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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

October 2012: 

General Aviation Safety: 

Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and Mitigate Safety Risks: 

GAO-13-36: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-36, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Although the U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, 
hundreds of fatalities occur each year in general aviation-—which 
includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military. The 
general aviation industry is composed of a diverse fleet of over 
220,000 aircraft that conduct a wide variety of operations—-from 
personal pleasure flights in small, piston aircraft to worldwide 
professionally piloted corporate flights in turbine-powered aircraft. 
According to 2011 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 92 
percent of that year’s fatal accidents occurred in general aviation. 
The majority of general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot 
error. 

GAO was asked to examine the (1) characteristics of and trends in 
general aviation accidents from 1999 through 2011 and (2) recent 
actions taken by FAA to improve general aviation safety. GAO analyzed 
NTSB accident data, reviewed government and industry studies and other 
documents, and interviewed FAA and NTSB officials and industry 
stakeholders. 

What GAO Found: 

The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased 
from 1999 through 2011; more than 200 fatal accidents occurred in each 
of those years. Airplanes-—particularly single-engine piston 
airplanes—-flying personal operations were most often involved in 
accidents. Most general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot 
error and involved a loss of aircraft control. Some segments of the 
industry experienced accidents disproportionately to their total 
estimated annual flight hours. For example, among the airplane 
categories we reviewed, experimental amateur-built airplanes were 
involved in 21 percent of the fatal accidents but accounted for only 4 
percent of the estimated annual flight hours. In another example, 
corporate operations were involved in about 1 percent of fatal 
accidents while accounting for 14 percent of estimated annual flight 
hours. We can draw some conclusions about general aviation accident 
characteristics, but limitations in flight activity and other data 
preclude a confident assessment of general aviation safety. The 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) survey of general aviation 
operators, on which the agency bases its annual flight-hour estimates, 
continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual limitations, 
even with FAA’s efforts to improve it over the years. To obtain more 
reliable data, FAA has discussed requiring that flight-hour data be 
reported, such as during annual aircraft maintenance inspections. FAA 
has set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate per 
100,000 flight hours by 10 percent from 2009 to 2018. However, given 
the diversity of the industry and shortcomings in the flight activity 
data, this goal is not sufficient for achieving reductions in fatality 
rates among the riskier segments of general aviation. Further, 
achieving the goal could mask continuing safety issues in segments of 
the community. 

FAA has embarked on several initiatives to meet its goal of reducing 
the fatal general aviation accident rate by 2018. These include the 
renewal of the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) with 
a data-driven approach and the implementation of the Flight Standards 
Service’s 5-year strategy. The GAJSC, a government-industry 
partnership, focuses on analyzing general aviation accident data to 
develop effective intervention strategies. The 5-year strategy 
involves numerous initiatives under four focus areas: (1) risk 
management, (2) outreach and engagement, (3) training, and (4) safety 
promotion. The FAA Safety Team, which is composed of FAA staff and 
industry volunteers, will be responsible for carrying out significant 
portions of the strategy. While the GAJSC’s efforts are modeled on an 
approach deemed successful in contributing to a reduction in fatal 
commercial aviation accidents, the 5-year strategy has shortcomings 
that jeopardize its potential for success. For example, the strategy 
lacks performance measures for the significant activities that 
comprise it. Without a strong performance management structure, FAA 
will not be able to determine the success or failure of the 
significant activities that underlie the 5-year strategy. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that FAA require the collection of 
general aviation aircraft flight-hour data in ways that minimize the 
impact on the general aviation community, set safety improvement goals 
for individual general aviation industry segments, and develop 
performance measures for the significant activities underlying the 5-
year strategy. Department of Transportation officials agreed to 
consider GAO’s recommendations and provided technical comments, which 
GAO incorporated as appropriate. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-36]. For more 
information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. at (202) 512-2834 or 
dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

General Aviation Accidents Decreased, but Some Segments Had 
Disproportionate Shares of Accidents: 

FAA Has Key Initiatives Under Way to Improve General Aviation Safety, 
but One Has Several Shortcomings: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Estimated Active Airplane Pilots and Selected Requirements 
and Limitations for U.S. Pilot Certificates: 

Table 2: Summary of General Aviation Accident Characteristics: 

Table 3: Percentage of Fatal Accidents and Estimated Flight Hours by 
Airplane Category and Operation (1999 to 2010): 

Table 4: Aviation Industry Organizations Interviewed for This Study: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Types of General Aviation Aircraft: 

Figure 2: General Aviation Accidents (1999 to 2011): 

Figure 3: Type of Operation Flown by Airplanes in General Aviation 
Accidents (1999 to 2011): 

Figure 4: Fatal General Aviation Accident Rates per 100,000 Flight 
Hours (2000 to 2010): 

ABBREVIATIONS: 

ABS: American Bonanza Society: 

AOPA: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association: 

CAST: Commercial Aviation Safety Team: 

CGAR: Center for General Aviation Research: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

EAA: Experimental Aircraft Association: 

E-AB: Experimental amateur built aircraft: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAASTeam: FAA Safety Team: 

GAJSC: General Aviation Joint Steering Committee: 

GAMA: General Aviation Manufacturers Association: 

IG: inspector general: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NBAA: National Business Aviation Association: 

NextGen: Next Generation Air Transportation System: 

NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board: 

SAFE: Society of Aviation and Flight Educators: 

SAT: safety analysis team: 

SMS: safety management system: 

VFR: visual flight rules: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 4, 2012: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Nick J. Rahall, II: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Thomas E. Petri: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world and a 
significant contributor to the nation's economy. However, hundreds of 
fatalities occur each year in the sector known as general aviation, 
which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military. 
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 92 
percent of all fatal aviation accidents[Footnote 1] in 2011 occurred 
in general aviation. Each fatal general aviation accident typically 
involves a small number of casualties because of the smaller aircraft 
that are usually flown in general aviation. Nevertheless, these 
accidents can profoundly affect communities--as with the November 23, 
2011, crash near Apache Junction, Arizona, that killed six people, 
including a father and his three children who were going to the 
father's home for Thanksgiving--and the nation--as with the August 9, 
2010, crash near Aleknagik, Alaska, in which former Senator Ted 
Stevens and four others perished and several others were seriously 
injured. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
data, the majority of general aviation accidents occurs because of an 
error on the part of the pilot and often involves causes similar to or 
the same as those identified in prior accidents. In June 2011, NTSB 
added "improve general aviation safety" to its most wanted list of 10 
critical changes needed to reduce transportation accidents and save 
lives. 

You asked us to examine general aviation safety in the U.S. This 
report discusses the (1) characteristics of and trends in general 
aviation accidents[Footnote 2] from 1999 through 2011 and (2) recent 
actions taken by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve 
general aviation safety. To address our objectives, we analyzed NTSB 
accident data, consulted our prior work on general aviation safety 
trends as well as other related work,[Footnote 3] reviewed other 
government and industry documents, and interviewed FAA and NTSB 
officials and industry stakeholders. We conducted this performance 
audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more 
information about our scope and methodology. 

Background: 

General aviation is characterized by a diverse fleet of aircraft flown 
for a variety of purposes. In 2010, FAA estimated that there were more 
than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation fleet, comprising 
more than 90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. Included among 
these aircraft are airplanes, balloons, unmanned aircraft systems, 
gliders, and helicopters. (See figure 1.) Airplanes comprise the vast 
majority--almost 80 percent--of the general aviation fleet. According 
to a 2009 FAA study, general aviation airplanes have an average age of 
40 years.[Footnote 4] In addition, most are single-engine piston, such 
as the Beechcraft Bonanza, Cessna 172, and Piper Archer. 

Figure 1: Types of General Aviation Aircraft: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 7 photographs] 

Source: AOPA. 

[End of figure] 

FAA designates a small, but growing, portion of the general aviation 
fleet as "experimental." These include aircraft used for racing and 
research as well as exhibition aircraft, such as former military 
aircraft known as warbirds. The largest group of experimental 
aircraft--and the fastest growing segment of the general aviation 
fleet, according to FAA--is defined by FAA as "experimental-amateur 
built" (E-AB). Individuals build E-AB aircraft either from kits sold 
by manufacturers or from their own designs. E-AB aircraft can contain 
previously untested systems, including engines not designed for 
aircraft use, and modifications of airframes, controls, and 
instrumentation. The E-AB fleet is diverse, ranging from open-
framework designs with no cabin structure to small, pressurized 
airplanes able to fly long distances. The majority are simple craft 
used primarily for short personal flights. The expertise of the 
builders varies, as does the experience of the pilots and the 
availability of training for transitioning to the aircraft.[Footnote 
5] Following a successful inspection of the aircraft and documentation 
review, FAA issues a special airworthiness certificate in the 
experimental category to the aircraft's builder and assigns operating 
limitations in two phases specifying how and where the aircraft can be 
flown.[Footnote 6] Phase I is the required flight test period, in 
which the builder determines the aircraft's airspeed and altitude 
capabilities and develops a flight manual. Phase II refers to normal 
operations after the flight testing is completed. 

General aviation aircraft can be used for a wide variety of 
operations, although about 78 percent of general aviation operations 
fall under one of four types: 

* personal (e.g., a pilot taking his family on a sightseeing trip); 

* business (e.g., a pilot flying herself to a meeting); 

* corporate (e.g., a professionally-piloted aircraft transporting 
corporate employees around the globe); and: 

* instructional (e.g., a student flying with a certified flight 
instructor). 

These operations are conducted from the more than 2,950 public use 
general aviation airports (which primarily serve general aviation 
aircraft) as well as from thousands of other airports (including those 
that support commercial air service) and landing facilities (e.g., 
heliports). General aviation flights operate under various federal 
aviation regulations.[Footnote 7] For purposes of this report, our 
definition of general aviation includes flights operated under part 91 
general operation and flight rules. 

Pilots, including those flying general aviation operations, earn one 
or more of the six basic types of pilot certification--(1) student, 
(2) sport, (3) recreational, (4) private, (5) commercial, and (6) 
airline transport. To obtain any of these certificates, individuals 
must typically successfully complete pilot training at any of the 
approximately 3,400 collegiate, flight-instructor, or vocational pilot 
schools[Footnote 8] and pass an FAA knowledge test as well as a 
practical test, which consists of a flight test and an oral 
examination. These tests are typically administered by designated 
pilot examiners, who are individuals authorized to conduct various 
pilot-certification-related activities on behalf of FAA. Pilots may 
also earn additional authorizations--referred to as ratings--that 
define the conditions or specific aircraft in which a pilot 
certificate may be used. In addition, FAA, to further define 
conditions or specific aircraft not covered by ratings, may issue 
endorsements. To be considered active, a pilot must also hold a valid 
medical certificate.[Footnote 9] FAA estimated that as of December 31, 
2011, there were approximately 580,800 active pilots holding one of 
those six airplane pilot certificates.[Footnote 10] Table 1 provides 
more information about the estimated number of active airplane pilots 
and selected pilot certificate requirements and limitations. 

Table 1: Estimated Active Airplane Pilots and Selected Requirements 
and Limitations for U.S. Pilot Certificates: 

Certificate type: Student; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 118,657; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 16[B]; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 0;
Prior certifications: None; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? No; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? No. 

Certificate type: Sport; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 4,066; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 17[C]; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 20; 
Prior certifications: Student certificate; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? Yes[ D]; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? No. 

Certificate type: Recreational; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 227; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 17; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 30; 
Prior certifications: Student or sport certificate; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? Yes[D]; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? No. 

Certificate type: Private; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 194,441; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 17[C]; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 40; 
Selected requirements: 
Prior certifications: Student, sport, or recreational certificate; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? Yes; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? No. 

Certificate type: Commercial; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 120,865; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 18; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 250; 
Prior certifications: Private certificate; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? Yes; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? Yes. 

Certificate type: Airline transport pilot; 
Estimated number of active pilots as of December 31, 2011[A]: 142,511; 
Selected requirements: 
Minimum age: 23; 
Minimum total prerequisite flight hours: 1,500; 
Prior certifications: Commercial certificate with an instrument rating; 
Selected limitations: 
Allowed to carry passengers? Yes; 
Allowed to carry property for compensation or hire? Yes. 

Sources: FAA and 14 C.F.R. part 61. 

[A] Pilots with rotorcraft-only certificates are excluded. 

[B] Student pilots must be at least 14 to operate a glider or balloon. 

[C] Private and sport pilots seeking certificates to fly a glider or 
balloon are eligible to do so at age 16. 

[D] Recreational and sport pilots may carry no more than one passenger. 

[End of table] 

Various offices within FAA are responsible for ensuring general 
aviation safety, most notably the Flight Standards Service, Aircraft 
Certification Service, Office of Accident Investigation and 
Prevention, and Office of Runway Safety. According to FAA, the 
agency's fiscal year 2011 budget submission included nearly $203 
million for activities within the Aviation Safety organization related 
to the top priority of reducing the general aviation fatal accident 
rate. FAA's responsibilities include administering aircraft and pilot 
certification, conducting safety oversight of pilot training and 
general aviation operations, and taking enforcement actions against 
pilots and others who violate federal aviation regulations and safety 
standards. FAA also collects general aviation fleet and flight 
activity data through an annual survey and supports the NTSB by 
gathering information about general aviation accidents. According to 
NTSB officials, FAA collects information on the vast majority of 
general aviation accidents. 

NTSB is responsible for all aviation accident investigations--using 
the information gathered by FAA and its own investigators--and for 
determining the probable cause of accidents. NTSB uses a coding system 
of aircraft accident categories and associated phases of flight that 
are useful in describing the characteristics and circumstances of 
aviation accidents. For ease of interpretation and to categorize 
similar events, NTSB identifies one event as the "defining event" of 
the accident, which generally describes the type of accident that 
occurred--hard landing, midair collision, or fuel exhaustion, for 
example. In addition, NTSB identifies the causes of an accident and 
the contributing factors, which describe situations or circumstances 
central to the accident cause. Just as accidents often include a 
series of events, the reason those events led to an accident may 
reflect a combination of multiple causes and contributing factors. For 
this reason, a single accident report can include multiple cause and 
contributing factor codes. NTSB also collects descriptive information 
about the environmental conditions, aircraft, and people involved in 
aviation accidents. It captures its findings and descriptive 
information in its Aviation Accident Database. NTSB calculates general 
aviation accident and fatality rates, which it does using its own 
accident data and FAA's annual estimates of general aviation flight 
activity. NTSB may also recommend regulatory and other changes to FAA 
and the aviation industry based on the results of its investigations 
and any studies it conducts. 

The U.S. general aviation industry includes a number of trade groups, 
"type clubs,"[Footnote 11] and other organizations that actively 
promote the importance of safety and, in many cases, offer educational 
opportunities to pilots. Many of the groups also work with FAA on 
advisory and rulemaking committees. Prominent trade organizations 
include the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), the 
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), the General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association (GAMA), and the National Business Aviation 
Association (NBAA). The Society of Aviation and Flight Educators 
(SAFE) and the National Association of Flight Instructors represent 
certified flight instructors and other aviation educators. The 
American Bonanza Society (ABS), the Cirrus Owners and Pilots 
Association, and the Lancair Owners and Builders Organization are 
examples of the several general aviation type clubs. 

General Aviation Accidents Decreased, but Some Segments Had 
Disproportionate Shares of Accidents: 

Our analysis of NTSB accident data showed that the annual number of 
general aviation accidents generally decreased for 1999 through 2011. 
We also identified several characteristics of accidents with respect 
to the types of operations and the causes of the accidents. These 
characteristics were largely consistent with observations made during 
our last review of general aviation safety in 2001.[Footnote 12] To 
better understand these characteristics, where possible, we sought to 
measure their occurrence in numbers of accidents in relation to their 
overall occurrence in, for instance, total flight hours or pilot 
certifications as estimated by FAA. In doing so, we identified some 
accident characteristics that, based on our analysis, appear to occur 
disproportionately. However, we also identified methodological and 
conceptual limitations with the activity data--particularly the 
General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey that FAA uses to 
estimate annual flight hours and the number of active aircraft--that 
we discuss later in this section. See table 2 for a summary of the 
characteristics of general aviation accidents according to our 
analysis of the NTSB accident data. 

Table 2: Summary of General Aviation Accident Characteristics: 

Analysis: Percentage change in general aviation accidents; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: -24%; 
Nonfatal accidents: -29%. 

Analysis: Most common operation flown in general aviation accidents; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: Personal; 
Nonfatal accidents: Personal. 

Analysis: Most common type of airplane in general aviation accidents; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: Single-engine piston; 
Nonfatal accidents: Single-engine piston. 

Analysis: Most common defining event in general aviation accidents; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: Loss of control in flight; 
Nonfatal accidents: Loss of engine power (total or partial). 

Analysis: Proportion of pilots in general aviation accidents who were 
a cause of the accident; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: 70%; 
Nonfatal accidents: 59%. 

Analysis: Percentage of pilots in general aviation accidents with 
fewer than 100 hours in the accident aircraft make and model; 
Result: 
Fatal accidents: 44%; 
Nonfatal accidents: 43%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB data. 

[End of table] 

General Aviation Accidents Decreased from 1999 to 2011: 

From 1999 through 2011, nonfatal accidents involving general aviation 
airplanes generally decreased, falling 29 percent, from 1,265 in 1999 
to 902 in 2011.[Footnote 13] Fatal accidents generally decreased as 
well, falling 24 percent. Figure 2 indicates the number of fatal and 
nonfatal accidents for each year we reviewed. During this period of 
time, though the majority (approximately 56 percent) of all accidents 
resulted in no injuries, there were more than 200 fatal accidents each 
year. 

Figure 2: General Aviation Accidents (1999 to 2011): 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

 Color A Color B 

Year: 1999; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,265; 
Fatal accidents: 282; 
Total accidents: 1,547. 

Year: 2000; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,193; 
Fatal accidents: 274; 
Total accidents: 1,467. 

Year: 2001; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,128; 
Fatal accidents: 272; 
Total accidents: 1,400. 

Year: 2002; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,090; 
Fatal accidents: 286; 
Total accidents: 1,376. 

Year: 2003; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,122; 
Fatal accidents: 304; 
Total accidents: 1,426. 

Year: 2004; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,061; 
Fatal accidents: 268; 
Total accidents: 1,329. 

Year: 2005; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,081; 
Fatal accidents: 272; 
Total accidents: 1,353. 

Year: 2006; 
Nonfatal accidents: 986; 
Fatal accidents: 261; 
Total accidents: 1,247. 

Year: 2007; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,098; 
Fatal accidents: 241; 
Total accidents: 1,359. 

Year: 2008; 
Nonfatal accidents: 1,034; 
Fatal accidents: 221; 
Total accidents: 1,255. 

Year: 2009; 
Nonfatal accidents: 950; 
Fatal accidents: 227; 
Total accidents: 1,177. 

Year: 2010; 
Nonfatal accidents: 936; 
Fatal accidents: 209; 
Total accidents: 1,145. 

Year: 2011; 
Nonfatal accidents: 902; 
Fatal accidents: 214; 
Total accidents: 1,116. 

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB data. 

Note: All accidents occurred in the 50 states and involved an airplane 
flying under Part 91. 

[End of figure] 

Most General Aviation Accidents Involved Personal Operations and 
Single-Engine Piston Aircraft: 

From 1999 through 2011, personal operations accounted for 73 percent 
of airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 77 percent of 
airplanes in fatal general aviation accidents. (See figure 3.) This is 
not a new phenomenon. As we reported about accidents occurring in 
1998, personal operations accounted for more than 75 percent of fatal 
general aviation accidents. 

Figure 3: Type of Operation Flown by Airplanes in General Aviation 
Accidents (1999 to 2011): 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

 Nonfatal Fatal 

Operation type: Personal; 
Nonfatal accidents: 10,228; 
Fatal accidents: 2,601; 
Total accidents: 12,829. 

Operation type: Instructional; 
Nonfatal accidents: 2,178; 
Fatal accidents: 244; 
Total accidents: 2,422. 

Operation type: Business; 
Nonfatal accidents: 440; 
Fatal accidents: 177; 
Total accidents: 617. 

Operation type: Corporate; 
Nonfatal accidents: 64; 
Fatal accidents: 19; 
Total accidents: 83. 

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB data. 

[End of figure] 

From 1999 through 2011, airplanes flying instructional operations were 
the second most often involved in accidents. However, instructional 
operations were also the operation with the smallest proportion of 
fatal accidents. According to our analysis, almost 38 percent of 
accidents that occurred during instructional flying involved hard 
landings or loss of control while the aircraft was on the ground. 
These types of events are less likely to cause fatalities than other 
types of events. It is also possible that the presence of a certified 
flight instructor onboard to share the management of the cockpit and 
other tasks may have contributed to the lower fatality rate for 
instructional operations. 

Corporate operations, in which a professional pilot flies an aircraft 
owned by a business or corporation, was the least common type of 
operation to be involved in general aviation accidents. Corporate 
operations accounted for less than 1 percent of fatal general aviation 
accidents and less than 0.5 percent of nonfatal accidents. From 2008 
through 2011, there were no fatal accidents involving corporate 
airplanes, giving corporate operations an accident record similar to 
that of commercial air carriers. Again, this is not a new phenomenon. 
As we reported in 2001, the low number of accidents involving 
corporate operations is attributable to a number of factors, including 
the pilot's training, experience, and participation in ongoing 
training to maintain and improve their skills, as well as the safety 
equipment that is typically installed on corporate aircraft. 

[Side bar: Specifications for a popular single-engine piston airplane: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Make/Model: Cessna 172N (1980); 
Maximum speed (at 8,000 ft.): 122 knots; 
Service ceiling: 14,200 feet; 
Maximum take-off weight: 2.300 lbs. 
Wingspan: 36 ft. 
Baggage allowance: 120 lbs. 
Seating capacity: 4 (including pilot). 

Piston airplanes have one engine connected to the propeller, which 
provides thrust to move the aircraft on the ground and through the air. 

Sources: www.172guide.com (specifications except seating capacity), 
AOPA (photo), GAMA (seating capacity), and NBAA (piston definition). 
End of side bar] 

According to a representative of the NBAA, an organization 
representing companies that rely on general aviation aircraft to 
conduct business, most corporate operations also benefit from advanced 
technologies, including avionics that provide synthetic vision and 
terrain displays; auto-throttle, which helps maintain airspeed; and 
fuel gauges that are built to the standards required for commercial 
airliners. Further, airplanes used for corporate purposes are often 
powered by turbine engines and may be subject to additional safety 
requirements.[Footnote 14] Flying for corporate purposes can also 
differ from other types of flying. Whereas a pilot flying for fun may 
perform several take-offs and landings and practice maneuvers, a 
corporate flight likely includes a single take off and landing, with 
the majority of time spent en route--one of the phases of flight when 
the fewest fatal accidents occur. 

Regarding the type of aircraft involved in general aviation accidents, 
single-engine piston airplanes accounted for almost 76 percent of 
airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 60 percent of 
airplanes in fatal accidents.[Footnote 15] Single-engine piston 
airplanes are the most common type of aircraft in the general aviation 
fleet and, according to stakeholders, the type of aircraft most 
commonly flown by pilots holding private pilot certifications and 
flying for personal reasons. According to AOPA, mechanical failures 
cause relatively few accidents, indicating that the frequency with 
which single-engine piston airplanes are in accidents is not 
necessarily a reflection of the safety of the aircraft. 

E-ABs were the second most common airplane involved in general 
aviation accidents. From 1999 through 2011, E-AB aircraft accounted 
for 14 percent of airplanes in nonfatal general aviation accidents and 
approximately 21 percent in fatal accidents. According to EAA, the 
organization that represents experimental and amateur-built aircraft 
owners, E-AB airplanes were also the fastest growing type of aircraft 
in the general aviation fleet in recent years. In 2011, there were 
approximately 33,000 registered E-AB aircraft, a 10 percent increase 
from 3 years earlier. AOPA's 2010 Nall Report--an annual safety report 
that provides perspectives on the previous year's general aviation 
accidents--indicated that the physical characteristics and the manner 
in which these aircraft are used expose E-AB aircraft pilots to 
greater risk and make accidents less survivable.[Footnote 16] 

In 2012, NTSB completed a safety study of E-AB aircraft that included 
the use of an EAA survey of E-AB pilots.[Footnote 17] Among other 
findings, NTSB concluded that the flight test period--the first 50 
hours of flight--is uniquely challenging for most E-AB pilots because 
they must learn to manage the handling characteristics of an 
unfamiliar aircraft while also managing the challenges of the flight 
test environment, including instrumentation that is not yet 
calibrated, controls that may need adjustments, and possible 
malfunctions or adverse handling characteristics. NTSB added that the 
E-AB safety record could be improved by providing pilots with 
additional training resources and, accordingly, made several 
recommendations to FAA and EAA regarding flight training and testing. 

Some Industry Segments Experienced Fatal Accidents Disproportionately 
to Their Estimated Annual Flight Hours: 

To better understand the above observations about the airplanes 
involved in and the types of operations flown during general aviation 
accidents, we compared the proportions of fatal accidents by airplane 
category and operation type to their shares of FAA estimated flight 
hours for 1999 through 2010.[Footnote 18] For this analysis, we 
considered 5 airplane categories: (1) non-E-AB, single-engine piston; 
(2) non-E-AB, multi-engine piston; (3) non-E-AB, turbine engine; (4) E-
ABs,[Footnote 19] regardless of engine type; and (5) others. As 
designated, there is no overlap in this categorization. If there were 
no relationship between accidents and airplane category, then we would 
expect each airplane category to be involved in accidents in 
proportion to its share of overall flight activity; for example, we 
would expect an airplane category that comprised 50 percent of general 
aviation flight hours to also comprise 50 percent of accidents. We 
found this to be the case with the single-engine piston airplane. 
Though the single-engine piston airplane is most often involved in 
fatal general aviation accidents, its share of fatal accidents (60 
percent) was slightly less than its share of general aviation flight 
hours (65 percent). By comparison, E-ABs comprised 21 percent of fatal 
accidents, but only 4 percent of estimated flight hours. With regard 
to type of operation, we found that 77 percent of fatal accidents 
occurred during personal operations, but only 40 percent of the 
estimated flight hours involved personal operations. (See table 3.) 

Table 3: Percentage of Fatal Accidents and Estimated Flight Hours by 
Airplane Category and Operation (1999 to 2010): 

Airplane category: Single-engine piston; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 60%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 65%. 

Airplane category: Multi-engine piston; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 12%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 10%. 

Airplane category: Turbine; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 6%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 19%. 

Airplane category: E-AB; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 21%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 4%. 

Airplane category: Other; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 0; 
Percentage of flight hours: 2%. 

Operation: Personal; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 77%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 40%. 

Operation: Instructional; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 7%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 18%. 

Operation: Business; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 5%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 14%. 

Operation: Corporate; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 1%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 14%. 

Operation: Other; 
Percentage of fatal accidents: 10%; 
Percentage of flight hours: 13%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB and FAA data. 

Note: For the purpose of this analysis, we used 5 categories of 
airplanes: (1) non-E-AB, single-engine piston; (2) non-E-AB, multi-
engine piston; (3) non-E-AB, turbine engine; (4) E-ABs regardless of 
engine type; and (5) others. Given this designation, there is no 
overlap among the categories. 2010 is the most recent year for which 
estimated flight hours are available. Percentages may not total 100 
percent due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Loss of Control Was the Most Common Type of Fatal General Aviation 
Accident: 

Loss of control in flight--the unintended departure of an aircraft 
from controlled flight, airspeed, or altitude--was the most common 
defining event in fatal general aviation accidents. Loss of control 
can occur because of aircraft malfunction, human performance, and 
other causes. During the period we examined, 1,036 fatal accidents (31 
percent) were categorized as loss of control in flight. This was the 
most common event in a fatal accident for 3 of the 4 types of general 
aviation operations--personal, instructional, and business operations--
and for all types of airplanes. FAA and the industry recently 
completed a review of a subgroup of fatal loss of control accidents 
and will be developing detailed implementation plans for the 
intervention strategies. 

Pilot Error Was a Cause of Most Accidents, but Targeting Mitigations 
Is Difficult because of a Lack of Pilot Data: 

According to our analysis of NTSB data, the pilot was a cause in more 
than 60 percent of the general aviation accidents from 2008 through 
2010.[Footnote 20] The pilot's actions, decision making, or cockpit 
management was a cause for 70 percent of the airplanes in fatal 
accidents and 59 percent in nonfatal accidents. NTSB and other experts 
view aviation accidents as a sequence of events with multiple causes 
and contributing factors. Of the 2,801 general aviation accidents that 
occurred from 2008 through 2010 for which a causal determination was 
made, 71 percent were determined to have multiple causes. In 
approximately 34 percent of fatal accidents involving airplanes, the 
cause was a combination of the pilot's actions and the failure to 
properly attain or maintain a performance parameter--e.g., airspeed 
and altitude. 

Many of the pilots involved in general aviation accidents had low 
levels of experience in the accident airplane make and model, which 
some stakeholders and experts with whom we spoke believed can 
contribute to pilot error. In its review of general aviation accidents 
from 2005, NTSB found that 40 percent involved pilots with 100 hours 
or less in the accident airplane make and model. In its review of 
general aviation accidents from 2007 through 2009, NTSB also found 
that, for pilots in accidents who were flying personal operations, a 
relatively small portion of their total hours flown had been in the 
type of airplane involved in the accident. Our analysis found that, in 
the accidents where flight hours were available, many pilots had a low 
number of hours flying in the accident airplane make and model. 
[Footnote 21] Approximately 43 percent of pilots in nonfatal accidents 
had fewer than 100 hours as the pilot in that make and model of 
airplane; for fatal accidents that figure was approximately 44 percent 
of pilots. However, without comparable information on flying hours or 
habits--such as how many different types of airplanes the pilot has 
flown--of pilots who are not in accidents, we cannot draw conclusions 
about the effect of pilot flight hours on accidents. For example, if 
about 40 percent of all pilots had fewer than 100 hours in any given 
airplane make and model, then we could expect the results of the above 
analysis even if pilot flight hours in the airplane make and model had 
no relation to accidents. We discuss the implications of the lack of 
this and other data later in this section. 

To further explore the relationship between pilot flight hours and 
accidents, we looked at the portion of pilots with fewer than 100 
hours in the accident airplane make and model where the pilot was 
determined to be a cause of the accident and compared it to the 
portion of pilots with more than 100 hours in the accident airplane 
make and model. We then did the same using pilot certification levels. 
Our analysis of accidents from 2008 through 2010 found that private 
pilots with fewer than 100 hours of experience in the accident 
airplane make and model were a cause of fatal and nonfatal general 
aviation accidents at similar rates as pilots with more than 100 hours 
of experience and with higher pilot certifications. For fatal 
accidents, 73 percent of pilots with fewer than 100 hours of 
experience in the accident airplane make and model were a cause as 
compared to 76 percent of pilots with more than 100 hours of 
experience. In nonfatal accidents, those portions were 63 and 64 
percent, respectively. With regard to pilot certification levels, we 
found that in nonfatal accidents, private pilots were a cause more 
often (68 percent) than other types of pilots (percentages ranging 
from 52 to 58 percent); but in fatal accidents, similar proportions of 
private and commercial pilots were found to be a cause (75 percent and 
80 percent, respectively).[Footnote 22] 

[Side bar: Example of a fatal loss of control accident involving an 
experimental aircraft—-John Denver accident: 

Accident summary: 
On October 12, 1997, at about 5:28 PM, an experimental category, 
amateur-built Long-EZ airplane crashed into the Pacific Ocean near
Pacific Grove, California. Air traffic control communications 
indicated that the airplane had departed from the Monterey Peninsula 
Airport, and the pilot made no distress calls. The pilot was killed, 
and the airplane was destroyed. 
Pilot information: 
The pilot reported a total flight time of 2,750 hours. He held a 
private pilot certificate with several ratings. FAA had previously 
determined that the pilot did not meet the medical standards in the 
Federal Aviation Regulations and was not qualified for any class of 
medical certificate at that time. 
Another Long EZ pilot (the "checkout" pilot) gave the pilot about 30 
minutes of ground and flight checkout in the accident airplane the day 
before the accident. About a month before the accident, he flew with 
the pilot on a demonstration flight in the accident airplane. He said 
the pilot had also flown in the backseat on two other demonstration 
flights. 
Aircraft information: 
The airplane was designed by Rutan Aircraft Factory and built by 
Adrian D. Davis, Jr. An airworthiness certificate for the aircraft was 
issued on June 12, 1987. The airplane was sold to the accident pilot 
on September 27, 1997. 
Probable cause: 
NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident was the pilot's 
diversion of attention from the operation of the airplane and
inadvertent application of the right rudder, which resulted in the 
loss of airplane control while attempting to manipulate the fuel 
selector handle. Also, NTSB determined that the pilot's inadequate 
preflight planning and preparation, specifically his failure to refuel 
the airplane, was causal. NTSB determined that the builder's location 
of the unmarked fuel selector handle, unmarked fuel quantity sight 
gauges, and the pilot's inadequate transition training and lack of 
total experience in the airplane type were factors in this accident. 
Safety recommendation: 
NTSB recommended that FAA establish a cooperative program that 
strongly encourages pilots transitioning to unusual or unfamiliar 
experimental airplanes to undergo type-specific training. 
Source: NTSB. End of side bar] 

Although some experts may believe that lack of experience can 
contribute to pilot error and accidents, the above suggests that this 
might not necessarily be the case. However, we do not have enough 
information to draw any real conclusions because FAA lacks certain key 
information about pilots that could help identify the root causes of 
accidents and, thus, risk mitigation opportunities. First, FAA's 
estimate of the number of active pilots is an imperfect measure 
because, according to FAA's definition, an active pilot is a 
certificated pilot who holds a valid medical certificate. However, 
depending on the type of operation the pilot is flying and the pilot's 
certification level, age, and health condition, the medical 
certificate is valid for between 6 and 60 months. The designation as 
active is also not an indication of whether the pilot has actually 
flown in the previous year. Second, though pilots report total flight 
hours as part of their medical certificate application, a pilot's 
experience in different makes and models of aircraft--which is not 
collected--is also relevant as there are risks associated with 
operating an unfamiliar airplane. As described above, this information 
would be necessary to draw conclusions about the effect of pilot 
flight hours on accidents. Third, though pilot flight hours are to be 
reported as part of the accident report, investigators are not always 
able to obtain this information for accident pilots as the logbooks in 
which it is recorded are sometimes destroyed in accidents. Of the 
3,257 pilots involved in an accident from 2008 through 2010, pilot 
flight hours in the accident airplane make and model was missing for 
514, or 16 percent of them. Missing data can compromise the validity 
of analyses that seek to examine the relationship between pilot 
experience and the causes of general aviation accidents. 

In addition, FAA does not maintain information about where pilots were 
trained or whether noncommercial pilots participate in any recurrent 
training programs other than its WINGS pilot proficiency program 
[Footnote 23]--information that would facilitate analyses of the 
relationship between pilot training and the causes of general aviation 
accidents and that could help identify shortcomings in current pilot 
training programs. Private pilots are not required to participate in 
recurrent training, though they must successfully complete a biennial 
review of their skills and knowledge by a designated pilot examiner or 
a certified flight instructor. In recent years, as pilot training has 
been identified as a contributing factor in high profile 
accidents,[Footnote 24] there has been a renewed focus on the sources 
and amount of pilot training and on altering the training 
paradigm.[Footnote 25] FAA has been required to take steps to maintain 
qualification and performance data on airline pilots,[Footnote 26] but 
there has been no decision about whether recurrent training will be 
included in the database, and no such effort has been undertaken with 
regard to the remaining pilot population. Without more information 
about the training of general aviation pilots--and not just those who 
are in accidents--FAA's efforts to identify and target risk areas and 
populations is impeded. 

Flight Activity Data Limitations Impede FAA's Ability to Assess 
General Aviation Safety and Target Risk Mitigation Efforts: 

FAA estimates of general aviation annual flight hours--a measure key 
to NTSB's calculation of general aviation accident and fatality rates 
and NTSB's and FAA's assessments of the safety of general aviation--
may not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual 
limitations with the survey used to gather flight activity data. Since 
1978, FAA has used a survey of aircraft owners to estimate annual 
general aviation flight hours. The survey was redesigned in 1999, and 
FAA has modified it since then, on its own volition and in response to 
NTSB recommendations, to improve the survey's ability to capture 
activity trends. Changes include sampling 100 percent of certain 
subpopulations of general aviation aircraft owners who were previously 
underrepresented in the random sample response--such as owners of 
turbine engine, rotorcraft, and Alaska-based aircraft--and revising 
the process for collecting information from owners of multiple 
aircraft. FAA and NTSB believe these changes have improved the 
reliability of the survey's estimates, but some conceptual and 
methodological limitations persist. 

First, as with all surveys that rely on self-reported data, there is 
the risk that respondents will not be able to accurately recall and 
report information, introducing error and perhaps bias into the 
survey's estimates. The general aviation survey, which is usually open 
from March through August each year, asks respondents to estimate the 
number of hours flown during the previous calendar year. Depending on 
funding availability, the survey has opened later or for shorter 
periods of time. This year, because of contracting-related delays in 
bringing the survey consultant on board, aircraft owners did not 
receive the first request for information about 2011 flight hours 
until August 2012. According to NTSB, accuracy depends on the record-
keeping habits and memories of aircraft owners, and in some cases, the 
aircraft owners' ability to obtain needed information from pilots who 
fly their aircraft. Though some portion of aircraft owners may record 
each flight in their logbooks, to which they can refer to complete the 
survey, logging each flight is not mandatory. To the extent aircraft 
owners rely on their recollection of flight hours flown in the 
previous year, long delays such as the one occurring this year are 
likely to further degrade the resulting information. 

Second, the survey has long suffered from low response rates, and this 
shortcoming, combined with limited information about the population, 
can call into question any estimates based on the survey's results. 
Since the current method for calculating the response rate was 
implemented in 2004, the overall response rate has ranged from 43 and 
47 percent annually through 2010. The primary problem with low 
response rates is that they can lead to biased estimates if survey 
respondents and nonrespondents differ with regard to the variables of 
interest--in this case, annual flight hours. According to guidance 
from the Office of Management and Budget, agencies should plan to 
conduct item-level bias analyses if the expected response rate of the 
survey is below 70 percent and to consider the anticipated response 
rate in the decision to proceed with the survey. In 2011, the survey 
contractor completed a nonresponse analysis and concluded that there 
was no evidence of significant bias.[Footnote 27] However, relatively 
little is known about the aircraft owners who do not respond and, as a 
result, the contractor and we concluded that the sample is not rich 
enough in information to understand the differences between the two 
groups. For instance, there may be certain characteristics of owners 
that are associated with flying habits, such as the owner's age or 
certification level.[Footnote 28] Though a low response rate does not 
necessarily imply bias, it does raise the possibility for it. Further, 
the ability to detect any such bias is limited by what is known about 
those who do not respond. Given these conditions, bias remains a 
serious concern. 

An alternative data collection method implemented in 2004 for owners 
of multiple aircraft may also introduce bias to the survey's flight-
hour estimates. In an effort to improve response rates among owners of 
multiple aircraft who were less likely to respond because of the 
burden of multiple forms, the survey administrators developed a 
modified data collection procedure for these owners. This includes 
sending out a form and calling these owners to verify receipt of the 
survey and encouraging participation. Survey staff also collect 
essential data--including the number of hours flown--during these 
phone calls. This alternative method accounted for data for 
approximately 23 percent of the aircraft owners responding to the 
survey that estimated 2010 flight hours. These efforts may have 
improved response rates, but these owners, the aircraft they own, and 
their use of the aircraft likely differ from owners of a single 
aircraft. By encouraging responses from a particular set of owners, 
survey estimates may be biased. 

Flight hours account for what stakeholders refer to as "exposure" or 
how often particular types of operations or aircraft are flown. FAA's 
flight hour estimates can provide a general sense of the relationship 
between hours and accidents. However, the methodological and 
conceptual limitations we have identified call the estimates' 
precision into question. As a result, these estimates may not be 
sufficient for drawing conclusions about small changes in accident 
rates over time--including FAA's progress toward its goal to reduce 
the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 
10 percent over 10 years. Implementing alternative means of collecting 
flight hour data, such as requiring the reporting of aircraft engine-
revolution or run-time data, could supplement or replace the data 
generated through the survey and add rigor to FAA's flight-hour 
estimates. Moreover, more precise flight-hour data could allow FAA to 
better target its safety efforts at subpopulations within the general 
aviation community. This could include reviewing an industry segment's 
characteristics, such as the number of fatal accidents relative to its 
portion of estimated flight hours and setting a measurable goal for 
improving safety within that segment. Though FAA has attempted to 
address the disproportionate number of fatalities within the E-AB 
community by developing an advisory circular to encourage transition 
training for pilots, it has not set a specific goal for reducing fatal 
accidents in that segment.[Footnote 29] 

FAA and NTSB, to their credit, have recognized that flight-hour 
estimates derived from the general aviation survey are imperfect. FAA 
has discussed ways to improve its flight-hour data, including 
requiring general aviation owners to report flight hours (in the form 
of engine-revolution or run-time data) directly to FAA during aircraft 
registration renewals or at the annual aircraft maintenance check. 
However, collecting data from these alternative sources has not 
progressed beyond internal discussions. In addition, organizations 
representing pilots have generally been opposed to suggestions for 
increased data collection, which they view as potential impediments to 
flying. According to these groups, general aviation pilots typically 
would prefer to avoid additional regulation or federal involvement. 

In 2005, NTSB explored using alternative approaches to determining 
annual general aviation activity, approaches that involved using other 
measures as proxies for hours flown--including the number of active 
pilots and fuel consumption. However, there are shortcomings to each 
of these options. As discussed previously, active pilots are defined 
as those who have current medical certifications; this is not related 
to whether the pilot actually flew in a given year. And while aviation 
gas consumption could be a proxy measure for piston engine aircraft 
activity, some piston-engine aircraft are used for operations other 
than general aviation. Further, jet fuel consumption cannot reasonably 
be used as a proxy for the general aviation activity of turbine engine 
aircraft because of the many types of operations (e.g., air taxi, air 
ambulance, etc.) flown by these aircraft. 

FAA's Singular Goal to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate May Mask 
Problems in Certain Segments of General Aviation: 

In 2008, FAA set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident 
rate by 10 percent--from a baseline of 1.12 fatal accidents per 
100,000 flight hours to 1 fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours--
over 10 years, from 2009 to 2018.[Footnote 30] This single long-term 
safety goal may mask problems in certain segments of the community. 
The goal stemmed from FAA's desire to have a target for its general 
aviation safety improvement efforts that accounted for changes in 
flight activity over time. According to FAA officials, they were 
looking for a goal that was achievable and represented an improved 
level of safety. FAA did not meet the annual targets for the goal in 
2009 and 2010 and, according to projections of flight activity, it 
does not appear FAA will meet its target in 2011.[Footnote 31] 

This singular goal is applied to an industry that is diverse in 
aircraft types and operations--some of which experience accidents at a 
higher rate than others. General aviation airplanes differ 
significantly in size and performance, ranging from single-seat E-AB 
airplanes to large corporate jets. The types of flying and pilot 
experience also vary by segment. Some private pilots may only fly a 
few times each year, while some corporate pilots may keep a schedule 
similar to that of a commercial airline pilot. In addition, given the 
expense of flying and maintaining an airplane, downturns in the 
economy can decrease activity in some segments of general aviation. 
Changes in flight activity in certain segments of the industry could 
mask or minimize problems in others and contribute to a rate that does 
not accurately reflect the trends in the individual segments. (See 
figure 4.) For instance, total general aviation flight hours have 
decreased since the most recent recession, but some segments have 
declined at a faster rate than others. Personal flying hours in 2010 
were 4 percent lower than they were in 2008; corporate flying hours, 
by comparison, were almost 15 percent lower in 2010 than in 2008. 
Historically, corporate flying has been one of the safest types of 
general aviation operations. From 1999 through 2010, corporate 
airplane operations accounted for just 1 percent of fatal general 
aviation accidents but 14 percent of flight hours. And from 2008 
through 2011, there were no fatal accidents involving corporate 
airplane operations. As a result, changes in corporate flight activity 
could result in changes in the overall fatal accident rate that are 
not necessarily a reflection of changes in safety but rather a 
reflection of the changing composition of general aviation flight 
activity. In addition, as previously discussed, the rate is based on 
estimates of annual general aviation flight hours that may not be 
reliable. 

Figure 4: Fatal General Aviation Accident Rates per 100,000 Flight 
Hours (2000 to 2010): 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours: 

Year: 2000; 
All General Aviation: 1.21; 
Business: 0.56; 
Corporate: 0.09; 
Instructional: 0.63; 
Personal: 1.93. 

Year: 2001; 
All General Aviation: 1.27; 
Business: 0.53; 
Corporate: 0.11; 
Instructional: 0.53; 
Personal: 1.95. 

Year: 2002; 
All General Aviation: 1.33; 
Business: 0.7; 
Corporate: 0.03; 
Instructional: 0.45; 
Personal: 2.15. 

Year: 2003; 
All General Aviation: 1.34; 
Business: 0.53; 
Corporate: 0.09; 
Instructional: 0.77; 
Personal: 2.17. 

Year: 2004; 
All General Aviation: 1.26; 
Business: 0.52; 
Corporate: 0.04; 
Instructional: 0.42; 
Personal: 2.08. 

Year: 2005; 
All General Aviation: 1.38; 
Business: 0.31; 
Corporate: 0.03; 
Instructional: 0.66; 
Personal: 2.57. 

Year: 2006; 
All General Aviation: 1.28; 
Business: 0.53; 
Corporate: 0.03; 
Instructional: 0.53; 
Personal: 2.29. 

Year: 2007; 
All General Aviation: 1.2; 
Business: 0.36; 
Corporate: 0.09; 
Instructional: 0.42; 
Personal: 2.37. 

Year: 2008; 
All General Aviation: 1.21; 
Business: 0.44; 
Corporate: 0; 
Instructional: 0.47; 
Personal: 2.37. 

Year: 2009; 
All General Aviation: 1.31; 
Business: 0.47; 
Corporate: 0.04; 
Instructional: 0.44; 
Personal: 2.47. 

Year: 2010; 
All General Aviation: 1.23; 
Business: 0.67; 
Corporate: 0; 
Instructional: 0.39; 
Personal: 2.37. 

Source: NTSB. 

[End of figure] 

There has been some discussion within FAA and industry about 
implementing separate goals for each segment of general aviation. 
According to one stakeholder we interviewed, the types of operations--
even among fixed-wing aircraft--differ enough to warrant such a 
disaggregation. He explained that an hour flown during a corporate 
operation, during which an advanced aircraft flies from point to point 
with a significant portion of the time spent en route, is quite 
different from a pilot flying for pleasure and practicing maneuvers 
and take-offs and landings--the phase of flight when most accidents 
occur. However, other stakeholders we interviewed maintained that they 
all fly under the same operating rules, so it is proper to consider 
the safety of general aviation as a whole. Given the significant 
dissimilarities among the various general aviation sectors, along with 
the varied accident and fatality rates, setting separate safety 
improvement goals would allow FAA to take a more risk-based approach 
and target its resources and safety improvement efforts to the unique 
characteristics of and risks posed by each sector. 

FAA Has Key Initiatives Under Way to Improve General Aviation Safety, 
but One Has Several Shortcomings: 

FAA has embarked on key initiatives to achieve its goal of a 10-
percent reduction in the fatal general aviation accident rate per 
100,000 flight hours by 2018. One is the long-standing General 
Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), which is led by the Office 
of Accident Investigation and Prevention. More recently, FAA announced 
a 5-year strategy to improve general aviation safety that was 
developed by the General Aviation and Commercial Division of the 
Flight Standards Service. Although both initiatives work toward the 
overall goal of reducing general aviation fatalities, the GAJSC is 
using a data-driven approach to identify risks in general aviation 
operations and propose mitigations, while the 5-year strategy is 
composed of a wide variety of activities under four focus areas. 

FAA Renewed the GAJSC in Early 2011: 

In January 2011, FAA renewed the GAJSC,[Footnote 32] a joint FAA 
effort with the general aviation industry,[Footnote 33] the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NTSB that in 1998 was 
part of the Safer Skies Initiative.[Footnote 34] Utilizing the model 
of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), the GAJSC's goal is to 
focus limited government and industry resources on data-driven risk 
reductions and solutions to general aviation safety issues.[Footnote 
35] The GAJSC consists of a steering committee that provides, among 
other things, strategic guidance and membership outreach. It also 
consists of a safety analysis team (SAT), which determines future 
areas of study and charters safety studies, among other things. GAJSC 
officials indicated that they would charter working groups as issues 
for study were identified. 

The first working group of the renewed GAJSC focused on loss of 
control in approach and landing accidents. This area was selected 
because, according to analyses of NTSB accident data for fatal 
airplane accidents that occurred from 2001 through 2011and for which 
NTSB had completed its investigation,[Footnote 36] loss of control was 
the number one causal factor. The working group divided into three 
subgroups--reciprocating non-E-AB aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, 
and E-AB aircraft--and agreed upon a sample of 30 accidents to be 
analyzed by each.[Footnote 37] Despite issues such as a lack of data 
and the consistency of member participation, the working group 
developed 83 intervention strategies. These strategies were used to 
develop the 27 safety enhancements that were presented to the GAJSC 
for approval. The GAJSC approved 23 of the safety enhancements. The 
next steps will include developing detailed implementation plans for 
each of the strategies, with the SAT conducting resource/benefit 
evaluations of each plan. The SAT then will determine which are the 
most effective solutions, draft a master strategic plan, and submit 
the plan to the GAJSC for approval. Implementation is expected to 
begin upon approval. During implementation, the SAT will be 
responsible for tracking implementation schedules and levels, tracking 
the effectiveness of the intervention strategies, and recommending 
areas for future study. We believe that with the GAJSC's renewal and 
adoption of CAST-like methods, it has the potential to contribute to a 
reduction in general aviation accidents and fatalities over the long 
term. 

FAA Launched a 5-Year Strategy in 2011 to Help Reduce the Fatal 
General Aviation Accident Rate: 

In March 2011, FAA announced its 5-year strategy to improve general 
aviation safety. This initiative is a complementary effort to the work 
of the GAJSC. FAA described the strategy as a nonregulatory approach 
conducted in partnership with the general aviation community and 
coordinated across FAA lines of business. The strategy has four focus 
areas--(1) risk management, (2) safety promotion, (3) outreach and 
engagement, and (4) training--and includes a 2-year review and the 
development of validation metrics as each phase of the plan is 
implemented. 

Risk Management: 

FAA initially planned to concentrate its risk management efforts in 
three areas: (1) the top 10 causes and contributing factors in fatal 
general aviation accidents--initiated in coordination with the GAJSC, 
(2) E-AB aircraft, and (3) agricultural operations, which comprise one 
segment of the general aviation sector.[Footnote 38] To begin this 
effort, an FAA team identified the top ten causes of fatal general 
aviation accidents as well as the leading contributing factors, and 
provided the information to the GAJSC. The GAJSC, as previously 
discussed, is using the results of the data analysis to focus its 
efforts on loss-of-control accidents during approach and landing. 

Safety Promotion: 

For the safety promotion aspect of its 5-year strategy, FAA relies on 
the FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam). Created in September 2004 as the 
education and outreach arm of FAA,[Footnote 39] the FAASTeam consists 
of 154 FAA employees in eight regional field offices, along with 32 
groups and 2,500 individual members from the general aviation 
industry. In 2011, FAA refocused the FAASTeam--from national and 
international activities--to promote general aviation safety and 
technical proficiency through a host of nationwide seminars and 
contact with pilots at airports. A significant part of the FAASTeam's 
new focus is the annual FAA safety standdown--a series of nationwide 
meetings that highlight issues of concern for general aviation and 
include industry and GAJSC member participation. The 2012 standdown 
focused on loss of control, the focus of a GAJSC working group, from 
three different perspectives: (1) preflight mistakes, (2) aeronautical 
decision making, and (3) handling a loss of control. In addition, the 
FAASTeam is conducting workshops for certified flight instructors to 
increase the quality of training offered to general aviation pilots. 
The FAASTeam has also been examining intervention strategies by 
working directly with designated pilot examiners to promote its 
educational opportunities to all applicants for practical tests. 

Outreach and Engagement: 

In its outreach and engagement efforts for the 5-year strategy, FAA 
has briefed aviation associations, type clubs, and flight instructors, 
and, with the assistance of the Aviation Accreditation Board 
International,[Footnote 40] held a symposium on flight training with 
academia in July 2011. FAA has also reached out to major aviation 
insurance providers. As a result of these and other efforts, FAA 
reports that it has strengthened its links with aviation associations 
while also improving its outreach efforts to type clubs. 

Training: 

The training portion of FAA's 5-year strategy includes chartering an 
aviation rulemaking committee[Footnote 41]on pilot testing standards 
and training, expanding its focus on certified flight instructors, and 
revamping the WINGS pilot proficiency program. In September 2011, FAA 
announced the establishment of an aviation rulemaking committee to 
address concerns from AOPA, SAFE,[Footnote 42] and others about the 
testing and training standards for pilots.[Footnote 43] The rulemaking 
committee focused on the certified flight instructor, private pilot, 
instrument rating, and commercial pilot certificates. It made nine 
recommendations to FAA to enhance the pilot-testing and pilot-training 
processes. The recommendations included establishing a stakeholder 
body to assist in the development of knowledge test questions and 
handbook content as well as transitioning to a single testing standard 
document for the knowledge test. FAA concurred with most of the 
rulemaking committee's recommendations. 

To increase its focus on certified flight instructors, FAA is 
reviewing certified flight instructor recurrent training and renewal 
requirements. FAA also updated the advisory circular on flight 
instructor courses and published it in September 2011.[Footnote 44] 

The FAASTeam's voluntary WINGS pilot proficiency program is being 
revamped to encourage more participation.[Footnote 45] An FAA-
established industry group has been surveying pilots to determine what 
changes need to be made to the WINGS program. Once the survey is 
completed, the resulting data will be analyzed and recommendations for 
changes will be made by the end of fiscal year 2012. FAA officials 
anticipate implementing changes to the program as funding becomes 
available in fiscal year 2013. 

The 5-Year Strategy Has Significant Shortcomings: 

FAA's 5-year strategy to improve general aviation safety suffers from 
several shortcomings that hinder its potential for success. First, 
senior FAA officials acknowledged that there are no specific 
performance goals or measures[Footnote 46] for the activities under 
the 5-year strategy. The officials said that because the goal of the 
initiative, as a whole, is to change general aviation culture, the 
strategy's success will be measured through changes in the general 
aviation fatal accident rate. They also indicated that they are 
developing validation metrics as each phase of the plan is 
implemented. However, successful results-oriented organizations 
measure their performance at each organizational level by developing 
performance measures. Without performance goals or measures for the 
individual initiatives implemented under the 5-year strategy, FAA will 
not be able to evaluate the success or failure of those activities, 
regardless of whether the fatal accident rate is reduced. Further, FAA 
has yet to meet its annual target for the general aviation fatal 
accident rate goal and may not meet the overall goal by 2018. 
Therefore, it is even more crucial that FAA determine whether these 
activities have been successful. 

Second, the strategy was developed without the initial input of 
significant stakeholders--the GAJSC and the general aviation industry. 
Successful agencies we have studied based their strategic planning, to 
a large extent, on the interests and expectations of their 
stakeholders, and stakeholder involvement is important to ensure that 
agencies' efforts and resources are targeted at the highest 
priorities.[Footnote 47] According to officials from the GAJSC and the 
general aviation industry groups we contacted, although they were 
briefed on the strategy, they were not consulted in its development 
and were surprised by the announcement of the strategy. General 
aviation industry trade groups, type clubs, and other organizations 
are active in promoting a safety culture and continuous education 
among their members. For example, AOPA offers numerous seminars each 
year to educate the pilot community, and EAA offers advisory programs 
for experimental aircraft builders and pilots. Further, many 
initiatives are joint efforts of FAA and the industry. Involving 
stakeholders in strategic planning efforts can help create a basic 
understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that 
confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and 
how those demands and resources require careful and continuous 
balancing. FAA officials have indicated that their initial publication 
of the strategy served as a "straw man" for obtaining industry's input 
and that there has been industry acceptance of the strategy as 
demonstrated by various industry groups' development of plans and 
programs supporting the strategy. However, a lack of industry input 
into the development and announcement of the strategy jeopardizes its 
prospects for acceptance and success. This may be indicated in the 
current perspective of two industry groups--which is that the best use 
of industry resources to improve general aviation safety is through 
the work of the GAJSC. 

Third, the FAASTeam, which will be the main vehicle for promoting the 
5-year strategy to the industry, lacks the confidence of two 
significant general aviation industry stakeholders we interviewed, and 
its reorganization has not been completed. These industry stakeholders 
indicated that there is inconsistency in the focus of the FAASTeam. 
One stakeholder noted that industry "struggles to understand the role 
of the FAASTeam," and the other stated that the FAASTeam is "well 
intentioned, but unfocused." In addition, FAA initially planned to 
reorganize the FAASTeam to reduce the number of volunteers to a strong 
core group and to include a national FAASTeam located in Washington, 
D.C. However, a senior FAA official recently indicated that the 
restructuring of the FAASTeam is in flux and that the plan to reduce 
the number of volunteers to a strong core group does not begin until 
2013. We believe that until there is a strong performance management 
structure, input and buy-in from industry, and a respected and 
organized FAASTeam, the effectiveness of the 5-year strategy will be 
in jeopardy. 

FAA Has Other Initiatives Under Way That Could Also Contribute to 
Improved General Aviation Safety: 

* Formed a rulemaking committee to recommend revisions to the small 
airplane airworthiness standards: In August 2011, FAA chartered a 
rulemaking committee to reorganize part 23--which promulgates 
airworthiness standards for small airplanes--according to airplane 
performance and complexity criteria as opposed to the traditional 
criteria of airplane weight and propulsion. The goals of this 
rulemaking committee include increasing safety and decreasing 
certification costs. Co-chaired by the manager of FAA's Small Airplane 
Directorate, the rulemaking committee includes members representing 
other sections of the Aircraft Certification and Flight Standards 
Services as well as members from industry groups, manufacturers, and 
foreign aviation authorities. The committee is expected to complete 
its work by the summer of 2013. 

* Encouraging adoption of a safety management system (SMS): In 
guidance issued in April 2011, FAA encouraged general aviation 
business and corporate operators to develop and implement SMS. 
[Footnote 48] FAA has also supported NBAA's promotion of single-pilot 
resource management, an SMS tool that teaches pilots to manage all 
available resources to ensure a successful flight. However, as we 
noted previously, personal operations continue to comprise the highest 
proportion of general aviation accidents, and as our current analysis 
shows, the majority is caused by pilot error. Therefore, it seems that 
FAA's focus on business operators is misplaced. A senior FAA official 
admitted that though FAA has incorporated some parts of single-pilot 
resource management into the practical test standards and flight 
reviews, it had not yet focused on SMS for general aviation operators. 
He contended that SMS is a challenge that necessitates a strong 
outreach effort showing that general aviation can benefit from it. 

* Providing funding to develop a system for reporting aircraft issues: 
FAA's Small Airplane Directorate has sponsored a project by Wichita 
State University to develop type club service information-sharing 
systems. The goal of the project is to share information among a 
targeted population of general aviation aircraft owners to prevent 
accidents and improve safety. Wichita State has collaborated with a 
large, well-organized type club, ABS, to develop the first reporting 
system. The ABS system will be accessed through the club's web site, 
and a moderator will review and approve entries. Once the system is in 
place, ABS will control the data that are generated, and FAA will not 
have direct access to the data. According to Wichita State officials, 
the intent is for aircraft owners to sort through the information 
reported to determine whether their own aircraft have similar problems 
and, if so, report them to the system. There are currently no plans to 
evaluate the results of the system. 

* Funding university research on general aviation issues: FAA's Center 
for General Aviation Research (CGAR) was formed in 2001 to supplement 
FAA's general aviation safety research.[Footnote 49] Researchers from 
the six universities that comprise CGAR are studying and proposing 
solutions for a variety of general aviation issues--including the lack 
of robust general aviation activity data, flight risk analysis, and 
flight data monitoring. CGAR is awarded funding through a biannual 
process in which FAA offices identify and prioritize a list of 
projects, and the FAA Technical Center awards the projects to CGAR or 
other research entities and conducts project oversight. According to 
FAA officials, CGAR is an attractive choice for research projects 
because it is required to match FAA project awards dollar-for-dollar 
with funds from other sources. CGAR has been awarded about $20 million 
since its inception. However, CGAR officials have noted that their 
efforts are hindered by changing leadership within FAA, the 
uncertainty of FAA funding, the need for more FAA sponsors, and the 
matching requirement. 

* Provided new technology to reduce accidents in Alaska: The Capstone 
and Weather Camera programs in Alaska have contributed to increased 
aviation safety in that state because its dependence on aviation and 
unusual weather conditions make it more susceptible to fatal aviation 
accidents than other states. In 1999, FAA, in conjunction with the 
industry and the State of Alaska, established Capstone to improve 
aviation safety and efficiency by putting cost-effective new avionics 
equipment (e.g., Global Positioning System) into aircraft and on the 
ground. Capstone was also intended to demonstrate certain capabilities 
for potential use in the rest of the national airspace system. The 
demonstration areas lacked radar, and most of the air carrier 
operations were limited to visual flight rules (VFR).[Footnote 50] 
Capstone began in Southwest and Western Alaska and was successful in 
reducing those areas' aircraft accidents by 40 percent. Since fiscal 
year 2007, the Weather Camera Program has funded the procurement and 
installation of 182 weather camera sites in Alaska. The cameras 
provide near real time video images of sky conditions at airports, 
mountain passes, and strategic VFR locations, such as high-use air 
routes, to enhance pilots' situational awareness. According to FAA, 
this new capability is providing measurable reductions in weather-
related VFR accidents in Alaska. FAA's goal is to install a total of 
221 weather camera sites. 

Technology and Equipment May Also Help Improve General Aviation Safety: 

According to FAA, new technologies such as inflatable restraints (air 
bags), ballistic parachutes, weather in the cockpit, angle-of-attack 
indicators, and terrain avoidance equipment could significantly reduce 
general aviation fatalities. Angle of attack indicators and inflatable 
restraints have the greatest likelihood of significantly improving 
safety. Angle-of-attack indicators provide the pilot with a visual aid 
to prevent loss of control of the aircraft. Previously, cost and 
complexity of indicators limited their use to the military and 
commercial aircraft. FAA has streamlined the approval of angle-of-
attack indicators for general aviation aircraft and is working to 
promote the retrofit of the existing fleet. FAA is also streamlining 
the certification and installation of inflatable restraints with the 
goal of making all general aviation aircraft eligible for 
installation.[Footnote 51] Further, FAA is working with manufacturers 
to define equipage requirements and support the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen)--a new satellite-based air traffic 
management system that by 2025 will replace the current radar-based 
system--by streamlining the certification and installation of NextGen 
technologies. Some industry experts told us, however, that there might 
not be future opportunities to significantly improve general aviation 
safety with the aid of technology since most accidents are still 
attributed to pilot error. 

Conclusions: 

To further reduce the number of fatal general aviation accidents, FAA 
needs to effectively target its accident mitigations, as it is 
attempting to do through the GAJSC. The agency's ability to do so, 
however, is limited by a lack of pilot data. For instance, FAA does 
not maintain certain key information about general aviation pilots, 
including how many are actively flying each year and whether they 
participate in recurrent training other than FAA's own WINGS program. 
Without this information, FAA cannot determine the potential effect of 
the various sources and types of training on pilot behavior, 
competency, and the likelihood of an accident. The lack of pilot data 
also makes it difficult to identify the root causes of accidents 
attributed to pilot error and determine appropriate risk mitigation 
opportunities. 

The annual survey FAA uses for collecting general aviation flight-
activity data suffers from significant limitations--limitations that 
call into question the resulting activity estimates FAA produces as 
well as the accident rates calculated by NTSB. Though FAA has improved 
the survey over the years, our concerns remain because the survey 
continues to experience response rates below 50 percent and relies on 
the record-keeping habits and memories of survey respondents who 
sometimes have to recall details that occurred more than 12 months 
earlier. Further, other methods for obtaining general aviation flight-
activity data have encountered resistance from the industry. Without a 
more accurate reporting of general aviation flight activity, such as 
requiring the reporting of flight hours at certain intervals--e.g., 
during registration renewals or annual maintenance inspections--FAA 
lacks assurance that it is basing its policy decisions on a true 
measure of general aviation trends, and NTSB lacks assurance that its 
calculations of accident and fatality rates accurately represent the 
state of general aviation safety. 

Given the diversity of the general aviation community--illustrated, 
for example by the wide variety of aircraft in the fleet and the 
varying nonfatal and fatal accident rates among the general aviation 
segments, the adoption of a singular agency goal--a 10 percent 
reduction in the general aviation fatal accident rate per 100,000 
flight hours by 2018 is not the most effective risk-based tool for 
achieving general aviation safety gains. The goal does not take into 
account the variety of general aviation operations or the risks 
associated with each. For example, one hour flown during a personal 
operation is not the same as one hour flown during a corporate 
operation. Also, economic conditions affect each segment differently, 
making it difficult to discern if a change in the accident rate is an 
indication of a change in the safety of the industry. If the goal is 
reached, the overall success might mask ongoing safety issues in one 
or more segments of the community. 

FAA officials have indicated that the success of the 5-year strategy--
which is composed of numerous initiatives--will be measured through 
changes in the general aviation fatal accident rate. However, 
successful results-oriented organizations measure their performance at 
each organizational level by developing performance measures. For this 
reason, we think it is important for FAA to develop performance 
measures for the significant initiatives underlying the 5-year 
strategy. This is important because if FAA does not measure the 
performance of the significant underlying initiatives, it will not be 
able to determine whether the initiatives were effective in their own 
right. In addition, in order for the FAASTeam to be successful in its 
promotion of the 5-year strategy, it must be well respected within the 
general aviation community. We are not making a recommendation 
regarding the FAASTeam at this time since plans for restructuring it 
are in flux and its volunteer force realignment is not scheduled to 
begin until 2013. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance FAA's efforts to improve general aviation safety, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA 
Administrator to take the following four actions: 

* To expand the data available for root cause analyses of general 
aviation accidents and other purposes, collect and maintain data on 
each certificated pilot's recurrent training, and update the data at 
regular intervals. 

* Improve measures of general aviation activity by requiring the 
collection of the number of hours that general aviation aircraft fly 
over a period of time (flight hours). FAA should explore ways to do 
this that minimize the impact on the general aviation community, such 
as by collecting the data at regular events (e.g., during registration 
renewals or at annual maintenance inspections) that are already 
required. 

* To ensure that ongoing safety issues are addressed, set specific 
general aviation safety improvement goals--such as targets for fatal 
accident reductions--for individual industry segments using a data-
driven, risk management approach. 

* To determine whether the programs and activities underlying the 5-
year strategy are successful and if additional actions are needed, 
develop performance measures for each significant program and activity 
underlying the 5-year strategy. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided the Department of Transportation (DOT) with a draft of 
this report for review and comment. DOT officials agreed to consider 
our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of NTSB, and 
interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge 
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix II. 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Our objective was to conduct a comprehensive review of general 
aviation safety. To do so, we addressed the following questions: (1) 
what are the characteristics and trends in general aviation accidents 
from 1999 to 2011 and (2) what actions have been taken by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve general aviation safety? 

To identify the characteristics of and trends in general aviation 
accidents, we conducted a data analysis using the National 
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database. We 
limited our analysis to accidents involving airplanes operating under 
Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations that occurred from January 
1, 1999, through December 31, 2011, in the U.S. We excluded accidents 
that occurred in U.S. territories, possessions, and international 
waters. To assess the reliability of the NTSB data, we reviewed 
documentation on data collection efforts and quality assurance 
processes, talked to knowledgeable NTSB officials about the data, and 
checked the data for completeness and reasonableness. We determined 
that these data were sufficiently reliable for the descriptive and 
comparative analyses used in this report. To supplement our analysis 
of the NTSB accident data, we also analyzed FAA's general aviation 
flight-hour estimates for 1999 through 2010 and estimated active pilot 
data for 2011. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed 
documentation on data collection efforts and quality assurance 
processes and talked to knowledgeable FAA officials. In assessing the 
reliability of the flight-hour estimates, we also spoke with the 
contractors responsible for executing the survey that yielded these 
estimates, the General Aviation and Part 135 Survey. We determined 
that the flight-hour data and the active pilot data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this engagement. Specifically, these data 
elements were sufficiently reliable to provide meaningful context for 
the numbers and characteristics of accidents that we report. However, 
we also determined that because of the methodological limitations 
identified--a low response rate and the potential for nonresponse bias-
-the flight-hour estimates developed from the General Aviation and 
Part 135 Survey may not have the precision necessary to measure small 
changes in the general aviation accident rate over time. 

To identify actions FAA and others have taken to improve general 
aviation safety, we reviewed our prior reports as well as documents 
and reports from FAA, NTSB, NASA, and general aviation industry trade 
and other groups, including the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
(AOPA), the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), and the Society 
of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE); FAA orders, notices, advisory 
circulars; and applicable laws and regulations. We also determined the 
roles and responsibilities of FAA and NTSB in collecting and reporting 
general aviation safety data. In addition to interviewing officials 
from the various FAA offices and divisions responsible for general 
aviation safety, we interviewed aviation experts affiliated with 
various aviation industry organizations. (See table 4.) 

Table 4: Aviation Industry Organizations Interviewed for This Study: 

Aviation technology developer: 
Garmin. 

Educational organization: 
Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE). 

Employee organization: 
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS). 

Trade groups: 
Aviation Insurance Association (AIA); 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA); 
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA); 
General Aviation Manufacturer's Association (GAMA); 
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA). 

Universities: 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; 
Wichita State University. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

To obtain additional insight into the general aviation industry, we 
attended the September 2011 AOPA Aviation Summit in Hartford, 
Connecticut; the March 2012 Annual FAA Aviation Forecast Conference in 
Washington, D.C.; the February 2012 Northwest Aviation Conference in 
Puyallup, Washington; and the June 2012 NTSB General Aviation Forum in 
Washington, D.C. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 
important contributions to this report: H. Brandon Haller, Assistant 
Director; Pamela Vines; Jessica Wintfeld; Russ Burnett; Bert Japikse; 
Delwen Jones; Josh Ormond; and Jeff Tessin. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] An aviation accident, as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 830.2, occurs when 
in the course of the operation of an aircraft--between the time anyone 
boards with the intention of flight and until the last person 
disembarks--any person suffers death or serious injury or the aircraft 
receives substantial damage. With certain exceptions, substantial 
damage means damage or failure that adversely affects the structural 
strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and 
that would normally require major repair or replacement of the 
affected component. 

[2] We did not include incidents--defined as occurrences other than 
accidents associated with the operation of aircraft which could have 
affected operational safety--in this study because reporting of 
nonserious incidents is not mandatory. As such, there is not a 
reliably comprehensive database of incidents to analyze. 

[3] See GAO, General Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related 
Infrastructure, and Safety Issues, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-916] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 
2001); Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls Are Needed 
to Improve FAA Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-117] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 
2011); and Aviation Safety: FAA Is Taking Steps to Improve Data, but 
Challenges for Managing Safety Risks Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-660T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 
2012). 

[4] FAA, Part 23--Small Airplane Certification Process Study, July 
2009. 

[5] In order to qualify for an experimental certificate for an amateur-
built aircraft, the builder must fabricate and assemble a major 
portion--or 51 percent--of it. The builder can hire others to complete 
the remainder of the tasks. 

[6] In addition to those granted to experimental aircraft, there are 
several other categories of "special" airworthiness certificates. (14 
C.F.R. § 21.175(b)). Included among these are two certificate 
categories for light sport aircraft, which are simple, small, 
lightweight (less than 1,320 pounds for land-based aircraft), low-
performance aircraft. The experimental light sport aircraft category 
includes kit-built versions and special light-sport aircraft that are 
re-certificated as experimental. The special light-sport aircraft 
category is for light sport aircraft manufactured according to an 
industry consensus standard rather than a type certificate. 14 C.F.R. 
§ 1.1. 

[7] Federal Aviation Regulations under which general aviation 
operations are flown include 14 C.F.R. part 91 (general operating and 
flight rules), part 125 (privately operated aircraft with seating 
capacity of 20 or more or maximum payload capacity of 6,000 lbs. or 
more), part 133 (rotorcraft external load operations), and part 137 
(agricultural operations). FAA includes some part 135 operations (on-
demand) as well as parts 133 and137 and public aircraft in its 
tracking of the general aviation fatal accident rate. 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-117]. Our 
definition of flight-instructor based schools includes individual 
flight instructors. 

[9] Medical certificates are issued by FAA-designated aviation medical 
examiners following a physical examination of the applicant. The class 
of medical certificate required and the length of validity depend on 
the operation that pilot is flying and the age of the pilot. For 
pilots exercising sport pilot privileges, a valid U.S. driver's 
license is required in place of a medical certificate. 

[10] There are separate certifications for rotorcraft (helicopter) and 
glider pilots. These certifications are not included in this estimate. 

[11] Type clubs are organizations formed around a particular type of 
aircraft. Type clubs may host discussion forums, publish magazines, 
and keep libraries of technical information. Some type clubs have also 
developed specialized training courses and voluntary inspection 
programs for various systems or entire aircraft types. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-916]. 

[13] As previously mentioned, we limited our data analysis for this 
report to accidents involving airplanes flying under Part 91. These 
aircraft accounted for 88 percent of all general aviation accidents 
from 1999 through 2011. 

[14] Large and turbine-powered multiengine airplanes have additional 
equipment and operating requirements as described in 14 C.F.R. Pts. 91 
Subpart F and 61. 

[15] These numbers exclude single-engine piston airplanes that are 
classified as E-ABs. 

[16] Air Safety Institute, The 2010 Joseph T. Nall Report of Accident 
Trends and Factors, Frederick, MD. As previously noted, most E-ABs are 
simple aircraft that may incorporate previously untested systems and 
modified airframes and instruments. They are also used primarily for 
short personal flights, which means more take-offs and landings. 

[17] NTSB, The Safety of Experimental Amateur-Built Aircraft, NTSB/SS-
12/01, Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2012. 

[18] 2010 is the most recent year for which estimated flight hours are 
available. 

[19] We understand that E-ABs are not, strictly speaking, an airplane 
type but that they represent a type of airworthiness certificate. 

[20] In 2007, NTSB undertook an effort to align its categories of 
accident causes with internationally recognized standards. As such, in 
2008 NTSB created a new organizational structure for this information 
within its database. According to an expert at NTSB, it would be 
inappropriate to try to apply the new cause coding to accidents 
investigated before the changes were made. As a result, our analysis 
of the accident causes only includes those that are classified under 
the new structure. 

[21] In some instances, there was more than one pilot associated with 
an airplane. Since we were unable to determine from the data which 
pilot was in control of the aircraft at the time of the incident, we 
included data on all pilots involved in the accident in this and 
subsequent analyses regarding pilot characteristics or experience. 

[22] Forty-three percent of pilots with airline transport pilot 
certificates that were involved in fatal accidents were determined to 
be a cause of the accident. 

[23] The WINGS pilot proficiency program is an internet-based program 
open to any active pilot; it focuses on activities and tasks that 
address the causal factors of accidents. 

[24] The investigation of the February 2009 Colgan Air crash near 
Buffalo, New York, identified aspects of training as safety issues 
associated with the crash. 

[25] We and others, including SAFE, have previously found that the 
current pilot -training paradigm focuses on rote memorization and on 
the execution of stick and rudder skills and does not emphasize the 
importance of cockpit management, which can prevent accidents, 
according to stakeholders. For instance, according to FAA and other 
stakeholders, the regulations regarding ground school and flight 
training, as well as the test standards for a commercial pilot 
certificate, generally emphasize the mastery of maneuvers and 
individual tasks to determine competence. The emphasis is on the 
development of motor skills to satisfactorily accomplish individual 
maneuvers--whereas only limited emphasis is placed on aeronautical 
decision making. 

[26] The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension 
Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-216, § 203, 124 Stat. 2348, 2352 (2010)) 
required that FAA develop a centralized pilot records database that 
air carriers must access to review pilot qualifications and past 
performance data before hiring pilots. According to the Department of 
Transportation Inspector General (IG), FAA met the act's initial 
milestone in developing a centralized electronic pilot-records 
database that will include records previously maintained by air 
carriers. However, the IG indicated that FAA needs to address the 
level of detail that should be captured from air carrier pilot-
training records--such as determining whether recurrent flight 
training will be included, how to transition from the current 
practices to the new database without disrupting information flow, and 
how to ensure the reliability of data. 

[27] Most surveys experience some degree of nonresponse, which gives 
rise to the concern that the respondents might differ from 
nonrespondents in such a way that the results of the survey might be 
biased. When response rates are low, researchers often conduct a 
nonresponse bias analysis, in which respondents and nonrespondents are 
compared using information that is available about the nonrespondents. 
In this case, little information was available about the 
nonrespondents, and the contractor was only able to compare 
respondents and nonrespondents with respect to aircraft type and 
aircraft age. Lack of information about other characteristics of 
nonrespondents made it impossible to test for other possible 
differences between the two groups. 

[28] Hypothetically speaking, perhaps older owners fly more than 
younger ones and are also more likely to respond to the survey. Even 
if the survey collected information about age, there is no 
corresponding information available for nonrespondents. As a result, 
the survey contractor would have no way of detecting that older owners 
are responding at a higher rate and biasing the flight-hour estimates 
upward. 

[29] AC-90-109, Airmen Transition to Experimental or Unfamiliar 
Airplanes, Mar. 30. 2011. 

[30] Prior to 2009, FAA set an annual goal of the number of fatal 
general aviation accidents not to exceed. Critics of this approach 
noted that this goal did not account for exposure and that accident 
numbers would decrease if general aviation activity decreased. In 
response to these concerns, FAA shifted to a rate-based goal. 

[31] The results of the survey used to estimate general aviation 
flight hours are generally released in the fall for the previous 
calendar year. The 2011 estimates have not yet been released. 

[32] The GAJSC's early efforts focused on enhancing aeronautical 
decision making, promoting runway safety, and reducing weather-related 
accidents, and its work was conducted through three subgroups--
personal/sport aviation, technically advanced aircraft/automation, and 
turbine aircraft operations. In addition, the General Aviation Data 
Improvement Team oversaw the annual general aviation activity survey 
and analyzed accident data. Early GAJSC work resulted in the 
development of guidance and training, such as the Air Safety 
Foundation's WeatherWise Safety Seminar. The GAJSC, according to FAA 
officials, has floundered in the past but still produced good 
information and contributed to enhanced safety; however, its prior 
efforts were topic driven and based more on expert opinion than on 
data analysis. 

[33] Industry members of the GAJSC include AOPA, EAA, GAMA, and NBAA. 

[34] Safer Skies, which FAA announced in 1998, was a major initiative 
to reduce the number of fatal aviation accidents per million flight 
hours by 2007. 

[35] CAST is a joint government-industry effort to reduce the 
commercial aviation fatality risk in the United States using an 
integrated, data-driven strategy. According to CAST, its work--along 
with new aircraft, regulations, and other activities--reduced the 
commercial aviation fatal accident rate by 83 percent from 1998 to 
2008 and is an important aspect of FAA's efforts to improve aviation 
safety by sharing and analyzing data. 

[36] These accident flights were conducted under 14 C.F.R. Pts. 91, 
137, and 135 (unscheduled). The analysis also included public use 
flights and flights with an unknown flight operation code. 

[37] Because of a lack of accidents, the turbine engine group analyzed 
28 accidents and 2 serious incidents. 

[38] However, because most of the agricultural accidents reviewed were 
survivable and two industry groups focused on helicopter safety 
already had strong safety programs in place, FAA decided to forgo 
concentration on the agricultural sector of general aviation. 

[39] FAA Order 8000.83. 

[40] The Aviation Accreditation Board International is a nonprofit 
organization that sets standards for all aerospace programs taught in 
colleges and universities worldwide. 

[41] An aviation rulemaking committee is an informal committee 
established through the FAA Administrator to allow industry's 
participation in providing recommendations to the rulemaking process. 
Participants are invited by FAA to the designated rulemaking committee. 

 

[42] As a result of its May 2011 pilot training reform symposium, SAFE 
made six broad recommendations addressing safety, industry growth, 
doctrine, standards, curricula, and aviation educators. For example, 
SAFE recommended that FAA doctrine and standards be revised to 
implement scenario-based training, risk management, and other higher 
order pilot skills. 

[43] We reported on pilot training in November 2011. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-117]. 

[44] AC 61-83G, Nationally Scheduled FAA-Approved Industry-Conducted 
Flight Instructor Refresher Course, Sept. 30, 2011. 

[45] Pilots who participate in and satisfactorily complete a current 
phase of the WINGS program can credit satisfactory completion to meet 
the biennial flight review requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(e). 

[46] Performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring of 
accomplishments, particularly progress toward established goals. 

[47] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[48] An SMS is a data-driven, risk-based safety approach that involves 
establishing the necessary organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies, and procedures. We published a report in 
September 2012 on our assessment of FAA's shift to SMS. See Aviation 
Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk Management, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-898] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 12, 2012). 

[49] The following universities comprise CGAR: Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University (administrator), University of Alaska, 
University of North Dakota, and Wichita State University. Florida A&M 
and Middle Tennessee State Universities are affiliates. FAA announced 
on September 27, 2012, that it had selected a team of universities to 
lead a new Center of Excellence for general aviation since CGAR has 
nearly completed its 10-year term. The new group, called the 
Partnership to Enhance General Aviation Safety, Accessibility and 
Sustainability (PEGASAS), will be led by Purdue, Ohio State, and 
Georgia Tech. The core team will also include the Florida Institute of 
Technology, Iowa State University, and Texas A&M. There are an 
additional 10 affiliate universities. 

[50] Visual flight rules govern the procedures for conducting flight 
under visual conditions, as opposed to instrument flight rules, which 
govern the procedures for conducting flights using instruments. 

[51] In a January 2011 report, NTSB concluded that aviation airbags 
can mitigate occupant injuries in severe but survivable crashes in 
which the principal direction of force is longitudinal. NTSB made 
several recommendations to FAA to enhance the safety of and 
information about airbag use in aircraft. See NTSB, Airbag Performance 
in General Aviation Restraint Systems, NTSB/SS-11/01, Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 11, 2011. 

[End of section] 

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