
investigations[E]; 
Audience: Business, religious, civil, and community leaders; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 945. 

Training program and description: CREST; 
CREST is a 3-to 4-hour, more focused version of the Citizens' Academy 
that FBI field offices teach and conducted in partnership with a 
specific community group or organization. The topical focus of CREST 
sessions is customized to meet the needs of each organization. GAO's 
review of CREST agendas from 17 FBI field offices revealed that they 
provided a total of eight CREST sessions that related to 
counterterrorism during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. FBI was able to 
provide GAO with four of these presentations, all of which were CVE-
related because they, for example, educated participants about various 
types of violent extremists and extremist groups; 
Audience: Community group and organization members; 
CVE content areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Community 
engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 165. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information. 

Notes: Although this table identifies the CVE topics each training 
addressed, this is not meant to suggest CVE was their explicit or 
primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the table may have 
also addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified 
because they are not the focus of this review. In addition, this table 
excludes any training these programs provided that was not CVE-related 
according to our framework. The table also excludes data on training 
costs and information on additional trainings that FBI field offices 
provided that were CVE-related according to our framework because the 
FBI considered this information to be law enforcement sensitive. 

[A] This course is a combined effort of the FBI and the SLATT Program, 
which is described in table 8, and SLATT program instructors teach 
some National Academy course modules. To avoid double counting 
participants and costs, training SLATT provided at the National 
Academy is not included in the SLATT data presented in table 8. 

[B] CTC is part of the Department of Defense. It directs multiple 
graduate-level seminars on terrorism and counterterrorism and directs 
counterterrorism educational programs for partner government agencies, 
among other things. 

[C] This figure includes all course participants because the FBI could 
not provide data specific to state and local attendees. According to 
the FBI, even though it collects the names and positions of 
participants, it does not collect the names of the organizations for 
which they work, and the FBI would need this information to specify 
the number of state and local participants. 

[D] According to the FBI, the mission of its Community Outreach 
Program, of which the Citizens' Academy and CREST programs are a part, 
is to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI in order to 
enlist the cooperation and support of the public in the common 
interest of fighting terrorism and other criminal activity. Even 
though, according to the FBI, its outreach programs may produce a "CVE 
impact" on community partners by helping to build trust and empower 
communities to identify problems on their own, the Citizens' Academy 
is a community relations outreach effort that is not undertaken 
specifically for CVE and no formal CVE-related training curriculum is 
provided within the Citizens' Academy sessions. Although we agree that 
the FBI's outreach programs may have a CVE impact, according to our 
framework for CVE-related training, instruction provided through the 
Citizens' Academy in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 also constituted CVE-
related training. Accordingly, we are categorizing it as CVE-related 
in our analysis. 

[E] According to the FBI, field offices could not provide presentation 
materials in some instances because the presenter no longer has a copy 
of them, the presenter retired or transferred away from the field 
office, or the field office could otherwise not locate the 
presentation materials. 

[End of table] 

Although we determined that CRS provided CVE-related training 
according to our framework, CRS officials emphasized that the 
service's mission does not include any national security, 
counterterrorism, or CVE-related training efforts. CRS works with 
communities to help address tension associated with allegations of 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. CRS 
also works with communities to develop strategies to prevent and 
respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes on the basis 
of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, religion, or disability. According to CRS officials, 
through its work preventing hate crimes, CRS helps develop 
relationships among Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities who may be 
targeted for hate violence by violent extremists, including 
supremacists, and other community members, as well as local government 
and law enforcement officials. As a result, CRS does not conduct 
activities or programs with the express goal of CVE, but recognizes 
that its ability to help promote dialogue and develop strong 
relationships to create a sense of inclusion in communities may have 
ancillary CVE benefits in preventing violent extremism. 

Table 5: CVE-Related Training CRS Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Description: Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Course; 
Course provided to enhance law enforcement officers' understanding of 
and sensitivity to cultural and religious practices of Arab, Muslim, 
and Sikh American communities. This course is 2-4 hours in duration 
and is generally provided through two modules, one of which focuses on 
the cultural and religious practices of Arab-Americans and Muslims and 
the other of which focuses on cultural and religious practices of 
Sikhs; 
Audience: State and local law enforcement officers; 
CVE content areas addressed: Cultural competency; 
Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 2,765[A]; 
Estimated cost: $7,900[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information. 

[A] CRS does not systematically collect or use the number of attendees 
at CRS-delivered training as a data reference point or reporting 
requirement. CRS estimated the number of participants based on CRS 
staffs' observations at the time they delivered the course. While some 
staff recorded the information in their individual office files, 
others relied upon their memory to provide the data. 

[B] This estimate includes expenses CRS instructors who traveled to 
provide instruction incurred. It does not include the cost of 
instructors' time or the cost to develop the course. Although CRS paid 
a contractor to develop the course content in 2003 that was delivered 
in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, CRS cannot provide information on the 
cost of course development because CRS disposed of this information 
according to its record retention schedule. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: CVE-Related Training USAOs Provided to State and Local 
Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Training description: DOJ has 93 USAOs across the United States, 48 
(52%) of which provided, cohosted, or facilitated approximately 100 
CVE-related trainings to state and local entities during fiscal years 
2010 and 2011.[A] According to EOUSA officials, these trainings were 
generally provided through the Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) 
program. Each USAO has an ATAC, which includes a cross-section of 
federal, state, and local law enforcement; first responders; and 
private sector security personnel who work together to coordinate 
counterterrorism efforts in their communities by, among other things, 
conducting trainings. Each USAO has an ATAC coordinator who is 
responsible for initiating training programs, and law enforcement 
coordinators within offices may also help facilitate trainings in 
their districts. CVE-related trainings may be offered as stand-alone 
courses or at workshops or conferences, and may be provided by a USAO 
representative, a private contractor, or in coordination with another 
federal office or program, such as FBI JTTF, SLATT (described below), 
the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute (described 
below), CRS, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), or CTC[B]; 
Of the 100 CVE-related trainings, about a third--34--were facilitated 
by USAOs but provided by SLATT, CRS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, NCTC, or CTC, as follows: 
* Twenty-one were provided by SLATT; 
* Five were provided by CRS; 
* Four were provided by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties; 
* Four were provided by NCTC[C]; 
* Two were provided by CTC[D]; 
USAO representatives or a third party provided the remaining two-
thirds of CVE-related training at events that USAOs hosted or 
cohosted. For example: 
* Two USAOs cosponsored a conference on counterterrorism in 2010 and 
2011 with FBI and the state in which their districts are located. The 
2010 conference included a presentation on terrorism recruitment that 
addressed the radicalization of American-based Somalis, and the 2011 
conference included a presentation on the ideologies of domestic 
terrorists, including violent extremists; 
* One USAO hosted a 3-hour symposium on homegrown terrorism that 
provided state and local law enforcement professionals with 
information on how to recognize and protect against the threat it 
poses. For example, during the symposium, a presenter provided a 
review of how terrorists use the Internet to recruit jihadists and 
case studies of U.S. citizens that were recruited; 
* Another USAO sponsored a conference on global terrorism in 2010 and 
2011. The 2010 conference included a presentation on threats posed by 
radicalization and Islamic extremism in the United States, and the 
2011 conference included a presentation made by an FBI agent and a 
former defendant charged with providing material support to al Qaeda 
that addressed radicalization; 
Audience: Federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; 
CVE content areas addressed: USAOs provided or facilitated 66 CVE-
related trainings in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 excluding trainings 
provided by CRS, SLATT, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Institute, CTC, and NCTC. Of these 66 trainings: 
* 60 addressed violent radicalization; 
* 43 addressed cultural competency, and; 
* 8 addressed community engagement[E]; 
Approximate number of participants: 7,700[F]. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by EOUSA and USAOs. 

Notes: Even though this table identifies the CVE topics USAO trainings 
addressed, this is not meant to suggest CVE was their explicit or 
primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the table also 
addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because 
they are not the focus of this review. In addition, even though USAOs 
provided us with the total cost for the trainings that they provided 
or sponsored, they were not able to provide the cost of the portion of 
the course that was CVE-related. As a result, according to the 
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the estimates provided 
are likely significantly larger than should be attributed to CVE-
related training. Accordingly, we are not including them in this table. 

[A] Of the 93 USAOs, 50 indicated that they may have provided training 
that was CVE-related according to our framework. Upon reviewing 
training materials from these 50 offices, we determined that 48 
offices provided CVE-related training according to our framework. 

[B] NCTC is an additional federal entity that provided CVE-related 
training to state and local entities during fiscal years 2010 and 
2011. We are not presenting detailed information on these trainings 
given that the focus of this review is on DOJ and DHS. In addition to 
CVE-related training described in this report, NCTC's Radicalization 
and Extremist Messages Group provided briefings on 25 occasions to 
groups of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials during 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011 on the dynamics of radicalization. In 
addition, NCTC reported that its Directorate of Strategic Operational 
Planning CVE Group provided an awareness briefing to community 
leaders, educators, and others on more than 15 occasions. The purpose 
of the briefings was to share information on the threat of terrorist 
recruitment in the United States, listen to the perspectives and 
insights of community members, and foster discussion on ways the 
federal government and communities can work together to protect youth 
and at-risk individuals from extremist radicalization efforts. 

[C] According to NCTC officials, the center provided two additional 
briefings to USAO ATACs. 

[D] Trainings sum to 36 rather than 34 because two federal providers 
contributed to 2 of the trainings. 

[E] Numbers do not sum to 66 because some trainings addressed multiple 
content areas. 

[F] The number of approximate participants is based on participant 
information provided by USAOs. It excludes participants in trainings 
organized by USAOs but provided by other federal entities (e.g., the 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties) to avoid double counting 
participants that are reported in other tables in this appendix. In 
some instances, USAOs were able to report the total number of 
participants, but not the number of total participants who were state 
and local versus federal officials. In addition, in some instances 
USAOs reported attendance by "other" officials, but did not specify 
the officials' affiliations. Further, in select instances, USAOs 
reported a range of participants. To balance the potential impact of a 
differential over-or undercount on the estimates of the total number 
of participants, our estimates (1) include federal officials where 
they were grouped together with state and local officials (which may 
lead to overestimation), and (2) exclude "other" participants and use 
the low end of participant ranges (which may lead to underestimation). 

[End of table] 

Within DHS, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute 
and I&A provided CVE-related training to approximately 3,410 state and 
local intelligence and law enforcement officials during fiscal years 
2010 and 2011.[Footnote 44] This training consisted of two classroom-
based courses that the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Institute provided on about 40 occasions; one CVE-focused workshop 
that the I&A State and Local Program Office hosted; and 17 briefings 
that the I&A Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch (HVEB) provided in 
coordination with the FBI and NCTC at fusion centers and fusion center 
conferences. Table 7 provides more detailed information on each of 
these trainings. 

Table 7: CVE-Related Training DHS Provided to State and Local Entities 
in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

DHS entity: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute: 

Training/description: State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center 
Training, Cultural Tactics for Intelligence Professionals module: 1-
hour module that is part of a broader training course focused on, 
among other things, the diversity of the threat violent extremists 
pose and building cultural competency, including dispelling 
misconceptions about Islam; 
Audience (state, local, and other participants): Fusion center 
personnel; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 736; 
Estimated cost: $274,300. 

Training/description: CVE through Community Partnerships course: 4 to 
8-hour course focused on the threat posed by violent extremism; 
building cultural competency, including dispelling misconceptions 
about Islam; and the role of communities in CVE, including 
contributions of Muslim communities in thwarting violent extremist 
plots and tips for interacting with community members; 
Audience (state, local, and other participants): Federal, state, 
local, and international law enforcement officers; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 1,021; 
Estimated cost: $444,800. 

Training/description: CVE through Community Partnerships conference 
presentations: abbreviated version of CVE through Community 
Partnerships course curriculum presented at law enforcement 
conferences; 
Audience (state, local, and other participants): Federal, state and 
local law enforcement officers; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Cultural 
competency; Community engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 585; 
Estimated cost: $108,500. 

DHS entity: I&A HVEB and State and Local Program Office: 

Training/description: Fusion center briefings: briefings provided by 
HVEB in collaboration with the FBI and NCTC to build awareness of the 
threat posed by, and indicators of, violent extremism, and to improve 
sharing of information related to violent extremism among federal, 
state, and local partners; 
Audience (state, local, and other participants): Fusion center 
personnel and other state and local law enforcement and intelligence 
professionals; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Violent radicalization; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 930[A]; 
Estimated cost: $24,000[B]. 

Training/description: National CVE Workshop: 2-day workshop led by the 
State and Local Program Office to build understanding of violent 
extremism and share best practices to understand the phenomenon of 
violent extremism in the United States, build awareness of the violent 
extremism threat to local communities, and support fusion centers to 
develop better intelligence products to support law enforcement 
customers; 
Audience (state, local, and other participants): Fusion center 
personnel, intelligence commanders, and other federal partners; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Violent radicalization; Community 
engagement; 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 138; 
Estimated cost: $108,500[C]. 

Total: 
Approximate number of state and local participants: 3,410; 
Estimated cost: $960,100. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information. 

Note: Even though this table identifies the CVE topics that each 
training addressed, this is not meant to suggest CVE was their 
explicit or primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the 
table may have also addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not 
identified because they are not the focus of this review. In addition, 
I&A officials do not identify I&A training presented in this table as 
CVE-related because I&A's focus is on describing threats from an 
intelligence perspective and not on countering the phenomenon of 
violent extremism. Nonetheless, as the HVEB trainings described above 
address the topics of violent radicalization and community engagement, 
they constitute CVE-related training as conceived by our framework, 
and thus constitute CVE-related training for the purpose of our review. 

[A] I&A provided the briefings at various fusion centers, and the 
approximate number of participants reflects the sum of estimated 
attendees at all of the briefings. I&A did not maintain records on the 
number of participants in the briefings because, according to I&A 
officials, I&A was generally invited to speak by fusion centers and 
did not sponsor the event. Accordingly, participant data are based on 
the recollection of I&A participants. 

[B] I&A fusion center briefing costs exclude money spent on local 
travel. In addition to costs incurred by I&A, the FBI spent 
approximately $8,800 to attend and provide these fusion center 
briefings. 

[C] The FBI spent approximately $6,300 to attend, and provide 
briefings at, the National CVE Workshop. 

[End of table] 

DOJ and DHS also administered four grant programs during fiscal years 
2010 and 2011 that provided funding for which CVE-related training was 
an eligible expense: (1) the DOJ Community Policing Development (CPD) 
Program, (2) the DOJ Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 
(JAG) Program, (3) the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), and 
(4) the DOJ SLATT Program. We reviewed grant documentation for CPD 
grant projects that DOJ identified as potentially CVE-related and 
determined that they were not used to pay for training that was CVE-
related according to our framework. Information DHS and DOJ collect on 
grant projects funded through the HSGP and JAG programs suggests that 
minimal, if any, funds from these programs were used for CVE-related 
training purposes; however, the level of detail in the information the 
departments collect from HSGP and JAG grantees is not sufficient to 
reliably and conclusively make this determination. In fiscal years 
2010 and 2011, SLATT provided CVE-related training to approximately 
11,000 state and local officials. Additional details regarding this 
training are provided in table 8. 

Table 8: CVE-Related Training That the SLATT Program Provided in 
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011: 

Description: SLATT provides funding to a single grantee through a 
cooperative agreement to provide training in detecting, investigating, 
and prosecuting extremist criminal activity, including activity that 
is inspired by international events. SLATT training consists of about 
26 modules that address a range of topics, such as Arabic culture and 
Islam, violent criminal extremism in the prison system, and 
radicalization on college campuses. Training is provided through 
either a 3.5-day course or through workshops that are 1 or 2 days in 
duration. The content is tailored to the particular needs of the 
officers to who attend; 
Audience: State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel; 
CVE topical areas addressed: Among the 19 CVE-related SLATT modules: 
* 16 addressed violent radicalization; 
* 14 addressed cultural competency, and; 
* 6 addressed community engagement[A]; 
Approximate number of state, local, and tribal participants: 11,000[B]; 
Estimated cost: $4,615,100[C]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Justice Programs information. 

Notes: Although this table identifies the CVE topics that SLATT 
modules addressed, this is not meant to suggest that CVE was the 
explicit or primary focus of each module. Some SLATT modules also 
addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because 
they are not the focus of this review. 

[A] Numbers do not sum to 19 because some trainings addressed multiple 
content areas. 

[B] We assessed 19 of the 26 SLATT training modules as CVE-related. 
The number of participants reflects total state, local, and tribal 
attendees at courses in which one or more of the 19 modules were 
taught. SLATT provided training to approximately 900 additional 
participants that was not CVE-related according to our framework. 

[C] SLATT training costs include expenses associated with delivering 
all facets of the SLATT Program, such as research, administration, and 
production of materials. They also include the cost of delivering the 
7 training modules that are not-CVE as conceptualized by our review. 
According to the SLATT program officials, although the program 
currently tracks the cost of providing specific trainings, it did not 
track their individual costs during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. In 
addition, according to SLATT officials, is difficult to estimate the 
costs associated with providing the CVE-related portion of a training 
that covers both CVE and other topics. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Types of Concerns Raised about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related 
Training: 

Table 9 presents a summary of the 77 state and local participant 
concerns that we identified during our review of course evaluation 
forms that DHS and DOJ provided to us.[Footnote 45] 

Table 9: Types of Concerns State and Local Participants Raised about 
DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training That Occurred during Fiscal Years 
2010 and 2011: 

Training provider[A]: DOJ SLATT; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 11,000; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 5,005; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 17; 
Offensive: 1; 
Inaccurate: 4. 

Training provider[A]: FBI National Academy; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 300; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 248; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 4; 
Offensive: 2; 
Inaccurate: 1. 

Training provider[A]: FBI Citizens' Academy[D]; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 900; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 121; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 0; 
Offensive: 0; 
Inaccurate: 0. 

Training provider[A]: FBI NJTTF Program; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 1,400; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 1,053; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 26; 
Offensive: 5; 
Inaccurate: 3. 

Training provider[A]: DOJ USAOs; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 7,700; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 1,185; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 3; 
Offensive: 1; 
Inaccurate: 2. 

Training provider[A]: DHS I&A; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 1,100; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 28; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 0; 
Offensive: 0; 
Inaccurate: 0. 

Training provider[A]: DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Institute; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 2,300; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 784; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 4; 
Offensive: 3; 
Inaccurate: 1. 

Training provider[A]: Total; 
Approximate total number of state and local participants in CVE-
related trainings (rounded to the nearest hundred)[B]: 24,700; 
Number of participants that provided feedback[C]: 8,424; 
Number of participants that raised concerns: 
Politically or culturally biased: 54; 
Offensive: 12; 
Inaccurate: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and DOJ participant evaluations. 

[A] For more information about the training these programs provided, 
see appendix III. 

[B] The total number of participants for each program is the sum of 
all state and local participants in training that was CVE-related 
according to our framework, and the programs may have provided 
additional training to participants that was not CVE-related. 
Participants may be counted more than once if they attended multiple 
CVE-related training courses. 

[C] Some programs solicited participant feedback on only select 
courses. This table excludes CVE-related training provided by FBI 
field offices through the Community Relations Executive Seminar 
Training Program and other initiatives on which the offices did not 
solicit participant feedback. It also excludes the Community Relations 
Service, which reported that it has used evaluations in the past, but 
too few participants returned course evaluations, thus limiting the 
service's ability to analyze them effectively. According to Community 
Relations Service officials, the service is in the process of 
instituting new procedures for distributing, collecting, and reviewing 
course evaluations that it expects will improve the number of 
evaluations returned. 

[D] The FBI provided us with information on trainings provided through 
the Citizens' Academy by 42 of the FBI's 56 field offices. 
Accordingly, the total number of Citizens' Academy participants 
excludes training provided by the 14 remaining field offices. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington. D.C.20528: 

September 17, 2012: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-12-952SU, "Countering Violent Extremism:
Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts" 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in conducting its 
review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note the report positively recognizes 
DHS's efforts to develop Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training 
and to communicate training topics to components and state and local 
partners. DHS is also appreciative that the report acknowledges 
Department efforts to disseminate training guidance and best practices 
to help improve the quality of CVE training. 

DHS continues to improve communication efforts with its various CVE 
stakeholders. For example, the Department has undertaken efforts to 
reach out to more than 100 State Administrative Agency Heads and 
Homeland Security Advisors from over 30 states in order to clarify 
what topics should be addressed in CVE-related training. Additionally, 
the Department is continuing to work with grantees to ensure 
understanding of our CVE efforts and high-quality training. For 
example, DHS is hosting a CVE Train-the-Trainer workshop in San Diego, 
California on September 27-28, 2012 for trainers from across the 
country. Last month, DHS also launched a new CVE Training Webportal 
for a select group of law enforcement training practitioners. We plan 
to expand access to this Webportal, containing more than 160 CVE 
training materials, to trainers nationwide within the next 60 days. 

DHS has also begun to implement the priorities outlined in the CVE 
Training Vetting Framework developed by Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. For 
example, DHS has identified Subject Matter Expert (SME) trainers who 
have a background in CVE on the new Webportal. These SMEs meet the 
standards of DHS's training guidance and best practices, and can be 
used as an additional resource by our state and local partners. 

To better communicate CVE topics to state and local partners, DHS/FEMA 
is also working on a new Information Bulletin for State Administrative 
Agency Heads and grantees that describes the new CVE Webportal and the 
CVE training activities that can be funded by the FY 2012 Homeland 
Security Grant Program. 

We noted the report does not contain any recommendations specifically 
directed to DHS, however, please know the Department remains committed 
to improving and expanding its development of CVE resources and 
communicating the content of these resources to its state and local 
partners. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were provided under separate cover. 
Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. We look 
forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General: 
Washington, DC 20530: 

September 17, 2012: 

Eileen Larence, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Subject: GAO Draft Report Countering Violent Extremism: Additional 
Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts (GAO-12-952SU): 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

The Department of Justice appreciates the opportunity to review the 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled 
Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen 
Training Efforts (GAO-12-952SU). The draft report contains two
recommendations for executive action: 

Recommendation 1: 

"To better enable DOJ to demonstrate the extent to which it is 
fulfilling its [countering violent extremism (CVE)]-related training 
responsibilities, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney General 
identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related training—
including training that is directly related to CVE or that has 
ancillary benefits to CVE—and communicate the topics to DOJ 
components." 

Recommendation 2: 

"To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which 
CVE-related programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying 
with the CVE national strategy, we recommend the following two 
actions: The Deputy Attorney General direct USAOs and the Director of 
the FBI's Office of Public Affairs direct FBI field offices to 
consider soliciting feedback more consistently from participants in 
informal training, such as presentations and briefings, that covers 
the type of information addressed in the CVE national strategy." 

The Department concurs generally with the GAO's second recommendation 
and will provide a plan of action in its response to Congress that 
describes how the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the FBI field offices 
will consider soliciting feedback more consistently from participants 
in the type of informal training identified and discussed in the draft 
report. 

The Department disagrees, however, with the GAO's recommendation that 
DOJ "identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related training—
including training that is directly related to CVE or that has 
ancillary benefits to CVE" in order to "demonstrate the extent to 
which it is fulfilling its CVE-related training responsibilities." 
(GAO Draft Report, p. 32.) The Department believes this recommendation 
rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the Department's efforts 
to counter violent extremism. 

Due to the Department's—-and specifically the U.S. Attorneys' 
Offices'—-long history of constructive engagement with various 
communities, the Department's approach to CVE is focused primarily on 
engaging with communities that may be targeted by violent extremists, 
not CVE-related training. Under the Administration's Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States (SIP), the Department has primary 
responsibility, through its U.S. Attorneys' Offices, for expanding the 
scope of engagement and outreach events and initiatives that may have 
direct or indirect benefits for CVE. It shares lead responsibility 
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in some cases with 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), for other engagement-
related efforts. While DOJ has primary responsibility for many 
community engagement and outreach efforts, it does not have primary 
responsibility for developing specific CVE-related training.[Footnote 
1] Under the SIP, DHS has primary responsibility for improving the 
development and use of standardized CVE-related training. Indeed, 
virtually all of the current and future activities listed under SIP 
Objective 2.3, which focuses on improving CVE training, are led by 
DHS, or relate exclusively to important work that DHS has done, 
especially with respect to state and local law enforcement.[Footnote 2] 

The National CVE Strategy recognizes that, "Mather than creating a new 
architecture of institutions and funding" to combat violent extremism, 
we should be "utilizing successful models" that already exist. 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States, p. 3. In the same way that the Department engages with 
communities to raise awareness about other public safety threats or 
acts of violence, the Department has been and will continue to work 
"to ensure that our communities are empowered to recognize threats of 
violent extremism and understand the range of government and 
nongovernment resources that help keep their families, friends, and 
neighbors safe." (SIP, p. 7.) 

Through the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and other DOJ components, the 
Department has successfully leveraged existing programs and 
partnerships to expand its engagement efforts consistent with the SIP. 
In December 2010, 32 U.S. Attorneys' Offices began expanding their 
engagement with communities to raise awareness about civil rights 
violations and public safety threats, including the threat of violent 
extremism. As part of the SIP, the Department has built on that 
initial U.S. Attorney-led effort and included communities that may be 
targeted by violent extremism into broader engagement forums and 
programs that involve other communities. In addition, the Department 
is coordinating efforts to expand engagement specific to CVE with 
communities that may be targeted by violent extremists. 

While the Department undertakes various cultural competency trainings 
and community outreach efforts-—and recognizes how these may have 
benefits for CVE—-it would be imprecise and potentially counter-
productive to redefine them as "CVE," as the GAO draft report 
recommends. Labeling our related cultural competency trainings and 
engagement and outreach efforts as "CVE" would imply that they are 
driven by security efforts when they are not.[Footnote 3] For example, 
the Department's Community Relations Service (CRS) has a specific 
statutory mandate as the only federal agency dedicated to assisting 
state and local units of government, private and public organizations 
and community groups with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic 
tensions, incidents and civil disorders, and in restoring racial 
stability and harmony. While the Department certainly recognizes how 
CRS's work benefits CVE by improving relations and building trust 
between the government and certain communities, CVE is not within 
CRS's statutory purview and its work was not specifically designed to 
benefit CVE. 

Across the range of DOJ activities with direct and ancillary CVE 
benefits, the Department has coordinated closely, both within and 
outside the Department, to facilitate a whole-of-government approach 
to CVE. For example, DHS is developing CVE curricula, and Department 
components have provided input and feedback as appropriate. We also 
participate in the sub-Interagency Policy Committee on CVE Training 
that is co-led by DHS and NCTC; through this group, DOJ components are 
made aware of training modules that are being developed and funded at 
other agencies, and those agencies are likewise made aware of DOJ 
funding opportunities. 

In conclusion, the Department appreciates the work of the GAO and this 
opportunity to comment on the GAO's draft report. We will follow up 
with the GAO on a course of action to address its second 
recommendation. We are also committed to providing Members of Congress 
with information on the Department's efforts to implement the 
Administration's CVE national strategy. Should you have any questions 
regarding this topic, please do not hesitate to contact Louise 
Duhamel, Acting Assistant Director, Audit Liaison Group, at 202-514-
0469. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James M. Cole: 
Deputy Attorney General: 

Appendix VI Footnotes: 

[1] This is not to suggest, however, that the Department does not 
conduct any CVE-related training for state and local law enforcement. 
For example, the Office of Justice Program's State and Local 
Antiterrorism Training (SLATT) program has direct benefits for CVE. 
SLATT courses include: Pathways to Radicalization, Recognizing
Terrorist Indicators and Warning Signs, Special Interest/Anarchist 
Groups, Radicalization on College Campuses, the Psychopathology of 
Hate Groups, and Violent Criminal Extremism in the Prison System. 

[2] An exception to this involves review of training materials and 
guidance on training. All departments and agencies have the lead on 
"taking steps to identify training materials that may not meet 
internal standards and to improve processes for creating and reviewing 
such materials." As the GAO correctly notes in the report, "DOJ has 
undertaken reviews and OHS and DOJ have developed guidance to improve 
training quality." (GAO Draft Report, p. 26.) 

[3] Indeed, as the SIP recognizes, at the same time we engage in 
outreach, "we must ensure that our efforts to prevent violent 
extremism do not narrow our relationships with communities to any 
single issue, including national security." (SIP, p. 7.) 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov: 

In addition to the contact named above, Kristy N. Brown, Assistant 
Director, and Taylor Matheson, Analyst-In-Charge, managed this 
assignment. Melissa Bogar and Lerone Reid made significant 
contributions to this report. Gustavo Crosetto, Pamela Davidson, 
Richard, Eiserman, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Jan 
Montgomery, and Anthony Pordes also provided valuable assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States, (Washington, D.C: August 2011), for a 
definition of "violent extremism." 

[2] University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Profiles of Islamic 
Radicalization in North America Database (College Park, MD: 2010-2011). 

[3] We refer to training we identified to address one or more of these 
three content areas as "CVE-related" throughout this report. In 
addition, whether the training was specifically developed for CVE 
purposes or if the training was primarily developed for another 
purpose but addresses at least one of the CVE content areas, we refer 
to it as "CVE-related." 

[4] The cost of providing some of the training is law enforcement 
sensitive and not included in this report. 

[5] The state administrative agencies that we surveyed are responsible 
for managing DHS grant awards to states and the District of Columbia 
and ensuring that grant recipients comply with grant requirements. 

[6] The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States, (Washington, D.C.: August 2011); and 
the White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
(Washington, D.C: December 2011). 

[7] One such program is the Building Communities of Trust Initiative. 
Established by DOJ and DHS, this initiative is intended to improve 
trust among local police, fusion centers, and the communities they 
serve in order to address the challenges of crime and terrorism 
prevention. A fusion center is generally a collaborative effort of two 
or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to 
the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 
See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a 
New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at 
the Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence, 
Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006). 

[8] The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 15. 

[9] HSAC provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. It is composed of leaders from state and local 
government, first responder communities, the private sector, and 
academia. 

[10] During fiscal years 2010 and 2011, components that contributed to 
CVE-related training included the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties and I&A, which provided CVE-related training; FEMA, which 
administered grants that could be used for CVE-related training; and 
S&T, which oversaw research on CVE that was relevant to CVE-related 
training content. These components are all members of DHS's internal 
CVE Working Group, which the department established in October 2011 in 
order to coordinate all CVE activities, policies, and operations 
across DHS. More than 20 DHS components and offices are represented in 
the working group. 

[11] These include trainings for experienced state and local law 
enforcement officers and recruits, correctional facility officers, and 
federal law enforcement officers. For more information about these 
trainings, see appendix II. 

[12] MCC is a professional association of police chiefs and sheriffs 
that is to provide a forum for executives to share ideas, experiences, 
and strategies for addressing the challenges of policing in large 
urban communities. MCC membership is composed of chiefs and sheriffs 
of the 63 largest law enforcement agencies in the United States and 7 
largest in Canada. NCAP works to bring together top-tier professionals 
with backgrounds in law enforcement, academia, the intelligence 
community, government service, and homeland security to provide law 
enforcement training and technical assistance programs. IACP is a 
nonprofit membership organization of police executives, with over 
20,000 members in over 100 countries. IACP's leadership consists of 
the operating chief executives of international, federal, state, and 
local agencies of all sizes. 

[13] The U.S. Intelligence Community comprises 17 components, 
including DHS I&A and the FBI, and is overseen by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4). 

[14] The Executive Office for United States Attorneys is to act as a 
liaison between DOJ and the 93 United States Attorneys' offices, which 
may partake in CVE-related activities. The Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services works to advance the practice of community 
policing in America's state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies by sharing information and making grants to police 
departments around the United States. The Bureau of Justice 
Assistance's mission is to provide leadership and services in grant 
administration and criminal justice policy development to support 
local, state, and tribal justice strategies to achieve safer 
communities. 

[15] The Community Relations Service is DOJ's "peacemaker" for 
community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, 
color, and national origin. It is dedicated to assisting state and 
local units of government, private and public organizations, and 
community groups with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic 
tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and in restoring racial 
stability and harmony. According to DOJ, pursuant to the Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Community 
Relations Service also works with communities to develop strategies to 
prevent and respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes 
committed on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. See generally 
Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009). See also 18 
U.S.C. § 249. 

[16] Radicalization addresses approaches that are based on research 
and accurate information to understanding the threat radicalization 
poses, how individuals may become radicalized, how individuals seek to 
radicalize Americans (threat of violent extremist recruitment), 
behaviors exhibited by radicalized individuals, or what works to 
prevent radicalization that results in violence. Cultural competency 
seeks to enhance state and local law enforcement's understanding of 
culture or religion, and civil rights and civil liberties, or their 
ability to distinguish, using information-driven and standardized 
approaches, between violent extremism and legal behavior. Community 
engagement addresses ways to build effective community partnerships, 
such as through outreach, and community capacity for the purpose of, 
among other things, mitigating threats posed by violent extremism. See 
appendix I for more detailed information about how we developed and 
applied the framework. 

[17] According to the FBI, while the bureau has conducted 
counterterrorism training in the past, it would not be appropriate to 
categorize any of what FBI considers to be counterterrorism training 
as CVE-related training because the term "CVE" is relatively nascent, 
neither the FBI nor DOJ has defined what constitutes CVE-related 
training, and there is a distinction between counterterrorism and CVE. 
However, the CVE national strategy implementation plan identifies 
certain activities that the FBI has undertaken as CVE-related. For 
instance, the implementation plan cites briefings that the FBI 
provided in collaboration with DHS, NCTC, and the National 
Intelligence Council--which serves as a bridge between the 
intelligence and policy communities--on violent extremism as an 
example of national CVE efforts. In addition, our framework does not 
identify CVE-related training and counterterrorism training as 
mutually exclusive. For instance, if the primary focus of training is 
counterterrorism, certain topics addressed by the training may be CVE-
related. As FBI training programs described in figure 1 used course 
materials during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that addressed at least 
one of the CVE content areas identified by our framework, we are 
nonetheless categorizing them as CVE-related for the purpose of our 
review. 

[18] The departments did not collect feedback from all participants 
that attended CVE-related training during this period. For example, 
while the FBI requires solicitation of feedback for its centrally 
administered, curriculum-based courses, it does not require the 
solicitation of feedback for its Community Relations Executive Seminar 
Training and Citizens' Academy outreach programs, or other briefings 
or presentations that FBI field offices provide, because it does not 
consider these programs and activities as training. Similarly, USAOs 
are not required to obtain feedback from recipients of presentations 
and briefings that their individual offices provide. In addition, some 
of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program, National Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, and USAO trainings for which we reviewed 
feedback forms included federal participants. In these instances, as 
participants did not indicate their affiliated agency on the feedback 
forms, we reviewed all completed forms, including those that may have 
been filled out by federal officials. 

[19] According to CRS officials, the service has used evaluations in 
the past, but too few participants returned course evaluations, thus 
limiting the service's ability to analyze them effectively. The 
service is in the process of instituting new procedures for 
distributing, collecting, and reviewing course evaluations that it 
expects will improve the number of evaluations returned, according to 
these officials. 

[20] The Kirkpatrick model is a multilevel approach to evaluate an 
organization's training and development efforts. Soliciting feedback 
from course participants is a key element in this model, which 
consists of four levels of evaluation. The first level measures the 
training participants' reaction to, and satisfaction with, the 
training program through the collection of feedback. The second level 
measures the extent to which learning has occurred because of the 
training effort. The third level measures the application of this 
learning to the work environment through changes in behavior that 
trainees exhibit on the job because of training. Finally, the fourth 
level measures the impact of the training program on the agency's 
program or organizational results. 

[21] The FBI's Citizens' Academy and CREST programs are provided to 
business and religious leaders and members of the community to provide 
them with firsthand experience with how the FBI investigates crimes 
and threats to national security, as well as to educate them about the 
various tools and techniques it employs to carry out its mission. Some 
Citizens' Academy and CREST sessions include CVE-related 
presentations. For more information, see appendix III. 

[22] The CREST and Citizens' Academy programs are provided directly by 
FBI field offices. However, the Office of Public Affairs provides 
administrative and logistical support and suggestions for program 
execution. 

[23] Officials noted that SLATT is a program administered by the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance but often is hosted and facilitated by 
USAOs. Feedback is solicited from SLATT training participants, which 
is considered to be formal training. 

[24] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2004). 

[25] To identify these letters of concern, we reviewed open source 
information, contacted advocacy organizations, and requested all 
complaints regarding CVE-related training sent to DHS and DOJ during 
fiscal years 2010 and 2011. See appendix I for more information 
regarding our methodology. 

[26] The other 11 incidents discussed in the letters cited were 
outside of the scope of this review because, for example, they 
pertained to training that was provided exclusively to federal 
officials or occurred before fiscal year 2010. As a result, they are 
excluded from this analysis. 

[27] Although some USAOs reported that they have not yet reviewed 
training materials they used in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that we 
identified as CVE-related, officials from the Executive Office for 
United States Attorneys stated that the office will continue to work 
with the U.S. Attorneys' Offices to execute any further review of 
training materials that is required by the Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General. 

[28] DHS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) Training Guidance and Best Practices. October 
2011. 

[29] FEMA Information Bulletin #373, Ensuring Training on Counter 
Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism is Consistent with USG and 
DHS Policy (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2011). 

[30] The Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory Group was established to help 
identify more effective ways for DOJ to foster greater communication 
and collaboration, as well as a new level of respect and 
understanding, between law enforcement and Muslim and Arab-American 
communities. The group includes representatives from the Office of 
Legal Policy, the Civil Rights Division, the Office of Justice Policy, 
the Community Relations Service, the Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys, the National Security Division, the FBI, the Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Bureau of Prisons, and 
members of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee. 

[31] The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism is an independent consortium funded in part by DHS S&T. 

[32] The state administrative agencies that we surveyed are 
responsible for managing DHS grant awards to states and the District 
of Columbia that are eligible for CVE-related training and ensuring 
that grant recipients comply with grant requirements. 

[33] We did not include the cost estimates for some of the training in 
appendix III because the FBI considers those estimates to be law 
enforcement sensitive. 

[34] The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States, (Washington, D.C: August 2011), 1. The 
strategy defines violent extremists as individuals who support or 
commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. 

[35] The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
(Washington, D.C: December 2011). 

[36] A fusion center is generally a collaborative effort of two or 
more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to 
the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 
See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a 
New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at 
the Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence, 
Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006). 

[37] The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization within 
their Community, Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th 
Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of John Cohen, Principal Deputy 
Counterterrorism Coordinator and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security). 

[38] MCC is a professional association that is to provide a forum for 
executives to share ideas, experiences, and strategies for addressing 
the challenges of policing large urban communities. MCC membership is 
composed of police chiefs and sheriffs of the 63 largest law 
enforcement agencies in the United States and 7 largest in Canada. The 
National Consortium for Advanced Policing brings together 
professionals with backgrounds in law enforcement, academia, 
intelligence, government service, and homeland security to provide law 
enforcement training and technical assistance programs. 

[39] IACP is a nonprofit membership organization of police executives, 
with over 20,000 members in over 100 countries. IACP's leadership 
consists of the operating chief executives of international, federal, 
state, and local agencies of all sizes. 

[40] The FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force, among other things, 
coordinates information and intelligence gathering initiatives and 
synthesizes terrorism intelligence for use by FBI entities, as well as 
other agencies in the Intelligence Community. The Interagency Threat 
Assessment Coordination Group was established at the National 
Counterterrorism Center to help DHS, the FBI, and other agencies 
produce federally coordinated, terrorism-related information products 
tailored to the needs of state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments and private sector partners. 

[41] The National Task Force, led by DOJ and DHS, was established in 
November 2010 to help coordinate community engagement at the national 
level. It includes all departments and agencies involved in relevant 
community engagement efforts and focuses on compiling local, national, 
and international best practices and disseminating these to the field. 
The task force is also responsible for connecting field-based federal 
components to the full range of U.S. government officials involved in 
community engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and 
resource sharing. 

[42] For information about this framework and how we identified these 
topical areas, see appendix I. 

[43] The FBI's mission is to protect and defend the United States 
against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, uphold and enforce 
the criminal laws of the United States, and provide leadership and 
criminal justice services to agencies and partners. CRS is DOJ's 
"peacemaker" for community conflicts and tensions arising from 
differences of race, color, and national origin. It is dedicated to 
assisting state and local units of government, private and public 
organizations, and community groups with preventing and resolving 
racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and in 
restoring racial stability and harmony. According to DOJ, pursuant to 
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 
CRS also works with communities to develop strategies to prevent and 
respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes committed on 
the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, 
sexual orientation, religion, or disability. See generally Pub. L. No. 
111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009). See also 18 U.S.C. § 249. 

[44] The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute 
provides training on issues at the intersection of homeland security 
and civil rights and civil liberties. I&A's mission is to provide 
intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe, secure, 
and resilient, and the Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch is 
responsible for carrying out this mission as it pertains to homegrown 
violent extremism. 

[45] We did not independently assess the validity of the concerns 
raised by participants. Therefore, the data presented represent only 
the participants' perspectives. 

[End of section] 

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