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Increasing Air Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, Components, and 
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GAO-12-577R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 4, 2012: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Nuclear Weapons: Evaluation of Report on Feasibility of 
Increasing Air Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, Components, and 
Materials: 

Transporting nuclear weapons, components, and materials represents a 
safety and security risk. House Report 110-652, which accompanied the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. No. 
110-417), directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
[Footnote 1] and the Air Force to conduct a feasibility study on 
increasing the use of aircraft to transport nuclear weapons, 
components, and materials and to report back to Congress by December 
31, 2008.[Footnote 2] In turn, House Report 112-78, which accompanied 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 
No. 112-81), directed us to conduct an independent evaluation of the 
air transportation study (ATS) jointly issued by the Administrator of 
NNSA and the Secretary of the Air Force in September 2009.[Footnote 3] 
The conclusions of the 2009 ATS report supported maintaining the 
current balance of air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons. 
[Footnote 4] 

We provided a classified briefing of our preliminary observations to 
staff of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, on February 2, 2012. On March 13, 
2012, we provided classified briefing slides to the House Armed 
Services Committee. 

This report provides information on whether (1) acceptable 
methodologies were used in the ATS report to develop nuclear weapons 
transportation options that considered safety, security, and 
operational requirements, (2) acceptable methodologies were used in 
the report to develop cost estimates for nuclear weapons 
transportation options identified in the report, and (3) recent 
changes to nuclear weapons transportation operations, technologies, or 
threat information might alter the conclusions reached in the report. 

To conduct our work, among other things, we applied a GAO methodology 
for assessing evaluation designs using support from ATS documents and 
interviews with NNSA and Department of Defense (DOD) officials from 
cognizant organizations (stakeholders); applied accepted economic 
practices for conducting feasibility studies; and reviewed pertinent 
DOD and Department of Energy guidance on transporting nuclear weapons, 
as well as interviewed additional officials from the office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Strategic Deterrence and 
Nuclear Integration, and Sandia National Laboratories about changes in 
operating procedures, technologies, or threat information since the 
issuance of the ATS report. In addition, we visited key NNSA and Air 
Force organizations, selected on the basis of their importance to the 
nuclear transportation mission, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

We conducted this work between November 2011 and May 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

In summary, we found the following: 

* The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for 
developing transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and 
operational requirements for these options. The assessment of safety 
risk from a possible airplane crash transporting nuclear weapons was 
the key factor supporting the report's conclusions to maintain the 
current balance of air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, the majority of the nuclear weapons in the active nuclear 
stockpile require special DOD approval to be transported by air. 

* The ATS report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop 
relative costs among the different transportation options under review 
and included selected costs, such as per-weapon, per-mile operating 
costs for transportation of nuclear weapons via current air and ground 
approaches. However, it did not analyze all costs--for example life 
cycle costs--or for developing infrastructure, such as airfields, 
necessary to support some air transportation options. 

* According to stakeholders, changes in operational requirements for 
transporting nuclear weapons, new technologies that have improved 
security and safety, or reassessments of potential threats of future 
attacks since the report's completion in 2009 would probably not 
mitigate the safety risk of air transportation and would be unlikely 
to alter the report's conclusions. 

For additional information on the results of our work, please see 
enclosure I, an unclassified version of the briefing slides that were 
delivered to the House Armed Services Committee. We are not making any 
recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. 

We requested comments from NNSA and the Air Force on a draft of the 
classified version of the briefing slides. NNSA officials provided 
their comments via e-mail on March 5, 2012, stating that the briefing 
accurately reflects the findings, results, and conclusions of the ATS 
report and that NNSA does not have any concerns or substantive 
comments. Air Force officials also provided oral comments on the draft 
briefing the same day, stating that they generally agreed with the 
information presented. They also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, 
Administrator of NNSA, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air 
Force, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office, and other appropriate congressional 
committees. This report is also available at no charge on GAO's 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact either Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov 
or John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report were Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), Penney Harwell Caramia 
(Assistant Director), Thomas Baril Jr., David Keefer, Thomas Laetz, 
Sally Newman, and Kiki Theodoropoulos. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment: 

Signed by: 

John Pendleton, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Enclosures - I: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: Unclassified Briefing on Air Transportation Study Report: 

Nuclear Weapons Transportation: Evaluation of Air Transportation Study 
Report: 

Unclassified Version of Briefing to Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 
House Armed Services Committee: 

March 13, 2012: 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise, aloisee@gao.gov. 

Background: 

House Report 110-652 that accompanied the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directed the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) and the Air Force, in coordination with 
the joint Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) 
Nuclear Weapons Council, to conduct a feasibility study on increasing 
the use of aircraft to transport nuclear weapons, components, and 
materials and to report back to Congress by December 31, 2008. 

NNSA transmitted a status report to congressional defense committee 
chairs on December 29, 2008, that also clarified scope and assumptions 
and extended the report date to July 31, 2009. 

The joint NNSA-Air Force Air Transportation Study (ATS) Report to 
Congress on the Feasibility of Increasing Air Transportation of 
Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Materials, was submitted on September 
3, 2009. 

House Report 112-78 that accompanied the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to conduct an 
independent evaluation of the ATS report. We presented our preliminary 
views to congressional staff on February 2, 2012. This briefing 
provides a final update on our evaluation of the ATS report. 

GAO’s Objectives: 

Our objectives were to determine whether: 

1. Accepted methodologies were used in the ATS report to develop 
nuclear weapons transportation options that considered safety, 
security, and operational requirements; 

2. Accepted methodologies were used to develop cost estimates 
for the nuclear weapons transportation options identified in the 
report; and; 

3. Recent changes to nuclear weapons transportation operations, 
technologies, or threat information might alter the conclusions 
reached in the report. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To evaluate the report’s methodologies used to develop nuclear weapons 
transportation options that considered safety, security, and 
operational requirements, we applied a GAO methodology for assessing 
evaluation designs, using support from ATS documents and interviews 
with NNSA and DOD officials from cognizant organizations 
(stakeholders). A list of these organizations is found at the end of 
these briefing slides. 

To assess the approach used in the report to develop cost estimates, we 
reviewed ATS documents, interviewed stakeholders, and applied accepted 
economic practices for conducting feasibility studies. 

To assess the potential effect of ongoing or recent changes in 
operations, technologies, or threat information on the conclusions 
reached in the report, we reviewed DOD and DOE/NNSA guidance and 
interviewed stakeholders. 

We visited key Air Force and NNSA organizations, selected on the basis 
of their importance to the nuclear transportation mission, located at 
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM. Our observations made at 
Kirtland cannot necessarily be generalized to other DOD and NNSA sites. 

This briefing satisfies the requirement for GAO to independently 
evaluate the ATS report, as stated in House Report 112-78. 

We conducted this review between November 2011 and May 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

At Kirtland Air Force Base, we: 

* Observed wing preparation and briefings for a loading exercise as 
well as traveled delivery route. We received security briefings 
detailing wing procedures. We were shown a flatbed trailer for 
transporting nuclear weapons to the loading area. 

* Visited NNSA’s Office of Secure Transportation’s (OST) Command and 
Control Center, discussed active defense concepts, and viewed a 
Safeguards Transporter (figure 1) and support vehicle. 

* Viewed a prototype nuclear weapons security container system at 
Sandia National Laboratories. 

Figure 1: Examples of Ground and Air Transportation Vehicles: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs] 

Flatbed trailer; 
C-17; 
Safeguards Transporter. 

Source: Sandia National Laboratories (trailer and transporter photos) 
and Air Force (C-17 photo). 

[End of figure] 

Results in Brief: 

The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for 
developing transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and 
operational requirements for these options. The assessment of safety 
risk from a possible airplane crash transporting nuclear weapons was 
the key factor supporting the report’s conclusions to maintain the 
current balance of air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, the majority of the active nuclear stockpile require 
special DOD approval to be transported by air. 

The report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop 
relative costs among the different transportation options under review 
and included selected costs, such as per-weapon, per-mile operating 
costs for transportation of nuclear weapons via current air and ground 
approaches. It did not, however, contain detailed cost estimates for 
new infrastructure, such as airfields, that would be required for some 
options. 

According to stakeholders, changes in operational requirements, 
technologies, or threat information since the report’s completion in 
2009 would probably not mitigate the safety risk of air transportation 
and would be unlikely to alter the report’s conclusions if the study 
were conducted today. 

Objective 1: Safety, Security, and Operational Requirements: 

The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for 
developing transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and 
operational requirements. 

The evaluation approach of the report had both design strengths and 
weaknesses, but the weaknesses were in part mitigated by the extensive 
comment and review processes that were used in drafting the report to 
resolve comments and reach concurrence among the report’s 
stakeholders. Additional review and endorsement by the joint DOD-DOE 
Nuclear Weapons Council also mitigated these weaknesses. 

Stakeholders who participated in and reviewed the ATS report, 
including those who took issue with portions of the report, agreed 
that a different methodological approach would not have changed the 
report’s conclusion—the safety risk from a possible airplane crash 
transporting nuclear weapons was the key factor supporting the report’
s conclusions to maintain the current balance of air and ground 
transportation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the majority of the 
active nuclear stockpile require special DOD approval to be 
transported by air. 

Strengths: The report: 

* Included relevant stakeholders in planning the evaluation; 

* Identified clear and measurable evaluation objectives; 

* Established criteria to measure performance; 

* Chose a reasonable design to answer evaluation objectives given 
time and resource constraints; 

* Included qualified subject matter experts from cognizant 
organizations; 

* Supported evaluation conclusions with data, analysis, validation 
processes, and stakeholder reviews. 

Weaknesses: The report did not: 

* Provide evidence of a formal evaluation plan to guide the effort; 

* Define how cost-effectiveness would be assessed against other 
evaluation criteria (safety, security, and operational requirements); 

* Develop a systematic process for collecting and analyzing data based 
on a defined plan; 

* Clearly articulate some specific steps used in the evaluation, such 
as how options were rated by stakeholders. 

The identified weaknesses in the report were sufficiently mitigated by: 

* A contemporaneous internal Sandia National Laboratories nuclear 
weapons transportation study that reached conclusions similar to those 
of the ATS report while using a slightly different methodology; 

* An extensive comment and review process that was used in drafting 
the report to resolve comments and reach concurrence among the 
report’s stakeholders; and; 

* Additional review and endorsement by the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear 
Weapons Council, which helped ensure broad acceptance of the ATS 
report. Established by Congress in 1986, the Council provides an 
interagency forum for reaching consensus and establishing priorities. 
It also provides policy guidance and oversight of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile management process to ensure the safety, security, and 
reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. 

Objective 2: Cost Estimating: 

The report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop 
relative costs among the 11 different transportation options under 
review and included selected costs, such as per-weapon, per-mile 
operating costs for transportation of nuclear weapons via current 
ground and air approaches. 

The report did not contain a detailed cost analysis that analyzed all 
costs (e.g., life cycle) associated with each transportation option. 
For example, the report recognized the comparative costs of developing 
infrastructure, such as airfields, that would be necessary to support 
some air transportation options but did not contain detailed cost 
estimates for this infrastructure. 

According to ATS team members, conducting more detailed cost analysis 
of the transportation options would have: 

* required more time to collect and analyze all necessary data; and; 

* distracted from a focus on transportation safety and security. 

Objective 3: Changes to Operations, Technologies or Threat Information: 

According to stakeholders we spoke with, changes in operational 
requirements, technologies, or threat information during the report’s 
preparation and since its issuance would be unlikely to alter the 
conclusions if the feasibility study were conducted today. 

The ATS stakeholders reported that, during the study period, they 
considered: 

* Information from an intelligence organization within OST; 

* Operational changes that were being implemented by OST; 

* DOE’s 2008 Graded Security Program and DOD’s Nuclear Security Threat 
Capabilities Assessment; and; 

* Security analyses and exercises such as DOD’s MIGHTY GUARDIAN and 
OST vulnerability assessments. 

Since the report’s issuance, DOD and DOE have taken additional 
actions and are making improvements in the security and safety of 
ground transportation of nuclear weapons, components, and materials. 
For example: 

* development and future deployment of a nuclear weapons security 
container system designed to mitigate a specific vulnerability; 

* design and future production of a new secure ground transporter; 
and; 

* ongoing efforts to assess the potential threats of a future attack. 

Several factors could cause the assessment of transportation options 
to shift in the future: 

* arms control treaties and international agreements—-which might 
increase the need to move weapons both within the United States and 
abroad; 

* innovation in life extension programs—-which could increase the 
inherent safety and security of nuclear weapons; 

* new technologies—-which could increase the safety and security of 
air transport, such as a closed trailer for on-base movement to 
aircraft, equipment to reduce loading time, and containers to mitigate 
aircraft safety and security risk; 

* an accident or event involving either ground or air transport of 
nuclear weapons, components, and materials-—which could change the 
current level of acceptable risk for either safety or security. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this briefing from NNSA 
and the Air Force. 

* NNSA provided comments via e-mail on March 5, 2012, noting that the 
briefing accurately reflects the findings, results, and conclusions 
of the joint Air Force/NNSA 2009 ATS, and that NNSA does not have any 
concerns or substantive comments. 

* Air Force officials provided oral comments on the draft briefing on 
March 5, 2012, stating that they generally agreed with the information 
presented. They also provided technical comments, which have been 
incorporated as appropriate. 

Organizations Contacted: 

Washington, D.C.: 

* Department of the Air Force: 
- Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10). 

* Department of Energy: 
- Headquarters, National Nuclear Security Administration: Office of 
Secure Transportation. 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense: 
- Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biologic Defense 
Programs (Nuclear Matters). 

* Former senior defense officials. 

Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command (by telephone): 
* J872. 

Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico: 
* Air Mobility Command; 
* Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center: 
- 377th Air Base Wing; 
- 498th Nuclear Systems Wing; 
* NNSA, Office of Secure Transportation; 
* Sandia National Laboratories. 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 
* Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is 
responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear 
weapons programs. 

[2] NNSA and the Air Force were directed to conduct the study in 
coordination with the joint Department of Defense/Department of Energy 
Nuclear Weapons Council. 

[3] Specifically, GAO was directed to submit a report of our 
independent evaluation to the congressional defense committees. 

[4] NNSA and the Air Force, Report to Congress on the Feasibility of 
Increasing Air Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, Components, and 
Materials, Sept. 3, 2009. 

[End of section] 

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