This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-12-631 
entitled 'Millennium Challenge Corporation: Results of Transportation 
Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries' which was released on 
September 12, 2012. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2012: 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: 

Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries: 

GAO-12-631: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-631, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To help developing countries reduce poverty and stimulate economic 
growth, MCC has approved 26 bilateral compact agreements totaling 
about $9.3 billion. In the seven compacts that ended in 2010 and 2011—
Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Georgia, Armenia, and Benin—
transportation infrastructure projects generally received about 50 
percent of the compact’s total funding. To measure the results of its 
compacts, MCC sets targets for various performance indicators—-such as 
number of kilometers paved or volume of merchandise passing through a 
port—-and estimates the number of beneficiaries. This report, 
responding to a congressional mandate, examines the extent to which 
MCC has, for transportation infrastructure projects, (1) achieved 
expected performance targets and (2) consistently estimated numbers of 
beneficiaries. GAO analyzed MCC documents, interviewed MCC officials, 
and drew on fieldwork completed for related work in four of the seven 
countries. 

What GAO Found: 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)-—a U.S. government 
corporation—-recognizes the importance of a disciplined, transparent, 
and accountable approach to tracking compact results. However, it 
reduced the scopes of its early transportation infrastructure projects 
and reports mixed success in meeting key performance targets. In 
addition, problems with data quality call into question the 
reliability of those reported results. GAO found the following for the 
seven compacts ending in 2010 and 2011, each with a road project or a 
port project. 

Road Projects: 

* MCC reduced kilometers to be paved under six compacts-—Honduras, 
Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Georgia, and Armenia-—by a combined 63 
percent (from about 1,800 to 600 km) because of increased construction 
costs and political problems in partner governments. MCC reported 
meeting reduced targets for five compacts. However, for three 
compacts, MCC did not consistently account for kilometers completed 
with funding from third parties. 

* MCC reported meeting revised targets for road roughness—-a measure 
of pavement quality-—for five of the compacts. However, reported data 
have quality issues, including the inconsistent application of 
measurement methodologies and calculation errors that resulted in 
overstated results. 

* MCC reported meeting targets for annual average daily traffic-—a 
measure of the volume of traffic using the road-—for three of the 
compacts. However, weaknesses in traffic baseline estimates may have 
affected the establishment of targets and therefore MCC’s ability to 
measure results. 

Port Projects: 

* In Cape Verde, MCC funding ($53.7 million) was insufficient to 
construct all planned port elements. As a result, MCC reduced the 
project’s scope and deferred measuring the results of key indicators. 

* In Benin, MCC completed most of the envisioned scope of the port 
project. MCC’s data show that the compact met the original target for 
one of three key performance indicators, volume of merchandise. (The 
other two indicators relate to the measurement of shipping costs.) 
However, GAO found that MCC’s estimation of this indicator’s baseline 
may lead to overstated results. In addition, data quality reviews 
identified problems with the data used, which MCA-Benin did not 
formally address. 

In 2009, MCC improved its methodology for estimating beneficiaries—
people who realize income gains or expenditure savings as a result of 
its investment—by standardizing its approach. MCC subsequently revised 
its beneficiary numbers for all compacts. However, the new approach 
did not include a formal quality review process. As a result, 
implementation of the new approach suffered from varying degrees of 
quality problems. For example, (1) MCC did not implement its 
beneficiary estimation methodology consistently across early 
transportation infrastructure projects; (2) beneficiary calculations 
contained incorrect formulas and numbers, and differed from supporting 
documents; and (3) beneficiary figures in MCC’s public documents were 
sometimes inaccurate. 

What GAO Recommends: 

MCC should strengthen existing policies and practices regarding 
measuring and evaluating results data and formalize a quality review 
process to improve its beneficiary calculations. MCC agreed with all 
of our recommendations and outlined some steps the agency will take or 
has already taken to address them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-631]. For more 
information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or 
gootnickd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

MCC Data Show that Some Key Performance Targets Were Met, but Data 
Quality Problems Call into Question Reported Results: 

Data Resulting from Beneficiary Calculations May Not Be Valid: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Compact Timeframes: 

Appendix III: Roads Data: 

Appendix IV: Port Data: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium Challenge Corporation: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Performance Results for the Kilometers of Road Completed 
Indicator, MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 2: Scope Revisions of Road Projects for MCC Compacts Ending in 
2010 and 2011: 

Table 3: Key Performance Results for the Road Roughness Indicator, 
Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 4: Key Performance Results for the Average Annual Daily Traffic 
Indicator, Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 5: Data Quality Reviews Performed for Road Project Common 
Indicators: 

Table 6: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Cape Verde: 

Table 7: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Benin: 

Table 8: Kilometers of Roads Completed for MCC Road Projects in 
Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 9: Road Roughness of MCC Road Projects in Compacts ending in 
2010 and 2011, as Measured by the International Roughness Index (IRI): 

Table 10: Average Annual Daily Traffic on MCC-Funded Roads in Compacts 
Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 11: Volume of Merchandise through Port for Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 12: Container Ship Time at Berth for Port Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Table 13: Container Ship Time at Anchor for Port Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Funds for Transportation Infrastructure and Other Projects, 
by MCC Compact: 

Figure 2: Relationship between MCC Indicators, Baselines, Targets, and 
Results: 

Figure 3: Timeframes for MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011, by Date 
of Signature: 

Abbreviations: 

IRI: International Roughness Index: 

MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation: 

MCA: Millennium Challenge Account: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 12, 2012: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a U.S. government 
corporation, was established in 2004 to provide aid to developing 
countries that have demonstrated a commitment to ruling justly, 
encouraging economic freedom, and investing in people. MCC provides 
assistance to eligible countries through multiyear compact agreements 
to fund specific projects aimed at reducing poverty and stimulating 
economic growth. MCC's core principles include assessing the results 
of its funding to determine how its activities affect poverty and 
economic growth. To do this, MCC has instituted a monitoring and 
evaluation approach that includes identifying relevant indicators to 
measure results during and at the end of project implementation and 
establishing performance targets for each indicator. MCC's efforts to 
determine how its activities will affect poverty and economic growth 
also include estimating the number of people who will benefit from its 
projects and analyzing the impact of its projects on populations of 
specific interest. 

As of June 2012, MCC had signed 26 compacts, committing a total of 
approximately $9.3 billion.[Footnote 1] Seven of these compacts ended 
in 2010 or 2011: Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Georgia, 
Armenia, and Benin.[Footnote 2] (See appendix II for compact time 
frames.) 

In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress 
mandated that we review the results achieved by MCC compacts.[Footnote 
3] We have previously reported on the results of MCC's transportation 
infrastructure projects in four countries. In July 2011, we reported 
that MCC had met reduced targets for its compacts with Cape Verde and 
Honduras, the first two compacts to reach completion.[Footnote 4] In 
June 2012, we reported that MCC transportation infrastructure projects 
in Georgia and Benin varied in quality and may not be sustainable. 
[Footnote 5] Because much of MCC's funding for compacts that ended in 
2010 and 2011 focused on transportation infrastructure projects, this 
report examines the extent to which MCC has, for transportation 
infrastructure projects, (1) achieved expected performance targets and 
(2) used a consistent methodology to estimate numbers of beneficiaries. 

To assess the extent to which MCC has achieved its performance targets 
for transportation infrastructure projects under compacts that ended 
in 2010 and 2011, we reviewed MCC guidance and policy documents and 
analyzed compact agreements, monitoring and evaluation plans, and 
results data. We compared actual results achieved at the end of the 
compact for select performance indicators with MCC's original targets 
and, in some cases, with revised targets associated with each 
indicator. Since MCC tracks many performance indicators for each 
compact project, we selected a subset of indicators to examine for 
this report. 

* For the road projects, we examined kilometers of road completed, 
roughness as a measure of road quality, and average annual daily 
traffic. We selected those road project indicators because they 
address the projects' key objectives and because they are among the 
"common indicators" MCC requires for all road projects, so that it can 
aggregate results across countries. 

* For the port projects, we examined the volume of merchandise through 
the port and two indicators related to the measurement of shipping 
costs: container ship time at berth and container ship time at anchor. 
Because MCC has not established common indicators for ports, we 
selected indicators that addressed the projects' key objectives, 
corresponded to the common road indicators, and were originally 
included in both port projects. 

Additionally, we interviewed MCC officials about data quality and 
indicator tracking tables. As part of our related engagements--focused 
on Cape Verde and Honduras, and on Georgia and Benin[Footnote 6]--we 
visited compact projects in-country and met with partner country 
government officials, including those responsible for compact 
implementation, and with contractors, project managers, construction 
supervisors, and relevant private businesses. 

To assess the extent to which MCC has consistently applied its 
beneficiary estimation methodology, we reviewed MCC's Guidelines for 
Economic and Beneficiary Analysis as well as its beneficiary 
calculations and accompanying supporting documents for the seven 
compacts that ended in 2010 and 2011. We compared original and revised 
beneficiary estimates for the transportation projects and assessed the 
justification behind any changes. Data are considered reliable when 
they are accurate, complete, consistent, and valid, given the uses for 
which they are intended. 

MCC enters into a legal relationship with partner country governments 
that vest an accountable entity with responsibility for day-to-day 
management of compact project implementation, including monitoring and 
evaluation activities such as setting and revising performance 
targets. Because such actions require MCC's direct oversight and 
approval, throughout this report, we attribute all decisions related 
to project rescoping and compact targets to MCC. (See appendix I for 
further details of our objectives, scope, and methodology.) 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 
2012, as part of a body of work on this subject, in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

MCC Organization: 

MCC is managed by a chief executive officer, appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is overseen 
by a Board of Directors. The Secretary of State serves as board chair 
and the Secretary of the Treasury as vice-chair.[Footnote 7] MCC's 
model of providing foreign aid is based on a set of core principles 
deemed essential for effective development assistance, including good 
governance, country ownership, focus on results, and transparency. 
According to MCC, country ownership of an MCC compact occurs when a 
country's national government controls the prioritization process 
during compact development, is responsible for implementation, and is 
accountable to its domestic stakeholders for decision making and 
results. To implement the compact, the partner government establishes 
an accountable entity, referred to as a Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA).[Footnote 8] MCC provides the framework and guidance for compact 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation that MCAs are to use in 
implementing compact projects. 

Transportation Infrastructure Projects: 

The seven MCC compacts completed in 2010 and 2011 each included a 
transportation infrastructure project that--except in the case of 
Armenia--received 50 percent or more of the compact's total funding 
(see figure 1). For the purposes of this report, we have defined 
transportation infrastructure as public works that convey passengers 
or goods from one place to another; infrastructure includes structures 
such as roads, seaports, airports, and railways. We reviewed five 
compacts with road projects, one with a port project, and one with 
both types of projects. 

Figure 1: Funds for Transportation Infrastructure and Other Projects, 
by MCC Compact: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Type of project: road; 
Honduras; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $125.7 million; 
Other projects: $89.3 million; 
Total amount at signature: $215.0 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $120.6 million; 
Other projects: $83.4 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $204.0 million. 

Type of project: road and port; 
Cape Verde; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $78.8 million; 
Other projects: $31.3 million; 
Total amount at signature: $110.1 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $82.5 million; 
Other projects: $26.0 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $108.5 million. 

Type of project: road; 
Nicaragua; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $92.8 million; 
Other projects: $82.3 million; 
Total amount at signature: $175.1 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $56.7 million; 
Other projects: $56.0 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $112.7 million. 

Type of project: road; 
Georgia; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $102.2 million; 
Other projects: $193.1 million; 
Total amount at signature: $295.3 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $212.9 million; 
Other projects: $174.3 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $387.2 million. 

Type of project: port; 
Benin; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $169.4 million; 
Other projects: $137.9 million; 
Total amount at signature: $307.3 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $187.9 million; 
Other projects: $113.9 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $301.8 million. 

Type of project: road; 
Vanuatu; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $60.7 million; 
Other projects: $5.0 million; 
Total amount at signature: $65.7 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $60.1 million; 
Other projects: $5.3 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $65.4 million. 

Type of project: road; 
Armenia; 
Amount at signature: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $67.1 million; 
Other projects: $168.6 million; 
Total amount at signature: $235.7 million; 
Amount disbursed: 
Transportation infrastructure projects: $8.4 million; 
Other projects: $168.2 million; 
Total amount disbursed: $176.6 million. 

Sources: GAO analysis. 

Notes: Amount at signature is the amount allocated when MCC and the 
partner country sign the compact; amount disbursed is the actual 
amount disbursed by compact closure. Any undisbursed funds are 
returned to MCC. "Other projects" includes funds disbursed before the 
compact's entry into force, to facilitate implementation of the 
compact. 

[End of figure] 

MCC Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: 

According to MCC's Policy for Monitoring and Evaluation of Compacts 
and Threshold Programs,[Footnote 9] performance monitoring helps track 
progress toward compact goals and objectives and serves as a 
management tool. Therefore, MCC requires partner countries to create a 
monitoring and evaluation plan that they update throughout the course 
of the compact. The plan's monitoring component outlines the 
performance indicators by which the compact results will be measured. 
It also establishes a performance target for each indicator, including 
a baseline value (the starting value of an indicator) and the expected 
year by which the target will be achieved.[Footnote 10] For some 
indicators, baseline measurements are necessary to establish interim 
and final targets. MCC and the MCAs monitor the progress of compact 
activities using an indicator tracking table, which is a reporting 
tool that displays targets and tracks progress against them. (See 
figure 2.) 

Figure 2: Relationship between MCC Indicators, Baselines, Targets, and 
Results: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Indicator: 
An Indicator is a measurement used to track project progress 
throughout the compact.  

Baseline: 
At the beginning of each project, baseline values are measured as a  
starting point.  

Yearly target values: 
MCA sets yearly performance targets for some indicators to assess 
interim progress. 

End-of-compact target: 
An end-of-compact target is established for each indicator. This is 
how MCC determines whether it met compact goals.   

Actual results: 
Compact actual results are the final results achieved. 

MCC policy requires that MCA contract with independent entities to 
conduct data quality reviews of compact performance data. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Notes: The indicators shown are for a road project. The terms 
indicator, baseline values, actual results, performance targets, end-
of-compact target, and data quality reviews pertain to all MCC 
projects. 

[End of figure] 

Transportation Infrastructure Indicators: 

MCC established common indicators in 2009 to aggregate results across 
countries.[Footnote 11] For road projects, MCC has established several 
common indicators, including the following:[Footnote 12] 

* Kilometers of road completed: A measure of the total length of road 
completed under a compact. This indicator is a cumulative measure of 
works completed. 

* Road roughness: A measure of pavement quality that affects ride 
quality, vehicle delay costs, fuel consumption, and maintenance costs. 
Roughness is used to determine the reduction in road-user costs and 
indicates when resurfacing work is needed. New pavement roughness 
ratings--as measured by the international roughness index (IRI)--
should range from 1.5 to 3.5; the higher the IRI, the rougher the 
pavement, with a roughness of 0 being perfectly smooth. 

* Average annual daily traffic: A measure of the volume and type of 
traffic using a road. 

MCC has not established common indicators for ports, because ports are 
a small part of its portfolio (it has funded port projects in only two 
countries). However, we selected certain key indicators to review 
because they addressed the projects' key objective of economic growth: 
[Footnote 13] 

* Volume of merchandise through the port: A measure of the total 
volume of exports and imports passing through the port each year. 

* Container ship time at berth: A measure of the average number of 
days a container ship spends at berth to load and/or unload its cargo. 

* Container ship time at anchor: A measure of the average number of 
hours a container ship spends at anchor waiting for a berth. 

Independent Data Quality Reviews: 

MCC requires that MCAs contract an independent entity (such as a local 
or international firm, research organization, or individual 
consultant) to review the quality of compact performance data. These 
reviews determine the utility, objectivity, and integrity of 
information gathered, identify problems with data quality, and 
recommend actions to remedy these issues. Reviews should ensure that 
data used to measure indicators meet the following criteria: validity, 
reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity. MCC policy allows 
each country to determine the frequency and timing of each review as 
well as the indicators to be evaluated. This requirement was fulfilled 
for every compact except Nicaragua. MCC policy requires the MCA to 
comment on the review, including noting the recommendations it will 
implement. In addition, the MCA should reflect, in a subsequent 
monitoring and evaluation plan, any indicator changes made in response 
to data quality reviews. MCC policy also requires the MCA to make 
publicly available on its website a summary of the final reviews and 
its comments. MCAs are responsible for ensuring that MCC-approved 
recommendations are implemented. 

Beneficiary Assessment: 

MCC defines beneficiaries as people who realize income gains or 
expenditure savings as a result of its investment.[Footnote 14] MCC's 
authorizing legislation requires that compacts contain an 
identification of the intended beneficiaries, disaggregated by income 
level, gender, and age, to the maximum extent practicable. MCC notes 
that "the use of these [beneficiary] analyses and their availability 
to the general public are trademarks of MCC's commitment to 
transparency and results-based aid." In addition, MCC's 2009 
Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary Analysis maintain that 
identification of intended beneficiaries should not be limited to 
counting the number of people who benefit from compacts but should 
include a more detailed analysis of the effect of compacts on 
different subgroups, including the poor, the elderly, women, children, 
and ethnic subpopulations. MCC has not undertaken such detailed 
beneficiary analysis for the seven compacts completed in 2010 or 2011. 
[Footnote 15] 

MCC Data Show that Some Key Performance Targets Were Met, but Data 
Quality Problems Call into Question Reported Results: 

MCC reduced the scope of early road and port projects and reports 
mixed success in meeting key performance targets. In addition, 
problems with data quality call those reported results into question. 

MCC Reduced Targets for Completed Roads by 63 Percent and Had Data 
Quality Problems: 

In each of the six compacts with road projects, MCC reduced the number 
of kilometers to be completed. In addition, the roughness and annual 
average daily traffic indicators had data quality problems. Most 
compacts did not examine the three common road indicators in their 
data quality reviews. In addition, MCC did not consistently account 
for third-party funding. 

According to MCC Data, Most Compacts Met Reduced Targets for 
Kilometers of Roads Completed: 

MCC reduced by 63 percent the total number of road kilometers to be 
completed for the six compacts with road projects, from an original 
combined target of 1,822.8 kilometers to a final combined target of 
623.9 kilometers.[Footnote 16] Five of six compacts met their reduced 
targets for kilometers completed. Honduras was the only compact that 
did not meet its target (see table 1). 

Table 1: Key Performance Results for the Kilometers of Road Completed 
Indicator, MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Honduras[A]; 
Original target: 200.0; 
Revised target: 174.5; 
Percentage change: -12.8; 
Final result: 115.0; 
Target met: met original target. 

Cape Verde; 
Original target: 63.0; 
Revised target: 39.3; 
Percentage change: -37.6; 
Final result: 40.6; 
Target met: met revised target. 

Nicaragua; 
Original target: 158.0; 
Revised target: 67.0; 
Percentage change: -57.6; 
Final result: 74.0; 
Target met: met revised target. 

Georgia; 
Original target: 245.0; 
Revised target: 220.2; 
Percentage change: -10.1; 
Final result: 220.2[B]; 
Target met: met revised target. 

Vanuatu; 
Original target: 213.8; 
Revised target: 149.7; 
Percentage change: -30.0; 
Final result: 149.7; 
Target met: met revised target. 

Armenia; 
Original target: 943.0; 
Revised target: 24.4; 
Percentage change: -97.4; 
Final result: 24.4; 
Target met: met revised target. 

Total; 
Original target: 1,822.8; 
Revised target: 675.1; 
Percentage change: -63.0; 
Final result: 623.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Note: See appendix III for additional details on targets and results 
for the kilometers of road indicator in each country. 

[A] Kilometers include secondary roads and sections 3 and 4 of the 
highway in Honduras. Sections 1 and 2 of the highway were to be 
completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration; as of March 9, 2012, 
construction of these segments was not complete. 

[B] Of this amount, 217 kilometers were fully rehabilitated using MCC 
funds. For the remaining about 3 kilometers, MCC funded maintenance 
items, such as road painting. 

[End of table] 

In general, MCC decreased the scope of the road projects because of 
increased construction costs, changes in exchange rates, or actions 
taken by host country governments that were inconsistent with MCC's 
eligibility criteria. For example, MCC decreased the scope of the 
compacts in Nicaragua and Armenia because of concerns about democratic 
governance in the respective partner governments (see table 2). 

Table 2: Scope Revisions of Road Projects for MCC Compacts Ending in 
2010 and 2011: 

Compact: Honduras; 
Scope change: Reduced kilometers of secondary roads completed. Removed 
two sections of the highway project, to be completed with additional 
funding from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration post-
compact; 
Reason for scope change: Increased construction costs. 

Compact: Cape Verde; 
Scope change: Eliminated two roads; 
Reason for scope change: Increased construction costs. 

Compact: Nicaragua; 
Scope change: In June 2009, MCC terminated funding for the 
transportation activities not already under contract. At this time, 74 
kilometers of road were already under construction; 
Reason for scope change: Electoral irregularities in the municipal 
elections of November 2008, which were inconsistent with MCC 
eligibility criteria.[A]. 

Compact: Georgia; 
Scope change: Reduced kilometers of road to 70 percent of the original 
plan; 
Reason for scope change: Increased construction costs and changes in 
exchange rates. 

Scope change: Subsequently increased kilometers of road to roughly 90 
percent of the original plan; 
Reason for scope change: MCC obligated an additional $100 million to 
the compact following the end of Georgia's war with Russia over South 
Ossetia in 2008, $60 million of which went to the road project. 

Compact: Vanuatu; 
Scope change: Reduced scope from the rehabilitation of several roads, 
airstrips and wharfs to two roads; 
Reason for scope change: Increased construction costs and changes in 
exchange rates. 

Scope change: Increased kilometers completed on road in Santo; 
Reason for scope change: New Zealand provided additional funding to 
support MCC road project in June 2009. 

Compact: Armenia; 
Scope change: Reduced kilometers of road to roughly 32 percent of the 
original plan prior to June 2008; 
Reason for scope change: Increased construction costs and changes in 
exchange rates. 

Scope change: In June 2009, MCC put an indefinite hold on funding for 
road construction that was not already underway. At this time, 
construction of 24.4 kilometers had been completed; 
Reason for scope change: Concerns about the status of democratic 
governance in Armenia, which were inconsistent with MCC's eligibility 
criteria[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC documents. 

[A] The country also failed to meet MCC's corruption indicator, which 
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain. 

[End of table] 

MCC-Reported Results for Road Roughness Have Data Quality Issues: 

MCC data show that five of six compacts met original targets for road 
roughness. In addition, MCC reports that the Georgia and Armenia 
compacts surpassed their original roughness targets and built a 
smoother road than originally planned.[Footnote 17] Honduras did not 
did not meet its roughness target. (See table 3.) 

Table 3: Key Performance Results for the Road Roughness Indicator, 
Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Honduras[A]; 
Original target: 2.2; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 3.0; 
Target met: Did not meet original or revised target. 

Cape Verde; 
Original target: 2.3; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 2.3; 
Target met: Met original target. 

Nicaragua; 
Original target: 3.1; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 2.5; 
Target met: Met original target. 

Georgia; 
Original target: 3.2; 
Revised target: 2.5; 
Final result: 1.5; 
Target met: Met original target; Met revised target. 

Vanuatu; 
Original target: 3.5; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 3.0; 
Target met: Met original target. 

Armenia; 
Original target: 5.0; 
Revised target: 4.0; 
Final result: 3.5; 
Target met: Met original target; Met revised target. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Notes: A higher roughness number indicates a rougher road, while zero 
is a perfectly smooth road. A missing value for the revised target 
indicates that the original target was not revised. See appendix III 
for additional details on targets and results for the roughness 
indicator in each country. 

[A] The roughness measure includes secondary roads and sections 3 and 
4 of the highway in Honduras. Sections 1 and 2 of the highway were to 
be completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration; as of March 9, 2012, 
construction of these segments was not complete. 

[End of table] 

We identified problems with the measurement of road roughness for some 
of the six compacts with road projects, including the use of 
inconsistent application of methodologies and calculation errors. 
These problems call into question MCC's reported roughness results. 

Inconsistent application of methodologies. MCC determined roughness 
using a visual scale for some roads and mechanical measurements for 
others. While both methods are legitimate means of measuring 
roughness, they have different degrees of accuracy. Moreover, MCC did 
not apply either measurement method consistently across compacts. 
First, for the two countries measuring roughness visually, Cape Verde 
and Vanuatu, MCC inappropriately provided the MCAs a World Bank scale 
for unpaved roads to assess the paved roads. Second, for compacts 
where roughness was measured mechanically, the MCAs used different 
machines that had varying levels of accuracy. Third, for three 
compacts--Nicaragua, Honduras, and Armenia--the MCAs measured 
roughness on both sides of the road and then averaged these 
measurements to calculate a final measure. In contrast, MCA-Georgia 
calculated roughness using measurements taken on one side of the road 
only, potentially producing a less accurate measurement since 
roughness can vary from one side of the road to the other.[Footnote 18] 

Calculation errors. We found that errors calculating roughness led to 
an overstatement of results. For example, MCA-Nicaragua recorded 
zeros--an IRI rating for a perfectly smooth road--for sections that 
could not be measured, incorrectly lowering the overall roughness 
calculation from 4.8 to 3.4 for one road and indicating that the road 
was smoother than it actually was.[Footnote 19] Additionally, MCA-
Honduras did not account for the differing lengths of each segment of 
secondary road when aggregating the roughness values and therefore 
overstated its reported results at 3.2 instead of 3.3. Although this 
difference is not large, consistent methodologies should be used 
across compacts to allow a valid basis for comparing and evaluating 
results. 

MCC-Reported Results for Road Traffic Have Data Quality Issues: 

MCC data show that three of the six compacts with road projects met 
original or revised targets for average annual daily traffic.[Footnote 
20] The Nicaragua and Armenia compacts met their original targets and 
the Vanuatu compact met a reduced target. For the other three 
compacts, Cape Verde did not meet its original target; Georgia did not 
meet its reduced target; and MCC stated that a final traffic measure 
in Honduras is not expected until late 2012. (See table 4.) 

Table 4: Key Performance Results for the Average Annual Daily Traffic 
Indicator, Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Honduras[A]; 
Original target: 3,772; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: N/A; 
Target met: N/A. 

Cape Verde[B]; 
Original target: 559; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 295; 
Target met: Did not meet original or revised target. 

Nicaragua; 
Original target: 932; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 1,216; 
Target met: Met original target. 

Georgia; 
Original target: 6,700; 
Revised target: 1,183; 
Final result: 1,092; 
Target met: Did not meet original or revised target. 

Vanuatu; 
Original target: 969; 
Revised target: 196; 
Final result: 334; 
Target met: Met revised target. 

Armenia; 
Original target: 460; 
Revised target: 706; 
Final result: 735; 
Target met: Met original target; Met revised target. 

Legend: 

N/A: Not available. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Notes: A missing value for the revised target indicates that the 
original target was not revised. See appendix III for additional 
details on targets and results for the traffic indicator in each 
country. 

[A] The calculation for original and revised average annual daily 
traffic measures include the secondary roads and sections 3 and 4 of 
the highway in Honduras. Sections 1 and 2 of the highway were to be 
completed post-compact with additional funding provided by the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration; as of March 9, 2012, 
construction of these segments was not complete. In addition, MCC 
officials stated that a final traffic measure in Honduras is not 
expected until late 2012. 

[B] The final result for Cape Verde is not annualized. 

[End of table] 

MCC did not consistently update the baseline estimates for the annual 
average daily traffic indicator either by projecting growth or by 
using new information when it became available. Because MCC 
establishes the targets for some indicators by applying estimated 
growth rates to the baselines, these identified weaknesses may have 
affected MCC's ability to create accurate traffic targets, thus 
affecting its reported results. 

* For the secondary roads project in Nicaragua, MCC stated that it 
updated the baseline estimates established in 2007 by applying 1 
year's growth rate to the traffic measures, because construction was 
expected to begin in fall 2008. However, MCC did not use this method 
in Cape Verde, where there was a similar time lag.[Footnote 21] 

* For the section of highway to be rehabilitated in Nicaragua, MCC 
retained a baseline calculated in a 2000 traffic study[Footnote 22] 
even though it had 2007 data for the specific 18 kilometers of road it 
planned to rehabilitate. 

* In Honduras, MCC used a baseline established before 2005 despite the 
availability of data from a 2008 traffic survey. The 2008 traffic 
survey results showed that traffic volumes already met or exceeded the 
end-of-compact targets for most road segments. Because MCC used the 
2005 data, the final results for the project indicate a larger change 
over the compact implementation timeframe than actually occurred. 

Common Indicators for Road Projects Not Consistently Reviewed for 
Quality: 

The data quality reviews conducted for most compacts did not include 
the kilometers-paved, roughness, or average annual daily traffic 
indicators. MCC requires that MCAs contract an independent entity to 
review the quality of compact performance data. According to MCC, this 
requirement was fulfilled for every compact except Nicaragua. However, 
only the data quality reviews for Georgia included all three 
indicators. (The reviews did not identify any data problems with these 
indicators).[Footnote 23] Although the data quality reviews for 
Armenia included two of the three indicators, the compact was put on 
hold before MCA-Armenia could fully correct identified problems. In 
Vanuatu, data quality reviews conducted in 2008 and 2009 identified 
problems with the measurement of annual average daily traffic. 
[Footnote 24] MCA-Vanuatu did not provide a response to either of the 
recommendations in the review and made no changes to the definition of 
the traffic indicator in the final monitoring and evaluation plan. The 
data quality reviews for the Honduras and Cape Verde compacts did not 
include any of the three road indicators. Table 5 summarizes the 
treatment of the three common road indicators we examined in data 
quality reviews for the six compacts. 

Table 5: Data Quality Reviews Performed for Road Project Common 
Indicators: 

Honduras; 
Kilometers of road completed: Indicator not reviewed; 
International roughness index: Indicator not reviewed; 
Average annual daily traffic: Indicator not reviewed; 
Recommendations implemented: N/A. 

Cape Verde; 
Kilometers of road completed: Indicator not reviewed; 
International roughness index: Indicator not reviewed; 
Average annual daily traffic: Indicator not reviewed; 
Recommendations implemented: N/A. 

Nicaragua[A]; 
Kilometers of road completed: No data quality review performed; 
International roughness index: No data quality review performed; 
Average annual daily traffic: No data quality review performed; 
Recommendations implemented: N/A. 

Georgia; 
Kilometers of road completed: Indicator reviewed without 
recommendation; 
International roughness index: Indicator reviewed without 
recommendation; 
Average annual daily traffic: Indicator reviewed without 
recommendation; 
Recommendations implemented: N/A. 

Vanuatu; 
Kilometers of road completed: Indicator not reviewed; 
International roughness index: Indicator not reviewed; 
Average annual daily traffic: Indicator reviewed with recommendation; 
Recommendations implemented: No. 

Armenia; 
Kilometers of road completed: Indicator not reviewed; 
International roughness index: Indicator reviewed with recommendation; 
Average annual daily traffic: Indicator reviewed with recommendation; 
Recommendations implemented: No[B]. 

[End of table] 

Legend: 

N/A: Not applicable. 

[A] MCC officials stated that no data quality reviews were performed 
in Nicaragua. 

[B] Recommendations were not implemented in Armenia, because the road 
project was put on hold in June 2009. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCA data quality reviews. 

MCC Did Not Consistently Account for Third-Party Funding: 

The governments of three countries--Honduras, Cape Verde, and Vanuatu--
secured funding from a third party to rehabilitate some of the road 
lengths that MCC removed from the scope of the compact.[Footnote 25] 
However, we found that MCC did not consistently account for this third-
party funding when reporting the final results of kilometers 
completed. As a result, MCC understated its results in Honduras and 
overstated them in Vanuatu. 

* The government of Honduras secured money from the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration to complete 57.6 kilometers of the 
highway project, which MCC removed from the compact's original scope. 
[Footnote 26] However, MCA-Honduras did not revise its kilometers-
completed target to reflect this reduction in scope. Therefore, MCC 
reports that it did not meet the compact's final kilometers-completed 
target, even though data suggest that the kilometers MCC funded were 
complete at the end of the compact: 

* The government of Cape Verde secured funding from the government of 
Portugal to rehabilitate 22.9 kilometers of secondary roads that MCC 
removed from the scope of its compact. MCA-Cape Verde revised its 
kilometers-completed target to reflect this reduction in scope and did 
not report these 22.9 kilometers as a part of its final results. 
Therefore, MCC reports that it met the compact's revised kilometers-
completed target. 

* The government of Vanuatu secured money from New Zealand to assist 
in rehabilitating a 57.2 kilometer road, because the MCC compact funds 
were not sufficient to complete all 57.2 kilometers. However, MCC 
reported all 57.2 kilometers as a part of its final results, even 
though it did not fund all of the work. 

MCC Reduced the Cape Verde Port Project Scope and Did Not Meet Many 
Targets for the Benin Port Project: 

For the Cape Verde compact, MCC reduced the scope of the port project, 
deferred the measurement of key indicators, and therefore did not 
conduct any data quality reviews of those indicators. In Benin, MCC 
completed most of the originally envisioned port project scope, and 
its data show that the compact met the original target for one of the 
three key indicators. However, we identified issues with the 
indicators' baseline estimates. In addition, data quality reviews 
identified problems with the data behind the indicators, which MCA-
Benin did not formally address. 

In Cape Verde, MCC Reduced the Port Project's Scope and Deferred the 
Measurement of Key Indicators: 

MCC split the Cape Verde project into two phases in May 2008 because, 
owing to increased construction costs, the $53.7 million allocated to 
the port projects was insufficient to fund all of the planned 
improvements. MCC funded phase 1 of the improvements, including 
construction of a cargo storage area and an access road, and 
rehabilitation of Wharf 2. The government of Cape Verde secured a loan 
from the government of Portugal for $87 million to complete phase 2, 
that is, those elements removed from the scope of the MCC 
project.[Footnote 27] The MCC-funded portion of the construction 
(phase 1) represents about one-third of the total expected cost of 
both phases. Nearly 100 percent of the works for phase 1 were 
completed by compact end. Phase 2 was awarded late in the compact, and 
work was under way as of July 2012. 

MCC deferred the measurement of key performance indicators when it 
revised the project scope, because results for key indicators could be 
measured only after full completion of the port (see table 6). MCC 
intends to measure results for the key indicators when phase 2 is 
complete. 

Table 6: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Cape Verde: 

Indicator: Volume of merchandise (thousand tons/year); 
Original target: 710.5; 
Revised target: 
Final result: 
Target met: 
Performance indicators were eliminated once the Cape Verde project was 
descoped. 

Indicator: Container ship time at berth (days); 
Original target: 1.0; 
Revised target: 
Final result: 
Target met: 
Performance indicators were eliminated once the Cape Verde project was 
descoped. 

Indicator: Container ship time at anchor (hours); 
Original target: 4.0; 
Revised target: 
Final result: 
Target met: 
Performance indicators were eliminated once the Cape Verde project was 
descoped. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Note: See appendix IV for additional details on targets and results 
for key indicators in Cape Verde. 

[End of table] 

MCA-Cape Verde contracted for data quality reviews in 2007 and 2010. 
The port project was reviewed in 2010; however, key indicators were 
not evaluated, because MCA-Cape Verde deferred measurement of those 
indicators until phase 2 was complete. 

MCC's Reported Results for the Benin Port Project Have Data Quality 
Issues: 

MCC data show that Benin maintained most of the original project scope 
and met the original target for one of three key indicators.[Footnote 
28] The project scope included constructing or rehabilitating a jetty, 
a new wharf, and port roads and installing lighting, security, and an 
electricity distribution system. MCC reports that the Benin compact 
met the original target for volume of merchandise through the port, 
but it did not meet targets for the other two key indicators, 
container ship waiting time at berth and container ship waiting time 
at anchor. See table 7 for a summary of key performance results for 
the Benin port project. 

Table 7: Key Performance Results for MCC Port Project in Benin: 

Indicator: Volume of merchandise (thousand tons/year); 
Original target: 6,944.6; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 7,605.9; 
Target met: Met original target. 

Indicator: Container ship time at berth (days); 
Original target: 1.0; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 1.3; 
Target met: Did not meet original or revised target. 

Indicator: Container ship time at anchor (hours); 
Original target: 4.0; 
Revised target: [Empty]; 
Final result: 34.6; 
Target met: Did not meet original or revised target. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

Note: A missing value for the revised target indicates that the 
original target was not revised. See appendix IV for additional 
details on targets and results for key indicators in Benin. 

[End of table] 

We identified problems with MCC's measurement of the volume-of-
merchandise indicators, and MCA-Benin's data quality reviews 
identified additional problems with all three key indicators. For the 
volume-of-merchandise indicator in Benin, MCC used 2004 data from the 
Port Authority to establish a baseline of 4.1 million metric tons in 
the compact's monitoring and evaluation plans and indicator tracking 
tables. MCA-Benin did not subsequently update the baseline. However, 
the compact did not enter into force until October 2006 and port 
improvement construction did not begin until August 2009. Available 
annual data for Benin showed that in 2005 the volume of merchandise 
had already increased to 5.2 million metric tons. Without an updated 
baseline, the estimate may not accurately reflect preconstruction 
conditions and may lead MCC to overstate the degree to which port 
traffic increased because of the compact. 

MCA-Benin contracted data quality reviews in 2008, 2009, and 2011. The 
2008 and 2009 data quality reviews identified issues with the three 
key port indicators that we reviewed, but MCC did not address all of 
the issues.[Footnote 29] The 2011 review did not examine these 
specific port indicators. 

* For the volume-of-merchandise indicator, MCA-contractors noted that 
although data collection methods were consistent and the data were 
valid, the Port Authority of Cotonou needed to improve the timeliness 
of data related to this indicator because the data entry and control 
procedures created delays in the availability of information. MCC 
policy indicates that data should be sufficiently current to inform 
management decisions because decisions depend on regular collection of 
performance information. In 2008 and 2009, the contractors recommended 
that MCA-Benin set up an automatic data transfer system for 
information collected on ship stopover, to avoid redundant data entry 
efforts by the port's statistical services. Although the 2009 review 
indicated that the port was resolving problems through the creation of 
a port information system when the evaluation was conducted, we found 
that MCA-Benin did not resolve the issues identified for this 
indicator. No changes were made in the final monitoring and evaluation 
plan to indicate that adjustments were made in the data collection 
methods for this indicator. In addition, MCA-Benin responses to the 
review did not address this issue. 

* For the container ship time at berth and container ship time at 
anchor indicators, the 2008 and 2009 reviews noted that, while the 
data collected were a direct measure of what the indicators were 
intended to capture and the data collection procedures were 
consistent, there were no historical data to support the baseline 
values for these indicators. The reviews recommended using baseline 
values established in a 2005 report by an international consulting 
firm. We found that MCA-Benin did not resolve issues identified for 
these two indicators. MCC and MCA officials stated that they decided 
not to revise indicator baselines and targets as recommended, and no 
revisions were made to baseline figures in subsequent monitoring and 
evaluation plans. MCC and MCA officials provided no additional 
explanation. 

Data Resulting from Beneficiary Calculations May Not Be Valid: 

In 2009, MCC improved its beneficiary estimates by adopting a more 
standardized approach, which it documented in its Guidelines for 
Economic and Beneficiary Analysis; however, the updated guidelines do 
not include a formal quality review process. MCC subsequently revised 
its beneficiary estimates for ongoing compacts, but the implementation 
of the new approach was not always consistent and suffered from 
varying degrees of quality control problems. Although some of the 
individual problems we identified were small in nature, taken as a 
whole they reduce confidence in MCC's estimates. 

MCC's Updated Beneficiary Analysis Guidelines Do Not Include a Formal 
Quality Review Process: 

In our previous work, we found that MCC did not have a consistent 
methodology for estimating the number of beneficiaries across 
compacts.[Footnote 30] As a result, MCC adopted a new, more 
standardized approach, which it published in its 2009 Guidelines for 
Economic and Beneficiary Analysis. MCC subsequently conducted a 
"beneficiary scrub," revising beneficiary numbers for ongoing compacts 
based on the 2009 guidelines. However, we found errors and 
inconsistencies in the calculations. MCC stated that these scrubs are 
informally reviewed but that they do not undergo a formal quality 
review process.[Footnote 31] Such a process would ensure that the 
information and data provided have been verified for consistency and 
accuracy. 

Weaknesses Call into Question the Validity and Reliability of MCC's 
Beneficiary Data: 

We identified three general weaknesses with MCC's beneficiary 
calculations. First, the beneficiary calculations in MCC's internal 
documents contain weaknesses such as incorrect formulas and numbers as 
well as discrepancies with supporting documents. Second, MCC did not 
apply a consistent methodology in estimating beneficiaries for its 
early transportation infrastructure projects. Third, the beneficiary 
figures in MCC's public documents are sometimes inaccurate. 

MCC's Beneficiary Calculations Contained Mistakes: 

Some beneficiary calculations contained mistakes in the formulas used. 
For example, the computations of the population growth rate for 
Georgia and Cape Verde contained an error in the mathematical formula, 
causing MCC to slightly overstate the growth rate in the first case 
and understate it in the second case. In addition, erroneous numbers 
were used in four of the seven compacts we reviewed. 

* For the Georgia road project, MCC stated in the beneficiary 
calculation documents that "the original beneficiary estimate of 
53,988 people counts all households living in the four rayons, or 
districts, through which the road passes…The revised beneficiary 
estimate [of 58,079] is based on a 5 km catchment area of the Road." 
MCC thus originally claimed a lower number of beneficiaries for a 
larger geographic area (the districts) than the more limited catchment 
area--the geographic area in which benefits may be expected to accrue--
of 5 kilometers on either side of the road.[Footnote 32] 

* For the Benin port project, the population projection in the 
beneficiary scrub began with a 2005 original baseline figure of 
8,490,000, since the port project is expected to raise the incomes of 
the entire population of Benin. However, this number could not be 
derived from its purported source, the 2002 population census. 
[Footnote 33] 

* For the Armenia road project, the document supporting the 
beneficiary scrub calculation considered a catchment area for an 
erroneous revised road length of 68 kilometers rather than the correct 
figure of 24.4 kilometers. 

* In the Cape Verde roads and bridges activity, the original 
beneficiary numbers provided in the document supporting the 
beneficiary scrub spreadsheet did not match the figures in the 
spreadsheet. 

MCC's Methodology to Estimate Beneficiaries Is Not Consistently 
Applied across Compacts: 

In the 2009 revision of its Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary 
Analysis, MCC standardized its methodology to estimate beneficiaries 
and accordingly modified its beneficiary numbers in the spreadsheets 
for its beneficiary scrubs. However, the amount of detail in the 
analysis varied across compacts, and population growth rates were not 
always calculated in a consistent manner. 

Of the beneficiary scrubs we reviewed, four of seven contained 
disaggregated data at the project level. Specifically, the Armenia, 
Georgia, Nicaragua, and Vanuatu scrubs are made up of multiple, 
relatively detailed spreadsheets. By contrast, one beneficiary scrub, 
for Honduras, contained one page of macro-level summary data with no 
explanation or sources for the figures. The remaining two of the seven 
scrubs contained additional data but were not as detailed as the first 
four. For example, the Cape Verde scrub included a second sheet of 
World Bank development indicators on the country, and the Benin scrub 
had some details on one of the compact projects. These varying levels 
of detail suggest that the scrubs were executed in an ad hoc, rather 
than consistent, manner. 

MCC uses population growth rates to estimate the number of 
beneficiaries in a 20-year projection period; for each compact, MCC 
publicly presents the number of beneficiaries projected for the end of 
the 20-year period.[Footnote 34] However, the scrub sheets we reviewed 
showed that MCC sometimes computed population growth rates differently 
across compacts, even when the scrubs provided the same underlying 
information. 

* For Honduras, MCC indicated that it took the population growth rates 
for 2005, 2006, and 2007 from World Bank data and averaged the three 
rates to get an average annual growth rate for the projection. 
[Footnote 35] 

* For Georgia and Cape Verde, MCC did not use the historical growth 
rates provided but instead took total population figures in 2005 and 
2007 and used them to compute an average annual growth rate for the 
beneficiary projection. 

* For Vanuatu, MCC computed an average annual growth rate based on 
four historical growth rates without specifying a source or year. 

For Some Countries, MCC Did Not Update Beneficiary Numbers or Reported 
Them Incorrectly: 

In three of seven compacts, we found that some numbers in MCC's public 
documents had not been updated or were inaccurate. 

* In the case of the Georgia road, a December 2009 report and a July 
2011 close-out document used original beneficiary estimates (53,988), 
instead of using the revised estimate (58,079) from July 2009, when 
MCC reported having recalculated the beneficiary numbers. In addition, 
in the 2011 status report, the total number of beneficiaries for the 
compact as a whole (143,000) was smaller than the beneficiaries of the 
infrastructure project alone (300,000). 

* For the Benin port project, the beneficiary estimate that appeared 
in a 2011 status report (8,791,832) was an original estimate from 2009 
instead of the revised estimate of 16,119,058. In addition, the 
supporting document accompanying the 2009 scrub spreadsheet mistakenly 
reported 13,421,086 beneficiaries for the port project by 2026. 
However, the data in the scrub indicated that this figure referred to 
the number of beneficiaries in 2020; the correct number of projected 
beneficiaries for 2026 is 16,119,058. 

* For Armenia, the beneficiary estimate for the road project in a 2011 
publication (6,216) did not reflect a revision of the estimate done in 
2009 (6,356). 

Conclusions: 

MCC recognizes the importance of a disciplined, transparent, and 
accountable approach to tracking compact results to make well-informed 
decisions about U.S. investments. It has established an extensive 
monitoring and evaluation program that includes guidance and tools for 
the partner countries and controls on data quality. In addition, MCC 
has created and implemented a revised beneficiary calculation 
methodology to ensure standardization across projects and compacts. 

Even with these steps, problems exist with the data behind several of 
MCC's key performance indicators, limiting the reliability of MCC's 
reported results. 

* MCAs have not measured the results of common indicators in a uniform 
manner--including how they account for additional third-party funding--
nor have they consistently reviewed the quality of data used to report 
the indicators' results. As such, MCC cannot confidently compare or 
aggregate the results of these common indicators as intended. 

* MCC requires the establishment of baselines to measure the impact 
its assistance has on partner countries. However, because some 
incorrect baselines were used, results may be over-or understated. 

* MCAs have not consistently fulfilled the MCC requirements that they 
conduct independent data quality reviews and respond to issues the 
reviews raised. As a result, MCC and its partners have missed 
opportunities to improve data quality and facilitate data reporting 
and aggregation. 

In addition, MCC's beneficiary calculations have problems that limit 
their usefulness. Because MCC's new approach to estimating beneficiary 
numbers does not include a formal quality review process, the 
beneficiary estimates contain incorrect numbers and formulas and 
inconsistent calculations. While the impact of these problems is 
generally small, the lack of a robust, formal quality review process 
nonetheless calls into question the reliability of MCC's estimates. 
Without a correct representation of the compacts' results and 
beneficiaries, MCC, Congress, and other key stakeholders cannot 
accurately evaluate the extent to which MCC is achieving its goals of 
poverty reduction and economic growth. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that MCC's Chief Executive Officer take the following 
four actions. 

To improve the reliability of results measurement, MCC should: 

* improve guidance for common indicators by requiring that they are 
included in data quality reviews, measured uniformly across compacts, 
and reported in a standardized manner--including when third-party 
funding is used to complete the original scope of a project; 

* improve guidance for baseline measurements by requiring MCAs to 
document the date, source, and methodology for establishing the 
baseline; and: 

* enforce current monitoring and evaluation policy requiring MCAs to 
conduct data quality reviews and to provide written comments in 
response to identified issues, discussing how recommendations will be 
implemented or explaining why changes may not be made. 

To ensure more accurate beneficiary numbers, MCC should: 

* incorporate into the Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary 
Analysis a formal process for reviewing beneficiary calculations and 
analysis. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, MCC stated that it 
agrees with our four recommendations and outlined steps it will take 
or has taken to address them. 

* With respect to our first recommendation--to improve guidance for 
common indicators--MCC stated that it has taken preliminary actions to 
address it. We reviewed MCC's May 2012 Guidance on Common Indicators 
and found that it defines the indicators and specifies each 
indicator's unit of measurement and how each should be disaggregated. 
In addition, when MCC activities are conducted jointly with other 
organizations (e.g. when the activities include third-party funding), 
MCC's guidance instructs MCAs to report only MCC's contribution to a 
particular common indicator. In addition, the guidance states that MCC 
will be explicit in reporting which changes in outcome indicators are 
more likely the result of MCC investments and which changes might also 
be influenced by other interventions. However, the guidance lacks 
enough specificity to address other weaknesses we identified. For 
example, when discussing road roughness, the guidance does not 
instruct MCAs to measure both sides of the road to account for 
variation in roughness from one side of the road to the other. In 
addition, this guidance does not specify that MCAs should include 
common indicators in their data quality reviews. 

* With respect to our second recommendation--to improve guidance for 
baseline measurements--MCC stated that its current monitoring and 
evaluation policy requires that compacts' monitoring and evaluation 
plans document the date, source, and methodology for establishing 
baseline measurements. MCC further stated that current MCA monitoring 
and evaluation plans are compliant with this requirement. 

* With respect to our third recommendation--to enforce current 
monitoring and evaluation policy requiring MCAs to conduct data 
quality reviews and to provide written comments in response to 
identified issues--MCC stated that it works with MCAs to ensure that 
recommendations of data quality reviews are incorporated into 
monitoring and evaluation plans and then implemented. 

* With respect to our fourth recommendation--to incorporate a formal 
process for reviewing beneficiary calculations and analysis--MCC noted 
that it will institute a formal process for reviewing beneficiary 
calculations and address the weaknesses we identified in this report. 

MCC asserted that the results of its compact investments are not 
diminished by the data quality challenges highlighted in this report. 
MCC noted, for example, that more than 623 kilometers of rehabilitated 
roads now serve poor and rural households in the countries we 
reviewed, linking farmers to markets and bolstering important regional 
trade routes. Regarding our finding that the total target for 
kilometers of road completed for the six compacts was reduced by 63 
percent, MCC also noted that the final target for Honduras, Georgia, 
Cape Verde, and Vanuatu would be only 19 percent below the original 
target if we were to exclude the road projects that MCC terminated or 
discontinued as a result of the Armenian and Nicaraguan governments' 
undemocratic behavior. 

We have reprinted MCC's comments in appendix V. We have also 
incorporated technical comments from MCC in our report where 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In addition, this 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please 
contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

David Gootnick: 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Public Law 110-
161, mandated that GAO review the results of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation's (MCC) compacts. This report examines the extent to which 
MCC has, for transportation infrastructure projects in compacts ending 
in 2010 and 2011, (1) achieved expected performance targets and (2) 
used a consistent methodology in estimating numbers of beneficiaries. 
The seven countries with compacts relevant to our scope are Honduras, 
Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Vanuatu, Armenia, and Benin. 

MCC enters into a legal relationship with partner country governments, 
which vests responsibility for day-to-day management of compact 
project implementation with an accountable entity--a Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA)--including monitoring and evaluation 
activities such as setting and revising targets. Because such MCA 
actions require MCC's direct oversight and approval, throughout this 
report we attribute all decisions related to project rescoping and 
compact targets to MCC. 

To assess the extent to which MCC has achieved its performance targets 
for transportation infrastructure projects in compacts ending in 2010 
and 2011, we reviewed MCC guidance and policy documents and analyzed 
compacts, monitoring and evaluation plans, and indicator tracking 
tables for the compacts with Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, 
Vanuatu, Armenia, and Benin. In assessing and reporting MCC's results, 
we compared actual results achieved at the end of the compact for 
select performance indicators with the original and, in some cases, 
revised targets associated with each indicator. We considered the 
original target to be the one first documented for each performance 
indicator and the final target to be the one last documented in MCC 
monitoring documents. 

Given that MCC tracks several performance indicators for each compact 
project, we selected a subset of indicators to examine for this 
report. For the roads projects, we examined kilometers of road 
completed, road roughness, and average annual daily traffic. We 
selected these road project indicators because (1) they address the 
projects' key objectives and (2) they are among the "common 
indicators" that MCC requires all road projects to measure so that it 
can aggregate results across countries. For the port projects, we 
examined volume of merchandise through the port, container ship time 
at berth, and container ship time at anchor. Although MCC has not 
established common indicators for the port projects, we selected these 
port project indicators because they (1) addressed the projects' key 
objectives, (2) corresponded to the common indicators established for 
the roads projects, and (3) were originally included in both port 
projects. 

To report the average value of targets and results for compact road 
projects, we calculated a weighted average using the length of each 
road segment. We performed this calculation for the average annual 
daily traffic and roughness indicators for Cape Verde, Honduras, 
Vanuatu, and Nicaragua because these MCAs report targets and results 
by road segment. For Honduras, we did not weight the indicators using 
values from sections 1 and 2 because the government of Honduras 
completed these sections with funding from the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration. For Cape Verde, we did not include the 
average annual daily traffic and roughness for bridge projects, 
because the kilometer lengths of these sections were not available. 

To determine the amount of funding used for transportation 
infrastructure projects, we reviewed MCC financial data. We included 
compact implementation funding--funds disbursed before entry into 
force to facilitate the implementation of the compact--with other 
projects not related to transportation infrastructure. 

To determine which MCAs contracted for independent data quality 
reviews, which transportation infrastructure indicators were 
evaluated, and whether recommendations were made for common and key 
indicators, we reviewed third-party data quality review reports. To 
determine whether recommendations were implemented, we reviewed MCA 
comments on the data quality reviews that MCC provided to us and we 
reviewed final monitoring and evaluation plans. 

To assess the extent to which MCC has consistently applied its 
beneficiary estimation methodology, we reviewed MCC's beneficiary 
calculations and accompanying supporting documents for the seven 
compacts that ended in 2010 and 2011. In particular, we examined for 
consistency and accuracy the data and formulas on projected 
beneficiaries for road and port projects in the Excel spreadsheets 
that MCC used to update--or "scrub"--the beneficiary estimates. We 
reviewed the documents explaining the calculations. We compared 
original beneficiary figures for these transportation projects with 
the revised ones and assessed the justification behind the changes. We 
also examined quarterly status reports and the monitoring and 
evaluation plans for each compact to check the accuracy of the 
publicly reported beneficiary counts. We consulted with MCC officials 
when we found discrepancies and errors in the data. 

As part of related GAO engagements focusing on Cape Verde and Honduras 
[Footnote 36] and on Georgia and Benin,[Footnote 37] we visited 
compact projects in-country and met with MCA officials, partner 
country government officials, contractors, project managers, 
construction supervisors, and relevant private businesses. 

Data are considered reliable when they are accurate, complete, 
consistent and valid, given the uses for which they are intended. To 
assess the reliability of MCC indicator and beneficiary data, we (1) 
reviewed MCC policy for the monitoring and evaluation of compacts and 
for calculating beneficiary numbers, (2) interviewed MCC and MCA 
officials regarding the reliability and validity of the data, (3) 
reviewed independent data quality reviews required by MCC, (4) 
compared performance indicators across original and final monitoring 
and evaluation plans and indicator tracking tables to identify 
inconsistencies, and (5) reviewed beneficiary calculations for 
accuracy. We identified some weaknesses in the data that may affect 
the data's reliability, as discussed in this report. 

Finally, some of the reports and documents referenced above were 
written in French and Spanish. We translated these documents as 
needed, creating English summaries to enable our analysis. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to September 2012 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
[Footnote 38] Those standards require that we plan and perform the 
audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Compact Timeframes: 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) completed seven compacts in 
2010 and 2011--Honduras, Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Benin, 
Vanuatu, and Armenia (see figure 3). MCC commits funding when it signs 
a compact, but MCC does not obligate funding until the compact enters 
into force. MCC funding that the partner country does not spend for 
compact activities by the end of the 5-year implementation timeframe 
must be deobligated.[Footnote 39] 

Figure 3: Timeframes for MCC Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011, by Date 
of Signature: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Honduras; 
Compact signature: 6/13/2550; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 6-13-05-9/29/05; 
Entry-into-force: 9/29/2005; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 9/29/05-9/28/10; 
End of compact: 9/28/2010. 

Cape Verde; 
Compact signature: 9/07/2005; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 7/04/05-10/17/05; 
Entry-into-force: 10/17/2005; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 10/17/05-10/16/2010; 
End of compact: 10/16/2010. 

Nicaragua; 
Compact signature: 7/14/2005; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 7/14/05-5/26/06; 
Entry-into-force: 5/26/2006; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 5/26/06-5/25/2011; 
End of compact: 5/25/2001. 

Georgia; 
Compact signature: 9/12/2005; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 9/12/05-4/7/06; 
Entry-into-force: 4/7/2006; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 4/7/06-4/6/2011. 
End of compact: 

Benin; 
Compact signature: 2/22/2006; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 2/22/06-10/6/06; 
Entry-into-force: 10/6/2006; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 10/6/06-10/5/11; 
End of compact: 10/5/2011. 

Vanuatu; 
Compact signature: 3/2/2006; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 3/2/06-4/28/06; 
Entry-into-force: 4/28/2006; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 4/28/06-4/27/11; 
End of compact: 4/27/2011. 

Armenia; 
Compact signature: 3/27/2006; 
Preparation for entry-into-force: 3/27/06-9/29/06; 
Entry-into-force: 9/29/2006; 
5-year compact implementation timeframe: 9/29/06-9/28/11; 
End of compact: 9/28/2011. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC compact data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Roads Data: 

Table 8: Kilometers of Roads Completed for MCC Road Projects in 
Compacts Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Honduras; 
Original target: 200.0; 
Final target: 174.5[A]; 
Final result: 115.0; 
Percentage of original target met: 57.5%; 
Percentage of final target met: 65.9%. 

Cape Verde; 
Original target: 63.0; 
Final target: 39.3; 
Final result: 40.6; 
Percentage of original target met: 64.4%; 
Percentage of final target met: 103.3%. 

Nicaragua; 
Original target: 158.0; 
Final target: 67.0; 
Final result: 74.0; 
Percentage of original target met: 46.8%; 
Percentage of final target met: 110.4%. 

Georgia; 
Original target: 245.0; 
Final target: 220.2; 
Final result: 220.0; 
Percentage of original target met: 89.8%; 
Percentage of final target met: 100.0%. 

Vanuatu; 
Original target: 213.8; 
Final target: 149.7; 
Final result: 149.7; 
Percentage of original target met: 70.0%; 
Percentage of final target met: 100.0%. 

Armenia[B]; 
Original target: 943.0; 
Final target: 24.4; 
Final result: 24.4; 
Percentage of original target met: 2.6%; 
Percentage of final target met: 100.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

[A] After reducing the scope of the Honduras compact, MCC formally 
reduced the final target for the secondary road activities but did not 
reduce the final target for the highway activity. 

[B] MCC provided documentation of kilometers completed; however, the 
documentation did not include takeover certificates from contractors, 
the data source for final kilometers in other countries. 

[End of table] 

Table 9: Road Roughness of MCC Road Projects in Compacts ending in 
2010 and 2011, as Measured by the International Roughness Index (IRI): 

Honduras[B]: 

Road section: CA-5 Highway: Section 1; 
Roughness baseline: 4.7; 
Original target: 1.9; 
Final target: 1.9; 
Final result: N/C; 
IRI methodology[A]: [Empty]. 

Road section: CA-5 Highway: Section 2; 
Roughness baseline: 4.4; 
Original target: 1.9; 
Final target: 1.9; 
Final result: N/C; 
IRI methodology[A]: [Empty]. 

Road section: CA-5 Highway: Section 3; 
Roughness baseline: 4.0; 
Original target: 1.9; 
Final target: 1.9; 
Final result: 2.2; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Road section: CA-5 Highway: Section 4; 
Roughness baseline: 4.0; 
Original target: 1.9; 
Final target: 1.9; 
Final result: 3.2; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Road section: Secondary roads; 
Roughness baseline: 13.6; 
Original target: 2.5; 
Final target: 2.5; 
Final result: 3.2; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Cape Verde: 

Road section: Road 1: Orgăos-Pedra Badejo; 
Roughness baseline: 19.0; 
Original target: 2.0; 
Final target: 2.0; 
Final result: 2.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Road section: Road 2: Cruz Grande-Calhetona; 
Roughness baseline: 18.0; 
Original target: 2.0; 
Final target: 2.0; 
Final result: 2.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Road section: Road 4: Assomada-Rincăo; 
Roughness baseline: 20.7; 
Original target: 2.0; 
Final target: 2.0; 
Final result: 2.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Road section: Vila das Pombas-Eito; 
Roughness baseline: 18.0; 
Original target: 10.0; 
Final target: 10.0; 
Final result: 10.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Nicaragua: 

Road section: Highway N-1: Villanueva-Guasaule; 
Roughness baseline: 12.0; 
Original target: 3.4; 
Final target: 3.4; 
Final result: 1.8; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Road section: S1: Somotillo-Cinco Pinos; 
Roughness baseline: 13.2; 
Original target: 3.0; 
Final target: 3.0; 
Final result: 3.4; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Road section: Leon-Poneloya; 
Roughness baseline: 12.0; 
Original target: 3.0; 
Final target: 3.0; 
Final result: 1.8; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Georgia; 

Road section: [Empty]; 
Roughness baseline: 16.6; 
Original target: 3.2; 
Final target: 2.5; 
Final result: 1.5; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Vanuatu: 

Road section: Efate Ring Road; 
Roughness baseline: 17.5; 
Original target: 3.5; 
Final target: 3.5; 
Final result: 3.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Road section: Santo East Coast Road; 
Roughness baseline: 22.0; 
Original target: 3.5; 
Final target: 3.5; 
Final result: 3.0; 
IRI methodology[A]: Visual. 

Armenia; 
Road section: [Empty]; 
Roughness baseline: 14.2; 
Original target: 5.0; 
Final target: 4.0; 
Final result: 3.5; 
IRI methodology[A]: Mechanical. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

N/C = not complete. 

Note: We found weaknesses in some of the reported data on road 
roughness, including the use of inconsistent application of 
methodologies and calculation errors. 

[A] There are two standard methods for measuring IRI: mechanical 
reading and visual observation. Mechanical reading involves using a 
device such as a bump integrator, walking profiler, or car-mounted 
software equipment to measure the IRI for each kilometer of road, 
which is then averaged across the length of the road to provide a 
single IRI estimate. The margin of error for mechanical readings 
differs depending on the type of device used. Visual observation is 
based on interpreting the smoothness of an observers' drive of the 
road at different speeds in a standard passenger vehicle, as 
corresponding to an IRI visual assessment scale. The accuracy of the 
visual inspection varies with the experience of the observer. 

[B] Because of the rescoping of the Honduras compact, sections 1 and 2 
of the CA-5 Highway were completed post-compact with additional 
funding provided by the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration; as of March 9, 2012, construction of these segments was 
not complete. 

[End of table] 

Table 10: Average Annual Daily Traffic on MCC-Funded Roads in Compacts 
Ending in 2010 and 2011: 

Honduras[A]: 

CA-5 Highway: Section 1; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 8,374; 
Original target: 9,447; 
Final target: 9,447; 
Final result: N/C. 

CA-5 Highway: Section 2; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 5,411; 
Original target: 6,104; 
Final target: 6,104; 
Final result: N/C. 

CA-5 Highway: Sections 3 & 4; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 6,732; 
Original target: 7,594; 
Final target: 7,594; 
Final result: N/C. 

Secondary roads; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 676; 
Original target: 887; 
Final target: 887; 
Final result: N/C. 

Cape Verde[B]: 

Road 1: Orgăos-Pedra Badejo; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 298; 
Original target: 375; 
Final target: 375; 
Final result: 432. 

Road 2: Cruz Grande-Calhetona; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 440; 
Original target: 554; 
Final target: 554; 
Final result: 235. 

Road 4: Assomada-Rincăo; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 543; 
Original target: 684; 
Final target: 684; 
Final result: 268. 

Road: Vila das Pombas-Eito; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 410; 
Original target: 517; 
Final target: 517; 
Final result: 184. 

Bridge Ribeira Grande-Paul; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 552; 
Original target: 695; 
Final target: 695; 
Final result: 76. 

Bridge Ribeira da Torre-Ponta de Sol; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 765; 
Original target: 963; 
Final target: 963; 
Final result: 644. 

Bridge A Paul (Vila das Pombas); 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 671; 
Original target: 845; 
Final target: 845; 
Final result: 50. 

Nicaragua: 

Highway N-1: Villanueva-Guasaule; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 1,413; 
Original target: 1,580; 
Final target: 1,580; 
Final result: 1,962. 

S1: Somotillo-Cinco Pinos; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 234; 
Original target: 278; 
Final target: 278; 
Final result: 561. 

S9: Leon-Poneloya; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 1,103; 
Original target: 1,276; 
Final target: 1,276; 
Final result: 1,462. 

Georgia: 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 612; 
Original target: 6,700; 
Final target: 1,183; 
Final result: 1,092. 

Vanuatu: 

Efate Ring Road; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 85; 
Original target: 950; 
Final target: 98; 
Final result: 305. 

Santo East Coast Road; 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 307; 
Original target: 1,000; 
Final target: 355; 
Final result: 381. 

Armenia: 
Average annual daily traffic baseline: 637; 
Original target: 460; 
Final target: 706; 
Final result: 735. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

N/C = not complete. 

Note: We found weaknesses in some of the reported data on average 
annual daily traffic, including inconsistent updating of baseline 
measurements. 

[A] A traffic count for completed roads in Honduras was conducted from 
December 19, 2010, through January 25, 2011. MCC stated that it does 
not expect a final traffic measure in Honduras until late 2012. 

[B] As of January 2012, a final traffic study for completed roads in 
Cape Verde had not been conducted; results shown reflect traffic 
counts conducted at the compact end date and do not reflect annualized 
average daily traffic volumes. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Port Data: 

Table 11: Volume of Merchandise through Port for Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Thousand tons/year: 

Cape Verde[A]; 
Baseline: 482; 
Original target: 711; 
Final target: 711; 
Final result: N/C. 

Benin; 
Baseline: 4,519[B]; 
Original target: 6,945; 
Final target: 6,945; 
Final result: 7,606. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

N/C = not complete. 

[A] MCC eliminated performance indicators after decreasing the scope 
of the Cape Verde port project, because the indicators could not be 
measured prior to completion of the Phase II works, including the 
wharf 1, container yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the 
government of Portugal and was expected to be completed after the 
compact closed. 

[B] Baseline from 2004. According to MCC, the value in 2005 was 5,680 
thousand tons. If MCC had used 2005 data for its baseline, the volume 
of merchandise would not show as large an increase. 

[End of table] 

Table 12: Container Ship Time at Berth for Port Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Days: 

Cape Verde[A]; 
Baseline: 1.41; 
Original target: 1.01; 
Final target: 1.01; 
Final result: N/C. 

Benin; 
Baseline: 2; 
Original target: 1; 
Final target: 1; 
Final result: 1.31. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

N/C = not complete: 

[A] MCC eliminated performance indicators after descoping the Cape 
Verde port project, because the indicators could not be measured prior 
to completion of the Phase II works, including the wharf 1, container 
yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the government of 
Portugal and was expected to be completed after the compact closed. 

[End of table] 

Table 13: Container Ship Time at Anchor for Port Projects in MCC 
Compacts That Ended in 2010 and 2011: 

Hours: 

Cape Verde[A]; 
Baseline: 5; 
Original target: 4; 
Final target: 4; 
Final result: N/C. 

Benin; 
Baseline: 16; 
Original target: 4; 
Final target: 4; 
Final result: 34.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of MCC data. 

N/C = not complete. 

[A] MCC eliminated performance indicators after descoping the Cape 
Verde Port project, because the indicators could not be measured prior 
to completion of the Phase II works, including the wharf 1, container 
yard, and breakwater. Phase II was funded by the government of 
Portugal and was expected to be completed after the compact closed. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Millennium Challenge Corporation: 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: 
United States of America: 

August 13, 2012: 

David Gootnick: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gootnick: 

Subject: Results of Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven 
Countries, Report# GAO-12-631. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, "Results of 
Transportation Infrastructure Projects in Seven Countries." I was 
pleased to see the report acknowledge MCC's commitment to 
accountability and measuring results. As GAO concluded: "MCC 
recognizes the importance of a disciplined, transparent, and 
accountable approach to tracking compact results to make well-informed 
decisions about U.S. investments. It has established an extensive 
monitoring and evaluation program that includes guidance and tools for 
the partner countries and controls on data quality." MCC is committed 
to rigorously monitoring and evaluating the results of its 
investments, and welcomes GAO's findings and recommendations for 
continued improvement in this area. MCC agrees with the four 
recommendations made in the report, and outline below how the agency 
is addressing the recommendations. 

Before discussing the recommendations I would like to note that MCC's 
compact investments have produced significant, demonstrable results 
that are not diminished by the data quality challenges highlighted in 
the report. For example, over 623 kilometers of rehabilitated roadways 
are now serving poor and rural households in Honduras, Cape Verde, 
Nicaragua, Georgia, Vanuatu, and Armenia, linking farmers to markets 
and bolstering important regional trade routes. As GAO reports, 
performance targets for road roughness were met or exceeded in five of 
those six countries, and half met or exceeded targets for annual 
average daily traffic. The report states that the performance target 
for the number of kilometers to be paved across the six countries was 
reduced by 63 percent. However, if GAO excluded road projects that MCC 
terminated or discontinued as a result of undemocratic behavior by the 
governments of Armenia and Nicaragua, consistent with MCC's rigorous 
approach to holding partner countries accountable for good policy 
performance, the target for kilometers of roadway completed in Honduras,
Georgia, Cape Verde, and Georgia was reduced by only 19 percent below 
the original target. 

MCC agrees with GAO's recommendations to improve the reliability of 
results measurement and has already taken action to address many of 
them. In response to lessons learned from the implementation of the 
compacts analyzed by GAO, which were among the first implemented by 
MCC, the agency updated its Policy for Monitoring and Evaluation of 
Compacts and Threshold Programs (M&E Policy) in 2012 and published 
specific guidance for common indicators to improve the reliability of 
results measurement across all compact programs. 

GAO recommends that MCC "improve guidance for common indicators by 
requiring that they are included in data quality reviews, measured 
uniformly across compacts, and reported in a standardized manner 
including when third-party funding is used to complete the original 
scope of a project." MCC agrees and has already taken preliminary 
actions to address this recommendation. The 2012 revision to MCC's M&E 
Policy and accompanying guidance require Millennium Challenge Account 
entities (MCAs) to include compact-relevant common indicators in their 
M&E Plans, including definitions and descriptions. The guidance will 
ensure that MCC's common indicators are measured uniformly and 
reported in a standardized manner across compacts. In the 
implementation of the M&E Policy, MCC will ensure data quality
reviews include common indicators. MCC will also ensure that it 
accounts for third-party funding consistently across countries in its 
reporting. 

GAO also recommends that MCC "improve guidance for baseline 
measurements by requiring MCAs to document the date, source, and 
methodology for establishing the baseline." MCC agrees with this 
recommendation, and the agency's M&E Policy already requires that MCA
M&E Plans document the date, source, and methodology for establishing 
baseline measurements. Current MCA M&E Plans are compliant with this 
requirement. 

With respect to data quality reviews, GAO recommends that MCC "enforce 
current monitoring and evaluation policy requiring MCAs to conduct 
data quality reviews and to provide written comments in response to 
identified issues." MCC agrees with this recommendation. MCC's M&E 
Policy states, "MCAs are responsible for ensuring that MCC-approved 
recommendations of data quality reviews are.followed through and 
implemented' (emphasis added). In performing its oversight role, MCC 
works with MCAs to ensure that recommendations of data quality reviews 
are incorporated into M&E Plans and then implemented. 

GAO notes that MCC improved its beneficiary estimates in 2009 by 
adopting a more standardized approach and revising its beneficiary 
numbers. Despite these improvements, the report identified remaining 
weaknesses in MCC's beneficiary calculations, including mistakes in 
formulas, inconsistent application of estimation methodologies, and 
inaccurate reporting of beneficiary numbers. While GAO notes that "the 
impact of these problems is generally small," MCC will take steps to 
address the weaknesses, including re-examining formulas and 
beneficiary data and correcting errors or inconsistencies in analysis 
or reporting as necessary. 

GAO also reports that MCC's approach to estimating beneficiary numbers 
does not include a formal quality review process. Although beneficiary 
estimates are reviewed informally by MCC staff economists, a formal 
review process is not in place. As recommended by GAO, MCC will 
institute a formal process for reviewing beneficiary calculations. 
This should not only reduce the frequency of possible errors, but also 
will ensure consistent application of MCC guidelines for beneficiary 
estimates. 

I thank you and your staff for the professional manner in which this 
audit was conducted and for the opportunity to provide additional 
information and feedback on the GAO draft report. MCC looks forward to 
continued engagement with GAO to improve its compact assistance 
programs. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Andrew Mayock: 
Acting Vice President: 
Department of Compact Operations: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Emil Friberg, Jr. (Assistant 
Director), Miriam Carroll Fenton, Aryn Ehlow, Heather Hampton, and 
Seyda Wentworth made key contributions to this report. In addition, 
Michael Armes, Lynn Cothern, Reid Lowe, Ernie Jackson, Leslie Locke, 
and Jena Sinkfield provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Georgian and Benin Transportation 
Infrastructure Projects Varied in Quality and May Not Be Sustainable. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-630]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 27, 2012. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compacts in Cape Verde and Honduras 
Achieved Reduced Targets. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728]. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 
2011. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Summary Fact Sheet for 17 Compacts. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-797R]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 14, 2010. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: MCC Has Addressed a Number of 
Implementation Challenges, but Needs to Improve Financial Controls and 
Infrastructure Planning. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-52]. Washington, D.C.: November 6, 
2009. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Independent Reviews and Consistent 
Approaches Will Strengthen Projections of Program Impact. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-730]. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 
2008. 

Management Letter: Recommendations for Improvements to MCC's Internal 
Controls and Policies on Premium Class Air Travel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-468R]. Washington, D.C.: February 
29, 2008. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Projected Impact of Vanuatu Compact 
Is Overstated. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1122T]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Vanuatu Compact Overstates Projected 
Program Impact. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-909]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress and Challenges with 
Compacts in Africa. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1049T]. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2007. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compact Implementation Structures 
Are Being Established; Framework for Measuring Results Needs 
Improvement. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-805]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. 

Analysis of Future Millennium Challenge Corporation Obligations. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-466R]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 21, 2006. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress Made on Key Challenges in 
First Year of Operations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-625T]. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 
2005. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation: Progress Made on Key Challenges in 
First Year of Operations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-455T]. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 
2005. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] MCC commits funding when a compact is signed and obligates funds 
after the compact enters into force. As of June 2012, MCC had signed 
initial compacts with, in order of signature, Madagascar, Honduras, 
Cape Verde, Nicaragua, Georgia, Benin, Vanuatu, Armenia, Ghana, Mali, 
El Salvador, Mozambique, Lesotho, Morocco, Mongolia, Tanzania, Burkina 
Faso, Namibia, Senegal, Moldova, the Philippines, Jordan, Malawi, 
Indonesia, and Zambia. In February 2012, MCC signed a second compact 
with Cape Verde. 

[2] We did not include the Madagascar compact in this review because, 
as the result of an undemocratic transfer of power in Madagascar in 
March 2009, MCC formally terminated the compact effective August 31, 
2009, before the end of the 5-year statutory compact timeframe. 

[3] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 
668(d)(1)(A). The Act also required us to examine the financial 
control and procurement practices of MCC and its accountable entities. 
We responded to this requirement separately in GAO, Millennium 
Challenge Corporation: MCC Has Addressed a Number of Implementation 
Challenges, but Needs to Improve Financial Controls and Infrastructure 
Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-52] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2009). 

[4] GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Compacts in Cape Verde and 
Honduras Achieved Reduced Targets, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728] (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 
2011). 

[5] GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Georgia and Benin 
Transportation Infrastructure Projects Varied in Quality and May Not 
Be Sustainable, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-630] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 27, 2012). 

[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-630]. 

[7] Other board members are the U.S. Trade Representative, the 
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the 
Chief Executive Officer of MCC, and up to four Senate-confirmed 
nongovernmental members appointed by the President from lists of 
individuals submitted by congressional leadership. 

[8] MCC generally refers to each country's accountable entity by 
combining MCA with the country's name (e.g., MCA-Benin). 

[9] MCC developed guidelines in 2006 to assist eligible countries in 
the preparation of monitoring and evaluation plans and issued an 
updated policy in 2009 and in 2012. 

[10] In many cases, indicators are chosen because they relate to 
inputs for the economic rate of return analysis that MCC conducts to 
estimate a project's likely impact on the partner country's economic 
growth and poverty reduction prior to compact approval. More 
specifically, a project's estimated economic rate of return is the 
expected annual average return to the country's firms, individuals, or 
sectors for each dollar that MCC spends on the project. 

[11] MCC issued its Common Indicators Directive in 2009, establishing 
the common indicators and requiring MCAs to use them in project 
monitoring and evaluation plans. Although the seven compacts that we 
reviewed were signed before 2009, initial monitoring and evaluation 
plans for three of the six compacts with road projects included common 
indicators for kilometers completed, road roughness, and average 
annual daily traffic. The MCAs for the three remaining compacts 
introduced the common indicators into their monitoring and evaluation 
activities before the compacts ended. 

[12] MCC has developed additional common indicators for roads, 
including the percentage of funds disbursed for contracted studies, 
value of signed contracts for road works, percentage of funds for 
contracted road works disbursed, kilometers of roads under works 
contracts, and value of signed contracts for feasibility design 
supervision and program management contracts. 

[13] MCC has developed other indicators for ports, including 
percentage of funds for contracted port works disbursed, average time 
for goods to clear customs, average duration of stay of trucks at 
port, tons of merchandise shipped per year, and whether the port is 
meeting the International Ship and Port Facility Code, which 
establishes security requirements for ports. 

[14] According to its Guidelines for Economic and Beneficiary 
Analysis, MCC takes the household as the unit of measurement, counting 
as beneficiaries all members of the household. MCC's projects include 
targeted projects that benefit specific individuals or households--for 
example, projects focused on agricultural development or school 
construction--but also includes projects that are national or broad-
based in scope and benefit people living in a large geographical area. 
Beneficiaries include everyone who realizes income gain or expenditure 
savings regardless of the magnitude of these changes, although the 
income gain or expenditure savings are likely to vary significantly 
across individuals and projects. 

[15] MCC officials stated that detailed beneficiary analyses for its 
compacts are carried out retrospectively. MCC provided us with 
detailed beneficiary analyses, including "poverty scorecards" focusing 
on the impact of compacts on the poor, for six other compacts out of 
the 26 current and completed compacts. 

[16] In response to a draft copy of this report, MCC noted that if one 
excludes road projects that MCC terminated or discontinued as a result 
of undemocratic behavior by the governments of Armenia and Nicaragua, 
the final target for kilometers of roads completed in Honduras, 
Georgia, Cape Verde, and Vanuatu is only 19 percent below the original 
target. See appendix V for a copy of MCC's comments. 

[17] In Georgia, MCC reduced the roughness target to account for a 
delayed construction start date. A road's surface is smoothest 
directly following construction. Because the delay in construction 
pushed the expected completion date closer to the compact end date, 
this reduced the amount of time MCC-funded roads could deteriorate 
before roughness measurements were taken at the end of the compact. 
Therefore, the roads were expected to have a better roughness measure 
than originally planned. In Armenia, MCC reduced the target for road 
roughness once the project was placed on indefinite hold. The 24.4 
kilometers that MCC completed before putting the project on hold had a 
lower roughness target than the full package of roads MCC originally 
planned to complete. Therefore, removing the terminated roads from the 
project resulted in a better roughness measure for the compact overall. 

[18] During construction, because all lanes of a road often are not 
paved at the same time, uneven construction quality (e.g., nonuniform 
compaction of asphalt pavements), construction techniques that allow 
some variation in the surface, and other factors may lead to different 
roughness measures for each lane. 

[19] For two of the road segments, the nonmeasurable sections of road 
were left blank and the calculation of the final IRI used the value 
from the one measurable side of the road as the overall measure for 
that kilometer. 

[20] MCC revised the original traffic targets for the Georgia, 
Vanuatu, and Armenia compacts. In Georgia and Vanuatu, MCC reduced 
traffic targets when it corrected the original baseline estimates. In 
Armenia, MCC increased the traffic target once the road project was 
placed on indefinite hold; the single road that MCC completed prior to 
the project hold had a higher traffic target than the full package of 
roads MCC originally planned to complete. 

[21] MCC used a traffic count from a study conducted in 2005; however, 
construction of the road project began in 2006. 

[22] In addition, the 2000 traffic study was conducted for a 72-
kilometer section of highway, rather than the 18 kilometers designated 
for the project. 

[23] MCC policy allows each country to determine the frequency and 
timing of each review, along with which indicators will be evaluated. 

[24] The 2008 review provided several recommendations on how to 
structure the traffic count survey. In addition, a 2009 review found 
that the Vanuatu compact was at risk of double counting vehicles and 
recommended that the monitoring and evaluation plan indicate that 
traffic refers to the sum of the average number of vehicles passing 
over checkpoints. 

[25] Third-party funding is funding from a source other than MCC or 
the partner government. 

[26] MCC originally planned to fund all reconstruction included in the 
four sections of the Honduras highway project. However, because 
estimated costs had increased, MCC determined that it would be unable 
to complete all four sections within the 5-year compact timeframe and 
within the funding allocation. As a result, MCC funded about 94 
percent of construction on sections 3 and 4, funded 31 percent of 
section 2, and funded none of section 1. The third-party funding from 
the Central American Bank of Economic Integration funded the 
difference. For more information on this project, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728]. 

[27] Phase 2 works included the expansion of Wharf 1 and construction 
of a new breakwater. 

[28] While the project was largely completed as planned, components 
for a proposed fourth lot--which included a storage facility for dry 
bulk goods such as grains and sand and a fish quality inspection 
station--were deemed not viable once MCA-Benin conducted its 
feasibility studies. As a result, MCA-Benin did not tender a bid for 
that lot. According to MCC officials, the funds originally planned for 
those items were shifted to the other infrastructure components. The 
funds also helped cover cost increases and additional work on the 
wharf such as increasing wall length and dredging the berth. 

[29] Reviews also identified other port indicators for improvement in 
Benin. For example, the 2008 and 2009 reviews indicated that the 
average duration of stay of trucks at port, which measures the 
reduction in time necessary for vehicles to cross the port due to 
reduced congestion, had a baseline value that was set with no 
justification of its actual level. The review recommended that this 
information be collected in the annual survey of port user 
satisfaction. MCA-Benin did so and determined that the baseline value 
was 7 hours. However, no changes were made to the final monitoring and 
evaluation plan to reflect this and MCC and MCA officials indicated 
that they agreed not to revise indicator baselines at the time. 

[30] See GAO, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Independent Review and 
Consistent Approaches Will Strengthen Projections of Program Impact, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-730] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jun. 17, 2008). 

[31] According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, a variety of control activities should be used in 
information processing, including checking the data entered. In 
addition, GAO's Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool states 
that data validation and editing should be performed to identify 
erroneous data, which need to be reported and promptly corrected (GAO, 
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August 
2001). 

[32] MCC officials told us that the original number of 53,988 
beneficiaries was erroneous and should have been 111,442, in 
accordance with the 2004 Georgian Agricultural Census. 

[33] The 2002 census indicates 6,769,914 for the population of Benin; 
adjusting population growth for 3 years leads to 7,419,235, not 
8,490,000, in 2005. In addition, the supporting document that 
accompanied the beneficiary scrub spreadsheet and explained the 
computations had a different "original" baseline number--8,791,832--
for 2005. 

[34] MCC officials indicated that the standard time horizon for the 
beneficiary analysis is generally 20 years but that exceptions exist. 

[35] In the case of Benin and Nicaragua, the growth rate for the year 
2000 was added to the formula. 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-728]. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-630]. 

[38] We began work for this report in 2010; however, the job was 
suspended while we conducted work for a related engagement. 

[39] The statutory 5-year maximum timeframe begins once a compact 
enters into force. 

[End of section] 

GAO’s Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO’s website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
“E-mail Updates.” 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

[End of document] 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, DC 20548.