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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Addressees: 

February 2012: 

Afghanistan: 

Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence: 

GAO-12-285: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-285, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian 
presence under Chief of Mission authority to build the capacity of the 
Afghan government to provide security, essential services, and 
economic development. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
deploys civilians under combatant commander authority to Afghanistan 
to support both combat and capacity-building missions. DOD established 
the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) in 2009 to create a cadre 
of civilians trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to 
expeditionary requirements. As the military draws down, U.S. civilians 
will remain crucial to achieving the goal of transferring lead 
security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014. 
For this report, GAO (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian 
presence in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DOD’s implementation of its CEW 
policy, and (3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had 
provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel 
before deployment. GAO analyzed staffing data and training 
requirements, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Department 
of State (State), other U.S. agencies with personnel under Chief of 
Mission authority in Afghanistan, and DOD. 

What GAO Found: 

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in 
Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that 
presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission 
authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. 
However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by 
agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s data 
system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as 
location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 
2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported 
expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 
2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is unknown due 
to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 
report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data 
concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation 
and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to 
be completed in fiscal year 2012. 

DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement its Civilian 
Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) policy, including establishing a program 
office; however, nearly 3 years after DOD’s directive established the 
CEW, the program has not been fully developed and implemented. 
Specifically, DOD components have not identified and designated the 
number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW because 
guidance for making such determinations has not been provided by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Officials stated that once key 
assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been 
finalized, implementing guidance will be issued. Until guidance that 
instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number 
and types of positions that will constitute the CEW is developed, DOD 
may not be able to (1) make the CEW a significant portion of the 
civilian workforce as called for in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Plan, (2) meet readiness goals for the CEW as 
required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan for fiscal years 2012-
2013, and (3) position itself to respond to future missions. 

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and DOD provided 
Afghanistan-specific, predeployment training to their civilians, but 
DOD faced challenges. State offered predeployment training courses to 
address its requirements for Chief of Mission personnel and designated 
a centralized point of contact to help ensure that no personnel were 
deployed without taking required training, including the Foreign 
Affairs Counter Threat course. While predeployment training 
requirements were established for Afghanistan by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, DOD relied on its 
various components to provide the training to its civilians. In some 
cases, DOD components offered duplicate training courses and did not 
address all theater requirements in their training because DOD did not 
have a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and 
coordinating efforts to implement them, as called for in the Strategic 
Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of 
Defense. Absent this process, DOD could not ensure that its civilians 
were fully prepared for deployment to Afghanistan and that training 
resources were used efficiently. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO’s recommendations to DOD include developing key assumptions and 
identifying the number and types of positions that should constitute 
the CEW, and establishing a process to identify and synchronize 
training requirements. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

View GAO-12-285. For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at 
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson Jr. at 
(202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in 
Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track That 
Presence: 

DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did Not 
Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should Constitute the 
CEW: 

U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment Training 
Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: General Activities of U.S. Agencies under Chief of Mission 
Authority in Afghanistan: 

Table 2: Extent to Which Agencies Had Filled Chief of Mission Staffing 
Requirements in Afghanistan, December 2011: 

Table 3: Discrepancies between Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing 
Matrix and ACPTS: 

Table 4: Extent to Which DOD's New Capacity-Building Programs Had 
Filled Staffing Requirements in Afghanistan, as of December 2011: 

Table 5: State-Required, Afghanistan-Specific Training for Chief of 
Mission Personnel: 

Table 6: Gaps and Duplication in Training Courses Provided to DOD 
Civilians Deployed to Afghanistan: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Staffing Processes Used by State, USAID, and USDA to Recruit 
and Identify Candidates for Positions in Afghanistan: 

Figure 2: Increase in U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan, 
January 2009 through December 2011: 

Figure 3: Reported Increase in DOD Overall Civilian Presence in 
Afghanistan, January 2009 through December 2011: 

Figure 4: Trainees React to Simulated Mortar Attack during Interagency 
Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise: 

Figure 5: Civilian Trainees Interact with Afghan Role Players in 
Scenario Involving Afghan Casualties Resulting from a NATO Airstrike: 

Abbreviations: 

ACPTS: Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System: 

CEW: Civilian Expeditionary Workforce: 

CONUS: continental United States: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FACT: Foreign Affairs Counter Threat: 

HMMWV: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected: 

State: Department of State: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 27, 2012: 

Congressional Addressees: 

In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian 
presence to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide 
security, essential services, and economic development with limited 
international support. In this expansion, U.S. agencies were to deploy 
civilian experts under the authority of the Chief of Mission[Footnote 
1] beyond the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to the provinces and districts to 
create more of an impact on Afghan lives by building the capacity of 
local government institutions. Housed with military personnel, these 
field-deployed civilians were to coordinate with their military and 
Afghan counterparts to integrate their capacity-building activities 
into the larger counterinsurgency campaign. Additionally, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed civilians to Afghanistan 
under the authority of U.S. Central Command to support combat 
operations through equipment maintenance, logistical support, and 
intelligence gathering and analysis. Some DOD civilians also deploy to 
build the capacity of Afghan security institutions such as the Afghan 
Ministries of Defense and Interior. DOD established the Civilian 
Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) by directive in January 2009 to serve as 
a source for such deployable civilians.[Footnote 2] 

Current U.S. strategy calls for provinces and districts to be 
transitioned to greater Afghan government control as local capacity 
improves and conditions allow.[Footnote 3] The U.S. civilian expansion 
in Afghanistan and the deployment of those civilians into the field is 
crucial to these capacity-building efforts, particularly as the United 
States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, 
has committed to fully transferring lead security responsibility to 
the Afghan government by the end of 2014. Furthermore, a recent report 
from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
found that the cost of sustaining the U.S. civilian presence would 
likely rise as the U.S. military presence decreases. 

Because of broad congressional interest in Afghanistan, we performed 
our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United 
States to conduct work on his own initiative. In this report, we 
examine issues related to the management of U.S. agency civilian 
personnel deployed to Afghanistan under both Chief of Mission and DOD 
authority. Specifically, we (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. 
civilian presence in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DOD's implementation 
of its CEW policy, and (3) determined the extent to which U.S. 
agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their 
personnel before deployment. 

For our first objective, to examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian 
presence in Afghanistan, we obtained and analyzed staffing data from 
the Department of State (State) and DOD regarding staffing 
requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of 
Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander 
authority deployed in-country following the President's March 2009 
call to enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government 
institutions. To determine the reliability of the staffing data, we 
reviewed available documentation pertaining to the data systems and 
procedures used to develop staffing data, examined the data for 
outliers and missing observations, and conducted follow-up interviews 
to discuss questions that arose in our analysis of the data. 
Furthermore, we compared State data against staffing data obtained 
from other agencies under Chief of Mission authority, including the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), and the Departments of Homeland Security, 
Justice, and the Treasury. We found State's staffing data to be 
sufficiently reliable to provide an indication of the positions filled 
at the level of the agency but not sufficiently reliable to report on 
more-detailed staffing information, such as position type. For DOD, we 
compared program requirements and staffing data for the Ministry of 
Defense Advisors program and Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program with 
documentation obtained from the program office. Because DOD staffing 
data were based on daily submissions from combatant commands, we could 
not validate its accuracy; however, DOD officials identified the data 
as sufficiently reliable to illustrate the increase in DOD's overall 
civilian presence, and we agree. 

For our second objective, to evaluate the implementation of DOD's CEW 
policy, we reviewed relevant documents to identify the structure of 
the CEW, DOD's plans for implementing the policy, and how the CEW 
related to departmentwide programs and goals. In addition, we 
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
CEW program office, the military services, and U.S. Central Command to 
further understand the current status of efforts to fully implement 
the CEW, the department's plans for the CEW of the future, and how the 
CEW was currently supporting the department's needs for deployable 
civilians. 

For our third objective, to determine the extent to which U.S. 
agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific and Foreign 
Affairs Counter Threat (FACT)[Footnote 4] training to their personnel 
before deployment, we first identified Chief of Mission and DOD 
training requirements. For personnel under Chief of Mission authority, 
we compared training requirements with waiver logs, State Foreign 
Service Institute attendance rosters, available staffing data, and 
State Diplomatic Security's FACT Tracker to determine whether 
civilians deploying through the Chief of Mission had received the 
required training. For DOD, we compared the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and U.S. Central Command training requirements[Footnote 5] 
with training curricula contained in regulations, training websites, 
course schedules, and course handbooks offered by DOD organizations 
that deploy civilians to Afghanistan. In addition, we interviewed 
relevant officials from agencies under Chief of Mission Authority and 
DOD. Finally, we observed scenario-based training administered to 
Chief of Mission and DOD personnel held at the Muscatatuck Urban 
Training Center in Indiana. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See appendix 
I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.) 

Background: 

The United States and its international partners from over 40 nations 
have been engaged in efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild 
Afghanistan since 2001. U.S. civilians have been a vital part of the 
U.S. strategy. To implement the U.S. strategy, the U.S. Mission 
Afghanistan committed in April 2009 to expand its civilian personnel 
both in Kabul and in the field. U.S. government civilians in 
Afghanistan generally fall under either the authority of the Chief of 
Mission (i.e., the U.S. Ambassador) or under DOD's combatant commander 
authority. The Chief of Mission has authority over almost every U.S. 
executive branch employee there, except those under the command of a 
U.S. military commander or those on the staff of an international 
organization.[Footnote 6] Although typically stationed at the U.S. 
Embassy and consulates, U.S. Chief of Mission personnel in Afghanistan 
can also be deployed at a variety of military facilities outside of 
Kabul. These field-deployed civilians rely on the military for 
security, mobility, food, and lodging but remain under Chief of 
Mission authority. The Chief of Mission presence in Afghanistan 
consists of personnel from several agencies performing a variety of 
activities, some of which are described in table 1. 

Table 1: General Activities of U.S. Agencies under Chief of Mission 
Authority in Afghanistan: 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: State; 
General activities: Executive management of civilian presence at post 
and in the field, personnel security, public diplomacy, 
counternarcotics, capacity building of governance sector, and other 
technical areas. 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: USAID; 
General activities: Social sector development, infrastructure, 
stabilization, democracy and governance, economic growth, and 
agriculture. 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: USDA; 
General activities: Agricultural expertise and capacity building of 
Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: Department of the 
Treasury; 
General activities: Mentoring and capacity building of finance-
oriented Ministries, as well as attaché function and involvement in 
the Afghan Threat Finance Cell. 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: Department of Justice 
(e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement 
Administration); 
General activities: Combating corruption, disruption, and dismantling 
of drug trafficking, improving the security of courthouses, and 
capacity building of justice and governance sectors, as well as of 
counternarcotics institutions. 

U.S. Agency under Chief of Mission authority: Department of Homeland 
Security (e.g., Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement); 
General activities: Capacity building for border management, security, 
and customs collection. 

Sources: State, USAID, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Department of 
Justice, and Department of Homeland Security. 

[End of table] 

In addition, DOD estimates that, since 2001, over 41,000 civilians 
have deployed worldwide[Footnote 7] to support combat operations, 
contingencies, disaster relief, and stability operations, including 
ongoing operations in Afghanistan. DOD civilians in Afghanistan serve 
under the authority of the combatant commander responsible for 
operations in that area of the world--the U.S. Central Command--and 
support a wide range of DOD missions. These missions include combat 
support missions that have traditionally been performed by military 
personnel such as equipment maintenance, logistical support, and 
intelligence gathering and analysis; noncombat support missions such 
as administrative positions within the joint task force headquarters; 
and capacity-building missions parallel to the Chief of Mission effort 
to improve Afghan security institutions. 

To integrate the U.S. civilian expansion into the broader 
counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign outside of Kabul, the 
U.S. Mission Afghanistan, U.S. Forces--Afghanistan,[Footnote 8] and 
the International Security Assistance Force[Footnote 9] have 
established a framework for civilian-military activities. The U.S. and 
International Security Assistance Force civilian-military effort 
includes the use of provincial reconstruction teams and district 
support teams. Provincial reconstruction teams are combined civilian 
and military groups responsible for integrating the activities of all 
military and civilian elements in an assigned province. This 
integration includes harnessing both civilian and military resources 
to perform security, governance, and development activities to 
implement the U.S. counterinsurgency and stabilization strategy as 
well as to monitor and report on progress. District support teams are 
combined civilian and military groups responsible for integrating the 
security, governance, and development activities of all civilian and 
military elements in an assigned district. 

To enhance civilian-military coordination, the U.S. Mission 
Afghanistan has established a parallel civilian structure within each 
relevant military installation (i.e., regional command down to 
district support teams), with senior civilian representatives and 
civilian team leads managing and supervising Mission personnel at each 
level, as well as coordinating with their military and local Afghan 
government counterparts. Together, the senior civilians and military 
commanders at each level coordinate to perform stability, capacity-
building, and development operations in their area of responsibility. 
Mission contingents at the field facilities typically contain State, 
USAID, and/or USDA personnel. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents also deploy to some military facilities in the field but 
primarily conduct counternarcotics activities with U.S. military and 
Afghan counternarcotics forces. 

Chief of Mission and DOD Processes for Fulfilling Civilian Staffing 
Requirements: 

U.S. Mission Afghanistan develops requests for Chief of Mission 
civilian positions in Afghanistan, and State Headquarters approves 
these requests after consulting with other agencies. In addition, 
representatives from State, other U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission 
authority, and U.S. Embassy Kabul participate in periodic interagency 
staffing reviews. During these staffing reviews, participants use 
strategic "lines of effort" to classify and prioritize all Chief of 
Mission positions in Afghanistan according to their priority and 
feasibility of staffing. Strategic lines of effort for Afghanistan 
comprise management operations, agriculture, public diplomacy, rule of 
law, economic growth, counternarcotics, infrastructure, border 
management, stabilization, governance, threat finance, and bilateral 
relationship. Approved requirements and their staffing progress are 
discussed among State, other agencies under Chief of Mission authority 
such as USAID and USDA, and U.S. Embassy Kabul at biweekly 
teleconferences. Agencies under Chief of Mission authority rely on 
both temporary, external hires and permanent employees to staff 
civilian requirements in Afghanistan. In particular, agencies are 
relying on special hiring authorities to meet their staffing needs. 
[Footnote 10] Figure 1 illustrates how State, USAID, and USDA recruit 
and identify candidates for positions in Afghanistan. 

Figure 1: Staffing Processes Used by State, USAID, and USDA to Recruit 
and Identify Candidates for Positions in Afghanistan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

State: 

External: 
Candidates respond to online job announcement; 
State HQ reviews applications and forwards top-ranking candidates to 
Mission; 
Mission Afghanistan makes final selection. 

Internal: 
Foreign Service	Officers bid on Afghanistan part of early cycle; 
State HQ in consultation with Mission Afghanistan, selects from 
bidding candidates. 

USAID: 

External: 
Candidates respond to online job announcement; 
USAID HQ reviews applications and forwards top-ranking candidates to 
Mission; 
Mission Afghanistan makes final selection. 

Internal: 
Foreign Service Officers bid on Afghanistan as part of early staffing 
cycle; 
USAID HQ in consultation with Mission Afghanistan, selects from 
bidding candidates. 

USDA: 

External: 
USDA's Foreign Agricultural	Service	positions via its	website; 
USDA recruits candidates through land-grant universities and 
international	programs; 
USDA HQ applications and forwards top-ranking candidates to Mission; 
Mission Afghanistan makes final selection. 

Internal: 
Secretary of Agriculture calls for internal candidates via a 
departmentwide	memo; 
USDA HQ applications and forwards top-ranking candidates to Mission; 
Mission Afghanistan makes final selection. 

Mission Afghanistan makes final selection: 
Security and	background check; 
Medical clearance; 
Foreign Service Institute, Diplomatic Security, and applicable agency-
specific training; 
Personnel deployed. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and USDA human capital 
documentation, as well as interviews with agency officials; and Art 
Explosion (clip art). 

[End of figure] 

DOD relies on an established process for filling civilian positions in 
Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, the department establishes 
civilian requirements and fills positions through an integrated 
military and civilian planning process. Civilian requirements begin at 
the Joint Task Force level, with commanders identifying military and 
civilian personnel needed to complete a mission. The commander 
specifies unit and individual needs in request for forces and joint 
manning documents, and sends these documents to the corresponding 
combatant commanders for validation and position designation. When the 
joint manning document is approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff record 
and designate the service responsible for filling positions. At that 
time, individual positions are designated as military or civilian, or 
acceptable for either to fill. Once all positions are validated and 
categorized, the request is sent to the Joint Force Coordinator within 
the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[Footnote 11] A list of 
individual position requirements is then sent to the services for 
staffing. Once the staffing source is identified, the requesting 
commander becomes responsible for tracking which positions have been 
filled. 

To enable the department to readily identify civilians to deploy in 
support of its missions, including those in Afghanistan, DOD 
established the CEW program in January 2009 within the Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy--
which is under the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness.[Footnote 12] The CEW is dedicated to creating 
a cadre of DOD civilians that are organized, ready, trained, cleared, 
and equipped in a manner that enhances their availability to mobilize 
and respond urgently to expeditionary requirements now and in the 
future. 

As we previously reported, DOD's use of civilian personnel to support 
military operations has long raised questions about its policies on 
compensation and medical benefits for such civilians.[Footnote 13] 
Interest in issues related to deployed civilians increased as 
executive agencies began deploying civilians to support efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, we issued a report that addressed 
issues related to whether agencies that deployed civilians had (1) 
comparable policies concerning compensation, (2) comparable policies 
concerning medical care, and (3) policies and procedures for 
identifying and tracking deployed civilians. The report contained 18 
recommendations made to nine agencies concerning policies related to 
deployed civilians, including a recommendation to both the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of Defense to improve their capability to 
identify and track deployed civilians. We reported that this 
capability was critical, so that agencies could notify deployed 
civilians about emerging health concerns that might affect them. 
[Footnote 14] 

Chief of Mission and DOD's Training Requirements for Personnel 
Deploying to Afghanistan: 

Both Chief of Mission and DOD civilians are to receive Afghanistan-
specific training before deployment. According to State, in June 2009 
Afghanistan-specific training became mandatory for all Chief of 
Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan after October 1, 2009. 
State's Foreign Service Institute provides this training. In addition 
to this Afghanistan-specific training, since 2008 State has required 
that Chief of Mission personnel at high-threat posts such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan take the FACT course provided by 
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.[Footnote 15] This course is 
designed to address the threats that personnel might face in a number 
of high-threat posts and includes components on first aid, firearms, 
counterthreat driving techniques, and duck-and-cover exercises. In 
addition to these Chief of Mission courses, some U.S. agencies provide 
their own mission-specific training. Mandatory training requirements 
for DOD civilians deploying to Afghanistan have been established by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command. 
[Footnote 16] DOD relies on a variety of organizations--including the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and each of the military services--
to provide this location-specific training to civilians prior to 
deployment to Afghanistan. In addition, there are some mission-
specific training requirements that civilians must complete. For 
example, some DOD personnel must complete language and culture 
training beyond the normal requirement. 

U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in 
Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track That 
Presence: 

Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority 
more than tripled their civilian presence and expanded outside Kabul 
in response to the President's 2009 announcement. DOD both created new 
programs to build the security capacity of the Afghan government and 
reported expanding its overall civilian presence. U.S. agencies during 
the course of our review acknowledged data reliability problems with 
staffing data and have efforts under way to improve the reliability of 
that data. 

U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan More Than Tripled Since 
2009: 

According to State, from January 2009 through December 2011, the Chief 
of Mission civilian presence more than tripled from 320 to 1,142 
civilians, an increase of 257 percent. Overall Chief of Mission 
staffing requirements also grew during this period from 531 to 1,261 
positions, and, as of December 2011, about 91 percent (1,142 of 1,261) 
of those positions were filled. As of October 2011, State officials 
did not foresee further expansion of the U.S. civilian presence and 
planned to change their focus to reconfiguring staffing resources as 
needed within the existing presence. Figure 2 illustrates the 
increased U.S. Chief of Mission presence in Afghanistan since January 
2009. 

Figure 2: Increase in U.S. Chief of Mission Presence in Afghanistan, 
January 2009 through December 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Date: January 2009; 
Requirements: 531; 
Positions filled: 320. 

Date: January 2010; 
Requirements: 974; 
Positions filled: 768. 

Date: February 2011; 
Requirements: 1,167; 
Positions filled: 989. 

Date: September 2011; 
Requirements: 1,261; 
Positions filled: 1,142. 

Source: State Department Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix. 

Note: According to State officials, U.S. Embassy Kabul also utilized 
"other Chief of Mission civilians"--i.e., short-term deployments, key 
contractors, and eligible family members--to temporarily fill some 
high-priority staffing gaps. Temporary staff totals included 137 for 
January 2010, 135 for February 2011, and 97 for December 2011. State 
could not provide data on other Chief of Mission civilians for January 
2009. We could not verify the extent to which these temporary staff 
substituted for official approved positions. 

[End of figure] 

Of the nine executive branch agencies under Chief of Mission 
authority, as of December 2011 State, USAID, Department of Justice, 
and USDA had filled most of the Chief of Mission position 
requirements, as illustrated in table 2. 

Table 2: Extent to Which Agencies Had Filled Chief of Mission Staffing 
Requirements in Afghanistan, December 2011: 

Agency: Mission; 
Position requirements: 1,261; 
Positions filled: 1,142; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 90.6%. 

Agency: Mission; Kabul; 
Position requirements: 732; 
Positions filled: 686; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 93.7%. 

Agency: Mission; Field; 
Position requirements: 529; 
Positions filled: 456; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 86.2%. 

Agency: State; 
Position requirements: 594; 
Positions filled: 577; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 97.1%. 

Agency: USAID; 
Position requirements: 378; 
Positions filled: 366; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 96.8%. 

Agency: Department of Justice; 
Position requirements: 154; 
Positions filled: 116; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 75.3%. 

Agency: USDA; 
Position requirements: 77; 
Positions filled: 55; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 71.4%. 

Agency: Department of Homeland Security; 
Position requirements: 25; 
Positions filled: 23; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 92.0%. 

Agency: Department of the Treasury[A]; 
Position requirements: 16; 
Positions filled: 11; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 68.8%. 

Agency: Department of Transportation; 
Position requirements: 15; 
Positions filled: 12; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 80.0%. 

Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Position requirements: 1; 
Positions filled: 1; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 100.0%. 

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
Position requirements: 1; 
Positions filled: 1; 
Percentage of position requirements filled: 100.0%. 

Source: State Department Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix. 

Notes: These numbers reflect State data on requirements and filled 
positions as of December 6, 2011, and do not reflect any changes that 
have occurred since that time. 

[A] The Department of the Treasury noted that State's database had not 
been updated to reflect 13 total approved Treasury positions. Treasury 
further noted that two of its positions listed as "open" remained pro 
grammatically on hold, resulting in 11 active slots filled. 

[End of table] 

Additionally, the Chief of Mission presence expanded outside Kabul--a 
response to the President's call for greater U.S. civilian expertise 
at provincial and district levels. From January 2009 through December 
2011, field position requirements grew by approximately 260 percent 
(from 147 to 529), and over 85 percent of those requirements were 
filled. These positions are assigned to locations throughout 
Afghanistan, including at military facilities such as provincial 
reconstruction and district support teams and at State's regional 
consulates. 

Comparing the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix[Footnote 17] 
numbers with the position requirements reported by individual 
agencies, we found that the data in the Chief of Mission Civilian 
Staffing Matrix were sufficiently reliable for identifying high-level 
staffing information such as total number of positions filled by each 
agency under Chief of Mission authority. According to State officials, 
the high-level staffing data identified in the Chief of Mission 
Civilian Staffing Matrix are updated weekly using data from U.S. 
agencies and are also validated through periodic teleconferences, 
including staff from State headquarters, other agencies, and the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul. 

State Took Steps to Enhance Its Ability to Track Its Civilian Presence: 

The 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy 
emphasizes the need to match civilian personnel's expertise to 
specific mission requirements on the ground. Furthermore, according to 
federal internal control standards, program managers need operational 
data to determine whether they are meeting the goals of their 
agencies' strategic and annual performance plans and accounting for 
the effective and efficient use of resources.[Footnote 18] U.S. 
Embassy Kabul and State's Office of Orientation and In-Processing 
(responsible for ensuring that interagency personnel meet all 
administrative, medical, and training requirements before deploying to 
Afghanistan) began using a data system called the Afghanistan Civilian 
Personnel Tracking System (ACPTS) in February 2011 to track Chief of 
Mission personnel's locations and movements (e.g., movement from Kabul 
to a district support team) and to identify position-specific 
information (e.g., location, position title, appointment type or 
grade, vacancy status, and the strategic line of effort to which a 
position belongs). State officials noted that they planned to use this 
information to optimize the U.S. presence in the next interagency 
staffing exercise, when they might need to be prepared to reconfigure 
the existing presence. However, when we examined this data system in 
March and July 2011, we found discrepancies that called into question 
the system's reliability. For example, the ACPTS data we received were 
insufficiently reliable to determine which strategic line of effort 
contained the greatest staffing shortfall--crucial information for an 
interagency staffing exercise. Over 60 percent of the ACPTS records 
for July 2011 (648 of 1,192) were missing data in at least 1 of 10 
data fields. Our analysis revealed, for example, that 36 percent of 
the appointment grade fields and 30 percent of the line-of-effort 
fields were missing. We also found discrepancies between the ACPTS and 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix with regard to the overall 
position requirements and the number of positions filled. Table 3 
lists the discrepancies we identified in State, USAID, and USDA totals. 

Table 3: Discrepancies between Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing 
Matrix and ACPTS: 

Chief of Mission agency: State; Kabul; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 385; 
ACPTS: 384; 
Delta: -1; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 360; 
ACPTS: 317; 
Delta: -43. 

Chief of Mission agency: State; Field; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 204; 
ACPTS: 177; 
Delta: -27; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 149; 
ACPTS: 134; 
Delta: -15. 

Chief of Mission agency: USAID; Kabul; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 161; 
ACPTS: 181; 
Delta: 20; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 148; 
ACPTS: 167; 
Delta: 19. 

Chief of Mission agency: USAID; Field; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 217; 
ACPTS: 198; 
Delta: -19; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 153; 
ACPTS: 179; 
Delta: 26. 

Chief of Mission agency: USDA; Kabul; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 17; 
ACPTS: 19; 
Delta: 2; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 10; 
ACPTS: 10; 
Delta: 0. 

Chief of Mission agency: USDA; Field; 
Position requirements: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 60; 
ACPTS: 61; 
Delta: 1; 
Positions filled: 
Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing Matrix: 44; 
ACPTS: 33; 
Delta: -11. 

Source: GAO analysis of State Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing 
Matrix (June 28, 2011) and ACPTS (July 7, 2011) datasets. 

[End of table] 

Our discussions with State, USAID, and USDA officials revealed 
additional discrepancies in the ACPTS data, including duplicate 
entries, position titles that did not match official position 
documentation, and inaccurate arrival dates and appointment grade 
information. 

In June 2011, State officials acknowledged that these challenges 
prevented ACPTS from being used effectively to aggregate detailed, 
position-specific information regarding the overall U.S. civilian 
presence in Afghanistan. Although we could not verify the accuracy of 
the ACPTS system, during the course of our review and after several 
discussions with us regarding data reliability, in the fall of 2011 
State began taking steps to improve the reliability of the ACPTS 
database. For example, according to State officials, the Office of 
Orientation and In-Processing recently completed a review of the ACPTS 
system that included correcting inaccuracies, revising data fields to 
better reflect actual information being entered, and deleting 
unnecessary data fields. State has also established standard operating 
procedures for updating the ACPTS system. For example, according to 
State officials, the U.S. Embassy's Arrivals and Departure Unit will 
be responsible for completing the ACPTS records of newly deployed 
staff once they arrive in-country, and the Interagency Provincial 
Affairs Office will be responsible for updating their location 
information if their duty station changes in the field. Furthermore, 
in October 2011, U.S. Embassy Kabul issued a new policy for Mission 
staffing and accountability that established a notification and 
reporting system to conduct accountability checks of Chief of Mission 
staff and also outlined the responsibilities of supervisors and 
individuals in ensuring staffing accountability and tracking. 
According to State officials, Embassy Kabul conducts monthly data 
calls with all agencies present in Kabul in accordance with this 
policy, and the collected data is reconciled with ACPTS data. 

DOD Reported Expanding Its Civilian Presence in Afghanistan: 

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Personnel Status 
Report, DOD increased its overall civilian presence in Afghanistan by 
approximately 643 percent from January 2009 through December 2011. 
While officials acknowledged that some inaccuracies existed in the 
data provided by this report, they believed that the data fairly 
depict the increase in the overall DOD civilian presence in 
Afghanistan. As shown in figure 3, DOD reported its civilian presence 
in Afghanistan grew from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in 
December 2011. 

Figure 3: Reported Increase in DOD Overall Civilian Presence in 
Afghanistan, January 2009 through December 2011: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Date: January 2009; 
Civilians in Afghanistan: 394. 

Date: January 2010; 
Civilians in Afghanistan: 1,555. 

Date: January 2011; 
Civilians in Afghanistan: 2,145. 

Date: December 2011; 
Civilians in Afghanistan: 2,929. 

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff Personnel Status Report. 

Note: We could not validate the accuracy of the data provided by the 
Joint Personnel Status Report. DOD officials believe the data are 
sufficiently accurate to illustrate the increase in the civilian 
presence in Afghanistan, and we agree. 

[End of figure] 

These civilians serve in a variety of roles that support both DOD's 
combat mission and its capacity-building efforts. However, it is 
difficult to specify the number of civilians within DOD's overall 
civilian presence that supported the capacity-building efforts because 
these civilians frequently fill positions that support both combat 
support and capacity-building missions. For example, civilians that 
deploy with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers support multiple projects 
involving both Afghan National Security Forces and U.S. military 
forces, making it difficult to identify the number of civilians that 
support capacity-building efforts. 

In addition, DOD established two programs to respond to the 
department's mission to build the capacity of the Afghan government. 
The first program--Ministry of Defense Advisors, created in fiscal 
year 2010--operates under the authority of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy and deploys senior DOD civilians for up to 2 years 
to serve as advisors to officials in the Afghan government's 
Ministries of Defense and Interior to exchange knowledge concerning 
defense-related issues. The Ministry of Defense Advisor program was 
designed to forge long-term relationships that strengthen 
Afghanistan's security institutions.[Footnote 19] The second program--
Afghanistan Pakistan Hands, created in fiscal year 2009--operates 
under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and deploys DOD 
civilians for 5 years to serve as experts on Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to support the counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, these 
civilians engage directly with host country officials to enhance 
government, interagency, and multinational cooperation and fill 
related positions outside the region. As of December 2011, these 
programs had identified requirements for 156 civilian positions, and 
106 of these positions were filled. At the time of our review, 
officials were unclear as to whether the requirements for these two 
programs would stabilize, increase, or decrease. In table 4, we show 
the extent to which each of these programs had filled the required 
positions. 

Table 4: Extent to Which DOD's New Capacity-Building Programs Had 
Filled Staffing Requirements in Afghanistan, as of December 2011: 

Program: Ministry of Defense Advisor program; 
Position requirements: 102; 
Positions filled: 60[A]; 
Percentage of positions filled: 59%. 

Program: Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program; 
Position requirements: 54; 
Positions filled: 46; 
Percentage of positions filled: 85%. 

Program: Total; 
Position requirements: 156; 
Positions filled: 106; 
Percentage of positions filled: 68%. 

Source: Offices of Ministry of Defense Advisor and Afghanistan 
Pakistan Hands programs. 

[A] Program officials indicated that an additional 11 advisors had 
been selected to fill positions in Afghanistan and would begin 
training in January 2012 for deployment in March 2012. Ministry of 
Defense Advisor program officials indicated, however, that the number 
of candidates scheduled to begin training was likely to change prior 
to the beginning of training. 

[End of table] 

DOD Took Steps to Improve Its Ability to Track Its Civilian Presence: 

Although DOD has aggregate staffing data for deployed civilians within 
a country or geographical region, its current data system for tracking 
deployed civilians may not provide sufficiently reliable information 
to characterize the specific location and identity of deployed 
civilians within a country. DOD uses the Joint Personnel Status Report 
to track the number and location of military, civilian, and contractor 
personnel deployed worldwide. This report is manually created each day 
by the combatant commands to include the number and location of 
personnel within their area of responsibility.[Footnote 20] However, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff officials told us that the system contains 
inaccuracies. For example, the officials noted previous reports have 
omitted and double counted some personnel, as well as listed some 
personnel in the wrong locations. The officials stated they could not 
quantify the magnitude of these inaccuracies due to the system's 
reliance on manual updates from the individual combatant commands and 
limited demographic data. We reported in 2009 that DOD issued guidance 
and established procedures for identifying and tracking deployed 
civilians in 2006 but concluded in 2008 that its guidance and 
procedures were not being consistently implemented across the 
department. In 2009, we found that these policies were still not being 
fully implemented and recommended that DOD establish mechanisms to 
ensure that these policies were implemented.[Footnote 21] In response 
to this recommendation, DOD stated that it would work with the Defense 
Manpower Data Center to develop a tracking system for deployed 
civilians and hoped to have the system completed by September 2009. 

At the time of our review, Joint Staff officials stated that in 
conjunction with the Defense Manpower Data Center, they had completed 
development and were fielding this automated tracking system that 
would access information from service specific personnel databases in 
conjunction with Common Access Card usage in theater to establish and 
record the specific location of employees.[Footnote 22] According to 
DOD officials, this new system will provide DOD with an automated 
system to track the number, identity, and location of deployed 
civilians. As we reported in both 2005 and 2009, this type of 
information is critical for identifying potential exposures or other 
incidents related to a civilian's deployment.[Footnote 23] DOD 
officials stated that, once operational within a combatant commander's 
area of responsibility, this system will automatically create a report 
that fulfills Joint Personnel Status reporting requirements for 
identifying the number and location of military, civilian, and 
contractor personnel deployed globally. However, according to Joint 
Chiefs of Staff officials, this system will not be ready to support 
these reporting requirements within the Central Command area of 
responsibility until the middle of fiscal year 2012. 

DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did Not 
Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should Constitute the 
CEW: 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is 
responsible for overseeing implementation of the 2009 CEW directive, 
including developing policy and implementing procedural guidance for 
the CEW. To implement the policies in this directive, the heads of the 
DOD components are to identify and designate positions as emergency-
essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteers as 
part of the CEW.[Footnote 24] Emergency-essential positions are those 
that support the success of combat operations or the availability of 
combat-essential systems. Non-combat essential positions support the 
expeditionary requirements in other than combat or combat support 
situations. Capability-based volunteers are employees who may be asked 
to volunteer for deployment, to remain behind after other civilians 
have evacuated, or to fill the positions of other DOD civilians who 
have deployed to meet expeditionary requirements in order to ensure 
that critical expeditionary requirements are fulfilled.[Footnote 25] 
Finally, according to the directive, the components are to plan, 
program, and budget for CEW requirements. 

We found that DOD had taken preliminary steps to implement the CEW. 
Specifically, DOD had (1) established a CEW program office, (2) 
created a database containing resumes submitted by volunteers, (3) 
advertised expeditionary positions for civilians on a designated 
website, and (4) established predeployment training requirements for 
volunteers selected to fill CEW positions.[Footnote 26] According to 
CEW officials, approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of the 2,929 
filled civilian positions in Afghanistan were filled by CEW volunteers 
and the remaining positions were primarily filled by civilian 
personnel in the military services and other DOD components. 

However, the CEW program has not been fully developed and implemented. 
In particular, DOD components have not identified and designated the 
number and types of positions that should constitute the emergency-
essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteer 
segments of the CEW because guidance for making such determinations 
has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that once key 
assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been 
finalized, implementing guidance will be issued that will contain 
information on how the components are to identify and designate 
positions as emergency-essential, non-combat essential and capability-
based volunteers. However, Office of the Secretary of Defense 
officials were not sure as to when this guidance would be issued. 
[Footnote 27] 

By not developing guidance that instructs the components on how to 
identify and designate the number and types of positions that will 
constitute the CEW, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a 
significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DOD's 
Fiscal Year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,[Footnote 28] 
(2) meet readiness goals for the CEW as required in DOD's Strategic 
Management Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2013,[Footnote 29] and (3) 
position itself to respond to future missions. 

First, in DOD's fiscal year 2009 civilian human capital strategic 
plan, DOD identified the CEW as a significant segment of the overall 
DOD civilian workforce dedicated to supporting DOD operations, 
contingencies, emergencies, humanitarian missions, stability and 
reconstruction operations, and combat missions. Further, this plan 
noted the importance of conducting a gap analysis[Footnote 30] to 
identify any differences between the current civilian workforce and 
the workforce that will be needed in the future for each of the 
department's "mission critical occupations"--i.e., occupations that 
are essential to carrying out the department's mission.[Footnote 31] 
In July 2011, we testified that identifying skills and capability gaps 
of the civilian workforce is critical for DOD's strategic planning 
efforts and that DOD should conduct gap analyses to identify gaps in 
both the current and the future workforces.[Footnote 32] Completing a 
gap analysis is important for DOD to develop strategies to acquire and 
retain the needed workforce. Further, once workforce needs and 
strategies are identified, the DOD components will be better 
positioned to plan, program, and budget for CEW requirements as called 
for in the CEW directive. 

Second, as called for by the Department of Defense Strategic 
Management Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2013, DOD's goal to get the 
right workforce mix should occur through several initiatives, 
including one to improve the readiness of the CEW by increasing the 
percentage of emergency- essential and non-combat essential personnel 
who are qualified as ready. However, without an understanding of the 
number and types of positions in the emergency-essential and non-
combat essential categories, the current CEW is not positioned to 
support this DOD priority. 

Third, DOD officials told us that institutionalizing the CEW is 
critical to DOD efforts to best utilize its total workforce structure--
military, civilian, and contractor personnel--because the difficulties 
associated with identifying and deploying civilians are not unique to 
the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, 
similar issues were experienced in Bosnia, but because the 
organization and processes that supported the deployment of civilians 
during that operation were not retained, DOD had to reconstitute the 
capability to identify and deploy civilians when the need arose for 
civilians to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment Training 
Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation Challenges: 

State Provided Required Training for Personnel Deploying to 
Afghanistan: 

State has established predeployment training requirements for all 
Chief of Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan, including courses 
offered by State's Foreign Service Institute, as well as key security 
training provided by State's Diplomatic Security Bureau--the FACT 
course. The Foreign Service Institute's Afghanistan-specific training 
courses address State's 2009 training requirement for Chief of Mission 
personnel deploying to Afghanistan and focus on providing Chief of 
Mission personnel with basic professional skills and knowledge needed 
to participate in stabilization and reconstruction activities as 
members of the U.S. Embassy Kabul or its subordinate entities. 
Additionally, the training recognizes the requirements for effectively 
operating in a complex environment, including administrative, 
survival, and day-to-day functioning/life support. Table 5 further 
describes the Foreign Service Institute's training for Chief of 
Mission personnel. 

Table 5: State-Required, Afghanistan-Specific Training for Chief of 
Mission Personnel: 

Course description: Afghanistan Familiarization; 
Overview of; 
* Afghanistan's history, culture, and politics, including 
counterinsurgency and border issues; 
* U.S. political and military strategy in Afghanistan; and; 
* U.S. agency programs in Afghanistan; 
* Specific topics include threat assessments, counterintelligence 
awareness, and deployment-related administrative and logistic 
information. 

Course description: Afghanistan Field Orientation; 
For personnel assigned to provincial reconstruction teams: 
* Basic professional skills and knowledge essential for functioning as 
a member of a civilian-military field team; 
* Training on dealing with traumatic events, Afghan tribal dynamics 
and Taliban tactics, integration of civilian-military planning, and 
tools for assessing district stability. 

Course description: Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training 
Exercise; 
Applying lessons learned from the Afghanistan Field Orientation course 
in a simulated environment by working with military colleagues: 
* learning security procedures for travel by military convoy or 
helicopter, and; 
* using interpreters during scripted training events featuring Afghan 
role-players; 
* Scenarios include simulations of insurgent attacks. 

Source: GAO summary of Foreign Service Institute's course catalog and 
materials for fiscal year 2011. 

[End of table] 

All Chief of Mission personnel are required to take the Afghanistan 
Familiarization course, while all personnel deploying to locations 
outside of Kabul are also required to take the Afghanistan Field 
Orientation and the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training 
Exercise courses. According to State officials, the Afghanistan 
Familiarization course covers subjects that contribute to employees' 
success on the job, such as orientation issues and State support at 
high-threat posts. Additionally, the Afghanistan Field Orientation 
course covers subjects that State has identified as needed for the 
success of provincial reconstruction teams and other civilian-military 
entities at the regional and district levels. According to State and 
contractor officials we interviewed during our observation of the 
Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise at the 
Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Butlerville, Indiana, personnel 
who attend this training are able to practice working in situations 
they would likely encounter while deployed. The training includes 
working through an interpreter and heavily interacting with Afghan 
officials. In addition, because field-deployed civilians live and work 
alongside military colleagues, the exercises focus on the cultural 
(e.g., education about military ranks) and practical (e.g., 
participation in convoy security) aspects of working with the 
military, as shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Trainees React to Simulated Mortar Attack during Interagency 
Civilian-Military Integration Training Exercise: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

During the Interagency Civilian-Military Integration Training 
Exercise, students get the opportunity to simulate living with the 
military on a Forward Operating Base, and travel by convoy and 
helicopter to meetings with their Afghan counterparts, played by 
domestic role-players. There is also the opportunity to work through 
interpreters, negotiate sensitive situations, and solve problems with 
Afghan authorities, officials, religious leaders, and villagers, as 
shown in figure 5. 

Figure 5: Civilian Trainees Interact with Afghan Role Players in 
Scenario Involving Afghan Casualties Resulting from a NATO Airstrike: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

State implemented internal controls to help ensure that Chief of 
Mission personnel took the required training before deployment. 
State's Office of Orientation and In-Processing acts as a central 
processing point for all Chief of Mission personnel deploying to 
Afghanistan and works with the Foreign Service Institute to ensure 
that all training requirements have been met. Examples of the Center's 
training verification activities include accessing Foreign Service 
Institute online registration to determine the accuracy of enrollment 
records, tracking completion of personnel's deployment checklists, and 
visiting classes to confirm enrolled personnel attended the course. 
According to State officials, in addition to these controls, Embassy 
Kabul also checks to make sure that the training requirement is met 
before granting country clearance to individuals about to be deployed. 
The Office of Orientation and In-Processing also reviews these country 
clearances before allowing individuals to deploy. 

To test the reliability of State's internal controls, we compared 
State, USAID, and USDA names from a March 2011 run of ACPTS personnel 
data against Foreign Service Institute training records and State 
training waiver logs. The analysis yielded 134 names of personnel who 
could have potentially missed required Foreign Service Institute 
training. After the names were submitted to the Orientation and In- 
Processing Center, State stated it was able to account for all of the 
personnel, either by verifying that they had taken the training or 
possessed a valid reason for not having taken the training.[Footnote 
33] 

According to State officials, the Office of Orientation and In- 
Processing and Embassy Kabul also check to verify that personnel have 
taken the FACT course before being deployed to Afghanistan. In June 
2011, we reported that Diplomatic Security had difficulty verifying 
training taken by non-State personnel and made several 
recommendations.[Footnote 34] Diplomatic Security was aware of this 
problem and, in June 2011, was in the process of implementing the FACT 
Tracker to address it. This tracker could be checked by regional 
security officers at high-threat posts to confirm required training 
was taken before granting personnel country clearance. At the time of 
our review, Diplomatic Security officials stated that the FACT Tracker 
was fully operational and could verify FACT training going back to 
2005. 

To test this internal control, we selected a random sample of 65 names 
from the July 2011 ACPTS personnel data and compared these names 
against data in the FACT Tracker. We and Diplomatic Security, through 
the use of the FACT Tracker, were able to account for all 65 names. As 
100 percent of our sample received FACT or other appropriate training, 
we believe that State has established an effective system of internal 
controls over its training.[Footnote 35] 

DOD Provided Afghanistan-Specific Training to Civilians, but Some 
Training Contained Gaps or Duplication: 

According to DOD guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness is to develop policies, plans, and programs 
for the training of DOD personnel, including civilians.[Footnote 36] 
In November 2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established 
counterinsurgency standards and required training of individuals and 
units, including DOD civilians deploying to Afghanistan, on such 
things as language and cultural awareness. DOD guidance also requires 
U.S. Central Command to coordinate and approve training necessary to 
carry out missions assigned to the command and U.S. Central Command- 
established theater-training requirements that apply to DOD civilians 
deployed to the command's area of responsibility.[Footnote 37] U.S. 
Central Command theater-training requirements include general 
requirements such as anti-terrorism awareness training; chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear personnel protective measures 
and survival skills; mine and unexploded ordnance awareness; and 
requirements specific to the country of deployment--for Afghanistan, 
the requirements include, for example, language and cultural awareness 
training, implementation of the Secretary of Defense-approved 
counterinsurgency qualification standards, and High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) egress training. Finally, DOD's 2010 strategic plan 
calls for the establishment of a requirements process that includes 
front-end analysis and synchronizing service training programs with 
combatant commander requirements.[Footnote 38] 

As shown in table 6, several DOD organizations deploying civilians to 
Afghanistan provide predeployment training to address Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Central Command, and their own specific 
requirements. To address these requirements, each of DOD's components 
independently developed its own training courses; however, we 
identified some gaps and duplication in this training. For example, 
Air Force civilians deploying to Afghanistan through the CEW were 
required to attend both Air Force and CEW predeployment training. The 
CEW predeployment training consists of an 11-day course that covers 
areas such as personal and family benefits and legal information; 
survival skills, including first aid; HMMWV rollover training and 
Counter- Improvised Explosive Device training; and language and 
cultural awareness skills. As a result, those Air Force civilians 
deploying through the CEW received training on some of the same 
material, such as Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training, twice 
prior to deployment. According to DOD officials, in November 2011, DOD 
began granting some waivers from the CEW training to Air Force 
civilians that completed Combat Airman Skills Training.[Footnote 39] 
However, DOD officials stated not all civilians deploying to 
Afghanistan are required to complete this training; therefore, Air 
Force civilians who do not receive Combat Airman Skills Training would 
still be required to complete both Air Force and CEW predeployment 
training. Additionally, some Army civilian training did not meet the 
requirements established by U.S. Central Command. For example, Army 
civilian training at the CONUS (continental United States) Replacement 
Center[Footnote 40] did not cover either the U.S. Central Command-
required HMMWV or MRAP vehicle rollover techniques. Table 6 lists the 
gaps and duplication we identified. 

Table 6: Gaps and Duplication in Training Courses Provided to DOD 
Civilians Deployed to Afghanistan: 

Gap: 
Ministry of Defense Advisors program: None identified; 
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce: None identified; 
Afghanistan Pakistan Hands: None identified; 
Army Corps of Engineers: Topics that should have been covered to 
address combatant commander theater requirements: 
* HMMWV and MRAP egress; 
* Nonlethal weapons; 
Army CONUS Replacement Center: Topics that should have been covered to 
address combatant commander theater requirements: 
* Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear; 
* HMMWV and MRAP egress; 
* Nonlethal weapons; 
Air Force Expeditionary Force training: None identified; 
Navy: None identified. 

Duplication: 
Ministry of Defense Advisors program: None identified; 
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce: Topics duplicated by Air Force 
training: 
* Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear[A]; 
* Self- aid/buddy care[A]; 
* Cultural awareness[C]; 
* Counter improvised explosive device training[A]; 
* Unexploded Ordnance Awareness[A]; 
* Survival, evasion, resistance, escape[A]; 
* Basic marksmanship, if required[D]; 
* Law of Armed Conflict[C]; 
Afghanistan Pakistan Hands: None identified; 
Army Corps of Engineers: None identified; 
Army CONUS Replacement Center: None identified; 
Air Force Expeditionary Force training: Topics duplicated by CEW 
training: 
* Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear[A]; 
* Self-aid/buddy care[A]; 
* Cultural awareness[B]; 
* Counter improvised explosive device training[A]; 
* Unexploded Ordnance Awareness[B]; 
* Survival, evasion, resistance, escape[B]; 
* Basic marksmanship, if required[D]; 
* Law of Armed Conflict[B]; 
Navy: None identified. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD regulations, guidance, and training 
curricula. 

[A] Denotes training that has hands-on or computer-based or classroom 
components. 

[B] Denotes training that is computer-based. 

[C] Denotes training that is classroom-based. 

[D] Denotes training that is hands on. 

[End of table] 

DOD organizations have independently developed training courses 
leading to some gaps and duplication in the training provided because 
the Office of the Secretary Defense for Personnel and Readiness, which 
has primary responsibility for civilian personnel policy, did not have 
a process for identifying baseline civilian predeployment training 
requirements, synchronizing service-specific training programs with 
combatant commander and other Office of the Secretary of Defense 
predeployment training requirements, and coordinating the efforts of 
key stakeholders, such as the military services and subordinate 
commands. In May 2011, we recommended that DOD improve the planning 
and coordination of language and culture training--a component of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense's counterinsurgency training. 
[Footnote 41] In addition, during our review, an official in the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
stated that training standards should be established for the 
department and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness should require the services to incorporate 
these standards into the training the services provide. 

Without a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and 
coordinating efforts to implement the requirements, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense cannot ensure that DOD is preparing its civilians 
for deployment to Afghanistan and is using training resources 
efficiently. 

Conclusions: 

The U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan and the deployment of 
civilians to Afghan provinces and districts remain crucial to U.S. 
efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide 
essential services to its people with limited international support. 
With the increased focus on deploying more U.S. civilians throughout 
Afghanistan comes the need for the U.S. Mission to be able to track 
and monitor the movement and location of its civilian staff, 
especially given the ongoing drawdown of U.S. troops and plans to 
transition lead security responsibility to the Afghan government in 
2014. We are encouraged by State and DOD's efforts to improve tracking 
of deployed civilian personnel. Additionally, as DOD has expanded its 
involvement in overseas military operations worldwide, it has grown 
increasingly reliant on its civilian workforce to provide support to 
these operations. While DOD's efforts to institutionalize the CEW are 
commendable, until DOD makes decisions regarding the size of the CEW 
and issues implementation guidance, the CEW may not be capable of 
supporting future overseas operations as well as departmentwide goals 
to strengthen and rightsize the DOD total workforce. 

Furthermore, having policies and procedures in place to help ensure 
that U.S. civilians receive necessary training before they deploy to a 
high-threat working environment such as Afghanistan can enhance their 
safety as well as their ability to accomplish the mission. While 
agencies present under Chief of Mission authority benefit from a 
centralized set of training requirements and internal controls, DOD's 
civilian training process does not have the same level of oversight or 
centralized control. Enhancing DOD's civilian training process would 
provide greater synchronization of training requirements while still 
allowing the various components to tailor their training to mission- 
specific needs. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enable DOD to make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian 
workforce, meet readiness goals for the CEW, and position itself to 
respond to future missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to take the following two actions: 

* Develop key assumptions concerning the size and composition of the 
emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based 
volunteer categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive. 

* Finalize the implementation guidance to DOD components on how to 
identify and designate the number and types of positions that 
constitute the emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and 
capability-based volunteer categories. 

To provide a consistent approach for synchronizing predeployment 
training for DOD civilians, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to take the following two actions: 

- Establish a process to identify and approve predeployment training 
requirements for all DOD civilians. 

- Establish a process to coordinate with key stakeholders such as the 
military services and subordinate commands to ensure that requirements 
are synchronized among and within DOD components and with 
departmentwide guidance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, USDA, as well 
as the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and the Treasury. DOD 
provided written comments, reprinted in their entirety in appendix II, 
and concurred with our four recommendations--characterizing them as 
supporting its current initiative to transform the CEW. Specifically, 

* DOD concurred with our recommendations to (1) develop key 
assumptions concerning the size and composition of the emergency-
essential, non- combat essential, and capability-based volunteer 
categories referred to in the 2009 CEW directive and (2) finalize the 
implementation guidance to DOD components on how to identify and 
designate the number and types of positions for these categories. DOD 
did not specify how it would implement these recommendations. 

* DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to 
identify and approve pre-deployment training requirements for all DOD 
civilians. DOD stated that through the process of identifying pre- 
deployment training requirements, DOD will establish a core set of 
training needs that are applicable under all circumstances under which 
DOD civilians may deploy. DOD also stated that it will develop policy 
that recognizes the agility necessary to prepare DOD civilians for 
unique mission requirements and conditions now and in the future. 

* DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to 
coordinate with key stakeholders such as the military services and 
subordinate commands to ensure that training requirements are 
synchronized among and within DOD components and with department-wide 
guidance. DOD stated the process it develops for identifying pre- 
deployment training requirements will account for the need to make the 
best use of resources using guiding principles and criteria from the 
Secretary of Defense and advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as needed to ensure an agile and effective contingency 
workforce. 

State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland 
Security provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into 
the report as appropriate. The Department of the Treasury noted that 
State's database had not been updated to reflect 13 total approved 
Treasury positions. Treasury further noted that two of its positions 
listed as "open" remained programmatically on hold, resulting in 11 
active slots filled. We incorporated this technical comment in our 
report. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland 
Security, and State; the U.S. Attorney General; the Administrator of 
USAID; and other interested parties. The report also is available at 
no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or 
Charles Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Addressees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations and 
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz:
Chairman:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign 
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To review the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, we obtained 
information from pertinent strategic planning, recruitment, staffing, 
and reporting documents and interviewed relevant officials from the 
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, 
Justice, State (State), and the Treasury, as well as the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). We did not examine costs for 
the deployment or support of civilian personnel in Afghanistan due to 
a concurrent review by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction on this topic, published in September 2011. 
[Footnote 42] 

To examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, 
we obtained and analyzed staffing data from State and DOD regarding 
staffing requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under 
Chief of Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander 
authority deployed in-country following the President's March 2009 
call to enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government 
institutions. Our scope was limited to U.S. direct hires and did not 
include locally engaged staff or contractors. Because, according to 
DOD officials, the majority of DOD civilians directly serve in combat 
support positions, we focused our request for staffing data on 
organizations or programs intended to enhance the capacity of the 
Afghan government, which included the Ministry of Defense Advisors and 
Afghanistan Pakistan Hands programs. We validated reports on Chief of 
Mission staffing progress through interviews with officials 
representing agencies that deployed staff to fill positions in 
Afghanistan since January 2009, including officials from Homeland 
Security, Justice, State, the Treasury, USAID, and USDA. We did not 
meet with officials from several agencies with fewer than five 
permanent staff deployed to Afghanistan, such as the Departments of 
Transportation and Health and Human Services. 

To assess the reliability of the staffing data reported by State and 
DOD for civilians in Afghanistan, we reviewed available documentation, 
examined the data for outliers and missing observations, and conducted 
follow-up interviews to discuss questions that arose in our analysis 
of the data. Additionally, for Chief of Mission data, we compared 
complementary datasets from State's Afghanistan Civilian Personnel 
Tracking System (ACPTS) and the Chief of Mission Civilian Staffing 
Matrix to identify whether any reporting discrepancies existed. We 
requested datasets from State from each database over corresponding 
time periods; our first data run compared February 10, 2011, Chief of 
Mission Civilian Staffing data with March 16, 2011, ACPTS data; our 
second data run compared June 28, 2011, Chief of Mission Civilian 
Staffing Matrix data with July 7, 2011, ACPTS data. We further met 
with State officials to identify the cause and effect of discrepancies 
that were found to exist, in order to assess whether the discrepancies 
limit the ability of U.S. agencies to evaluate their staffing 
progress. For DOD, we requested data from the Ministry of Defense 
Advisors program, the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and the 
Joint Personnel Status Report to identify DOD's civilian presence in 
Afghanistan. We also met with officials from the Ministry of Defense 
Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to discuss the data sources, internal controls, and data 
reliability related to their respective staffing data. We found State 
civilian staffing data for Afghanistan to be sufficiently reliable to 
provide an indication of the positions filled at the level of the 
agency, but State ACPTS data were not sufficiently reliable to report 
on more-detailed staffing information, such as position type. For the 
Ministry of Defense Advisors program and the Afghanistan Pakistan 
Hands program, we found that program documents supported the 
requirements and the number of filled positions that the program 
offices provided and that the data from these programs were 
sufficiently reliable to illustrate the positions filled within these 
programs. However, the extent to which DOD staffing data in the Joint 
Personnel Status Report are reliable is unknown because previous 
reports have omitted or double counted personnel. DOD officials noted 
that while errors do occur in the daily submission of Joint Personnel 
Status Report data from the combatant commands, the reports are 
accurate enough to identify trends in DOD's civilian presence over 
time, and we agree. As of late 2011, we could not fully verify the 
accuracy of the ACPTS system. However, during the course of our review 
and after several discussions with us regarding data reliability, 
State began taking steps to improve the reliability of the ACPTS 
database. 

To evaluate the implementation of DOD's Civilian Expeditionary 
Workforce (CEW) policy, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents. 
Specifically, we reviewed the DOD directive that established the 
program to understand the structure of the CEW as presented in this 
document and reviewed the 2009 DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan to identify the steps DOD had established as a road map for 
implementing the CEW directive. We also reviewed other documents such 
as DOD's Strategic Management Plan Fiscal Years 2012-2013 to determine 
how the CEW related to high-priority departmentwide programs. In 
addition, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and CEW 
program officials to further understand the current status of efforts 
to fully implement the CEW and the department's plans for the CEW of 
the future. We also interviewed U.S. Central Command officials to 
determine how the CEW was being used to satisfy its needs for 
deployable civilians in Afghanistan and officials from the Air Force, 
Army, and Navy, to determine how these agencies coordinated efforts to 
identify deployable civilians. 

To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required 
Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment, we 
reviewed predeployment training requirements established by the 
Department of State for all Chief of Mission personnel and the 
requirements set by various programs and components within the DOD. We 
did not analyze training provided by the Department of Justice or its 
components due to its specialized law-enforcement nature. For DOD 
training, we reviewed training programs for the CEW, Ministry of 
Defense Advisors program, Afghanistan Pakistan Hands program, and U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers as well as civilian training for the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy. We focused on these DOD programs because of 
their capacity-building focus. On two separate occasions, we observed 
scenario-based training administered to Chief of Mission personnel and 
the Ministry of Defense Advisors program, both held at the Muscatatuck 
Urban Training Center in Indiana. 

To assess the extent to which the agencies complied with predeployment 
training requirements for Chief of Mission personnel, we compared a 
March 2011 data run of State, USAID, and USDA personnel from State's 
ACPTS system against Foreign Service Institute training rosters for 
the three Afghanistan-specific, mandatory training courses as well as 
against a State training waiver log. We focused on State, USAID, and 
USDA personnel due to the size of their respective civilian presence, 
as well as their primacy in deploying civilians to the field. This 
analysis yielded 134 names that did not appear on the Foreign Service 
Institute rosters or in the waiver log, which we submitted to State's 
Office of Orientation and In-Processing for explanation. Additionally, 
to test Diplomatic Security's FACT Tracker, we selected a random 
sample of 65 State, USAID, and USDA names from July 2011 ACPTS 
personnel data and compared these names against data in the FACT 
Tracker. This sample was designed so that if we found that all sample 
cases received FACT or other appropriate training, we would be at 
least 95 percent confident that fewer than about 5 percent of State, 
USAID, and USDA personnel in Afghanistan during July 2011 did not 
receive FACT training. Although we note weaknesses in ACPTS's data 
reliability, we judged the database sufficiently reliable to compare 
names against training rosters, waiver logs, and the FACT Tracker. 

For DOD personnel, we compared the training curricula utilized by the 
military services, defense agencies, and the CEW to U.S. Central 
Command, U.S. Forces--Afghanistan, and Office of the Secretary of 
Defense requirements and guidance to see whether the training 
addressed the requirements. In addition, we compared the various 
training received by deploying civilians to determine if there was any 
duplication or repetition in the training provided. Because training 
record keeping within DOD is decentralized, we did not verify 
individual training records to establish whether deployed civilians 
had received the required training. We did, however, review the 
procedures that the military services and defense agencies have in 
place to ensure that deploying civilians have taken required training. 
In addition, we interviewed officials with the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, CEW training office, 
Air Force, Army, Navy, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Central 
Command to discuss the predeployment training requirements for 
deployed civilians. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to February 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

February 15, 2012: 

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

Enclosed is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-12-285, "Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen 
Management of U.S. Civilian Presence," dated February 2012 (GAO Code 
320766). We believe your thoughtful recommendations support our 
current initiative to transform the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 
Program. 

Please feel free to contact, Mr. John Moseley, our primary action 
officer for this report at (703) 696-5375 for additional information. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

P.M. Tamburrino, Jr. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary: 
Civilian Personnel Policy: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 2012: 
GAO-12-285 (GAO Code 320766): 

"Afghanistan: Improvements Needed To Strengthen Management Of U.S. 
Civilian Presence" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations And Report 
Comments: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
develop key assumptions concerning the size and composition of the 
emergency-essential, noncombat essential, and capability-based 
volunteer categories referred to in the 2009
CEW directive. 

DoD Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
finalize the implementation guidance to DOD components on how to 
identify and designate the number and types of positions that comprise 
the emergency-essential, noncombat essential, and capability-based 
volunteer categories. 

DoD Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish a process to identify and approve pre-deployment training 
requirements for all DOD civilians. 

DoD Response: Concur. Currently, DoD civilians deploy under at least 
four different circumstances: 1) to support the mission requirements 
of an individual Component, 2) to support an overarching Department of 
Defense mission, 3) to support a joint requirement driven by a 
Combatant Command, or 4) on a limited basis to support the mission of 
another Federal agency. Through the process of identifying pre-
deployment training requirements, DoD will establish a core set of 
training needs that are applicable under all circumstances along with 
policy that recognizes the agility necessary to prepare DoD civilians 
for unique mission requirements and conditions now and in the future. 

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish a process to coordinate with key stakeholders such as the 
military services and subordinate commands to ensure that requirements 
are synchronized among and within DOD components and with the 
department-wide guidance. 

DoD Response: Concur. The process will account for the need to make the
best use of resources using guiding principles and criteria from the 
Secretary of Defense and advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as needed to ensure an agile and effective contingency 
workforce. 

Comment: Reference page 31. paragraph 2. Current sources in AFCENT 
state that Air Force deployees attend only AF training. In the spirit 
and intent of this report, the Department will ensure appropriate 
training is based on the assignment and location of deployment and 
ensure the best use of pre-deployment training sources to achieve 
optimum economies of scale. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov Charles Michael 
Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contacts named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant 
Director; Kimberly Seay, Assistant Director; David Adams; Adam 
Bonnifield; Virginia Chanley; David Hancock; Mae Jones; Linda Keefer; 
Shakira O'Neil; and John Wren made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Chiefs of Mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. 
diplomatic missions and have full responsibility for the direction, 
coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch 
employees in that country, with some exceptions. The U.S. Ambassador 
to a foreign country is the Chief of Mission in that country. 

[2] Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian 
Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 23, 2009). 

[3] The U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan refers to the strategy announced 
in a March 2009 speech by the President and reiterated in a December 
2010 strategic review under the auspices of the National Security 
Council. Planning and implementation of this strategy is further 
detailed in the August 2009 U.S. Government Integrated Civilian- 
Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the February 
2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. 

[4] This training addresses threats that U.S. personnel might face in 
a number of high-threat posts abroad. 

[5] Counterinsurgency Qualification Standards and the U.S. Central 
Command Fragmentary Order 09-1700. 

[6] Executive branch agencies under Chief of Mission authority must 
obtain Chief of Mission approval before changing the size, 
composition, or mandate of their staffs and when assigning personnel 
to the mission or host country, regardless of the duration or purpose 
of the proposed position or assignment. National Security Decision 
Directive 38 governs proposals for the establishment of or changes in 
full-time, permanent, direct-hire positions. We did not gather data on 
U.S. civilians working for international organizations in Afghanistan. 

[7] Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Medical Care for 
Department of Defense and Non-Department of Defense Federal Civilians 
Injured or Wounded in Support of Contingency Operations (Washington, 
D.C.). 

[8] U.S. Forces--Afghanistan is the operational arm of DOD in 
Afghanistan responsible for all missions not covered within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization mandate. The commander of U.S. Forces-- 
Afghanistan also serves as the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization-led International Security Assistance Force. 

[9] Since 2001, the United States has worked with international 
partners under a United Nations mandate to assist Afghanistan in 
creating a safe and secure environment, in part through the 
International Security Assistance Force that oversees all coalition 
military operations in Afghanistan and is organized around six 
regional commands. U.S. forces in Afghanistan are deployed either as 
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International 
Security Assistance Force or Operation Enduring Freedom. 

[10] Examples include State "3161 hires" (see 5 U.S.C. § 3161), USAID 
Foreign Service Limited Appointments (see 22 U.S.C. § 3949), and USDA 
use of "Schedule B" hiring authority (see 5. C.F.R. § 213.3201). 

[11] This function was previously performed by U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, which DOD disestablished in August 2011. 

[12] Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian 
Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 23, 2009). 

[13] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Medical Policies for Deployed DOD 
Federal Civilians and Associated Compensation for Those Deployed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1235T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007); and DOD Civilian Personnel: Greater Oversight 
and Quality Assurance Needed to Ensure Force Health Protection and 
Surveillance for Those Deployed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1085] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 
2006). 

[14] GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide 
Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed 
Federal Civilians, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562] 
(Washington D.C.: June 26, 2009). 

[15] Some law enforcement and other personnel with specialized 
training can be waived from this course. 

[16] The U.S. Central Command is the combatant command that has 
operational authority for an area of the globe that consists of 20 
countries, including Afghanistan. 

[17] According to State officials, this matrix serves as the 
authoritative record on Chief of Mission staffing requirements and 
positions filled in Afghanistan. 

[18] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington D.C.: November 1999). 

[19] For more information on DOD's capacity-building efforts at the 
Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, see GAO, Afghanistan: 
Actions Needed to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance to 
Afghanistan Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-710] (Washington D.C.: July 20, 
2011). 

[20] DOD defines a combatant command as a unified or specified command 
with a broad continuing mission under a single commander that 
typically has geographic or functional responsibilities. Geographical 
commands include U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and 
U.S. Southern Command. Functional commands include U.S. Special 
Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation 
Command. 

[21] GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide 
Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed 
Federal Civilians, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562] 
(Washington D.C.: June 26, 2009). This report examined a number of 
issues concerning deployed civilians, including compensation and 
benefits; medical care during and following deployment; and the 
ability of agencies to track the number and location of their deployed 
civilians. 

[22] The Common Access Card is the standard identification badge for 
all DOD personnel, including military, reserve, guard, civilian, and 
contractors. The card is typically used to enter military 
installations. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562] and GAO, 
Defense Health Care: Improvements Needed in Occupational and 
Environmental Health Surveillance during Deployments to Address 
Immediate and Long-Term Health Issues, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-632] (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2005). 

[24] DOD officials noted that separate from the CEW, DOD components 
have some civilian positions designated as "emergency-essential" and 
deploy those personnel to support their specific missions. 

[25] Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian 
Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 23, 2009). 

[26] Training requirements included generic training applicable to all 
CEW selectees as well as location-specific training. 

[27] Office of the Secretary of Defense officials first indicated in 
June 2011 that this draft guidance was being coordinated, but the 
final guidance has not yet been finalized and issued. 

[28] Department of Defense, Report on the Strategic Human Capital Plan 
for Civilian Employees of the Department of Defense 2006-2010. 

[29] Department of Defense Strategic Management Plan FY 2012-2013 
(Sept. 20, 2011). 

[30] Our body of work has consistently defined a workforce gap 
analysis to include gaps in critical skills and competencies. See GAO, 
Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to 
Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-235] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 
2009); DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans 
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-753] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004); Human Capital: A Guide for 
Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal 
Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-893G] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 2003); and A Model of Strategic Human Capital 
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

[31] DOD's civilian human capital strategic plan is published by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

[32] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Competency Gap Analyses and Other 
Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Strategic Workforce Plans, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-827T] (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2011). 

[33] Examples included equivalent training courses taken, as well as 
miscellaneous approved exceptions due to inaccuracies in the March 
2011 ACPTS data, such as duplicate or misspelled names and inaccurate 
location information. Four USAID personnel did not take required 
training, three of whom deployed just as the training requirement was 
coming into effect. 

[34] For example, we recommended that Diplomatic Security develop or 
improve the process to track its individual training requirements and 
completion of training more broadly. See GAO, Diplomatic Security: 
Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges 
to Training Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-460] (Washington D.C.: June 1, 
2011). As of October 2011, Diplomatic Security was taking steps to 
improve its tracking of training through collaboration with the 
Foreign Service Institute. 

[35] In statistical terms, given that 100 percent of our sample took 
FACT or other equivalent training, we can state with 95 percent 
confidence that fewer than about 5 percent of State, USAID, and USDA 
personnel in Afghanistan during July 2011 did not receive FACT 
training. 

[36] DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and 
Its Major Components (Dec. 21, 2010) and Department of Defense 
Directive 5124.02, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness (USD (P&R)) (June 23, 2008). The Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence retains oversight and policy responsibility for DOD 
intelligence and security components. 

[37] DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and 
Its Major Components (Dec. 21, 2010). 

[38] DOD, Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the 
Department of Defense (Sept. 23, 2010). 

[39] Combat Airman Skills Training is special training provided to 
personnel who will be going into a hostile and uncertain environment. 

[40] The CONUS Replacement Center's mission is to receive and process 
individual nonunit related personnel and civilians for deployment to 
and redeployment from the theaters of operations. 

[41] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 
Coordination of Army and Marine Corps Language and Culture Training, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-456] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 26, 2011). 

[42] The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 
Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and 
Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies, Office of the 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Audit-11-17 
and Department of State Office of Inspector General AUD/SI-11-45 
(Sept. 8, 2011). 

[End of section] 

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