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entitled 'Warfighter Support: DOD Should Improve Development of 
Camouflage Uniforms and Enhance Collaboration Among the Services' 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

September 2012: 

Warfighter Support: 

DOD Should Improve Development of Camouflage Uniforms and Enhance 
Collaboration Among the Services: 

GAO-12-707: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-707, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2002, the military services have introduced seven new camouflage 
uniforms with varying patterns and colors-—two desert, two woodland, 
and three universal. In addition, the Army is developing new uniform 
options and estimates it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to 
replace its current uniform and associated protective gear. GAO was 
asked to review the services’ development of new camouflage uniforms. 
This report addresses: 1) the extent to which DOD guidance provides a 
consistent decision process to ensure new camouflage uniforms meet 
operational requirements and 2) the extent to which the services have 
used a joint approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent 
protection and manage costs. To do this, GAO reviewed DOD, Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO acquisition guidance and key 
practices, statutory requirements and policies, interviewed defense 
officials, and collected and analyzed records about uniform 
development. 

What GAO Found: 

The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether 
and how to apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for 
their uniform development and they varied in their usage of that 
guidance. As a result, the services had fragmented procedures for 
managing their uniform development programs, and did not consistently 
develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO identified two key elements 
that are essential for producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: 
1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented 
consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make 
decisions, such as credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine 
Corps followed these two key elements to produce a successful outcome, 
and developed a uniform that met its requirements. By contrast, two 
other services, the Army and Air Force, did not follow the two key 
elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet mission 
requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from 
DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based 
approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined 
approach to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet 
operational needs. 

The military services’ fragmented approach for acquiring uniforms has 
not ensured the development of joint criteria for new uniforms or 
achieved cost efficiency. DOD has not met a statutory requirement to 
establish joint criteria for future uniforms or taken steps to ensure 
that uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection 
for service members, and the services have not pursued opportunities 
to seek to reduce clothing costs, such as by collaborating on uniform 
inventory costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010 required the military departments to establish joint 
criteria for future ground combat uniforms. The departments asked the 
Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to develop the joint 
criteria, but the task is incomplete. If the services do not use joint 
criteria to guide their activities, one or more service may develop 
uniforms without certainty that the uniforms include the newest 
technology, advanced materials or designs, and meet an acceptable 
level of performance. Further, DOD does not have a means to ensure 
that the services meet statutory policy permitting the development of 
service-unique uniforms as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent 
practicable, provide service members the equivalent levels of 
performance and protection and minimize the risk to individuals 
operating in the joint battle space. Without a policy to ensure that 
services develop and field uniforms with equivalent performance and 
protection, the services could fall short of protecting all service 
members equally, potentially exposing a number to unnecessary risks. 
Finally, the services may have opportunities for partnerships to 
reduce inventory costs for new uniforms. The Army may be able to save 
about $82 million if it can partner with another service. Under DOD 
guidance, the services are encouraged to actively seek to reduce 
costs. The Air Force has shown interest in the Army’s current uniform 
development, but none of the services has agreed to partner with the 
Army on a new uniform. In the absence of a DOD requirement that the 
services collaborate to standardize the development and introduction 
of camouflage uniforms, the services may forego millions of dollars in 
potential cost savings. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take four actions to improve the development 
of camouflage uniforms and enhance collaboration among the services: 
ensure that the services have and use clear policies and procedures 
and a knowledge-based approach, establish joint criteria, develop 
policy to ensure equivalent protection levels, and pursue partnerships 
where applicable to help reduce costs. DOD concurred with GAO’s 
recommendations and identified planned actions. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-707]. For more 
information, contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 
russellc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Military Services Have Not Used a Consistent Decision-Making Process 
to Produce Effective Camouflage Uniforms: 

Military Services' Fragmented Approach to Developing Uniforms Has 
Resulted in Inconsistent Protection for Service Members and No 
Collaboration to Reduce Costs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat Uniforms: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Services' Camouflage Uniforms, Dates of Initiation and 
Fielding, and Development Costs: 

Figure 2: Services' Flame Resistant Uniforms, Dates of Initiation, and 
Development Costs: 

Abbreviations: 

ABU: Airman Battle Uniform: 

ABE: Airman Battle Ensemble: 

ABS-G: Airman Battle System-Ground: 

ACU: Army Combat Uniform: 

AT&L: Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: 

BDU: Battle Dress Uniform: 

DCU: Desert Combat Uniform: 

DLA: Defense Logistics Agency: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FR ACU: Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform: 

FROG: Flame Resistant Organizational Gear: 

IED: Improvised Explosive Device: 

MARPAT: Marine Corps Pattern: 

MCCUU: Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform: 

MDA: Milestone Decision Authority: 

MP-ICE: Program Manager-Infantry Combat Equipment: 

OCP: Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

PEO: Program Executive Office: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 28, 2012: 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kelly Ayotte:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard Burr:
United States Senate: 

The military services spent about $300 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to 
procure new camouflage uniforms. The primary goal of camouflage is to 
reduce vulnerability of forces to detection in combat; however, over 
time the services also have chosen camouflage patterns that are 
service specific and distinguish one service from another. Since 2002, 
the services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with 
varying patterns and colors--two desert, two woodland, and three 
universal.[Footnote 1] In addition, each service has introduced a 
service-specific flame-resistant uniform in response to urgent 
warfighter needs. Most of the services' new camouflage patterns and 
colors replaced two Army-developed camouflage patterns that all 
military services were using.[Footnote 2] Specifically, the services 
replaced the Army's four-color woodland camouflage pattern developed 
in 1981, known as the Battle Dress Uniform or Combat Utility Uniform, 
and its three-color desert camouflage pattern developed in early 1990 
and known as the Desert Camouflage Uniform. Further, as part of the 
Army's ongoing camouflage study, the office responsible for uniforms, 
Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, plans to present the results 
of its camouflage testing to senior leadership by the end of December 
2012 on future uniform options. If the Army selects a new uniform, 
officials estimated that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to 
replace a new camouflage uniform and associated protective gear for 
the entire service. 

In May 2010, we reported on the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of 
ground combat uniforms in response to a mandate in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.[Footnote 3] We 
reported that combat uniform performance standards developed by some 
of the services were not related to specific combat environments; the 
introduction of flame-resistant fabric, insect repellent treatment, 
and the increased pace of operations in Afghanistan accounted for 
increases in uniform production and procurement costs; and government-
owned patents on elements of the Marine Corps' uniforms presented no 
legal barrier to allowing other services to use these elements. In 
June 2011, we reported on matters related to the supply of flame 
resistant fibers for the production of military uniforms.[Footnote 4] 
In response to your request, this report addresses 1) the extent to 
which DOD guidance provides a consistent decision process to ensure 
new camouflage uniforms meet operational requirements and 2) the 
extent to which the services have used a joint approach to develop 
criteria, ensure equivalent protection, and manage costs. 

To determine the extent to which DOD guidance ensures the services 
follow a consistent decision process to guide the development and 
acquisition of their camouflage uniforms, we reviewed key guidance and 
service decision-making processes. We reviewed key practices for 
federal acquisitions that are included in the Office of Management and 
Budget's (OMB) guidelines and GAO's framework for assessing 
acquisition functions.[Footnote 5] We compared OMB's and GAO's key 
elements for acquisitions with the decision processes used by the 
services, and we identified two elements that are essential for 
agencies to follow to produce successful outcomes and were applicable 
to uniform-development programs. The two elements are clear policies 
and procedures that are implemented consistently and a knowledge-based 
approach that includes meaningful data to determine whether a product 
will meet customer requirements. Additionally, we interviewed relevant 
DOD and military service officials, including military service 
officials responsible for the management of uniform development and 
acquisition policy. Further, we interviewed officials from the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics about the relevance and flexibility of DOD's acquisition 
guidance and how the services used this or other guidance in their 
development decisions. We visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
and Navy offices responsible for managing the development or 
acquisition of its camouflage uniforms and gathered and analyzed data 
on the use of policies to support their decision processes and the 
testing or cost data that guided decisions during the development of 
their camouflage uniforms. 

To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint 
approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage 
costs, we reviewed requirements and policies found in DOD guidance and 
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 
[Footnote 6] We also reviewed data and interviewed officials from the 
military services and members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles 
Governance Board to determine if the services had established criteria 
for camouflage uniforms using a joint approach. In addition, we 
assessed information from DOD about how DOD officials plan to meet the 
statutory policy permitting future uniforms to uniquely reflect the 
identity of the individual services, as long as they provide 
equivalent levels of performance and protection to the maximum extent 
practicable. Finally, we reviewed guidance and interviewed officials 
with the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office to assess how 
they encourage the services to jointly reduce development and 
acquisition costs. Our detailed scope and methodology appears in 
Appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to September 
2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Military Services' Camouflage Uniforms: 

Each service has introduced at least one new uniform into inventory in 
the last 10 years. Prior to 2002, all four military services were 
using the Army's Battle Dress and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, 
since that time each of the services (including the Army) has 
developed new uniforms to address deficiencies that they identified 
with the existing Army uniforms. Improvements incorporated into the 
design of the services' new uniforms include improved visual or near-
infrared capabilities for concealment and improved fabric technology. 
Additionally, each service introduced a service-specific flame 
resistant uniform in response to urgent need requests. For additional 
information on the development of flame resistant uniforms by the 
services, see appendix II. The services also expected the new uniforms 
to provide other benefits, such as a unique appearance to increase the 
morale of personnel and aid in recruitment. Figure 1 provides 
additional information on the development of the services' uniforms 
and is followed by a description of each service's development 
activities. 

Figure 1: Services' Camouflage Uniforms, Dates of Initiation and 
Fielding, and Development Costs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

2002: 
Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU): 
[Images of Desert and Woodland models] 
Marine Corps: 
* Initiated: April 2000; 
* Fielded: June 2002; 
* Development cost: $319,000. 

2005: 
Army Combat Uniform (ACU): 
[Image of Universal model] 
Army: 
* Initiated: January 2003; 
* Fielded: February 2005; 
* Development cost: $32 million. 

2007: 
Airman Battle Uniform (ABU): 
[Image of Universal model]  
Air Force: 
* Initiated: October 2002; 
* Fielded January 2007; 
* Development cost: $3.1 million. 

2010: 
Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP): 
[Image of Transitional model]  
Army: 
* Initiated: September 2009; 
* Fielded July 2010; 
* Development cost: $3.4 million. 

2011: 
Navy Working Uniform Type II (desert)/Type III (woodland): 
[Images of Desert and Woodland models] 
Navy: 
* Initiated: March 2006; 
* Type II fielded: February 2011; 
* Type III fielded: September 2011; 
* Development cost: $435,000. 

2012: 
Army Camouflage Study: 
Under Development: Desert, Traditional, Woodland models; 
Army: 
* Initiated: February 2010    
* Fielded: Currently under development (decision by December 2012); 
* Development cost through 2011: $2 million. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Marine Corps: 

In April 2000, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed the 
development and fielding of a new Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform 
(MCCUU). The requirements of the new uniform, developed under the 
decision-making authority of the Commander of the Marine Corps System 
Command, were to provide Marines with a uniform that increased 
durability and combat utility compared to the current uniform, provide 
commanders versatility for a variety of missions, and be uniquely 
Marine. The Marine Corps spent $319,000 to develop the MCCUU, and 
began fielding its new uniforms in June 2002. 

Army: 

Development of the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) began in January 2003 in 
response to a need for a combat uniform with greater operational 
utility. Under the decision authority of the Chief of Staff, the new 
uniform included requirements to improve visual or near-infrared 
capabilities, to improve morale, and to provide a universal camouflage 
pattern with acceptable levels of performance in woodland, desert, and 
urban terrains. The Army spent about $3.2 million to develop the ACU 
in the universal camouflage pattern and began fielding its new uniform 
in February 2005. 

In 2009, based on concerns from soldiers in Afghanistan, a 
congressional conference committee directed DOD to take immediate 
action to provide personnel deployed to Afghanistan with a camouflage 
pattern that was suited to that environment.[Footnote 7] The 
conference committee further directed the Secretary of the Army to 
provide a report on the program plans and budgetary adjustments 
necessary to provide appropriate uniforms to deployed and deploying 
troops to Afghanistan. In response, the Army developed the Operation 
Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP) to address current 
camouflage requirements and initiated a study of camouflage for future 
uniforms. The Army spent about $3.4 million to develop the OCP and 
began fielding the uniform in July 2010. As part of its study of 
camouflage, the Army is reviewing camouflage to identify three color 
variations--desert, woodland, and transitional[Footnote 8]--as future 
uniform options. Additionally, the study will identify one camouflage 
pattern for protective gear that blends well with all three uniforms. 
By the end of December 2012, the Army plans to brief senior Army 
leadership on the results of its study. The Army spent about $2 
million through Fiscal Year 2011 on the development of these uniforms, 
and reported in February 2012 that it expects to spend an additional 
$5 million on development costs through Fiscal Year 2017. If the Army 
chooses a new camouflage uniform, officials estimate that it may cost 
up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace its uniform and related 
protective gear. 

Air Force: 

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force in October 2002 initiated a 
research and development project to field a new uniform. The objective 
was to design a distinctive uniform that--compared to the current Army 
Battle Dress Uniform (BDU)--provided a better fit, and was also easier 
and less costly to maintain.[Footnote 9] According to officials, the 
program was conducted under the authority of the Chief of Staff. The 
Air Force spent about $3.2 million on the development of the Airman 
Battle Uniform (ABU) and began fielding its new uniform in January 
2007. 

Navy: 

In 2006, as part of a broader review of Navy uniforms, the Chief of 
Naval Operations announced approval of a concept for new desert and 
woodland[Footnote 10] uniforms for Navy ground forces.[Footnote 11] In 
2009, the Chief of Naval Operations received approval from Special 
Operations Command to use camouflage patterns, developed by Naval 
Special Warfare Command,[Footnote 12] for the Navy's new Type II 
desert and Type III woodland uniforms. The Commander, Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command, oversaw the $435,000 spent by the Navy on the 
final design of its two new camouflage uniforms. The Navy began 
fielding its Type II desert uniform in February 2011 and its Type III 
woodland uniform in September 2011. 

DOD Policies: 

DOD's acquisition guidance, collectively referred to as the 5000 
series,[Footnote 13] provides management principles, policies, and 
procedures to establish and manage acquisition programs and to help to 
manage the nation's investments in technologies, programs, and 
products. The primary objective of defense acquisition is to acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements 
to mission capability and operational support, and to do so in a 
timely manner and at a fair and reasonable price. The military 
departments have issued guidance to implement the DOD guidance. 
[Footnote 14] According to DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense 
Acquisition System, an acquisition program is a directed, funded 
effort that provides a new, improved or continuing materiel, weapon or 
information system, or service capability in response to an approved 
need. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, establishes a flexible management framework for translating 
capability needs and technology opportunities into acquisition 
programs. 

In addition, the instruction identifies specific statutory and 
regulatory reports and information--such as an acquisition strategy, 
cost estimates, test and evaluation activities, and risk assessments 
throughout the process to support decisions from design to production. 
[Footnote 15] A key tenet of the guidance is that it provides the 
approving official, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), with the 
discretion to structure the activities and reporting requirements of 
the acquisition process as appropriate and consistent with statutory 
and regulatory requirements to achieve performance, schedule, and cost 
goals. 

Under another DOD Regulation, DOD 4140.1-R, DOD provides guidance on 
the development to the delivery of items, and on the key practices in 
materiel management within DOD's supply chain framework.[Footnote 16] 
For uniforms and other clothing and textiles, the regulation includes 
procedures on coordination of research and testing activities. It also 
encourages DOD components to actively seek to reduce costs by 
standardizing basic materials and accessories, such as new clothing 
items,[Footnote 17] and provides information on costs to introduce a 
new uniform into inventory. According to Defense Logistics Agency 
policy, an initial inventory fee could apply to new items when the 
cost of introducing a replacement item into inventory is greater than 
10 percent of the cost of the item being replaced or when a new item 
is introduced by an individual organization.[Footnote 18] The initial 
inventory fee, charged by the Defense Logistics Agency, covers the 
cost of acquiring initial inventory of seven months of the new 
clothing and the cost of the remaining inventory being replaced. 

Also, DOD issued Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and 
Textiles (Class II), in August 2008, in part to prescribe authority, 
policy, and responsibilities for the management of clothing and 
textiles in peacetime and across the spectrum of military operations. 
[Footnote 19] The instruction directed the establishment of the Joint 
Clothing and Textiles Governance Board and also made the Director of 
the Defense Logistics Agency responsible for ensuring collaboration 
and DOD-wide integration of clothing and textiles activities by 
establishing and chairing the board. The governance board includes 
representation from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Supply Chain Integration and logistics officials from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and the Defense Logistics 
Agency. 

DOD Instruction 4140.63 also describes responsibilities of various DOD 
entities in the development, management, and use of clothing and 
textiles. Clothing and textiles covered by the instruction include 
uniforms, other personal items, and organizational clothing and 
individual equipment that belong to the organization and not to the 
person using it. In addition, the instruction prescribes policy that 
the military departments maintain responsibility for the acquisition, 
funding, and fielding of new clothing and textiles in accordance with 
the management principles, policies, and procedures in DOD Directive 
5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System. Finally, Instruction 4140.63 
directs the military departments to coordinate operational 
requirements and sourcing with the Director of the Defense Logistics 
Agency to minimize duplication and redundancy. 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010: 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires 
the Secretaries of the military departments to establish joint 
criteria for future ground combat uniforms.[Footnote 20] According to 
the act, the joint criteria shall ensure that new technologies, 
advanced materials, and other advances in ground combat uniform design 
may be shared between the military services and are not precluded from 
being adapted for use by any military service due to service-specific 
proprietary arrangements. The act also established United States 
policy that the design and fielding of future ground combat uniforms 
may uniquely reflect the identities of the individual military 
services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, 
provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for members 
commensurate with their respective assigned combat missions and 
minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine 
operating in the joint battle space.[Footnote 21] 

Military Services Have Not Used a Consistent Decision-Making Process 
to Produce Effective Camouflage Uniforms: 

The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether 
and how to apply acquisition guidance for their uniform development, 
and varied in their use of the guidance. DOD provided no alternative 
or additional direction clarifying use of acquisition guidance or 
other guidance when developing ground combat uniforms. Consequently, 
the services used varying, fragmented processes for managing their 
uniform acquisition activities, which have not consistently ensured 
the development of effective camouflage uniforms. 

DOD, OMB and GAO Have Provided Guidance and Key Practices for 
Effective Acquisition Processes: 

DOD has provided policy, known as the 5000 series, which is designed 
to offer the services a flexible management framework for translating 
capability needs and technology opportunities into stable, affordable, 
and well-managed acquisition programs. In the context of their uniform 
development activities, the services varied in their views as to the 
applicability of the 5000 series. For example, the Air Force did not 
view its uniform development and fielding activities as an acquisition 
program, although it may do so in the future as a consequence of the 
policy contained in DOD Instruction 4140.63.[Footnote 22] The services 
also varied in their usage of the acquisition guidance where they 
determined that it applied. Under the guidance, the milestone decision 
authority may tailor the regulatory information requirements and 
acquisition process to achieve cost, schedule, and performance goals, 
where consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. 
Generally, due to statutory and regulatory requirements, higher-cost 
acquisition programs have greater information, reporting, and 
procedural requirements than lower-cost programs. Accordingly, since 
milestone decision authorities that manage lower-cost programs 
generally have fewer statutory or regulatory requirements to 
implement, they often have greater flexibility to tailor the guidance. 
Due to the flexibility allowed in DOD's acquisition guidance and 
varied views as to its applicability to uniform development programs, 
we also evaluated key practices in the Office of Management and 
Budget's guidance to federal acquisition officers on steps to take to 
assess and achieve efficient and effective acquisition functions. 
OMB's guidance noted that it was adopting key practices that we 
reported in 2005, which listed a framework of cornerstones and 
elements for an effective acquisition function.[Footnote 23] 

Specifically, for this review we identified two elements from the OMB 
and GAO guidance that we considered essential for agencies to follow 
to produce successful outcomes because the two elements most closely 
relate to product development activities. The two elements are: clear 
policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and a 
knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful data to determine 
whether a product will meet customer requirements. We assessed whether 
three services--the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force--followed two key 
elements that OMB and GAO have determined are key practices for a 
decision-making process that produces successful outcomes, and to what 
extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements. We did 
not assess the Navy's decision process because it adopted uniforms 
developed by Naval Special Warfare Command rather than developing a 
new uniform. The development activities of special operation forces, 
such as the Naval Special Warfare Command, are outside the scope of 
this review. We were not requested to review the uniform program for 
special forces. 

Services Varied in their Decision-Making Processes for Acquisitions, 
and Two New Uniforms Did Not Meet Specific Mission Requirements: 

The services' decision-making processes for developing new uniforms 
are fragmented and vary in their effectiveness. The Marine Corps used 
a decision process that followed the two key elements that we 
identified as essential to produce a successful acquisition outcome, 
and produced a combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials have 
found effective. However, the Army and Air Force did not follow the 
two key elements, and they found that their new uniforms did not meet 
specific mission requirements. To meet combat requirements, both the 
Army and Air Force replaced their uniforms for personnel deployed to 
Afghanistan with the OCP uniform. 

Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and 
procedures for a knowledge-based approach to developing effective 
uniforms, some services may continue to lack assurance that they have 
a disciplined process that is capable of delivering uniforms that meet 
warfighter requirements. 

Marine Corps' Decision Process Used Elements Essential For a 
Successful Outcome: 

Marine Corps officials used a decision process that followed two key 
elements we found essential to produce a successful acquisition 
outcome, and produced a combat uniform that the Marine Corps officials 
have found effective and continues to meet Marines' needs. The Marine 
Corps officials used clear policies and procedures that were 
implemented consistently, and used a knowledge-based approach that 
included collection and use of meaningful data to determine whether a 
product will meet warfighter requirements. 

Regarding clear policies and procedures, according to officials, the 
Marine Corps used the flexible decision framework provided by then-
current versions of DOD's and the Secretary of the Navy's acquisition 
guidance to establish a process designed to ensure that its decisions 
would result in a camouflage uniform that met its requirements. 
[Footnote 24] In doing so, the Marine Corps developed a number of key 
documents as tools to support acquisition planning and decision 
making. For example, the Marine Corps developed documents to support 
decision making in the five areas described below. 

* Acquisition Strategy--First, officials used an acquisition strategy 
to highlight deficiencies in the service's current uniform and 
assessed methods for addressing the deficiencies. The service 
considered modifying the current uniform or buying a commercially 
available uniform, but concluded that the best approach was to begin a 
new development program that could rapidly test and evaluate 
prototypes of alternative designs that would meet Marine preferences 
obtained from field surveys and allow it to develop a unique uniform 
for the Marine Corps. Officials provided an action plan and key dates 
for developmental testing, testing of prototypes, field evaluations, 
production approval, contract award, first article testing, product 
verification, full production, initial issuance, and initial 
operational capability. Also, the strategy included contracting 
requirements and a phased fielding plan to test small lots of uniforms 
for a limited number of Marines before building up inventory to meet 
the needs of all Marines. 

* Acquisition Program Baseline--The Marine Corps developed an 
acquisition program baseline to seek and receive full funding for new 
uniforms, and to list performance, schedule, and cost parameters over 
the program's life cycle. 

* Risk Assessment--In preparing a risk assessment, the Marine Corps 
concluded that risk to cost, schedule, and performance would be low. 
The assessment included a 20-year life cycle cost estimate for the 
uniform. Further, the scheduled fielding of the uniform would be 
deliberately slow to build up inventory before changing over to the 
new uniform. The new uniforms were developed with Marine input both at 
the conceptual and developmental phases, and the uniforms were updated 
based on field input during the first phase of fielding. 

* Cost Estimate for Program's Life Cycle--The Marine Corps chose to 
prepare a life-cycle cost estimate for the program. Life-cycle costs 
include research and development, investment, operation and support, 
and disposal. The life-cycle cost analysis was used to assess program 
affordability and to support the review and oversight of cost 
estimates. Among various assumptions of costs, Marine Corps officials 
determined that the 2001 projections of the number of officer 
candidates and active and reserve recruits would remain constant 
throughout the 20-year life cycle. All told, the Marine Corps 
estimated that the 20-year life-cycle costs would be about $502 
million in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars. 

* Test and Evaluation Master Plan--The Marine Corps Systems Command 
created a plan to evaluate different camouflage patterns and colors. 
Marine Corps Systems Command and U.S. Army Soldier, Biological and 
Chemical Command, conducted testing and evaluation on camouflage 
technology and alternative uniform designs to determine which 
camouflage and elements of uniform design would meet user 
requirements. The plan also included field tests by approximately 450 
Marines to evaluate two designs of the new uniform for suitability for 
a number of mission-oriented tasks, such as helicopter and amphibious 
operations. The planned tests and evaluations were to determine 
durability, function, and preferred features. 

In addition, Marine Corps officials established a process that 
followed the federal key practice to use a knowledge-based approach 
that includes meaningful data to determine whether a product will meet 
customer requirements. A knowledge-based approach includes obtaining 
sufficient information about technology, design options, and 
production capabilities so that the product will be able to meet 
various requirements. In April 2000, according to documents, Marine 
Corps officials decided to replace the existing combat uniforms with 
new camouflage combat uniforms to increase durability and utility for 
combat over the current BDU and Desert Camouflage Uniform and to 
provide Marines with a unique and distinct combat uniform. 

As part of their knowledge-based approach during decision making, 
Marine Corps officials considered about 70 camouflage patterns, and 
Marine Corps test observers, who were assessing the effectiveness of 
the camouflage, narrowed the candidates to eight. The eight were 
narrowed to the top three performers, due to what Marine Corps 
officials described as patent issues. The Marine Corps chose four 
colors each for the patterns for woodland and desert environments 
based on discussions with camouflage experts. The Marine Corps 
Commandant reviewed the camouflage patterns and officials chose two 
camouflage patterns for further testing--Tiger Stripe and Canadian 
Disruptive Pattern (later named the Marine Corps Pattern or MARPAT). 
However, initial field testing showed that the Tiger Stripe was not an 
effective camouflage pattern. After other field tests with woodland 
and desert colored variations of the Marine Corps Pattern, Marine 
Corps officials determined that the Marine Corps Pattern had 
performance advantages over the Tiger-Stripe pattern when used in 
camouflage uniforms. On the 7-point scale, with 7 being the most 
effective camouflage, test observers gave average scores of 5.0 to the 
Marine Corps Pattern and 4.16 to the Tiger Stripe. In June 2001, the 
Commander of the Marine Corps Systems Command approved the MARPAT 
camouflage pattern for production and deployment of the new MCCUU 
uniform. 

During the field tests of the MCCUU, evaluators involved 284 Marines 
from Marine Expeditionary Forces for an average of 22 days in 2001. 
Wearers spent about 8 days in the field, and 14 days on base. The 
evaluation led by U.S. Army Soldier, Biological & Chemical Command, 
included the following results: 

* Fit and Comfort: 76 percent were satisfied with the fit of the 
blouse and 64 percent were satisfied with the fit of the trousers. 
Overall, wearers gave both clothing items 6.3 comfort ratings toward 
the maximum positive rating of 7. 

* Durability: 13 percent reported durability problems with the blouse, 
such as Velcro and snaps that did not hold or rips and tears. 25 
percent reported durability problems with the trousers, such as 
excessive wear and rips at the knees (mostly caused by field training). 

* Appearance: 98 percent stated the uniform generally was easy to care 
for and maintain, and about two-thirds of respondents stated that the 
uniform, after laundering, had creases that were sharp enough for 
garrison wear. 

* Mission Suitability: 97 percent stated the uniform was suitable for 
use in a tactical environment. 

As a result of the field testing, the service adopted the Marine Corps 
Pattern and uniform design in the production of its new camouflage 
uniforms. 

Army's Decision Process Did Not Use Elements Essential For a 
Successful Outcome: 

The Army used a decision process for the development of a new uniform 
that did not produce a successful outcome, and it had to replace that 
uniform in 2010. The Army did not consistently use clear policies and 
procedures or use a knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful 
data to determine whether the product would meet customer 
requirements. Our prior work has shown that the use of policies, 
procedures, and a knowledge-based approach is essential to produce 
successful outcomes.[Footnote 25] While the Army conducted some 
testing on camouflage patterns, it did not complete the testing before 
selecting a pattern. As a result, the Army developed a uniform that 
proved to provide ineffective concealment for operations in 
Afghanistan. 

According to officials and documentation, during the decision process 
to develop the Army Combat Uniform (ACU)--which ran from 2003 to 2005--
the Army used some elements of DOD's 5000-series policy and Army 
Regulation 70-1, which is the military department's implementing 
guidance. The Army identified the approval structure and decision 
maker for its development activities. However, the Army did not follow 
the 5000-series policy or establish alternate policies and procedures 
on reporting of testing, performance, and risk to the program to 
support its decision making, which could have provided reasonable 
assurance that its requirements were met. The Army tailored its 
development program in a manner that excluded steps in the process 
that might have ensured the use of test and evaluation results to 
support decision making throughout the development of the ACU. For 
example, the Army did not take steps to establish an acquisition 
strategy, which can guide the development activities, or use another 
mechanism to inform senior leadership about testing, performance, and 
risks associated with the development of the uniform. An acquisition 
strategy can provide a master schedule for research, development, 
testing, production, fielding and other activities; one of the keys to 
a successful program is an acquisition strategy that is carefully 
developed and consistently followed. 

As part of our review, officials from the program office that managed 
the program--Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier--told us that 
officials briefed the Chief of Staff in March 2004 through the Army 
Uniform Board on issues related to the management of fielding the new 
uniform to soldiers. Specifically, the briefing included the number of 
uniforms per soldier, the cost of the new uniforms, and the timeline 
for fielding. The Army did not provide information on testing results 
or an evaluation of the performance and risks associated with the 
development of the uniform. Developing an acquisition strategy could 
have provided the Army with a structured approach to requirements, 
testing plans, cost estimate data, a risk assessment of the program, 
and recommendations to support decision making. 

Similarly, we found that the Army did not employ the key practice of 
using a knowledge-based approach to support development decisions that 
included obtaining sufficient information about camouflage performance 
from testing data. As part of the development of the ACU, the Army 
Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center began a 
field evaluation in 2002 of the performance of 13 camouflage patterns 
and color combinations. However, PEO Soldier officials told us that 
prior to the completion of this study the leadership chose a 
camouflage pattern and colors for the new uniform without data from 
the camouflage study. PEO Soldier leadership could not provide a 
performance report to support the selection of the Universal 
Camouflage Pattern nor explain how the camouflage pattern was 
developed. The Universal Camouflage Pattern was not part of the Natick 
study and was not tested prior to the decision by PEO Soldier to use 
this pattern or prior to the June 2004 approval of the pattern by the 
Chief of Staff. The Army began fielding the uniform in February 2005. 
Later in 2005, the Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center completed its camouflage evaluation and recommended 
a different pattern--Desert Brush--as the most effective universal 
camouflage pattern. In 2009, a follow-on Army study found that the 
Universal Camouflage Pattern of the ACU offered less effective 
concealment than the patterns chosen by the Marine Corps and some 
foreign military services, such as Syria and China. The test showed 
that soldiers wearing the Universal ACU were at greater operational 
risk of visibility to enemy forces than soldiers wearing the Marines' 
pattern. 

Moreover, soldiers deployed to Afghanistan conveyed concerns about 
their uniform, which they indicated provided ineffective concealment 
in the Afghan environment. In response to those concerns, in 2009 a 
congressional conference committee directed immediate action to 
provide combat uniforms suited to that environment.[Footnote 26] The 
Army established a decision process that included a strategy of 
development and fielding activities and leadership review of the 
testing to support a decision on a new uniform. The Army expedited 
testing of camouflage patterns suited for Afghanistan by sending a 
photo simulation team to Afghanistan to collect environmental data. 
Further, the Army surveyed soldiers on deployment to support its 
decision making. The Army also considered the conclusions of the 2005 
and 2009 Natick studies. 

In 2010, the Army began replacing the ACU for personnel deployed to 
Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP), 
and estimated that the replacement would add more than $38.8 million 
in development and initial fielding costs for fiscal year 2010 and 
2011. 

For future uniform needs, the Army is conducting a study to choose 
environment-specific camouflage patterns for use Army-wide by the end 
of December 2012. If the Army chooses a new camouflage uniform, 
officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to 
replace its uniform and related protective gear. The leadership of PEO 
Soldier told us that, unlike the decision process used to support 
development of the camouflage pattern for the ACU, the decision 
process for future camouflage uniforms will include a knowledge-based 
approach and greater use of DOD policies and procedures to ensure that 
decisions are informed, science-based, and data driven. For example, 
the Army established an acquisition strategy for conducting the 
development of new uniforms, hosted regular meetings to obtain input 
from other services and Army organizations, and PEO Soldier regularly 
provided Army leadership with information about its development 
activities. 

Air Force's Decision Process Did Not Use Elements Essential for a 
Successful Outcome: 

In 2002, Air Force officials began developing the Airman Battle 
Uniform (ABU) for noncombat use to replace two combat uniforms. At the 
time, the U.S. military, including the Air Force, was conducting 
expeditionary operations worldwide, including Afghanistan. Officials 
later recognized that the ABU under development might not meet their 
needs, and in 2005 they began testing to determine the suitability of 
the ABU in a combat environment. We found that the decision process 
used by the Air Force in the development of the ABU did not follow the 
key element of using clear policies and procedures. Also, the Air 
Force did not employ a knowledge-based approach including an analysis 
of the potential requirements for both combat and base uniforms. As a 
result, the Air Force developed a non-combat uniform for wear at the 
home base. Personnel found that the uniform's fabric weight was 
uncomfortable due to heat buildup, and the Air Force had to replace 
the uniform with one constructed from a lighter fabric. 

During our review, Air Force officials told us that they did not 
follow DOD's 5000-series policies. According to Air Force officials, 
in 2002 Air Force leadership determined that its development 
activities for its new uniform--intended for use only on bases--did 
not constitute an acquisition program under the 5000 series and Air 
Force Instruction 63-101, entitled Operations of Capabilities Based 
Acquisition System. Instead of following a specific policy, the Chief 
of Staff provided direction on the development of the uniform during 
three senior leadership briefings between 2002 and 2004, according to 
Air Force officials. In considering support for his decision making, 
the Chief of Staff did not require the Clothing Office to establish a 
strategy to guide the development activities, such as documenting 
deficiencies of the current combat uniforms and establishing 
capability requirements for the replacement uniforms. Also, the Chief 
of Staff did not use a mechanism to report how the new uniform would 
meet capability requirements, as well as the results of uniform 
testing, performance evaluation, and risk assessment. All these 
procedures could have provided more reasonable assurance that 
personnel requirements were met. If the Air Force had used DOD 
policies or established an alternative policy that included procedures 
to review requirements of the new uniform prior to the start of 
development activities, Air Force officials may have determined that 
replacing combat uniforms with a non-combat uniform would leave a gap 
in uniform capabilities. 

In addition, in developing their uniform the Air Force officials did 
not fully employ the key practice of using a knowledge-based approach 
that included the collection and use of meaningful data to determine 
whether a product will meet customer requirements. The Air Force 
tested the ABU against other service uniforms in different 
environments for camouflage effectiveness and conducted field tests 
for comfort and durability. We found that the Air Force's testing 
process had weaknesses, such as not testing different camouflage 
patterns and fabrics prior to choosing the tiger-stripe pattern, and 
using test results of a desert pattern in a woodland area. Also, 
officials chose not to implement all of the testing recommendations 
from the Air Force's Air Warfare Center, including one recommendation 
to reduce the heat build-up from the uniform. 

During the development of the uniform, the Air Force conducted surveys 
of personnel to determine their uniform design preferences. Then, 
according to Air Force officials and documents, the Chief of Staff 
directed the Clothing Office to use a tiger-striped camouflage pattern 
in a uniform for all environments with colors complementing the Army's 
universal camouflage uniform, and to use one fabric weight for the 
trousers and the blouses worn in hot and cold climates. In contrast, 
the Marine Corp's knowledge-based approach included testing and 
evaluation of multiple camouflage patterns and colors from which they 
selected two top performing patterns. As a result, the Marine Corps 
produced two prototypes for extensive field testing and evaluation. 
Using this information, the Marine Corps was able to make 
knowledgeable decisions to select the best prototype and to make 
improvements in the design prior to production. The Marine Corps 
selected the same twill fabric weave that the Air Force selected for 
the ABU, but the Marine Corps decided to use a lighter weight fabric 
than the Air Force did for the uniform jacket as a way to prevent heat 
buildup. 

In 2005, the Air Force Uniform Board sought testing of the ABU to 
assess the uniform's suitability for use in a combat environment and 
whether a second version of the uniform was needed. The Air Warfare 
Center produced a test plan, which included the overall test 
methodology and measures of uniform effectiveness and performance for 
concealment and comfort. 

In October 2006, the Air Warfare Center issued a report on its testing 
of the combat effectiveness of the ABU. The report concluded that the 
ABU camouflage performed well in most environments--never ranking 
lower than third among the six uniforms in different environments. 
However, the report also concluded that the ABU was not an effective 
combat uniform due to trouser fit, heat buildup, and other concerns. 

Regarding camouflage effectiveness, the Air Force compared the ABU 
performance to five fielded uniforms: Army Combat Uniform, Marine 
Corps desert and woodland uniforms, and Army Battle Dress (woodland) 
and Desert Camouflage uniforms. However, four of the five uniforms 
were environment-specific uniforms not intended for a number of 
settings for which they were tested. Specifically, in a tropical 
forest environment, the Air Force tests showed that the DCU and Marine 
Corp desert uniforms performed worst, and were ranked 5th and 6th 
respectively out of six uniforms tested. Similarly, in a desert scrub 
environment, the Air Force tests showed that the BDU woodland and 
Marine Corps woodland performed worst, ranking 5th and 6th 
respectively among six uniforms tested. Our analysis shows that the 
Air Force used camouflage test results from settings other than the 
ones for which they were developed, which raises questions about the 
meaningfulness of the report's conclusion that the ABU camouflage 
performed well in most environments. In 11 of 19 tests, Air Force 
observers rated the ABU as marginal or unsatisfactory for concealment 
58 percent of the time.[Footnote 27] 

Additionally, the report recommended some design changes to improve 
fit and comfort and to improve the ABU's overall effectiveness for 
combat use. As a result, the Air Force incorporated some changes into 
the final production design, such as relocating pocket drain holes and 
redesigning the trouser crotch, but did not address other 
recommendations like the heat buildup.[Footnote 28] In response, the 
Clothing Office noted that the original direction for the development 
of the ABU was for non-combat use rather than as a combat uniform or 
as a camouflage-effective garment. 

At the conclusion of our field work, we learned that the Air Force had 
begun replacing the ABU with a lighter weight version to address the 
long standing complaints by personnel about the heat buildup issue. 
According to Air Force officials, the replacement ABU in a lighter 
weight fabric will be used by home base and deployed personnel with 
the exception of those serving in Afghanistan, where the Army OCP 
uniform will continue to be used. If Air Force officials had expanded 
the knowledge-based approach for selecting a uniform--such as by 
ordering extensive testing and evaluation of varying fabric weights 
for comfortable wear to support the decision process--the service may 
have avoided the need to replace uniforms with a lighter weight fabric. 

In 2010, Air Force Central Command decided that it would be safer for 
personnel serving in Afghanistan to wear the Army's flame resistant 
OCP uniform rather than the ABU or its flame resistant uniform. Air 
Force Central Command determined that the ABU's camouflage contrasted 
with the Army's camouflage, increasing the risk of personnel standing 
out to enemy forces when Army and Air Force personnel were in a joint 
operating environment. 

Military Services' Fragmented Approach to Developing Uniforms Has 
Resulted in Inconsistent Protection for Service Members and No 
Collaboration to Reduce Costs: 

The military services' fragmented approach to developing uniforms, 
without any joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, has not 
ensured that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent levels of 
performance and protection for service members, and the services have 
not collaborated to reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. DOD 
has reported to the congressional defense committees on planned steps 
to develop joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, but it 
has not met the statutory requirement to establish joint criteria. 
Additionally, there is no DOD policy to ensure that future service-
specific uniforms comply with statutory policy to provide equivalent 
levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to 
individual service members operating in the joint battle space, to the 
maximum extent practicable. We found that the services have 
experienced opportunities to potentially save millions of dollars in 
development costs and in initial inventory fees by partnering with 
another service in the introduction of new uniforms. At the time of 
our review, the services had no partnership agreement to reduce 
potential costs on the Army's new uniforms, and the Navy had decided 
to field its uniform before securing a partnership with the Coast 
Guard that may have achieved $6 million in cost savings for inventory 
fees. 

DOD and Its Components Have Not Met the Statutory Requirement to 
Establish Joint Criteria for Ground Combat Uniforms: 

DOD and its service components have not collaborated to establish 
joint criteria for ground combat uniforms. A provision in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the 
Secretaries of the military departments to establish joint criteria 
for future ground combat uniforms that ensures new technologies, 
advanced materials, and other advances in ground combat uniform design 
may be shared between the military services and are not precluded from 
being adapted for use by any military service due to service-unique 
proprietary arrangements.[Footnote 29] The Secretaries of the military 
departments were to establish the joint criteria by February 22, 2011. 
[Footnote 30] In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
directed the Secretary of Defense to report by August 2010 on the 
steps that DOD took and planned to take to implement the requirement 
for joint criteria, including the steps the Secretaries of the 
military departments took or would take--in conjunction with the Joint 
Staff and combatant commands--to update their ground combat uniform 
standards and develop operational performance criteria for 
camouflage.[Footnote 31] DOD issued a report to congressional 
committees in February 2012 on the steps it planned to take to 
establish joint criteria for ground combat uniforms, but it has not 
yet met the statutory requirement to develop joint criteria. 

The Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board, established in 2008, 
is the forum the military departments are using to establish joint 
criteria for the performance of camouflage uniforms. The governance 
board was established by DOD to ensure collaboration and DOD-wide 
integration of clothing and textile activities, such as uniforms. 
[Footnote 32] The DOD instruction on clothing and textiles made the 
Director of the Defense Logistics Agency responsible for establishing 
and chairing the board. According to governance board officials, a 
working group of the governance board met in 2010 to begin discussions 
on the joint criteria. The working group includes representatives from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and all the 
military services. However, the group's leadership did not meet the 
February 2011 deadline for issuing joint criteria because, according 
to members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board, 
members of the working group were unable to obtain consensus. Our 
prior work has concluded that successful interagency collaboration, 
such as among the military services and defense agencies, requires 
commitment by senior officials to articulate their agreements in 
formal documents, such as a memorandum of understanding or interagency 
guidance.[Footnote 33] Without high-level commitment from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of DLA may be unable to 
promote effective interagency cooperation and collaboration among the 
members of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board and ensure 
DOD-wide integration of clothing and textiles activities. 

Moreover, in February 2012, Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 
Board officials told us that competing demands to address logistics 
efficiency initiatives also delayed the development of the criteria. 
In its February 2012 response to the congressional committees, DOD 
acknowledged that it could do more to promote and enhance inter-
service collaboration and life-cycle coordination with the Defense 
Logistics Agency and provided a plan to develop joint criteria. 
[Footnote 34] Governance board officials told us that they plan to 
convene a new working group and complete the joint criteria by 
December 2012. Further, DOD reported that the governance board will 
identify a common set of performance characteristics to be used across 
the military departments. Without joint criteria on the performance of 
uniforms to guide activities, one or more service may develop uniforms 
without knowing whether its uniforms include the newest technology, 
the newest materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of 
performance. 

Furthermore, the DOD instruction on clothing and textiles also made 
the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency--as chairman of the 
governance board--responsible for overseeing the development of a 
charter to outline the board's roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 
35] However, the charter has not been completed. An official told us 
that the charter has been drafted and continues to be under review by 
members. According to board officials, the governance board has met 
twice and the officials believe that the board's progress is not 
impeded by the lack of a signed charter. However, almost four years 
after the board was created, DOD has not defined the board's role. 
Until the board has a charter outlining its authorities, the 
department may continue to experience difficulty in establishing joint 
criteria for future ground combat uniforms. 

DOD and Its Components Have Not Developed a Policy to Ensure That 
Service-Specific Uniforms Provide Equivalent Levels of Protection and 
Have Not Collaborated to Minimize Risk: 

Each military department has developed its own standards for combat 
uniforms, and DOD does not have a policy to ensure that the services' 
fragmented uniform programs comply with statutory policy to provide 
equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk 
to individual service members operating in the joint battle space, to 
the maximum extent practicable. The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 established policy that the design and fielding 
of future ground combat uniforms may uniquely reflect the identity of 
the individual services as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent 
practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and protection 
for members commensurate with their respective assigned combat 
missions and minimize the risk to the individual soldier, sailor, 
airman, or marine operating in the joint battle space, among other 
things.[Footnote 36] Separately, under DOD's instruction on clothing 
and textile management, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is responsible for the 
development of DOD policy and implementing guidance on all matters 
relating to the clothing and textiles supply chain.[Footnote 37] 

We found that the services have not collaborated on uniform 
development, and have not ensured that their current service-unique 
uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and 
minimize risk to individual service members operating in the joint 
battle space. DOD and the Joint Staff have described the modern-day 
battlefield as a place with no clearly defined front lines or safer 
rear area where combat support operations are performed.[Footnote 38] 
In such an environment, service members wearing uniforms consisting of 
different camouflage may be exposed to different levels of risk. For 
example, the Air Force requires personnel in Afghanistan to wear a 
camouflage uniform that best protects them and enables them to blend 
with other service members with whom they operate to minimize risk. 
However, the Navy requires some personnel in the desert environment to 
wear different camouflage uniforms, potentially exposing them to 
increased risk. 

In September 2010, Air Force Central Command decided to enhance the 
level of protection of personnel serving in Afghanistan by directing 
personnel to wear the Army's OCP uniform (where available) rather than 
the Air Force's existing ABU and flame-resistant uniform. According to 
Air Force officials, this action was taken to reduce the risk of any 
personnel standing out in the joint operating environment. Conversely, 
the Navy limited the use of its Type II desert uniform in desert 
environments. In a 2009 administrative message, the Navy stated that 
the Type II desert and Type III woodland uniforms would increase the 
probability of mission success and survivability in combat and 
irregular warfare operations.[Footnote 39] However, the Navy also 
indicated that only Naval Special Warfare personnel and sailors 
assigned to or directly supporting Naval Special Warfare units would 
be authorized to wear the Type II desert uniform. Although the Navy 
later revised its guidance on wear of the Type II desert and Type III 
woodland uniforms,[Footnote 40] this restriction and its focus on 
personnel from or supporting Naval Special Warfare units largely 
remained. As a result of the policy, some Navy units, such as 
construction and intelligence units, were issued the woodland Type III 
uniforms to wear in desert environments. 

In June 2010, the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed concern 
about the Navy's restricted use of the uniform among its personnel. 
[Footnote 41] In hearings before the Subcommittee on Readiness and 
Management Support in April 2010, the Assistant Commandant of the 
Marine Corps testified that Marine Corps and Navy discussions prompted 
the Navy's policy to restrict the use of its Type II desert combat 
uniform. When the Marine Corps first learned that the new Navy uniform 
looked very similar to the Marine Corps' combat uniform, the Assistant 
Commandant testified, the Marine Corps suggested the selection of a 
Navy pattern that was different enough to distinguish it from the 
uniform worn by the Marines. However, the Assistant Commandant 
testified, the Marine Corps Commandant and the Chief of Naval 
Operations later reached an agreement that forward-deployed Navy SEALS 
and similar personnel could use the Type II desert uniform. The effect 
of the agreement, however, is that it does not allow other Navy ground 
support units to wear the Type II uniform. According to Navy 
officials, the Navy did not approve a waiver requested by the 
Commander of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command to allow 
expeditionary sailors, not directly supporting Naval Special Warfare, 
to wear the desert uniform in a desert environment. The Navy's 
restriction on the use of its Type II desert uniform appears 
inconsistent with the department's prevailing view of the modern-day 
battlefield. 

DOD has not developed a policy to ensure that future service-specific 
uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and 
minimize risk to the individual operating in the joint battle space. 
In its February 2012 response to congressional committees about ground 
combat uniforms, DOD reported on the Joint Clothing and Textiles 
Governance Board's activities to improve performance of uniforms. As 
part of its effort to establish joint criteria and standardize 
uniforms, the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board plans to 
identify a common set of performance characteristics. The governance 
board intends for the performance characteristics to be used across 
the military departments to develop and field the most effective 
camouflage uniforms and personal protective gear to ensure maximum 
protection for the troops. However, common performance characteristics 
alone may not fully minimize risk without also considering the effects 
of combining different uniforms in the same battle space. Without a 
policy to ensure that services develop and field uniforms with 
equivalent performance and protection, the services could fall short 
of offering equivalent protection for all service members, and DOD 
could expose even those service members wearing the most effective 
camouflage available to unnecessary risks. 

Military Services Have Not Fully Explored Partnership Opportunities to 
Reduce Inventory Costs: 

Although the statutory policy permits the services to pursue unique 
uniform designs, the services' fragmented approach to developing 
camouflage uniforms has resulted in numerous inventories of similar 
uniforms at increased cost to the supply chain. As presented earlier 
in this report, each service now has its own set of camouflaged 
uniforms--the Army and Air Force with their universal camouflage ACU, 
OCP and ABU uniforms, and the Marine Corps and Navy with their 
environment-specific MARPAT and Type I and II woodland and desert 
camouflage uniforms. In addition, each service has developed a 
separate flame resistant version of its uniforms. Maintaining 
inventory levels of reserve and contingency stock for multiple 
versions of camouflage uniforms, in aggregate, requires a larger total 
inventory of uniforms than would be necessary to support a product 
line with fewer uniform versions, and the services have not taken 
advantage of opportunities to reduce costs through partnering on 
inventory management or by collaborating to achieve greater 
standardization among their various camouflage uniform versions. 

Under DOD's supply chain regulation on materiel management, DOD 
components are encouraged, but not required, to standardize basic 
materials and accessories and to standardize uniforms and other 
clothing items when possible to reduce costs.[Footnote 42] However, 
according to DLA officials, none of the services has partnered on 
combat uniforms since they began separately replacing the BDU and DCU 
beginning in 2002. Instead, each of the services generally went its 
own way in developing or adopting service-specific camouflage 
uniforms. For example, the goals for the Marine Corps' uniform 
development program included providing Marines with a unique combat 
uniform, the Air Force wanted a utility uniform with a distinctively 
Air Force look, the Navy's goals were to adopt a set of uniforms that 
reflected the requirements of a 21st century Navy and its naval 
heritage, and the Army wanted a new uniform that would be more widely 
accepted by its soldiers than the BDU. The services' fragmented 
approaches to uniform development began with the Marine Corps in 2002 
and continued for other services until the Navy was the last service 
to replace the BDU in 2011 with camouflage uniforms developed for 
naval special forces. During our review, we found that the services 
collectively have spent approximately $12.5 million for uniform 
development since 2000 or an average of $2.1 million for each of the 
six development programs that we reviewed. 

In addition, DOD's supply chain regulation states that any desired 
distinctiveness for clothing items should be accomplished by methods 
such as using separate items of insignia and patches. However, two 
services--the Marine Corps and the Navy--have printed their service 
logos on the camouflage-patterned fabric during the manufacturing 
process. We have previously reported that the Marine Corps patents on 
elements of the uniform do not preclude another service from adopting 
the Marine Corps' uniform. However, given the prevailing military 
service culture that places a high value on having distinctive and 
unique combat uniforms, the printing of a service's logo on a 
uniform's fabric might make it difficult for another service to adopt 
the uniform for temporary mission needs or as a permanent replacement 
unless the printed logo was removed. Conversely, the Army and the Air 
Force have not found it necessary to print their service logos on 
their combat uniforms. The Army, for example, has been open in 
allowing members of another service to wear its uniform to meet 
mission needs. 

We also found that the services have not reduced costs by 
collaborating to eliminate inventory fees for new uniforms. When the 
military services introduce a new item, the Defense Logistics Agency 
imposes an initial inventory fee if the cost of the new item is 
greater than 10 percent of the cost of the item being replaced and if 
the item is introduced into inventory by only one DOD component. 
[Footnote 43] The inventory fee covers the cost of acquiring initial 
inventory, according to Defense Logistics Agency officials, and 
includes the first four months of inventory, a three-month safety 
level, and the cost of the remaining uniforms in inventory being 
replaced.[Footnote 44] To encourage the services to reduce costs by 
standardizing materials and eliminating duplication, according to the 
Defense Logistics Agency, Troop Support office, officials will waive 
the initial inventory fee if two or more services agree to jointly 
introduce the item into their inventories. 

Two military services, the Army and the Navy, have recently 
experienced opportunities to potentially save tens of millions of 
dollars in initial inventory fees by partnering with another service 
in the introduction of new uniforms. The Army is currently testing 
camouflage patterns to support the development of new camouflage 
uniforms for service-wide use and has estimated that the service could 
avoid initial inventory fees of as much as $82 million by partnering 
with another service or services. However, during our review none of 
the services had reached an agreement to partner with the Army. 
According to PEO Soldier officials, they have coordinated with the 
other services by hosting an Integrated Product Team to obtain input 
on their development activities and included Marine Corps and Navy 
camouflage uniforms in the baseline testing to evaluate new camouflage 
patterns. The Air Force is monitoring the Army's activities and Air 
Force officials stated that they are considering using the new 
uniforms if the uniforms meet their requirements. Nevertheless, we 
found that Army officials have not reached an agreement with the Air 
Force or other services to partner on the joint introduction of its 
uniforms to achieve cost savings if the initial inventory fee applies. 
If the Army does not partner with at least one service on the 
introduction of its new uniforms, it will miss an opportunity to 
eliminate the initial inventory fee cost, decrease the life-cycle 
costs of its uniforms, and may duplicate effort if the Air Force or 
another service later decides to independently develop a new uniform. 

The Navy, as part of its acquisition planning in the spring of 2011, 
estimated potential cost savings of about $6 million in its initial 
inventory fees if it partnered with another service in the 
introduction of its Type II desert and Type III woodland uniforms. In 
March 2011, the Coast Guard requested approval from the Navy, Naval 
Special Warfare Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command to use 
the camouflage uniforms for maritime, counter-terrorism, and security 
missions. The Coast Guard request stated that the uniform partnership 
would promote the active relationship between the Coast Guard and the 
Navy and provide interoperability and cooperation in the joint 
maritime environment. In August 2011, the Navy revised guidance on the 
wear of its uniforms, permitting the Coast Guard to use its Type II 
desert uniform for Coast Guard personnel assigned to or directly 
supporting Naval Special Warfare, and it approved use of the Type III 
woodland uniforms for all other Coast Guard personnel.[Footnote 45] 
Nevertheless, Navy officials decided to field the uniform before 
establishing a formal partnership with the Coast Guard. As a result, 
the Navy incurred $6 million in inventory fees, thereby increasing the 
overall life-cycle cost of the uniforms. 

In the absence of DOD requirements that the services collaborate to 
standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, 
the services may continue to miss opportunities to increase 
efficiencies and forego tens of millions of dollars in cost savings. 

Conclusions: 

In the past 10 years, each of the military services independently 
introduced at least one service-specific camouflage uniform, and two 
services' uniforms did not meet requirements and needed to be 
replaced. DOD has provided the services with guidance for acquisitions 
through its 5000-series instruction, but all services did not follow 
that guidance because they determined it was not applicable to their 
development and acquisition of uniforms or they did not apply the 
guidance in a manner that would ensure effective outcomes. In 
addition, DOD did not clarify the appropriate use of this or other 
guidance when developing combat uniforms, resulting in varying, 
fragmented procedures that did not consistently produce effective 
camouflage uniforms. By not following two key practices for a decision-
making process that can produce successful outcomes, military services 
developed uniforms that did not meet specific mission requirements. 
DOD has provided some additional clarity in the 2008 instruction on 
the management of clothing and textiles, but the military services may 
continue to vary in their application and use of acquisition guidance. 
With additional clarity from DOD on the consistent use of policies and 
procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the services could increase 
their assurance of having a disciplined process that is capable of 
developing uniforms that meet warfighter requirements. 

Additionally, the military services have fragmented approaches to 
developing uniforms that do not rely on joint criteria for meeting 
combat requirements, do not ensure that the resulting uniforms provide 
equivalent levels of performance and protection, and do not lead to 
collaboration to reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. Without a 
high-level commitment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Director of the Defense Logistics Agency may be unable to promote 
effective interagency cooperation and collaboration among the members 
of the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board. If the services 
developed and used joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, 
service officials could increase assurance that their new uniforms 
include the newest technology and the newest materials or designs, and 
meet an acceptable level of performance. Also, by completing the 
board's charter to outline the board's roles and responsibilities, the 
board could increase the likelihood that its members would establish 
the joint criteria for uniforms required by statute in 2009. The 
services have not established a means to assess and ensure that future 
uniforms will fulfill statutory policy regarding service-unique 
uniforms and, as a result, may not be able to ensure that future 
ground combat uniforms provide all service members with equivalent 
levels of protection and performance or minimize risks while operating 
in the joint battle space. Finally, the services' fragmented approach 
to uniform development has resulted in the services not standardizing 
camouflage uniforms, not collaborating or partnering on inventory fees 
to reduce development and inventory costs, and potentially not saving 
on overall procurement costs. Standardizing the development of 
camouflage uniforms and partnering to share inventory fees could 
increase efficiency in uniform development programs and potentially 
save DOD tens of millions of dollars over the life cycles of the 
services' combat utility uniforms. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 
actions: 

* To better ensure camouflage uniforms being developed by the military 
services meet mission requirements, direct the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure that the 
services have and consistently use clear policies and procedures and a 
knowledge-based approach to produce successful outcomes. 

* To facilitate the department's ability to meet the statutory 
requirement to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms, direct 
the Secretaries of the military departments to identify and implement 
actions necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance 
Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to the 
development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform. These 
actions should include efforts to ensure the completion of the Joint 
Clothing and Textiles Governance Board's charter outlining the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the board, and establishing a 
timeline for developing joint standards. 

* To address the statutory policy related to camouflage uniforms, 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to develop a policy and establish a timeframe to ensure that 
future service-specific uniforms provide equivalent levels of 
performance and protection, and minimize risk to service members 
operating in the joint battle space. 

* To take advantage of potential efficiencies and cost savings when 
introducing new uniforms, direct the Secretaries of the military 
departments to actively pursue partnerships for the joint development 
and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the development of 
uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall procurement 
costs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In written 
comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix III, DOD concurred 
with our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which 
we have incorporated, as appropriate. In response to our 
recommendations, DOD stated that steps will be taken to improve the 
use of policy and procedures during development of uniforms, to 
address statutory requirements and policy, and take advantage of 
potential efficiencies and cost savings. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to ensure that the services have, and consistently use, 
clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach to 
produce successful outcomes. DOD said that (USD) AT&L will place 
additional emphasis on the importance of following guidance related to 
the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System through oversight by the Joint Clothing and 
Textiles Governance Board. If DOD completes the Joint Clothing and 
Textiles Government Board charter clearly outlining the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the Board to include oversight of 
the services' uniform development process, then the action proposed by 
the department may satisfy the intent of the recommendation. However, 
DOD did not specifically identify how the Joint Clothing and Textiles 
Governance Board plans to provide consistent, long-term oversight to 
ensure the military services use policies and procedures to guide 
their development activities in the future. As we discuss in our 
report, without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear 
policies and procedures for a knowledge-based approach to developing 
effective uniforms, some services may continue to lack assurance that 
they have a disciplined process that is capable of delivering uniforms 
that meet warfighter requirements. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretaries of the military departments to identify and 
implement actions necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles 
Governance Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms 
prior to the development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform 
and establishing a timeline for developing joint standards. One 
important action includes the completion of the Board's charter 
outlining the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the board. 
DOD stated that the military departments participate in the Joint 
Clothing and Textiles Governance Board's efforts to develop joint 
criteria for camouflage uniforms by providing appropriate research and 
development and functional expertise. DOD stated that draft joint 
criteria for camouflage uniforms have been developed and are going 
through the DOD approval process, which DOD estimated will be 
completed in the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 2013. Finally, DOD stated 
that once approved, the joint criteria will be used prior to the 
development or acquisition of new camouflage uniforms. While we are 
encouraged to learn that DOD has draft joint criteria moving through 
the approval process, the development of the joint criteria has been 
an ongoing effort for several years--initially to be completed by 
February 2011, then in December 2012, according to DOD's status report 
to congressional committees, and now no later than March 2013, in 
response to our recommendation. Because of the difficulties the 
department has experienced in developing and approving joint criteria, 
our recommendation called for the completion of the Joint Clothing and 
Textiles Governance Board's charter as a specific action that DOD 
should take to facilitate the department's ability to meet the 
statutory requirement to develop joint criteria for future ground 
combat uniforms. DOD, however, did not address completion of the 
Board's charter in its comments. We continue to believe that 
completion of the charter to clearly outline the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the Board would facilitate 
military department approval of meaningful joint criteria. Further, we 
believe that completion of the Board's charter will be critical in 
ensuring that the Board can assist DOD in 1) carrying out the 
oversight of service uniform development actions and 2) providing 
additional oversight and encouraging active partnerships for joint 
development and use of uniforms, particularly since DOD has identified 
the Board as an essential actor in carrying out three of our four 
recommendations. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics develop a policy 
and establish a timeframe to ensure that future service-specific 
uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection, and 
minimize risk to service members operating in the joint battlespace. 
DOD said that the USD (AT&L) will disseminate policy guidance to the 
military departments that will include direction for using joint 
criteria and ensuring equivalent levels of performance and protection 
by the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year 2013. If fully implemented, we 
believe this action would satisfy our recommendation. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of the 
military departments actively pursue partnerships for the joint 
development and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the 
development of uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall 
procurement costs. DOD stated that it will use the Joint Clothing and 
Textiles Governance Board and the Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment 
Board to provide additional oversight and further pursue active 
partnerships for joint development and use of uniforms. We believe 
these actions, if fully implemented, would satisfy our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and other 
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Cary B. Russell: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which Department of Defense (DOD) guidance 
provides a consistent decision process to ensure that new camouflage 
uniforms meet operational requirements, we reviewed key guidance and 
interviewed relevant DOD and military service officials. We collected 
and reviewed the DOD's and services' regulations, instructions, 
policies, procedures, and other guidance that the services used to 
structure their decision processes on the development and acquisition 
of their camouflage uniforms. We assessed the decision processes based 
on their use of DOD's 5000-series acquisition guidance, military 
department implementing guidance, or other guidance, and OMB's 
acquisition guidance and GAO's framework for assessing acquisition 
functions. We assessed whether three services--the Marine Corps, Army 
and Air Force--followed the two key elements that GAO has determined 
are key practices for a decision process that produces successful 
outcomes, and to what extent each service developed uniforms that met 
requirements. We visited the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy 
offices responsible for managing the development or acquisition of 
their camouflage uniforms and gathered data and reports that the 
services used to support their decisions. We interviewed military 
service officials responsible for the management of uniform 
development and acquisition policy and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics about 
the flexibility of DOD's 5000-series guidance and how the services 
used this guidance in their development activities. To determine 
whether the services' uniforms met requirements, we collected data and 
interviewed service officials to determine if the new uniforms have 
been replaced to meet operational needs. 

To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint 
approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage 
costs, we reviewed the DOD guidance, the requirement of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the military 
departments establish joint criteria for future ground combat 
uniforms, and policy established by the act permitting the design and 
fielding of service-unique, future ground combat uniforms so long as 
they, to the maximum extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of 
performance and protection to all service members commensurate with 
their assigned combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual 
service members operating in the joint battle space, among other 
things.[Footnote 46] We collected data and interviewed relevant 
officials from the four military services and officials with the Joint 
Clothing and Textiles Governance Board from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and 
the Defense Logistics Agency to determine if the services are using a 
joint approach to address the requirement and policy and if they are 
being met. Specifically, we interviewed governance board officials and 
reviewed documents related to the board's efforts and plans to develop 
joint criteria and collect a set of common uniform characteristics to 
support development of uniforms and protective gear. Finally, to 
determine how the services jointly seek to reduce costs in the 
acquisition of uniforms, we gathered data from the Navy and Army on 
the estimated cost to introduce their new camouflage uniforms into 
inventory. We reviewed DOD's supply chain materiel management 
regulation and other guidance from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop 
Support office on initial inventory fees and how the agency provides 
the services a reduced initial inventory fee if a service partners 
with one or more service. To assess the reliability of the cost data, 
we interviewed Navy and Army officials to understand how the initial 
inventory fee was determined. The Defense Logistics Agency confirmed 
the cost of the Navy's initial inventory fee. To verify the Army's 
estimate, we obtained data from the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop 
Support office on monthly demand for uniforms and created our own cost 
estimate. To ensure that the computer-generated data from the Defense 
Logistics Agency, Troop Support office is reliable, we collected 
information about the Enterprise Business System and the Standard 
Materiel Management System and interviewed officials who manage the 
system. We determined that the data from the Defense Logistics Agency, 
Troop Support office, the Navy, and the Army were sufficiently 
reliable for the purpose of our engagement. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to September 
2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Flame Resistant Ground Combat Uniforms: 

Since 2006, each service has developed or adopted flame-resistant 
uniforms in response to urgent warfighter needs. See figure 2 for 
additional information about the uniforms. Prior to Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD personnel with flame 
resistant uniforms were mainly aviators, fuel handlers, and combat-
vehicle crewmen. These personnel required flame resistant uniforms 
because of their potential exposure to fire or other thermal energy. 
With the growing prevalence of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
threat, all ground forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
exposed to the possibility of fire-related injuries. As the threat 
from IEDs emerged and continues today, the services have developed 
flame resistant uniform capabilities to protect the warfighter. 

Figure 2: Services' Flame Resistant Uniforms, Dates of Initiation, and 
Development Costs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timeline] 

2006: 
Marine Corps Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG): 
[Image of Desert and Woodland models] 
Marine Corps: 
* Initiated: July 2006 by an urgent statement of need; 
* Development cost: $1.5 million. 

2007: 
Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU): 
[Image of Universal model] 
Army: 
* Initiated: March 2007 by an operational statement of need; 
* Development cost: $530,000 (partial cost). 

2008: 
Airman Battle System-Ground (ABS-G): 
[Image of Universal model] 
Air Force: 
* Initiated: May 2008 by urgent operational need; 
* Development cost: $1.7 million. 

2009: 
Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP): 
[Image of Transitional model] 
Army: 
* Initiated: September 2009 following committee direction; 
* Development cost: $3.4 million. 

2011: 
Navy Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG): 
[Image of Desert, Transitional and Woodland models] 
Navy: 
* Initiated: April 2011 by an urgent statement of need; 
* Development cost: $29,000. 
 
Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps developed its Flame Resistant Organizational Gear 
(FROG) in response to a July 2006 Urgent Statement of Need to increase 
protection against flash flame IED events in Central Command's area of 
responsibility. The Urgent Statement of Need requested burn protection 
for the hands, face, and neck. After extensive testing, the Marine 
Corps determined that in addition to providing a base layer of 
protection, the service also needed to provide an outer layer of 
protection. The Marine Corps conducted testing of flame-resistant 
fabrics in January and February of 2007 and selected the TenCate 
Defender™ M fabric for its flame-resistant uniforms. The Marine Corps 
spent about $1.5 million in the development of the FROG through Fiscal 
Year 2008. The service began fielding FROG items in February 2007 to 
all deployed and deploying Marines. 

The Army's Flame Resistant Army Combat Uniform (FR ACU) was developed 
in response to two Operational Need Statements requiring flame 
protection clothing capabilities to support operations in Central 
Command's area of responsibility due to greater threats of IEDs with 
enhanced accelerants throughout the theater. In August 2006, the Army 
received an Operational Need Statement from Multi-National Corps Iraq 
which called for an increase in the number of flame-resistant uniforms 
already available to be used by soldiers to protect against increased 
burn injuries occurring from IED attacks. The Operational Need 
Statement was met by issuing Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman's uniforms 
and Nomex® Combat Vehicle Crewman's balaclavas for those soldiers 
deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom. In addition, as part of its response, the Army tested flame-
resistant fabrics in 2006 for future uniforms. In March 2007, an 
Operational Needs Statement was submitted by United States Army 
Central requesting flame-resistant uniforms to enhance survivability 
while conducting missions. The Army developed its FR ACU using the 
same flame-resistant fabric, TenCate Defender™ M, identified in its 
2006 testing and as the Marine Corps' FROG. The Army did not provide 
the total cost of the development of the FR ACU, but did provide PEO 
Soldier's research and development costs of about $530,000. The Army 
began fielding the FR ACU to soldiers in late 2007. 

In response to direction from a June 2009 conference committee that 
DOD take immediate action to provide personnel deployed to Afghanistan 
with a camouflage pattern that is suited to the environment of 
Afghanistan,[Footnote 47] the Army developed the Operation Enduring 
Freedom Camouflage Pattern (OCP). The OCP uniform provides increased 
camouflage protection to soldiers operating in Afghanistan's diverse 
environments and is printed on the TenCate Defender™ M flame resistant 
fabric. The Army spent about $3.4 million through 2009 on development, 
began fielding the uniform in July 2010, and it is expected to be 
fully fielded by September 2012. 

The Air Force's Airman Battle System-Ground (ABS-G) was developed in 
response to a May 2008 Urgent Operational Need for flame-resistant 
equipment to be used in ground combat and combat support environments 
by personnel performing non-traditional, ground-focused, or newly 
emerging missions for the Air Force and in support of other joint and 
services' staffs in Central Command's area of responsibility. The ABS-
G consists of four layers of flame-resistant clothing: a base layer, 
core layer, an outer layer, and an extreme cold-weather layer. In 
2007, the Air Force and Army conducted joint testing of flame-
resistant fabrics to identify alternatives to TenCate Defender™ M 
based on concerns about the availability of flame resistant rayon 
given a projected increase in demand from both services. The Air Force 
spent about $1.7 million between 2007 and 2010 in the development of 
the ABS-G and began fielding it in March 2009. However, in September 
2010, the Air Force changed its combat uniform wear policy to enhance 
the level of protection for personnel who perform ground combat 
missions. The updated policy authorizes personnel conducting ground 
combat missions beyond the perimeter of a base to wear the uniform of 
their assigned or aligned unit--generally the Army's OCP--and directs 
all other Air Force personnel deployed to Afghanistan to wear the 
Army's OCP uniform or the FR ACU if the OCP uniform is not available. 
If neither uniform is available, the policy authorizes personnel to 
wear the ABS-G. Air Force officials stated that the ABS-G will be 
transitioned out of the Air Force's inventory as soon as the 
production levels of the Army's flame-resistant uniforms can meet Air 
Force demand. 

In response to an Urgent Statement of Need dated February 2011, the 
Navy adopted the Marine Corps' flame resistant uniform for Navy use, 
thereby avoiding a duplication of effort and eliminating development 
costs. Through the Naval Logistics Integration initiative with the 
Marine Corps, the Navy is leveraging the Marine Corps' flame resistant 
uniform and gear and adding its own Type II desert and Type III 
woodland camouflage patterns and the legacy Desert Camouflage Uniform 
patterns to the FROG uniform for use by the Navy's expeditionary 
ground personnel. The Marine Corps Systems Command's Program Manager 
for Infantry Combat Equipment (PM-ICE) is the program manager for the 
Navy expeditionary ground personnel's flame-resistant uniforms. The 
Navy spent about $29,000 for final preproduction review of the 
uniforms and had no additional research or development costs because 
it adopted the Marine Corps' flame-resistant uniform. The Navy began 
fielding elements of the Navy FROG in September 2011. According to an 
official, the Navy plans to begin fielding its FROG in the Type II 
desert pattern in 2012. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary 0f Defense: 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness: 
3500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3500: 

September 25, 2012: 

Mr. Cary B. Russell: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Russell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-12-707, "Warfighter 
Support: DoD Should Improve Development of Camouflage Uniforms and 
Enhance Collaboration Among the Services,” dated August 22, 2012 (GAO 
Code 351527). 

The Department concurs with the draft report recommendations that DoD 
improve the development of camouflage uniforms and enhance 
collaboration among the Services by ensuring the Military Departments: 
a) have and use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based 
approach; b) establish joint criteria; c) develop policy to ensure 
equivalent protection levels; and d) establish partnerships where 
applicable to help reduce costs. Detailed comments on the report 
recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments have been provided separately. For further 
questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Lee Plowden, 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, at 571-372-5204 or 
lee.plowden@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Alan F. Estevez: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 22, 2012: 
GAO-12-707 (GAO Code 351527): 

"Warfighter Support: DOD Should Improve Development Of Camouflage 
Uniforms And Enhance Collaboration Among The Services" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take 
the following action to better ensure camouflage uniforms being 
developed by the Military Services meet mission requirements, direct 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to ensure that the Services have and 
consistently use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based 
approach to produce successful outcomes. 

DOD Response: Concur. DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System," and CJCS Instruction 3170.01H, "Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System," provide the policy 
and procedures necessary for the Military Departments to produce 
successful outcomes. USD(AT&L) will place additional emphasis on the 
importance of following these policies and procedures through 
oversight by the Joint Clothing and Textile Governance Board (JCTGB). 

Recommendation 2: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take 
the following action to facilitate the department's ability to meet 
the statutory requirement to develop joint criteria for camouflage 
uniforms, direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to 
identify and implement actions necessary to enable the JCTGB to 
develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to the development 
or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform. These actions should 
include efforts to ensure the completion of the Joint Clothing and 
Textile Governance Board's charter outlining the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the board, and establishing a 
timeline for developing joint standards. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Military Departments participate in the 
JCTGB effort to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms by 
providing appropriate research and development and functional 
expertise. Draft joint criteria for camouflage uniforms have been 
developed and are going through the DoD approval process. The estimated
completion for approval is 2"d Quarter FY 2013. After approval, the 
criteria will be used prior to the development or acquisition of new 
camouflage uniforms. 

Recommendation 3: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take 
the following action to facilitate the statutory policy related to 
camouflage uniforms, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop a policy and 
establish a timeframe to ensure that future service-specific uniforms 
provide equivalent levels of performance and protection, and minimize 
risk to service members operating in the joint battle space. 

DOD Response: Concur. USD(ATL) will disseminate policy guidance to the
Military Departments that will include direction for using joint 
criteria and ensuring equivalent levels of performance and protection. 
The estimated completion date is 3rd Quarter FY 2013. 

Recommendation 4: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take 
the following action to take advantage of potential efficiencies and 
cost savings when introducing new uniforms, direct the Secretaries of 
the Military Departments to actively pursue partnerships for the joint 
development and use of uniforms to minimize fragmentation in the 
development of uniforms, and to seek to reduce inventory and overall 
procurement costs. 

DOD Response: Concur. DoD Instruction 4140.63, "Management of DOD 
Clothing and Textiles (Class II)," directs the Military Departments to 
emphasize efficiency and cost savings in uniform development. DoD will 
use the JCTGB and Cross-Service Warfighter Equipment Board to provide 
additional oversight and further pursuit of active partnerships for 
joint development and use of uniforms. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cary Russell, Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, 
(202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact name above, key contributors to this report 
were Larry Junek, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Morris, Grace Coleman, 
Susan Ditto, James Lackey, Tobin McMurdie, Carol Petersen, Richard 
Powelson, Michael Shaughnessy, and Amie Steele. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] A universal camouflage pattern is designed to blend across 
terrains such as woodland, urban, and desert. 

[2] One camouflage pattern, the Operation Enduring Freedom Camouflage 
Pattern, replaced the Army Combat Uniform in Afghanistan. 

[3] GAO, Warfighter Support: Observations on DOD's Ground Combat 
Uniforms, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-669R] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2010). The report followed a briefing 
provided to the committees in April 2010 to fulfill the mandate found 
in section 352 of the Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(b), (c) 
(2009) (10 U.S.C. § 771 note prec.). 

[4] GAO, Military Uniforms: Issues Related to the Supply of Flame 
Resistant Fibers for the Production of Military Uniforms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-682R] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2011). 

[5] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Guidelines for Assessing 
the Acquisition Function (May 2008); GAO, Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-218G] (Washington, D.C.: September 
2005). 

[6] See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a), (d). 

[7] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009). 

[8] A transitional camouflage pattern, similar to the universal 
camouflage pattern, is designed for multiple geographic environments. 

[9] The BDU was not permanent pressed and needed either to be ironed 
after laundering or to be professionally dry cleaned to maintain an 
acceptable appearance during duty at bases, according to Air Force 
officials. 

[10] The desert uniform is designed for desert, tundra, and arid 
regions; the woodland uniform is designed for jungle, woodland, and 
temperate regions. 

[11] The Navy also developed its Navy Working Uniform Type I in a 
blue, digital pattern, but designated it for sailors at sea and 
ashore. It is not considered a ground combat or utility uniform, and 
consequently we did not include it as part of this review. 

[12] Independent of the Navy costs, Naval Special Warfare spent around 
$8 million overall on the development of its Personal Signature 
Management program, of which its camouflage uniforms were one 
component. 

[13] The 5000 series includes Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, 
The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003) (certified current as of 
Nov. 20, 2007); Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008); and the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, which supports the guidance by providing 
background information, tutorial discussions, key practices, and 
information about requirements for each phase and milestone decision. 

[14] The military departments' implementing guidance includes Army 
Regulation 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy (July 22, 2011); Secretary of 
the Navy Instruction 5000.2E, Implementation and Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (Sept. 1, 2011); and Air Force Instruction 63-101, 
Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management (Apr. 8, 2009) 
(incorporating through change 4, Aug. 3, 2011). 

[15] DOD has issued guidance that amplifies and amends the 
requirements found in DOD Instruction 5000.02. See, e.g., Directive 
Type Memorandum 11-003, Reliability Analysis, Planning, Tracking, and 
Reporting (Mar. 21, 2011); Directive Type Memorandum 09-027, 
Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
(Dec. 4, 2009). 

[16] See generally Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD 
Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation (May 23, 2003). 

[17] With respect to clothing items, including combat and individual 
equipment, the regulation encourages standardization insofar as 
functionality, maintenance of combat readiness, and mission 
accomplishment permit. The regulation states that any desired 
distinctiveness should be obtained by using separate items of 
insignia, patches, etc. See id., para. C8.2.2.4.1. 

[18] For new clothing with a forecasted total annual demand value 
exceeding $100,000, DOD policy provides that the initial investment 
and acquisition of inventory levels to satisfy demands up to the 
effective date of supply is the financial responsibility of the 
requesting component. Officials of the Defense Logistics Agency, Troop 
Support office stated that their interpretation of the policy is that 
items with a value of 10 percent greater than the item being replaced 
will include the initial inventory fee. 

[19] See Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD 
Clothing and Textiles (Class II) (Aug. 5, 2008). 

[20] See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(d). 

[21] See § 352(a). Under the policy, service-unique uniforms would, to 
the maximum extent practicable: (1) provide members of every military 
service an equivalent level of performance, functionality, and 
protection commensurate with their respective assigned combat 
missions; (2) minimize risk to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, 
or marine operating in the joint battle space; and (3) provide 
interoperability with other components of individual war fighter 
systems, including body armor and other individual protective systems. 
See id. 

[22] The instruction prescribes policy that the military departments 
maintain responsibility for the acquisition, funding, and fielding of 
new clothing and textiles in accordance with the management 
principles, policies, and procedures in DOD Directive 5000.01. See 
Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing 
and Textiles (Class II), para. 4(b) (Aug. 5, 2008). 

[23] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Guidelines for Assessing 
the Acquisition Function (May 2008); [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-218G]. 

[24] According to officials, the Marine Corps used Department of 
Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System (Jan. 4, 2001) and Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, 
Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information Technology 
Acquisition Programs (Dec. 6, 1996). These publications have since 
been superseded. 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-218G]. 

[26] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009). 

[27] We excluded 2 of 22 tests because no data was collected, and 
excluded another test that used subjective data. 

[28] The Air Force allowed personnel to remove interior pockets in the 
ABU shirt to address the heat buildup issue. The Air Force web site 
states that to address the heat issue some personnel may choose to cut 
the interior pockets out of the garment, as long as it does not change 
the outer appearance of the uniform. 

[29] See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(d). 

[30] See id. The provision required the establishment of joint 
criteria no later than 270 days from the date of our report on ground 
combat uniforms required by section 352(c). We fulfilled the 
requirement with a report submitted to the congressional defense 
committees on April 26, 2010, but the report was published on May 28, 
2010 as [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-669R]. 

[31] See S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 117 (2010) (accompanying S. 3454, a 
proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2011). 

[32] See DOD Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and 
Textiles (Class II), encl. 2, para. 3(a) (Aug. 5, 2008). 

[33] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 17, 2008). 

[34] DOD, Report on Requirements for Standard Ground Combat Uniforms 
(Washington, D.C.:, February 2012). 

[35] See DOD Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD Clothing and 
Textiles (Class II), encl. 2, para. 3(a) (Aug. 5, 2008). 

[36] See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a). 

[37] Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63, Management of DOD 
Clothing and Textiles (Class II), encl. 3, para. 1 (Aug. 5, 2008). 

[38] DOD, Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and 
Regulations Restricting the Service of Female Members in the U.S. 
Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.:, February 2012). 

[39] Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 374-09, Navy Working Uniform 
Type II and III (Dec. 29, 2009). 

[40] Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 259-11, Navy Working Uniform 
Type I, II, and III, Camouflage Utility Uniforms (Aug. 30, 2011). The 
Navy guidance was revised, in part, to allow U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel to wear Navy uniforms under certain conditions. 

[41] See S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 117 (2010). 

[42] See Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain 
Materiel Management Regulation, chapter 8 (May 23, 2003). 

[43] For new clothing with a forecasted total annual demand value 
exceeding $100,000, DOD policy provides that the initial investment 
and acquisition of inventory levels to satisfy demands up to the 
effective date of supply is the financial responsibility of the 
requesting component. Officials of the Defense Logistics Agency's 
Troop Support office stated that their interpretation of the policy is 
that items with a value of 10 percent greater than the item being 
replaced will include the initial inventory fee. 

[44] According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, the initial 
inventory fee is based on a calculation of the monthly demand, the 
speed of fielding, and the cost of the new uniforms. 

[45] See Chief of Naval Operations, NAVADMIN 259-11, Navy Working 
Uniform Type I, II, and III, Camouflage Utility Uniforms (Aug. 30, 
2011). 

[46] See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(a), (d). 

[47] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 86 (2009) (Conf. Rep., accompanying 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009). 

[End of section] 

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